Lucas v. Silva 1983 MSJ

Case4:07-cv-01673-CW Document82 Filed03/30/11 Page1 of 21
1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
3 ISIAH LUCAS, JR., No. C 07-1673 CW (PR)
4 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
5 TO STRIKE MEDICAL RECORDS; AND
v. GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
6 SUMMARY JUDGMENT
LT. SILVA, et al.,
7 (Docket nos. 63, 67)
Defendants.
8 /
9 INTRODUCTION
10 On March 23, 2007, Plaintiff Isiah Lucas, Jr., a state
For the Northern District of California
11 prisoner currently incarcerated at the Richard J. Donovan

United States District Court
12 Correctional Facility, filed this pro se civil rights action

13 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging constitutional violations
14 stemming from his incarceration at the Correctional Training
15 Facility (CTF). On October 29, 2009, the Court found cognizable
16 Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants CTF Warden B.
17 Curry, CTF Captain T. Jarvis, CTF Associate Warden D. Silva and CTF
18 Sergeant M. Miranda for deliberate indifference to his serious
19 medical needs. The Court dismissed Plaintiff's claim against
20 Defendant CTF Captain I. Guerra with leave to amend.
21 On November 25, 2009, Plaintiff submitted his amended
22 complaint. On May 6, 2010, the Court found cognizable Plaintiff's
23 claim of deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs
24 against Defendant Guerra.
25 On June 7, 2010, Defendants Curry, Jarvis, Silva and Miranda
26 filed a motion to dismiss for Plaintiff's failure to exhaust. On
27 October 6, 2010, the Court denied the motion to dismiss.
28
1 On October 21, 2010, Plaintiff moved to amend his complaint to

2 add claims against additional Defendants. On November 12, 2010,
3 the Court granted Plaintiff's motion to add deliberate indifference
4 claims against Defendants CTF Sergeant M. Knedler and CTF
5 Correctional Officers N. McGriff, J. Childers and G. Lopez.
6 Before the Court is the motion for summary judgment filed by
7 Defendants Curry, Jarvis, Guerra, Silva, Miranda, Knedler, McGriff,
8 Lopez and Childers. In support of their motion, Defendants rely on
9 Plaintiff's medical records. Plaintiff has filed an opposition,
10 attaching unauthenticated medical records as exhibits in support of
11 his opposition. Defendants have filed their reply, along with

12 objections to the exhibits attached to Plaintiff's opposition.

13 Also before the Court is Plaintiff's motion to strike the
14 medical records relied upon by Defendants.
15 Having considered the papers filed by the parties, the Court
16 DENIES Plaintiff's motion to strike and GRANTS Defendants' motion
17 for summary judgment.
18 BACKGROUND
19 Plaintiff has "hyper-extensive (i.e., double jointed) knees"
20 and "a history of complaints about lower back and neck pain," which
21 he attributes to arthritis. (Orr Decl. ¶ 3.) On January 18, 2005,
22 while incarcerated at Pleasant Valley State Prison, Plaintiff
23 received a Comprehensive Accommodation Chrono (chrono) for a "lower
24 bunk/lower tier" in response to his complaints of knee problems and
25 back discomfort. (Grigg Decl., Ex. B.)
26 On April 19, 2006, Plaintiff was transferred to CTF, where he
27 was housed as a "close custody" inmate. (Pl.'s Dep. 75:20-78:8,
28 Dec. 16, 2010.) This custody level requires "more stringent
2
1 security due to an inmate's crimes and sentences or, more

2 frequently, due to their behavior while in prison." (Miranda Decl.
3 ¶ 4.) For security purposes, prison officials could only house
4 Plaintiff in a facility dedicated to prisoners with that custody
5 level. (Pl.'s Dep. 74:5-15.)
6 Plaintiff notified CTF medical personnel of his chrono upon
7 arrival. However, at that time there was "a significant shortage
8 of available lower bunk housing" in CTF "closed custody wings."
9 (Silva Decl. ¶ 4-6.) Only inmates with "documented seizure
10 disorders" were given lower bunks. (Id.) Plaintiff was informed
11 he would be "temporar[ily]" assigned to an upper bunk "until a

