United States and the New Great Game In Central Asia

‘The Great Game’ is a term originally coined by Arthur Connolly, a Captain in the

British East India Company, but immortalized by Rudyard Kipling in his novel Kim at

the turn of the nineteenth century1. It refers to the battle between Tsarist Russia and

Imperial Britain to establish hegemony over Central Asia.

Central Asia occupied strategic importance as the gateway to India2; an opportunity for

Russia to extend its empire to the lucrative British “crown jewel”, and a challenge for

Britain to defend and preserve it. The compulsions of Empire made it a critical

possession; without it, survival – let alone supremacy – in Asia seemed impossible.

Afghanistan served as the violent battleground for the frequent collision of two empires.

The British failed twice in their attempts to invade Afghanistan, ultimately reconciling to

a default buffer zone beyond the Durand line3.

The original Great Game gradually faded away as the global order restructured itself

amidst the World Wars; a debilitated British empire withdrew, and Tsarist Russia turned

red with revolution. As the age of empire receded, it took with it much of the significance

previously associated with the Caspian region. In subsequent years this region was

firmly, even ruthlessly, incorporated into the Soviet sphere; serving as the source of raw

materials and nuclear dumping ground for a budding superpower4. The Cold War toppled

the Great Game on the global political chessboard.

1
Hopkirk, Peter, 2002, p61
2
Dettmer, Jamie, 06/12/2000, p24
3
Fromkin, David, Spring80, p0
4
ahmed rashid
Although Central Asia had been relegated to the fringes of political and academic

discourse, radical shifts in global economic and technological trends forced it, once

again, into the limelight. Progress in industrial technology and the oil boom in the nearby

Middle-East were to have far reaching ramifications for the region. When the OPEC

cartel demonstrated its ability to produce ripples across the globe through the oil-shocks

of the 70s, it became glaringly evident: oil, quite literally, fueled the global economy. The

elevation of oil from the status of just another mineral to a devastating weapon meant that

simply its possession made a region significant – or a significant target. Central Asia was

back on the map.

The Caspian Sea boasts the world’s largest untapped fossil fuel resources. While it does

not rival the reserves of the Arabian basin, it is expected to far exceed those of the North

Sea. Various estimates project the crude from 85 to 219 barrels; significant at either

extreme. Conservative estimates determine the net value to be around US$ 4 trillion.

Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan alone could contain more than 110 billion barrels, more than

three times the US reserves5. Furthermore, Kazakhstan’s Tenghiz oil field by itself

contains between 6-9 billion barrels of oil6. The potential oil production of the region is

forecast to shoot up to 4.7 million barrels per day (bpd) by 20107.

The dramatic collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the reluctant emergence of five

new nation-states in the Central Asian region thrust history into full circle; a new Great

Game was on. This time, however, the stakes are higher; the struggle rages not for the

5
Kleveman, Lutz, 2/16/2004, p11
6
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/kazaproj.html
7
Kleveman, Lutz, 2/16/2004, p11
grandeur of empire, but for the custody of the lifeblood flowing through the veins of the

international economy. The rather simple, bipolar Anglo-Russian rivalry has been

replaced by a complex web of competing powers vying for supremacy: the United States,

Russia, Turkey, Iran, China, and even the European Union. This time the battle is not for

Asia, but for the World.

As the undisputed leader of the industrialized world, the United States has developed an

insatiable addiction to oil. In 2002, of the 77 million bpd of crude consumed on a global

level, the US accounted for nearly 19.66 million bpd on average – more than one quarter

of the entire world’s consumption8. Oil consumption alone represents nearly 2.5% of the

US GDP. It is by far the largest importer as well as the consumer of the world’s oil. It

produces only 48% of the oil it consumes, a figure expected to drop to 38% by 2020 9.

Considering the central role of fuel in nearly every component of the manufacturing,

services, or even mechanized agriculture sectors; oil lubricates the entire economic

machinery and forms a cornerstone of growth. Considering the critical importance of oil

to the United States, it assumes a strategic rather than a purely economic concern.

Evidently, oil has dangerous potential to be the United States’ Achilles heel.

