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GREAT BRITAIN AND THE COMING OF
THE PACIFIC WAR, 1939-1941
By Peter Lowe, B.A., Ph.D., F.R.Hist.S.
READ 1 MAY 1973
Netherlands East Indies; here the report was less decisive owing
to fundamental disagreement between the General Staff and the
Air Council on the one hand and the Admiralty on the other
hand as to whether a binding commitment to assist the Nether-
lands East Indies should be undertaken. The first sea lord and
chief of the naval staff, Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, explained on
27 July that it was impossible for the navy to accept any new
commitments unless they were guaranteed by the United States.ls
So strongly was this view held that the Admiralty was even pre-
pared to envisage the Japanese taking the Netherlands East Indies.
As will be seen later, this issue became a long drawn out and
acrimonious matter in 1941.
Meanwhile the Foreign Office had begun seriously to examine
the possibility of bringing the Sino-Japanese war to an end and
of making concessions to Japan in accordance with the change of
policy determined upon when the decision had been made to close
the Burma road. Sir John Brenan observed that the chiefs of staff,
Craigie and Lothian, plus Australia and, to a lesser extent, the
United States supported the concept of a peace settlement. Brenan
envisaged Japanese recognition of the integrity and independence
of China in return for united economic concessions by the powers;
Japan would undertake to remain neutral in the European war
and to refrain from territorial expansion in any direction. Britain
would offer generous financial assistance and a guaranteed supply
of raw materials to Japan; at the end of the Sino-Japanese war
Britain would surrender her extra-territorial rights in China, as
had been anticipated for over a decade.19 Sterndale Bennett, the
head of the Far Eastern department, minuted that Brenan had not
gone far enough: a searching appraisal was required.20R. A. Butler
reiterated his belief in the need for a settlement:
The 'complete defeat' of Japan can only be brought about by
the enlistment in the war of a first class nation. We should be
unwise to undertake the task and I doubt whether the Russians
or Americans will.
Therefore I think that we should work for as good a settle-
ment in the Far East as we can manage. We &8the Americans
have economic weapons against Japan. Under cover of these
we should attempt to secure a modification of the Konoye terms
[of November-December 1938] . ..
To be successful we must be more active with the American
18 Chiefs of staff committee conclusions,
27 July 1940, C.O.S. (40) 236,
Cab. 79/5.
19 AMemorandumby Brenan, lo
July 1940, F3586/193/61, F.O. 371/24708.
20 Minute by Sterndale Bennett, 11
July 1940, ibid.
GREAT BRITAIN AND THE COMING OF THE PACIFIC WAR 49
Govt. than hitherto. We cannot have them sniping at us in
public while privately telling us that they understand our motives.
I should like to take this line with them:- 'Your & our inter-
ests are very similar ... in the Far East let us try, under cover
of our economic weapons, to secure a fair settlement, 8cto revise
our position in China (extraterritoriality etc.). If we look like
failing then can we not count on your aid, when the Japs start
pouncing on other people's property?'21
and American possessions in the Far East and Pacific: from China
respect for Britain's particular interests and a promise of partici-
pation in the rehabilitation of China.22 The various other depart-
ments consulted were asked to inform the Foreign Office of their
conclusions.
The Dominions Office and the Ministry of Economic Warfare
expressed considerable doubt as to whether it was in Britain's
interest to help to terminate the Sino-Japanese war, thus reverting
to the attitude widely held before the Burma road crisis.23 The
most entertaining answer came from the Colonial Office, which
stressed the problems inherent in making concessions to Japan
but added that if general talks were held, it would like to secure
the extension of the lease of the New Territories in the crown
colony of Hong Kong.24 The Foreign Office gloomily concluded
that even if the skies brightened east of Singapore the prospects
for reaching an acceptable settlement were not encouraging. It
should, however, be noted that several prominent figures in public
life apparently favoured a settlement, including Lord Hankey,
the chancellor of the duchy of Lancaster, Ernest Bevin, the minister
of labour, and Sir Walter Citrine, general secretary of the T.U.C.25
Churchill was profoundly sceptical, advising Halifax to 'go very
slow on all this general and equitable peace business between
China and Japan'.26
The Foreign Office had already reached the provisional decision
to recommend reopening the Burma road when the three-month
agreement expired in October.27The effect on American opinion
was the vital aspect. When Lothian and the Australian minister,
Casey, saw Cordell Hull on 16 September, Lothian asked him what
support would be forthcoming if Britain stood up to Japan and
reopened the Burma road. Hull replied that this would depend
on the outcome of the 'Battle of Britain': if Britain held out until
22 Memorandum, 'General Settlement with
Japan', enclosed in Foreign
Office to Board of Trade, Ministry of Economic Warfare, Colonial Office,
Dominions Office, India Office, Burma Office and Petroleum Department,
lo August 1940, ibid.
