SEER, Vol.56; No.

3,July 1978

The Sovietization of the Jewish

Community of Eastern Poland
I939- 94I
B. C. PINCHUK

SOVIETrule in EasternPoland lasted twenty-one months. During that

time the Soviet Government occupied, annexed, and tried to inte-
grate the territoriesinto the Soviet state. Military occupation and
formal incorporation of Eastern Poland into the Byelorussian and
Ukrainian Republics constituted only the first steps in an effort to
transform the territoriesinto an integral part of the Soviet Union.
Unlike its predecessorsin power,the Communistrulersdid not consider
military occupation a sufficient safeguard. To a much larger extent
than Imperial Russia, the Soviet Government sought to change the
character of the acquired territories. The Sovietization of the area
meant an attempt at total political, economic, social and cultural
transformationto conform to the regime existing in the U.S.S.R.
The large Jewish community of Eastern Poland was subjected to
the same process of integration as the other inhabitants of the area.
However, because the Jews were a minority group their Sovietiza-
tion included certain characteristics of adjustment peculiar to an
ethnic minority in a multinational environment. The Sovietization
of the Jewish community reflected the accumulated experience, as
well as the current policy of the Kremlin towards the Jews living in
the U.S.S.R. itself. In Eastern Poland, however, the developments
were condensed in time, because the authorities were attempting to
impose as rapidly as possible the Stalinist model of relations between
them and the Jewish population.
The Sovietization of Eastern Poland'sJewry should be perceived
as a two-way process:Moscow's policy and its implementation on the
one hand and its acceptance and adaptation by the Jews on the
other. The entire processwas stronglyinfluenced by the circumstances
of the occupation: Russian international relations, particularly with
Nazi Germany, and the latter's anti-Jewish policy, the national
composition of the area, and the institutional structureand cultural
tradition of the Jewish community of Eastern Poland.
On I7 September I939 Soviet troops crossed the Polish border,
in accordance with the non-aggressionpact signed with Germany on
B. C. Pinchuk is a Senior Lecturer in the History Department of the University of Haifa.
388 B. C. PINCHUK

23 August. The final boundariesbetween the U.S.S.R. and Germany

were agreed upon on 28 September I939.1 The eastern and south-
eastern provinces of Poland were occupied under the pretext of
'liberating the kindred Ukrainian and Byelorussianpeoples' living
in those territories.2The fiction of liberation was maintained by the
Soviet authorities throughout their occupation of the area; it had
important consequences for their attitude towards other ethnic
groups. Less than a month after the occupation, Peoples' Assemblies,
elected according to the best tradition of Soviet democracy, were
convened in L'vov and Bialystok. The assemblies voted unani-
mously for the incorporation of Western Ukraine and Western
Byelorussiainto the U.S.S.R., as part of Soviet Byelorussiaand the
Ukraine.3 On i and 2 November I939 the Supreme Soviet of the
U.S.S.R. agreed to incorporate the new territories and unite them
with the Soviet Ukraine and Byelorussia.
The use of historical and national argumentsto justify the annexa-
tion of Eastern Poland also found its expressionin policies followed
in the region. The Byelorussiansand Ukrainians barely constituted
a majority in the former Polish provinces.4They were particularly
weak in the urban centres. The Soviet authorities followed a deli-
berate policy of Ukrainianization and Byelorussification.Ukrainians
and Byelorussianswere preferred in appointments to government
jobs. The language of instruction in many schools, even where
Poles and Jews constituted a majority, was changed and thousands
of Poles were evicted from the region.5 It should be noted, however,
that the new rulers showed little trust in the local population in
general, and most of the administrativepersonnel was brought from
the East, the Soviet Union proper. These were the so-called
vostochniki(Easterners)who presidedover the Sovietization of Eastern
Poland.
The speed of Sovietization was to a large extent determined by
the reaction of the local population and by external developments,
particularlythe fear of Nazi Germany. One can distinguish,roughly,
two phases of Sovietization. The firstlasted from the beginning of the
occupation through the decision to incorporate the area into the

1 R. J. Sontag and J. S. Beddie, eds, Nazi-Soviet Relations: Documentsfromthe Archives

of the GermanForeignOffice,Washington, D.C., 1948, pp. 90-96.
2 A. S. Cardwell, Poland and Russia, New York, 1944, p. 46.
3 N. P. Vakar, Byelorussia,Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1956, pp. 157-58. 'I did not
hear even a single speech expressing even the slightest doubt that Soviet power should be
established in the Western Ukraine,' recalled N. Khrushchev, who as party boss of the
Ukraine presided over the Sovietization of the Western Ukraine: see Khrushchev Remembers,
Boston, 1970, p. 146.
4 J. S. Roucek, 'Minorities in Poland', in Poland,edited by B. E. Schmitt, Los Angeles,
1947.
6 Cardwell, op. cit., pp. 52-71.
 THE SOVIETIZATION OF EASTERN POLAND 389
U.S.S.R., and even a few months longer, until January 1940. It was
characterized by a policy designed to gain the favour of the local
population. It coincided with the first stages of forming a Soviet
administration in the annexed territories. While there were many
instances of arrestsand deportations from the very beginning of the
occupation, this phase was characterized by its relative leniency.
During that period the new authorities destroyed the old political-
administrative order. Soviets were established in the villages and
towns to replace the former administration.6Key positions in the
new hierarchy were occupied by people who came from the East:
local Communists,at least for a short time, held secondarypositions.7
The political and national organizations of the old order ceased to
exist, whether voluntarily or by decree, and were replaced by the
Communist party.
The economic policy of the firstfew months could be characterized
as a kind of pseudo-NEP. Large estates were divided among the
peasants. Banks, factories, the wholesale trade and natural resources
were nationalized. Yet retail trade, small enterprises and handi-
crafts remained in private hands.8 In January I940, the Polish
zloty ceased to be legal currency in the annexed territories. People
were allowed to convert no more than three hundred zloty into
roubles.9 This decision, for all practical purposes, marked the end
of the pseudo-NEP economy. It expropriated the middle class,
while high taxes, lack of new supplies and massive purchasing by the
Soviet personnel from the East literally emptied the local stores of
commodities which could rarely be replaced.'0 The lower class,
which contained a high proportion of Jews, was similarly ruined.
Economic circumstances forced people to join co-operatives or to
look for government employment.
The liquidation of the NEP economy coincided with the first
large-scale deportations in February I940. These developments led
to the second, more acceleratedphase of Sovietization. While we have
no documentary evidence as to the reasons behind the harsher
policy, it is not too difficult to explain. The Soviet authorities saw
no reason to perpetuate a different regime in Eastern Poland. After

