United States vs. Maqui, 27 Phil.

97 (1914)

mArch 14, 1914

G.R. No. L-8931

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JUAN MAQUI, defendant-appellant.

Alejo Mabanag for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey for appellee.

Carson, J.:

The appellant in this case was convicted in the court below of the theft of the caraballa and her calf, and sentenced
to imprisonment for the period of five years, to suffer the accessory penalties prescribed by law, and to pay his
share of the costs of the proceedings.

Counsel for the accused contends that the trial court erred in giving probative value to the testimony of one Dagsa,
the principal witness for the prosecution; in accepting proof as to certain extrajudicial admissions alleged to have
been made by the accused, including an offer to compromise the case by the payment of a sum of money; and in
declining to accept as true the testimony of the accused in his own behalf at the trial. We find nothing in the record,
however, which would justify us in disturbing the findings of the trial judge as to the degree of the credit which
should be accorded the various witnesses called at the trial.

Counsel rests his contention that the evidence as to the extrajudicial statements made by the accused should have
been excluded on the ground that, as counsel insists, there is no formal proof n the record that they were made
voluntarily, and that they were therefore inadmissible as proof in so far as they can be construed as admission or
confession of guilt. In answer to this contention it is sufficient to say that there is no suggestion in the record in the
court below that these extrajudicial statements were not made voluntarily, and we are satisfied that if the evidence
as to the circumstances under which these incriminating statements were made be accepted as true it clearly
rebuts the possibility that they were made involuntarily, or extorted by force, threats, or promise of reward. The
record clearly discloses that these extrajudicial statements were made in the course of offers to compromise and
that they were made by the accused voluntarily, though doubtless these offers to compromise were made in the
hope that it accepted he would escape prosecution.

The question as to the admissibility of offers to compromise in criminal cases has frequently been discussed in the
courts of the United States, and the practice there does not appear to be wholly uniform. We think, however, that
the weight both of authority and of reason sustains the rule which admits evidence of offers to compromise, but
permits the accused to show that such offers were not made under a consciousness of guilt, but merely to avoid
the inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other reason which would justify a claim by the accused that the
offer to compromise was not in truth an admission of his guilt and an attempt to avoid the legal consequences
which would ordinarily ensue therefrom.

Satisfaction to the owner of the goods stolen is admissible, as evidence against the accused, but if made merely to
avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment, and not under a consciousness of guilt, it is not evidence. (U. S. vs.
Hunter, 1 Cranch, C. C., 317.)

In a prosecution for seduction, evidence that the accused had sought an adjustment with the prosecutrix is
inadmissible, if such offer of adjustment did not contain an admission of guilt. (Wilson vs. State, 73 Ala., 527.)

On a prosecution for assault with intent to commit rape upon a married woman, evidence is admissible on behalf of
the prosecution to show that the defendant sent a third person to the father of the prosecutrix to ascertain if the
case could be compromised. (Barr vs. People, 113 Ill., 471.)

In a larceny case, evidence is not admissible to show that defendant stated that he would pay $50 if it could be
settled, in reply to threats by the owner of the goods stolen that he would be prosecuted for damages, and a
solicitation to settle. (Frain vs. State, 40 Ga., 530.)

In a prosecution for larceny, evidence is not admissible that defendant paid a sum of money in settlement of a civil
action brought to recover the property alleged to have been stolen. (State vs. Emerson, 48 Iowa, 172.)
An offer of compromise, voluntarily made by the accused, without threat or promise, and the reply thereto, are
admissible in evidence upon his trial for a crime. (State vs. Bruce, 33 La. Ann., 186.)

An offer of compromise of a crime, unaccepted by the prosecutor, may be proven by the state as an admission of
guilt, or as disclosing possession of the property which is the subject of the burglary and larceny charged in the
indictment. (State vs. Rodriguez, 45 La. Ann., 1040; 13 Southern, 802.)

It may be shown that the prisoner sent a massage to the prosecutor, proposing to take a whipping and to be let go.
(State vs. DeBerry, 92 N. C., 800.)

We are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused, but we are opinion that in imposing the
penalty the trial court should have taken into consideration as a mitigating circumstance the manifest lack of
"instruction and education" of the offender. It does not clearly appear whether he is or not an uncivilized Igorot,
although there are indications in the record which tend to show that he is. But in any event, it is very clear that if
he is not a member of an uncivilized tribe of Igorots, he is a densely ignorant and untutored fellow, who lived in the
Igorot country, and is not much, if any, higher that are they in the scale of civilization. The beneficent provisions of
article 11 of the Penal Code as amended by Act No. 2142 of the Philippine Legislature are peculiarly applicable to
offenders who are shown to be members of these uncivilized tribes, and to other offenders who, as a result of the
fact that their lives are cast with such people far away from the centers of civilization, appear to be so lacking in
"instruction and education" that they should not be held to so high a degree of responsibility as is demanded of
those citizens who have had the advantage of living their lives in contact with the refining influences of civilization.

It is true that this court has quite uniformly held that convicts of the crimes of theft and robbery are not entitled to
the benefits of the provisions of article 11 of the Penal Code prior to its amendment by Act No. 2142, this on the
theory that under the provisions of the article prior to its amendment the ground upon which the courts were
authorized in their direction to mitigate the penalties prescribed by the code was "the circumstance of the offender
being a native, mestizo, or Chinese." As to crimes of this nature we declined to hold that the mere fact that one is a
native of the Philippine Islands, a mestizo or a Chinese would justify a claim that upon conviction of crimes such as
theft or robbery he should be treated more leniently than the members of any other race or people, no sounds
presumption arising from the mere racial affiliation of the convict that he was less or to resist the temptation to
commit them than are they.

Under the provisions of the article as amended by Act No. 2142, the ground upon which the courts are authorized
to mitigate the prescribed penalties is not racial affiliation of the convict, but "the degree of instruction and
education of the offender;" and while mere ignorance or lack of education will not always be sufficient to justify the
mitigation of the prescribed penalties for crimes such as theft and robbery, there can be no doubt that cases may
and will arise wherein under all the "circumstances attending" the commission of these offenses the exercise of a
sound discretion will justify a more lenient treatment of an ignorant and semicivilized offender, than that which
should be accorded one who has the advantage of such a degree of instruction and education as would justify the
court in believing that he was capable of fully and properly understanding and appreciating the criminal character of
the offense committed by him.

We conclude, therefore, that under the provisions of article 111 as amended by Act No. 2142, the courts may and
should, even in cases of theft and robbery, take into consideration where it appears that under all the
circumstances attending the commission of the offense, he should not be held to the strict degree of responsibility
prescribed in the code for the ordinary offender.

The larceny of large cattle and falls within articles 517, 518, and 520 of the Penal Code, as amended by Act No.
2030. According to those sections, as amended, the value of the animals stolen being 650 pesetas, a penalty one
degree higher than arresto mayor in its medium degree to presidio correccional in its minimum degree should have
been imposed; in other words, presidio correccional in its medium degree to presidio mayor in its minimum degree.
Giving the convict the benefit of the provisions of article 11 of the Penal Code, as amended, this penalty should be
imposed in its minimum degree — that is to say, the penalty applicable in this case is that of presidio correccional in
its medium degree.

Modified by imposing the penalty prescribed for the offense of which the defendant and appellant was convicted in
the minimum degree — that is to say, by, imposing upon the accused the penalty of two years four months and one
day of presidio correccional, in lieu of that of five years' imprisonment imposed by the court below — the judgment
convicting and sentencing him should be and is hereby affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the
appellant.

Arellano, C.J., Moreland, Trent and Araullo, JJ., concur. .

Referring Cases

Sorry, no referring cases.

Hawthorne vs. Eckerson Co., 77 F.2d 844 (1935)

HAWTHORNE v. ECKERSON CO.

77 F.2d 844 (1935)
HAWTHORNE
v.
ECKERSON CO.
No. 401.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
June 3, 1935.
Clayton H. Kinney, of Rutland, Vt., for appellant.
Novak & Bloomer, of Rutland, Vt., for appellee.
Before MANTON, SWAN, and AUGUSTUS N. HAND, Circuit Judges.

AUGUSTUS N. HAND, Circuit Judge.

The plaintiff was driving her own Marquette automobile and was accompanied by one Addie O.
Kellogg, her partner in an antique furniture business, who was sitting in the driver's seat with her.
As the car was rounding a curve in the highway leading from Middlebury to Brandon, Vt., it collided
with a Chevrolet automobile belonging to the defendant Eckerson Company, and driven by A. J.
Gassett, of Burlington, Vt., one of its traveling salesmen. The plaintiff and Miss Kellogg were both
injured and the Marquette car was damaged to the extent of about $125. The plaintiff testified that
when rounding the curve she kept well to the inside of the road and was driving at a speed of only
18 miles per hour. She also showed that Gassett came around the curve at a speed of 40 miles an
hour, did not keep the Chevrolet on his side of the road, but had come over to her side, and that
because of this the collision occurred. After the plaintiff had put in her case the defendant rested
without introducing any proof. Thereupon the court charged the jury that it was to find: (1) Whether
the plaintiff had proved that Gassett was in the employ of the defendant and performing some duty
pertaining to his employment at the time of the collision; (2) whether, if it found such to be the
case, the collision was caused by the defendant's negligence; (3) in the event that (1) and (2) were
resolved against the defendant, what were the plaintiff's damages? The jury returned a verdict of
$4,664.51 for the plaintiff, and from the judgment entered thereon this appeal was taken.
The errors relied on are:
(a) That the court improperly allowed the jury to find that Gassett was acting as defendant's agent
at the time of the collision because he was in the general employment
[ 77 F.2d 846 ]

of the defendant and was driving its car.

(b) That the court unlawfully permitted the plaintiff to prove a settlement by the defendant with Miss
Kellogg of her claim for injuries arising out of the accident in the present case.
While there are various other assignments of error, there is nothing of substance other than (a)
and (b).
In many jurisdictions it is held that in an action for injuries due to collision by an automobile, proof
that at the time of the accident the car was owned by the defendant establishes a prima facie case
for the plaintiff. Curry v. Stevenson, 58 App. D. C. 162, 26 F.2d 534; D'Aleria v. Shirey, 286 F. 523
(C. C. A. 9); Foundation Co. v. Henderson (C. C. A.) 264 F. 483; Benn v. Forrest, 213 F. 763 (C. C.
A. 1); Ferris v. Sterling, 214 N.Y. 249, 108 N. E. 406, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 1161; Rose v. Balfe, 223
N.Y. 481, 119 N. E. 842, Ann. Cas. 1918D, 238; Tischler v. Steinholtz, 99 N. J. Law, 149, 122 A.
880; Gehloff v. DeMarce, 204 Wis. 464, 234 N. W. 717. It is unnecessary for us to say whether
mere proof of ownership of a colliding car constitutes a prima facie case and requires a defendant
who wishes to escape liability to go forward with evidence that the driver was not engaged in the
defendant's business at the time of the accident. There are decisions, including that of Ronan v. J.
G. Turnbull Co., 99 Vt. 280, 131 A. 788, that proof of ownership of the car and of general
employment of the driver by the defendant is insufficient to justify an inference of agency. But, in
any event, it seems clear that, where the car is shown to belong to the defendant and the driver to
be a person accustomed to drive it on the defendant's business, there is enough to require the
latter to meet the natural inference that at the time of the accident the driver was acting as agent
— in other words, in the usual way.
The decision in Ronan v. J. G. Turnbull Co., 99 Vt. 280, 131 A. 788, is relied on by the defendant-
appellant as showing that the evidence in the case at bar did not justify a finding that the driver
was acting as the owner's agent when the accident occurred. But that decision is far from holding
that proof that the driver of a defendant's car, who is not only an employee but is accustomed to
drive it on the defendant's business, will not justify the inference that he was engaged in that
business at the time when an accident has happened, unless there is some reason to suppose
that he was not then so engaged. In the Ronan Case the only evidence (aside from proof of
ownership, of employment of the driver, and of his occasional use of the car, when collecting the
defendant's bills) was that the driver was engaged in his own business at the time when the
accident occurred. That decision seems to us to have no bearing on the facts before us here.
Whatever may be the scope of Ronan v. J. G. Turnbull Co., 99 Vt. 280, 131 A. 788, we think that it
does not go far enough to preclude the inference that Gassett was engaged in the defendant's
business at the time when the plaintiff suffered her injuries. The proof shows not only that the car
belonged to the defendant and that Gassett was in its employ as a traveling salesman, but also
that he was accustomed to drive the car when traveling on the defendant's business in the sale of
its merchandise and that this practice extended to the general neighborhood where the collision
occurred and had existed for a long period before the accident and had continued thereafter. Such
proof, when unexplained, gives rise to an inevitable inference that Gassett was acting as the
defendant's agent.
There is no reason to suppose that the Vermont law is not in accord with what we believe to be the
general rule applicable to the case at bar. But, in any event, we are not bound to follow the rules of
evidence of the state in which the trial was had, Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Norwich Pharmacal
Co., 18 F.2d 934, 939 (C. C. A. 2); Pariso v. Towse (C. C. A.)45 F.2d 962, 964, and we feel no
doubt that, under general principles, the trial judge was right in treating proof of ownership of the
car and Gassett's practice of doing business therewith as defendant's traveling salesman as a
basis for the inference that he was acting as defendant's agent at the time of the collision.
Inasmuch as there was uncontradicted testimony that the car was the defendant's, that Gassett
was its traveling salesman and was accustomed to drive the car while on its business, nothing
further was necessary to show prima facie that Gassett was acting for the defendant. There was
also uncontradicted evidence that Gassett, when rounding the curve on the road to Middlebury, did
not keep on his side of the middle of the highway and that the plaintiff kept as far over on her side
as was practicable. Upon such a record there was no
[ 77 F.2d 847 ]

question for the jury except that of damages.

The defendant complains because the court permitted the plaintiff to prove the settlement with
Miss Kellogg, both in order to show that Gassett was its agent and also to show liability. We think
the rulings in this respect were erroneous. Compromises are not in themselves evidence as
admissions of liability, and the same rule applies when they are offered as proof of agency.
Wigmore on Evidence, § 1061; Wigmore, Supp. (1934) p. 460; West v. Smith, 101 U.S. 263, 273,
25 L. Ed. 809; Paster v. Pa. R. R. (C. C. A.) 43 F.2d 908; Ross v. Fishtine, 277 Mass. 87, 177 N. E.
811; Fulton Iron & E. Works v. Kimball Tp., 52 Mich. 146, 17 N. W. 733; Georgia Ry. & Electric Co.
v. Wallace & Co., 122 Ga. 547, 50 S. E. 478; State v. Campbell, 129 Iowa, 154, 105 N. W. 395;
Powers' Adm'r v. Wiley, 241 Ky. 645, 44 S.W.2d 591; Nadler v. Willen (Sup.) 190 N.Y.S. 577. It is a
quite different matter to allow in evidence independent statements contained in offers of settlement
as admission of liability. West v. Smith, 101 U.S. 263, 25 L. Ed. 809; Hall v. Sera, 112 Conn. 291,
152 A. 148.
Since, irrespective of any inference arising from the agreement of settlement, there was
uncontroverted proof that Gassett was the agent of the defendant, it may be argued that the error
in admitting evidence of the compromise was not prejudicial, for the judge charged the jury that the
plaintiff could only recover compensatory damages for her personal loss and injuries. But in the
course of the testimony as to the settlement, proof was elicited at the suggestion of the court itself,
that Miss Kellogg had received $4,750 in payment of her claim. Such evidence might have led the
jury to allow the plaintiff a recovery equivalent to that of Miss Kellogg, the other occupant of the
car. It is true that the testimony was only admitted on the theory that such a substantial payment
as $4,750 would not have been made merely to buy peace and that the making of it, therefore,
justified the inference that Gassett was the agent of defendant and that the latter was responsible
for his acts. But the evidence was legally inadmissible to prove agency, and we cannot say that
knowledge by the jury of the amount paid to Miss Kellogg might not have caused them to take her
recovery into account in estimating the plaintiff's damages. Tennant v. Dudley, 144 N.Y. 504, 507,
39 N. E. 644; Mischner v. Thalheim, 184 App. Div. 883, 170 N.Y.S. 758.
In Ga. Ry. & Elec. Co. v. Wallace & Co., 122 Ga. 547, 50 S. E. 478, 480, the court said: "The rule
against allowing evidence of compromise is founded upon recognition of the fact that such
testimony is inherently harmful, for the jury will draw conclusions therefrom * * * in spite of anything
which may be said by the judge in instructing them as to the weight to be given such evidence."
That the jury may have been prejudiced by proof of the settlement seems especially likely because
the verdict for the plaintiff was for about the same sum as that paid Miss Kellogg, though the
latter's injuries seem to have been the more serious.
Settlements have always been looked on with favor, and courts have deemed it against public
policy to subject a person who has compromised a claim to the hazard of having a settlement
proved in a subsequent lawsuit by another person asserting a cause of action arising out of the
same transaction. Powers' Adm'r v. Wiley, 241 Ky. 645, 44 S.W.2d 591.
As proof of the settlement was erroneously received and may have prejudiced the result of the
trial, the judgment cannot stand.
Judgment reversed.
MANTON, Circuit Judge, dissents with opinion.
MANTON, Circuit Judge (dissenting).
Appellee's proof of ownership, general employment, and customary use established a prima facie
case, which means that there was a question of fact for the jury as to operation of the car for the
appellant's business. From such proof the jury was permitted to infer, as its reason might dictate,
either that the driver was, or was not, acting within the scope of his employment.
The evidence said to be erroneously admitted may have been a factor which determined the jury's
verdict. In such case, it would be important and may well have been the decisive piece of evidence
upon which the verdict was based. Therefore, it is essential to hold that the evidence of payment of
a claim of a passenger in appellee's car, at the time of the accident, was an admission of the
scope of employment of appellant's servant. A compromise is not admissible
[ 77 F.2d 848 ]
as an admission because it is, in point of fact, no admission at all. It is referred to by Wigmore,
§ 1061, as a hypothetical concession, and is not an assertion. It does not imply a belief that the
claim is well founded, but only that payment is to be preferred to the annoyance of a suit. In
Tennant v. Hamilton, 7 C. L. & F. 122, it was said that "money paid upon a complaint made,
paid merely to purchase peace, is no proof that the demand is well founded." See Rideout v.
Newton, 17 N.H. 71; Snow v. Batchelder, 8 Cush. (Mass.) 513. So, when a person
compromises a claim made against him, it cannot be said that he, by such act, admits the truth
of any part of the claim.
However, a plain and forthright admission of the truth of a claim and payment thereof, even though
the amount of damages is the result of a compromise, cannot be truly said to be a compromise. A
compromise is hypothetical and therefore nonadmissible as an assertion. But if payment of a claim
is absolute in terms, it is not a compromise but is, rather, an outright admission of the truth of the
claim. Where there is no mere assumption that a claim is well founded, or payment thereof for the
purpose of purchasing peace, there is no compromise. In such case there is an admission of the
truth of the claim. Consequently, the question of whether the trial court was correct in admitting
evidence of payment of the passenger's claim depends upon whether such payment was merely a
hypothetical admission or was an absolute admission of the truth of the claim.
The distinction between an admission of the truth of a claim and a mere "purchase of peace" was
observed in the leading case of Colburn v. Town of Groton, 66 N.H. 151, 28 A. 95, 22 L. R. A. 763.
The facts in that case were quite similar to those present in the instant case. There the plaintiff
brought an action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the
fault of the defendant. At the time of the accident, a passenger in plaintiff's vehicle received
injuries, and plaintiff offered to show that the defendant had settled the passenger's claim for
damages. On appeal, the court held that whether payment of the passenger's claim was an
admission of liability, in which event it was admissible, or was a mere "purchase of peace," and
nonadmissible, was a question for the judge to decide before admitting it in evidence. Whether or
not payment of a third party's claim is admissible in evidence, said the court, depends entirely
upon the intent of the party making the payment. What the intent was is a question for the trial
court. (The case cited states that the amount paid in settlement may be a circumstance to be
considered in arriving at the intent with which the payment was made.)
In Grimes v. Keene, 52 N.H. 330, plaintiff offered to prove that the defendant had paid a passenger
in his carriage for injuries caused by the same accident. It was held that such evidence was
admissible on the ground that payment of the claim was an admission of the truth of the claim,
especially in so far as no proof that the payment of the claim was a matter of compromise was
offered by defendant.
In Phoenix Assurance Co. v. Davis, 67 F.2d 824 (C. C. A. 5), it was held that whether a transaction
is a mere compromise or an admission is ordinarily a preliminary question for the trial judge,
though if the evidence on this preliminary question is conflicting, the question may be submitted to
the jury with proper instructions. The court thus observed the distinction between a "purchase of
peace" and an admission.
In Weiss v. Kohlhagen, 58 Or. 144, 113 P. 46, it was held that it is permissible to offer in evidence
proof that the party claimed to be liable had settled with others in the same position as the plaintiff.
In Manistee National Bank v. Seymour, 64 Mich. 59, 31 N. W. 140, it was stated to be the general
rule that all admissions not made to make peace are admissible in evidence.
In Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Rhodes, 21 Colo. App. 229, 121 P. 769, it was held that plaintiff in
a suit to recover for the death of cattle alleged to have been killed by defendant, might offer in
evidence proof that the defendant had paid another whose cattle were killed at the same time in
the absence of proof by defendant that the payment was made merely to purchase peace.
In Michigan, etc., Ins. Co. v. Pere Marquette Ry. Co., 193 Mich. 429, 160 N. W. 599, it was held
that the trial court should decide whether a payment is a compromise or an admission that a claim
is well founded.
 Therefore, if payment of the passenger's claim was an outright admission that the driver was
acting within the scope of
[ 77 F.2d 849 ]

