CRM

Manual No.
: JCI-13
Jade Cargo International Co. Ltd.
Crew Resource Management

MANUAL
(January 2008)
Revision Status: Original
Approved By Flight Crew Training Section
Acknowledgement and credit for most of the content of this manual is hereby given to
Emirates and SAA
Page: TOC-1
CRM Manual Date: January 2008
Table of Contents
1 CRM Training................................................................................................... 4
1.1 Introduction............................................................................................. 4
1.2 Courses...................................................................................................4
1.2.1 CRM Introduction Course.............................................................. 4
1.2.2 CRM Indoctrination Course........................................................... 4
1.2.3 CRM Update Course..................................................................... 4
1.2.4 CRM Recurrent Training................................................................5
1.2.5 CRM Upgrade Training..................................................................5
1.2.6 CRM Transition CRM.................................................................... 5
2 Modules Content.............................................................................................. 5
2.1 Threat and Error Management............................................................... 5
2.2 Culture.................................................................................................... 5
2.3 Automation.............................................................................................. 5
2.4 Leadership, Followership & Team Dynamics......................................... 6
2.5 Communication (Communication Styles & Conflict Resolution)............. 6
2.6 Problem-Solving & Decision Making.......................................................6
2.7 Cognition................................................................................................. 6
2.8 Stress & Alertness Management............................................................ 6
2.9 Situational Awareness............................................................................ 6
3 Threat and Error Management.........................................................................7
3.1 Introduction............................................................................................. 7
3.2 CRM Training in Aviation........................................................................ 7
3.3 Human Performance...............................................................................7
3.4 Evolution of CRM.................................................................................... 8
3.5 Human Error........................................................................................... 8
3.6 Human Factors In Design....................................................................... 8
3.7 The Error Chain...................................................................................... 9
3.8 Swiss Cheese......................................................................................... 9
3.9 Threat and Error Management............................................................. 10
3.10 Threat and Error..................................................................................10
3.11 Warning Flags.....................................................................................11
3.12 Avoid, Trap, Mitigate........................................................................... 11
4 Culture............................................................................................................12
4.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 12
4.2 National Culture.................................................................................... 12
4.3 Individualism/Collectivism (IDV)........................................................... 12
4.4 Effects on Crew Behaviors................................................................... 12
4.5 Uncertainty Avoidance (UA)................................................................. 13
4.6 Power Distance (PDI)........................................................................... 13
4.7 Organizational and Professional Culture.............................................. 14
5 Automation..................................................................................................... 14
5.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 14
5.2 Flight Deck Automation.........................................................................14
5.3 What to Automate................................................................................. 15
5.4 Fitts’ List................................................................................................ 16
5.5 The Automation Pyramid...................................................................... 17
5.6 The Irony of Automation....................................................................... 18
Page: TOC-3
5.7 The Automation Issue........................................................................... 18

5.8 Interfaces.............................................................................................. 18
5.9 Feedback.............................................................................................. 19
5.10 From an Aircraft Manufacturer............................................................ 19
5.11 Ergonomic Design Principles.............................................................. 19
5.12 Conclusion.......................................................................................... 20
6 Leadership and Team Dynamics................................................................... 20
6.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 20
6.2 Leadership............................................................................................ 20
6.3 Leadership Theory................................................................................ 21
6.4 Action-Centred Leadership................................................................... 21
6.5 Task...................................................................................................... 22
6.6 Team Building and Maintenance.......................................................... 22
6.7 Individual Development and Satisfaction.............................................. 22
6.8 The Role of Leader............................................................................... 22
6.8.1 Regulating Information Flow........................................................ 22
6.8.2 Directing and Coordinating Crew Activities................................. 23
6.8.3 Motivating Crew Members........................................................... 23
6.8.4 Leadership Styles........................................................................ 23
6.9 Cockpit Authority Gradient.................................................................... 25
6.10 Followership........................................................................................25
6.11 Team Dynamics.................................................................................. 26
7 Communication.............................................................................................. 27
7.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 27
7.2 Principles of Communication................................................................ 27
7.3 Communication Barriers....................................................................... 27
7.4 Communication Styles.......................................................................... 28
7.4.1 Assertive Behavior [a1]................................................................28
7.4.2 Aggressive Behavior [a2].............................................................29
7.4.3 Supportive Behavior [s1]............................................................. 29
7.4.4 Submissive Behavior [s2]............................................................ 29
7.5 Dealing with Aggression....................................................................... 30
7.6 Conflict Resolution................................................................................ 31
7.7 Problem Solving....................................................................................31
7.8 Compromising....................................................................................... 31
8 Problem Solving and Decision Making.......................................................... 32
8.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 32
8.2 Structured Decision Making.................................................................. 32
8.2.1 The Model “Footprint”.................................................................. 33
8.2.2 Providing “Seamless Integration”................................................ 33
8.3 A Problem-Solving Model..................................................................... 34
8.4 Time Management................................................................................ 35
8.5 The Jade Cargo International Decision-Making Model.........................36
8.6 Assess.................................................................................................. 37
8.7 Action.................................................................................................... 37
8.8 Manage................................................................................................. 37
9 Cognition........................................................................................................ 38
9.1 Introduction........................................................................................... 38
9.2 Models.................................................................................................. 38
Flight Crew Training Centre
Page: TOC-3
9.3 A Model of the Cognitive Brain............................................................. 38

9.4 Input functions.......................................................................................39
9.4.1 Senses.........................................................................................39
9.4.2 Attention.......................................................................................39
9.4.3 Divided Attention......................................................................... 39
9.5 Perception............................................................................................. 39
9.6 Processing Functions........................................................................... 40
9.6.1 Memory........................................................................................40
9.6.2 Sensory Memory......................................................................... 40
9.6.3 Short-Term Memory.................................................................... 40
9.6.4 Long-Term Memory..................................................................... 41
9.6.5 Flashbulb Memory....................................................................... 41
9.6.6 Central Processor/Decision-Maker.............................................. 42
9.6.7 Problems with Decision Making...................................................42
9.7 Conclusion............................................................................................ 43
10 Stress and Alertness.................................................................................... 43
10.1 Introduction......................................................................................... 43
10.2 Stress.................................................................................................. 44
10.3 Types of Stress................................................................................... 44
10.3.1 Acute Stress.............................................................................. 44
10.3.2 Episodic Acute Stress................................................................45
10.3.3 Chronic Stress........................................................................... 46
10.3.4 Sources of Stress...................................................................... 46
10.3.5 Life Stress..................................................................................46
10.3.6 Environmental Stress................................................................ 47
10.3.7 Cognitive Stress........................................................................ 47
10.4 Alertness............................................................................................. 48
10.5 Sleep Management.............................................................................48
10.6 Circadian Rhythms..............................................................................49
10.7 Stress and Alertness Management.....................................................50
10.8 Controlled Rest in the Flight Deck...................................................... 50
11 Situational Awareness..................................................................................50
11.1 Introduction......................................................................................... 50
11.2 Levels of Situation Awareness (SA)................................................... 50
11.3 Loss of Situational Awareness............................................................51
11.4 The Safety Window.............................................................................52
11.5 Situational Awareness and Error Management.................................. 53
11.6 Factors Affecting Situational Awareness............................................ 53
11.7 Communication and Shared Situational Awareness.......................... 53
11.8 Techniques for Better Situational Awareness Management...............54
12 Reference Notes.......................................................................................... 55

Page: 4
1 CRM Training
1.1 Introduction
CRM training will be provided to all Jade Cargo International pilots in
accordance with the policy contained within the Flight Operations Manual.
CRM training provided to Jade Cargo International pilots is based on the
requirements of the Chinese Civil Aviation Regulations (CAAC) and also meets
the requirements of other regulatory bodies.
1.2 Courses
1.2.1 CRM Introduction Course

The Jade Cargo International CRM Introduction Course is a “CAAC” approved
course conducted by Jade Cargo International staff. The course is not
assessable.
The Initial Course will be applied to all new pilots upon entry to Jade Cargo
International. It is designed to introduce pilots who have received prior Human
Performance training with other airlines to the concepts in use at Jade Cargo
International. The required time is prior to transition training. It is designed to
be complementary to the Transition Course (see below). The duration of the
course is one day.
1.2.2 CRM Indoctrination Course

The Jade Cargo International CRM Indoctrination Course is a “CAAC”
approved course conducted by Jade Cargo International staff. The course is
not assessable.
Most pilots joining Jade Cargo International will have completed Human
Performance training as part of their license requirements; however CRM is
viewed as specific to the airline. Therefore, the purpose of this course is to
deliver Jade Cargo International perspective on CRM, expanding on the
introductory course that has already been completed. The duration of the
course is two days and is designed to be applied in isolation. The award of a
Certificate of Completion and registration with Crew Records signifies
successful completion of a course.
1.2.3 CRM Update Course

Jade Cargo International designates a three-year training cycle for CRM. This
cycle is deemed to begin when a pilot completes his transition training with
Jade Cargo International. To revalidate a pilot’s CRM training at the end of the
cycle, a one day update course is conducted.

Page: 5
1.2.4 CRM Recurrent Training

Jade Cargo International pilots receive a recurrent CRM component as part of
the recurrent training package approved by the (CAAC). The content of this
CRM component is designed by the Head of Training in co-ordination with the
CRM Instructor.
1.2.5 CRM Upgrade Training

Jade Cargo International requires all candidates for Command training to
receive an intensive CRM course. The course consists of a review of decision-
making, leadership and team management, and a series of role-plays. The
role-plays are designed to allow upgrade candidates to use the decision-
making tools, and team management skills. They will be conducted in a cockpit
environment and videotaped where appropriate for debriefing purposes.
The candidates will conduct their own debrief, assisted by the facilitator. This
has proven to be a powerful tool to reinforce the learning process.
1.2.6 CRM Transition CRM

Jade Cargo International includes a CRM component in all type transition
courses. This will be delivered during the ground school phase. The course is
tailored to suit the specific requirements of each aircraft type.
2 Modules Content
2.1 Threat and Error Management
 Nature of human performance & error
 A model of human error
 Threat and error defined
 Latent threats
 Defenses
 Managing error
2.2 Culture
 The characteristics of National culture
 Influence of Professional & Organizational culture
 Defenses against multi-cultural threats
 Safety culture within Jade Cargo International
2.3 Automation
 Impact of automation
 Appropriate use of automation
Page: 6
 Reference accidents with automation issues
2.4 Leadership, Followership & Team Dynamics

 Command authority
 Leadership styles
 Team effectiveness
 Reference accidents with leadership issues
2.5 Communication (Communication Styles & Conflict

Resolution)
 Model for effective communication
 Source of Conflict
 Communication role-play
 Reference accidents with communication issues
2.6 Problem-Solving & Decision Making

 Problem identification
 Time management
 Company decision-making tool
 Reference accidents with decision-making issues
2.7 Cognition
 Overview of cognitive functions
 Perception
 Senses
 Memory
 Limitations
2.8 Stress & Alertness Management

 Types and sources of stress
 Fatigue & sleep management
 Jade Cargo International policy and procedures
2.9 Situational Awareness

 Types of situational awareness
 Skills affecting individual situational awareness
 Loss of situational awareness
 Reference accidents with situational awareness issues

Page: 7
3 Threat and Error Management

3.1 Introduction
Investigation of commercial airline accidents has identified that a significant
proportion of these are due in some way to a human element. Despite
improvements in technology, design and engine reliability, Human Factors still
have a critical influence on the accident rate.
Regulators and industry have sought to reduce the human effect by the
introduction of non-technical training to address the human issues. Regulators
require knowledge of Human Performance and Limitations (HPL) for license
issue, completion of a Multi-Crew Co-ordination (MCC) course prior to airline
employment and for an airline to run an approved Crew Resource
Management (CRM) program for all phases of training.
Threat and error management is at the core of current CRM practice. This is
due, in part, because it encompasses all other areas of the discipline. The safe
and efficient management of an aircraft requires a balance of both technical
knowledge and skills, with an understanding of the limitations of the human
operator.
3.2 CRM Training in Aviation

The relationship between Human Factors, HPL, MCC and CRM is most easily
described as one of specialization.
Human Factors or ergonomics is the broad science that covers human

interaction in the workplace, environment, home, and with other humans. This
includes everything from the design of a tool, to the brightness required of an
electronic display, to the design of a checklist, to the amount of air recirculation
that is required in a pressurized aircraft.
Human Performance and Limitations refers to those aspects that relate to

human involvement in aircraft operations. This is a general overview and
broadly theoretical. MCC starts to cover the practicalities of multi-crew
operations, whereas CRM is focused at the level of the individual airline and is
normally a customized program.
3.3 Human Performance

Human performance can be considered as falling into three categories;
knowledge, skill and attitude. Traditionally the focus of CRM has been on
attitude, which has typically resulted in only temporary changes in behavior and
is not universally accepted by the pilot population. Every airline has the
anecdotal CRM immune Captain, who complains that it is all a waste of time
and does not apply to him.