6 See K. K. Dubina, ed., Istoriya UkrainskoyS.S.R., Kiev, i969, II, p. 471; T. S.

Gorbunov et al., IstoriyaBelorusskoyS.S.R., Minsk, I962, vol. Ii, PP. 384-85.
7 KhrushchevRemembers,p. 143; J. A. Armstrong, UkrainianNationalism, 1939-1945,
New York, 1955, p. 68.
8 Vakar, op. cit., pp. I62-63.
Ibid., p. i64.
10 There are numerous accounts of the hunger for consumer goods of the Soviet troops
and administrators who arrived in Eastern Poland. While claiming, always, that 'We
have plenty of everything in our country', the soldiers and officials bought everything
they could lay their hands on. See T. Fuks, A VanderungIber OkupiriteGebitn, Buenos
Aires, 1947, pp. 45-46; P. Shwartz, Dos Iz GevenDer Onheib,New York, 1943, pp. 225-33.
390 B. C. PINCHUK
the organizationof the new administration and the establishmentof
the firmgripof the secretpolice,the newrulersfelt confidentenough
to proceedwith the transformation of the regionto conformto the
Stalinistmodel.The relativeleniencyof the firstphaseof Sovietiza-
tion was merelya featureof the transitionperiod.Nazi successeson
the Westernfrontin April-Juneconvincedthe Soviet leadersthat
they had to tighten their grip on the newly acquiredterritories.
The annexationof the Baltic States and Bessarabiain June-July
1940 showedhow eager the Kremlinwas to safeguardits western
borders.As can be seenfromofficialSovietstatistics,afterJune I940
collectivization and industrialization were radically accelerated.11
The massive removal of hundreds of thousands of people who
constituted the upper social strata of local society was the harshest
expressionof the second phase of Sovietization.12
On the eve of the outbreak of the Soviet-German war, Eastern
Poland, in its political institutions, cultural policies and economic
structure,was becoming an integral part of the U.S.S.R. The changes
introduced by the new rulers were usually passively tolerated by the
local population; but it is difficult to assessthe extent to which people
were ready to accept Soviet ideology and to participate in building
the new regime.
The Sovietization of the Jewish community of Eastern Poland, its
dispositionto accept the Soviet regime and to adjust to the new order
were influenced by its socio-economic and cultural structure and by
the overall evolution of the Sovietization process. One factor that
was of utmost importance in determiningJewish readiness to accept
and conform at least passively to the Soviet regime was the threat of
Nazi Germany.
Approximately 1.2 million Jews lived in Eastern Poland when it
was occupied by the Soviets.13They constituted about 9.9 per cent
of the total population.'4 To the number of the original Jewish
inhabitants we must add about 300-350,000 Jewish refugees from the
Polish provinces occupied by Germany.'5 The Jewish Community
of Eastern Poland was among the largest among European Jewry.
Here were found some of the more important centres of the Pale of
Settlement, with a long tradition ofJewish learning and an elaborate

11 Dubina, op. cit., p. 480; Vakar, op. cit., pp. i66-67.

12 Documents
onPolish-Soviet
Relations,1939-1945, London, I96I, I, pp. 573-74.
13 This number is based on the calculations of B. D. Weinryb, 'Polish Jews Under
Soviet Rule', in P. Meter et al., Thejews in the SovietSatellites,Syracuse, 1953, p. 33i. For
slightly different figures see S. Schwarz, revrei v SovetskomSoyuze s nachala Vtoroymirovoy
voyny,New York, I966, p. 20. Schwarz estimated that 1,309,000 Jews lived in the area at
the time it was occupied.
14 Schwarz, op. cit., p. 20.
", Sh. Redlich, 'Hayehudim Bashtakhim Shesupkhu Librit-Hamoatsot, 1939-1941'
(Bhinot, no. i, Tel Aviv, 1970, p. 72).
 THE SOVIETIZATION OF EASTERN POLAND 39I

network of Jewish communal and cultural institutions. The region

included many ethnic groups and had witnessed centuries-old
national feuds and animosities,16 so that the Jews in the area were
among the most conscious of the EuropeanJewish communities with
regard to their national-religious heritage.
Most of the Jews - 6i.5 per cent in Western Byelorussia and
75.8 in Western Ukraine - lived in larger or smaller towns (the
so-called shtetl), where they frequently constituted more than half
the population.17 The socio-economicstructureof the Jewish popula-
tion on the eve of occupation had not changed radically from what it
had been when the area was part of the Pale of Settlement in the
Russian Empire. Eastern Poland was mostly an agricultural area,
with only small pockets of modern industrial development. The Jews
were engaged chieflyin supplyingthe ruralpopulation with consumer
goods, peddling, retail commerce, handicraftsand as workersin small
enterprisesprocessingthe agriculturalproducts and natural resources
of the region.'8 In Eastern Poland, even more than in other parts of
the country, theJews were over-representedin business,craftsand the
free professions.'9The last decade of Polish rule saw a general decline
and impoverishment of the Jews in Poland. Jewish workersencoun-
tered difficulties in finding employment in medium or large enter-
prises. By the time of the occupation a very high proportion of the
Jewish population were paupers or belonged to the lower middle
class, which was hard hit by the economic policies of the new
regime.20
The intense ethnic struggle between Poles, Ukrainians and
Byelorussians over cultural and political supremacy strengthened
Jewish national feelings and attachments. Jewish communal and
cultural life was more intensive than in other parts of Poland. In the
provinces of Eastern Poland were go per cent of the Hebrew ele-
mentary and secondary schools in Poland, an elaborate system of
Yiddish schools, as well as many of the more famous yeshivot.
L'vov, Bialystok, Grodno and Rovno had Yiddish dailies and
dozens of Jewish periodicals.21
On the eve of the Soviet occupation the Jews of Eastern Poland
suffered from both the hostile attitude of the government and the

16 H. Seton-Watson, Eastern EuropeBetween the Wars, 19i8-I941, New York, I967,

pp. 268-319.
17 According to the 193I Polish census, 4I.9 per cent of the urban population of the
Eastern provinces were Jews: R. Mahler, rehudei Polin Bein Shtei Milkhamot Olam, Tel
Aviv, 1968, pp. 25, 33.
18 Weinryb,op. cit., p. 331-
19 76 per cent of the business, 53 per cent of crafts and industry and similarly high
proportions of the free professions were in Jewish hands: loc. cit.
20 Schwarz, op. cit., p. 2I.
21 WVeinryb, op. cit., pp. 332-33.
392 B. C. PINCHUK
local population. The Polish governmentdiscriminatedagainst
them, and they foundit increasinglydifficultto struggleagainstthe
risingtide of anti-Semitism,so that importantsectionsof theJewish
populationwere predisposedto accept the new rulers, at least
passively.
The destructionof the old orderof theJewishcommunitystarted
with the entry of the Red Army. With few exceptions,such as the
synagogues,mostJewishinstitutionsandorganizations weredissolved
during the first few months of Soviet rule. Paradoxically,this
destructivephasecoincidedwith the period of maximumgoodwill
towardsthe new rulersand a willingnessto adjustto the new order.
The attitudeof theJewishpopulationwasaffectedby the fact that
until I 7 September,the day Soviettroopscrossedthe border,many
believedthat Nazi Germanywould overrunall Poland. After the
collapseof the Polishgovernmentand beforethe entryof the Red
Army,therewereinstancesof attemptedpogroms.22 No wonderthe
phrase'Weweresavedby the Soviets'appearsin manycontemporary
testimonials.The friendlyattitudeand disciplinedbehaviourof the
common Soviet soldier contributedto the favourablereception.
Hitler and local anti-Semitism,rather than love of Communism,
predisposedtheJewishpopulationto the Sovietarmy,a phenomenon
which recallsJewish attitudestowardsthe Bolsheviksduring the
Civil Warin Russia.
'The air of a holidaywas felt everywhere',recalledan inhabitant
of Slonim,the day Soviettroopsenteredthe town.
Who caredabout Communism?Who paid any attentionto theoretical
problemsof nationaleconomy,whenone facedan immediatedangerto
life?The questionof whetherthe regimewasgood or badwasirrelevant.
There could hardly be any doubt that the entireJewish population,
poor and rich, workersand factory owners,were relievedwhen the
Red Armyenteredour town.23
One comes acrossalmostidenticaldescriptionsin dozensof other
townsand citiesof EasternPoland.24TheJews werereadyto accept
the new reality.At least on this occasion,the SovietYiddishnews-
papers,reportingthe 'enthusiasticreceptionsof the liberated',were
reflectingthe truth.25
Whilemanywereapprehensivebecauseof theirsocialbackground
or politicalpast, the prevailingmoodin theJewishcommunitywas
22 See SeferDereczyn,Tel Aviv, n.d., p. 260; Kehillat
Lanin-SeferZikaron,Tel Aviv, 1957,
P. 47.
23 Pinkas Slonim,vol. 12, Tel Aviv, I962, p. I8, henceforth referred to as Slonim.
24 Dereczyn,Op. Cit., p. 247; SeferIzkor LikhillatSarny,Tel Aviv, 1961, p. 78, henceforth
referred to as Sarny.
25 See Oktiaber,Yiddish daily published in Minsk, and Der Shtern,Kiev, for the period
i8 to 29 September1940.
 THE SOVIETIZATION OF EASTERN POLAND 393
one of genuine happiness, particularly in the smaller towns and
among the poor. 'I am going from place to place, from one shtetlto
another, and am amazed to find true enthusiasm for the Soviet
regime', recordedF. Zerubavelin her impressionsof the firstweeks of
Soviet rule.26 The Jews felt free, equal and safe from pogroms.
'Jewish children move without fear ... they go to school and cross
the street without looking around with horror in their eyes.'27In
L'vov, where in the past one had to be careful not to be overheard
speaking Yiddish, 'the local state radio was broadcastingin Yiddish
for one hour each day'.28 Polish anti-Semites in Bialystok had to
hide, to restraintheir anti-Jewishexpressions,fearing the authorities'
reaction.29
Yet not everybody shared the enthusiasm, nor the predisposition
to accept the new order. The political, cultural and social Jewish
dlite as well as the more affluent had good reasons to be apprehen-
sive. To them the Soviet occupation presenteda personalthreat, even
if it rescued them from Hitler.30
Long established institutions or organizations of the old order
disintegrated with little official coercion. The kehilla, the Jewish
communal organization, which had an official status in Poland,
including the right to levy taxes,3' was not abolished by an official
decree;32it ceased to exist mainly because it lost the right to levy
taxes when the Polish legal code was abolished. The Soviet authori-
ties, for all practical purposes, did not have to decree the dissolution
of the kehilla. These institutions were managed and drew their
major material support from people who had every reason to fear
the new order. Thus in Eastern Galicia 'the executive boards simply
stopped functioning with the entrance of the Soviet troops. The
offices were closed and after a while confiscated'.33In Grodno,
Western Byelorussia,'the board of the kehilladissolved itself. All the
board members stayed at home, trying to be as inconspicuous as
26 F. Zerubavel, Na Vanad,Buenos Aires, 1947, p. 75. 'Those are Messiah's times, and