his employment, it was admissible. The appellee offered evidence that the passenger claimed
the appellant was liable to her for injuries inflicted by the appellee through its agent. Appellee
then showed that the appellant paid the passenger's claim. Appellee offered this as an
admission on the part of the appellant that the driver of the car was acting as appellant's agent
and within the scope of his employment.
The court below admitted the testimony as an admission that the driver was appellant's agent
acting within the scope of his authority. The appellant offered no evidence whatever that it was a
hypothetical admission only; that is, merely a compromise. The appellant having offered no
evidence, the trial court was correct in admitting it for the purpose offered, namely, as an
admission rather than as evidence of a compromise for the purpose of purchasing peace.
The judgment should be affirmed.

People vs. Yip Wai Ming, 264 SCRA 224 (1979)

G.R. No. 120959 November 14, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
YIP WAI MING, accused-appellant.

MELO, J.:
Accused-appellant Yip Wai Ming and victim Lam Po Chun, both Hongkong nationals, came to Manila on vacation on
July 10, 1993. The two were engaged to be married. Hardly a day had passed when Lam Po Chun was brutally beaten
up and strangled to death in their hotel room. On the day of the killing, July 11, 1993, Yip Wai Ming, was touring
Metro Manila with Filipino welcomers while Lam Po Chun was left in the hotel room allegedly because she had a
headache and was not feeling well enough to do the sights.
For the slaying, an Information was lodged against Yip Wai Ming on July 19, 1991, which averred :
That on or about July 11, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill with treachery and evident premeditation, did
then and there attack, assault and use personal violence upon one Lam Po Chun by then and there
mauling and strangling the latter, thereby inflicting upon her mortal and fatal wounds which were the
direct and immediate cause of her death thereafter.
On May 15, 1995, Branch 44 of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Manila
and presided over by the Honorable Lolita O. Gal-lang rendered a decision in essence finding that Yip Wai Ming
killed his fiancee before he left for the Metro Manila tour. Disposed thus the trial court:
WHEREFORE, in view of the forgoing established evidence, judgment is hereby rendered convicting
the accused Yip Wai Ming beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as charged in the
information and as defined in Article 248, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code, and in accordance
therewith the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation which attended the commission of
the offense, the said accused Yip Wai Ming is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua with all the accessory penalties provided for by law.
Accused is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased Lam Po Chun of Hongkong the death
indemnity for damages at Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos; Moral and compensatory damages of
Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos each or a total of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00);
plus costs of suit.
 The accused being detained, he is credited with the full extent of the period under which he was
under detention, in accordance with the rules governing convicted prisoners.
SO ORDERED.
(p. 69, Rollo.)
There was no eyewitness to the actual killing of Lam Po Chun. All the evidence about the killing is circumstantial.
The key issue in the instant appeal is, therefore, whether or not the circumstantial evidence linking accused-appellant
to the killing is sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
The evidence upon which the prosecution convinced the trial court of accused-appellant's guilt beyond reasonable
doubt is summarized in the Solicitor-General's brief as follows :
On or about 7 o'clock in the evening of July 10, 1993, appellant and his fiancee Lam Po Chun who
are both Hongkong nationals, checked in at Park Hotel located at No. 1032-34 Belen St., Paco,
Manila. They were billeted at Room 210. Angel Gonzaga, the roomboy on duty, assisted the couple in
going up to their room located at the second floor of the hotel (p. 14, tsn, October 13, 1993, p. 66, tsn,
September 1, 1993). When they reached Room 210, appellant got the key from Angel Gonzaga and
informed the latter that they do not need any room service, particularly the bringing of foods and
other orders to their room (pp. 67-69, tsn, September 1, 1993).
After staying for about an hour inside Room 210, the couple went down to the lobby of the hotel.
Appellant asked the front desk receptionist on duty to call a certain Gwen delos Santos and to instruct
her to pick them up the following day, July 11, 1993, a Sunday at 10 o' clock in the morning (pp. 21-
25, tsn, September 8, 1993).
At about past 8 o'clock in the same evening of July 10, 1993, Cariza Destresa, occupant of Room 211
which is adjacent to Room 210, heard a noise which sounds like a heated argument between a man
and a woman coming from the room occupied by appellant and Lam Po Chun. The heated
discussions lasted for thirty (30) minutes and thereafter subsided.
In the following morning, that is, July 11, 1993, at around 9:15, the same Cariza Destreza again heard
a banging which sounds like somebody was thrown and stomped on the floor inside Room 210.
Cariza, who became curious, went near the wall dividing her room and Room 210. She heard a cry of
a woman as if she cannot breathe (pp. 23-24, tsn, August 30, 1993).
At about 10 o'clock a.m., Gwen delos Santos, together with two lady companions, arrived at the
lobby of the Park Hotel. The receptionist informed appellant by telephone of her arrival. In response,
appellant came down without his fiancee Lam Po Chun. After a while, he together with Gwen delos
Santos and the latter's companions, left the hotel. Before leaving, he gave instruction to the front desk
receptionist not to disturb his fiancee at Room 210. He also ordered not to accept any telephone calls,
no room cleaning and no room service (pp. 37- 43, tsn, October 18, 1993).
When appellant left, the front desk receptionist, Enriquieta Patria, noticed him to be in a hurry,
perspiring and looking very scared (p. 32, tsn, September 22, 1993).
During the whole morning of July 11, 1993, after appellant left the hotel until his return at 11 o'clock
in the evening, he did not call his fiancee Lam Po Chun to verify her physical condition (p. 44 tsn,
October 18, 1993, p. 18, tsn, November 23, 1993).
When appellant arrived at 11 o'clock p.m. on that day, he asked the receptionist for the key of his
room. Then together with Fortunato Villa, the roomboy, proceeded to Room 210. When the lock was
opened and the door was pushed, Lam Po Chun was found dead lying face down on the bed covered
with a blanket. Appellant removed the blanket and pretended to exclaim "My God, she is dead" but
did not even embrace his fiancee. Instead, appellant asked the room boy to go down the hotel to
inform the front desk, the security guard and other hotel employees to call the police (pp. 8-27, tsn,
October 18, 1993).
When the police arrived, they conducted an examination of the condition of the doors and windows
of the room as well as the body of the victim and the other surroundings. They found no signs of
forcible entry and they observed that no one can enter from the outside except the one who has the
 key. The police also saw the victim wrapped in a colored blanket lying face down. When they
removed the blanket and tried to change the position of her body, the latter was already in state
of rigor mortis, which indicates that the victim has been dead for ten (10) to twelve (12) hours. The
police calculated that Lam Po Chun must have died between 9 to 10 in the morning of July 11, 1993
(pp. 2-29), tsn, September 22, 1993).
Dr. Manuel Lagonera, medico-legal officer of the WPD, conducted an autopsy of the body of the
victim. His examination (Exh. V) revealed that the cause of death was "asphyxia by strangulation."
Dr. Lagonera explained that asphyxia is caused by lack of oxygen entering the body when the
entrance of air going to the respiratory system is blocked (pp. 6-19, tsn, December 14, 1993).
Prior to the death of the victim, her brother, Lam Chi Keung, learned that her life was insured with
the Insurance Company of New Zealand in Causeway Bay, Hongkong, with appellant as the
beneficiary. The premium paid for the insurance was more than the monthly salary of the deceased as
an insurance underwriter in Hongkong (Exh. X).
It was on the bases of the foregoing facts that appellant was charged before the Regional Trial Court
in Manila for the crime of murder committed against the person of Lam Po Chun.
(pp. 3-7, Appellee' Brief, ff. p. 176, Rollo.)
In his brief, accused-appellant offers explanatory facts and argues that the findings of fact of the trial court are based
mainly on the prosecution evidence displaying bias against accused-appellant. He contends that the court made
unwarranted and unfounded conclusions on the basis of self-contradictory and conflicting evidence.
Accused-appellant, at the time of the commission of the crime, was a customer relations officer of Well Motors
Company in Kowloon, Hongkong. He met Lam Po Chun at a party in 1991. Both were sportsminded and after a short
courtship, the two began to have a relationship, living together in the same apartment. The two toured China and
Macao together in 1992. In April, 1993 the two decided to get married. In May 1993, they registered with the
Hongkong Marriage Registry. The wedding was set for August 29, 1993.
An office-mate of accused-appellant named Tessie "Amay" Ticar encouraged him and Lam Po Chun to tour the
Philippines in celebration of their engagement. After finishing the travel arrangements, the two were given by Ticar
the names (Toots, Monique, and Gwen) of her cousins in Manila and their telephone number. Photos of their Manila
contacts were shown to them. In addition to his Citibank credit card, accused-appellant brought P24,000.00 secured at
a Hongkong money exchange and HK$4,000.00. Lam Po Chun had HK$3,000.00.
The two arrived in Manila on July 10, 1993 at about 5:40 P.M. on board Cathay Pacific Flight CX 903. They arrived at
Park Hotel around 7 P.M. From their hotel room, accused-appellant called their contact, Gwen delos Santos, by
telephone informing her of their arrival. The two ate outside at McDonald's restaurant.
Accused-appellant woke up the following morning — Sunday, July 11, 1993 — at around 8 o'clock. After the usual
amenities, including a shower, the two had breakfast in the hotel restaurant, then they went back to their room. At
around 10 o'clock that same morning, accused-appellant received a phone call from the hotel staff telling him that
their visitors had arrived.
He then went to the lobby ahead of Lam Po Chun, introduced himself to the delos Santos sisters, Gwen and Monique,
and their mother. A few minutes later, Lom Po Chun joined them. Two bottles of perfume were given to the sisters as
arrival gifts.
Gwen delos Santos invited the couple to tour the city but Lam Po Chun decided to stay behind as it was very hot and
she had a headache. She excused herself and went up to her room, followed later by accused-appellant to get another
bottle of perfume.
Accused-appellant claims that before leaving, he instructed the clerk at the front desk to give Lam Po Chun some
medicine for headache and, as much as possible, not to disturb her.
Accused-appellant, Gwen, Monique, and the sisters' mother took a taxicab to Landmark Department Store where they
window shopped. Accused-appellant states that from a telephone booth in the store, he called Lam Po Chun but no
one answered his call. From Landmark where they had lunch, the four went to Shoemart Department Store in Makati.
Accused-appellant bought a Giordano T-shirt at Landmark and chocolates at Shoemart. Gwen delos Santos brought
the group to the house of her aunt, Edna Bayona, at Roces, Quezon City. From Roces St., Gwen delos Santos brought
the group to her home in Balut, Tondo. Using the delos Santos telephone, accused-appellant called his office in
Hongkong. The PLDT receipt showed that the call was made at 6:44 P.M. on July 11, 1993. Accused-appellant claims
that, afterwards, he called up Lam Po Chun at their hotel room but the phone just kept on ringing with nobody
answering it. The group had dinner at the delos Santos house in Tondo. After dinner, Gwen delos Santos' brother and
sister-in-law arrived. They insisted in bringing their guest to a restaurant near Manila Bay for coffee, but it was full so
they proceeded to Tia Maria, a Mexican restaurant in Makati.
Finally, the delos Santos family brought Andy Yip back to the Park Hotel, arriving there at around 10:30 PM. Before
the delos Santos group left, there was an agreement that the following morning accused-appellant and Lam Po Chun
would join them in another city tour.
After accused-appellant's knocks at the door of their room remained unanswered, he went back to the hotel front desk
and asked the hotel staff to open the door for him. The room was dark. Accused-appellant put on the light switch. He
wanted to give the roomboy who accompanied him a P20 or P30 tip but his smallest bill was P100. He went to a side
table to get some smaller change. It was then when he noticed the disordered room, a glass case and wallet on the
floor, and Lam Po Chun lying face down on one of the beds.
Accused-appellant tried to wake Lam Po Chun up by calling her name but when she did not respond, he lifted up her
face, moving her body sidewards. He saw blood. Shocked, he shouted at the roomboy to call a doctor.
Several people rushed to Room 210. A foreigner looked at Lam Po Chun and said she was dead. The foreigner placed
his arms around accused-appellant who was slumped on the floor and motioned for him to leave the room. Accused-
appellant refused, but he was made to move out and to go to the lobby, at which place, dazed and crying, he called up
Gwen delos Santos to inform her of what happened. Gwen could not believe what she heard, but she assured accused-
appellant that they were going to the hotel. Policemen then arrived.
In the instant appeal, accused-appellant, through his new counsel, former Justice Ramon C. Fernandez, assigns the
following alleged errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS
ARRESTED WITHOUT WARRANT, WAS TORTURED AND WAS NOT INFORMED THAT HE
HAD THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT AND BE ASSISTED BY INDEPENDENT AND
COMPETENT COUNSEL DURING CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT HAD THE
VICTIM APPLE INSURED AND LATER KILLED HER FOR THE INSURANCE PROCEEDS.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT COMMITTED
A CRIME OF MURDER AGGRAVATED BY EVIDENT PREMEDITATION.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF OFFICER
ALEJANDRO YANQUILING, JR.
V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RELYING ON THE TESTIMONY OF CARISA DESTREZA
WHO INCURRED SERIOUS CONTRADICTIONS ON MATERIAL POINTS.
VI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RELYING ON THE TESTIMONIES OF THE OTHER
PROSECUTION WITNESSES THAT CONTRADICTED EACH OTHER ON MATERIAL
POINTS.
VII
 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE TESTIMONIES OF THE WITNESSES
OF THE ACCUSED ARE INCREDIBLE.
VIII
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION HAS ESTABLISHED
THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT BY PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
IX
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT COMPLETELY ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION.
(pp. 80-82, Rollo.)
The trial court, in arriving at its conclusions, took the various facts presented by the prosecution, tied them up together
like parts of a jig-saw puzzle, and came up with a complete picture of circumstantial evidence depicting not only the
commission of the crime itself but also the motive behind it.
Our review of the record, however, discloses that certain key elements, without which the picture of the crime would
be faulty and unsound, are not based on reliable evidence. They appear to be mere surmises and assumptions rather
than hard facts or well-grounded conclusions.
A key element in the web of circumstantial evidence is motive which the prosecution tried to establish. Accused-
appellant and Lam Po Chun were engaged to be married. They had toured China and Macao together. They were
living together in one apartment. They were registered with the Hongkong Marriage Registry in May 1993. Marriage
date was set for August 29, 1993. This date was only a month and a half away from the date of death of Lam Po Chun.
In the absence of direct evidence indubitably showing that accused-appellant was the perpetrator of the killing, motive
becomes important. The theory developed by the prosecution was not only of a cold-blooded crime but a well-planned
one, including its timing up to the half hour. It is not the kind of crime that a man would commit against his wife-to-be
unless a strong motive for it existed.
The trial court would have been justified in finding that there was evident premeditation of murder if the story is
proved that Lam Po Chun insured herself for the amounts of US $498,750.00 and US $249,375.00 naming accused-
appellant as the beneficiary.
There is, however, no evidence that the victim secured an insurance policy for a big amount in US dollars and
indicated accused-appellant as the beneficiary. The prosecution presented Exhibit "X", a mere xerox copy of a
document captioned "Proposal for Life Insurance" as proof the alleged insurance. It is not a certified copy, nor was the
original first identified.
The authenticity of the document has thus not been duly established. Exhibit "X" was secured in Hongkong when
Lam Chi Keung, the brother of the victim, learned that his sister was murdered in Manila. It is not shown how and
from whom the information about any alleged insurance having been secured came. There is no signature indicating
that the victim herself applied for the insurance. There is no marking in Exhibit "X" of any entry which purports to be
the victim's signature. There is a signature of Apple Lam which is most unusual for an insurance application because
the victim's name is Lam Po Chun. To be sure nobody insures himself or herself under a nickname. The entries in the
form are in block letters uniformly written by one hand. Below the printed name "Lam Po Chun" are Chinese
characters which presumably are the Chinese translation of her name. Nobody was presented to identify the author of
the "block" handwriting. Neither the prosecution nor the trial court made any comparisons, such as the signature of
Lam Po Chun on her passport (Exh. "C"), with her purported signature or any other entry in the form.
It needs not much emphasis to say that an application form does not prove that insurance was secured. Anybody can
get an application form for insurance, fill it up at home before filing it with the insurance company. In fact, the very
first sentence of the form states that it merely "forms the basis of a contract between you and NZI Life." There was no
contract yet.
There is evidence in the record that the family of Lam Po Chun did not like her relationship with accused-appellant.
After all the trouble that her brother went through to gather evidence to pin down accused-appellant, the fact that all
he could come up with is an unsigned insurance application form shows there was no insurance money forthcoming
for accused-appellant if Lam Po Chun died. There is no proof that the insurance company approved the proposal, no
proof that any premium payments were made, and no proof from the record of exhibits as to the date it was
accomplished. It appearing that no insurance was issued to Lam Po Chun with accused-appellant as the beneficiary,
the motive capitalized upon by the trial court vanishes. Thus, the picture changes to one of the alleged perpetrator
killing his fiancee under cold-blooded circumstances for nothing.
There are other suspicious circumstances about the insurance angle. Lam Po Chun was working for the National
insurance Company. Why then should she insure her life with the New Zealand Insurance Company? Lam's monthly
salary was only HK $5,000.00. The premiums for the insurance were HK $5,400.00 or US $702.00 per month. Why
should Lam insure herself with the monthly premiums exceeding her monthly salary? And why should any insurance
company approve insurance, the premiums of which the supposed insured obviously con not afford to pay, in the
absence of any showing that somebody else is paying for said premiums. It is not even indicated whether or not there
are rules in Hongkong allowing a big amount of insurance to be secured where the beneficiary is not a spouse, a
parent, a sibling, a child, or other close relative.
Accused-appellant points out an apparent lapse of the trial court related to the matter of insurance. At page 33 of the
decision, the trial court stated:
Indeed, Yip Wai Ming testified that he met Andy Kwong in a restaurant in Hongkong and told Yip
and Lam Po Chun should be married and there must be an insurance for her life . . . .
(p. 33, RTC Decision; p. 66, Rollo.)
The source of the above finding is stated by the court as "tsn hearing Sept. 22, 1992." But accused-appellant Yip Wai
Ming did not testify on September 22, 1992. The entire 112 pages of the testimony on that date came from SP02
Yanquiling. The next hearing was on September 29, 1993. All the 100 pages of the testimony on that date came from
Yanquiling. The next hearing on October 13, 1993 resulted in 105 pages of testimony, also from Yanquiling. This
Court is at a complete loss as to the reason of the trial court sourcing its statement to accused-appellant's alleged
testimony.
Lam Po Chun must have been unbelievably trusting or stupid to follow the alleged advice of Andy Kwong. It is
usually the man who insures himself with the wife or future wife or beneficiary instead of the other way around. Why
should Lam Po Chun, with her relatively small salary which is not even enough to pay for the monthly premiums,
insure herself for such a big amount. This is another reason why doubts arise as to the truth of the insurance angle.
Another key factor which we believe was not satisfactorily established is the time of death. This element is material
because from 10 A.M. of July 11, 1993 up to the time the body was discovered late that evening, accused-appellant
was in the company of Gwen delos Santos, her sister Monique, and their mother, touring Metro Manila and going
from place to place. This much is established.
To go around this problem of accused-appellant being away from the scene of the crime during the above mentioned
hours, the prosecution introduced testimonial evidence as to the probable time of death, always placing it within the
narrow 45-minute period between 9:15 and 10 A.M. of July 11, 1993, the time when Cariza Destresa, the occupant of
the adjoining room, heard banging sounds coming from the room of accused-appellant, and the time accused-appellant
left with his Filipino friends.
The prosecution alleges that at 10 A.M., Lam Po Chun was already dead. However, Gwen delos Santos who never
saw the couple before was categorical in declaring that she met both of them at the lobby before the group left for the
tour (tsn, Feb. 14, 1994, p. 64; p. 20, RTC Decision; p. 150, Rollo), but Lam Po Chun asked to be excused because of
a headache. In fact, delos Santos was able to identify Lam Po Chun from pictures shown during the trial. She could
not have done this unless she really saw and met the victim at the hotel lobby at around 10 A.M. of July 11, 1993.
The prosecution introduced an expert in the person of Dr. Manuel Lagonera to establish the probable time of death.
Dr. Lagonera, medico-legal officer of the PNP Western Police District, after extensive questioning on his
qualifications as on expert witness, what he discovered as the cause of death (strangulation), the contents of the
deceased's stomach, injuries sustained, and the condition of the cadaver, was asked to establish the time of death, to
wit:
Q. If we use thirty six (36) hours to forty eight (48) hours, will you agree with me
that it is possible that the victim was killed in the morning of July 10, 1993?
A. I cannot, I have no basis whether the victim was killed in he morning or in the
afternoon
 (tsn, Dec. 14, 1993, p. 31.)
Dr. Lagonera's testimony on the number of assailants was similar. He had no basis for an answer, thusly:
ATTY. PASCUA:
Q. Would you be able to determine also based on your findings your autopsy
whether the assailants, the number of the assailants?
WITNESS:
A. I have no basis, Sir.
ATTY. PASCUA:
Q. You have no basis. And would it also have been possible, that there were more
than one assailants?
WITNESS:
A. It is possible also.
ATTY. PASCUA:
Q. It is possible also, who simultaneously inflicted the wounds of the victim?
WITNESS:
A. It is possible.
ATTY. PASCUA:
Q. Based also on your autopsy report, were there signs that the victim put a struggle?
WITNESS:
A. There were no injuries in the hand or forearms or upper arms of the victim. So,
there were no sign of struggle on the part of the victim.
ATTY. PASCUA:
Q. And your basis in saying that there was no struggle on the part of the victim was
that there were no apparent or seen injuries in the hands of the victim?
WITNESS:
A. Yes, sir.
ATTY. PASCUA:
Q. But you did not examine the fingernails?
WITNESS:
A. No, I did not examine, Sir.
ATTY. PASCUA:
Q. Were there also injuries at the back portion of the head of the victim?
WITNESS:
A. No injuries at the back, all in front.
ATTY. PASCUA:
Q. All in front, meaning in terms of probability and based on your professional
opinion, the attack would have come from a frontal attack or the attacker would have
come from behind to inflict the frontal injuries of the victim?
WITNESS:
 A. It can be the attack coming from behind in the front or both, sir.
ATTY. PASCUA:
Q. But in your professional opinion or in your experience, based on the injuries
sustained including the location of the injuries on the body of the victim, would it be
more probable that the attack came from in front of the victim?
WITNESS:
A. Yes, it is possible, Sir.
(tsn, Dec. 14, 1993, pp. 60-63.)
Dr. Lagonera placed the probable time of death as July 10, 1993 (tsn, Dec. 14, 1993, p. 108). It is undisputed that at
around 8:30 A.M. of July 11, 1993 accused-appellant and Lam Po Chun took breakfast together at the hotel restaurant.
She could not have been killed on July 10, 1993. The autopsy conducted by Dr. Lagonera and the testimony of
accused-appellant coincided insofar as the food taken at breakfast is concerned. The couple ate eggs, bacon, and
toasted bread. But the doctor was insistent that the death occurred the previous day.
Where a medico-legal expert of the police department could not, with any measure of preciseness, fix the time of
death, the police investigator was bold and daring enough to establish it. Surprisingly, the trial court accepted this kind
of evidence. SP02 Alejandro Yanquiling testified that he arrived at the Park Hotel at about 11:25 o'clock on the
evening of July 11, 1993 to conduct the investigation of the crime. At the time, the victim showed signs of rigor
mortis, stiffening of the muscle joints, with liquid and blood oozing from the nose and mouth. On the basis of his
observations, he declared that the victim had been dead for 10 to 12 hours.
The trial court stated that if the victim had been dead from 10 to 12 hours at 11:35 o'clock in the evening, it is safe to
conclude that she was killed between 9 and 10 o'clock on the morning of July 11, 1993. The mathematics of the trial
court is faulty. Twelve hours before 11:35 P.M. would be 11:35 A.M.. Ten hours earlier would even be later — 1.35
P.M. Since accused-appellant was unquestionably with Gwen delos Santos and her group touring and shopping in
megamalls between 10 A.M. and 11:35 P.M., the assailant or assailants must have been other people who were able to
gain entry into the hotel room at that time.
The trial court stated that there was no sign of any forcible entry into the room, no broken locks, windows, etc. The
answer is simple. Somebody could have knocked on the door and Lam Po Chun could have opened it thinking they
were hotel staff. Unfortunately, Detective Yanquiling was so sure of himself that after pinpointing accused-appellant
as the culprit, he did not follow any other leads. In the course of his interviews with witnesses, his purpose was simply
to nail down one suspect. His investigation was angled towards pinning down Yip Wai Ming. In fact, Gwen delos
Santos testified that Yanquiling talked to her over the telephone almost daily urging her to change her testimony.
Officer Yanquiling testified on cross-examination that he did not apply any mode of scientific investigation. If a
medico-legal expert of the same police department who conducted an autopsy had no basis for giving the probable
time of death, the police officer who merely looked at the body and saw the blood oozing out of the victim's nose and
mouth must have simply guessed such time, plucking it out of thin air. The trial court accepted the erroneous timing,
conveniently placing it where a finding of guilt would follow as a consequence.
Before a conviction can be had upon circumstantial evidence, the circumstances should constitute an unbroken chain
which leads to but one fair and reasonable conclusion, which points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, of
the guilty person (U.S. vs. Villos, 6 Phil. 510 [1906]; People vs. Subano, 73 Phil. 692 [1942]). Every hypothesis
consistent with innocence must be excluded if guilt beyond reasonable doubt is based on circumstantial evidence
(U.S. vs. Cajayon, 2 Phil. 570 [1903]; U.S. vs. Tan Chian, 17 Phil. 209 [1910]; U.S. vs. Levente, 18 Phil. 439 [1911]).
All the evidence must be consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent
with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt (People vs. Andia,
2 SCRA 423 [1961]).
The tests as to the sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt have not been
met in the case at bar.
The chain of circumstances is not unbroken. The most vital circumstantial evidence in this case is that which proves
that accused-appellant killed the victim so he could gain from the insurance proceeds on the life of the victim. Another
vital circumstance is the time of death precisely between 9:15 and 10 A.M. Both were not satisfactorily established by
the prosecution. Where the weakest link in the chain of evidence is at the same time the most vital circumstance, there
can be no other alternative but to acquit the accused (People vs. Maaborang, 9 SCRA 108 [1963]).
Since the sentence of conviction is based on the crime having been committed within a short time frame, accused-
appellant cannot be convicted on the strength of circumstantial evidence if doubts are entertained as to where he was
at that particular time and reasonable conclusions can be had that other culprits could have entered the room after
accused-appellant left with the delos Santos family. Other people could have killed the victim.
The trial court also relied heavily on the testimony of Cariza Destresa, a 19-year old cultural dancer occupying with
her Australian boyfriend Peter Humphrey, the adjoining Room 211. Destresa testified that while she was in Room 211
at about 9:15 o'clock on the morning of July 11, 1993, she heard banging sounds in Room 210, as if somebody was
being thrown, and there was stomping on the floor. The banging sounds lasted about thirty (30) minutes, an
improbably long time to kill a woman. Destresa stated that she placed her ear near the wall and heard the cry of a
woman having difficulty in breathing.
The witness heard the banging sounds between 9:15 and 9:45 A.M. of July 11, 1993, not before or after. The
unreliability of Destresa's memory as to dates and time is shown by the fact that when asked as to the date of her
Australian boyfriend's arrival in the Philippines, she stated, "July 29, 1993." Pressed by the prosecuting attorney if she
was sure of said date, she changed this to "July 16, 1993." Pressed further:
Q. Are you sure that he arrived in the Philippines on July 16, 1993?
A. I can't exactly remember the date of the arrival of my boyfriend here in the
Philippines because his coming was sudden, Sir.
(tsn, Sept. 30, 1993, p. 10.)
On July 16 and July 19, 1993 Lam Po Chun was already dead. If Peter Humphrey was still in Australia on July 11,
1993, how could he occupy with his girlfriend the next door room, Room 211, on that date at the Park Hotel. If
Destresa cannot remember the date her Australian boyfriend arrived, how could the trial court rely on her memory as
to the 30-minute interval from 9:15 A.M. to 9:45 A.M. of July 11, 1993 when the alleged murder took place. Asked
what time on July 13, 1993 she gave her sworn statement to the police, Destresa answered, "I am not sure, may be it
was in the early morning between 2 or 3 o'clock of that day, Sir." Destresa was asked how she could be certain of July
13, 1993 as the date of her sworn statement. She answered that this was the day her boyfriend left for Australia (tsn,
Aug. 31, 1993, p. 29). In her testimony given on the same day, Destresa states that she stayed in Room 211 for 3
months. She later changed her mind and said she stayed there only when Peter Humphrey was in the Philippines.
According to the witness, Peter left on May 29, 1993; arrived in June and July; left in June; arrived in July; left on
July 13, 1993. Destresa was confused and evasive not only as to dates, but also as to her employment, stating at the
start of her testimony that she was jobless, but later declaring that she was a dancer with the "Rampage" group and
performed in Dubai.
Destresa testified at one point that she heard an argument between a man and a woman in a dialect she could not
understand. This was supposed to be on the evening of July 11, 1993. At that time, the victim had long been dead.
Destresa gave various contradictory statements in her August 30, 1993; August 31, 1993; and September 1, 1993
testimony. To our mind, the trial court gravely erred in relying on her testimony.
Accused-appellant was arrested on July 13, 1993, two days after the killing. There was no warrant of arrest. Officer
Yanquiling testified that there was no warrant and he arrested the accused-appellant based on "series of circumstantial
evidence." He had no personal knowledge of Yip Wai Ming having committed the crime. Accused-appellant stated
that five police officers at the police station beat him up. They asked him to undress, forced him to lie down on a
bench, sat on his stomach, placed a handkerchief over his face, and poured water and beer over his face. When he
could no longer bear the pain, he admitted the crime charged. participated in a re-enactment, and signed an
extrajudicial statement. All the while, he was not informed of his right to remain silent nor did he have counsel of his
choice to assist him in confessing the crime.
The custodial interrogation of accused-appellant was violative of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution. The
Constitution provides that "(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this section or Section 17 hereof
shall be inadmissible against him." Section 17, Article III provides: "No person shell be compelled to be a witness
against himself." Any confession, including a re-enactment without admonition of the right to silence and to counsel,
and without counsel chosen by the accused is inadmissible in evidence (People vs. Duero, 104 SCRA 379 [1981]).
This Court notes that accused-appellant did not file any complaint or charges against the police officers who allegedly
tortured him. But he was a foreign national, a tourist charged with a serious crime, finding himself in strange
surroundings. In Hongkong, there would have been family members and friends who could have given him moral
support. He would have known that he was being questioned in his own country, being investigated under the laws of
that country. The degree of intimidation needed to coerce a person to confess to the commission of a crime he did not
commit would be much less if he is in a strange land. Accused-appellant states that his lawyers told him not to file any
charges against the policemen. He followed their advice, obviously not wanting to get into more trouble.
This Court has carefully gone over the record of this case. We simply cannot state that the circumstantial evidence is
in its entirety credible and unbroken and that the finding of guilt excludes any other possibility that the accused-
appellant may be innocent.
Most of the circumstantial evidence in this case came from the investigation conducted by Officer Alejandro
Yanquiling or from the prodding by him of various witnesses. The desire of a police officer to solve a high profile
crime which could mean a promotion or additional medals and commendations is admirable. However, an investigator
must pursue various leads and hypotheses instead of singlemindedly pursuing one suspect and limiting his
investigation to that one possibility, excluding various other probabilities. The killing of a tourist is a blot on the peace
and order situation in the Philippines and must be solved. Still, concentrating on pinning down an alien companion of
the victim and not pursuing the possibilities that other persons could have killed the victim for her money and
valuables does not speak well of our crime detection system. It is not enough to solve a crime. The truth is more
important and justice must be rendered.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Yip Wai Ming
is acquitted of the charge of murder on grounds of reasonable doubt and his immediate release from custody is
ordered unless he is being held on other legal grounds.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

People vs. Maqueda, 242 SCRA 565 (1995)

G.R. No. 112983 March 22, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
HECTOR MAQUEDA @ PUTOL, and RENE SAGVAMAIJTE (at large), Accused, HECTOR MAQUEDA @
PUTOL, Accused-Appellant.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