The supply shocks of the 1970s drove home the lesson that reliance on single source

produced inevitable dependence which undermined domestic and international interests

of the United States10. The rising power of the OPEC cartel and the heightened instability

of the Middle-East represented potential threats. Middle-Eastern political uncertainty

8
http://www.scaruffi.com/politics/oil.html
9
YELENA KALYUZHNOVA, AMYMYERS JAFFE, DOV LYNCH and ROBIN C. SICKLES (eds),
Energy in the Caspian Region (Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2002), 266 pp., - page 214
10
Reid, Keith, Aug2004, p18
translated into wild fluctuations of international oil prices, disseminating anxiety and

stifling investment. The association with authoritarian Arab regimes represented a

perennial embarrassment as it contradicted the stated American ideals of worldwide

democracy. The anti-American sentiment emerging from the Middle-Eastern masses

posed the persistent threat of overthrow of friendly regimes and instant cessation of oil

supplies11. Raging Islamic fanaticism and perceptions of an impending “Clash of

Civilizations” complicated matters even further. On the domestic front, opposition to

close ties with counter-ideological Arab states reoriented the issue from an international-

strategic to a domestic-political dimension.

In order to circumvent potential hazards and reduce its dependence on Middle-Eastern

oil, the United States has been actively pursuing the policy of diversifying its energy

supplies12. The Caspian region and West Africa have quite naturally acquired significance

in this respect since they possess the largest reserves of fossil fuel outside the Middle-

East13. Soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Western oil firms backed by their

respective governments poured into the newly formed Central Asian Republics (CARs)

in order to negotiate contracts for oil exploration and drilling14.

Since the September 11th attacks on the World Trade Centre, the United States has

stepped up efforts to consolidate its presence in the Caspian region. A series of bilateral

and multilateral agreements with the CARs have surreptitiously incorporated economic

11
Kleveman, Lutz, 2/16/2004, p11
12
YELENA KALYUZHNOVA, AMYMYERS JAFFE, DOV LYNCH and ROBIN C. SICKLES (eds),
Energy in the Caspian Region (Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2002), 266 pp., - page 218
13
Kleveman, Lutz, 2/16/2004, p11
14
Bassman, Robert S.. Europe, Feb2002 Issue 413, p14, 1/2p, 1c
objectives, hidden beneath the pomp and clamor of the “War on Terror.” Since December

2001, the United States has built up an overwhelming military presence in Central Asia

and adjoining regions. It has established an airbase in Uzbekistan with 1500 troops

stationed there, a virtual buy-out as it provides Uzbekistan $160 million of aid in

exchange, and political support for the authoritarian dictator Islam Karimov15. The US

has built another airbase in Kyrgyzstan with an expected troop deployment of 300016. It

has also consolidated its position in Afghanistan with the presence of around 5000 troops

since the end of the war, not to mention a compliant government and nominated head-of-

state who also happens to be a former advisor to American oil giant Unocal17. Georgia

has around 500 American elite troops and a financial incentive of $100 million of aid18.

American capability for maneuvering has been extended further by the grant of

permission for military overflights by Turkmenistan19. An extensive military presence in

the region serves the strategic objective of containing Russian, Chinese and Iranian

influence in the region; all major players of the new Great Game. The presence of US

troops on the Russian “near abroad” has dramatically altered the geo-strategic power

balance in the region.

More complicated than the issue of securing access to and drilling oil from the Caspian

basin is the medium of its shipment to markets located in the West20. Since Central Asia

is a landlocked region, oil pipelines have to necessarily pass through neighboring states

before being shipped off to Western ports. This proves to be problematic since nearly all
15
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/1593736.stm
16
Kellogg, Paul. Contemporary Politics, Mar2003, Vol. 9 Issue 1, p75, 8p;
17
Rasizade, Alec. Contemporary Review, May2002, Vol. 280 Issue 1636, p257, 14p;
18
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1848521.stm
19
Rasizade, Alec. Contemporary Review, May2002, Vol. 280 Issue 1636, p257, 14p;
20
Bassman, Robert S.. Europe, Feb2002 Issue 413, p14, 1/2p, 1c
states adjoining Central Asia are either too unstable to ensure security for the pipelines,

or are themselves stakeholders in the Great Game. Currently, most of the oil

infrastructure of Central Asia passes through their former benefactor, Russia. China and

Iran provide the most economical alternatives for routing the pipelines. However, dictates

of political and strategic realities prohibit any such plans as anathema 21. Pipeline politics

has become the new diplomatic – and sometimes even military – challenge for the

Americans.