Stalin is the Messiah himself', contends an old Jew in one of the shtetls: ibid., p. 87.
27 Fuks, op. cit., p. 6i.
28 Ibid.
29 M. Grosman, In FarkisheftnLandFun Legendern Dzhugashvili,Paris, 1960, vol. I, p. 31.
30 A typical joke among Jews after the entry of Soviet troops was: 'Until now we were

sentenced to death, now the sentence has been commuted to life imprisonment'. See
Shoat rehudeiPolin, Jerusalem, 1940, I, p. 34. This publication is a compilation of first-
hand reports by people who managed to escape in 1940. It is of great value as a source for
the Sovietization of Eastern Poland for the period September 1939 to March 1940.
Henceforth referred to as ShoatPolin.
31 H. M. Rabinowicz, The Legacyof PolishJewry: A Historyof PolishYews in the Interwar
rears, 199-i1939, New York, I965, p. 121.
32 D. Grodner maintains that 'special decrees brought to an end the existence of the
khillot'. See his article 'In Soviet Poland and Lithuania' (Contemporary Jewish Record,
New York,April 194I, p. I42). Grodnerdoes not provideany evidencefor the existenceof
such decrees.
33 Report from Eastern Galicia and L'vov in ShoatPolin, p. 6i.
394 B. C. PINCHUK

possible', as was related by one of its members.34There are testimon-

ies to the same effect from dozens of other towns. The attitude of the
Soviet government to the Jewish communal structure and autono-
mous institutions was well known. The leaders of the community
had few illusions as to Soviet policy concerning their activities.
Confiscating the property of the kehilla,forbidding it to levy taxes
and sending its functionariesinto hiding, the Soviets destroyed the
most important Jewish autonomous institution. The more affluent
segment of the Jewish population, which provided most of the funds
and leadership of the communal institutions, could not perform the
same functions under the Soviet regime.
The dissolution of the kehillastruck a blow at other autonomous
Jewish institutions. The kehillacovered most of the expenses for the
maintenance of the rabbinate, the synagogues, the cemeteries,
religious and secular Jewish education, and philanthropic institu-
tions. The disappearanceof the kehillaundermined to a large extent,
even without decree, the viability of an independent Jewish educa-
tional system. Some of the social welfare institutions continued to
exist for several months. Relief organizations continued to offer
help to the thousands of refugees until they ran out of funds. When
the Joint Distribution Committee in L'vov received new funds from
abroad, the Soviet authorities refused to continue the operation.
'We are against philanthropy', explained the local official.35 It
should be noted, however, that there were local differences with
regard to the existence of the different social and welfare organiza-
tions. In some places they closed immediately with the entry of the
Soviet troops, their funds were expropriated and some of their
functions taken over by the new administration.36There were, on
the other hand, towns in which some formerJewish welfare societies,
vocational trainingand otherorganizationscontinued to exist forsome
time.37Organizationswhich did not have a specific political orienta-
tion were not dissolved, for example, labour organizations which
were 'co-opted' by the new authorities and merged with their
Ukrainian and Polish counterparts.8 It is difficult to say whether
these inconsistencies reflected a lack of policy or problems in policy
implementation, but by the beginning of I940 the elaborate system
ofJewish autonomous communal organizationshad disappeared.

Shel Galuiot,no. 9, Jerusalem, 1973, p. 505. Henceforth quoted as

34 Grodno-Entsiklopedia
Grodno.
31 ShoatPolin, p. 33.
36 For example, see Grodno,p. 505; Sarny,p. 75.
37 For examples from L'vov, see ShoatPolin, pp. 43-44, 6 i; from Sokolka, SeferSokolka,
Jerusalem, I968, pp. 343-44.
38 ShoatPolin,p. 6i.
 THE SOVIETIZATION OF EASTERN POLAND 395
This disintegrationcan almost be described as a spontaneous act:
On the day the Red Army crossed the border, the political activities
of the Jewish parties ceased by themselves. No official prohibition of
their activities was announced. The activists thought that it would be
wise on their part to stop all activities. It should be noted, however, that
this act of voluntary dissolution was common to the Polish and
Ukrainian parties as well,
reported one of the Zionist leaders of Western Ukraine.39 The same
story is related by other activists from different parts of the occupied
territory.40 This reaction may be explained by the fact that Bolshevik
opposition to, and Communist persecution of any form of inde-
pendent Jewish political activity, whether in its Zionist forms or by
the Bund, were by I939 common knowledge. The potential threat
was an inducement to terminate all public Jewish political activities.
During the first weeks of Soviet rule, there were relatively few
arrests of Jewish political leaders.
One could not detect any clear policy during the first few weeks of
Soviet rule. The behaviour of the new rulers differed from one province
to another, from town to town,
reads a report from Western Ukraine.4' In certain places no arrests
were made of Jewish political activists.42 At Kolomyya [in Polish
Kolomyja and under Austria-Hungary Kolomea] the invaders
came with well-prepared lists of people to be arrested.43 At the
beginning one could distinguish a difference in the attitude towards
the leaders of the Bund and those of the Zionist parties. The Bundists
were the first to be arrested, and the same applied to other Social
Democratic movements.44 V. Alter and H. Erlich, two prominent
leaders of the Bund in Poland, were arrested in the first week of the
occupation.45 The Soviet authorities acted on the assumption,
frequently justified by events, that the rank and file of the Bund
would be attracted to the Communists after their leaders had been
eliminated. Often the entire membership of a Bundist trade union
joined the party after the arrest of a few leading figures.46
Until the beginning of I940 the Zionists were apparently treated
with relative leniency. There were scattered arrests of Zionist
activists, but they reached mass proportions only later, during the