Page: 8
It is now recognized that attitudes are difficult to change, especially on a

long- term basis in the presence of contradictory influences.
Current CRM thinking focuses on training knowledge and skills. Not only is this
more predictable and measurable, but pilots are predisposed to accept
knowledge and tools with which to improve performance.
3.4 Evolution of CRM

 1st Generation concentrated on attitudes and personal management style
(Cockpit RM)
 2nd Generation introduction of modular training, with aviation focus (Crew

RM)
 3rd Generation attempt at integration with technical training, focus on

specific skills
 4th Fourth Generation developed alongside the introduction of Advanced

Qualification Program (AQP) and LOFT
 5th Fifth Generation introduced the concept of error management
This has now evolved into “threat and error” management, encompassing the
best of previous generations, but avoiding the trap of undue emphasis on
attitudes.
3.5 Human Error

Reason (Reason, J, 1990, Human Error) has developed a model of human
error that classifies these according to the circumstances under which they
occur. Reason is the acknowledged expert on human error.
Errors are defined as unintentional deviations from required behavior and are
to be expected in everyday life with unavoidable regularity. Most of these errors
are small, and humans have good error-correcting mechanisms to mitigate the
effects of these errors. Violations refer to intentional noncompliance, which
cannot be tolerated in the aviation industry.
3.6 Human Factors In Design

The principle need for Human Factors in design is to account for individual
differences and to produce a system that is better matched to real human
performance. In particular this means designing for error.
Error cannot be avoided so the design must ensure that the most serious
mistakes are prevented by trapping mechanisms and clearly forewarned by
use of appropriate and timely feedback.

Page: 9
3.7 The Error Chain

The introduction of automated systems has made it virtually impossible for a
frontline operator to cause an accident in isolation. This does not mean that
accidents can no longer occur. Rather, that the causes of most recent
accidents have been found to be omissions or errors that occurred remotely
from the operator who suffered the loss. These are what Reason call “latent
threats”, existing conditions that might remain dormant for years, possibly as
early as the design stage of a product. A simple example of a latent threat is a
mousetrap. In isolation it is insignificant, but when the mouse tries to take the
bait, it snaps.
Accident investigation has therefore become much more complex with

additional factors to consider. The accident is caused by the completion of a
chain of events – the “error chain”, of which the operating crew are the last link.
If they can break the chain, the accident does not occur.
For example, the British Midland 737-400 that crashed in 1989 was a classic
example of an error chain. Without assigning a principle cause, some of the
factors were as follows:
 Lengthened 737-400 entered service requiring increased thrust

 Existing engines approved for higher thrust without flight-test
 Type certification granted
 Operator differences training approved
 Fleet operated with mix of different style engine instruments
 Significance of other operator’s engine defects not identified
 Engine malfunction during accident flight
 Incorrect identification of engine malfunction
All of these factors were required for the accident to take place. Some were
latent failures, occurring years ago on the drawing board. Others were
management failures. The crew was the last chance of avoiding this accident,
the last line of defense.
3.8 Swiss Cheese

In the example above it might appear that this was one very unlucky scenario.
It was but it is not an isolated case. There are similar events unfolding all
around us in aviation.
Reason has likened the multiple layers of defenses to slices of cheese. Each
layer in itself is a rather flimsy defense, but placed together they form a robust
wall, a combined layer of defenses that can act as an effective shield.
In order to illustrate better the concept of latent threats, Reason used Swiss
cheese. The holes in the cheese are the flaws that exist in each individual layer
of defense. Occasionally, the holes will line up, leaving an opening in the
defensive wall and allowing an accident to happen.

Page: 10
We cannot have a foolproof layer of defense, at any level, but as long as the
holes do not line up, the accident chain is broken. The last layer of defense is
the flight-crew, and it is up to us to break the chain.
3.9 Threat and Error Management

Aviation is a hazardous industry but it is not a dangerous one. The latest
statistics indicate that one accident occurs per million aircraft departures. The
safety record in the airline industry is held in high regard, because despite the
risks, safe operations are the norm. Threats and errors are unavoidable, but
they are well managed within a system that has countless checks and
balances.
3.10 Threat and Error

Threat is defined as an influence, external to the flight-deck that requires action
to ensure safe operation. Errors made by the crew during normal and non-
normal operations may require intervention to prevent an unsafe situation
arising. (Errors made by other people ATC, Engineering, Management,
Regulators etc are threats to the crew.)
Threats - External influences

Errors - Internal influences
Safe operation depends on management of those threats and errors that

cannot be completely eliminated.
Some examples of common threats are:
 Adverse weather
 Terrain
 Airport conditions
 Aircraft malfunctions
 Automation events.
There are four broad classifications of flight-crew errors:
 Procedural – appropriate procedure followed but incorrect execution – i.e.

wrong altitude selection on MCP
 Communication – missing information or misinterpretation
 Decision – elective decision by crew that unnecessarily increases risk –
 i.e. flying to close to a thunderstorm
 Violations – intentional non-compliance – i.e. performing a checklist from
memory.
Most errors committed by the flight-crew are inconsequential. Line Operational

Safety Audits (LOSA) observations have shown that over 70% errors are
inconsequential, in fact almost half of all errors go totally undetected by the crew.
A small percentage (8%) results in additional errors, the start of an accident chain.

Page: 11
Over 20% of the time though, research has shown that flight-crew error led
directly to an undesired aircraft state, such as an unstabilized approach.
3.11 Warning Flags

Aircraft accidents tend to have many similarities. The NTSB identified in 1994 that
of 37 commercial aviation accidents reviewed, nine common factors existed.
These have been termed warning flags. The purpose of the NTSB review was to
enable flight-crews to recognize that when multiple warning flags exist, great care
should be taken to avoid compounding the problem by making additional errors.
We have already determined that we cannot expect to work in a risk-free industry.
However, presence of several of these warning flags should alert us to the
possibility of danger.
The flags can be loosely divided into threats and errors:
Threats Errors
Captain flying Procedural error
Experience gradient Poor tactical decision
First duty day Failure monitor/challenge
Time since awake Improper checklist use

Operational stress
Those accidents described below and covered during Jade Cargo International
CRM courses have many of these warning flags clearly identifiable. However in all
cases, the crew failed to see the threats and usually compounded them by making
additional errors.
3.12 Avoid, Trap, Mitigate

How we deal with these threats and errors depends on the phase of flight:
 Avoid Identify potential threats/errors in advance and avoid them

 Trap Identify current threats/errors that are developing, and correct them
 Mitigate Identify errors that have occurred and limit the damage

Page: 12
4 Culture
4.1 Introduction
Due to the diverse nature of the workforce, Jade Cargo International has identified
that cultural issues represent a significant difference from a typical airline CRM
program. This chapter identifies the key concepts that differentiate national
cultures and also examines the influence that may occur as a result of particular
sub-cultures, such as organizational, professional and safety culture.
4.2 National Culture

Most discussion about culture tends to centre on the effects of national culture.
Hofstede carried out the principle research in this area1. He identified five
dimensions where cultures differ. The five dimensions are
Individualism/Collectivism, Uncertainty Avoidance, Power Distance, Long-term/
Short-term orientation and Masculinity/Femininity. The last two do not typically
apply to pilot groups, (which are predominantly male). The remaining three
dimensions are discussed below.
4.3 Individualism/Collectivism (IDV)

Individualism on the one side, versus its opposite, collectivism, is the degree to
which individuals are integrated into groups. On the individualist side we find
societies in which the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to
look after him/herself and his/her immediate family. On the collectivist side, we
find societies in which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong,
cohesive in-groups, often extended families (with uncles, aunts and grandparents)
which continue protecting them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty. The word
“collectivism” in this sense has no political meaning: it refers to the group, not to
the state. Again, the issue addressed by this dimension is an extremely
fundamental one, regarding all societies in the world.
Expatriates are typically of a more individualist nature, having left their country of
domicile for economic advantage.
4.4 Effects on Crew Behaviors

 High IDV – Personal gain and protection of oneself are the main priorities.
 “Look after number 1” regardless of the effect on the operation
 Low IDV – Focus is on the gain for the collectivist whole regardless of
personal inconvenience or benefit.
 A compromise between the two extremes is what is desired for safe

operation

Page: 13
4.5 Uncertainty Avoidance (UA)

Uncertainty avoidance deals with a society's tolerance for uncertainty and
ambiguity; it ultimately refers to man's search for Truth. It indicates to what extent
a culture programs its members to feel either uncomfortable or comfortable in
unstructured situations. Unstructured situations are novel, unknown, surprising,
and different from usual. Uncertainty avoiding cultures try to minimize the
possibility of such situations by strict laws and rules, safety and security
measures, and on the philosophical and religious level by a belief in absolute
Truth; “there can only be one Truth and we have it”. People in uncertainty avoiding
countries are also more emotional, and motivated by inner nervous energy. The
opposite type, uncertainty accepting cultures, are more tolerant of opinions
different from what they are used to; they try to have as few rules as possible, and
on the philosophical and religious level they are relativist and allow many currents
to flow side by side. People within these cultures are more phlegmatic and
contemplative, and not expected by their environment to express emotions.
Uncertainty avoidance is the extent to which members of a culture feel

threatened by the uncertain or unknown.
Effects on crew behaviors:

 High UA Rigid adherence to procedures and SOPs. “A rule for every
situation” approach to flying and a marked reluctance to deviate from
SOPs even if the situation demands it.
 Low UA Disregard for SOPs and procedures. “I know better than the
people who wrote the books” style of operation.
 Medium UA is optimum for the flight deck.
4.6 Power Distance (PDI)

Power-Distance is the extent to which the less powerful members of organizations
and institutions (like the family) accept and expect that power is distributed
unequally. This represents inequality (more versus less), but defined from below,
not from above. It suggests that the followers, as much as by the leaders endorse
a society’s level of inequality. Power and inequality, of course, are extremely
fundamental facts of any society and anybody with some international experience
will be aware that all societies are unequal, but some are more unequal than
others.
Power distance can be related to cockpit gradient.
Effects on crew behaviors:

 High PDI – can lead to an autocratic leadership style by the Captain – a
steep cockpit gradient
 Medium PDI – a consultative style where input is sought but the final
decision is made by the Captain

