Global Economy Journal

Volume 8, Issue 1 2008 Article 6

Social Dumping: The Debate on a Multilateral

Social Clause
Inmaculada Hurtado∗ Patricia Argerey†

∗
Universidad San Pablo CEU, Madrid, huroca@ceu.es
†
Universidad San Pablo CEU, Madrid, pargerey@ceu.es

Copyright 2008
c The Berkeley Electronic Press. All rights reserved.
Social Dumping: The Debate on a Multilateral
Social Clause∗
Inmaculada Hurtado and Patricia Argerey

Abstract

Competition between countries has rapidly increased in the current context of economic glob-
alization. Both indirect competition (through trade) and direct competition (through illegal immi-
gration) can breed social dumping, exerting downward pressure on labor conditions in developed
countries. In this paper we show the need for a social clause in order to prevent firms from illegally
obtaining a comparative advantage. The adoption of a social clause, based on agreed labour rights
by all signatories to ILO Conventions and on the compliance by multinationals, would eliminate
social dumping.

Linking labor standards and trade at the multilateral level has received a lot of criticism. Some
claim that this is just another strategy to masquerade the protectionist ambitions of developed
countries. We believe that it should be adopted at the multilateral level in order to favor an ethical
behavior in both trade and investment. This is particularly crucial for less developed countries that
have inserted themselves in the international economy.

A balanced analysis of the arguments in favor and against the adoption of a social clause reveals
that there is a patent need for an international harmonization of workers’ rights regardless of the
instruments.

KEYWORDS: social clause, social dumping, trade, comparative advantage

∗
Martha Carro Fernández has translated this article from its original in Spanish.
 Hurtado and Argerey: The Debate on a Multilateral Social Clause

1. Introduction

The relationship between international trade and labor market conditions has been
subject to analysis for some time now. Trade liberalization has resulted in short-
term production and employment redistribution at the international level. To be
sure, production and employment increase in those economies that experience the
highest productivity efficiency while decreasing in those economies with lower
productivity levels. In the long term, trade has a clear positive effect both on
employment and salary levels1.
There are three critical perils that put at risk the benefits obtained through
trade liberalization: (a) the increase in salary divergences among the countries that
have liberalized trade; (b) the increase in salary differences between skilled and
non-skilled workers; and (c) changes in labor patterns within sectors. Trade
liberalization and increased capital and labor international mobility have forced
certain firms to look for cost-reducing strategies that enable them to achieve
higher indices of international competitiveness. It is important to point out that
trade liberalization coincided, since the late 80s, with international capital flow
liberalization. While capital has not flowed as expected from rich to poor
countries, lower relative costs in developing countries has certainly attracted
international firms seeking to become more competitive at the international level.
Resource seeking investment and its impact on the labor market is one crucial
aspect of our investigation. This type of horizontal investment can encourage
firms to consider low labor standards as a location factor that improves the firm
comparative advantage. On the other hand, developing countries seek to attract
this type of investment either as a financing source or as tool to increase their
export competitiveness vis-à-vis other developing economies. There are,
therefore, changes to the traditional international economic scenario. Developed
countries are witnessing how their relative dominance over international trade is
being threatened by several developing countries, such as China and India.
This article is structured in three sections. We first analyze the current state of
the issue by exploring whether industrialized countries are extracting an
illegitimate comparative advantage through relatively lower labor standards,
therefore incurring in social dumping, or whether such standards are linked to a
given development level. Secondly, we define social dumping and social clause
and explain the options available to regulate, at the multilateral and regional level,
international trade and labor rights. Finally, we analyze the main arguments in
favor and against the implementation of a multilateral social clause as a tool to
improve international trade.

1
Some of the most recent studies on trade and labour are Harvey, et. al. (2007); Jansen and
Lee (2007); and Dehesa (2007).