As against a bustling city life, Britisher Horace William Barker, a consultant of the World Bank, and his Filipino wife,
Teresita Mendoza, chose the peace and quiet of a country home not any near the metropolis of Manila or its environs,
but in the rugged and mountainous terrain of Tuba, Benguet. Perhaps they thought they were in a veritable paradise,
beyond the reach of worldly distractions and trouble when in the early morning of 27 August 91, in the, sanctity of
their own home, Horace was brutally slain and Teresita badly battered with lead pipes on the occasion of a robbery.
Sufficient prima facie evidence pointed to Rene Salvamante, the victims·former houseboy, as one of the perpetrators
of the That illusion was shattered ghastly crime.
As to Rene's co-conspirator, the, prosecution initially included one Richard Malig y Severino in the information for
robbery with homicide and serious physical injuries 1 filed on 19 November 1991 with Branch 10 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Benguet at La Trinidad, Benguet.
Only Richard Malig was arrested On 22 January 1992, prior to the arraignment of Richard Malig, the prosecution filed
a motion to amend the information 2 to implead as co-accused Hector Maqueda alias Putol because the evaluation Of
the evidence subsequently submitted established his complicity in the crime, and at the hearing of the motion the
following day, the Prosecutor further asked that accused Richard Malig be dropped from the information because
further evaluation of the evidence disclosed no sufficient evidence against him. 3
The motion to drop Malig was granted and warrants for the arrest of accused Salvamante and Maqueda were issued.
Maqueda was subsequently arrested on 4 March 1992, and on 9 April 1992, he filed an application for bail. 4 He
categorically stated therein that "he is willing and volunteering to be a State witness in the above-entitled case, it
appearing that he is the least guilty among the accused in this case."
On 22 April 1992, the prosecution filed an Amended Informations 5 with only Salvamante and Maqueda as the
accused. Its accusatory portion reads as follows:
That on or about the 27th Of August, 1991, at Tagadi; Upper Tadiangan Municipality of Tuba,
Province Of Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the, above-
named accused, Conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one another, armed with lead pipes,
and with intent of gain and against the will and consent of the owners thereof, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the house of Spouses TERESITA and WILLIAM
HORACE BARKER and with violence against and intimidation of the persons therein ransack the
place and take and carry away the following articles, to ,it:
[An enumeration and description of the articles follow]
all having a total value of TWO HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS
(P204.250.00), Philippine Currency, belonging to, the said Teresita and William Horace Barker; that
on the occasion and by reason of the said robbery; both accused willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
repeatedly strike Teresita Barker and William Horace Barker with lead pipes on the different Parts of
their body, leading to the death of William Horace Barker and inflicting various physical injuries on
the former which required medical attendance for a period of more than thirty (30) days and have
likewise incapacitated her from the performance of her, customary labor for the same period of time.
Contrary to Law.
Since Rene Salvamante continues to elude arrest and has remained at large, trial proceeded entered a plea of not guilty
on 22 April 1992. 6
In its decision 7 Promulgated on 31 August 1993, the trial Maqueda guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
robbery with homicide and serious physical Injuries and sentenced him to Suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetuaand
to indemnify the victim, Teresita M, Barker in the amount of P50,000.00 for the death of William Horace Barker,
court found accused Hector P41,681,00 representing actual expenses, P100,000.00 as moral damages and to pay the
costs."
The prosecution presented as its witnesses Mrs. Teresita Mendoza Barker, househelps Norie Dacara and Julieta
Villanueva, Mike Tayaban, Dr. Francisco Hernandez, Jr., Francisco Cabotaje, prosecutor Daniel Zarate, Ray Dean
Salvosa, Glen Enriquez, SPO1 Rodolfo Tabadero, and Policarpio Cambod in its evidence in chief and Fredesminda
Castrence and SP03 Armando Molleno on rebuttal. Accused Hector Maqueda took the witness stand and presented
SPO1 Aurelio Sagun, Jr. in his evidence in chief and Myrna Maqueda Katindig as his sour-rebuttal witness.
The version of the prosecution, as culled from the trial court's detailed and meticulous summary thereof, is as follows:
Between 10:30 and 11:00 pm. of 26 August 1991, the spouses Horace William Barker and Teresita Mendoza Barker
repaired to their bedroom after Teresita had checked, as washer wont, the main doors of their house to see if they had
been locked and bolted.
At around 6:00 a.m. of the following day, 27 August 1991, Norie Dacara, a househelp of the Barkers who shared a
room with her cousin and fellow househelp, Julieta Villanueva, got up, opened the door to the garage, went to the
lavatory to wash her face, and proceeded to the toilet. When she opened the door of the toilet and switched. on the
light, she saw Rene Salvamante. She knew Salvamante very well because he and his sister Melanie were the former
househelps of the Barkers whom she and Julieta Villanueva had replaced and because Salvamante had acquainted her
on her chores.
Salvamante suddenly strangled her. While she Was fighting back, Norie happened to turn her face and she saw a fair-
complexioned, tall man with a high-bridged nose at Salvamante's side, whom she identified at the trial as Maqueda.
After she broke free from Salvamante, Norie fled towards the garage and shouted for help. Salvamante chased her and
pulled her back inside the house.
Julieta Villanueva, who was awakened by the shouts of Norie, got out of her bed and upon opening the door of her
room, saw a man clad in maong jacket and short pants with 'his right hand brandishing a lead pipe standing two
meters in front of her. At the trial, She pointed to, accused Maqueda as the man she saw then. (She got scared and
immediately closed the door. Since the door knob turned as if someone was forcing his way into the room, she held on
to it and shouted for help.
The shouts awakened Teresita Mendoza Barker. She rose from her bed and went out of the room, leaving behind her
husband who was still asleep; She went down the Stairs and proceeded t, the dining room. She saw Salvamante and a
companion who was a complete stranger to her. Suddenly the two rushed towards her and beat her up with lead pipes.
Despite her pleas to get what they want and not to hurt her, they continued to beat her up until she lost consciousness.
At the trial, she pointed to accused Maqueda as Salvamante's companion.
Salvamante also hit Norie with the lead pipe on her back and at the·back of her right hand. She fell to the concrete
floor, and after she had recovered, she ran to-the garage and hid under the car. After a few seconds, ,he went near the
door of the garage and because she could not open it, she called Julieta. Julieta opened the door and they rushed to
their room and closed the door. When they saw that the door knob was being turned, they braced themselves against
the door to prevent anyone from entering. While locked in their room, they heard the moans of Mrs. Barker and the
shouts of Mr. Barker: "That's enough, that's enough, that's enough." When the noise stopped, Norie and Julieta heard
the sound of water flowing from the toilet and the barking of dogs.
At 7:00 a.m. of that same day, 27 August 1991, Mike Tabayan and Mark Pacio were resting in a waiting shed beside
the Asin road at Aguyad, Tuba·, Benguet, which is only a kilometer away from the house of the Barkers. They saw
two men approaching them from a curve. When the two men reached the shed, he and Mark noticed that the taller of
the two had an amputated left hand and a right hand with a missing thumb and index finger. This man was carrying a
black bag on his right shoulder
Speaking in Tagalog, the taller man asked Mike and Mark whether the road they were following would lead to
Naguilian, La Union. Mike replied that it did not. Five minutes later, a passenger jeepney bound for Baguio City and
owned and driven by Ben Lusnong arrived at the waiting shed. The two men bearded it, Mike again noticed that the
taller man had the defects above mentioned because the latter used his right hand with only three fingers to hold on to
the bar of the jeepney as he bearded it. In the Investigation conducted by the Tuba Police, he identified through a
picture the shorter man as Salvamante, and at the hearing, he pointed to Maqueda as the taller man.
At 9:00 a.m. of 27 August 1991, Norie and Julieta gathered bough courage to leave the room where they had earlier
barricaded themselves and proceed to the kitchen to get the key to the gate of the garage. In the dining room, they saw
the Barkers bathed in their own blood. Norie and Julieta rushed out of the house and ran to the place of Janet Albon to
seek help. After requesting Janet to call the police, they returned to the Barker's house but did not enter it for fear of
what they had seen earlier. They just stayed near the road.
Soon after, security guards of the Baguio College Foundation (BCF) arrived. A team from the Baguio City Police
Station, headed by Police Officer Policarpio Cambod, and which included Dr. Perfecto Micu of the City Health
Department, also arrived. The team conducted an initial investigation only because it found out that the scene of the
crime was within the jurisdiction of the Tuba Police Station, which, however, was difficult to get in touch with at that
time. Dr. Perfecto Micu found the body of Mr. Barker inside the Barker house and Cambod prepared a sketch (Exhibit
"JJ") showing its location.' They went around the house and found a lead pipe (Exhibit "AA") at the toilet, a black T-
shirt (Exhibit "CC"), and a green hand towel (Exhibit "DD"). He also discovered another lead pipe (Exhibit "BB") at
the back of the door of the house. He then interviewed the two househelps who provided him with descriptions of the
assailants. The team then left, leaving behind BCF Security Officer Glen Enriquez and a security guard. Cambod
prepared a report of his initial investigation (Exhibit "KK").
Enriquez conducted his own investigation. At the master's bedroom, he saw several pieces of jewelry scattered on the
floor and an empty inner cabinet. He noticed footprints at the back of the house, particularly at the riprap wall, and
observed that the grass below it was parted as if someone had passed through and created a trail amidst the grass down
toward the Asin road of Tuba, Benguet. Upon his request, a security guard of the BCF, Edgar Dalit, was sent to the
Barker house to secure the premises. Enriquez then left after Dalit's arrival.
At 5:00 p.m. of that same day, members of the Tuba Police Station arrived at the·Barker house to conduct their
investigation. Enriquez, who in the meantime was called by Dalit, returned to the Barker house.
The lead pipes, black T-shirt, and the green hand towel recovered from the Barker house by the Baguio City Police
were first brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory Service at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet, and then to the
court.
The body of William Horace Barker was taken to the Baguio Funeral Homes at Naguilian Road, Baguio City, where it
was examined by Dr. Francisco P. Cabotaje, Municipal·Health Officer of Tuba, Benguet. H, found in it twenty-seven
injuries, which could have been caused by a blunt instrument, determined the cause of death as hemorrhagic shock,
and then issued a death certificate (Exhibits "P," "O," and "R").
The wounded Teresita Barker was brought to the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center where she was treated
and confined for eight days. The attending physician, Dr. Francisco L. Hernandez, Jr., first saw her at around 11:00
a.m. of 27 August 1991. She was in a comatose state. Dr. Hernandez found that she sustained multiple lacerations
primarily an the left side of the occipital area, bleeding in the left ear, and bruises on the arm. One of the muscles
adjoining her eyes was paralyzed. She regained consciousness only after two days. Dr. Hernandez opined that Mrs.
Barker's injuries were caused by a blunt instrument, like a lead pipe, and concluded that if her injuries had been left
unattended, she would have died by noontime of 27 August 1991 due to bleeding or hemorrhagic shock.
On 1 September 1991, a police team from the Tuba Police Station, Benguet, came to the hospital bed of Mrs. Barker,
showed her pictures of several persons, and asked her to identify the persons who had assaulted her. She pointed to a
person who turned out to be Richard Malig. When informed of the investigation, Dr. Hernandez told the members of
the team that it was improper for them to conduct it without first consulting him since Mrs. Barker had not yet fully
recovered consciousness. Moreover, her eyesight had not yet improved, her visual acuity was impaired, and she had
double vision.
On 3 September 1991, the remains of Mr. Barker were cremated. Mrs. Barker was then discharged from the hospital
and upon getting home, tried to determine the items lost during the robbery. She requested Glen Enriquez to get back
the pieces of jewelry taken by the Tuba PNP (Exhibit "U"). The Tuba PNP gave them to Enriquez (Exhibit "V"). Mrs.
Barker discovered that her Canon camera, radio cassette recorder (Exhibit "W-3"), and some pieces of jewelry
(Exhibit "W-2") were missing. The aggregate value of the missing items was P204,250.00. She then executed an
affidavit on these missing items (Exhibit "X.).
Mrs. Barker underwent a CT Scan at the St. Luke's Hospital in Quezon City. It was revealed that she sustained a
damaged artery on her left eye which could cause blindness. she then sought treatment at the St. Luke's Roosevelt
Hospital in New York (Exhibit "L") where she underwent an unsuccessful operation. She likewise received treatment
at the New York Medical Center (Exhibit "M").
On 29 November 1991, Ray Dean Salvosa, Executive Vice President of the BCF, ordered Glen Enriquez to go to
Guinyangan, Quezon, to coordinate with the police in determining the, whereabouts of accused Rene Salvamante. In
Guinyangan, Enriquez was able to obtain information from the barangay captain, Basilio Requeron, that he saw
Salvamante together with a certain "Putol" in September 1991; however, they already left the place.
On 21 December 1991, Enriquez, Melanie Mendoza, and three others went back to Guinyangan to find out whether
Salvamante and "Putol" had returned. Upon being informed by Barangay Captain Requeron that the two had not,
Enriquez requested Requeron to notify him immediately once Salvamante or "Putol" returned to Guinyangan,
On 4 March 1992, Requeron's daughter called up Enriquez to inform him that Putol," who is none other than accused
Hector Maqueda, had been arrested in Guinyangan. Enriquez and Maj. Rodolfo Anagaran, Chief of the Tuba Police
Station, together with another policeman, Proceeded to Guinyangan. The Guinyangan Police Station turned over
Maqueda to Maj. Anagaran who then brought Maqueda to the Benguet Provincial Jail.
Before Maj. Anagaran's arrival at Guinyangan, Maqueda had been taken to the. headquarters of the 235th PNP Mobile
Force Company at Sta. Maria, Calauag, Quezon. Its commanding officer, Maj. Virgilio F. Rendon, directed SP03
Armando Molleno to get Maqueda's statement. He did so and according to him, he informed Maqueda of his rights
under the Constitution. Maqueda thereafter signed a Sinumpaang Salaysay (Exhibit "LL") wherein he narrated his
participation in the crime at the Barker house on 27 August 1991.
On 9 April 1992, while he was under detention, Maqueda filed a Motion to Grant Bail (Exhibit "GG-6"). He stated
therein that "he is willing and volunteering·to be a State witness in the above entitled case, it appearing that he is the
least guilty among the accused in this case." Prosecutor Zarate then had a talk with Maqueda regarding such statement
and asked him if he was in the company of Salvamante on 27 August 1991 in entering the house of the Barkers. After
he received an affirmative answer, Prosecutor Zarate told Maqueda that he would oppose the motion for bail since he,
Maqueda, was the only accused on trial (Exhibit "II").
In the meantime, Ray Dean Salvosa arrived at the Office of Prosecutor Zarate and obtained permission from the latter
to talk to Maqueda. Salvosa then led Maqueda toward the balcony. Maqueda narrated to Salvosa that Salvamante
brought him to Baguio City in order to find a job as a peanut vendor; Salvamante then brought him to the Barker
house and it was only when they were at the vicinity thereof that Salvamante revealed to him that his zeal purpose in
going to Baguio City was to rob the Barkers; he initially objected to the plan, but later on agreed to it; when they were
in the kitchen of the Barker house, one of the househelps was already there; Salvamante hit her with a lead pipe and
she screamed; then Mrs. Barker came down, forcing him, Maqueda, to attack her with the lead pipe provided·him by
Salvamante, After he felled Mrs. Barker, he helped Salvamante in beating up Mr. Barker who had followed his wife
downstairs. the Barkers were already unconscious on the' floor, Salvamante went upstairs and a few minutes later
came down bringing with him a radio cassette and some pieces of jewelry.
Maqueda further divulged to Salvosa that they then changed clothes, went out of the house, walked toward the road
where they Saw two persons from whom they asked directions, and when a passenger jeepney stopped and they were
informed by the two Persons that it was bound for Baguio City, he and Salvamante bearded it. They alighted
somewhere along Albano Street in Baguio City and walked until they reached the Philippine Rabbit Bus station where
they boarded a bus for Manila. 8
Accused Hector Maqueda put up the defense of denial and alibi. Hi, testimony is summarized by the trial court in this
wise:
Accused Hector Maqueda denied having anything to do with the crime. He stated that O" August 27,
1991 he was at the polvoron factory owned by Minda Castrense located at Lot 1, Block 21 Posadas
Bayview Subdivision, Sukat, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. He was employed as a caretaker Since July
5, 1991 and he worked continuously there up to August 27, 1991, It was his sister, Myrna Katindig,
who found him the job as caretaker. A, caretaker, it was his duty to supervise the employees in the
factory and whenever his employer was not around, he was in charge of the sales. He and his 8 co-
employees all Sleep inside the factory.
On August 26, 1991, he reported for work although he could not recall what he did that day. He slept
inside the factory that night and on August 27, 1991, he was teaching the new employees how to
make the seasoning for the polvoron.
On December 20, 1991, he went home to Gapas, Guinyangan, Quezon Province as it was his
vacation time from his job at the polvoron factory. He was to be back at work after New Year's Day
in 1992. Upon alighting from the bus at Guinyangan, Quezon, he saw accused Rene Salvamante. He
knows accused Salvamante as they were childhood playmates, having gone to the same elementary
school. He had no chance to talk to him that day when he saw him and so they just waved to each
other. He again saw accused Salvamante after Christmas day on the road beside their (Salvamante)
house. Salvamante invited him to go to Calauag, Quezon Province and roam around. He agreed to go
as he also wanted to visit his brother, Jose Maqueda who resided at Sabangdos, Calauag, Quezon.
When the two accused were at Calauag, Salvamante asked Maqueda to accompany him /Salvamante)
in selling a cassette recorder which he said came from Baguio City. Accused Maqueda knew that
Salvamante worked in Baguio as the latter's mother told him about it. They were able to sell the
cassette recorder to Salvamante's aunt. They had their meal and then went to visit accused Maqueda's
brother. After that occasion, he never saw accused Salvamante again. After his Christmas vacation, he
went back to work a the polvoron factory until February 29, 1992. One of his co-workers Roselyn
Merca, who was a townmate of his asked him to accompany her home as she was hard up in her work
at the factory. Hence, he accompanied Rosely home to Guinyangan, Quezon. He was supposed to
report back for work on March 2, 1992 but he was not able to as he was arrested by members of the
CAGFU at the house of Roselyn Merca when he brought her home. He was then brought to the
Guinyangan municipal jail, then to the Tuba Police Station, Tuba, Benguet. There he was told to
cooperate with the police in arresting Salvamante so he would not stay long in the Province of
Benguet. He was also told that if he would point to accused Salvamante, he would be freed and he
 could also become a state witness: He told them that he could attest to the fact that he accompanied
accused Salvamante in selling the cassette recorder.
On March 5, 1992, he was brought to the Benguet Provincial Jail at La Trinidad, Benguet where he has
remained under detention up to the present. 9
The prosecution rebutted the testimony of Hector Maqueda by presenting Fredesminda Castience and SP03 Armando
Molleno. Castrence, the owner of the polvoron factory where Maqueda worked, ·testified that she started her business
only on 30 August 1991 and thus it was impossible for her to have hired Maqueda on 5 July 1991. SP03 Molleno
declared that he informed Maqueda of his constitutional rights before Maqueda was investigated and that Maqueda
voluntarily and freely gave his Sinumpaang Salaysay (Exhibit "LL"). 10
Although the trial court had doubts on the identification of Maqueda by prosecution witnesses Teresita Mendoza
Barker, Norie Dacara, and Julieta Villanueva and thus disregarded their testimonies on this matter, it decreed a
conviction "based on the confession and the proof of corpus delicti" as well as on circumstantial evidence. It stated
thus:
Since we have discarded the positive identification theory of the prosecution pinpointing accused
Maqueda as the culprit, can we still secure a conviction based on the confession and the proof of
corpus delicti as well as on circumstantial evidence?
In order to establish the guilt of the accused through circumstantia1 evidence, the following requisites
must be present: 1) there must be more than One circumstance; 2) the facts from which the inferences
are derived are proved; and 3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt (People vs. Pajarit, G.R. No. 82770, October 19, 1992, 214
SCRA 678). There must be an unbroken chain of circamstances which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing to the defendant to the exclusion of all Others, as the author of the