Page: 14
 Low PDI – decisions arrived at by consensus with all crew having equal
Input
4.7 Organizational and Professional Culture

Although national culture tends to dominate in most circumstances, there can be
anomalies where a professional group, such as pilots, or an organizational culture
can prevail, against a conflicting trend.
In particular, promotion of a safety culture might be encouraged for the pilot group
to resist a perceived weakness in any national characteristic.
Furthermore, this may or may not conflict with a Company’s management style.
An “On time departure” policy or a “Minimum Fuel” policy might lead to
unnecessary pressure to compromise. It is not the policies themselves that are a
potential problem, but the pilots’ perceptions of the Company’s intent.
In Jade Cargo International we have a structure that emphasizes “Safe and

efficient”. This is endorsed by an open-reporting policy for safety and human
factors issues, though the Air Safety Report and Confidential Human Factors
Reporting schemes.
5 Automation
The problem with computers is that they do what they are actually told to do, not
what we thought we told them to do. (Norbert Wiener)
5.1 Introduction
Automation is defined as the replacement of a human function, either physical or
cognitive, by a machine function. Although there are numerous examples of the
introduction of automated systems on the flight deck, it is those automatic
functions relating to flight path control and navigation with which we are primarily
concerned.
This chapter investigates the benefits and the traps associated with automation,
and also provide some guidance for the management of automation issues.
5.2 Flight Deck Automation

Early jet transport aircraft had a crew of five or six on the flight deck, including
radio operators, navigators and flight engineers. Improvements in technology
(automation) have resulted in only the two pilots remaining as required crew.
The reason that this has been acceptable is that the residual workload has
remained at a manageable level. The aircraft manages and self-monitors many of
the functions that were previously in the domain of the other crewmembers.
Page: 15
Why automate? “Automation brings increased safety, accuracy and reduced

costs.” This may be the intention but the statement doesn’t provide the whole
story. There are (system) performance issues associated with the introduction of
automation, not to mention the human (social) effects. The latter will not be
discussed here.
The issue of automation is not whether a machine is capable of doing the

job; it is that humans are still required for the part of the task that cannot be
automated.
The problem with automation is therefore how man and machine interact – the
interface. In particular, it is the understanding of the automation that causes
concern.
“Dekker and Woods” highlighted the apparent benefits of automation against the
real effect:
Table 1: Benefit of Automation:
Intended Benefit Reality

Better Results, same Transforms practice, roles of
system humans change
(substitution)
Reduction in workload Creates more cognitive work,

often at the wrong time
Focuses user attention Difficulties with Situation

Awareness
Less knowledge required New knowledge and skills

required
Reduces error New error associated with

communication
The table above illustrates how the intended benefits of automation will not be
achieved without additional effort.
5.3 What to Automate

Prior to deciding on what to automate, it would be a good idea to determine the
comparative advantages of humans and machines. In practice this does not
always happen; engineers automate what they are able to automate and the rest
is left for the human operator to manage.

Page: 16
“Engineering is not the process of building a perfect system with infinite

resources. Rather, engineering is the process of economically building a
working system that fulfils a need.” (Good, M, Spine, T, Whiteside, J &
George, P, 1986, User-derived impact analysis as a tool for usability engineering)
5.4 Fitts’ List

In the 1950s, Fitts identified those skills where machines exceeded and those
where the human is better. The “Fitts” list’ is still valid today:
Table 2: Fitts’ list3
Skill Machine Human

Speed Much superior Comparatively slow
Power Output Superior in level and Comparatively weak

consistency
Consistency Ideal for repetitive activity Unreliable, subject to

learning and fatigue
Information Multi-channel, fast Single-channel, slow

Capacity communication communication
Memory Ideal for literal reproduction, Better for principles and

access restricted and formal strategies, access
versatile and innovative
Reasoning Good deductive, difficult to re- Good inductive, easy to re

program, fast, accurate. Poor program, slow, inaccurate.
error correction Good at error correction
Wide energy ranges,

Sensing Specialized, narrow range, some multi-function
Good quantitative assessment.
Poor at pattern assessment
Good at coping with
Perceiving Poor at coping with variation in variation in written &
written & spoken material. Poor spoken material. Poor at
at detecting messages in noise. detecting messages in
noise.
Most notable of the differences from a flight-deck perspective is that humans are
poor monitors and good at accepting revised plans. The principle task allocated
to humans on the flight deck involves monitoring for which we are not ideally
Page: 17
suited. The automation on the other hand may need to be re-programmed for last
minute changes, an area of weakness in interface design.
5.5 The Automation Pyramid

Research literature on automation talks about levels of “supervisory control”. This
refers to the level of monitoring and decision-making required by the operator. In
the aviation scenario, this refers to how far removed the pilot is from the actual
job of flying the aircraft.
Although in some systems, such as nuclear power-plant control rooms, it is
possible to differentiate seven distinct levels, in practical aviation terms we have
identified four levels of automation.
These four levels of automation are available to us to use as appropriate for the
situation. Pilots will dynamically move between levels, according to any change in
tactical goal.
Consider the case where an aircraft is on an intercept heading for an instrument

approach:
 Manual flight without flight director: requires the pilot to manually fly the
aero plane and monitor the closing rate of the inbound track and adjust
accordingly. – This is a high workload situation, although “fly-by-wire” will
still be assisting.
 Manual flight with flight director: the pilot now has a reduced cognitive
load as he no longer has to interpret closing information, but the system
must be programmed to give the correct guidance. Overall result is
reduced workload, with different cognitive skills required.
 Autopilot with basic/selected modes: The cognitive demand is as above,

but the pilot is relieved of the task of manual flight, resulting in further
reduced workload. Note that the pilot is still actively involved in the task
and through FCU/MCP manipulation retains situational awareness of the
flights progress.
 Autopilot with fully managed modes (LNAV/VNAV): The pilot no longer

has to calculate closing rate information or fly the aircraft. In its current
mode the aircraft will intercept the inbound course. There is a reduced
cognitive load, so the overall workload is drastically reduced. Monitoring
or supervising is the principle role left to the pilot.
The potential problem that we face is that if we operate for too long in the fully
automated regime, vigilance and complacency may become issues. It also
becomes more difficult to revert to more basic modes with reduced automation.
The principle pilot skill on modern generation automated aircraft knows

which mode of automation is most appropriate to the task, including when
to turn it off!

Page: 18
5.6 The Irony of Automation

The irony of automation is that, having been unable to completely replace the
pilots with automation; the pilots still have to intervene at critical moments when
the automation cannot cope.
The highest workload situations tend to be left un-automated. Unfortunately, as

routine automation takes away the opportunity to rehearse basic flying skills the
skill and practice required by the pilots to manage these events is lacking.
5.7 The Automation Issue

Now that the benefits and drawbacks of automation have been identified, it is
important to address the issues identified by accident reviews. It has already
been noted that the introduction of automated features changes the role of the
pilot. For this new knowledge and skills are required.
The major problem that has been identified with automation is due to a lack of
understanding. If we do not fully understand the system we are not able to
anticipate the system response or evaluate its performance.
Using automation requires us to:
 Understand each mode before selection
 Anticipate how the aircraft will react to the mode change
 Evaluate whether the desired effect has been achieved
Numerous accidents have resulted as a result of pilot inputs that were not
appropriate for the correct completion of the desired task (Nagoya, Cali,
Habsheim etc). Studies have revealed that “mode” errors are among the most
common on advanced aircraft.
5.8 Interfaces
The blame for this lack of understanding is not necessarily with the pilot. The key
issue is with the design of the interface: how the pilots and the automation
communicate. The FAA identified this weakness and commissioned a study that
reported in 1996. The report identified links between automation and situational
awareness, communications and monitoring.
In particular, the FAA recommended that operators’ manuals should provide

“clear and concise guidance” on conditions when the auto-pilot or auto-throttle
will or will not engage, will disengage or will revert to another mode.

Page: 19
5.9 Feedback
“Norman” contests that the real issue with automation is due to poor or
inappropriate feedback. The failing of the man-machine system is because the
pilot is no longer “in the loop”.
Appropriate feedback makes the task of monitoring system failures or anomalies
more effective. Feedback is also required for monitoring normal system status
change. A lack of, or subtle, feedback results in a reduction of situational
awareness.
The Jade Cargo International procedure’s of calling FMA changes is

designed to counter this threat.
5.10 From an Aircraft Manufacturer

Appropriate degree of automation.
Boeing and Airbus flight decks are designed to provide automation to assist, but
not replace, the flight-crew member responsible for safe operation of the airplane.
Flight-crew errors typically occur when the crew does not perceive a problem and
fails to correct the error in time to prevent the situation from deteriorating.
Consequently, Boeing and Airbus flight decks incorporate intuitive, easy-to-use
systems. These systems support instrument displays with visual and tactile
motion cues to minimize potential confusion about what functions are automated.
These cues reinforce situational awareness and help keep the flight crew fully
aware of changes occurring to the airplane’s status and flight path during all
phases of automated and manual flight.
5.11 Ergonomic Design Principles

The following design principles have been identified as necessary for producing a
usable interface:
 Intuitive - Logical layout of controls and displays
 Use of natural command language (Windows v Dos)
 Minimal user memory load (prompt keys)
 Consistency
 Feedback
 Clear, Understandable error messages
 Error prevention
These principles apply to computerized systems as much as day-to day items.

When was the last time you had to refer to a user manual for a chair or a tea-pot?
…or a video cassette recorder…?

Page: 20
The advantage of retaining humans in the system is that they are adaptable and
flexible. Humans are capable of devising strategies, either as an organization or
as individuals to reduce the threat posed by a design that is less than perfect.
Recognition of a poor design is part of the way towards eliminating the

threat it poses.
5.12 Conclusion
Automation is seen as the antidote to pilot error. In fact it has generated the
potential for a different type of human error. We must guard against the threats
posed by automation, by knowledge of the appropriate levels of automation and
understanding of the automated systems. Appropriate feedback is vital to achieve
and sustain the high levels of situational awareness required for safe operations.
6 Leadership and Team Dynamics

6.1 Introduction
There are various competing theories about what makes a leader and the
definition of leadership. In the flight-deck environment, the Captain is the
designated “leader”, yet numerous accident and incident reports identify where
the leader has failed in his role and remarkably has not exercised leadership.
This chapter will identify some of the attributes necessary for effective leadership
and identify how styles of leadership vary.
6.2 Leadership
A leader is a person whose ideas and actions influence the thought and the
behavior of others. Through the use of example and persuasion, and an
understanding of the goals and desires of the group, the leader becomes a
means of change and influence.
Leadership is needed to effectively understand and cope with a variety of

situations. Personality or attitude clashes within a crew complicate the task of a
leader and can have an influence on both safety and efficiency. Aircraft accident
and incident investigations have demonstrated that personality differences can
influence the behavior and performance of crewmembers.
There is a fundamental difference between leadership, which is acquired, and

authority, which is assigned. An individual's position as captain does not
automatically assume that he or she is an effective leader. An optimal situation
exists when leadership and authority are combined.