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 Global Economy Journal, Vol. 8 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 6

2. The state of affairs: is there really an unlawful comparative advantage?

International trade has traditionally been explored through a geographic approach

that sets the North and the South at odds. From this perspective, the North
includes countries with a high development level and a productive system based
on services. The South comprises economies relatively less developed that exhibit
lower levels of income per capita and a sectoral distribution biased towards
industrial and agricultural production. The insertion of several emerging markets
into the international economic scenario has abruptly changed the aforementioned
geographical patterns. Deep economic and political changes in Eastern Europe,
market-oriented reforms and trade and investment liberalization in China and to a
certain extent in India, and integration processes in Latin America have changed
trade and investment blueprints.
The burst of emerging economies, mainly China and India, as new areas of
both consumption and investment, has profoundly altered the so-called North-
South relation. Labor-intensive products - more vulnerable to international
competition- are exerting downward pressure on prices and salaries among
developing industrialized countries resulting in South-South competition2.
Several economies have designed strategies to attract foreign investment and to
increase their exports that result in a race to the bottom. Countries such as
Malaysia and Mexico have progressively dismantled labor standards seeking to
attract labor-intensive multinational firms.
Thus, the question is whether the increase in developing countries
competitiveness is the result of low real labor costs or, on the other hand, is
created by the pressure exerted through social dumping. Politicians and scholars
from developed economies argue that low labor standards that keep labor costs at
their minimum3 create unfair competition in international markets. This situation
will result in social dumping defined as a developed country firm’s decision to
supply its domestic market through production located in a developing economy
where labor standards do not comply with the minimum requirements adopted by
the home-country therefore allowing the firm to enjoy lower production costs4.
Social dumping can be oriented towards the reduction of labor costs on the
production of exportable goods by a firm from a less developed country or to the
attraction of foreign capital that considers low production costs as a location
factor.
The unfair competition strategy adopted by several developing countries
should not be confused with structural socio-economic factors that result in a

2
Chan and Ross (2003).
3
Other labor conditions that do not affect labor costs are kept at a minimum level.
4
Cordella and Grilo (1998).

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 Hurtado and Argerey: The Debate on a Multilateral Social Clause

comparative advantage5. To be sure, payment to labor depends, among other

factors, on the conditions of the labor market, productivity, regulatory standards,
and even on ways and customs. Hence, labor standards are explained by the
economy’s level of development while low salaries reflect small productivity
levels associated with a lack of technology6.
Following the marginal productivity theory, each factor of production is paid
according to its marginal productivity and therefore certain developing countries
will not be incurring in illegal comparative advantage. However, we should not
forget that there are countries that deliberately seek to create comparative
advantages through the dismantling of internationally recognized labor standards7.
In this sense, the International Labor Organization (ILO)8 adopted, in 1998, the
Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work committing
governments, workers, and employers organizations to abide by basic
international labor standards. These standards include the freedom of association,
the right to organize and collective bargaining, the abolition of forced labor and
exploitation of children, and the eradication of labor discrimination. This
Declaration constitutes the most ambitious international step in the defense of
basic labor rights. From the perspective of foreign direct investment, social
dumping is related to the international firms’ decision to locate production across
international borders in order to increase competitiveness through low labor
standards. According to Bhagwati (2001), the argument that firms exert
downward pressure on labor standards by threatening to locate production in
developing countries has become a dogmatic belief. However, production
relocation is not self-evident. Even within the textile industry sector, that has
experienced relocation to developing countries, factories are still located in

5
Golub (1997).
6
Lim (2007).
7
Malaysia, for example, has enacted legal restrictions to the workers’ right of association in
the electronics sector where the country enjoys a strong comparative advantage.
8
ILO is a United Nations agency that seeks to promote labor rights, encourage decent
employment opportunities, enhance social protection and strengthen dialogue in handling work-
related issues. (ILO, 2007). The organization organizes periodical international summits, reviews
the labor rights policies of its members, it issues recommendations and encourages the signing of
international conventions. However, the ILO does not enjoy enforcement capabilities. The
International Labour Organization (ILO) is devoted to reducing poverty , achieving fair
globalization and advancing opportunities to obtain decent and productive work in conditions of
freedom, equity, security and human dignity. As a tripartite organization the ILO works with
governments, employers and workers' organizations. Through the engagement and commitment of
its tripartite constituents, the ILO plays a major role in facilitating the integration of the Decent
Work Agenda into strategies for poverty reduction and a fair globalization.