39 Ibid., p. 62.
40 Ibid., p. 23. Also SeferEidut VzikaronLekhillatPinsk-Karlin,Tel Aviv, I966, p. I86,
henceforth referred to as Pinsk; Sarny,p. 79.
41 ShoatPolin, p. 41.
42 Sarny,p. 79.
43 Sefer ZikaronLekhillatoKolomeaVhasviva,Tel Aviv, 1972, p. 378.
44 Schwarz, op. cit., pp. 330-31.
5 Grodner, op. cit., p. 146.
46 ShoatPolin, pp. 35-36.
396 B. C. PINCHUK
summer of I940. Some Zionist organizations smuggled some of their
leaders to Vilna which was transferredto Lithuania on I0 October
I940. Lida had an active underground Zionist organization which
helped the refugeesto crossthe nearby border.47Zionist underground
activities, particularly youth movements, continued for some time.
In December I 939 and as late as March I 940, conventions of
underground activities took place in Rovno and L'vov.48
An interesting episode is the Soviet authorities' attempt to win
over some of the hachsharot (pioneer groups) who lived in communes
training in agriculture before leaving for Palestine. Quite a few
hachsharot continued to be tolerated in the occupied territoryfor some
time.49 'Representatives of the Soviet authorities approached some
of the communes trying to convince their members to join the new
regime', reported a witness from L'vov.50 No official decree was
published during the first few months outlawing the Zionist com-
munes. It is not clear whether this was due to a policy decision or to
imperfect policy implementation.51In Pinsk, for example, the local
authorities hoped that the commune would help them in the
collectivization of agriculture. The commune was approached by a
member of the provincial Soviet who tried to convince its members
that Zionism had been needed in anti-semitic Poland, but not in the
U.S.S.R. where all nationalities were free and equal.52
The Sovietization of the elaborateJewish educational and cultural
structures in the occupied territory meant the destruction of the
former order. For a while a de-nationalized Yiddish culture was
encouraged as a transitional phase to what was hoped would be
complete assimilation. This served as a means of gaining support
among the Jewish population, as well as a means of indoctrination.
The old Jewish school system, in Hebrew or Yiddish, secular or
religious, was closed down. The Soviet authorities were eager to
re-establishnormal conditions in the occupied area as fast as possible
and among the first orders was one which dealt with the reopening
of the schools. The order did not clearly specify the language of
instruction: all the schools, except those teaching Byelorussianchild-
ren in Polish, were ordered to continue to use their formerlanguage,
recalled an inspector of the school system of Kletsk.53As a result,
many schools in Western Byelorussia taught for some time in

47 Sefer Lida, Tel Aviv, 1970, pp. 256-60.

48 See SeferHashomerHatsair, Merkhavia, I969, II, p. 219.
49 Ibid., 1, p. 457; II, p. 226. Also Khalutsimin Polin, New York, I96I, II, pp. 48-52.
50 ShoatPolin, p- 36.
51 Ibid., p. 24.
62 Pinsk, p. I87.
53 Pinkas Kletsk,Tel Aviv, 1959, p. 86, henceforth referred to as Kletsk.
 THE SOVIETIZATION OF EASTERN POLAND 397
Hebrew.54Similar situations existed in the Western Ukraine.65The
'mistake'was corrected after a few weeks and Hebrew was forbidden
as a language of instruction or publication. The entire episode was
probably the result of ignorance on the part of some officials
concerning the state of Jewish education in Poland.
Within two or three months of the occupation an entire network
of Jewish elementary and secondary schools emerged which used
phonetic Yiddish script as the language of instruction. The parents
themselves 'decided' to use Yiddish as the language of instruction.56
Soviet opposition to Hebrew, expressed even in the attempt to
change the accepted Yiddish spelling, had a long history: Hebrew
was identified with bourgeois culture and the Zionist political
persuasion. Thus the prohibition against teaching Hebrew and the
struggle against it were construed not as 'a struggle against a lan-
guage, but against an ideology - Zionism - of an enemy class -
the bourgeoisie'.57
In addition to Hebrew,Jewish history and the Bible were removed
from the curriculum of the Yiddish schools. Students were forced
to attend school on the shabatandJewish holidays and were subjected
to anti-religious and anti-national propaganda.58The schools and
their teachers served as Sovietizing agents. The teacher was con-
sidered by the authorities as a propagandist among the parents and
was also used to indoctrinate the population at large.59 At the
beginning the school staff was asked to continue teaching according
to the 'Soviet spirit'. Special courses were organized to train the
teachers in Soviet teaching methods and ideology and in the instruc-
tion of Yiddish.60In contrastwith other fields, manning the extensive
and expanding educational system of Eastern Poland with people
brought from the interior, even on the level of school principals,
was difficult. Yet, after several months, from the beginning of spring
I940, there was a trend towards 'purging' the schools of 'unreliable
elements'.61
The declared policy of the Soviet authorities was to provide every
ethnic group with the opportunity to study in its 'mother tongue'.
But it was clear that the Jewish and Polish populations were dis-
criminated against in favour of a policy of Ukrainianization and

54 Ibid.; also Pinsk, p. I28.

56 ShoatPolin, p- 41.
56 BialystokerShtern,27 January 1940.
57 Z. Gitelman, jewish Nationalityand SovietPolitics, Princeton, 1972, p. 277.
58 Kletsk,p. 87; Pinsk, p. 133; SeferZikaron-Dubno,
Tel Aviv, I 966, pp. 649-50, henceforth
referred to as Dubno.
59 Oktiaber,Minsk, 4 May 194I.
60 Kletsk,p. 87; SeferZikaronLikhilatIvia, Tel Aviv, I 968, p. 38 1, henceforth referred to
as Ivia. Also Oktiaber,Minsk, I5 August 1940.
61 See Fuks, op. cit., pp. 92-93 for L'vov; Pinsk, p. 133 for Pinsk; Kletsk,p. 92.
 398 B. C. PINCHUK

Byelorussification. Former Jewish schools were converted into

Ukrainian and Byelorussian schools; Soviet official statistics un-
mistakably demonstrate that the number of Yiddish schools
decreased. Thus on I4 February I940 the Oktiaberfrom Minsk
reported that in Western Byelorussiathere were I97 Yiddish schools
out of a total of 5,07 I schools functioning in the area. On 5 May I 940
the same source reported I70 Yiddish schools and on i3 December
only I50 out of a total that increased to 5,685.62 The trend is un-
mistakable: even the de-nationalized Yiddish schools constituted an
obstacle to the assimilatorypolicies followed by the Soviet authorities.
From non-Soviet sources we learn that from the summer of 1940
many Yiddish schools were forced to adopt Russian as their language
of instruction: a development which coincided with an accelerated
pace of Sovietization in general. Testimonies from L'vov, Grodno,
Pinsk and other places prove that Yiddish schools were converted
into Russian or Ukrainian schools. Instructive in this respect are the
examples of the Yiddish schools of Kletsk and Lubach. In both
Kletsk and Lubach Jews constituted 70 per cent of the population.63
Before the beginning of the school year of I940-41, under instruc-
tions from the authorities in Lubach64 and Kletsk65the parents
decided 'unanimously' to convert the schools into Russian schools.
The most important argument in favour of adopting Russian as the
language of instruction was that graduates of Yiddish schools could
not continue their studies in their mother tongue at the higher
institutions of learning. This had a particular impact on the younger
generation. The decreasing number of Yiddish schools in the
occupied territorycorrespondedto the decreaseof Yiddish schools in
the Soviet Union itself, brought about mainly by pressurefrom above
and by internal developments within the Jewish community.66
The diversifiedJewish cultural activities of Eastern Poland under-
went a radical change under the new regime. The same precepts that
governed Soviet attitudes towardsJewish education applied in other
areas. The Soviet policy of Byelorussificationand Ukrainianization
served the goal of integration of the Jewish population into the
Soviet system, where Jews were destined to assimilate and to lose
their identity. The most conspicuous result was a sharp quantitative
decline in Jewish cultural activity. A single Jewish daily, the
BialystokerShtern,replaced the dozens of Jewish dailies previously