12 bottom bunk was found." (Compl. at 5.) Plaintiff alleges that

13 "almost everyday" he addressed CTF staff regarding his "medical
14 condition and need for a lower bunk/lower tier." (Id. at 5 n.1.)
15 In his motion to add claims against additional Defendants,
16 Plaintiff identifies the particular members of CTF staff he
17 approached as Defendants Knedler and McGriff. (Mot. to Add Defs.
18 at 2.) Plaintiff alleges "no resolution was ever manifested."
19 (Compl. at 5 n.1.)
20 On May 2, 2006, Plaintiff filed a CDC 1824 Reasonable
21 Modification or Accommodation Request, identified as appeal log no.
22 06-01425, in which he requested single cell status or
23 administrative segregation due to his "phobia and paranoia with
24 cell-mates." (Grigg Decl., Ex. D.) On May 26, 2006, appeal log
25 no. 06-01425 was "partially granted" at the first level of review
26 in that Defendant Miranda interviewed Plaintiff, instructed him to
27 "fill out and submit a request for a cell change form" and also
28 informed him he would "be placed on the C-Wing lower bunk waiting
3
1 list." (Id.) The partial grant was approved by Defendant Jarvis.

2 On June 5, 2006, Plaintiff was moved to an upper bunk on the
3 "3rd tier" in "D-Wing," and told by Defendant Knedler that he would
4 be "the only black inmate on the waiting list . . . for a bottom
5 bunk." (Compl. at 6.)
6 On June 7, 2006, Plaintiff told Defendants Childers and Lopez
7 he "was suffering from being assigned to the top bunk, and . . . he
8 couldn't take the pain/agony much longer." (Id. at 6.) Although
9 Defendants Childers and Lopez told Plaintiff they would "see what
10 they could do," they did not ever assign him to a lower bunk. (Id.
11 at 6-7.)
12 On June 14, 2006, Plaintiff submitted appeal log no. 06-01425

13 to the second level of review.
14 On June 25, 2006, Plaintiff submitted written correspondence
15 to Defendant Curry, the Office of the Inspector General, the Prison
16 Law Office and the Rosen, Bien & Asaro law firm. Plaintiff
17 requested that they "intervene in a manner to bring a resolution"
18 to his bunking assignment, because sixty-eight days had passed
19 without prison staff "comply[ing] with medical orders . . . ."
20 (Id. at 7.) Defendant Guerra responded to Plaintiff's letter on
21 Defendant Curry's behalf. (Pl.'s Dep. 113:24-114:6.)
22 On June 26, 2006, Defendant Silva interviewed Plaintiff in
23 connection with the second level of review for appeal log no.
24 06-01425. (Silva Decl. ¶ 8.) Defendant Silva "said he would see
25 what he could do about the matter." (Compl. at 8.)
26 On June 27, 2006,1 Defendant Silva again interviewed Plaintiff
27
1
Plaintiff has written the date of his second interview with
28 Defendant Silva as "6/27/07." (Compl. at 8.) The Court assumes
Plaintiff mistakenly wrote "07" instead of "06" for the year.
4
1 regarding the "bottom bunk matter." (Id.) Defendant Silva "said

2 they were working on the matter and said to give them a little
3 longer." (Id.) On July 2, 2006, when Plaintiff saw Defendant
4 Silva in the corridor, he "not only expressed the continuous need
5 for a bottom bunk," but also "a need to get out of cell 307
6 altogether." (Id.) Defendant Silva "threw his hands up and said
7 that there was nothing he could do at that time." (Id.)
8 On July 8, 2006, Plaintiff was "no longer able/willing to deal
9 with the pain and suffering from being assigned to a top
10 bunk . . . ." (Id.) He placed his property outside his cell and
11 refused to re-enter. CTF Correctional Officer LaVelle intervened,

12 and Plaintiff was transferred to administrative segregation for

13 "Battery on a Peace Officer."2 (Id. at 9.)
14 On July 10, 2006, appeal log no. 06-01425 was partially
15 granted at the second level of review, in that Plaintiff was
16 informed there was "a severe shortage of lower bunks available,"
17 and that "[d]uring this housing crunch, inmates with Lower Bunk
18 Chronos will be housed in upper bunks, except for those inmates
19 with documented seizure disorders." (Id.) The response also
20 informed Plaintiff that he was "on the priority place for any lower
21 bunk that becomes available in the Close Custody Wings." (Id.)
22 The partial grant was approved by Defendants Curry and Guerra.
23 In sum, Plaintiff claims he was not assigned to a lower bunk
24 for a total of eighty-one days, until his transfer to
25 administrative segregation. Plaintiff was housed in administrative
26 segregation from July 8, 2006 to February 28, 2007. The Court
27
28 2
Plaintiff claims he was "wrongfully" found guilty of Battery
on a Peace Officer. (Compl. at 9.)
5
1 assumes Plaintiff was transferred out of CTF soon after being

