God Is Nothing but Talk: Modernity, Language, and Prayer in a Papua New Guinea Society

Author(s): Joel Robbins

Source: American Anthropologist, New Series, Vol. 103, No. 4 (Dec., 2001), pp. 901-912
Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the American Anthropological Association
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JOEL ROBBINS
Universityof California,San Diego
La Jolla, CA 92093-0532

God Is Nothing but Talk:

Modernity, Language, and Prayer in a Papua New Guinea Society
This articlebringstogethertheoriesof local modernityandof linguisticideologyto analyzethe way the Urapminof Papua
New GuineahaveencounteredmodernlinguisticideologythroughtheirChristianization. Againstthe prevailinganthropo-
logical focus on the indigenizationof modernity,this articlearguesthe importanceof attendingto cases in which people
graspthe contentof modernityon its own terms.Studyingthis kind of local modernityallows us to model an important
kindof contemporaryculturalchangeanddiscoverneglectedaspectsof modernityas refractedthroughthe experiencesof
people new to it. Here,an analysisof the Urapminencounterwithmodernlinguisticideologyrevealsthatideology'sroot-
ednessin a modelthatties meaningto intentionandtruthfulnessandfavorsthe speakeroverthelistenerin theconstruction
of meaning.It is suggestedthatan awarenessof the biasesof this ideology can open up new topicsin linguisticanthropol-
ogy. [modernity, linguistic ideology, religion, Christianity, Melanesia]

them,giving us modernitiesthatarenot only local butalso

on local or indigenous modernities and that con-
cerned with linguistic ideology. In doing so, it aims
not only to forge a link between them but also to make con-
tributions to both bodies of work. On the linguistic side, it
begins by supporting the claim that there is such a thing as
a particularly modern linguistic ideology. The recognition
that this is so has already led some linguistic anthropolo-
gists to engage in a productive critique of the way the al-
most exclusive emphasis on the referential function of lan-
guage in modem linguistic ideology leads many linguists
to disregard its pragmatic function (Silverstein 1976 is a
classic early statement of this position). Taking my impe-
tus from the success of this critical move, I want to suggest
here that attention to the ways nonmodern people engage
with modern linguistic ideology can reveal other of its as-
pects that continue to haunt our understandingof language.
In particular, I want to use evidence from a study of the
way one Papua New Guinea society has encountered some
aspects of modern linguistic ideology to indicate the extent
to which linguistic theory takes for granted certain as-
sumptions about the relation of intention to meaning, the
nature of speaking subjects, and the relative importance of
speakers over listeners in the process of semiosis.
But given that I want to argue both that there is such a
thing as a modem linguistic ideology and that nonmodemrn
people can in some meaningful way engage it, I need to be-
gin by clearing a path for myself through the rapidly thick-
ening tangle of work on local modernities. The extent to
which the debates surrounding this subject remain unset-
tled is evidenced by the adjectival instability that marks
indigenous, alternative,vernacular,multiple, at large,
global,and so on (e.g., Appadurai1996; Eisenstadt2000;
Featherstoneet al. 1995;Gaonkar1999).Tackingbackand
forthbetweenclaims of convergenceand divergence,ho-
mogenizationanddifferentiation, thosetakingup positions
in these debatesall struggleto find ways to theorizepro-
ductivelythe relationbetweenthe two polarprocessesof
the modernencompassingthe indigenousand the indige-
nousencompassingthe modern.
For anthropologists, the problemof comprehendingthe
relationbetween these two processes is compoundedby
the neednot only to get thingsrightin theorybutalso to do
so in a way thatis productiveof and backedup by good
ethnographicwork.In practice,thishas often meantlisting
toward the divergence side of things and seeing indi-
genizedmodernitiesas verymuchlike indigenouscultures
in generalin termsof theirpluralityandlocal specification.
No matterwhat modernityis to begin with, the argument
thatsupportsthis practicegoes, once cooked in the heatof
local fires it will have lost its shapeto a significantextent
and become something indigenous and distinctive, a
homemadeproductof the kind anthropologistshave long
studied.In thispractice,keepingthingsculturallylocal im-
plicitly becomes the only way of keeping them ethnog-
raphicallyreal.
Whilemy own inclinationsalso tendin thisindigenizing
direction,I wantto registera worryabouta corollarythat
mightbe drawnfromouranthropological emphasison the
powersof the local to encompassthe modern.This corol-
lary assertsthat when local culturescut modernityto fit

AmericanAnthropologist103(4):901-912. Copyright? 2001, AmericanAnthropologicalAssociation