Page: 21
The Captain’s authority as leader is derived from the China Civil Aviation
Regulations.
As leader the Captain has both responsibility and accountability. This implies a
certain amount of discretion in choice of action. In fact, from a practical view point
the Captain has a right, and a duty, to decide on a course of action.
6.3 Leadership Theory

Early research into leadership theory stems from the military. Some of this is
relevant in the sphere of commercial aviation. An effective leader must have both
technical and personal skills, and be able to maintain team morale. The leader
must have a thorough technical knowledge of the aircraft and appropriate
supporting systems. In addition, any limitations of this knowledge must be
identified, along with recognition of the appropriate source of assistance and the
correct answer when provided.
Personal qualities required are those of courage, will power, initiative and
integrity. An ability to communicate and self-motivation are also vital.
6.4 Action-Centred Leadership

Pilots tend to be naturally task-focused individuals; however the leader also has
other areas of responsibility. The leader must balance the demands of the task,
the team and the individual.
The importance of each sphere of responsibility will change dynamically

according to the situation. Jade Cargo International SOPs and technical training
support this function of leadership, with use of the Assess, Action, and Manage
Decision-Making Model.
Task Team
Individuals
Figure 1: Action Centred Leadership

Page: 22
6.5 Task
To achieve the task, consider the following:
 Planning
 Communication of intent
 Avoid over-involvement as it reduces the capacity to think ahead.
 Maintain situation awareness
 Monitor and evaluate the task’s progress
6.6 Team Building and Maintenance

Team work is vital for an effective solution to a task. To enhance the sense of
unity:
 Use expertise within the team
 Briefing
 Co-ordination of effort
 Provide feedback
6.7 Individual Development and Satisfaction

In the two-pilot flight deck, many of the considerations for the team also apply for
managing an individual’s needs. With a wide variety of background, experience
and culture in Jade Cargo International the following techniques may also assist
in promoting the individual’s needs:
 Sensitivity to cultural needs

 Maintain an open environment by active listening
 Admission of errors and encourage Standard calls to identify deviations
6.8 The Role of Leader

The CRM Manual produced by Transport Canada identified the following four
tasks that encompass the role of the leader:
6.8.1 Regulating Information Flow

The leader must regulate, manage and direct the flow of information, ideas and
suggestions within the crewmembers and outside sources
 Communicating flight information

 Asking for opinions, suggestions
 Giving opinions, suggestions
 Clarifying communication
 Providing feedback
 Regulating participation

Page: 23
6.8.2 Directing and Coordinating Crew Activities

The leader must function as crew manager to provide orientation, coordination
and direction for group performance
 Directing and coordinating crew activities
 Monitoring and assessing crew performance

 Providing planning and orientation
 Setting priorities
6.8.3 Motivating Crew Members

The leader must maintain a positive climate to encourage good crew member
relations and to invite full participation in crew activities
 Creating proper climate

 Maintain an "open" cockpit atmosphere
 Resolving/preventing angry conflict
 Maintain positive relations
 Providing non-punitive critique and feedback
The leader is ultimately responsible for decisions
 Assuming responsibility for decision making

 Gathering and evaluating information
 Formulating decisions
 Implementing decisions
 Providing feedback on action
6.8.4 Leadership Styles

Having determined what is required of a leader, how is this delivered in practice?
Leadership style refers to the degree of involvement between the leader and the
team during decision-making. It can range from the extreme of autocratic or
dictatorial to
“Laissez-faire”. In between, there are differing degrees of participation such as

democratic and participative.

Page: 24
Laissez Faire Democratic/Participative Autocratic
Figure 2: Authority Dynamic Range
While “laissez-faire” (loosely translated as anything goes) might appear to be an

appropriate attitude, in this case the leader does not care whether the team
performs well or not. This differs from a “relaxed” attitude, while monitoring to
assure necessary performance. It may be acceptable to be “laissez-faire” when
all goes well, but not if things are going wrong. The definition used here is
“laissez-faire”, regardless of performance – which is unacceptable on the flight
deck.
“VROOM” has isolated five categories on the scale above. These definitions
below provide more detail to assist with understanding the concept.
Note that an individual need not always be associated with only one style. For
most effective leadership, a different style is adopted according to the situation.
 Autocrat [A1]: solves the problem or makes the decision alone, using
information available at that time.
 Consultative Autocrat 1 [A2]: obtains the necessary information from

subordinates, and then decides on the solution to the problem alone.
Does not necessarily tell subordinates what the problem is while getting
the information from them. The role played by subordinates in making the
decision is clearly one of providing the necessary information, rather than
generating or evaluating alternative solutions.
 Consultative Autocrat 2 [C1]: shares the problem with relevant

subordinates individually, getting their ideas and suggestions without
bringing them together as a group. Then makes the decision that may or
may not reflect the subordinates’ influence.
 Consultative Autocrat 3 [C2]: shares the problem with subordinates as a

group, collectively obtaining their ideas and suggestions. Then makes the
decision that may or may not reflect your subordinates' influence.
 Consensus Seeker [G2]: shares the problem with subordinates as a

group. Together, generates and evaluates alternatives and attempts to
Page: 25
reach agreement (consensus) on a solution. The role is much like that of

a chairman.
 Trying not to influence the group to adopt "own" solution and willing to
adopt and implement any solution that has the support of the entire
group.
Of these classifications it is worth noting that the last, G2, avoids the Captains’
obligation and duty to make a decision and to accept responsibility.
6.9 Cockpit Authority Gradient

In addition to the style adopted by the Captain, the interaction between the flight-
deck members will define the authority gradient between the two. A steep
gradient results in ineffective monitoring from the co-pilot, and a flat one reduces
the Captains’ authority by constant (unnecessary) challenge.
The optimum gradient, which may differ between individuals and national
cultures, encourages an open atmosphere to monitor and challenge, while
respecting the Captain’s legal authority.
Jade Cargo International encourages a flat cockpit authority gradient, since there
are a number of nationalities, levels of experience and different cultural
backgrounds among the workforce in the company. Nevertheless the duties and
responsibilities of the pilot-in-command should in no way be affected by this
need.
6.10 Followership
Followership is often perceived as a short-term necessity on the way to a
leadership position. While this might be an individual’s view, from the team
perspective nothing could be further from the truth. Followers are a vital part of a
team, and followership is a skill in its own right. For successful team
performance, supportive followers are as important as a leader.
An effective follower requires qualities of flexibility and adaptability, along with

good communication skills, predictability and an appropriate level of
assertiveness.
“Kelly’s” (Kelly, RE, 1988, A two-dimensional model of follower behavior in

Leadership: Enhancing the Lessons of Experience, Hughes, R, Ginnett, R &
Curphy, G (Eds), cited by Kern, T, 1997, Redefining Airmanship) model of
followership examines two dimensions; that of dependent/independent
uncritical/critical thinking and active/passive involvement in the team’s
performance. The four combinations available are therefore passive/uncritical,
passive/critical, active/uncritical and active/critical. A fifth group “Company men”
is chameleons adopting any of the four other styles as appropriate.

Page: 26
Effective followers are essential to safe flight, not afraid to speak up when
necessary and challenge a flawed decision, and actively supportive without being
“yes men”.
Alienated followers are those that have identified a problem with the operation,
but through disillusionment and disenchantment are not prepared to speak up.
They have the potential to destroy a team’s effectiveness, unless identified and
brought “back onside”.
Sheep are akin to human automatons, completing tasks in silence without adding
to the team’s performance.
Yes people can add an element of danger to the operation, because they actively
support without thinking. Their motivation is political rather than task/team
oriented. They inhibit crew decision-making and can encourage a feeling of
invincibility to the pilot-in-command.
Survivors are the Company men; they are typified by mediocre performance and
shift quadrants, not to foster an effective team but to avoid making waves.
6.11 Team Dynamics

Unlike military crews, airlines form new teams for practically every duty. Team
building is therefore a skill that needs to be emphasized if a “scratch” crew is to
perform well.
A good first impression is vital for successful team bonding and should be
accomplished in the first few minutes of team formation. A poor first impression
could take as long as seven hours of continual contact to undo. Using the first
minutes of meeting effectively is obviously very important. An airline crew needs
to be working together and communicating well from before the take-off roll. The
only way to ensure this is, to give the best possible impression during the crew
brief and ensure that both pilots come across as open to communication from the
crew.
Good communication skills have already been identified as critical for both
leaders and followers. They are also the foundation for teambuilding.
The crew briefing is probably the only opportunity to foster a vital link between the
flight deck and the cabin. Making a good first impression is vital.

Page: 27
7 Communication
7.1 Introduction
One of the key skills required for operating a multi-crew aircraft is the ability to
communicate. This chapter describes the principles of communication, the
advantages of various communication styles and the requirement for conflict
resolution. Barriers to communication are also identified, along with methods of
eliminating them.
This chapter is aimed at producing effective crew communication in the context of

multi crew operations.
7.2 Principles of Communication

Human communication is the act of sharing information. This can be verbal or
non-verbal information.
The actual words used accounting for about 10%.
Body Language and tone of voice makes up for the majority of human
communication, as much as 90%, The actual words used accounting for only
about 10%
The impact of body language is greatly reduced in a flight deck, and very rarely
are raised voices heard. So, in communication within a crew, the words used
tend to be very important.
Communication on the flight deck can be affected primarily by:
 Tone of voice
 Focusing on own/others’ needs
 The use of emotional language or “put-downs” i.e. insulting, degrading
language.
7.3 Communication Barriers

The flight deck of an airliner is not an ideal place to have a conversation. There
are many barriers to communication within a cockpit. While modern flight decks
are well insulated, noise is still a factor. Between a Captain and a First Officer,
rank could impinge on communication as well. In the case of Jade Cargo
International, culture plays a large part, as does the fact that many of our pilots
do not use English as their native language.
Communication breaks down barriers and promotes the exchange of important

information. This is the most relevant definition to the task of flying an aircraft.
However, verbal communication is one of the oldest forms of human interaction.
It serves a complex and vital role in establishing and maintaining relationships
Page: 28
between people. While a silent flight deck is desirable in some stages of flight, a
lively discussion in low workload phases usually goes a long way toward “setting
the tone”. Establishing a cordial and efficient working relationship can be made
easier by the use of some of the techniques covered in this chapter.
The principle means of communication is by the use of Standard Operating

Procedures (SOPs). The SOPs contain standard phrases and occasions when
exchanging information or verifying facts is required. By adhering to these
“standard calls” the danger of miscommunication is greatly reduced.
7.4 Communication Styles

To assist in analyzing effective communications, two aspects of the message
content will be considered; the focus, whether on the needs of others or your
own, and the manner, whether unnecessary emotional language or “put-downs”
are used.
From these two aspects the following model can be constructed:
Table 1: Communication Styles
“No put-downs” “Put-downs”

(1) (2)
Focus on own needs Assertive A1 Aggressive

A A2
Focus on needs of Supportive Submissive

others S1 S2
S
Four communication styles can be determined from this model; assertive,

aggressive, supportive and submissive.
7.4.1 Assertive Behavior [a1]

An assertive style enables one to speak in such a way that one does not abuse
or dominate others. It is stating our own needs and feeling without putting others
down.
Being Assertive:
 Heightens self esteem

 Makes other people take notice
 Establishes authority
Assertive behavior is a desirable form of communication. This is especially in the

flight deck from a person in a position of authority.

Page: 29
7.4.2 Aggressive Behavior [a2]

This is when someone is being aggressive, not recommended but part of life.
However, A2 behavior rarely occurs without precursors. Referring to the matrix, it
is clear that aggression comes about when an individual is focused on his own
needs and uses put- downs.
Being focused on one’s own needs is very human. Therefore, the key here is the
use of “put downs” or abusive language. The key to identifying aggression is the
use of “put downs”. This is a “no-go” area for us at work. It is important that “put
downs” or words or tone of voice that may be interpreted as such, are avoided at
all times. Defining a “put down” is not easy and it is incumbent on all parties
(particularly in a multi-cultural environment such as Jade Cargo International) that
great care is taken to avoid anything that can be construed to be one.
When aggressive feelings burst forth we tend to regret it afterwards because

serious negative consequences usually occur as a result of aggression.
Aggressive behavior will have a negative impact on a team. It is unlikely to

motivate the team, and will likely isolate the aggressor.
7.4.3 Supportive Behavior [s1]

A supportive style focuses on others needs in a way that does not downgrade
themselves.
A person being supportive will:
 Show concern
 Not diminish their own or others’ worth
 Be willing to help and listen
In a typical crew the PNF should adopt a supportive role. However this may
change depending on circumstances, such as during training or non-normal
situations.
7.4.4 Submissive Behavior [s2]

The simplest definition of submissive behavior is the acceptance of “put downs”.
With a submissive style the individual focuses on others’ needs in a way that
diminishes their own worth. They put themselves down. A person using a
submissive style of communication allows himself to be dominated.
In a non-critical situation, is it better to be submissive in order to defuse a

situation? Sometimes it may be preferable to “let it go” in order to preserve
harmony.