2 released from administrative segregation because on March 18, 2007,
3 when Plaintiff signed his complaint, he states that he was being
4 housed at California State Prison - Corcoran.
5 DISCUSSION
6 I. Legal Standard
7 Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine and
8 disputed issues of material fact remain, and when, viewing the
9 evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is
10 clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.
11 56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

12 Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir.
13 1987).
14 The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no
15 material factual dispute; therefore, the Court must regard as true
16 the opposing party's evidence, if it is supported by affidavits or
17 other evidentiary material. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Eisenberg,
18 815 F.2d at 1289. The Court must draw all reasonable inferences in
19 favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought.
20 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
21 587 (1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d
22 1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991).
23 Material facts which would preclude entry of summary judgment
24 are those which, under applicable substantive law, may affect the
25 outcome of the case. The substantive law will identify which facts
26 are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
27 (1986).
28 Where the moving party does not bear the burden of proof on an
6
1 issue at trial, the moving party may discharge its burden of

2 production by either of two methods:
3 The moving party may produce evidence negating an
essential element of the nonmoving party's case, or,
4 after suitable discovery, the moving party may show
that the nonmoving party does not have enough
5 evidence of an essential element of its claim or
defense to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at
6 trial.
7 Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd., v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d
8 1099, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000).
9 If the moving party discharges its burden by showing an
10 absence of evidence to support an essential element of a claim or
11 defense, it is not required to produce evidence showing the absence

12 of a material fact on such issues, or to support its motion with

13 evidence negating the non-moving party's claim. Nissan, 210 F.3d
14 at 1106; see also Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 885
15 (1990); Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir.
16 1991). If the moving party shows an absence of evidence to support
17 the non-moving party's case, the burden then shifts to the non-
18 moving party to produce "specific evidence, through affidavits or
19 admissible discovery material, to show that the dispute exists."
20 Bhan, 929 F.2d at 1409.
21 If the moving party discharges its burden by negating an
22 essential element of the non-moving party's claim or defense, it
23 must produce affirmative evidence of such negation. Nissan, 210
24 F.3d at 1105. If the moving party produces such evidence, the
25 burden then shifts to the non-moving party to produce specific
26 evidence to show that a dispute of material fact exists. Id.
27 If the moving party does not meet its initial burden of
28 production by either method, the non-moving party is under no
7
1 obligation to offer any evidence in support of its opposition. Id.

2 This is true even though the non-moving party bears the ultimate
3 burden of persuasion at trial. Id. at 1107.
4 II. Evidence Considered
5 A district court may only consider admissible evidence in
6 ruling on a motion for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
7 56(e); Orr v. Bank of America, 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002).
8 In support of Defendants' motion for summary judgment,
9 affidavits have been filed by Dr. Orr, Attorney M. Grigg and
10 Defendants Silva, Miranda, Childers, McGriff, Lopez and Knedler.
11 Plaintiff verified his complaint filed on March 23, 2007 by

12 signing it under penalty of perjury. Also in the record are

13 Plaintiff's amended complaint, his motion to add Defendants, and
14 his opposition, none of which is signed under penalty of perjury.
15 Therefore, for the purposes of this Order, the Court will treat
16 Plaintiff's original complaint filed on March 23, 2007 as an
17 affidavit in opposition to Defendants' motion for summary judgment
18 under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See
19 Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 & nn.10-11 (9th Cir. 1995).
20 In his motion to strike, Plaintiff moves to (1) rule
21 inadmissible any of his "medical records that Defendant [sic] has
22 obtained"; (2) compel Defendants to "return the medical
23 records/documents . . . obtained from CSP-Solano;" (3) compel
24 Defendants to "disclose the party that ordered the release of
25 Plaintiff's medical records;" and (4) compel Defendants to "abide
26 by law in the future in obtaining medical records/files." (Mot. to
27 Strike at 3.) Plaintiff argues his medical records are
28 inadmissible because he has "a constitutional right to privacy in
8
1 that of his medical records/diagnoses/information." (Id. at 1.)