23 Dominions Office to Foreign Office, 27 August 1940 and
Ministry of
Economic Warfare to Foreign Office, 2 September 1940, F41o8/193/61 F.O.
371/24709.
24 Colonial Office to
Foreign Office, 17 August 1940, F3859/193/61, F.O.
371/24709.
25 See letter from Lord
Sempill to Hankey, 3 June 1941 enclosing notes
prepared in September 1940, Hankey papers, Cab. 63/177.
26 W. S. Churchill, The Second World War, ii
(5th edition, 1955), p. 571,
Churchill to Halifax, 20 July 1940.
27 Memorandum
by Halifax, 'Reopening of the Burma Road', 2 September
1940, W.P. (40) 348, Cab. 66/11.
GREAT BRITAIN AND THE COMING OF THE PACIFIC WAR 51
1941, the United States could adopt a far stronger policy in the
Pacific. He implied that the United States would contemplate
action which 'might bring United States of America very near
to war against Japan'.28 However, he felt that this would not be
to Britain's advantage because it would entail a reduction in
supplies to her. He greatly hoped that the Burma road would be
reopened. The Foreign Office welcomed Hull's remarks and were
inclined to agree that it was not desirable that the United States
should go to war with Japan and reduce aid to Britain as a conse-
quence.29 When the war cabinet examined the position on
2 October, the prime minister 'questioned the statement that it
was not in our interests that the United States should be involved
in war in the Pacific'.30 Churchill was interested solely in the
moment when the United States would become a full ally, believing
that intervention in the Pacific would lead to participation in
the European war. The Burma road was reopened on 18 October
1940.
Between October 1940 and April 1941 a series of defence confer-
ences met in Singapore and Washington to exchange views with
the Americans and Dutch and to seek improved co-ordination
between the various forces in the Far East and Pacific. The first
conference met at Singapore in October 1940 as an all-British
gathering apart from an American observer. Its report reinforced
the pessimism of the chiefs of staff three months earlier. 'Our first
and immediate consideration must be to ensure the security of
Malaya against direct attack. The Tactical Appreciation shows
that the army and air forces in Malaya (including reinforcements
now being provided) are, both in numbers and equipment, far
below those required in view of the inadequacy of the naval forces
available. This deficiency must obviously be remedied immedi-
ately. .. .'31 Emphasis was laid on the importance of securing
effective Dutch co-operation. In the existing situation it was most
improbable that either Malaya or Singapore could be held for
other than a brief period. In their commentary on the report,
the joint planning staff endorsed a number of the detailed recom-
mendations concerning provision of new aerodromes, extension of
aid from India and the need for more discussions with Australia
and New Zealand. In general terms, however, the staff concluded,
'We consider... that the views of the commanders on the general
28 Lothian to Halifax, 16 September 1940, F429o/193/61, F.O. 371/24709.
29
Foreign Office minutes, 2-21 September 1940, ibid.
30 War cabinet conclusions, 2 October 1940, 264 (40) 4, Cab. 65/9.
31
'Report of the Singapore Defence Conference, October 1940', 31 October
1940, Cab. 80/24.
52 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY
safety. Its value as a symbol has become so great that its capture
by Japan would be a serious blow. But many severe blows can be
absorbed without leading to final disaster.'41While the Washington
talks fostered contacts and mutual appreciation, they did not lead
to the formulation of a carefully co-ordinated strategy against
Japan.