The United States has consistently supported plans for the construction of pipelines

which avoid territories of all three competing powers22. Although these are not as

economically viable, they somewhat ensure stability of supplies with minimum

unidirectional dependency. One, advocated by Unocal for the past decade, passes through

Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Baloch regions of Pakistan and then finally ends at the newly

constructed port at Gwadar23. Even though initial steps were taken to materialize this

arrangement, violent instability in Afghanistan and incidents of pipeline blasts in parts of

Balochistan have stalled any progress24. Even though efforts and plans are frequently

resurrected, the absence of order precludes any chances of construction and smooth

operation.

The most politically viable but economically costly proposal has been for the

construction of a pipeline which starts at Azerbaijan’s capital Baku, passes through

21
YELENA KALYUZHNOVA, AMYMYERS JAFFE, DOV LYNCH and ROBIN C. SICKLES (eds),
Energy in the Caspian Region (Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2002), 266 pp., - page 214
22
AHMED RASHID, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central
Asia (Yale University Press, New Haven, 2000), 288 pp., ISBN 0-300-08340-8 (hb) – pg 146
23
Kleveman, Lutz, 2/16/2004, p11
24
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/156497.stm
relatively stable and Western-oriented territories of Georgia and Turkey, and then finally

concludes at Ceyhan25. The unhindered operation of the pipeline is ensured since it passes

through the territories of NATO ally Turkey and Georgia – where US intervention is

relatively easier.

However, concerns have been expressed at the plan since the direction of the pipeline is

considered to be contrary to emerging trends in the world energy market. The pipeline is

headed towards the West in the direction of Europe, where the market for energy is

virtually saturated. The booming markets projected for the future are exactly in the

opposite direction towards China and India where rapid growth is creating an appetite for

energy26. Here again, US strategic and military objectives prevail over economic

considerations.

Although the United States has entered the region as the sole superpower – some would

say ‘hyperpower’ – of the world, it faces considerable challenges from other actors

engaged in the region for centuries. Russia still consider Central Asia its “near-abroad”

and is not willing to cede its influence easily. It is aided by the fact that the CARs cannot

afford to liberate themselves from its control. Years of Soviet rule have ensured that the

infrastructure of all the five republics is oriented towards Russia27. While the Soviet

Union might have fallen, the dependency relationship persists. Additionally, the presence

of a large number of Russians is these republics – serving in vital sectors of the economy

25
HOOMAN PEIMANI, The Caspian Pipeline Dilemma: Political Games and Economic
Losses (Praeger, Westport, CT, 2001), 134 pp., - pg 66
26
HOOMAN PEIMANI, The Caspian Pipeline Dilemma: Political Games and Economic
Losses (Praeger, Westport, CT, 2001), 134 pp.,
27
– ensures that domestic pressures will also prevent any major shift away from Russian

aspirations28. Irritated by Western ambitions, Russia has also flexed its military muscle

and established a military base in Kyrgyzstan, separated by mere miles from the

American airbase29. China, concerned about the fate of its Central Asian province of

Xinjiang with separatist tendencies, has initiated military activity in its region to ensure

minimal American influence or attempts at interference. It has also extended economic

assistance to Kazakhstan to the tune of $600 million, nudging it onto the path of a “multi-

vector” foreign policy30. US-Iran relations have been further strained by accusations and

counter accusations of involvement in clandestine activities for destabilizing Afghanistan

in particular and the entire region in general31.

It is obvious that Central Asia is not going to be an easy ride for the United States. If

instability and Islamic militancy are the chief causes for US disenchantment with the

Middle-East, it will be confronting precisely the same problems in the Caspian region as

well32. Heightening volatility characterizes the region where conflicting ideologies of

Islam, nationalism and regionalism clash frequently for dominance. Poverty and

underdevelopment have fueled the flames of simmering discontent, contained only by

ruthless authoritarianism. While the iron men who rule Central Asia appear to clamp

down on violence with violence of even greater magnitude; their actions can only

postpone the impending turmoil, not prevent it. In the final analysis stability in Central

Asia – whether for oil, pipelines, trade, or simply for its own sake – cannot simply be
28
29
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/3206385.stm
30
Rasizade, Alec. Contemporary Review, May2002, Vol. 280 Issue 1636, p257, 14p;
31
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/2222214.stm
32
Kleveman, Lutz, 2/16/2004, p11
forcefully imposed from abroad. This unfortunate region which has endured conflict and

chaos for centuries can only stabilize when reform is initiated from within, transforming

the conditions of the masses and permitting them to live according to their will. It is time

to realize that the region itself is the biggest player in the new Great Game.