2 Defendants did not respond to Plaintiff's motion to strike.
3 The Court finds unavailing Plaintiff's arguments for striking
4 the medical records. He claims that the medical records Defendants
5 rely on in support of their motion are inadmissible based on his
6 "right to privacy." (Id.) Plaintiff fails to argue that
7 Defendants relied on these particular medical records for reasons
8 other than in response to the lawsuit. Nor does Plaintiff argue
9 that any of the medical records Defendants rely on are irrelevant
10 to his deliberate indifference claim. The record shows that
11 (1) Defendants have relied on Plaintiff's lower bunk chrono and his
12 related medical records in support of their motion for summary

13 judgment; and (2) Plaintiff has submitted similarly relevant
14 medical records in support of his opposition. Therefore,
15 Plaintiff's motion to strike his medical records is DENIED, because
16 there is no evidence that Defendants relied on any irrelevant
17 medical records in support of their motion for summary judgment.3
18 III. Deliberate Indifference Claim
19 Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates the
20 Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual
21 punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). The
22 analysis of a claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical
23 needs involves an examination of two elements: (1) a prisoner's
24
3
Plaintiff has mooted his motion to strike by submitting his
25 own copies of similar medical records in support of his opposition.
As mentioned above, Defendants object to the exhibits attached to
26 Plaintiff's opposition -- including his medical records -- as
unauthenticated. However, because the Court relies in its analysis
27 below on Plaintiff's verified complaint and not on the exhibits
attached to his opposition, it need not address Defendants'
28 objection.
9
1 serious medical needs and (2) a deliberately indifferent response

2 by the defendants to those needs. McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d
3 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds by WMX
4 Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997)
5 (en banc).
6 A serious medical need exists if the failure to treat a
7 prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury or
8 the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." McGuckin, 974
9 F.2d at 1059 (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). Examples of
10 indications that a prisoner has a serious need for medical
11 treatment are the existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor

12 or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment;

13 the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an
14 individual's daily activities; or the existence of chronic and
15 substantial pain. Id. at 1059-60 (citing Wood v. Housewright, 900
16 F.2d 1332, 1337-41 (9th Cir. 1990)).
17 The plaintiff must also show that the defendant knew the
18 plaintiff faced "substantial risk of serious harm" yet failed to
19 take reasonable steps to abate it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
20 825, 837 (1994). A prison official "who act[s] reasonably cannot
21 be found liable under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause."
22 Id. at 845. Further, a prison official must not only "be aware of
23 facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial
24 risk of serious harm exists," but "must also draw the inference."
25 Id.
26 Therefore, in order to establish deliberate indifference,
27 there must be a purposeful act or failure to act on the part of the
28 defendant and resulting harm. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060; Shapley
10
1 v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm'rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir.
2 1985). A defendant's actions need not be "egregious" nor need they
3 result in "significant injury" in order to establish a violation of
4 the prisoner's federal constitutional rights, McGuckin, 974 F.2d at
5 1059; however, the existence of serious harm tends to support an
6 inmate's deliberate indifference claim. Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d
7 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006).
8 In order to establish deliberate indifference, Plaintiff must
9 show he had serious medical needs. Plaintiff alleges that while he
10 was assigned to an "upper tier/upper bunk," his back and knee pain
11 amounted to serious medical needs. Defendants allege, in contrast,

12 that Plaintiff did not have any serious medical needs because he
13 was not exposed "to a societally intolerable risk of harm." (Mot.
14 for Summ. J. at 8.) If Plaintiff's assignment "actually had
15 caused, or posed a genuine risk of, such harm," Defendants contend,
16 "Plaintiff could simply have put his mattress on the floor and
17 slept there." (Id.) Defendants also argue Plaintiff "tacitly
18 confirmed the absence of a 'societally intolerable risk' by
19 admitting he never even asked his cellmate to switch bunks." (Id.)
20 Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiff "confirmed his claim's
21 untenability through his inability to articulate what ostensibly
22 significant problem his upper bunk assignment supposedly caused or
23 could have caused." (Id. (citing Pl.'s Dep., 29:7-9; 30:22-24;
24 41:20-21).) Rather, Plaintiff "repeatedly alluded to mere
25 'stiffness.'" (Id.)
26
The Court must construe the evidence and the inferences to be
27
drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.
28
11
1 T.W. Elec. Serv. Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d
2 626, 631 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff's allegations could support an
3 inference and conclusion that the failure to assign him to a "lower
4 bunk/lower tier" pursuant to his lower bunk chrono resulted in the
5 "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." McGuckin, 974 F.2d at
6 1059. Therefore, the Court assumes without deciding that Plaintiff
7 had serious medical needs.
8 In order to establish deliberate indifference, Plaintiff also
9 must show that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his
10 serious medical needs. Therefore, the Court will consider his
11 claims against each specific group of Defendants as follows: the