Page: 30
Sometimes a person will prefer not to say anything for fear of being laughed or
shouted at.
In fact submissive behavior often comes about as a result of aggressive behavior

on the part of another person.
If someone is submissive, the assumption might be that they have nothing to

contribute, and perhaps discount their views even in a crisis
7.5 Dealing with Aggression

If aggression is met with aggressive behavior, it is likely communication that will
break down completely. If the other person is submissive, their needs will be
overlooked.
Dealing with aggression is not easy. The best response is to focus on the other
person’s needs (where this does not compromise safety) and ignore the
perceived put-downs. In other words, be supportive. This brings the focus back to
the task at hand and reduces conflict.
An assertive response might also be effective, provided that the intent is to stop
the use of put-downs. Since the safety of the flight is of paramount importance
and is a common need between all parties, focusing on this usually helps in
restoring harmony.
Assertive and supportive behavior styles are those that promote the most
efficient communication.
The use of the communication styles model identifies boundaries between

own/others needs and the use of “put-downs”. These boundaries are not
necessarily static or evenly divided. It may be necessary to vary the style of
communication according to the situation. Each individual and in fact every team,
will find a style that works well for them. Establishing the position of the lines can
be difficult, but leads to good understanding when accomplished.
Some of the factors that affect the position of these lines are:
 Race
 Culture
 Nationality
 Age
 Seniority / Rank
It must be emphasized that the lines move all the time. Being aware of this and
expecting it from yourself and others goes a long way toward fostering good
communication.

Page: 31
7.6 Conflict Resolution

Any time two or more people are brought to work together, the stage is set for
potential conflict. If conflict does occur, the results may be positive or negative,
depending on how those involved choose to approach it.
Conflict should not be taken as another word for not working together. It is
possible to cooperate with conflict arising. Conflict is not a necessary component
of human behavior, but unfortunately does occur a great deal.
What is important when conflict does occur is that the issue is resolved and that
safety is not compromised. Conflict is usually present because of:
 Differences in needs, objectives and values.

 Differences in perceiving motives, words, actions and situations.
 Differing expectations of outcomes - favorable versus unfavorable.
 Unwillingness to work through issues, collaborate or compromise.
Resolving conflict requires an analysis of the root cause of the conflict. Reference
to the Action-Centred Leadership model1 can assist in probing
sources of differences. Conflict becomes unhealthy when it is avoided or

approached on a win/ lose basis. Animosities can develop, communications may
breakdown, trust and support will deteriorate. When sides are chosen,
productivity will diminish or stop, and the damage is usually difficult to repair.
Conflict resolution can be achieved on a win/win basis and this produces

the best results.
Conflict is healthy when it causes the parties to explore new ideas, test their
position and beliefs, and stretch their imagination. When conflict is dealt with
constructively, people can be stimulated to greater creativity, which will lead to
better results.
The two key learning points in resolving a conflict are:
7.7 Problem Solving

 Needs of both parties are legitimate and important.
 High respect for mutual support.
 Assertive and cooperative.
 No one makes major concessions.
7.8 Compromising
 Important all parties achieve basic goals and maintain good relationship.
 There is more than one way to do anything.
 You must give to get.
 No one person or idea is perfect.

Page: 32
Provided these concepts are borne in mind, it is possible for diverse personality
types from widely disparate cultures to work together harmoniously and ensure
safe flight.
8 Problem Solving and Decision Making

8.1 Introduction
Problem-solving and decision-making are activities we conduct instinctively every
day. However, once in a while, a situation arises that is beyond our scope or
experience. This chapter introduces the Company decision-making model, which
provides a structured approach to problem solving and decision-making, either
for routine or novel situations.
Using a structured approach for problem solving and decision making leads to a
better outcome, and reduces the risk of omissions and errors in the assessment
phase of the problem. The importance of time management is also covered in
this chapter.
8.2 Structured Decision Making

Research has identified numerous occasions where similar accidents nearly
occurred. This raises the question as to whether we should consider good or bad
decisions, or good or bad outcomes. It is the end result that we are interested in,
however it is the industry’s belief that a structured decision making process will
reduce the risk of a poor outcome.
GOOD OUTCOMES ARE GENERALLY ENSURED BY THE USE OF
 Briefings
 Sharing the workload
 Planning for change
 Using aircraft equipment to your best advantage
POOR OUTCOMES ARE CAUSED IN PART BY:
 Attitudes
 Failures of judgment
 Deviation from SOPs
 Lack of briefings leading to misunderstandings and omissions
 Emotions overcoming good judgment
Various structured models are in use in airlines around the world. Most of them
are based on the original CRM loop of Inquiry, Advocacy, Conflict Resolution,
Action and Critique. It is not which model that is used that is important, rather that
a model is used. Using a structured approach is a form of SOP for decision
making.
Page: 33
The Jade Cargo International, Risk Management Model (RMM) is for the two
man crew cockpit.
The RMM is based on the assumption that the crew is fully proficient with the
following;
 Handling skills (manual and auto-flight)
 Technical knowledge (Type specific)
 Procedures (Manufacturer and Company)
 Basic Knowledge in Human Factors Principles
It must be emphasized at the outset that the RMM and CRM is intended to
provide an extra dimension to the Pilot’s management skills and not to make up
for a lack of knowledge or skills in any of the above mentioned documents.
8.2.1 The Model “Footprint”

The model is based on the “Battelle” “Situational Assessment Model” that had
been developed for the FAA.
“The Situational Assessment Model focuses on factors that influence a flight

crew’s assessment of a situation and the subsequent management of available
resources”.
This model was expanded to accommodate the following:
Procedures to rectify / contain the problem

Making a decision
Implementing the decision
However, it is felt that the process to “Rectify / contain the problem” had very
specific needs that could only be accommodated by allocating it to a phase of its
own. Because this additional phase consists mainly of corrective actions,
according to the manufacturers non-normal checklist and or company
procedures, it was decided to call this the “Action Phase”.
8.2.2 Providing “Seamless Integration”

To provide the required “seamless integration” as required by Advanced
Qualification Program (AQP), further modification to the RMM was required.
During each of the phases specific guidance is provided, indicating when

manufacturer’s company procedures should be applied, as well as the
appropriate CRM principals.
Flying skills and good management of the auto-flight systems is also applicable
throughout the application of the RMM.
Page: 34
8.3 A Problem-Solving Model

Prior to deciding on a course of action, it is essential to accurately determine
what the exact nature of the problem is, its implications and how much time is
available. Jade Cargo International uses a problem-solving model to focus on the
problem until these questions are answered.
Whenever a problem is encountered at work, there are two typical responses;

immediately come up with a solution or stay with the problem by further defining
it, seeking more information about it, to make sure we fully understand the
implications.
Men in general and particularly pilots tend to go straight to a solution. This does
not always produce the best solution. The situation can be considered in two
separate domains, the problem and the solution. Any communication relating to
this issue can also be considered as either information about the
problem/solution or an enquiry.
Using these classifications we can use a model to identify the appropriate type of
communication to best assist with resolving the situation.
Enquiry Information
Solution SE SI
Problem PE PI
Examples of each category are:
 Solution Enquiry [SE] – Suggestion
 Solution Information [SI] – Instruction
 Problem Enquiry [PE] - Information seeking, questions
 Problem Information [PI] – Analysis
Sometimes it is more appropriate to spend time in gathering information before

developing a solution. A key factor in making this decision depends on how much
time is available.
Jade Cargo International uses the catch phrase “stay below the line” to help
crews focus on the issues related to the problem before taking action.
The line in question determines whether the discussion is centred on the problem
(below the line) or on solutions to the problem (above the line). By staying below
the line as much as possible, a better understanding of the problem itself can be
gained.

Page: 35
The key of “staying below the line” allows us to fully assess the problem
within the available time.
The use of open questions can assist in staying below the line. Consider the
likely responses to these two questions:
 Where do you think we should divert to? Or

 Do you think we should divert to Munich?
The first question is an open question [PE?], whereas the second is almost a
suggestion [SE]. Open questions allow more options. A solution in the form of a
question however, may at best get a query in response, but will probably be
accepted, losing vital feedback.
Moving above the line is significant because it involves a suggestion or an
instruction. In the latter case, all conversation tends to stop and the decision is
implemented. It is for this very reason that moving above the line should be done
with caution.
8.4 Time Management

Some situations require an immediate response; others may be less time
dependent. Assessment of how much time we have is essential in problem-
solving. Once a time frame has been established, it is possible to prioritize
accordingly.
EFIS architecture, both in Boeing (EICAS) or Airbus (ECAM), is a valuable

problem- solving resource. In many cases it assists with our assessment of time.
Time can be considered as; critical, available and required.
 Time Critical situations require immediate action; this limits the

opportunity for assessment. Warnings and Time-Critical Warnings are
coded red on EFIS displays. They may be associated with immediate
action drills (such as GPWS), recall actions (Engine Fire) or a checklist
(Fire Wheel Well). In all cases, immediate action is required. Time spent
“below the line” is kept to a minimum.
 Time Available: Cautions require a timely response, time is available to

consider the problem and when is appropriate to take action. Caution
level alerts are amber on EFIS.
 Time Required: Other levels of alert may or may not necessarily be

identified with color coding on EFIS. However there will be some
occasions where it may be necessary to slow down or enter into a holding
pattern.
The key to these different types of time is that EICAS/ECAM will assist with
our assessment of time, using a traffic light system.
The effective use of time is very important in problem solving. A fast decision may
not always be the correct one. On the other hand, taking too much time to collect
information and make a decision, when there is little available, might compound
Page: 36
difficulties. An early calculation of the time situation will assist with decision-
making.
8.5 The Jade Cargo International Decision-Making

Model
RISK MANAGEMENT MODEL
AVIATE, NAVIGATE, COMMUNICATE CONTINUOUSLY
[Use Autopilot if available]
ASSESSMENT PHASE
[Seek information, test understanding, propose, prioritize, summarize]
CHECK CB’s AND SWITCHES
● IDENTIFY
DIAGNOSE: What is wrong?
• VERIFY
How to RECTIFY • Identify procedure
ACTION PHASE
[Monitor, test understanding, keep partner in the loop]
PROCEDURE TO RECTIFY / RECALL ITEMS / USE EICAS, QRH
If needed: “stop the checklist”
MANAGEMENT PHASE
[summarize, prioritize, seek information, test understanding propose, build]
EVENT STATUS
Making the Decision Consider:
TASK NEEDS GROUP NEEDS INDIVIDUAL NEEDS
Aircraft performance crew control stress

EROPS company individual crew members
AWOPS
passengers passenger
ATC
DDM/MEL
 Options(Itemize best option, Open Participation)