crime (People vs. Abuyen, G.R. No. 77285, September 4, 1992, 213 SCRA 569).
The circumstances shown by the prosecution which tend to show the guilt of the accused are:
1. A physical demonstration to which the accused and his counsel did not offer any objection shows
that despite his being handicapped, accused Maqueda could well and easily grip a lead pipe and strike
a cement post with such force that it produced a resounding vibration. It is not farfetched then to
conclude that accused Maqueda could have easily beat Mr. Barker to death.
2. His presence within the vicinity of the crime scene right after the incident in the company of
accused Salvamante was testified to by Mike Tabayan, the only prosecution witness who noticed the
defective hands of the accused. As they had to ask for directions from the witness in the Tagalog
dialect shows that they were strangers to the place
3. Accused Maqueda knows or is familiar with accused Rene Salvamante as they from the same
town. By his own testimony, accused Maqueda has established that he Salvamante are close friends
to the point that they went out together during the Christmas vacation in 1991 and he even
accompanied Salvamante in selling the black radio cassette recorder.
4. His Motion to Grant Bail (Exhibit "HH") contains this statement that he is willing and volunteering
to be State witness in the above-entitled case, it the accused in appearing that he is the least guilty
along This in effect, supports his extrajudicial confession trade to the police at Although he claims
that he did not his signature would lean his as he was just told that release from detention, this is a
flimsy excuse which cannot Had he not understood what the motion meant, he could have easily
asked his sister and brother-in-law what it meant seeing that their signatures up already affixed on the
motion.
5. This time, his admission to Prosecutor Zarate that he was at the Barker house that fateful morning
and his even more damaging admission to Ray Dean Salvosa as to what he actually did can be
considered as another circumstance to already bloster the increasing circumstances against the
accused.
6. The accused's defense is alibi. As stated in a long Line of cases, alibi is at best a weak defense and
easy of fabrication (People vs. Martinado, G.R. No. 92020, October 19, 1992, 214 SCRA 712). For
alibi to be given credence, it must not only appear that the accused interposing the same was at some
 other place but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the
time of its commission (People vs. Pugal, G.R. No. 90637, October 29, 1992, 215 SCRA 247). This
defense easily crumbles down as Tayaban placed accused Maqueda at vicinity of the crime scene.
The combination of all these circumstances plus extrajudicial confession produce the needed proof beyond
reasonable doubt that indeed accused Maqueda is guilty of the crime. 11
The extrajudicial confession referred to is the Sinumpaang Salaysay (Exhibit: "LL") of Maqueda taken by SP02
Molleno immediately after Maqueda was arrested.
Maqueda seasonably appealed to us his conviction. In his 14-page brief, he pleads that we acquit him because the trial
court committed this lone error:
. . . IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE
CRIME CHARGED. 12
Only three pages of the brief, typed double space, are devoted to his arguments which are anchored on his alibi that at
the time the crime Was committed he was not in Benguet but in Sukat, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, ad the failure of the
star witnesses for the Prosecution to identify him. He alleges that Mrs. Barker, when investigated at the hospital,
Pointed to Richard Malig as the companion of Rene Salvamante, and that when initially investigated, the two
housemaids gave a description of Salvamante's companion that fitted Richard Malig.
We find no merit in this appeal. As hereinafter shown, the defense of alibi is unconvincing.
The accused's arguments which stress the incredibility of the testimonies of Mrs. Barker and the househelps
identifying Maqueda are misdirected and misplaced because the trial court had ruled that Mrs. Teresita Mendoza
Barker and the two housemaids, Norie Dacara and Julieta Villanueva, were not able to positively identify Magueda,
The trial court based his conviction on his extrajudicial confession and the proof of corpus delicti, as well as on
circumstantial evidence. He should have focused his attention and arguments on these.
From its ratiocinations, the trial court made a distinction between an extrajudicial confession — the Sinumpaang
Salaysay — and an extrajudicial admission — the, verbal admissions to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa. A
perusal of the Sinumpaang Salaysay fails to convince us that it is an extrajudicial confession. It is only an extrajudicial
admission. There is a distinction between. the former and the latter as clearly shown in Sections 26 and 33, Rule 130
of the Rules of Court which read as follows:
Sec. 26. Admission of a party. — The act, declaration or omission of party as to a relevant fact may
be given in evidence against him.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 33. Confession. — The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense
charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him.
In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt. The term admission is usually applied in criminal cases to
statements of fact by the accused which do not directly involve an acknowledgment of his guilt or of the criminal
intent to commit the offense with which he is charged. 13 Wharton distinguishes a confession from an admission as
follows:
A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a criminal case, of his guilt of the
crime charged, while an admission is a statement by the accused, direct or implied, of facts pertinent to the
issue and tending, in connection with proof of other facts, to prove his guilt. In other words, an admission
is something less than a confession, and is but an acknowledgment of some fact or circumstance which in
itself is insufficient to authorize a conviction and which tends only to establish the ultimate fact of guilt. 14
And under Section 3 of Rule 133, an extrajudicial confession made by the accused is not sufficient for conviction
unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti.
The trial court admitted the Sinumpaang Salaysay of accused Maqueda although it was taken without the assistance of
counsel because it was of the opinion that since an information had already benefited in court against him and he was
arrested pursuant to a warrant of arrest issued by the court, the Sinumpaang Salaysay was not, therefore, taken during
custodial investigation. Hence, Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution providing as follows:
 Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to
be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably
of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
is not applicable, 15 i.e., the police investigation was " no longer within the ambit of a custodial investigation." It
heavily relied on People vs. Ayson 16 where this Court elucidated on the rights of a person under custodial
investigation and the rights of an accused after a case is filed in court. The trial court went on to state:
At the time of the confession, the accused was already facing charges in court. He no longer had the right
to remain silent and to counsel but he had the right to refuse to be a witness and not to have any prejudice
whatsoever result to him by such refusal. And yet, despite his knowing fully well that a case had already
been filed in court, he still confessed when he did not have to do so. 17
The trial court then held that the admissibility of the Sinumpaang Salaysay should not be tested under the aforequoted
Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution, but on the voluntariness of its execution. Since voluntariness is
presumed, Maqueda had the burden of proving otherwise, which he failed to do and, hence, theSinumpaang
Salaysay was admissible against him.
As to the admissions made by Maqueda to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa, the trial court admitted their
testimony thereon only to prove the tenor of their conversation but not to prove the truth of the admission because
such testimony was objected to as hearsay. It said:
In any case, it is settled that when testimony is presented to establish not the truth but the tenor of the
statement or the fact that such statement was made, it is not hearsay (People vs. Fule, G.R. No. 83027,
February 28, 1992, 206 SCRA 652). 18
While we commend the efforts of the trial court to distinguish between the rights of a person under Section 12(1),
Article III of the Constitution and his rights after a criminal complaint or information had been filed against him, we
cannot agree with its sweeping view that after such filing an accused "no longer Has] the right to remain silent End to
counsel but he [has] the right to refuge to be a witness and not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such
refusal." If this were so, then there would be a hiatus in the criminal justice process where an accused is deprived of
his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such rights. Such a view would not only
give a very restrictive application to Section 12(1); it would also diminish the said accused's rights under Section
14(2) Article III of the Constitution,
The exercise of the rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed thereof under Section 12(1), Article III of
the Constitution are not confined to that period prior to the filing of a criminal complaint or information but are
available at that stage when a person is "under investigation for the commission of an offense." The direct and primary
source of this Section 12(1) is the second paragraph of Section 20, Article II of the 1973 Constitution which reads:
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent
and to counsel, and to be informed of such right . . .
The first sentence to which it immediately follows refers to the right against self-incrimination reading:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
which is now Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The incorporation of the second paragraph of Section 20
in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 constitution was an acceptance of the landmark doctrine laid down by the united
States Supreme Court in Miranda vs. Arizona. 19 In that case, the Court explicitly stated that the holding therein "is
not an innovation in our jurisprudence, but is an application of principles long recognized and applied in other
settings." It went on to state its ruling:
Our holding will be spelled out with some specificity in the pages which follow but briefly stated, it is
this: the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial
interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure
the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way. As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective
means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous
opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning the person must
 be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence
against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The
defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to
consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone
and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The
mere fact that he may have answered some question or volunteered some statements on his own does not
deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an
attorney and thereafter consents to a questioned. 20
It may be pointed out though that as formulated in the second paragraph of the aforementioned Section 20, the
word custudial, which was used in Miranda with reference to the investigation, was excluded. In view thereof,
inGalman vs. Pamaran, 21 this Court aptly observed:
The fact that the framers of our Constitution did not choose to use the term "custodial" by having it
inserted between the words "under" and "investigation," as in fact the sentence opens with the phrase
"any person" goes to prove that they did not adopt in toto the entire fabric of the Miranda doctrine.
Clearly then, the second paragraph of Section 20 has even broadened the application of Miranda by making it
applicable to the investigation for the commission of an offense of a person and in custody. 22 Accordingly, as so
formulated, the second paragraph of Section 20 changed the rule adopted in People vs. Jose 23 that the rights of the
accused only begin upon arraignment, Applying the second paragraph of Section 20, this Court laid down this rule
in Morales vs, Enrile: 24
7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the
reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be
used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative,
or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means — by telephone if possible — or by letter or
messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished.
No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the
person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the
detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall
not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the
procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be
inadmissible in evidence.
Note that the first sentence requires the arresting officer to inform the person to be arrested of the reason for the arrest
and show him "the warrant of arrest, if any." The underscored phrase simply means that a case had been filed against
him in a court of either preliminary or original jurisdiction and that the court had issued the corresponding warrant of
arrest. From the foregoing, it is clear that the right to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed thereof under the
second paragraph of Section 20 are available to a person at any time before arraignment whenever he is investigated
for the commission of an offense. This paragraph was incorporated into Section 12(1), Article III of the present
Constitution with the following additional safeguards: (a) the counsel must be competent and independent, preferably
of his own choice, (b) if the party cannot afford the services of such counsel, he must be provided with one, and (c)
the rights therein cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
Then, too, the right to be heard would be a farce if it did not include the right to counsel. 25 Thus, Section 12(2),
Article III of the present Constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel." In People vs. Holgado, 26 this Court emphatically declared:
One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by our Constitution is that "no person shall be-held
to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law", and that all accused "shall enjoy the
right to be heard by himself and counsel." In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the
accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail
if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may
have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he
may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his
innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this
reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a
 constitutional right and it is so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the
Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he
desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign one de officio for him if
he so desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own.
It was, therefore, wrong for the trial court to hold that Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution is strictly limited to
custodial investigation and that it does not apply to a person against whom a criminal complaint or information has
already been filed because after its filing he loses his right to remain silent and to counsel. If we follow the theory of
the trial court, then police authorities and other law enforcement agencies would have a heyday in extracting
confessions or admissions from accused persons after they had been arrested but before they are arraigned because at
such stage the accused persons are supposedly not entitled to the enjoyment of the rights to remain silent and to
counsel.
Once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court and the accused is thereafter arrested by virtue of a warrant
of arrest, he must be delivered to the nearest police station or jail and the arresting officer must make a return of the
warrant to the issuing judge, 27 and since the court has already acquired jurisdiction over his person, it would be
improper for any public officer Or law enforcement agency to investigate him in connection with the commission of
the offense for which he is charged. If, nevertheless, he is subjected to such' investigation, then Section 12(1), Article
III of the Constitution and the jurisprudence thereon must be faithfully complied with.
The Sinumpaang Salaysay of Maqueda taken by SP02 Molleno after the former's arrest was taken in palpable
violation of his rights under Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution. As disclosed by a reading thereof, Maqueda
was not even told of any of his constitutional rights under the said section. The statement was also taken in the
absence of counsel. Such uncounselled Sinumpaang Salaysay is wholly inadmissible pursuant to paragraph 3, Section
12, Article III of the Constitution which reads:
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
However, the extrajudicial admissions of Maqueda to Prosecutor Zarate and to Ray Dean Salvosa stand on a different
footing. These are not governed by the exclusionary rules under the Bill of Rights.. Maqueda voluntarily and freely
made them to Prosecutor Zarate not in the course of an investigation, but in connection with Maqueda's plea to be
utilized as a state witness; and as to the other admission, it was given to a private person. The provisions of the Bill of
Rights are primarily limitations on government, declaring the rights that exist without governmental grant, that may
not be taken away by government and that government has the duty to protect; 28or restriction on the power of
government found "not in the particular specific types of action prohibited, but in the general principle that keeps alive
in the public mind the doctrine that governmental power is not unlimited. 29 They are the fundamental safeguards
against aggressions of arbitrary power, 30 or state tyranny and abuse of authority. In laying down the principles of the
government and fundamental liberties of the people, the Constitution did not govern the relationships between
individuals. 31
Accordingly, Maqueda's admissions to Ray Dean Salvosa, a private party, are admissible in evidence against the
former Under Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. In Aballe vs; People, 32 this Court held that the declaration
of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of the offense may be given in evidence against him and any person,
otherwise competent to testify as a witness, who heard the confession, is competent to testify as to the substance of
what he heard if he heard and understood it. The said witness need not repeat verbatim the oral confession; it suffices
if he gives its substance. By analogy, that rule applies to oral extrajudicial admissions.
To be added to Maqueda's extrajudicial admission is his Urgent Motion for Bail wherein he explicitly .stated that "he
is willing and volunteering to be a state witness in the above entitled case, it appearing that he is the least guilty
among the accused in this case."
In the light of his admissions to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa and his willingness to be a state witness,
Maqueda's participation in the commission of the crime charged was established beyond moral certainty. His defense
of alibi was futile because by his own admission he was not only at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission, he also admitted his participation therein. Even if we disregard his extrajudicial admissions to Prosecutor
Zarate and Salvosa, his guilt was, as correctly ruled by the trial court, established beyond doubt by circumstantial
evidence. The following circumstances were duly proved in this case:
 (1) He and a companion were seen a kilometer away from the Barker house an hour after the crime in
question was committed there;
(2) Rene Salvamante, who is still at large, was positively identified by Mrs. Barker, Norie Dacara,
and Julieta Villanueva as one of two persons who committed the crime;
(3) He and co-accused Rene Salvamante are friends;
(4) He and Rene Salvamante were together in Guinyangan, Quezon, and both left the place sometime
in September 1991;
(5) He was arrested in Guinyangan, Quezon, on 4 March 1992; and
(6) He freely and voluntarily offered to be a state witness stating that "he is the least guilty."
Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and
(c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.
Or, as jurisprudentially formulated, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if
the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion which points
to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person, i.e. the circumstances proved must be consistent
with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any
other hypothesis except that of guilty. 33 We do not hesitate to rule that all the requisites of Section 2, Rule 133 of the
Rules of Court are present in this case.
This conclusion having been reached, the defense of alibi put up by the appellant must fail. The trial court correctly
rejected such defense. The rule is settled that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the requirements of time and place
must be strictly met. It is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when the crime was committed, he
must demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission. 34 Through the unrebutted testimony of Mike Tayaban, which Maqueda does not controvert in his brief,
it was positively established that Maqueda and a companion were seen at 7:00 a.m. of 27 August 1991 at the waiting
shed in Aguyad, Tuba, Benguet, a place barely a kilometer away from the house of the Barkers. It was not then
impossible for Maqueda and his companion to have been at the Barker house at the time the crime was committed.
Moreover, Fredisminda Castrence categorically declared that Maqueda started working in her polvoron factory in
Sukat only on 7 October 1991, thereby belying his, testimony that he started working on 5 July 1991 and continuously
until 27 August 1991.
WHEREFORE, in of the foregoing, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the appealed decision Of Branch 10 of the
Regional Trial Court Of Benguet in Criminal Case, No.91-CR-1206 is AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against accused-appellant HECTOR MAQUEDA @ PUTOL.