12 prison officials and the appeal reviewers.

13
A. Prison Officials: Defendants Knedler, McGriff, Childers,
14 Lopez, Miranda and Silva
15
Plaintiff alleges Defendants Knedler, McGriff, Childers,
16
Lopez, Miranda and Silva were deliberately indifferent to his
17
serious medical needs because, although he informed these prison
18
officials of his need for a "lower bunk/lower tier" due to his back
19
and neck pain, they did not assign him to a lower bunk. (Compl. at
20
5 n.1, 6, 8.)
21
Defendants Knedler, McGriff, Childers and Lopez allege that,
22
although they do not specifically remember Plaintiff, they never
23
consciously disregarded any substantial risk or serious harm that
24
Plaintiff may have faced. (Knedler Decl. ¶ 6; McGriff Decl. ¶ 2;
25
Childers Decl. ¶ 2; Lopez Decl. ¶ 2.) They further allege that if
26
an inmate complained that his "lower bunk/lower tier" chrono was
27
not being recognized, it would generally not signal the inmate
28
12
1 faced a serious risk of harm, because such chronos were commonly

2 issued to enhance inmate comfort. (Knedler Decl. ¶ 8; McGriff
3 Decl. ¶ 8; Childers Decl. ¶ 8; Lopez Decl. ¶ 5.) Defendants
4 Knedler, McGriff, Lopez and Childers also claim they "could not
5 have circumvented" the order that "lower bunks were only to be
6 provided to inmates with documented seizure disorders until other
7 lower bunks opened up." (Miranda Decl. ¶ 13.) If a particular
8 inmate, who -- like Plaintiff -- did not have a documented seizure
9 disorder, complained about the upper bunk assignment, Defendants
10 Knedler, McGriff, Childers and Lopez had no other recourse but to
11 explain that there existed a lower bunk shortage and to provide

12 that inmate with the proper appeal or request forms.4 (Knedler

13 Decl. ¶ 7; McGriff Decl. ¶ 6-7; Childers Decl. ¶ 4-6; Lopez Decl.
14 ¶ 4.) Also, they claim that "it would have been impossible for the
15 officers to fulfill [Plaintiff's] demands" to move to a lower
16 bunk/lower tier "because correctional officers do not have the
17 authority to arrange for cell transfers." (Id.) If an inmate
18 complained that the upper bunk assignment caused him significant
19 problems, then Defendants Knedler, McGriff, Childers and Lopez
20 claim they would have alerted their supervisors or medical staff.
21 (Knedler Decl. ¶ 6; McGriff Decl. ¶ 5; Childers Decl. ¶ 4; Lopez
22 Decl. ¶ 5.)
23 Defendants Miranda and Silva likewise allege they did not
24 believe that keeping Plaintiff temporarily assigned to an upper
25
26 4
Defendant Lopez also explains that, as "security door
officer," he had "very limited contact with inmates," which "makes
27 it very unlikely that [he] would have had any sort of extended
conversation with Inmate Lucas." (Id. ¶ 6.)
28
13
1 bunk would cause him anything more than discomfort. (Silva Decl.
2 ¶ 9; Miranda Decl. ¶ 11.) Defendant Miranda alleges he had no
3 authority to grant Plaintiff's appeal because of the lower bunk
4 shortage, stating "placing Inmate Lucas on the waiting list was all
5 that [he] was authorized to do." (Miranda Decl. ¶ 8.) Defendant
6 Miranda claims he "had no ability to provide Inmate Lucas with a
7 lower bunk while those with more severe medical issues required
8 them." (Id. ¶ 11.) Defendant Silva alleges he "placed Mr. Lucas
9 on the priority wait list," then "sent the appeal response to
10 Captain Guerra and Warden Curry for approval." (Silva Decl. ¶ 9.)
11 Defendant Silva further claims, "I lacked the ability and authority
12 to move another inmate or make the type of medical determination