A defence conference was held at Singapore in February 1941
between the British, Dutch and Australians, followed by two
further conferences in April 1941; Americans were present as
observers or participants. It was felt in February that the Japanese
were not in a position to launch simultaneous offensives on
Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies: instead they would con-
solidate their hold on Indo-China, infiltrate Thailand and then
attack Malaya. 'If Japan is certain that the U.S.A. will intervene
to support the N.E.I. or the British Empire, the chances of war
breaking out are reduced to very small proportions.'42 In April
the statement that Japan was not in a position to attack both
Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies was qualified: it was now
considered that Japan could theoretically do so but in practice
would not owing to her preoccupation in China.43
Progress towards securing a unified response among the powers
threatened by Japan was slow, therefore. In the case of the United
States refusal to give a commitment was understandable given
the problems confronting Roosevelt. What is more surprising is
that Britain behaved in a not dissimilar way towards the Nether-
lands East Indies. Throughout 1941 an interminable debate per-
sisted between the Foreign Office, on the one hand, and the prime
minister and the chiefs of staff, on the other hand. The Foreign
Office maintained that since the Netherlands was allied with
Britain and the Netherlands East Indies was a vital area for the
defence of British interests, an undertaking of mutual support
in the event of Japanese aggression should be entered into. The
prime minister and the chiefs of staff, particularly the first sea
lord, refused to agree to a firm promise of support being given
unless the United States guaranteed support. The Netherlands
government in exile ardently desired an understanding, which
followed logically from the growing bellicosity of Japan and of the
stress on co-operation in the Singapore defence conferences in
41 Ibid.
42
'Report of the Anglo-Dutch-Australian Conference', held at Singapore,
22-25 February 1941, Cab. 80/29.
43 'Report of the American-Dutch-British Conversations', held at
Singapore,
27 April 1941 and 'Report of the British-Dutch Conversations', held at
Singapore, 27 April 1941, C.O.S. (41) 387 and 388, Cab. 80/28.
GREAT BRITAIN AND THE COMING OF THE PACIFIC WAR 55
February and April 1941. The subject was regularly raised in the
war cabinet by Anthony Eden, now foreign secretary, and post-
poned. On 21 July he told the war cabinet:
that the idea had been dropped of making a public declaration
that we should go to the help of the Dutch East Indies if they
were attacked by Japan. All that was now proposed was that
we should tell the Dutch privately that we would do so, and
would inform the United States of what we had done ...
On the merits of the case, he could not see that, if Japan
attacked the Dutch East Indies, we should not go to their aid.
He found difficulty in postponing a decision on this matter
further, as the Dutch were pressing us to ratify the conversa-
tions. The Governments of Australia and New Zealand were in
agreement with the course proposed ...44
Churchill once again disagreed:
As for a Japanese attack on Singapore, he did not believe any-
thing of the sort was contemplated. It might well be that, even
if Japan encroached on the Dutch East Indies, the right policy
would be that we should not make an immediate declaration
of war on Japan. Once war had been declared, Japanese cruisers
would attack our sea communications, and none of our shipping
would be safe unless heavily protected by convoys. At the present
moment we were not in a position to send an adequate fleet to
the Far East.45
It is remarkable that Churchill was prepared to contemplate
Japanese occupation of the Netherlands East Indies, particularly
when he himself had cogently pointed out the unacceptable
dangers of such a policy to the war cabinet a year before.46 It
was decided, as a compromise, that Eden should inform the
Netherlands minister that Britain considered that she had already
assumed the responsibility for protecting the East Indies as best
44 War cabinet conclusions, confidential annex, 21
July 1941, 72 (41) 0o,
Cab. 65/23.
45 Ibid.
46 Churchill had then observed:
'that, to his mind, the central facet of the
situation, if Japan obtained the mastery of the Netherlands East Indies, was
that she would be able to prepare strong positions facing Singapore, including
a base for her fleet. If we did not fight, she would be able to prepare these
positions in peace, and to use them against us at the moment which suited
her best.
If we made it clear that we should fight to preserve the integrity of the
Netherlands East Indies, Japan might very well decide against attack . . .'
See war cabinet conclusions, confidential annex, 29 July 1940, 214 (40) 7,
Cab. 65/14.
56 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY
Eden concurred and identified the obstacle, 'It is not only, or even
mainly the Chiefs of Staff (C.I.G.S. happens to agree with us) but
Admiralty & above all P.M. who take this view . ..50 There the
matter rested until just before the outbreak of war: an under-
taking of military support in unequivocal terms was at last con-
veyed to the Netherlands government on 5 December after Britain
had received a promise of support from the United States. It is a
revealing issue in a number of respects, not least for demonstrating
the obstinate inflexibility of Churchill and the Admiralty. It
damaged relations with the Netherlands government, alienated
officials in the East Indies and handicapped effective co-ordination
in defence. All to no purpose for, as Cadogan had once minuted,
the cynical answer to saying that little help can be given is that
there is nothing to lose by promising it therefore.51
In the final crisis of 1941 the changing relationship, whereby
the immense burden that Great Britain carried was assumed by
the United States, reached its climax. In the Far East Roosevelt