62 See Oktiaber,Minsk, 14 February, 5 May, 13 December 1940.

63 Oktiaber,27 January 1940.
64 GevenAmol a riddish ShtetlLubach,Tel Aviv, I971, p. 36, pp. 33-34.
6'f Kletsk,p. 92. On Kletsk see also the testimony on p. 87 of the book. According to that
witness the resolution was the result of the parents' initiative.
6i6 E. Schulman, A HistoryofJewish Educationin theSovietUnion,New York, I97I, ch. i o.
 THE SOVIETIZATION OF EASTERN POLAND 399
published in Eastern Poland. Der RoiterShtern,L'vov, appeared for
a few weeks in June I94.I
The BialystokerShternwas used by the authorities to reach the
Jewish masses who could not read any other language. True to the
Soviet pattern, the paper extolled the virtues of the regime and of
Stalin. It served as a propaganda tool by sending reportersto various
enterprisesto preach the 'true line'; it also servedas a watch-dog over
other Jewish cultural activities, such as writers, performers, artists
and theatres. 'Bolshevik Vigilance in Art', as one editorial was
called,67 was one of its primary roles. The Soviet Yiddish press
abounded with reports on the 'intensive Yiddish cultural activity' in
Western Byelorussia and Ukraine.68Yet the emphasis was almost
exclusively on the contribution of art to the creation of loyal Soviet
citizens and even more frequently on criticism ofJewish nationalism
and religion. Despite reports on the 'increase of the reading public
particularly among the young', as late as January 194I we find that
'most librariesin the Western Ukraine are still in the reorganization
stage'.69 'Reorganization', as we know from non-Soviet sources,
meant that librarieswere closed and purged of any book suspectedof
having national, 'counter-revolutionary'content.70
At the time many Jewish writersand artists,most of them refugees
from German-occupied territories, were concentrated in Eastern
Poland. L'vov and Bialystok served as their major centres and
therefore received special attention from the authorities. Soviet
Yiddish writers' 'brigades'were sent to indoctrinate the new citizens
of the Soviet state. The description of the intricate relations between
the Soviet and the refugee writersis beyond the scope of this paper.71
Suffice it to say that the influence was two-sided. The Soviet writers
brought the message of Socialist realism, the cult of personality and
objection to anything that might be interpreted as 'nationalism
and clericalism'.72Jewish themes, particularly the fate of the Jews
under Nazi occupation, were forbidden subjects. While the Soviet
press reported 'the tremendous increase in the literary production
of the Jewish writers in the Western Provinces',73many of the more
talented and sensitiveJewish writers ceased their artistic activity.

67 BialystokerShtern,I 0 February I 940.

68 See for example KieverEmes,I2 December 1940, VilnerEmes,14 December I940.
Ofboi, a monthly published in Latvia, also carried many reports on Jewish cultural
activities in Eastern Poland.
69 Ofboi,no. 3, Riga, January 1941 .
70 Lubach,p. 39; SeferLakhva,Tel Aviv, 1957, p. 35, henceforth referred to as Lakhva.
71 See Y. A. Gilboa's summary of the subject in his The Black rears of Sovietjtewry,
I939-1953, Boston, 1971, pp. I8-27.
72 See the detailed report in BialystokerShtern,I5 February 1940, on 'The Meeting with
the Moscow Soviet Yiddish Writers'.
7 Ofboi, no. 3, January 1941.
400 B. C. PINCHUK

Jewish religious life under Soviet rule, while officially tolerated,

was under constant pressure to reduce its scope. Many religious
institutions, such as the mikve (the communal ritual bath), or the
functions of rabbis, shokhtim(ritual slaughterers), and mohalim
(ritual circumcisers), were radically curtailed. Shops selling prayer
books and ritual items were closed down.74Religious worship was
not forbidden, yet various means, some subtle, others brutal, were
used to show the regime's negative attitude towards religion in
general and Judaism in particular. Religious instruction was
forbidden and the elaborate system of elementary and secondary
religious study was destroyed. Theyeshivotwere closed, among them
the famous and long established yeshivotof Mir and Volozhin.75
Officially no order to close down synagogueswas issued, but we have
many reports from different places on the conversion of houses of
prayer into clubs, co-operatives,warehouses,etc.76The closure of the
synagogueswas usually explained as a responseto public demand and
was based on a 'decision' of popular meetings. When Jewish workers
refused to work on the shabatin Pinsk, they were forced to sign a
petition that they wanted their rest day to be on Sunday and the
synagogues to be converted into workers'clubs."
Officially religion was not persecuted. However, the general
feeling among the Jewish population was that the authorities
considered religious observance a hostile act, certainly an obstacle
to success under the new regime. Anti-religious propaganda was
a major theme of the local press and of party activities. Special
propaganda efforts were directed against the observance of Jewish
holidays: 'The reactionary origins of the Passover' was a major
theme of anti-religious propaganda, as were the shabat and the
High Holidays.78
In spite of this attitude and the many restrictionsimposed on the
free practice of the Jewish religion, the synagogue remained the
most importantJewish institution. It became a last refuge, a meeting
place for Jews and an expression of Jewish national-religious
continuity. It should be added, however, that almost all the available
testimoniespoint to a general and drastic reduction in the number of
those attending the services, particularly among the younger
generation. Fearing that attendance would be considereda 'reaction-
ary' activity, many refrained from religious practices. The older