Parker vs. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62 (1979)

.S. Supreme Court

Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62 (1979)

Parker v. Randolph
No. 78-99

Argued March 20, 1979

Decided May 29, 1979

442 U.S. 62

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

Syllabus

Respondents were convicted, after a joint trial in a Tennessee court, of murder committed
during the commission of a robbery. None of the respondents took the witness stand, and
their oral confessions, found by the trial court to have been freely and voluntarily given, were
admitted into evidence through police officers' testimony. Respondent Pickens' written
confession was also admitted into evidence over his objection that it had been obtained in
violation of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona,384 U. S. 436. The trial court instructed the
jury that each confession could be used only against the defendant who gave it and could not
be considered as evidence of a codefendant's guilt. Ultimately, the Tennessee Supreme Court
upheld the convictions, holding that admission of respondents' confessions did not violate the
rule of Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123, which held that a defendant's rights under the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment were violated by the admission, at a joint trial,
of the confession of a codefendant who did not take the stand. Respondents subsequently
obtained writs of habeas corpus in a Federal District Court, which held that respondents'
rights under Bruton had been violated, and that introduction of respondent Pickens' written
confession had violated his rights under Miranda. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Held: The judgment is affirmed as to respondent Pickens and reversed as to the other
respondents. Pp. 442 U. S. 69-77; 442 U. S. 77-81.