902 * VOL. 103, No. 4
AMERICANANTHROPOLOGIST * DECEMBER
theirown dimensions,they can makeit assumealmostany
formtheylike. An argumentbasedon thiscorollaryfigures
prominentlyin a recent article by Englund and Leach
(2000). In thatarticle,the authorschastiseanthropologists
for subscribingto a versionof the convergencethesis that
holds that modernity everywhere introducesthe same
kindsof rupturesin ideas aboutproduction,exchange,and
personhood.In response,they presentanalysesfromPapua
New GuineaandAfricathatsuggestthatin fact peopleare
able to fit whatthey know of modernityquitecomfortably
into the categoriesof theirtraditionalcultures.'Thusin the
PapuaNew Guineacase, Europeansturnout to be nothing
morethanan avatarof traditionaltypes of potentiallypro-
ductive "others"like affines and the dead (Englundand
Leach 2000:231-232). Similarly,MalawianPentecostals
whose lives areguidedby the Holy Spiritarereallyno dif-
ferentthantraditionalhealerswhose personhoodwas also
a compositeof "spiritualand humanagencies"(Englund
and Leach 2000:235). In these two cases of local moder-
nity, nothingmuch has changedfrom what went before.
And this is as true for the anthropologistsas it is for the
peoplebeingdiscussed,for the authorsanalyzetheirethno-
graphicmaterialsexclusivelyin termsthatcouldhavebeen
applied to them before anyone would even have been
temptedto call themmodem.
It is not thatI do not believe thatit is possiblefor things
to go the way Englundand Leach describethem (though
whatI know aboutsome peoplein PapuaNew Guineaand
aboutmanyPentecostalsleads me to doubtthatthey have
these cases quiteright-see Robbins2000). It is undoubt-
edly truethatpeople who encounterelementsof a foreign
culturecan makethemdo and meanthingsthey neverdid
or meantin theiroriginalenvironment.The ubiquitousim-
age of the Papua New Guinean Highlandsartorialbri-
coleurdeckedout in updatedtraditionalstyle with old tin
can lids for ornamentsand a ballpointpen in his pierced
septumhasbeen makingthis pointfordecadesin bothaca-
demic andpopularcircles.The problemis thatif we want
the notionof local modernitiesto meananythingmorethan
whatis meantby the notionthatdifferentpeoplehave dif-
ferentcultures,thenwe cannottreatthe processesof local-
izationthatproducethem as simple analoguesof the one
thatproducesthe decorationof this Highlandswarrior.In-
stead,we will have to admitthatmodernityhas some con-
tent-more contentin fact thana tin can lid or a ballpoint
pen-and thatpeoplewho wouldadoptit mustreckonwith
thiscontent.Theywill of coursereckonwithit in theirown
ways, come to it with their own backgroundunder-
standingsandso on, butto reallywrestlewithmodernityis
to give thiscontentsome play.
What, then, is the content of modernity?Althoughit
wouldbe impossibleto split the modernatomin the space
availablehere,even were I able to do so, I do wantto try
brieflyto characterizemodernity'scontentin an anthropo-
logicallyusefulway. As I see it, modernityis a set of con-
2001
ceptionsandthe institutionsandpracticesthey give onto.It
is, in short,a culture,andit has the kindsof contentsother
cultureshave.This may soundlike an unremarkable claim,
but as Wittrock(2000) has recentlypointedout, social sci-
entistsfrequentlyfail to hold to it. Instead,they treatmod-
ernity as a set of institutions-in particularthose of the
market,of democraticgovernance,andof science-and ig-
nore the culturalideas that create those institutionsand
give themsense. ForWittrock,a sole focus on institutions
is a mistakenotjust becauseof the anthropologicalcom-
monplacethat institutionsonly exist within culturesbut
also because a strictlyinstitutionaldefinitionleads on to
the ratherperverseargumentthat most Westernsocieties
have neverbeen modem (thoughin a differentsense than
thatdiscussedby Latour[1993]) or have only been so in
the very recent past. From an anthropologicalpoint of
view, the habitof giving institutionalacid tests of moder-
nity is problematicfor a differentreasonas well: the fact
thatit rendersso manyThirdandFourthWorldpeopleab-
solutelynonmodem.Eitherone gets steamrolledby the in-
stitutionaljuggernaut,as the most extreme convergence
theoristsimagineone must,or one is not in the gameat all.
Anthropologistswho have workedon the modernizingpe-
ripheryof the global marketcan agree with Wittrockthat
this set of choices presentedto us by the institutionalap-
proachto modernityis a badone.
Havingdispensedwith institutionaldefinitionsof mod-
ernity,Wittrockoffers in theirplace a culturaldefinition
thatfiguresmodernityas a set of whathe calls "promissory
notes." These notes point to the possibility of creating
"new assumptionsabout humanbeings, their rights and
agency"(Wittrock2000:37). To be modem, it is enough
merelyto hold the promissorynotes, to feel thatone has a
rightto whatthey promise,andto struggleto redeemthem
throughinstitutionalexperimentationwith new kinds of
exchange,of polity,andof knowledgeseeking.If we pro-
visionallydefine modernityculturallyin termsof promise
andstrugglein this way, andnot in termsof finishedinsti-
tutions,we can see (1) thatmanylocal modemsarecanoni-
cally modem in this sense, for they definitelyhold some
versionsof these notes andworkto redeemthem,and (2)
thatmodernitycan be localizedin an enormousvarietyof
ways withoutcompletelylosing its characteras a sense of
entitlementto a futurein whichthese domainstakediffer-
ent formsthantheydo in thepresent.
Havingin thisway characterized modernityas a culture,
my argument is thatthe peoplewe would wantto call local
modemrns must at some pointengage it in these terms-as a
set of linkedpromises-and not as a jumble of disparate,
unrelatedelements that in their isolation yield without
struggle to attemptsto contain them within old under-
standings.I am not surehow oftensuchengagementscome
about,and the mechanismsthatbringthem into being re-
quire furtherstudy (cf. Sahlins 1992; Robbinsn.d.). Yet,
regardlessof how oftenthese engagementscome aboutor