74Shoat Polin, p. 4I; SeferStry, Tel Aviv, I962, p. I63, henceforth referred to as Stry.
75 Sefer Mir, Jerusalem, I962, p. 585, henceforth referred to as Mir; Sefer Volozhin,
Tel Aviv, 1970, p. 532, henceforth referred to as Volozhin.
I" Dubno,p. 65o; Ivia, p. 295; Lubach,p. 38; Mir, p. 586; IanovAl Iad Pinsk,Jerusalem,
I969, p. 3I2, henceforth referred to as Ianov.
77 Pinsk, p. 320.
78 Oktiaber, Minsk, Io May 1940.
 THE SOVIETIZATION OF EASTERN POLAND 40I
generation remained by and large faithful to its tradition; the
younger generation, exposed to intensive anti-religious propaganda
and seeking success in Soviet society, deserted religion and the
synagogue in large numbers.79
Denial of a positive national content was only one aspect of the
Soviet attempt to bring about the assimilationof the Jewish popula-
tion. On the other side were the attractions offered by the new
regime. There is no doubt that the Soviet order opened new oppor-
tunities to the younger generation. The overt discriminatorypolicies
of the former regime were abolished. Jews were considered equal
citizens and anti-Semitism was condemned, at least formally. Free
education was available at all levels; the numerusclaususthat had
blocked the way to higher institutions of learning for many Jewish
students was abolished. In addition, special treatment of the more
talented students attracted many Jews. This was particularly true in
the smaller towns and among the poorer sections. With the destruc-
tion of the former youth movements the komsomolattracted many
young Jews.80 Clubs, movies, reading rooms, and educational
opportunities enticed many to adapt to the Soviet system, breaking
long established taboos. The inclination to integrate with the
Soviet system was particularly strong where the former order had
previously shown clear signs of weaknessand dissolution. Soviet rule
exposed existing cleavages within the Jewish community. For many,
Sovietization meant the escape from a marginal existence and the
opportunity to use the varied possibilitiesoffered by the modernizing
Soviet state.
Developmentsin the educational, cultural and religiousinstitutions
of the Jewish population under Soviet rule were complex and fre-
quently confusing to the contemporaryobserver. The destruction of
the old orderwas obvious and expected, but what replaced the former
order appeared as a kind of revival ofJewish culture in Soviet form.
Neverthelessthe real goal was to eliminate, as quickly as possible, the
Jewish community as a distinct ethnic and cultural entity. De-
nationalization was the goal of the cultural transformation;the aim
was to weaken and eventually to destroy the basic attachments and
the value-systemof theJewish population. However, the implementa-
tion of this policy was subtle and gradual, a result of the Soviet
desire to gain the active support of the local Jewish population.
Hence, the Yiddish culture - Soviet style - established in Eastern
Poland, should be considered as a transitional stage. Already in the
summer of I940, it became clear that the goal was to approximate

79 Pinsk, p. 320; Ianov, p. 312; Lakhva,p. 37; Mir, p. 586.

80 Lubach,p. 39; Dubno, p. 65o; Ivia, p. 389.

26
402 B. C. PINCHUK

the state of Yiddish culture in its various manifestations to that

prevailing at that time in the Soviet Union, where assimilation,
forced from above by suppressing Jewish national culture and
fostered from below by modernizing processes within the Jewish
community, was making ever larger inroads.
The new regime needed all the help it could get, particularly
before the great influx of Soviet officials from the interior. The
authorities faced an awkward and complex situation when they
came to organize the local administrationand the new institutions.
Coming as 'liberators' of the Ukrainian and Byelorussian popula-
tion, members of these were naturally preferred in appointments
whenever possible. However, the local population, particularly the
Ukrainians, showed strong nationalist feelings, expressed mainly in
objection to Russian domination; in this the Ukrainian intelligentsia
was most vehement. The remnants of the local Communist parties
were suspected of Trotskyite deviations, and even when employed
by the Soviets were given secondary roles and closely watched. After
a short time, many of them were dismissed.8'The Polish population
in the annexed territories was suspected - and rightly so - of
resenting the new rulers. The Jews, particularly in the smaller
towns, could provide reliable and relatively well-educated personnel
for the new administrationand institutions.
The controlling positions in the local administration were from
the very beginning occupied by Soviet civil officialswho accompanied
the advancing troops.82The number of officials coming from the
interior of the U.S.S.R. increased with time: a reflection of the
general distrustof the authoritiesfor the new citizens of the U.S.S.R.83
The Jews constituted a large reservoir of manpower which the
Soviet authoritiesused in subordinatepositionsand in posts requiring
special training. Their high rate of unemployment gave the Jews an
added incentive to look for government jobs. Many Jews of Byelo-
russia had the advantage of a knowledge of Russian. Therefore the
Jewish population played an important role in building the Soviet
system in Eastern Poland. In that respect, the Jews in the annexed
territoriesunderwent the same process as the Jews in the U.S.S.R.
during the first years of Bolshevik rule. However, there were im-
portant differences, reflecting local conditions as well as current
Soviet policies. Jews were almost completely absent from controlling

81 On the dissolution of the Polish Communist Party, and the accusation that it was
'contaminated' by Trotskyite influences, see M. K. Dziewanowski, 7he CommunistParty
of Poland,Cambridge,Massachusetts,1959, pp. 149-54.
B2 Slonim,vol. 2, p. I8; Stty, p. i6I; Kletsk, p. 84; Samy, p. 78.
88 Armstrong, op. cit., p. 68; also ShoatPolin, p. 25.
 THE SOVIETIZATION 403
OF EASTERN POLAND
positions- a developmentthat had alsooccurredin the U.S.S.R. in
the late thirties.84
The participationof the Jews in Soviet institutionsduring the
first months of the annexationwas frequentlyspontaneousand
welcomedby the authorities.Officially,for the first time, no legal
discrimination againstJewsexisted.Thusat Sarny,in the Provisional
ProvincialExecutiveboard'CommunistJews had a leadingrole in
all thecommittees'.However,'whenthe newrulersconsolidatedtheir
position,the local Communistswere relegatedto inferiorpositions;
most of them ceasingto play any administrativeor politicalpart.'85
Even later, manyJews servedas specialistadvisorsin Sarnyand its
vicinity. In L'vov, the capital of the Western Ukraine,Jewish
Communistsheld importantpositionsin the administration,said a
contemporaryeye-witnessreporton the first few monthsof Soviet
rule:
Therewereno othersavailablefor thejob. The Ukrainianintelligentsia
was nationalist in its outlook, containing a negligible number of
Communists.Among the Polestherewere no local Communistsat all.
So they had to turn to the Jews.86
The result was, continuedthe report,that in many towns of the
annexedterritories
thereare manyJewishofficialsin the Sovietadministrationand militia.
However,the Jews occupyonly inferiorpositions.There are no Jewish
mayorsin EasternGalicia. Even Kolomyya,with a Jewish population
of almostseventyper cent, has a Ukrainianmayor.87
The Soviet authoritiesemployedJewish professionals,almost
without any discrimination.Doctors, engineers, teachers and
accountantswerein greatdemand.Beforethe springof I940 people
with suitable training were not checked too closely even with
referenceto their previouspoliticalallegiance.The resultwas that
manyJews who camefromthe middleclassor had previouslybeen
membersof Zionistorganizations, foundemploymentin the adminis-
trationand institutions.Typicalin this respectwas the replygiven
by the Soviet authoritiesto local Communistsin Kletsk.When the
latterpointedout the 'dubiouspast' of many of the employees,the
answerwas:
The Soviet authoritiesare aware of the problem.However,we need
theirskill,since the proletariatcannotreplacethem at this stage. The

84 S. W. Baron, The Russianjew UnderTsars andSoviets,New York, I964, pp. 241-42.

8I Sarny, p. 78; also Stry, p. I6i.
86 ShoatPolin, p. 42.
87 Ibid., pp. 27-28. Sarny, with a Jewish minority, had an Ukrainian as its mayor: see
Sarny,p. 8o.
404 B. C. PINCHUK