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 Global Economy Journal, Vol. 8 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 6

developed countries revealing the influence of new domestic factors as well as the
dependence on migrant workers9.
We believe that in facing social dumping it is necessary to adopt a social
clause as a multilateral mechanism that prevents certain firms from taking
advantage of relatively lax labor regulations and from the violation of labor
standards commonly accepted by the vast majority of WTO countries.
On the other hand, the introduction of a social clause in international trade
agreements, both South-South and North-South, has been put forward to avoid
unfair competition through labor standards violations. The social clause option is
especially relevant given the sharp increase in the number of trade and integration
agreements signed in the last two decades. Such increase is even more poignant in
the case of developed and transition economies.
Recently, several regional integration agreements signed by Latin American
countries include the protection of basic labor rights. Among these agreements,
we cite the 1994 North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC)
linked to NAFTA, the 1997 Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement, the 2002
Canada-Costa Rica Free Trade Agreement and the Dominican Republic-Central
America-United States Free Trade Agreement; and the recent Trade and
Investment Framework Agreement between the Eastern Republic of Uruguay and
the United States of America (January 2007).
Graph 1 shows the percentage of trade agreements signed between developed
countries (DC), less developed countries (LDC) and transition economies (TC)
vis-à-vis total trade agreements according to WTO data. As it is clear from graph,
more than 25% of trade agreements signed by 2005 involve countries with
different degrees of economic development (North-South). Moreover, more than
20% of the total corresponds to agreements between LDCs. These figures show
that almost half the agreements are susceptible of social dumping practices
suggesting the need for the adoption of a social clause at a regional level.

9
Within Europe, unemployment and migration (the so-called polish plumber) together with
the influence of mass media have revealed working conditions in sweatshops located in
developing countries. This, in turn, has resulted in increased awareness on social dumping among
trade unions, public opinion and politicians.

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 Hurtado and Argerey: The Debate on a Multilateral Social Clause

Graph 1. Regional Trade Agreements Distribution by Country Groups (2005).

DC-DC DC-LDC DC-TC LDC-LDC LDC-TC TC-TC

13%
29%

26%
5%

21% 6%

Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on WTO data updated up to February 2005. DC:
developed countries; LDC: developing and less developed countries; and TC: transition
economies.

3. The social clause: a problem or the solution?

The debate over the protection of basic human rights has drastically changed in
the last twenty years. While the first insights on the relationship between labor
standards and international trade dates from the mid-XIX century10, the debate
was energized during the GATT’s Uruguay Round.
The arguments have experienced a sharp change since the conclusion of the
Uruguay Round. The reason for this change has already been advanced. The
tradable goods that are more susceptible to international competition encourage
more competition between South-South than among North-South economies. Low
wages and labor standards conveyed through international trade to developing
countries are no longer a threat to their living standards. In turn, migratory flows
become a key analytical variable. To be sure, foreign labor force could replace
the domestic one, especially in the informal sector where hiring of immigrants is
critical and does not generally comply with labor standards and/or public health
and safety regulations.
10
Sengerberger (1991).

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 Global Economy Journal, Vol. 8 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 6

Based on the previous arguments, it is necessary to link international trade

and labor standards. There is no clear answer, however, as to how to establish the
connection. Our proposal is the social clause. The social clause is based on the
attachment of certain basic labor standards (see Tables 2 and 3 of the Annex) to
international trade agreements or to international trade rules. The main goal is to
remedy the lack of labor rights protection or its enforcement in the export
industries of many developing countries.
Bhagwati highlights that there are two different arguments that justify linking
trade to labor. Such arguments are founded on two opposing values: selfishness
and altruism.
The selfish approach refers to the threat that developed countries perceive
from the unfair competition carried out by developing countries through low real
salaries and the reduction in labor standards. As we advanced, the line between
comparative advantage and unfair competition is a blurry one.
The fear to competition through real salaries is not new and, to a certain
extent, is rational. To be sure, downward salary pressure could be indirect (free
trade could force unskilled workers’ salaries down) or direct (immigrants could
compete with domestic labor in specific sectors). Outsourcing of production
would also exert downward pressure on real salaries.
According to this interpretation, the price of labor-intensive products will
experience a relative decrease via international trade. The basic tenant of this
approach is that developing countries will specialize exclusively in the production
of these types of products. However, certain developing countries have also
specialized in capital-intensive exports that require skilled workers and
technological knowledge. We can conclude, therefore, that free trade between
developed and developing countries is not the principal cause of downward
pressure on real salaries in developed countries. As a matter of fact, the decrease
in unskilled labor demand slows down the salary reduction resulting from
technological change.
Some authors maintain that the social clause is susceptible to be interpreted as
a protectionist tool. An increase in competition can encourage protectionism
either via traditional instruments or reducing imports by increasing competitors’
production costs. The later causes a reduction in competitors’ competitiveness and
it is generally know as “export protectionism”. This argument has been put
forward by those who oppose an international harmonization of labor standards.
We believe that such protectionist risks disappear if the social clause is
multilateral and implemented by a supranational institution such as the ILO and
the WTO. Nowadays, however, the system in practice is arbitrary and countries