13 that such an act would require." (Id. ¶ 12.)
14 Defendants Knedler, McGriff, Childers, Lopez, Miranda and
15 Silva do not refute Plaintiff's allegation that, although he
16 complained of back and neck pain resulting from his upper bunk
17 assignment, they did not ever assign him to a lower bunk.
18 Defendants also do not allege they in fact alerted their
19 supervisors or medical staff that Plaintiff faced a serious risk of
20 harm. Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff,
21 he has shown these Defendants acted with a sufficiently culpable
22 state of mind by ignoring or failing to respond to his pain or
23 serious medical needs. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060. Therefore,
24 the Court finds that the evidence produced by Plaintiff raises a
25 material factual dispute about whether these Defendants acted with
26 deliberate indifference toward his serious medical needs when they
27 failed to remedy his complaints of back and neck pain from the
28
14
1 upper bunk assignment. Accordingly, Defendants Knedler, McGriff,

2 Lopez, Childers, Miranda and Silva are not entitled to summary
3 judgment as to the deliberate indifference claim.
4 B. Appeal Reviewers: Defendants Jarvis, Guerra and Curry
5
Plaintiff alleges Defendants Jarvis, Guerra and Curry were
6
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs because they
7
approved the partial grant for appeal log no. 06-01425 at either
8
the first or second level of review. Plaintiff also sues Defendant
9
Curry in his supervisory capacity. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges
10
Defendant Curry did not "intervene" to resolve Plaintiff's "lower
11
bunk/lower tier" situation, despite the fact that Plaintiff sent
12
him a letter. (Compl. at 7.)
13
Plaintiff claims that Defendants Jarvis and Guerra, as the
14
appeal reviewers, and Defendant Curry, as a supervisor, were aware
15
of Plaintiff's "lower bunk/lower tier" situation through reading
16
his appeal and his letter, respectively. These Defendants do not
17
refute Plaintiff's allegation that, although he alerted them of his
18
back and neck pain resulting from his upper bunk assignment, they
19
did not ever assign him to a lower bunk. Taking the facts in the
20
light most favorable to Plaintiff, he has shown these Defendants
21
acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind by failing to
22
intervene to resolve Plaintiff's "lower bunk/lower tier" situation,
23
despite the fact that Plaintiff alerted them of his pain or serious
24
medical needs. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060. Therefore, the
25
Court finds that the evidence produced by Plaintiff raises a
26
material factual dispute about whether these Defendants acted with
27
deliberate indifference toward his serious medical needs when they
28
failed to remedy his complaints of back and neck pain from the
15
1 upper bunk assignment. Accordingly, Defendants Jarvis, Guerra and

2 Curry are not entitled to summary judgment as to the deliberate
3 indifference claim.
4 IV. Qualified Immunity
5
In the alternative, Defendants Knedler, McGriff, Lopez,
6
Childers, Miranda, Silva, Jarvis, Guerra and Curry argue that
7
summary judgment is warranted because, as government officials,
8
they are entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiff's deliberate
9
indifference claim. They contend that "it would not have been
10
'clear' to other reasonable people in the defendant's [sic]
11
positions that their conduct was unconstitutional." (Mot. for
12
Summ. J. at 12.)
13
The defense of qualified immunity protects "government
14
officials performing discretionary functions . . . from liability
15
for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
16
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
17
reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
18
U.S. 800, 818 (1982). A court considering a claim of qualified
19
immunity must determine (1) whether the plaintiff has alleged the
20
deprivation of an actual constitutional right and (2) whether such
21
right was clearly established such that it would be clear to a
22
reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation
23
he confronted. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 129 S. Ct.
24
808, 818 (2009) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001)). The
25
court may exercise its discretion in deciding which prong to
26
address first, in light of the particular circumstances of each
27
case. Id.
28
16
1 Regarding the first prong, the threshold question must be:

2 taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the
3 injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a
4 constitutional right? Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. Regarding the
5 second prong, the inquiry as to whether a constitutional right was
6 clearly established must be undertaken in light of the specific
7 context of the case, not as a broad general proposition. Id. at
8 202. The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a
9 right is clearly established is "whether it would be clear to a
10 reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation
11 he confronted." Id. If the law "did not put the officer on notice
12 that his conduct would be clearly unlawful, summary judgment based

13 on qualified immunity is appropriate." Id. Defendants can have a
14 reasonable, but mistaken, belief about the facts or about what the
15 law requires in any given situation. Id. (quoting Malley v.
16 Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).
17
A memorandum issued by CTF Chief Deputy Warden P. Barker on
18
December 15, 2005 and addressed to all CTF staff stated, "Central
19
Facility is currently experiencing a severe shortage of housing for
20
inmates with Lower Bunk Chronos." (Grigg Decl., Ex. C.) "During
21
this temporary housing crunch, inmates with Lower Bunk Chronos will
22
be housed in race-appropriate upper bunks, except for those inmates
23
with documented seizure disorders." (Id. (emphasis in original))
24
The three wings dedicated to close custody inmates were C, D and E
25
wings. (Silva Decl. ¶ 4.) "Sending inmates whose chronos could not
26
be immediately accommodated to non-close custody wings was not an
27
option of the security level that close custody inmates required."
28
(Id. ¶ 5.) As mentioned above, Plaintiff was a level two, close
17
1 custody inmate. (Id. ¶ 6.)

2 Defendants Knedler, McGriff, Lopez, Childers, Miranda, Silva,
3 Jarvis and Guerra, who were all CTF staff members, were required to
4 abide by Chief Deputy Warden Barker's memorandum. Specifically,
5 these Defendants did not have the authority to provide Plaintiff
6 with a lower bunk because of the lower bunk shortage and strict
7 limitations set out in this memorandum. (Miranda Decl. ¶ 8, 13;
8 Silva Decl. ¶ 12.) Furthermore, these Defendants had legitimate
9 penological reasons for not assigning Plaintiff to a lower bunk in
10 non-close custody wings due to the "security level that close
11 custody inmates required." (Silva Decl. ¶ 5.) It would not have

12 been clear to a reasonable officer that following housing protocols

13 outlined in Chief Deputy Warden Barker's memorandum would have
14 violated Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment rights. Because a reasonable
15 officer in the positions of Defendants Knedler, McGriff, Lopez,
16 Childers, Miranda, Silva, Jarvis and Guerra could have thought his
17 conduct was lawful, they are entitled to qualified immunity on the
18 deliberate indifference claim. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202.
19 Therefore, their motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
20
Defendant Curry was an administrator and, as CTF Warden, he
21
did not have any direct involvement in Plaintiff's bunking
22
assignment. As mentioned above, Plaintiff claims Defendant Curry
23
received a letter from Plaintiff requesting he "intervene" to
24
resolve Plaintiff's "lower bunk/lower tier" situation. However, as
25
Defendants argue, there is no evidence that Defendant Curry was
26
aware of any constitutional violations and failed to act to prevent
27
them, because Plaintiff has "no idea" whether Defendant Curry
28
received his letter. (Mot. for Summ. J. at 11 (quoting Pl.'s Dep.
18
1 113:24-114:6).) While Plaintiff claims he sent a letter to

2 Defendant Curry about "the matter at hand," (compl. at 7), he does
3 not include a copy of this letter. Thus, the Court cannot assess
4 whether Defendant Curry was informed that Plaintiff experienced
5 neck and back pain due to his upper bunk assignment. Furthermore,
6 it was Defendant Guerra who responded to Plaintiff's letter by
7 attaching the memorandum regarding the lower bunk shortage.
8 Nevertheless, the Court has assumed above that Defendant Curry
9 was aware of Plaintiff's back and neck pain resulting from his
10 upper bunk assignment, and it has found a constitutional violation
11 because Defendant Curry did not intervene when his subordinates