575 F.2d 1178, affirmed in part and reversed in part.

MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and III,
concluding that, since the grant of certiorari was limited to the Bruton issue, the Court had no
occasion to pass on the merits of the ruling that respondent Pickens' rights
under Miranda had been violated. Pp. 442 U. S. 76-77.
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE STEWART, and MR.
JUSTICE WHITE, concluded, in Part II, that admission of respondents' confessions with proper
limiting jury instructions did

Page 442 U. S. 63

not infringe respondents' right of confrontation secured by the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Pp. 442 U. S. 69-76.

(a) In Bruton, introduction at a joint trial of a nontestifying codefendant's confession had a

"devastating" effect on the nonconfessing defendant's case. Introduction of such
incriminating extrajudicial statements of a codefendant will seldom, if ever, have the same
"devastating" consequences to a defendant who has himself confessed. The constitutional
right of cross-examination protected by Bruton has far less practical value to a defendant
who has confessed to the crime than to one who has consistently maintained his innocence.
Pp. 442 U. S. 72-73.

(b) Nor does the natural "motivation to shift blame onto others," recognized in Brutonto
render the incriminating statements of codefendants "inevitably suspect," require application
of the Bruton rule when the incriminated defendant has corroborated his codefendant's
statements by heaping blame onto himself. P. 442 U. S. 73.

(c) The Confrontation Clause does not bar admission into evidence of every relevant
extrajudicial statement by a nontestifying declarant simply because it in some way
incriminates the defendant. And an instruction directing the jury to consider a codefendant's
extrajudicial statement only against its source is generally sufficient to avoid offending the
implicated defendant's confrontation right. Pp. 442 U. S. 73-74.

(d) When the defendant's own confession is properly before the jury, as here, the possible
prejudice resulting from the jury's failure to follow the trial court's instructions is not so
"devastating" or "vital" to the confessing defendant as to require departure from the general
rule allowing admission of evidence with limiting instructions. Pp. 442 U. S. 74-75.

MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN would not find the rule of Bruton to be inapplicable simply because
interlocking confessions are involved. Rather, even where the confessions of nontestifying
codefendants overlap to some degree, he would follow the analysis indicated by Bruton and
then determine whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. On the facts of
this case, he concludes that any error was clearly harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Pp. 442 U. S. 77-81.
REHNQUIST, J., announced the Court's judgment and delivered an opinion of the Court with
respect to Parts I and III, in which BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, WHITE, and BLACKMUN, JJ.,
joined, and an opinion with respect to Part II, in which BURGER, C.J., and STEWART and
WHITE, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment, post, p. 442 U. S. 77. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion,

Page 442 U. S. 64

in which BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 442 U. S. 81. POWELL, J., took no
part in the consideration or decision of the case.

MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court (Parts I and III) together with an
opinion (Part II), in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE STEWART, and MR. JUSTICE
WHITE joined, and announced the judgment of the Court.

In Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123 (1968), this Court reversed the robbery conviction
of a defendant who had been implicated in the crime by his codefendant's extrajudicial
confession. Because the codefendant had not taken the stand at the joint trial, and thus could
not be cross-examined, the Court held that admission of the codefendant's confession had
deprived the defendant of his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.
The issue before us in this case is whether Bruton requires reversal of a defendant's
conviction when the defendant himself has confessed and his confession "interlocks" with and
supports the confession of his codefendant. We hold that it does not.

Respondents were convicted of murder committed during the commission of a robbery, and
were sentenced to life imprisonment. The cast of characters playing out the scenes that led
up to the fatal shooting could have come from the pen of Bret Harte. [Footnote 1] The story
began in June, 1970, when

Page 442 U. S. 65

one William Douglas, a professional gambler from Las Vegas, Nev., arrived in Memphis, Tenn.,
calling himself Ray Blaylock and carrying a gun and a deck of cards. It ended on the evening
of July 6, 1970, when Douglas was shot and killed in a Memphis apartment.

Testimony at the trial in the Tennessee state court showed that one Woppy Gaddy, who was
promised a cut of Douglas' take, arranged a game of chance between Douglas and Robert
Wood, a sometime Memphis gambler. Unwilling to trust the outcome of the contest entirely to
luck or skill, Douglas marked the cards, and, by game's end, Robert Wood and his money had
been separated. A second encounter between the two men yielded similar results, and Wood
grew suspicious of Douglas' good fortune. In order to determine whether and how Douglas
was cheating, Wood brought to the third game an acquaintance named Tommy Thomas, who
had a reputation of being a "pretty good poker player." Unknown to Wood, however, Thomas'
father and Douglas had been close friends; Thomas, predictably, threw in his lot with
Douglas, purposefully lost some $1,000, and reported to Wood that the game was clean.
Wood nonetheless left the third game convinced that he was being cheated and intent on
recouping his now considerable losses. He explained the situation to his brother, Joe E. Wood,
and the two men decided to relieve Douglas of his ill-gotten gains by staging a robbery of the
upcoming fourth game.

At this juncture, respondents Randolph, Pickens, and Hamilton entered the picture. To carry
out the staged robbery, Joe Wood enlisted respondent Hamilton, who was one of his
employees, and the latter, in turn, associated respondents Randolph and Pickens. Douglas
and Robert Wood sat down to the fourth and final contest on the evening of July 6, 1970. Joe
Wood and Thomas were present in the room as spectators.

Page 442 U. S. 66

During the course of the game, Douglas armed himself with a .38-caliber pistol and an
automatic shotgun; in response to this unexpected development Joe Wood pulled a derringer
pistol on Douglas and Thomas, gave the gun to Robert Wood, and left to tell respondents to
move in on the game. Before respondents arrived, however, Douglas reached for his pistol
and was shot and killed by Robert Wood. Moments later, respondents and Joe Wood broke
down the apartment door, Robert Wood gathered up the cash left on the table, and the gang
of five fled into the night. Respondents were subsequently apprehended by the police and
confessed to their involvement in the crime.

Respondents and the Wood brothers were jointly tried and convicted of murder during the
commission of a robbery. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-2402 (1975). [Footnote 2] Each defendant
was sentenced to life imprisonment. Robert Wood took the stand at trial, admitting that he
had killed Douglas, but claiming that the shooting was in self-defense. Thomas described
Douglas' method of cheating at cards and admitted his complicity in the fraud on Robert
Wood. He also testified in substance that he was present in the room when Joe Wood
produced the derringer and when Robert Wood shot and killed Douglas.

None of the respondents took the stand. Thomas could not positively identify any of them,
and although Robert Wood named Hamilton as one of the three men involved in the staged
robbery, he did not clearly identify Randolph and Pickens as the other two. The State's case
against respondents thus rested primarily on their oral confessions, found by

Page 442 U. S. 67

the trial court to have been freely and voluntarily given, which were admitted into evidence
through the testimony of several officers of the Memphis Police Department. [Footnote 3] A
written confession signed by Pickens was also admitted into evidence over his objection that
it had been obtained in violation of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966).
The trial court instructed the jury that each confession could be used only against the
defendant who gave it, and could not be considered as evidence of a codefendant's guilt.

The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals reversed respondents' convictions, holding that they
could not be guilty of felony murder, since Douglas had been shot before they arrived on the
scene, and, alternatively, that admission of their confessions at the joint trial violated this
Court's decision in Bruton. The Tennessee Supreme Court, in turn, reversed the Court of
Criminal Appeals and reinstated the convictions. Because "each and every defendant either
through words or actions demonstrated his knowledge thatkilling may be necessary,'" App.
237, the court held that respondents' agreement to participate in the robbery rendered them
liable under the Tennessee felony murder statute for Douglas' death. The Tennessee Supreme
Court also disagreed with the Court of Criminal Appeals that Bruton had been violated,
emphasizing that the confession at issue in Bruton had inculpated a nonconfessing defendant
in a joint trial at which neither defendant took the stand. Here, in contrast, the "interlocking
inculpatory confessions" of respondents Randolph, Pickens, and Hamilton,

"clearly demonstrated the involvement of each, as to crucial facts such as time, location,
felonious activity, and

Page 442 U. S. 68

awareness of the overall plan or scheme."

App. 245. Accordingly, the Tennessee Supreme Court concluded:

"The fact that jointly tried codefendants have confessed precludes a violation of
theBruton rule where the confessions are similar in material aspects."

Ibid., quoting State v. Elliott, 524 S.W.2d 473, 477-478 (Tenn.1975).

The United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee thereafter granted
respondents' applications for writs of habeas corpus, ruling that their rights under Bruton had
been violated and that introduction of respondent Pickens' uncounseled written confession
had violated his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, supra.The Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit affirmed, holding that admission of the confessions violated the rule announced
in Bruton and that the error was not harmless, since the evidence against each respondent,
even considering his confession, was "not so overwhelming as to compel the jury verdict of
guilty. . . ." 575 F.2d 1178, 1182 (1978). The Court of Appeals frankly acknowledged that its
decision conflicts with decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit holding
the Bruton rule inapplicable "[w]here the jury has heard not only a codefendant's confession
but the defendant's own [interlocking] confession. . . ." United States ex rel. Catanzaro v.
Mancusi, 404 F.2d 296, 300 (1968), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 942 (1970). Accord, United States
ex rel. Stanbridge v. Zelker, 514 F.2d 45, 48-50, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 872 (1975); United
States ex rel. Duff v. Zelker, 452 F.2d 1009, 1010 (1971), cert. denied,406 U.S. 932 (1972).
We granted certiorari in this case to resolve that conflict. [Footnote 4] 439 U.S. 978 (1978).

Page 442 U. S. 69

II

In Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U. S. 232 (1957), a nontestifying codefendant's

confession, which incriminated a defendant who had not confessed, was admitted at a joint
trial over defendant's hearsay objection. Concluding that "it was reasonably possible for the
jury to follow" the trial court's instruction to consider the confession only against the
declarant, this Court held that admission of the confession did not constitute reversible error.
Little more than a decade later, however, Dell Paoli was expressly overruled in Bruton v.
United States. In that case, defendants Bruton and Evans were convicted of armed postal
robbery after a joint trial. Although Evans did not take the stand, a postal inspector was
allowed to testify that Evans had orally confessed to having committed the robbery with
Bruton. The trial judge instructed the jury that Evans' confession was competent evidence
against Evans, but was inadmissible hearsay against

Page 442 U. S. 70

Bruton and therefore could not be considered in determining Bruton's guilt.

This Court reversed Bruton's conviction, noting that, despite the trial court's admittedly clear
limiting instruction, "the introduction of Evans' confession added substantial, perhaps even
critical, weight to the Government's case in a form not subject to cross-examination." 391
U.S. at 391 U. S. 127-128. Bruton was therefore held to have been denied his Sixth
Amendment right of confrontation. The Bruton court reasoned that, although in many cases
the jury can and will follow the trial judge's instruction to disregard inadmissible evidence,

"there are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions
is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and
human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored. Such a context is presented here,
where the powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statements of a codefendant, who stands
accused side-by-side with the defendant, are deliberately spread before the jury in a joint
trial. Not only are the incriminations devastating to the defendant, but their credibility is
inevitably suspect, a fact recognized when accomplices do take the stand and the jury is
instructed to weigh their testimony carefully given the recognized motivation to shift blame
onto others. The unreliability of such evidence is intolerably compounded when the alleged
accomplice, as here, does not testify, and cannot be tested by cross-examination. It was
against such threats to a fair trial that the Confrontation Clause was directed."

Id. at 391 U. S. 135-136 (citations and footnotes omitted). One year after Bruton was
decided, this Court rejected the notion that erroneous admission at a joint trial of evidence
such as that introduced in Bruton automatically requires reversal of an otherwise valid
conviction. See Harrington v. California, 395 U. S. 250 (1969). In some cases, the properly

Page 442 U. S. 71

admitted evidence of guilt is so overwhelming, and the prejudicial effect of the codefendant's
admission so insignificant by comparison, that it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that
introduction of the admission at trial was harmless error. [Footnote 5]

Page 442 U. S. 72

Petitioner urges us to follow the reasoning of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and
to hold that the Bruton rule does not apply in the context of interlocking confessions.
Alternatively, he contends that, if introduction of interlocking confessions at a joint trial does
violate Bruton, the error is all but automatically to be deemed harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. We agree with petitioner that admission at the joint trial of respondents' interlocking
confessions did not infringe respondents' right of confrontation secured by the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, but prefer to cast the issue in a
slightly broader form than that posed by petitioner.

Bruton recognized that admission at a joint trial of the incriminating extrajudicial statements
of a nontestifying codefendant can have "devastating" consequences to a nonconfessing
defendant, adding "substantial, perhaps even critical, weight to the Government's case." 391
U.S. at 391 U. S. 128. Such statements go to the jury untested by cross-examination and,
indeed, perhaps unanswered altogether unless the defendant waives his Fifth Amendment
privilege and takes the stand. The prejudicial impact of a codefendant's confession upon an
incriminated defendant who has, insofar as the jury is concerned, maintained his innocence
from the beginning is simply too great in such cases to be cured by a limiting instruction. The
same cannot be said, however, when the defendant's own confession -- "probably the most
probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted against him," id. at 391 U. S.
139 (WHITE, J., dissenting) -- is properly introduced at trial. The defendant is "the most
knowledgeable and unimpeachable source of information about his past conduct," id. at 391
U. S. 140

Page 442 U. S. 73

(WHITE, J., dissenting), and one can scarcely imagine evidence more damaging to his
defense than his own admission of guilt. Thus, the incriminating statements of a codefendant
will seldom, if ever, be of the "devastating" character referred to in Brutonwhen the
incriminated defendant has admitted his own guilt. The right protected byBruton -- the
"constitutional right of cross-examination," id. at 391 U. S. 137 -- has far less practical value
to a defendant who has confessed to the crime than to one who has consistently maintained
his innocence. Successfully impeaching a codefendant's confession on cross-examination
would likely yield small advantage to the defendant whose own admission of guilt stands
before the jury unchallenged. Nor does the natural "motivation to shift blame onto others,"
recognized by the Bruton Court to render the incriminating statements of codefendants
"inevitably suspect," id. at 391 U. S. 136, require application of the Bruton rule when the
incriminated defendant has corroborated his codefendant's statements by heaping blame
onto himself.

The right of confrontation conferred by the Sixth Amendment is a safeguard to ensure the
fairness and accuracy of criminal trials, see Dutton v. Evans, 400 U. S. 74, 400 U. S.
89 (1970), and its reach cannot be divorced from the system of trial by jury contemplated by
the Constitution. A crucial assumption underlying that system is that juries will follow the
instructions given them by the trial judge. Were this not so, it would be pointless for a trial
court to instruct a jury, and even more pointless for an appellate court to reverse a criminal
conviction because the jury was improperly instructed. The Confrontation Clause has never
been held to bar the admission into evidence of every relevant extrajudicial statement made
by a nontestifying declarant simply because it in some way incriminates the defendant. See,
e.g., id. at 400 U. S. 80;Mattox v. United States, 156 U. S. 237, 156 U. S. 240-244 (1895).
And an instruction directing the jury to consider a codefendant's extrajudicial statement only
against its source has been found sufficient to

Page 442 U. S. 74

avoid offending the confrontation right of the implicated defendant in numerous decisions of
this Court. [Footnote 6]

When, as in Bruton, the confessing codefendant has chosen not to take the stand and the
implicated defendant has made no extrajudicial admission of guilt, limiting instructions
cannot be accepted as adequate to safeguard the defendant's rights under the Confrontation
Clause. Under such circumstances, the "practical and human limitations of the jury
system," Bruton v. United States, supra at 391 U. S. 135, override the theoretically sound
premise that a jury will follow the trial court's instructions. But when the defendant's own
confession is properly before the jury, we believe that the constitutional scales tip the other
way. The possible prejudice resulting from the failure of the jury to follow the trial court's
instructions is not so "devastating" or "vital" to the confessing defendant to require departure
from the general rule allowing admission of evidence with limiting

Page 442 U. S. 75

instructions. [Footnote 7] We therefore hold that admission of interlocking confessions with

proper limiting instructions conforms to the requirements of the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution. [Footnote 8] Accordingly, the judgment

Page 442 U. S. 76

of the Court of Appeals as to respondents Hamilton and Randolph is reversed.

III

The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's granting of habeas corpus relief to
respondent Pickens on the additional

Page 442 U. S. 77

ground that his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), had been violated.
Although petitioner sought review of this ruling, our grant of certiorari was limited to
the Bruton issue. We thus have no occasion to pass on the merits of the Court of
Appeals' Miranda ruling. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals as to respondent
Pickens is affirmed.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

MR. JUSTICE POWELL took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

[Footnote 1]

As the Court of Appeals aptly commented:

"This appeal involves a sequence of events which have the flavor of the old West before the
law ever crossed the Pecos. The difference is that here there are no heroes, and here there
was a trial."

575 F.2d 1178, 1179 (CA6 1978).

[Footnote 2]

Tennessee Code Ann. § 39-2402 (1975) provides in pertinent part as follows:

"n individual commits murder in the first degree if . . ."

"(4) he commits a willful, deliberate and malicious killing or murder during the perpetration of
any arson, rape, robbery, burglary, larceny, kidnapping, aircraft piracy, or unlawful throwing,
placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb."