 Brainstorm options and check for poor judgment
 Summaries
 DECIDE[selling if required
IMPLEMENTING THE DECISION
 Satisfy TASK, GROUP AND INDIVUDUAL needs
 MONITOR PROGRESS – continually check for poor judgment
(PJ)
[Participation, delegation]
Remember that in complex situations, the Captain must manage. This means
that the F/O is best assigned the task of flying. Achieving the best solution
demands good teamwork. Good teamwork needs good communication.
Page: 37
8.6 Assess
The assessment phase is characterized by problem-solving and time
assessment. However, the first priority is to maintain control of the aircraft,
including the navigation away from terrain, obstacles and weather.
Both the assessment and time factor may be provided by EICAS/ ECAM
indications. Individual type procedures will determine what other action may be
required.
An important point here is that you do not rush. Undue haste has led to more
accidents than most people realize.
Once the problem is clearly defined and summarized should we then move above
the line.
8.7 Action
During this phase the emphasis is placed on procedural/technical knowledge
combined with good communication and monitoring techniques.
The specific action and or checklist required may be dictated by the type of
situation. Information may come from SOPs or other sources such as QRH or
other manuals and will need to be clearly defined.
8.8 Manage
Once the action has been completed, it is time to manage. “Did the action solve
the problem?” “Are you sure?” These are good questions to ask of oneself, if
there were any elements of confusion during the initial assess phase.
When the process is complete, we must come back to summarizing our actions
and again reflect and analyze our actions. It is a circular or iterative process.
Use Action-Centered leadership to meet the needs of the task, the team and the
individual. Action centered leadership is based on the principle that during a
normal flight, all the circles are the same size. It is only when you have to make
decisions in somewhat abnormal situations that the weighting of the circles
change.
For example in the first stages of a diversion, the task need is paramount. Once
this is under control, it diminishes in importance and the group need comes to the
fore. With the aircraft descending and flying in the desired direction, a good
commander will then address the passengers and crew and explain to them the
steps taken. Once the Group is informed and placated, individual needs (a cup of
coffee or a visit to the restroom perhaps) can be attended to.

Page: 38
9 Cognition
9.1 Introduction
Cognition is all about how humans process information. This chapter looks in
particular at some of the limitations of the human brain and the typical errors that
can occur as a result. An awareness of these limitations and errors can reduce
their impact on flight operations.
9.2 Models
Psychologists use models to produce a simple explanation of how something
complex works. A model may not be a very good literal representation of a
system, but functionally can be quite accurate. The importance of the model is
that it is effective in assisting understanding.
In the same way, individuals create internal representations of how systems

work, these are known as “mental models”. Mental models are vital to users for
controlling systems and problem-solving. Mental models are also a key
component of situation awareness.
Some characteristics of mental models are:
 They are incomplete and constantly evolving
 They are usually not completely accurate; they typically contain errors
and contradictions
 They provide simplified explanations of complex phenomena
 They can be represented by sets of condition-action rules (If… then…)
9.3 A Model of the Cognitive Brain

As in most processing flows, we will consider the brain in terms of input functions,
output functions and an internal processing function.
INPUT PROCESSING OUTPUT
Figure 1: Basic Cognition Flow

Very simply, we receive information, do something with that information and then
act on it.

Page: 39
9.4 Input functions
9.4.1 Senses
We have five senses through which we receive information; sight, sound, touch,
smell and taste. Flight-deck design typically makes use only of the first three of
these – sight, sound and touch.
The advantage of sight is that quite complex information can be transferred to the
user as long as they are looking at the signal. Sound on the other hand is omni-
directional, but only a limited signal can be conveyed. Routine (status)
information is therefore conveyed by visual cues, warnings or “attention-getters”
use audible alarms.
9.4.2 Attention
Our senses are constantly receiving and discarding signals, not all of them get
through to the processing stage. This is quite normal, as many of the signals are
neither intended for us nor relevant to us. However the brain does have a
mechanism for making sure that we do attend to matters that affect us. Attention
is directed by the processing function and can be thought of as a filter to the
overload of sensations all around us.
9.4.3 Divided Attention

Problems occur when we need to attend to more than one matter at a time. We
are unable to effectively monitor our principle task. The “cocktail party” syndrome
provides a useful example of this. During a busy, noisy social function it is quite
possible to sustain a conversation with someone, even though they do not have
the loudest voice. The brain will filter the unwanted background noise, but it is not
being ignored completely. If someone nearby were to mention a key topic of
interest to you (such as your name), it would become increasingly difficult to
maintain the original conversation, as firstly you would detect this new signal and
secondly try to monitor it as well as the initial conversation.
Attention is believed to be a single-channel function. It is only possible to

concentrate on one signal at a time. Those who believe that they can monitor two
channels simultaneously, are actually switching from one to the other, at some
point they will lose part of one or other signal.
9.5 Perception
Perception can also be thought of as another filter by the processing function.
This refers to a “pre-processing” stage where the brain interprets what it thinks it
has seen before dealing with it.
Perception is incredibly powerful, so much that, if we miss-perceive an event, it is

very difficult to subsequently identify it correctly and take the correct action to
Page: 40
deal with the problem. Perception is considered to be the first stage of Situational
Awareness.
The mind can have difficulty perceiving something it has never seen before or
that appears to be impossible. Psychology text-books (and the internet) have
numerous examples of such illusions.
9.6 Processing Functions
9.6.1 Memory
Memory is the storage area of the brain. The processing function is considered to
have two types of memory, short-term and long-term. Another type of memory is
sensory memory, which really belongs with the input functions.
9.6.2 Sensory Memory

Sensory memory refers to how long the senses maintain received data before it
is consciously dealt with or lost.
An example might be an R/T call that interrupts a conversation, typically with the
response “…was that for us?” but by the time the question is asked, the original
message has been replayed by the mind. In this case the “echoic” memory (of
the auditory system) can retain the data for as long as 10 seconds.
Iconic memory (for visual stimuli) is almost literally gone in a flash, for instance if
you are looking in the general direction of the EICAS/ECAM and a message pops
up and disappears, you have as little as 0.5 second to replay the stimulus before
it is lost.
Sensory memory data is lost by decay, and retained by conscious

attention.
9.6.3 Short-Term Memory

Short-term or “Working” memory is extremely limited and slow in operation. It has
a capacity of approximately seven bits of information. New information received
on top of this will replace the current contents of working memory, unless it is
consciously being dealt with.
We can increase the effectiveness of our short-term memory by “chunking”

information.
The string “28531018015011972” is clearly longer than seven digits. However it

becomes more manageable even with additional information in the form –
“Heading 285, speed 310, descend 180, expect 150 by xxx, and contact 119.72”.

Page: 41
Chunking has reduced this sequence to just five bits of information, manageable
by most.
Short-term memory data is lost by displacement and retained by rehearsal.
9.6.4 Long-Term Memory

Information transfers to the long-term or permanent memory by rehearsal and
repetition. It is believed to be unlimited in capacity and lasts forever. However the
problem is not with forgetting, but with inability to retrieve or access the
information.
Data in the long-term memory can be in the form of single bits of data or in the
form of learned routines, patterns or mini theories. This enables this “knowledge-
base” to handle recurrent routines, using “motor actions” without recourse to the
conscious workspace.
Retrieval of information is fast and effortless and parallel processing is available.

Data is stored in one of two methods by the long-term memory; episodic memory
gives an autobiographical view of events, whereas semantic memory stores
similar data in a form of hierarchical tree. This enables the brain to come up with
a “sensible wrong answer”, even if the correct data has never been learned.
For example, if you were told that Lexus have developed a new luxury car, but it
is top secret, you would be able to state with a fair degree of confidence that:
 It has four wheels
 It has leather seats
 It has an amazing stereo
 It will be available in black and silver
….. some secret?
Long-term memory data is not lost, but becomes irretrievable due to

interference.
One technique to assist with retrieval is the use of mnemonics, such as ATM
(Avoid, Trap, and Mitigate).
9.6.5 Flashbulb Memory

This is a phenomenon which describes what happens when an event so
incredible occurs that the information is immediately placed in long-term storage.
Usually the event and what you were doing at the time are inextricably linked as
one memory. For this reason it is normally possible to date these events quite
accurately, long after the event.
Page: 42
Examples of events producing a “flash-bulb” effect are; the assassination of JFK

[November 1963], the explosion of the Space Shuttle Challenger [January 1986],
the death of Princess Diana [August 1997] and the crash of Concorde [July
2000].
The events of September 11, 2001 are slightly different in this respect, as they
are referred to by the date itself.
9.6.6 Central Processor/Decision-Maker

The processor in the brain is exceptionally powerful; however it is a single
channel device.
It can only deal with one issue at a time. There may be occasions where it
appears to be doing several tasks, but in fact it is just switching quickly between
them.
There are other occasions where humans can do more than one thing at a time,
this is when the action has become a learned routine, a response and is handled
by the knowledge-base in the form of “motor-actions”.
It is the intention in pilot training to transfer emergency drills into over-learned

routines, in particular responses to RTO, GPWS and Wind-shear warnings fall
into this category. This prevents the cognitive functions from reaching overload
and resulting inaction.
9.6.7 Problems with Decision Making

As powerful as it is, human decisions have numerous sources of bias that may
hinder optimal performance. The process tends to be dominated by vision and
can only work sequentially.
Common psychological traps that humans may encounter include:
 Confirmation bias – only accepting evidence that confirms our position

and rejecting contradictory evidence.
 Availability – Solutions selected because they are available and simple to

execute regardless of effectiveness.
 Overconfidence
 Sunk Cost – “throwing good money after bad”
 Wishful thinking
 Outguessing Randomness
 Plan Continuation Error – The most significant trap that we fall into as
pilots is that we find it hard to discontinue a bad approach, or we press on

Page: 43
towards a landing with significant issues not resolved.
9.7 Conclusion
The brain is exceptionally powerful but typically limited to dealing consciously
with one issue at a time. It is easily overloaded and can also produce biased
results. This chapter highlights some of the issues now that they have been
identified, your brain knows how to deal with them…
10 Stress and Alertness

10.1 Introduction
Stress may be defined as the demands that act on the human body. Some of
these place physical strains on the body, others mental strains, some a
combination of both.
This chapter covers the effects of stress, sleeps loss and disruption on the body
and discusses techniques to manage stress and alertness.
Our interest is human performance. Performance varies with a number of factors,

including workload and circadian rhythms. In this respect, stress and fatigue
produce similar results. Alertness is a term used to describe the state of the body
as it reacts to stress and also to describe a state of awareness. The term arousal
will be used as the generic term for both.
Optimum Stimulation
Creativity
Rationality
Problem Solving
Progress
Under Stimulation Over Stimulation

Boredom Overload
Frustration Confusion
Dissatisfaction Distress

Page: 44
The diagram above can be used to explain the effects of both stress and fatigue
and these are covered below. The left side of the curve shows a person in a state
of under- stimulation. The right side shows over stimulation. Optimum human
performance takes place in the shaded area at the top of the curve. It is
preferable to remain on the left hand side of the curve, within easy reach of peak
performance if new demands arise.
Critical phases of flight, such as take-off and landing, require the crew to be at
optimal performance, but the time spent in these phases is relatively short.
Sustained operation in the shaded area is however, largely impossible.
Performance tends to degrade very rapidly if an attempt is made to remain at
optimum for a long period.
10.2 Stress
Stress is not necessarily a bad thing. A small amount of stress acts as a stimulus
and results in improved performance. In the diagram above, consider that arousal
refers to stress. Initially, as stress increases, performance improves, from being
somewhat dormant, into the optimum performance range (shaded). As stress
increases further, performance actually peaks, and then falls away. After a
certain point, which differs according to individuals and within individuals,
performance declines below optimum or satisfactory performance and enters a
rapid decline thereafter.
Stress has been necessary for the evolutionary survival of the human. The well-
known “fight or flight” or “adrenalin rush” syndromes are as a result of stress.
These prepare the body to react when presented with danger. Stress is also a
factor in achieving peak performance due to the release of adrenalin.
Too much stress decreases a person’s ability to function. Too little stress causes
complacency. The body needs an optimum level of stress to operate.
10.3 Types of Stress

Stress can be divided into two types, acute and chronic. The American
Psychological Association explains these as follows:
10.3.1 Acute Stress

Acute stress is the most common form of stress. It comes from demands and
pressures of the recent past and anticipated demands and pressures of the near
future. Acute stress is thrilling and exciting in small doses, but too much is
exhausting. A fast run down a challenging ski slope, for example, is exhilarating
early in the day. That same ski run late in the day is taxing and wearing. Skiing
beyond your limits can lead to falls and broken bones. By the same token,
overdoing on short-term stress can lead to psychological distress, tension
headaches, upset stomach, and other symptoms.