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 Hurtado and Argerey: The Debate on a Multilateral Social Clause

unilaterally decide to punish or reward trade relations with foreign countries

(GSP11) based on factors such as labor standards.
The altruistic approach rests on a worldwide extension of the labor standards
currently in place in developed countries. Such standards guarantee the highest
levels of workers’ rights protection.
Labor standards were, without a doubt, adopted as minimum requirements
that would improve working conditions. It was believed that adopting a minimum
set of labor standards would enhance social welfare, expand human capital and
propel economic development. Furthermore, enforcing such standards would
create homogenous rules for international trade prohibiting acts of unfair
competition and illegitimate comparative advantage. Under this framework,
salary levels would be determined by productivity. That is, salary levels would
reflect workers’ skills and capital and technology allocation and would not be
affected by working conditions, child labor, and labor discrimination.
We believe that the adoption of a social clause could be implemented by three
different channels or by the combination of some of them:
• Imposing trade sanctions on countries that practice unfair competition via
low labor standards. This would require an international harmonization of
labor standards and an assessment of their implementation through the
analysis of workers’ well-being.
• Regulating at the regional or, even better, at the multilateral level and by
consensus the effective adoption and implementation of labor standards.
Under this approach, ILO Conventions that refer to the link between
international trade and labor rights and that have been almost unanimously
ratified should be subject to enforcement. The regulation of fair trade has
been put forward as a complement to this proposal.
• Adopting self-regulation policies by those economies that host or control
multinational firms so they comply with the same labor standards both at the

11
The purpose of the generalised system of preferences (GSP) is to assist developing
countries to reduce poverty by using tariff preferences to help them obtain international trade
revenue. The GSP applied by the European Union since January of 2006 includes three different
schemes: the general scheme, the scheme of incentive to sustainable development and good
governance gobierno (GSP+) and the Everything But Arms initiative. The GSP+ replaces the
former drugg production and trafficking scheme and the environmental and social incentives
regime. The products included in this framework are almost all industrial products and a relevant
group of agricultural and fishery products that become tariff-free. The GSP+ is granted to
countries considered as vulnerable that, among other requisites, ratify and effectively apply 16 UN
and ILO human rights and labor standards conventions. The scheme retains the right to temporaly
suspend the preferences granted to countries that incurre in severe and systematic violations of
human rights and labor standards and/or unfair trade. See CE Council Regulation nº 980/2005
(June 27, 2005) relative to the application of a generalized system of preferences, DOUE L 169/1
(June 30, de 2005).

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 Global Economy Journal, Vol. 8 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 6

home and the host economy. Self-regulation implies the adoption of

transparent rules and procedures at the public and private levels, the
obligation to comply with agreements, and the duty to sanction or expel
from the market the firms that do not comply with the rules.
There are two controversial aspects inherent to the social clause definition: (a)
whether it should include salary regulations, and (b) whether it should include
sanctions for violations of internationally recognized labor standards.
What follows is a compilation of arguments in favor of and against the
implementation of a social clause. The arguments have been classified as
economic and non-economic.

Table 1. Arguments in favor and against the Social Clause

In Favor Against
ECONOMIC MOTIVATIONS
Race to the bottom
• Competition between developing • While labor costs constitute a
countries to attract foreign capital relevant location factor for
encourages a negative race to the multinational firms, host countries
bottom. The lack of a device that should not feel compelled to violate
sets international standards for the their own labor standards in order to
protection of labor rights favors the attract foreign direct investment.
race to the bottom. Ignoring labor standards is,
sometimes, a domestic policy tool
unrelated to the objective of
international competitiveness and the
attraction of foreign direct
investment.
• Some studies have demonstrated that
there are countries that have
successfully designed export
strategies without resorting to the
reduction of labor standards.
Economic growth in South East Asia,
for example, is a result of the increase
in productivity achieved by
investment in education and the
reorientation of labor-intensive
sectors to the production of
technology-intensive goods.