[Footnote 3]

Each of the confessions was subjected to a process of redaction in which references by the
confessing defendant to other defendants were replaced with the words "blank" or "another
person." As the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit observed below, the confessions were
nevertheless "such as to leave no possible doubt in the jurors' minds concerning
the person[s]' referred to." 575 F.2d 1180.

[Footnote 4]

The conflict extends throughout the Courts of Appeals. The Courts of Appeals for the Third
and Sixth Circuits have expressly ruled that the Bruton rule applies in the context of
interlocking confessions, see Hodges v. Rose, 570 F.2d 643 (CA6 1978); United States v.
DiGilio, 538 F.2d 972 981-983 (CA3 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Lupo v. United States, 429
U.S. 1038 (1977), and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has done so impliedly, see
Ignacio v. Guam, 413 F.2d 513, 515-516 (1969), cert. denied,397 U.S. 943 (1970). In
addition to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, at least four other Courts of Appeals
have rejected the Bruton claims of confessing defendants. Cases from the Fifth and Seventh
Circuits have reasoned that the Brutonrule does not apply in the context of interlocking
confessions and that, even if it does, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See
Mack v. Maggio, 538 F.2d 1129, 1130 (CA5 1976); United States v. Spinks, 470 F.2d 64, 65-
66 (CA7), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1011 (1972). Two other Courts of Appeals have rejected
the Brutonclaims of confessing defendants, refusing to concern themselves

"with the legal nicety as to whether the . . . case is 'without' the Bruton rule, or is
'within' Bruton [and] the violation thereof constitut[es] only harmless error."

Metropolis v. Turner, 437 F.2d 207, 208-209 (CA10 1971); accord, United States v.
Walton, 538 F.2d 1348, 1353-1354 (CA8), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1025 (1976). State court
decisions in this area are in similar disarray. Compare, e.g., Stewart v. State, 257 Ark. 753,
519 S.W.2d 733 (1975), and People v. Moll, 26 N.Y.2d 1, 256 N.E.2d 185,cert. denied sub
nom. Stanbridge v. New York, 398 U.S. 911 (1970), with People v Rosochacki, 41 Ill.2d 483,
244 N.E.2d 136 (1969), and State v. Oliver, 160 Conn. 85, 273 A.2d 867 (1970).

[Footnote 5]

In Harrington v. California, 395 U. S. 250 (1969), four defendants were found guilty of
murder after a joint trial. Defendant Harrington's extrajudicial statements placed him at the
scene of the crime, but "fell short of a confession." Id. at 395 U. S. 252. His three
codefendants, however, confessed, and their confessions were introduced at trial with the
instruction that the jury was to consider each confession only against its source. One of
Harrington's codefendants, whose confession implicated Harrington, took the stand and was
subject to cross-examination. The other two codefendants, whose statements corroborated
Harrington's admitted presence at the scene of the crime, did not take the stand. Noting the
overwhelming evidence of Harrington's guilt, and the relatively insignificant prejudicial impact
of his codefendants' statements, the Court held that

"the lack of opportunity to cross-examine [the non-testifying codefendants] constituted

harmless error under the rule of Chapman [v. California, 386 U. S. 18 (1967)]."

Id. at 395 U. S. 253.

On two subsequent occasions, this Court has applied the harmless error doctrine to claimed
violations of Bruton. In Schneble v. Florida, 405 U. S. 427 (1972), Schneble and a
codefendant were found guilty of murder following a joint trial. Although neither defendant
took the stand, police officers were allowed to testify as to a detailed confession given by
Schneble and a statement given by his codefendant which tended to corroborate certain
portions of Schneble's confession. We assumed, without deciding, that admission of the
codefendant's statement had violated Bruton, but held that, in view of the overwhelming
evidence of Schneble's guilt and the comparatively insignificant impact of the codefendant's
statement, "any violation of Bruton that mayhave occurred at petitioner's trial was harmless
[error] beyond a reasonable doubt." 405 U.S. at 405 U. S. 428 (emphasis added) .

In Brown v. United States, 411 U. S. 223 (1973), the prosecution introduced police testimony
regarding extrajudicial statements made by two nontestifying codefendants. Each statement
implicated both of the codefendants in the crimes charged. Neither codefendant took the
stand, and the police testimony was admitted into evidence at their joint trial. Because the
Solicitor General conceded that the statements were admitted into evidence in violation
of Bruton, we had no occasion to consider the question whether introduction of the
interlocking confessions violated Bruton.Proceeding from the Solicitor General's concession,
we held that the police testimony "was merely cumulative of other overwhelming and largely
uncontroverted evidence properly before the jury." 411 U.S. at 411 U. S. 231. Thus,
any Bruton error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

[Footnote 6]

In Opper v. United States, 348 U. S. 84 (1954), petitioner contended that the trial court had
erred in overruling his motion for severance, arguing that the jury may have improperly
considered statements of his codefendant, which were inadmissible as to petitioner, in finding
petitioner guilty. This Court rejected the contention:

"It was within the sound discretion of the trial judge as to whether the defendants should be
tried together or severally, and there is nothing in the record to indicate an abuse of such
discretion when petitioner's motion for severance was overruled. The trial judge here made
clear and repeated admonitions to the jury at appropriate times that Hollifield's incriminatory
statements were not to be considered in establishing the guilt of the petitioner. To say that
the jury might have been confused amounts to nothing more than an unfounded speculation
that the jurors disregarded clear instructions of the court in arriving at their verdict. Our
theory of trial relies upon the ability of a jury to follow instructions. There is nothing in this
record to call for reversal because of any confusion or injustice arising from the joint trial.
The record contains substantial competent evidence upon which the jury could find petitioner
guilty."

Id. at 348 U. S. 95 (footnote omitted) See, e.g., Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U. S.
539, 332 U. S. 552-553 (1947).

[Footnote 7]
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS characterizes our decision as an attempt "to create a vaguely defined
exception" to the Bruton rule for cases involving interlocking confessions, postat 442 U. S.
82, and suggests that the "proposed exception" is designed "to limit the effect of [the Bruton]
rule to the largely irrelevant set of facts in the case that announced it." Post at 442 U. S. 87.
First, the dissent describes what we believe to be the "rule" as the "exception." The "rule" --
indeed, the premise upon which the system of jury trials functions under the American
judicial system -- is that juries can be trusted to follow the trial court's
instructions. Bruton was an exception to this rule, created because of the "devastating"
consequences that failure of the jury to disregard a codefendant's inculpatory confession
could have to a nonconfessing defendant's case. We think it entirely reasonable to apply the
general rule, and not the Bruton exception, when the defendant's case has already been
devastated by his own extrajudicial confession of guilt.

Second, under the reasoning of Bruton, its facts were anything but "irrelevant" to its holding.
The Bruton Court recognized:

"[T]here are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow
instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the
practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored. . . . Such a context is
presented here. . . ."

391 U.S. at 391 U. S. 135. Clearly, Bruton was tied to the situation in which it arose:

"where the powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statements of a codefendant, who stands

accused side-by-side with the defendant, are deliberately spread before the jury in a joint
trial."

Id. at 391 U. S. 135-136.

[Footnote 8]

MR JUSTICE STEVENS, in dissent, states that our holding "squarely overrule[s]" this Court's
decisions in Roberts v. Russell, 392 U. S. 293 (1968); Hopper v. Louisiana, 392 U. S.
658 (1968); Brown v. United States, 411 U. S. 223 (1973); and Harrington v. California, 395
U. S. 250 (1969). "In all four of these cases," according to the dissent, "the Court found
a Bruton error even though the defendants' confessions interlocked."Post at 442 U. S. 83 n.
3. We disagree.

We think that the dissent fails both to note significant factual distinctions between the
present case and Roberts v. Russell, supra, and to recognize the difference in precedential
value between decisions of this Court which have been fully argued and disposed of on their
merits and unargued summary dispositions, a difference which we noted in Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 415 U. S. 670-671 (1974). In Roberts, "[t]he facts parallel[ed] the
facts in Bruton." 392 U.S. at 392 U. S. 293. Petitioner was convicted of armed robbery after a
joint trial in which a codefendant's confession inculpating petitioner was introduced through
the testimony of a police officer. Petitioner's cousin testified at trial that petitioner had
"indicated that he thought . . . Tennessee was an easy place to commit a robbery." App. to
Brief in Opposition, O.T. 1967, No 920, Misc., p. 4. This extrajudicial statement, while
inculpatory, was by no stretch of the imagination a "confession." The District Court denied
petitioner's application for a writ of habeas corpus, expressly relying on the authority of Delli
Paoli v. United States, 352 U. S. 232 (1957), and the Court of Appeals affirmed. This Court
subsequently overruled Delli Paoli in Bruton, and granted the petition for certiorari
inRoberts to consider "the question whether Bruton [was] to be applied retroactively."Roberts
v. Russell, supra at 392 U. S. 293. The Court decided the question affirmatively, vacated the
judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remanded the case to the District Court for further
consideration in light of Bruton, in no way passing on the merits of petitioner's Bruton claim.
Thus, Roberts, contrary to the dissent's reading, neither involved interlocking confessions nor
"found a Bruton error."

Hopper v. Louisiana, supra, came to this Court in much the posture as Roberts.Petitioners'
manslaughter convictions were affirmed by the Louisiana Supreme Court when Delli Paoli was
still good law, but, while their petition for certiorari was pending before this
Court, Bruton was decided. In a two-sentence summary disposition, this Court granted
petitioners' petition for certiorari, vacated the judgment of the Louisiana Supreme Court, and
remanded the case "for further consideration in light of Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S.
123, and Roberts v. Russell, [392 U.S.] 293." 392 U.S. at 658. Not having passed on the
merits of petitioners' Bruton claim, this Court can hardly be said to have "found
a Bruton error" in Hopper.

The dissent, we believe, likewise misreads Harrington v. California, supra, and Brown v.
United States, supra, as our discussion of those cases in n 5, supra, reveals.

MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

I join Parts I and III of the principal opinion and concur in the Court's judgment affirming in
part and reversing in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

For me, any error that existed in the admission of the confessions of the codefendants, in
violation of Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123 (1968), was, on the facts of this case,
clearly harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. I refrain from joining 442 U. S. as I read it, it
abandons the harmless error analysis the Court previously has applied in similar
circumstances and now adopts a per se rule to the effect that Bruton is inapplicable in an
interlocking confession situation.

In Bruton, of course, the Court held that the admission in a joint trial of the confession of a
codefendant who did not take the stand violated the Sixth Amendment confrontation right of
the other defendant. Because in most cases the impact of admitting a codefendant's
confession is severe, and because the credibility of any such confession "is inevitably
suspect," id. at 391 U. S. 136, the Court went on to hold that a limiting jury instruction could
not alleviate the resultant substantial threat to a fair trial the Confrontation Clause was
designed to protect. Id. at 391 U. S. 136-137.

Page 442 U. S. 78

In Harrington v. California, 395 U. S. 250 (1969), however, the Court recognized that
evidence of guilt could be sufficiently overwhelming so as to render any Bruton error
"harmless beyond a reasonable doubt," under Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18(1967).
Reversal of a conviction, then, was not required merely because of the existence of
a Bruton error. The Court applied a similar harmless error analysis inSchneble v. Florida, 405
U. S. 427 (1972), a case concerning the defendant's own confession and a partially
corroborating statement given by a nontestifying codefendant.

In the present case, the principal opinion appears to me to depart from this harmless error
approach and analysis to hold that Bruton simply does not apply in a case involving
interlocking confessions. It concludes that, in circumstances where one defendant has
confessed, the interlocking confession of a codefendant "will seldom, if ever, be of
the devastating' character referred to in Bruton." Ante at 442 U. S. 73. Similarly, it finds that
the fact that the confession of a codefendant is "inevitably suspect" is of little weight where
interlocking confessions are in evidence. Ibid. Thus, it holds that the right protected
by Bruton, i.e., the Confrontation Clause right of cross-examination, "has far less practical
value to a defendant who has confessed to the crime than to one who has consistently
maintained his innocence." Ibid. Accordingly, it concludes "that admission of interlocking
confessions with proper limiting instructions conforms to the requirements" of the
Constitution. Ante at 442 U. S. 75.

The Court has not departed heretofore from a harmless error approach in Brutoncases. It is
unclear where the present analysis will lead in cases where interlocking confessions are not in
issue, but where any Bruton error appears harmless underChapman; for where
the Bruton error is harmless, the error in admitting the nontestifying codefendant's
confession will be far from devastating. I would be unwilling to depart from the traditional
harmless error analysis

Page 442 U. S. 79

in the straightforward Bruton error situation. Neither would I depart from the harmless error
approach in interlocking confession cases. The fact that confessions may interlock to some
degree does not ensure, as a per se matter, that their admission will not prejudice a
defendant so substantially that a limiting instruction will not be curative. The two confessions
may interlock in part only. Or they may cover only a portion of the events in issue at the trial.
Although two interlocking confessions may not be internally inconsistent, one may go far
beyond the other in implicating the confessor's codefendant. In such circumstances, the
admission of the confession of the codefendant who does not take the stand could very well
serve to prejudice the defendant who is incriminated by the confession, notwithstanding that
the defendant's own confession is, to an extent, interlocking. I fully recognize that in most
interlocking confession cases, any error in admitting the confession of a nontestifying
codefendant will be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Even so, I would not adopt a
rigid per serule that forecloses a court from weighing all the circumstances in order to
determine whether the defendant, in fact, was unfairly prejudiced by the admission of even
an interlocking confession. Where he was unfairly prejudiced, the mere fact that prejudice
was caused by an interlocking confession ought not to override the important interests that
the Confrontation Clause protects.

It is possible, of course, that the new approach will result in no more than a shift in analysis.
Instead of focusing on whether the error was harmless, defendants and courts will be forced,
instead, to inquire whether the confessions were sufficiently interlocking so as to permit a
conclusion that Bruton does not apply. And I suppose that, after making a determination that
the confessions did not interlock to a sufficient degree, the court then would have to make a
harmless

Page 442 U. S. 80

error determination anyway, thus adding another step to the process.

Unfortunately, it is not clear that the new approach mandates even an inquiry whether the
confessions interlock. Respondents have argued that the confessions in this case, in fact, did
not interlock. Brief for Respondents 338. The principal opinion, however, simply assumes the
interlock. It thus comes close to saying that, so long as all the defendants have made some
type of confession which is placed in evidence, Bruton is inapplicable without inquiry into
whether the confessions actually interlock, and the extent thereof. If it is willing to abandon
the factual inquiry that accompanies a harmless error determination, it should be ready, at
least, to substitute an inquiry into whether there is genuine interlocking before it casts the
application of Bruton, and the underlying Confrontation Clause right, completely aside.

I merely add that, in this case, any Bruton error, in my view, clearly was harmless. The
principal issue concerning respondents at trial was whether three Negro males identified by a
number of witnesses as having been at the murder scene were indeed the respondents. Each
confession placed the confessing respondent at the scene of the killing. Each confession
implicated the confessor in the Woods' plan to rob the poker game. Each confession largely
overlapped with, and was cumulative to, the others. Corroborative testimony from witnesses
who were in the apartment placed respondent Hamilton at the scene of the murder, and
tentatively identified respondent Randolph as one of the Negroes who received a share of the
proceeds in Hamilton's apartment immediately after the killing. The testimony of five
witnesses to the events outside the apartment strongly corroborated the confessions. In
these circumstances, considering the confession of each respondent against him, I cannot
believe that "there is a reasonable possibility that the improperly admitted evidence
contributed to the conviction."

Page 442 U. S. 81

Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. at 405 U. S. 432. Reversal on the Bruton issue, therefore, is
required.

MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL join,
dissenting.

As MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN makes clear, ante at 442 U. S. 77-78, proper analysis of this case
requires that we differentiate between (1) a conclusion that there was no error under the rule
of Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123, and (2) a conclusion that, even if constitutional
error was committed, the possibility that inadmissible evidence contributed to the conviction
is so remote that we may characterize the error as harmless. Because MR. JUSTICE
BLACKMUN properly rejects the first conclusion, my area of disagreement with him is narrow.
In my view, but not in his, the concurrent findings of the District Court and the Court of
Appeals that the error here was not harmless [Footnote 2/1] preclude this Court from
reaching a

Page 442 U. S. 82
different result on this kind of issue. E.g., Berenyi v. Immigration Director, 385 U. S. 630, 385
U. S. 635; Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 336 U. S. 271,336 U. S. 275. But
see opinion of MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, ante at 442 U. S. 80-81.

My area of disagreement with the plurality opinion is far wider, and prompts more extended
remarks. The plurality adopts the first conclusion above -- that no constitutional error was
committed when the confessions of all three respondents were admitted into evidence at
their joint trial. Without purporting to modify the Bruton rule precluding the use of a
nontestifying codefendant's extrajudicial admissions against a defendant in a joint trial, the
plurality reaches this conclusion by attempting to create a vaguely defined exception for
cases in which there is evidence that the defendant has also made inculpatory statements
which he does not repudiate at trial. [Footnote 2/2]

If ever adopted by the Court, such an exception would

Page 442 U. S. 83

seriously undercut the Court's decision in Bruton by limiting its effect to a small and
arbitrarily selected class of cases. Indeed, its adoption would squarely overrule holdings in
four decisions of this Court that applied the rule of Bruton. [Footnote 2/3]

Page 442 U. S. 84

Evidence that a defendant has made an "extrajudicial admission of guilt" which "stands
before the jury unchallenged," ante at 442 U. S. 74, 442 U. S. 73, is not an acceptable
reason for depriving him of his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him.
[Footnote 2/4] In arguing to the contrary, and in striving "to cast the issue" presented "in
a . . . broader form" than any of the parties felt necessary to dispose of the case, ante at 442
U. S. 72, the plurality necessarily relies on two assumptions. Both are erroneous. First, it
assumes that the jury's ability to disregard a codefendant's inadmissible and highly
prejudicial confession is invariably increased by the existence of a corroborating statement by
the defendant. Second, it assumes that all unchallenged confessions by a defendant are
equally reliable. Aside from two quotations from the dissent in Bruton, however, the plurality
supports these assumptions with nothing more than the force of its own assertions. But the
infinite variability of inculpatory statements (whether made by defendants or codefendants),
and of their likely effect on juries, makes those assertions untenable. A hypothetical example
is instructive. Suppose a prosecutor has 10 items of evidence tending to prove that defendant
X and codefendant Y are guilty of assassinating a public figure. The first is the tape of a
televised interview with Y describing in detail how he and X planned and executed the crime.
Items 2 through 9 involve circumstantial evidence of a past association between X and Y, a
shared hostility for the victim, and an expressed wish for his early demise -- evidence that, in
itself, might very well be insufficient to convict X. Item 10 is the testimony of drinking
partner, a former cellmate, or a divorced spouse of X who vaguely recalls X saying that he
had been with Y

Page 442 U. S. 85

at the approximate time of the killing. Neither X nor Y takes the stand.