Page: 45
Fortunately, most people recognize acute stress symptoms themselves. It's a

laundry list of what has gone awry in their lives: the auto accident that crumpled
the car fender, the loss of an important contract, a deadline they're rushing to
meet, their child's occasional problems at school, and so on.
Because it is short term, acute stress doesn't have enough time to do the
extensive damage associated with long-term stress. The most common
symptoms are:
 emotional distress--some combination of anger or irritability, anxiety, and
 depression, the three stress emotions;
 muscular problems including tension headache, back pain, jaw pain, and
the muscular tensions that lead to pulled muscles and tendon and
ligament problems;
 stomach, gut and bowel problems such as heartburn, acid stomach,
 flatulence, diarrhea, constipation, and irritable bowel syndrome;
 transient over arousal leads to elevation in blood pressure, rapid

heartbeat, sweaty palms, heart palpitations, dizziness, migraine
headaches, cold hands or feet, shortness of breath, and chest pain.
Acute stress can crop up in anyone's life, and it is highly treatable and
manageable.
10.3.2 Episodic Acute Stress

There are those, however, who suffer acute stress frequently, whose lives are so
disordered that they are studies in chaos and crisis. They're always in a rush, but
always late. If something can go wrong, it does. They take on too much, have too
many irons in the fire, and can't organize the slew of self-inflicted demands and
pressures clamoring for their attention. They seem perpetually in the clutches of
acute stress.
It is common for people with acute stress reactions to be over aroused, short-
tempered, irritable, anxious, and tense. Often, they describe themselves as
having "a lot of nervous energy." Always in a hurry, they tend to be abrupt, and
sometimes their irritability comes across as hostility. Interpersonal relationships
deteriorate rapidly when others respond with real hostility. The work becomes a
very stressful place for them.
The symptoms of episodic acute stress are the symptoms of extended over
arousal: persistent tension headaches, migraines, hypertension, chest pain, and
heart disease. Treating episodic acute stress requires intervention on a number
of levels, generally requiring professional help.

Page: 46
Often, lifestyle and personality issues are so ingrained and habitual with these
individuals that they see nothing wrong with the way they conduct their lives.
They blame their woes on other people and external events. Frequently, they see
their lifestyle, their patterns of interacting with others, and their ways of perceiving
the world as part and parcel of who and what they are.
10.3.3 Chronic Stress

While acute stress can be thrilling and exciting, chronic stress is not. This is the
grinding stress that wears people away day after day, year after year. Chronic
stress destroys bodies, minds and lives. It wreaks havoc through long-term
attrition. It's the stress of poverty, of dysfunctional families, of being trapped in an
unhappy marriage or in a despised job or career.
Chronic stress comes when a person never sees a way out of a miserable
situation. It's the stress of unrelenting demands and pressures for seemingly
interminable periods of time. With no hope, the individual gives up searching for
solutions.
The worst aspect of chronic stress is that people get used to it. They forget it's
there. People are immediately aware of acute stress because it is new; they
ignore chronic stress because it is old, familiar, and sometimes, almost
comfortable.
Chronic stress kills through suicide, violence, heart attack, stroke, and, perhaps,
even cancer. People wear down to a final, fatal breakdown. Because physical
and mental resources are depleted through long-term attrition, the symptoms of
chronic stress are difficult to treat and may require extended medical as well as
behavioral treatment and stress management.
10.3.4 Sources of Stress

A stressor is the term used to define the cause of stress. Generally, stress is
accepted as the human response to these stressors, which exhibits as either a
physical response e.g., sweating, tremors, hyperventilation, heart arrhythmia, or a
mental response such as irritability. There are three broad sources of stressor:
life, environmental and cognitive.
10.3.5 Life Stress

Life stress typically results from a person’s particular lifestyle. More precisely, a
change in lifestyle is a source for this type of stress. This could come in many
different forms. Some examples are: marriage or divorce, change in job or
responsibilities (i.e. promotion to Captain), the illness or death of a close relative
or friend.

Page: 47
Research carried out by various organizations suggests a strong link between life
stress events and aircraft accidents. The original research was carried out by US
Navy psychologists during the Vietnam era and has been expanded since.
The most quoted example is that of a pilot experiencing marital difficulties, who
collided with a ground vehicle whilst landing. His accident statement directly
attributed the incident to his state of mind.
However, as it is a mental “picture” it is extremely difficult to establish any direct

causal link between life stress and an aircraft accident. Suffice to say that life
stress is almost definitely a threat to aircraft safety, especially when it involves an
operating pilot.
10.3.6 Environmental Stress

Environmental stress results from the physical environment surrounding an
individual. Two common examples could be heat and noise. Sleep disturbance is
also a source of environmental stress; this will be covered later in the chapter.
Heat causes a subtle and unseen form of incapacitation. Temperatures in the
cockpits rise rapidly on the ground during summer.
Noise is an unavoidable factor with aircraft operation, either on the apron, or in
the flight- deck. In the long-term, most pilots will experience some degree of
hearing loss. Noise is generated internally (radios) and externally (airflow and
engine). Pilots using noise attenuating headsets report less fatigue over long
sectors. Noise arouses the individual, but exposure for extended periods also
causes a drop in performance.
10.3.7 Cognitive Stress

Cognitive stress refers to the mental workload imposed on a person. This is
caused by the limited ability of humans to process information.
The effects of cognitive stress overload are most often experienced in high
workload situations. High workload causes a skilled pilot to commit what are
termed “action slips”. These occur when a pilot follows a “motor-action” response
and selects a control very similar to the desired one, but with a dissimilar
function. Examples are the auto-brake selector instead of brake fans, or the
selecting SPD instead of HDG.
When workload is high, humans tend to become victims of “intentional

selectivity”, as their brains try to accept large and unmanageable chunks of
information. The effect is that pilots will become focused on a task, and
mismanage priorities. This is referred to as “tunnel vision”.
Another not uncommon consequence of high workload is the tendency to trade

accuracy for speed. This is again caused by the brain trying to manage large
chunks of information in short periods. In trying to complete a task and move to

Page: 48
the next, humans will trade off speed against accuracy. The tendency is to accept
a less than optimum solution to a problem, thereby inducing further errors.
Although this can be an effective strategy, self- discipline must be exercised to

ensure a review is completed checking the suitability of actions performed.
Response time, or experiencing difficulty in responding to another task is another

possible symptom. Again this is caused by the inability to manage large amounts
of information. Where pilots have actually assigned priorities to other tasks, they
may become bogged down in processing the data. Typically, this occurs during
pre-flight where the workload is high with pre-assigned priorities. For example, a
F/O may experience difficulty in calculating the take-off speeds because he feels
the need to check the ATIS for the latest temperature. The inevitable result is a
slowdown in completing the task.
10.4 Alertness
Consider that arousal now refers to alertness, or state of awake ness.
Immediately after awakening, the mind and body are still in a state of drowsiness.
Depending on the individual, it may take some time before performance reaches
an acceptable level. After some time of being awake, the range of optimal
performance is reached. As in the case of stress, this continues to improve
performance until, after reaching a peak, it starts to decline as fatigue or
weariness sets in. This might be due to time since awake, workload (physical
exertion), lack of stimulus (stress) or circadian rhythms. Other factors affecting
alertness might be the quality and/or quantity of the previous sleep (sleep debt).
Managing alertness is an essential skill for long-haul flying. Jade Cargo
International aircraft have advanced automation features that manage most
routine tasks. However, this can have a negative effect during the cruise, when
workload is at an absolute minimum. On a night flight, inactivity and a lack of
interaction in a low-light environment can result in insufficient stimulation and loss
of vigilance. Techniques for maintaining vigilance in such a situation are similar to
those for combating fatigue.
10.5 Sleep Management

Sleep is a vital physiological function. It cannot be stored, but conversely a sleep
debt can build up, if we do not achieve enough sleep at the right time. A loss of
sleep leads to suppressed Rapid Eye Movement (REM), leading to withdrawal
effects and further disrupted sleep.
Sleep quality is also affected by our body clock. Better quality sleep is achieved
during our natural night. Sleep achieved as the body temperature starts to rise
can be disrupted by mid-morning, with an inability to sleep further. Getting eight
hours of disrupted sleep can have effects similar to too little sleep.
The consequences of sleepiness are:
 Decreased physical and mental performance

Page: 49
 Decreased positive and increased negative mood
 Increased vulnerability to performance decrements
 Following sleep loss, sleep is deeper rather than longer.
An individual with a significant “sleep-debt” (accumulated sleep disruption) is

often irritable, inattentive and has an increased reaction time. Longer term effects
include depression and chronic fatigue.
Stress and fatigue combine to pose a significant challenge to airline operations.

Knowing how to combat the ill-effects caused by these factors is an acquired skill
that needs to be practiced actively by the modern airline crewmember.
10.6 Circadian Rhythms

A well-rested individual operating within their normal circadian rhythms, will have
little problem achieving optimal performance at short notice should it become
necessary. However, the nature of long-haul operations means that pilots are
more often than not, neither well rested nor within their circadian rhythms.
The typical biological clock works on a 25-hour cycle. It is kept synchronized on a

daily basis by exposure to bright light and regular social interaction.
The longer body-day also makes it easier to adjust to time zone changes on
westbound routings, which extend the operating day, rather than eastbound
which compresses the day.
Following the disturbance of a time-zone change, not all body functions re-
synchronize at the same rate, this can leave the pilot somewhat disoriented for
several days after a trip involving several time-zone changes. This is known as
jet-lag.
Jet-lag can be described as external or internal. External refers to the body being
“out of sync” with the environment, on the wrong time zone. Internal refers to the
different body functions being “out of sync” with each other. Shift-work has similar
effects to jet-lag, which include:
 Disturbed sleep (inability to fall asleep or stay asleep)
 Increased waking (work-time) sleepiness
 Decreased physical or mental performance
 Increased reports of fatigue
 More negative mood
 Gastrointestinal problems

Page: 50
Circadian Rhythms
As with the other threats that we face, circadian disrhythmia is not sufficient
cause to cease operations. It is another warning flag, providing awareness and in
need of management.
10.7 Stress and Alertness Management

The FOM requires pilots to be in good physical and mental health – fit for duty.
Managing stress and sleep effectively, is the duty of every crewmember.
Exercise is often used as a form of stress relief. In extreme cases this can take
the form of dangerous sports. Others prefer mental stimulation. The use of card
and board games has historically been a popular form of stress relief. In the
modern world, computer games appear to be increasingly filling this role.
The use of alcohol is not recommended as a form of stress relief. As any medical
practitioner will verify, this is a potentially dangerous practice, with dire
consequences in the aviation industry.
10.8 Controlled Rest in the Flight Deck