same situationprevailedin the Soviet Union followingthe October

Revolution.8

With the stabilization of Soviet rule in Eastern Poland, people of

local origin, almost regardlessof ethnic background, occupied only
second-rate positions. They were employed in jobs that required
daily contact with the local population, and the same applied to
local Communists. At this level, usually there was no discrimination
against Jews, particularly in the smaller towns and in positions that
required special training. Government jobs that were formerly
closed to Jews now became accessible. However, key positions were
usually occupied by Easterners; when such positions were held by
locals, they were Ukrainians and Byelorussians.There were some
instances of discrimination against the Jews in government employ-
ment resulting from the policy of Ukrainianization and Byelorussifi-
cation.
Discrimination found its most conspicuous manifestation in the
various elections held in the annexed territories. The national
assembly of the Western Ukraine, elected in October I939, had only
twenty Jewish members out of I,495 representatives.89There is
evidence that the Soviet authorities used pressure in the Western
Ukraine to prevent the selection of Jewish candidates.90In Western
Byelorussia, seventy-two Jews were among the 926 representatives
of the national assembly,91probably because nationalist anti-Jewish
sentiment was weaker there. Not a single Jew was among the
representatives sent from the annexed territory to the Supreme
Soviet of the U.S.S.R. in the elections of March 1940. The situation
in Eastern Poland reflected the situation prevailing in Stalin's
U.S.S.R. In the thirtiesJewish representationin the higher echelons
of party and government underwent a sharp decline.92
The socio-economic changes brought about by the Soviet regime
affected the Jewish community in a differential way. It is quite
obvious that the new rulershad no specific plans for dealing with the
unique economic structure of Eastern Poland's Jewry. The pre-
dominance in the Jewish community of what constituted in Soviet
terms 'unproductive occupations' presented serious problems in its
economic adjustment, yet no special effort was made to 'producti-
vize' it. The policies followed by the Soviet authorities completely
disregardedthe special problems of adjustment faced by the Jewish
community.

88 Kletsk, p. 85.
89 Tewish elegraphicAgency,22 February
1940, quoted from Redlich, op. cit., p. 74.
90 Shoat Polin, p. 56.
91 Izvestiya, Moscow, November 1939.
92 S. M. Schwarz, Antisemitizmv SovetskomSoyuze,New York, 1952, pp. 98-122.
 THE SOVIETIZATION OF EASTERN POLAND 405
The transition period to the Soviet economic system lasted until
January-February I940. Only the larger estates, banks, factoriesand
larger houseswere nationalized. The criteriafor nationalization were
inadequately defined and depended frequently on the decisions of
local committees. Jews with small estates were often evicted
arbitrarily,if the local committee decided that the estate could not
be cultivated by the owner's family alone.93The nationalization of
the banks and factories affected only a small number of Jews. In
most cases the former owners were permitted to remain in the
nationalized factories as managers.94 Small shops and artisans'
workshopswere allowed, and even ordered, to continue to operate
as before, but they could not raise their prices while the Polish
zloty was made equal in value to the Soviet rouble.95Within a few
weeks Soviet personnel, civilian and military, literally bought out
the merchandisein the stores and smaller workshops.In spite of the
new rulers' efforts, prices rose and a scarcity of consumer goods
developed. Speculation, black marketeering, long lines of people
trying to get the basic necessities were among the signs of the
transitional period. Many thousands ofJews were unemployed. The
declassed, those without jobs and those previously unemployed lived
by selling their belongings and frequently needed outside help.96But
many of the hardshipsof the first few months of Soviet rule were the
outcome of the general dislocation resulting from the war and the
transition to a new economic system.
With the stabilization of Soviet rule a new economic structure
started to emerge within the Jewish community. The NEP economy
came to its end without any formal enactment. Stores were closed
down because they could not get new supplies. Small artisans'
workshops could not get raw materials; they closed on their own.
On i January I940 the zloty stopped being legal currency in former
Eastern Poland. Many families lost their savings, since they could
exchange only 300 zloty for roubles. Formerfactory owners, replaced
by Soviet officials who came from the interior, were left jobless.97
These developments mainly affected the middle and lower middle
classes, where many of the Jews were concentrated. 'From the
beginning of 1940 everybody joined the proletariat. Gradually we
had to adjust to the working conditions of the Soviet regime',
summarized a perceptive observerfrom Pinsk.98The unemployment
problem in the Jewish population was even more acute because of
93 ShoatPolin, pp. 58-93: reports from the Western Ukraine.
94 ShoatPolin, p. 59; Slonim,iI, p. 8; Pinsk, p. 77.
'5 Dubno, p. 646; Kktsk, p. 85; ShoatPolin, p. 34.
96i ShoatPolin, pp. 24, 43; Pinsk, p. 79; Grodno,pp. 139-40.
97 Slonim,vol. iI, p. 9; Pinsk, p. 78; ShoatPolin, p. 59.
98 Pinsk, p. 312.
406 B. C. PINCHUK

the several hundred thousand refugeesfrom Nazi-occupied territory.

The absence of statistical data precludes an accurate analysis of
the economic adjustment of the Jewish community to the Soviet
economic order. To a large extent one has to rely on conclusions
from subjective one-sided testimonies. Yet a general outline of the
economic transformation that took place can be arrived at even
from the inadequate sources available. The upper middle class,
including bankers,ownersof factoriesand large estates, most lawyers,
richer merchants, and some of the smaller shopkeepers, found it
difficult to adjust. They were prevented from getting employment
and were defined as 'class enemies'. When Soviet passports were
issued, the class origin was included, thus preventing its owner
from 'disappearing'. People were punished for their class origin,
for being 'unproductive' and the punishment was to prevent them
from engaging in 'productive' employment. However, this was a
relatively small group and its economic adjustment problem was
eventually solved by characteristic Soviet methods: some fled,
others moved to small towns and villages, and many were imprisoned
and deported to labour camps.99
In spite of the many difficulties, including a lower standard of
living and complete disregardfor the special adjustmentproblems of
the Jewish community, the twenty-one months of Soviet rule
witnessed a high degree of integration of the Jews into the new
economic order. Gradually the independent artisansjoined existing
co-operatives or formed their own. The authorities applied a
'tactful' form of pressure on the independent artisans to form
co-operatives: high taxes and, even more, lack of raw materials,
forced the artisansto accept the advice of the authorities to organize
co-operatives.'00There are numerous accounts from dozens of towns
throughout Eastern Poland which confirm that most Jewish artisans
eventually formed co-operatives with government assistance, while
some found employment in existing or newly-establishedfactories.
Consumer co-operatives and the new supply network established
by the Soviet authoritiesprovidedjobs for many formershopkeepers
and people formerly employed in commercial establishments.Many
of the co-operatives in the Western Ukraine were formed by
Ukrainians before the Soviet occupation and these were reluctant
to acceptJews.101TheJews had to findjobs in the expanding network
of government stores and supply networks.102

""Sarny, p. 79; Pinsk, p. 319; Ianov, p. 225.

100Stry, p. i6i; Kletsk,p. 89; Sarny,p. 79.
101 ShoatPolin, p. 59.
102 Kletsk, p. 89; Lubach,p.
35; Lakhva,p. 37.
 THE SOVIETIZATION OF EASTERN POLAND 407
The effect of Sovietization on the employment of the Jewish
intelligentsia varied. Weinryb's assertionthat 'the greater part of the
Jewish intelligentsia was deprived of the possibility of earning a
living in their own occupations"03 is greatly exaggerated. The
expanding Soviet administration, new industrial enterprises,health
and education services absorbedJewish engineers, doctors, pharma-
cists, accountants and teachers, almost without discrimination.
Lawyers and journalists, on the other hand, found it difficult to get
jobs.'04While there is no doubt that there were cases of discrimina-
tion, it would be a distortion of the picture to present them as the
rule. On the contrary, compared with the situation in Poland, many
new jobs became accessible to Jews. 'Jews were employed in various
jobs by the Soviet authorities without discrimination',reads a report
from Lomza.'05 'A sizeable number of Jews are now government
employees ... Many have improved their economic situation com-
pared to the past,'"06summarizedan eye-witnessfrom Kolomyya. An
inhabitant of Grodno remarked: 'Now, opportunities to work were
opened for most of our people. The younger generation in particular
was offered the chance to study and improve its status."l07This is
just a small sample of testimonies to the effect that, while the former
economic structure of the Jewish community in Eastern Poland was
crumbling, many Jews found their way into the emerging Soviet
economy. One gets the impression that the shtetl Jewry in general,
and its younger generationin particular,did adjustto the new system
which offered new, formerly closed, fields of economic activity.
Thus numerous accounts from different places maintain that
'gradually, people became used to the new conditions. There were
no luxuries, yet there was no unemployment and hunger'.'08
The younger generation in the Jewish shtetl definitely found life
easier and more promising under the Soviet regime.
Beforethe Jewish youth of the shtetl,living in conditionsof economic
degradation,deprivedof any chance for social progressand economic
success in anti-semitic Poland, new and wide horizons were opened,
contended a resident of Ivia.'09 Another witness from Lubach
arrived at the same conclusion: 'A new generation was growing that