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 Hurtado and Argerey: The Debate on a Multilateral Social Clause

Table 1. Arguments in favor and against the Social Clause

In Favor Against
Salary Level Problems in Developing Countries
• The adoption of basic labor • When salary levels reflect
standards can alleviate certain productivity, lack of qualification and
problems inherent to the labor technology gaps prevent firms from
markets of developing countries. increasing salary levels. There would
The excess of labor supply exerts not be social dumping and no need
downward pressure on salary levels, for a social clause.
sometimes even below the
equilibrium point. Trade unions are
incapable of facing this problem
and it is, therefore, critical to
maintain minimum labor rights
such as collective bargaining.
Government Measures
• Greater international capital • Free trade and open markets are sine
mobility coupled with international qua non conditions for economic
trade, the enhancement of efficiency and social prosperity. In
regulations, and the relative this sense, the market is a self-
immobility of the labor factor call regulating mechanism and labor
for government actions that include rights protection is unnecessary.
labor standards as part of • States are reluctant to grant
international trade agreements. sovereignty, especially in social
• Tariffs have been replaced by policies, to an international
differences in competition policies government body. Even when the
among countries. Given the international economy is increasingly
distortions inherent to such globalized there is no global
differences, labor standards should governance and states jealously keep
be regulated. their competences in socio-political
issues.
Multilateral Actions
• The social clause is, according to its • The adoption of a social clause could
detractors, a hidden protectionist encourage protectionist measures:
device. Competition in certain ¹ Blaming cheap labor for the loss
productive sectors takes place of employment opportunities in
between developing countries. developed countries can encourage
• The adoption of a multilateral social a popular cry for protectionism
clause constitutes an improvement. similar to the movements against
Both the European Union and the immigration.
United States apply a unilateral ¹ The increase in unemployment in

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 Global Economy Journal, Vol. 8 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 6

Table 1. Arguments in favor and against the Social Clause

In Favor Against
system that could conceal developed countries generates
protectionist practices threatening, incentives for protectionist
therefore, the international trade measures on the imports of goods
system (positive conditionality produced under unfair
through the GPS). competition.
Sanctions
• The adoption of sanctions is the • The adoption of sanctions could
only mechanism available to result in an indiscriminate use of the
enforce compliance with a system. Sanctions could be used as a
minimum set of basic labor goal in itself instead of an
standards. A multilateral sanction enforcement mechanism.
system that is the result of agreed
procedure is preferable to unilateral
and opaque reprisals. Conditionality
should not be applied, however, to
development cooperation devices.
NON-ECONOMIC MOTIVATIONS
Human Rights
• Complying with minimum labor • There is no universal agreement on
standards is advisable for every what constitutes basic labor
country regardless of its political standards. Moreover, there is no
and economic conditions. international organization that enjoys
the authority needed to guarantee the
compliance with labor rights.
• There are questions as to whether
freedom of association and the right
to collective bargaining constitute
basic labor rights.
Non- Discrimination
• Policies of non-discrimination are • Several countries are limited by
crucial to guarantee that an increase cultural, legal, and religious
in minorities’ participation rate principles that not allow for equal
adds to output and efficiency opportunities. The adoption of
growth. common standards could create a
conflict with domestic customs.
Child Labor
• Suppression of all child exploitation • Even if child exploitation is
is a guarantee for the future human prohibited, avoiding child labor can
capital of any country. While an only be achieved by government

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 Hurtado and Argerey: The Debate on a Multilateral Social Clause

Table 1. Arguments in favor and against the Social Clause

In Favor Against
educated society is a long-term actions that ensure access to
investment, it is key for economic education.
development.
Authoritarian Regimes
• In some countries, denying workers • It is difficult to reach a compromise
their labor rights is a crucial feature on political change with authoritarian
of the political system. Trade governments. It would also be
unions can become a key opposition complicated that these types of
source in authoritarian regimes. regimes would adopt a multilateral
social clause.