The FOM also provides for controlled sleep during low workload situations. This
acts as an effective fatigue prevention tool and allows a satisfactory level of
alertness to be maintained.
The duration of rest is limited to prevent sleep inertia. This practice is based on
extensive research done by NASA among others. It has proven that controlled
rest is a very effective tool for combating fatigue and maintaining alertness, when
conducted in a structured fashion.
11 Situational Awareness
11.1 Introduction
Situational awareness is frequently stated as a factor in accidents and incidents.
However it is often quoted without really being explained. In accidents involving
human error, a staggering 88% have been identified as involving a loss of
situational awareness.
This chapter will explain what it is, who has it and the skills necessary for
maintaining and sharing situational awareness.
11.2 Levels of Situation Awareness (SA)

“Endsley” has produced the commonly accepted definition of situation awareness
as: “The perception of the elements within a volume of time and space, the
Page: 51
comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in the near
future.”
This is quite complex, but what it means is that there are three levels of
situational awareness. It is not just enough to notice a situation; one must
understand and think ahead.
The problems with SA in accident cases have mostly revolved around pilots
failing to notice!
Figure 1: Levels of Situational Awareness
The key to situational awareness knows what comes next.
In addition to three levels of SA, there are different domains that must be
monitored by the pilot. The pilot must monitor the aircraft (flight-path, automation
modes, systems, fuel and time), the environment (terrain and weather) and the
people (ATC, crew, passengers and company). In a well-known phrase: Aviate,
Navigate, and Communicate.
The Importance of Situational Awareness
Now that we know what SA is, why is it so important? Situational awareness is

considered to be the driving force behind good decisions. If we are aware of all
the relevant factors (good SA), then our decisions will be well founded and good
performance will follow.
Situational Awareness + Decision-Making = Performance
SA is our current “mental mode” and not only directs attention where required,
but it guides our selection of goals by providing understanding and projection.
11.3 Loss of Situational Awareness

Individuals have differing levels of situational awareness; those with normally
high SA tend to recognize when they are losing SA, which mitigates part of the
problem.

Page: 52
Clues that indicate a possible loss of SA are ambiguity, fixation and confusion.
These may indicate that an error chain is in progress. Most accidents involving
human error include at least four of the following:
 Ambiguity - information from two or more sources that doesn't agree
 Fixation - focusing on any one thing to the exclusion of everything else
 Confusion - uncertainty about a situation (often accompanied by anxiety

or uneasiness)
 Failure to fly the plane: everyone is focused on non-flying activities
 Failure to look outside: everyone heads down
 Failure to meet expected checkpoint on flight plan or profile-ETA, fuel

burn, etc
 Failure to adhere to standard operating procedures
 Failure to comply with limitations, minimums, regulations etc
 Failure to resolve discrepancies - contradictory data or personal conflicts
 Failure to communicate fully and effectively - vague or incomplete

statements
11.4 The Safety Window

Reviews of accident trend data continue to indicate that most accidents occur
close to the ground, during the take-off and landing phases. In fact most are
within seven miles of the airport.
Jade Cargo International uses the concept of the “Safety Window”. When below
2000’ AGL (approximately 7nm from the airport) there is limited time to
troubleshoot an unresolved problem. The philosophy is to stay out or get out of
the safety window where ambiguity, fixation and confusion exist.
Results from observations at several different airlines, identified that most of the
consequential and additional errors occurred during the descent and landing
phase. Since historically over 70% of accidents have occurred in this phase,
there is much to be concerned about here.
A three-stage model “Avoid, Trap, Mitigate” is one solution to the problem.

Avoiding error is the initial course of action, if potential problems can be identified
in time. Prior to descent, clear briefings and good communication should take
place to achieve this.
After descent initiation, less time is available for noticing and avoiding, so the
emphasis should switch to trapping any errors that do occur. Additional errors
should be guarded against as these could lead to an error-chain forming. The
trapping phase begins at top-of- descent and leads up to the approach.
Page: 53
In the final stages of the approach, an undesired aircraft state (i.e. unstabilized
approach, too high, too fast etc) must be avoided. Should such a state occur,
there is very little time left to correct it. The best strategy is to “Mitigate” the
problem by going-around. The Mitigate phase commences at the start of the
Safety Window (2000’ AGL).
11.5 Situational Awareness and Error Management

Using “Threat and Error” management principles, potential problems that are
identified early allow the opportunity to avoid, indicating that the crew is thinking
ahead [Level 3 SA]. If the crew is trapping a lot of errors, this may indicate they
are operating at understanding [Level 2 SA]. Finally, if mitigation seems to be the
key factor, then the crew is only noticing problems [Level 1 SA].
Human error is inevitable. By analyzing how we deal with the problem, we can
make the link to identify at which level of SA we are operating at, so that we can
take action to improve it.
11.6 Factors Affecting Situational Awareness

Studies have revealed a ten-fold difference in SA between pilots within the same
airline. It has also been observed that crews flying non-glass aircraft have better
SA than those with the latest technology.
Basic skills that high SA crews exhibit are; communications, scan patterns and
checklist use. Advanced skills include pre-flight planning, contingency planning,
self-monitoring, task management and prioritization.
Situational awareness can be trained to a certain extent. Skills relating to spatial

ability, perceptual speed and working memory capacity are inborn. However,
attention-sharing, psychomotor skills and pattern matching are trainable.
11.7 Communication and Shared Situational

Awareness
For a crew to be most effective they must share the same high SA, otherwise
crew SA tends to fall to that of the weaker crewmember. Information can be
shared at all three levels of SA.
Consider the case of an unexpected tailwind on approach, identified by the PM:

PM: “Looks like a 15 knot tailwind on approach”
This is shared perception – they have noticed the problem

PF: “OK, I’ll reduce speed xx miles earlier than briefed, and use the speed brake
if necessary.”
This identifies shared comprehension – the PF understands.
PM: “They might change runways if the surface wind picks up.”
Page: 54
This is shared projection – they are thinking ahead.
Typically crews are comfortable with “perception” level communication, but for
various reasons feel inhibited in offering more processed information for fear of
offending the other pilot.
It is essential to confirm a level of understanding when communicating at the

perception level. The response “Ok” is no guarantee that the other pilot has even
noticed – he may just be acknowledging that you have stopped speaking!
11.8 Techniques for Better Situational Awareness

Management
 Predetermine crew roles for high-workload phases of flight.
 Develop a plan and assign responsibilities for handling problems and

distractions.
 Solicit input from all crew-members including cabin, ATC, maintenance,

dispatch, etc.
 Rotate attention from plane to path to people - don't fixate.
 Monitor and evaluate current status relative to your plan.
 Project ahead and consider contingencies.
 Focus on the details and scan the big picture.
 Create visual and/or aural reminders of interrupted tasks
 Watch for clues of degraded SA.
 Speak up when you see SA breaking down.

Page: 55
12 Reference Notes
Helmreich, R.L., & Merritt, A.C. (1996, April). Cultural issues in crew
resource management. Paper presented at the ICAO Global Human Fac-
tors Seminar, Auckland, New Zealand, April, 1996.
Helmreich, R.L., & Merritt, A.C. (1997). Local solutions for global prob-
lems: The need for specificity in addressing human factors issues. Paper
presented at the IXth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology,
Colombus, Ohio, April-May, 1997.
Merritt, A.C., & Helmreich, R.L. (1995). CRM in 1995: Where to from
here? In Proceedings of the Third Australian Aviation Psychology Sym-
posium, Sydney, November 20-24, 1995.
Merritt, A.C., & Helmreich, R.L. (1996). Creating and sustaining a Safety
Culture. CRM Advocate, 1, 8-12.
Merritt, A.C., & Helmreich, R.L. (1996). CRM: I hate it, what is it? (Er-
ror, stress, and culture) Paper presented at the Orient Airlines Associa-
tion Air Safety Seminar, Jakarta, Indonesia. April 23-25, 1996.
Merritt, A.C., Helmreich, R.L., Wilhelm, J.A., & Sherman, P.J. (1996).
Flight management attitudes questionnaire 2.0 (International) & 2.1
(USA/Anglo) (Technical Report 96-4). University of Texas: Aerospace
Crew Research Project.
Merritt, A.,C., (1995). Designing culturally sensitive CRM training:

CRM in China. Paper presented at the Training and Safety Symposium,
Guangzhou, P.R.C., May 1995.
Merritt, A.C., (1997). Replicating Hofstede: a study of pilots in eighteen

countries. Paper presented at the IXth International Symposium on Avia-
tion Psychology, Colombus, Ohio, April-May, 1997.
Ooi, T.S.,. (1991). Cultural influences on flight operations. Paper pre-

sented at the SAS Flight Academy Training Conference, November 26-28,
1991.
Taggart, W.R., (1995). The Aerospace Crew Research Project Line-LOS-

Checklist: Assessing system safety and crew performance. In proceed-
ings of the VIIIth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology. Co-
lumbus: Ohio State University.

CRM

Încărcat de

Informații document

Descriere originală:

Drepturi de autor

Formate disponibile

Partajați acest document

Partajați sau inserați document

Opțiuni de partajare

Vi se pare util acest document?

Este necorespunzător acest conținut?

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

CRM

Încărcat de

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

Manual No.

Jade Cargo International Co. Ltd.

Crew Resource Management

Revision Status: Original

Approved By Flight Crew Training Section

5.7 The Automation Issue........................................................................... 18

9.3 A Model of the Cognitive Brain............................................................. 38

Flight Crew Training Centre

1.2.1 CRM Introduction Course

1.2.2 CRM Indoctrination Course

1.2.3 CRM Update Course

Flight Crew Training Centre

1.2.4 CRM Recurrent Training

1.2.5 CRM Upgrade Training

1.2.6 CRM Transition CRM

 Reference accidents with automation issues

2.4 Leadership, Followership & Team Dynamics

2.5 Communication (Communication Styles & Conflict

2.6 Problem-Solving & Decision Making

2.8 Stress & Alertness Management

2.9 Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Training Centre

3 Threat and Error Management

3.2 CRM Training in Aviation

Human Factors or ergonomics is the broad science that covers human

Human Performance and Limitations refers to those aspects that relate to

3.3 Human Performance

Flight Crew Training Centre

It is now recognized that attitudes are difficult to change, especially on a

3.4 Evolution of CRM

 2nd Generation introduction of modular training, with aviation focus (Crew

 3rd Generation attempt at integration with technical training, focus on

 4th Fourth Generation developed alongside the introduction of Advanced

 5th Fifth Generation introduced the concept of error management

3.5 Human Error

3.6 Human Factors In Design

Flight Crew Training Centre

3.7 The Error Chain

Accident investigation has therefore become much more complex with

 Lengthened 737-400 entered service requiring increased thrust

3.8 Swiss Cheese

Flight Crew Training Centre

3.9 Threat and Error Management

3.10 Threat and Error

Threats - External influences

Safe operation depends on management of those threats and errors that

Some examples of common threats are:

There are four broad classifications of flight-crew errors:

 Procedural – appropriate procedure followed but incorrect execution – i.e.

Most errors committed by the flight-crew are inconsequential. Line Operational

Flight Crew Training Centre

3.11 Warning Flags

The flags can be loosely divided into threats and errors:

First duty day Failure monitor/challenge

Time since awake Improper checklist use

3.12 Avoid, Trap, Mitigate

 Avoid Identify potential threats/errors in advance and avoid them

Flight Crew Training Centre

4.2 National Culture

4.3 Individualism/Collectivism (IDV)

4.4 Effects on Crew Behaviors

 “Look after number 1” regardless of the effect on the operation

 A compromise between the two extremes is what is desired for safe