103 Weinryb, op. cit., p. 335.

104 ShoatPolin, p. 58; Pinsk, p. 312; Grodno,p. 505.
105 Lomza, New York, 1957, p. 287.
106 Kolomea,p. 377. See also the
summary on the situation in the Western Ukraine in
Shoat Polin, p. 58.
107 Grodno,p. 505; also
Oktiaber,Minsk, 17 February 1940, which reported that for the
first time Jews were employed by the railway authorities.
108 Ianov, p. 225; also Kletsk, p. go; Stry, p. i6i; Sarny, p. 79; Dubno, p. 648; Slonim,
vol. i i, p. 8; Lubach,p. 35; Volozhin,p. 530.
109 Iviai, p. 381.
408 B. C. PINCHUK

believed that the new regime opened new horizons for study,
improvement,progress.The youthliterallybloomed.'110 A movement
of the youngergenerationfrom the shtetlto the largertown, where
study and job opportunitieswere more abundantand accessible,
could be noticedin manyinstances.11
The Jewish communitywas affected by the economicchanges
introducedby the Sovietregimeto a muchlargerextentthan other
sectionsof the populationbecauseof its high concentrationin the
urbancentresand in the middleand lower-middleclasses.Its initial
adjustmentwas painful,when high rates of unemploymentforced
many, particularlyrefugees,to accept the Soviet offer to register
for workin the interiorof the U.S.S.R.112The registrationfor work
in the interior,done by special agents sent by Soviet enterprises,
couldbe consideredthe onlyplannedactionto amelioratethe special
problemsof transitionin theJewishcommunity.Forvariousreasons
the attemptstoppedin the springof I940. Many of thosewho went
triedto come back,and afterMay I940 the SovietYiddishpressno
longerdealtwith the subject.The adjustmenthad to be madewithin
the boundariesof the annexedterritories.
Thusradicalchangesin the socio-economic structureof theJewish
communitydid take place duringthe twenty-onemonthsof Soviet
rule. Old occupationswere eliminated, and many people were
deprivedof theireconomicbasis;however,and thiswasparticularly
truefortheshtetlJewry, the workersandpoorerelementsin the larger
townsgraduallyfoundtheirplacein the new system.
An integralpart of the Sovietizationwas the eliminationof the
formerelites.The eliminationof thoseelementswhichcouldprovide
leadershipfor any oppositionto the Soviet regimeas well as those
who did not or could not adjustto the new circumstanceswas a
continuousprocesswith severalpeaks."13 Startingwith the entrance
of the Soviettroopsinto EasternPolandthisextendedpurgeassumed
differentforms:imprisonment,detention,transferto other places
withinthe annexedterritories,and massdeportationsto labourand
prisoncamps.No exactfiguresare availableconcerningthe number
of deporteesfromthe indigenousJewish population.The estimates
are around several tens of thousands.114 They included mainly
formeractivistsin Jewish public life, leadersof the Zionistparties
110 Lubach,P- 40.
1 Lakhva,p. 36; SeferIlia, Tel Aviv, I962, p. 3I70; Sefer ZikaronLikhilatLipnishok,Tel
Aviv, I968, p. 135.
112 Various reports that estimate the number ofJews who accepted jobs in the U.S.S.R.
in tens of thousands: Redlich, op. cit., p. 74; BialystokerShtern,2, 13 February 1940.
118 For a detailed treatment of the subject see B. D. Pinchuk, 'Haglaiat Yehudim min
Hashtakhim Shetsurfu Librit-Hamoatsot Bashanim 1939-1940' (Shvut,no. 2, Tel Aviv,
1974, pp. 48-54).
114 Redlich, P. 73.
 THE SOVIETIZATION OF EASTERN POLAND 409

and of the Bund, and the richer strata of theJewish community. The
proportion of Jews imprisoned or deported did not greatly exceed
their proportion in the population. Poles constituted the majority
of the deportees.",5
The deportation of several hundred thousand Jewish refugees
raised the proportion of Jews among the deportees to thirty per
cent.116The presence of about three hundred thousand refugees
complicated the relations between the Soviet authorities and the
local Jewish community. The refugees found it difficult to adjust to
the Soviet regime and to break off the ties with their families left
under German rule. The Soviet authorities could not find employ-
ment for them, nor could they convince the refugees to accept
Soviet citizenship. With the general hardening of the line in Eastern
Poland in the summer of I940, the authorities decided to solve the
Jewish refugee problem by deporting the refugees to labour and
prison camps.117
Imprisonment and deportation, which were an ever-present
threat, created an atmosphere of insecurity and fear in the annexed
territory. While it certainly acted as a deterrent to opposition to
Sovietization, it also alienated many and militated against a positive
identification with the Soviet state.
Soviet rule in Eastern Poland ended after twenty-one months with
the same abruptnesswith which it had begun. Within that period the
life of the entire population and the Jewish community in particular
had undergone a radical change. After a short transitional period,
characterized by attempts to gain the goodwill and co-operation of
the local population and by inconsistencies and contradictions
brought about by the suddenness of the occupation, the Soviets
followed a policy of imposing the Stalinist model of state and society
on the new territories. For the Jewish community the Stalinist
model meant above all the reluctance to recognize the special
characterand needs of the Jewish population, its economic marginal-
ity and unique cultural and ethnic traditions and institutions. No
special agency, such as the Jewish sections of CPSU which had
existed in the Soviet Union until 1930, was created to deal with the
problems of the large Jewish population of Eastern Poland. There is
no evidence to show that the Soviet authorities deemed it necessary
to take any serious positive measures, beyond the destruction of the
old order, to integrate the Jewish population economically, socially
and politically with the Soviet system.

115 Documents
onPolish-Soviet
Relations,1939-1945, London, I961, vol. i, pp. 573-74.
116 Ibid.
117 Weinryb, op. cit., pp. 347-51.
410 B. C. PINCHUK

It is difficultto determine the degree of adjustmentand integration

which actually took place. There were great differences according
to economic status, age, the size of the towns, and the previous
cultural and ideological background of individuals. The upper
levels of Jewish society and its cultural and political elites found it
difficultto adjust and integrate. The broad masses,particularlyin the
shtetl and the younger generation, found it easier to use the new
opportunities offered by the Soviet regime. Formal equality,
disappearance of the threat of pogroms and new educational and
employment opportunities constituted important elements in the
willingness of many to accept the Soviet reality. But the most
important single factor that contributed to Jewish readiness to
consider the Soviet order favourably was the fate of the Jewish
population under Nazi rule.
After twenty-one months of Soviet rule it was noticeable that the
local Jewish community was moving in the same direction as Soviet
Jewry in the 1930S. The Jews were gradually becoming part of
Soviet society, the former order destroyed and the former elites
eliminated. The price of integration and successin Soviet society was
the gradual loss ofJewish distinctivenessand ethnic-culturalidentity.