4. Conclusions

Although the debate about the need for a social clause has been in stand-by mode
for several years, academics and politicians should not be alarmed by the
reluctance of some developing countries to link basic labor standards to
international trade. Moreover, the debate over the issue cannot cloud the pressing
need for the international protection of human rights. It is necessary to engage in
the conception of a transparent multilateral device, such as the social clause, that
compels countries to comply with the basic labor standards contained in the ILO
Declaration (See table 2 in the annex).
Social policy is currently leading many crucial integration processes at the
regional level. The disregard for the social clause could even result in the
dismantling of the open character of regional integration negotiations. From the
perspective of bilateral trade agreements it seems unreasonable not to include a
social clause; first because North-South agreements cannot seek to obtain
illegitimate comparative advantages and secondly because South-South
agreements cannot carry out a race to the bottom.
It is not suitable to blend economic matters, such as the minimum salary and
working conditions, with moral aspects such as individual freedoms. A social
clause must not include wage regulations. While the social clause should embrace
workers’ rights to trade union representation and guarantee collective bargaining,
it should not establish an international minimum salary.
Moreover, any social clause scheme must impose sanctions on the violation of
internationally agreed labor standards. The sanction system could be designed
along the lines of the principle of negative conditionality. Examples include the
barring from agreements that grant preferential trade status such as the GSP used
by the European Union and the United States or the Most Favored Nation Clause;

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 Global Economy Journal, Vol. 8 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 6

the adoption of quotas or any other quantitative trade barriers, and; the enacting of
full restrictions on imports of specific products manufactured by the non-
compliant countries.
The social clause should exclusively include labor regulations that comply
with universally agreed principles. It is, therefore, crucial that it is based on the
existence of a multilateral consensus on the aspects to be included, that is, on the
basic labor standards. Currently, there are eight basic labor standards agreed
within the framework of the ILO Collective Labor Conventions (table 2 in the
annex). There are four additional principles that are considered as institutional
priorities (table 3 in the annex).
Finally, we also need to take into account the role to the played by the
multilateral institutions. We believe that adopting the social clause within the
framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO) could be interpreted as a
trespassing of the institution’s purpose. However, the WTO is responsible for the
cooperation with the rest of international organizations and could create a new
pillar within their organizational chart oriented towards the cooperation with the
ILO. Such inter-institutional body should (a) analyze and monitor the multilateral
compliance with a minimum degree of workers’ rights and the evolution of trade
agreements that include a social clause and (b) become responsible, as a dispute
resolution system, for all the international aspects of the trade-labor relationship.
As a matter of fact, given that the ILO Conventions do not seek to impose an
inflexible harmonization of labor standards, the aforementioned mechanism could
be interpreted as a review of ILO’s responsibilities enhancing its role.
To sum up, the adoption of a social clause refers to the inclusion of legal
provisions that prohibit labor exploitation in both, international and regional trade.
This mechanism would also enable multilateral institutions, such as the WTO and
the ILO, to act as dispute settlement organizations by adopting retaliatory
measures against those countries that do not comply with a set of minimum
agreed labor standards when producing and exporting certain goods and services.

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 Hurtado and Argerey: The Debate on a Multilateral Social Clause

Annex

Table 2. Core Labor Standards

Enter into Nº of
CONVENTION
force date ratifications
C. 87
I. Freedom to trade union Freedom of Association and Protection of 7-4-1950 147
representation, collective the Right to Organize Convention, 1948
bargaining and labor C. 98
relations Right to Organize and Collective 7-18-1951 156
Bargaining Convention, 1949
C. 105 Abolition of Forced Labor
1-17-1959 167
II. Forced Labor Convention, 1957
C. 29
5-1-1932 171
Forced labor Convention, 1930
III. Child labor elimination C. 138 Minimum Age Convention, 1973 6-19-1976 147
and child and adolescent C. 182
protection Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention, 11-19-2000 163
1999
IV. Equality of C. 100 5-23-1953 163
opportunities and Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951
treatment at work C. 111 Discrimination (Employment and
6-15-1960 165
Occupation) Convention, 1958
Source: Author’s own elaboration, updated through March, 2007

Table 3. Priority Conventions for Institutions and Labor Policy

CONVENTION Num. of
Adoption Date
Ratifications
C. 11
Right of Association (Agriculture) Convention, 1921
12-11-1921 121
C. 135
Workers' Representatives Convention, 1971
23-6-1971 79
C. 141
23-6-1975 40
Rural Workers' Organizations Convention, 1975
C. 154
Collective Bargaining Convention, 1981
19-6-1981 38
Source: Authors’ own elaboration, updated through March, 2007.

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