12 failed to assign Plaintiff to a lower bunk. However, it would not

13 have been clear to a reasonable person in Defendant Curry's
14 position that failing to intervene when his subordinates ignored
15 Plaintiff's pain by following the housing protocols outlined in
16 Chief Deputy Warden Barker's memorandum would violate Plaintiff's
17 Eighth Amendment rights, especially in light of the fact that
18 inmates with documented seizure disorders had priority over the
19 other inmates with lower bunk chronos. Accordingly, Defendant
20 Curry is also entitled to qualified immunity on the deliberate
21 indifference claim; therefore, his motion for summary judgment is
22 GRANTED.
23
CONCLUSION
24
For the foregoing reasons,
25
26 1. Plaintiff's motion to strike the medical records relied
27 upon by Defendants (docket no. 63) is DENIED.
28 2. Defendants' motion for summary judgment (docket no. 67)
19
1 is GRANTED.
2 3. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in favor of
3 Defendants in accordance with this Order, terminate all pending
4 motions, and close the case. Each party shall bear his own costs.
5
4. This Order terminates Docket nos. 63 and 67.
6
IT IS SO ORDERED.
7
8 Dated: 3/30/2011
CLAUDIA WILKEN
9
United States District Judge
10
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15
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19
20
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20
1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE
2
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
3
4
ISIAH LUCAS JR.,
5
Case Number: CV07-01673 CW
6 Plaintiff,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
7
v.
8
9 M. MIRANDA et al,
10
Defendant.
11 /
12
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District
13 Court, Northern District of California.
14
That on March 30, 2011, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said
15 copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said
envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle
16 located in the Clerk's office.
17
18 Isiah Lucas E-91878
R.J. Donovan Correctional Facility
19
P.O. Box 799001
20 1-2-104
21 480 Alta Road
San Diego, CA 92179-9001
22
23
Dated: March 30, 2011
24
Richard W. Wieking, Clerk
25 By: Nikki Riley, Deputy Clerk
26
27
28
21

Lucas v. Silva 1983 MSJ

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Lucas v. Silva 1983 MSJ

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Case4:07-cv-01673-CW Document82 Filed03/30/11 Page1 of 21

1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

11 prisoner currently incarcerated at the Richard J. Donovan

12 Correctional Facility, filed this pro se civil rights action

1 On October 21, 2010, Plaintiff moved to amend his complaint to

11 his opposition. Defendants have filed their reply, along with

12 objections to the exhibits attached to Plaintiff's opposition.

1 security due to an inmate's crimes and sentences or, more

11 he would be "temporar[ily]" assigned to an upper bunk "until a

12 bottom bunk was found." (Compl. at 5.) Plaintiff alleges that

1 list." (Id.) The partial grant was approved by Defendant Jarvis.

12 On June 14, 2006, Plaintiff submitted appeal log no. 06-01425

1 regarding the "bottom bunk matter." (Id.) Defendant Silva "said

11 refused to re-enter. CTF Correctional Officer LaVelle intervened,

12 and Plaintiff was transferred to administrative segregation for

1 assumes Plaintiff was transferred out of CTF soon after being

11 56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

1 issue at trial, the moving party may discharge its burden of

11 defense, it is not required to produce evidence showing the absence

12 of a material fact on such issues, or to support its motion with

1 obligation to offer any evidence in support of its opposition. Id.

11 Plaintiff verified his complaint filed on March 23, 2007 by

12 signing it under penalty of perjury. Also in the record are

1 that of his medical records/diagnoses/information." (Id. at 1.)

12 related medical records in support of their motion for summary

1 serious medical needs and (2) a deliberately indifferent response

11 treatment are the existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor

12 or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment;

11 amounted to serious medical needs. Defendants allege, in contrast,

11 claims against each specific group of Defendants as follows: the

12 prison officials and the appeal reviewers.

1 faced a serious risk of harm, because such chronos were commonly

11 explain that there existed a lower bunk shortage and to provide

12 that inmate with the proper appeal or request forms.4 (Knedler

12 to move another inmate or make the type of medical determination

1 upper bunk assignment. Accordingly, Defendants Knedler, McGriff,

1 upper bunk assignment. Accordingly, Defendants Jarvis, Guerra and

1 Regarding the first prong, the threshold question must be:

12 that his conduct would be clearly unlawful, summary judgment based

1 custody inmate. (Id. ¶ 6.)

11 custody inmates required." (Silva Decl. ¶ 5.) It would not have

12 been clear to a reasonable officer that following housing protocols

1 113:24-114:6).) While Plaintiff claims he sent a letter to

11 because Defendant Curry did not intervene when his subordinates

12 failed to assign Plaintiff to a lower bunk. However, it would not

27 upon by Defendants (docket no. 63) is DENIED.

28 2. Defendants' motion for summary judgment (docket no. 67)

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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