If Y's televised confession were placed before the jury while Y was immunized from cross-
examination, it would undoubtedly have the "devastating" effect on X that theBruton rule was
designed to avoid. 391 U.S. at 391 U. S. 128. As MR. JUSTICE STEWART's characteristically
concise explanation of the underlying rationale in that case demonstrates, it would also
plaintly violate X's Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser. [Footnote 2/5]
Nevertheless, under the plurality's first remarkable assumption, the prejudice to X -- and the
violation of his constitutional right -- would be entirely cured by the subsequent use of
evidence of his own ambiguous statement. In my judgment, such dubious corroboration
would enhance, rather than reduce, the danger that the jury would rely on Y's televised
confession when evaluating X's guilt. See United States v. Bozza, 365 F.2d 206, 215 (CA2
1966) (Friendly, J.), quoted in 442 U. S. 13, infra. Even if I am wrong, however, there is no
reason to conclude that the prosecutor's reliance on item 10 would obviate the harm flowing
from the use of item 1.

The dubiousness of X's confession in this example -- as in any case in which the defendant's
inculpatory statement is

Page 442 U. S. 86

ambiguous, incomplete, the result of coercive influences, or simply the product of the well
recognized and often untrustworthy "urge to confess" [Footnote 2/6] -- illustrates the
inaccuracy of the plurality's second crucial assumption. It is no doubt true that, in some
cases, a defendant's confession will constitute such convincing evidence of his guilt that the
violation of his constitutional rights is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. E.g., Brown v.
United States, 411 U. S. 223; Schneble v. Florida, 405 U. S. 427. But in many cases, it is not
so convincing. Moreover, such evidence is not inherently more incriminating or more reliable
than other kinds of evidence such as fingerprints, photographs, or eyewitness testimony. Yet,
if these types of corroboration are given the same absolute effect that the plurality would
accord confessions, the Bruton rule would almost never apply. [Footnote 2/7]
I am also at a loss to understand the relevance of X's failure to "challenge" his confession at
trial. Ante at 442 U. S. 73. For there is nothing he could say or not say about his own alleged
confession that would dispel the dramatically damning effect of Y's. Furthermore, even apart
from the general rule that a defendant should not be penalized for exercising one right (in
this case, the right not to take the stand or to introduce other evidence) by having another
taken away (in this case the right to confront one's accuser), e.g., United States v.
Jackson, 390 U. S. 570, it is unclear why X's failure to repudiate it necessarily enhances the
reliability of a self-impeaching "confession" such as the one hypothesized above. Cf. Lakeside
v. Oregon, 435 U. S. 333, 435 U. S. 343-344 (STEVENS, J., dissenting).

Page 442 U. S. 87

In short, I see no logic to commend the proposed exception to the rule of Bruton save,
perhaps, a purpose to limit the effect of that rule to the largely irrelevant set of facts in the
case that announced it. If relevant at all in the present context, the factors relied on by the
plurality support a proposition no one has even remotely advocated in this case -- that the
corroborated evidence used in this case was so trustworthy that it should have been fully
admissible against all of the defendants, and the jury instructed as much. Conceivably,
corroborating or other circumstances surrounding otherwise inadmissible hearsay may so
enhance its reliability that its admission in evidence is justified in some situations. [Footnote
2/8] But before allowing such a rule to defeat a defendant's fundamental right to confront his
accusers, this Court surely should insist upon a strong showing not only of the reliability of
the hearsay in the particular case, but also of the impossibility, or at least difficulty, of making
the accusers available for cross-examination. [Footnote 2/9] And, in most cases, the
prosecution will be hard pressed to make the latter showing in light of its ability to try the
defendant and codefendant separately, and to afford each immunity from the use against him
of his testimony at the other's trial. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U. S. 441.

Absent admissibility of the codefendants' confessions against respondents, therefore, the

controlling question must be whether it is realistic to assume that the jury followed the
judge's instructions to disregard those confessions when it was

Page 442 U. S. 88

evaluating respondents' guilt. The plurality would answer this question affirmatively. But in so
doing, it would repudiate much that has been said by the Court and by an impressive array of
judicial and scholarly authorities who have addressed the issue.
As the plurality sees it, the answer to this question is supplied by the "crucial assumption
underlying [the jury] system . . . that juries will follow the instructions given them by the trial
judge." Ante at 442 U. S. 73. This assumption, it is argued, has been applied in "numerous
decisions of this Court" regarding codefendants' confessions. Ante at 442 U. S. 74, and n. 6,
citing Opper v. United States, 348 U. S. 84, and Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U. S. 539.
But this reasoning was advanced just as forcefully in the case that Bruton overruled -- a case,
incidentally, that relied on the same "numerous" decisions that the plurality resurrects in
favor of its analysis. See Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U. S. 232, 352 U. S. 242.
What Bruton said in response to this reasoning -- despite the plurality's contrary
assertions, see ante at442 U. S. 773 -- is no less applicable in the present context:

"[T]here are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow
instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the
practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored. . . . Such a context is
presented here, where the powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statements of a codefendant
who stands accused side-by-side with the defendant, are deliberately spread before the jury
in a joint trial. Not only are the incriminations devastating to the defendant, but their
credibility is inevitably suspect, a fact recognized when accomplices do take the stand and
the jury is instructed to weigh their testimony carefully given the recognized motivation to
shift blame onto others. The unreliability of such evidence is intolerably compounded when
the alleged accomplice,

Page 442 U. S. 89

as here, does not testify, and cannot be tested by cross-examination. It was against such
threats to a fair trial that the Confrontation Clause was directed."

391 U.S. at 391 U. S. 135-136 (citations and footnotes omitted).

Rather than falling back on once numerous but now discredited decisions, I prefer to stand by
the observations about this sort of question by jurists like Felix Frankfurter, Learned Hand,
[Footnote 2/10] Wiley Rutledge, [Footnote 2/11] Robert Jackson, [Footnote 2/12] and Henry

Page 442 U. S. 90

Friendly, [Footnote 2/13] and by scholars like Wigmore and Morgan. [Footnote 2/14] In my
judgment, as I think in theirs, the odds that a jury will obey a command to ignore a
codefendant's confession [Footnote 2/15] --

Page 442 U. S. 91
whether or not the defendant has himself confessed -- are no less stacked against the
defendant than was the deck of cards that William Douglas used to Robert Wood's, and
ultimately to his own, downfall in the game of chance arranged by Woppy Gaddy. In contests
like this, the risk that one player may be confused with another is not insubstantial. I
respectfully dissent.

[Footnote 2/1]

As Judge Edwards noted, writing for the Court of Appeals:

"In evaluating the question of harmless error in this case, it is important to point out the
factors which might affect a jury's verdict in relation to these three defendants in separate
trials where the Bruton rule was observed:"

"1) Randolph, Pickens and Hamilton were not involved in the gambling game between
Douglas, the Las Vegas gambler, and Robert Wood, the hometown gambler who got cheated."

"2) They were not involved in originating the plan for recouping Robert Wood's losses."

"3) They were not in the room (and had not been) when Robert Wood killed Douglas."

"4) Indeed, the jury could conclude from the admissible evidence in this case that, when Joe
Wood pulled out his pistol, the original plan for three 'unknown' blacks to rob the all-white
poker game was aborted, and that petitioners' subsequent entry into the room did not involve
them in the crime of murder."

"Additionally, if we return to consideration of the joint trial, that jury, as charged by the state
court judge, had the responsibility of determining whether or not any of the three confessions
testified to by Memphis police was voluntarily given. Assuming that two of the three
confessions had been removed from jury consciousness by adherence toBruton, we find it
impossible to conclude that the jury finding and ultimate verdict would, 'beyond reasonable
doubt,' have been the same."

"These factors serve to distinguish this case from Harrington v. California, [396 U.S. 250,]
and Schneble v. Florida, [405 U.S. 427,] and to convince us that the Brutonerrors found by
the District Judge cannot (as he also held) be determined to be harmless beyond reasonable
doubt."

575 F.2d 1178, 1182-1183.

[Footnote 2/2]
As MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN points out, ante at 442 U. S. 78-79, it is unclear whether the
plurality restricts its analysis to "interlocking" confessions, opinion of MR. JUSTICE
REHNQUIST, ante at 442 U. S. 75 (and, if so, what an "interlock" is), or whether a "broader"
exception is established for all confessions. Ante at 442 U. S. 72. Indeed, its opinion does not
explain how inculpatory a statement must be before it qualifies as a "confession," an
"extrajudicial admission of guilt," or a "statemen[t] . . . heaping blame onto
[oneself]." Ante at 442 U. S. 73, 442 U. S. 74. Moreover, the plurality variously states its test
as applicable "when[ever] the incriminated defendant has [once] admitted his own guilt"
(i.e., whenever he has not "maintained his innocence from the beginning"), or only when he
has once confessed and has left his "admission of guilt . . . before the jury unchallenged" by
any evidence of its invalidity. Ante at 442 U. S. 72,442 U. S. 73.

[Footnote 2/3]

In Roberts v. Russell, 392 U. S. 293, petitioner and a codefendant were jointly tried and
convicted of armed robbery, to which the codefendant had confessed, implicating petitioner.
In addition, petitioner's cousin testified that petitioner made certain inculpatory statements to
him concerning the robbery -- statements that the State Supreme Court relied upon heavily
in upholding the jury finding of petitioner's guilt. App. to Brief in Opposition, O.T. 1967, No.
920, Misc., pp. 4, 6. That court also held that the redaction of the codefendant's confession to
omit the references to petitioner as well as a cautionary instruction to the jury to consider the
confession as evidence against the codefendant alone was sufficient to avoid any problem
under the Confrontation Clause. On habeas corpus, the District Court and the Court of
Appeals agreed. This Court granted the writ of certiorari and summarily vacated the
conviction and remanded for reconsideration in light of Bruton. In so doing, it established
both that the Bruton rule applied to the States, and that it was retroactive. 392 U.S. at 392
U. S. 294-295.

Similarly, in Hopper v. Louisiana, 392 U. S. 658, the Court vacated the convictions of two
defendants, both of whom had made full confessions that were introduced at their joint trial
with the usual cautionary instructions. See 251 La. 77, 104, 203 So.2d 222, 232-233 (1967).
On remand, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the Bruton errors as to both defendants
were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in light of the overwhelming untainted evidence
inculpating both, 253 La. 439, 218 So.2d 551 (1969), and this Court denied certiorari. 396
U.S. 1012.

In two subsequent decisions, the Court held that error had been committed under the rule
of Bruton, although it found the error to be harmless. Brown v. United States, 411 U. S.
223, 411 U. S. 230-231; Harrington v. California, 395 U. S. 250, 395 U. S. 254. In all four of
these cases, the Court found a Bruton error even though the defendants' confessions
interlocked.

The plurality's analysis is also inconsistent with almost half of the lower federal and state
court opinions relied on in Bruton in support of its reasoning. 391 U.S. at 391 U. S. 129, 391
U. S. 135, and nn. 4, 8, 9. In 6 of the 14 cases cited there, the defendant as well as the
codefendant had confessed. See United States ex rel. Floyd v. Wilkins,367 F.2d 990 (CA2
1966); Greenwell v. United States, 119 U.S.App.D.C. 43, 336 F.2d 962 (1964); Barton v.
United States, 263 F.2d 894 (CA5 1959); United States ex rel. Hill v. Deegan, 268 F.Supp.
580 (SDNY 1967); People v. Barbaro, 395 Ill. 264, 69 N.E.2d 692 (1946); People v.
Fisher, 249 N.Y. 419, 432, 164 N.E. 336, 341 (1928) (Lehman, J., dissenting).

[Footnote 2/4]

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:

"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the
witnesses against him. . . ."

[Footnote 2/5]

"I think it clear that the underlying rationale of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause
precludes reliance upon cautionary instructions when the highly damaging out-of-court
statement of a codefendant, who is not subject to cross-examination, is deliberately placed
before the jury at a joint trial. A basic premise of the Confrontation Clause, it seems to me, is
that certain kinds of hearsay (see, e.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400; Douglas v.
Alabama, 380 U. S. 415) are at once so damaging, so suspect, and yet so difficult to
discount, that jurors cannot be trusted to give such evidence the minimal weight it logically
deserves, whatever instructions the trial judge may give. Seethe Court's opinion, [391 U.S.]
at 391 U. S. 136, n. 12. It is for this very reason that an out-of-court accusation is universally
conceded to be constitutionally inadmissibleagainst the accused, rather than admissible for
the little it may be worth."

391 U.S. at 391 U. S. 137-138 (STEWART, J., concurring).

[Footnote 2/6]

E.g., Foster, Confessions and the Station House Syndrome, 18 DePaul L.Rev. 683 (1969);
Sterling, Police Interrogation and the Psychology of Confession, 14 J.Pub.L. 25 (1965). See
generally T. Reik, The Compulsion to Confess 267 (1959).
[Footnote 2/7]

Indeed, George Bruton was identified at trial as the perpetrator by an eyewitness to the
robbery. App. in Bruton v. United States, O.T. 1967, No. 705, p. 70.

[Footnote 2/8]

Cf. Fed.Rule Evid. 804(b)(3) ("A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal
liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating
circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement"); Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U. S. 284.

[Footnote 2/9]

See Berger v. California, 393 U. S. 314; Barber v. Page, 390 U. S. 719; Pointer v. Texas, 380
U. S. 400; Motes v. United States, 178 U. S. 458; Rule 804(b), supra, 442 U. S. 8. See
generally Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for
Criminal Cases, 91 Harv.L.Rev. 567, 582-586, and n. 43 (1978).

[Footnote 2/10]

In his dissenting opinion in Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U. S. 232, Mr. Justice Frankfurter
commented on the recurring difficulties arising in the trial of two or more persons accused of
collaborating in a criminal enterprise when incriminating declarations by one or more of the
defendants are not admissible against others. He observed:

"The dilemma is usually resolved by admitting such evidence against the declarant but
cautioning the jury against its use in determining the guilt of the others. The fact of the
matter is that, too often, such admonition against misuse is intrinsically ineffective in that the
effect of such a nonadmissible declaration cannot be wiped from the brains of the jurors. The
admonition therefore becomes a futile collocation of words, and fails of its purpose as a legal
protection to defendants against whom such a declaration should not tell. While enforcing the
rule of admitting the declaration solely against a declarant and admonishing the jury not to
consider it against other defendants, Judge Learned Hand, in a series of cases, has
recognized the psychological feat that this solution of the dilemma demands of juries. He thus
stated the problem:"

" In effect, however, the rule probably furthers, rather than impedes, the search for truth,
and this perhaps excuses the device which satisfies form while it violates substance; that is,
the recommendation to the jury of a mental gymnastic which is beyond, not only their
powers, but anybody else's."
"Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007."

". . . The Government should not have the windfall of having the jury be influenced by
evidence against a defendant which, as a matter of law, they should not consider, but which
they cannot put out of their minds."

Id. at 352 U. S. 247-248.

[Footnote 2/11]

Writing for the Court in Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U. S. 539, 332 U. S. 559-560, Mr.
Justice Rutledge said:

"The grave danger in this case, if any, arose not from the trial court's rulings upon
admissibility or from its instructions to the jury. As we have said, these were as adequate as
might reasonably be required in a joint trial. The danger rested, rather, in the risk that the
jury, in disregard of the court's direction, would transfer, consciously or unconsciously, the
effect of the excluded admissions from the case as made against Goldsmith and Weiss across
the barrier of the exclusion to the other three defendants."

"That danger was real. It is one likely to arise in any conspiracy trial, and more likely to occur
as the number of persons charged together increases. Perhaps, even at best, the safeguards
provided by clear rulings on admissibility, limitations of the bearing of evidence as against
particular individuals, and adequate instructions are insufficient to ward off the danger
entirely. It is therefore extremely important that those safeguards be made as impregnable
as possible."

[Footnote 2/12]

Referring to the passage quoted from Blumenthal in the preceding footnote, Mr. Justice
Jackson made his frequently quoted observation.

"The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury, cf.
Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U. S. 539, 332 U. S. 559, all practicing lawyers know to be
unmitigated fiction."

Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U. S. 440, 336 U. S. 453 (concurring opinion).

[Footnote 2/13]

"Not even appellate judges can be expected to be so naive as really to believe that all twelve
jurors succeeded in performing what Judge L. Hand aptly called 'a mental gymnastic which is
beyond not only their powers, but anybody's else.' Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007
(2 Cir.1932). It is impossible realistically to suppose that, when the twelve good men and
women had [the codefendant's] confession in the privacy of the jury room, not one yielded to
the nigh irresistible temptation to fill in the blanks [caused by the redaction of the
defendants' names] with the keys [the other evidence] provided and [to] ask himself the
intelligent question to what extent Jones' statement supported [that evidence], or that, if
anyone did yield, his colleagues effectively persuaded him to dismiss the answers from his
mind."

United States v. Bozza, 365 F.2d 206, 215.

[Footnote 2/14]

See 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2272, p. 416 (3d ed.1940); E. Morgan, Some Problems of
Proof Under the Anglo-American System of Litigation 105 (1956).

[Footnote 2/15]

Indeed, the judge's command to ignore the confession may well assure that any juror who
happened to miss the connection to the defendant at first will nonetheless have made it by
the time he enters the jury room. Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U. S. 333, 435 U. S.
345 (STEVENS, J., dissenting)