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Relations, 1938-1941
Author(s): Chihiro Hosoya
Source: Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 5, No. 2 (1968), pp. 97-115
Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/423231 .
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MISCALCULATIONS IN DETERRENT POLICY:
JAPANESE-U.S. RELATIONS, 1938-1941
By
CHIHIRO HOSOYA
Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo
NOTES
1 For books on 'revisionism' see especially Charles A. Beard, PresidentRooseveltand the Coming
of the War, 1941; Charles C. Tansill, BackDoorto War, 1952; George E. Morgenstern,Pearl
Harbor; TheStoryof the SecretWar, 1947; Robert A. Theobald, The Final Secretof PearlHarbor,1954.
2 Paul W.
Schroeder, The Axis Allianceand Japanese-American Relations, 1941, 1958.
8 Ibid, pp. 202-203.
4 Ibid, pp. 203-204.
5 For Americanpolicy towardsJapan in the period fromthe beginningof the Sino-Japanese
War to 1938, see Dorothy Borg, The United States and the Far EasternCrisis of 1933-1938, 1964.
6 The figuresindicate the percentageof Japan'stradewith the United Statesto its total inter-
nationaltradein the 1930's:
Export to Import from
the United States the United States
1931...... 37.1 27.7
1932...... 31.6 35.6
1933...... 26.5 32.4
1934 ...... 18.7 33.7
1935...... 22.4 32.8
1936 .... 22.1 30.7
1937...... 20.1 33.6
1938...... 15.8 34.4
1939 .... 17.9 34.4
113
7 State Department report titled 'Narrative of Developments Leading to the Giving of Notice
by the U.S. of an Intention to Terminate the Japanese-American Commercial Treaty of 1911'
(April 30, 1940), State DepartmentFile (National Archives, Washington, D.C.), 711. 942/627.
8 See the above report.
9 The main points of a radio speech made by Premier Konoye on November 3 to clarify the
concept of 'New Order in East Asia' were as follows: 'Japan desires to build up a stabilized Far
East by cooperating with the Chinese people who have awakened to the need of self-determination
as an Oriental race. ... History shows that Japan, Manchukuo and China are so related to each
other that they must bind themselves closely together in a common mission for the establishment
of peace and order in the Far East by displaying their own individuality. ... Japan sees the
necessity of effecting a fundamental revision in this situation and desires to establish a new peace
fabric in the Far East on the basis of justice. ... The world knows that Japan is earnestly deter-
mined to fight it out with communism. What the Comintern intends to do is bolshevisation
of the Far East and disturbance of world peace.... Japan is determined also to cooperate in the
reestablishment of world order guided by a common view of the world. What the world at present
needs badly is the establishment of peace on a fair balance of power. There is no denying the
fact that various principles in the past have forced the maintenance of the status quomarked by
an unbalanced state. That the international treaty such as the covenant of the League of Nations
has lost its prestige is fundamentally due to this irrationality.'
10 In October 1938, the Japanese forces occupied several important cities, including Hankow,
along the middle of thc Yangtze River, and Canton, the most important city in South China,
after having undertaken a large scale military offensive.
11 United States, Departmentof State, PapersRelatingto the ForeignRelationsof the United States
(hereafter abbreviated as ForeignRelations), 1938, Vol. III, 1954, pp. 406-409.
12 For example, telegram of Grew to Hull, December 1, 1939, StateDepartment File, 711. 94/1396;
ForeignRelations,1939, Vol. III, 1955, pp. 604-613.
13 State Department Report, op.cit.
14 Ibid.
15 State Department File, 71 1.942/1701/2.
16 State
Department Report, op.cit; memorandum of Sayre to Hull, May 2, 1939, Foreign
Relations,1939, Vol. III, 1955, pp. 535-537.
17 ForeignRelations,1938, Vol. III, pp. 425-427.
" William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Challenge
to Isolation,1937-1940, 1952, p. 150.
19 Ibid., p. 152.
20 Ibid., pp. 152-153.
21 In this connection Langer and Gleason remark that Roosevelt was perhaps eager to 'pay
back the snub' he had recently suffered from the Senate in regard to neutrality legislation. Ibid.,
p. 158.
22 Cordell Hull, The MemoirsofCordell Hull, Vol. I, 1948, pp. 636-639. For a summary of the
developments leading to the nullification, see Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai, Taiheiyo Senso
Gen-in Kenkyubu, TaiAeiyoSensoe nomichi,[The Roadto thePacific War]Vol. VI, 1963, pp. 301-309.
23 Report of Sayre, December 5, 1938, ForeignRelations, 1938, Vol. III, pp. 406-409.
24 Telegram of Doorman, August 4, 1939, ForeignRelations, 1939, Vol. III, p. 565.
26 Morishimu Morito, Shinjuwan,Lisbon, Tokyo [Pearl Harbor,Lisbon, Tokyo], 1950, p. 1.
16 This
plan is found in KonoyeShiryo[KonoyeDocuments.]
27 In forming his cabinet General Abe received orders from the Emperor that his 'foreign policy
cooperate with England and the U.S.'. Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai, Taiheiy5Sensde no michi,
5, 1963, pp. 161-163.
28 KonoyeDocuments.
'9 Ibid.
0 ForeignRelations, 1939, Vol. III, pp. 620-621; Ibid., Japan, 1931-1941, Vol. II, 1943, pp.
48-51.
81 Hull memorandum of December 22, 1939, ibid., 1939, Vol. III, pp. 626-627; Hull telegram
to Grew, December 27, ibid., p. 631,
289Report of Grew to Hull, December 18, 1939, ibid., p. 622.
33 Memorandum of Hornbeck, December 19, 1939, State Department File, 711.942/454.
34 Memorandum of Hornbeck, August 2, 1939, State Department File, 711.941/1302.
35 For example, Hornback memorandum to Hull, September 21, 1939, ForeignRelations,1939,
Vol. III, pp. 547-548.
38 On this problem the proposition of so-called GRIT (Graduated Reciprocation in Tension
114
Reduction) in Charles E. Osgood, An Alternativeto War or Surrender,1962 and the 'Gradualism'
approach of Amitai Etzioni, After Containment:Winningwithout War, 1964 are provocative.
37 Hull, op.cit., pp. 727-728.
38 Ibid., p. 726. For Roosevelt's reply of approval (December 14), see State DepartmentFile,
711.942/413.
39 Hull, op.cit., p. 728; Telegram of Hull to Grew, December 21, 1939, ForeignRelations,
1939, Vol. III, pp. 625-626.
40 Grew to Hull, January 18, 1940, ForeignRelations, 1940, Vol. IV, 1955, p. 627; Hull to
Grew, January 19, 1940, Hull, op.cit., p. 628; Ballantine to Hull, January 20, State Department
File, 711.942/554.
SU MMARY
This article explores an action-reaction process which occurred between Japan and the
U.S. in the years preceding World War II, focusing on the U.S.' imposition of economic
sanctions. It maintains that these sanctions failed to deter the Japanese from pursuing
their expansionist policy, and instead stimulated Japan's southward expansion and
even its determination to go to war with the U.S. Miscalculations of the deterrent policy
are ascribed to lack of understanding of the hard-line faction within the U.S. Govern-
ment as to the structure of Japan's foreign policy decision-making, and the psychology
of the Japanese, in particular the military.
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