what mechanismsdrive them,the broaderpoint of my ar-
gument is that it is only when they do happenthat we
shouldspeaknot of local, or indigenous,or alternativecul-
turesbutof local, or indigenous,or alternativemodernities.
WhatI wantto demonstratein this articleis, amongother
things,thatthe Urapminof PapuaNew Guineapresenta
case of local modernityinjust this sense.
Forthe Urapmin,the strugglewith modernityhas in im-
portantrespectsbeen a strugglewith modem ideas about
language.2Among the promissorynotes that they hold,
some of the most importantoffer them the possibilityof
becomingnew kindsof linguisticsubjects.Thatthe Urap-
min focus on languagein this way probablyfollows to
some extentfrom the obvious fact thatlanguageis funda-
mentalto social life and so also to any effort, modem or
otherwise,at its reconstruction.Differentkinds of futures
requiredifferentkindsof linguisticpossibilities.But in the
Urapmincase, a preoccupationwith languagealso follows
from the fact thatthe Urapminencountermodernitywith
an elaborateandvery differentindigenouslinguisticideol-
ogy alreadyin hand.Languageis one areawheretheirin-
digenous ideas fail to mesh at all well with the modemrn
ones they are tryingto takeup. This gives theirstrugglea
local cast-both in relationto the fact that it unfolds to
such a greatextenton linguisticgroundsand in the direc-
tions it ultimatelytakes-and it allows an analysisof this
struggleto exemplify what can be accomplishedthrough
the studyof local modernitiesin the termsI have laid out
here.
From Ritual to Speech in Modern Urapmin
The 375 people who constitutethe Urapmincommunity
live in the MountainOk region of the far WesternHigh-
landsof PapuaNew Guinea.Withinthe literatureon peo-
ple who have remainedrelatively "remote"subsistence
gardenerseven in this era of globalization,the Urapmin
standout for the vehemencewith whichtheyhave rejected
whatthey see as theirtraditions(alowal imi kukup,"ways
of the ancestors")3and have embracedinstead a set of
modem promises of fundamentalfuture change. These
promisesare to some extent shapedby ideas drawnfrom
developmentalistand statepoliticalrhetoric,butthe Urap-
min understandthem primarilyin the termsof Protestant
Christianity,andit is the religiousaspectof thesepromises
thatwill be my focus here.
The storyof how the Urapmincame to encountermod-
ernityin its Christianguise is notquitethe expectedone of
missionaryimposition,for the Urapminwere never di-
rectlymissionizedby Westerners.In the 1960s and 1970s,
however, quite a few young Urapminmen and a few
young women left home to study with Australianand
Papua New GuineanBaptist missionariesliving among
theirneighbors.These young people broughtChristianity
back to Urapminand set up local schools to teach it to
ROBBINS / MODERNITY,LANGUAGE, AND PRAYER 903
those who had stayed at home. These efforts resultedin
few conversions,butthey did createa communitythatwas
familiarwith manyof the basic tenetsof Christianity.This
familiarityprovidedthe backgroundfor whatthe Urapmin
call the rebaibal(revival),a charismaticChristianmove-
ment that spreadthroughthe Highlandsof PapuaNew
Guineain the late 1970s. The rebaibalreachedthe Urap-
minin 1977,andwithina yearit hadled all of themto con-
vert and to discardthe bones (kun) and otherrelics that
wereat the centerof theirtraditionalreligion.
Fromthe pointof view adoptedhere,one can say thatit
was duringthe earlydays of the revivalthatthe Urapmin
began to put the variouspieces of Christianknowledge
they hadgainedtogetherinto a largerpictureof Christian-
ity's contentas a culture.Manypeople's testimoniesfrom
the revivalperioddwell on the experienceof a gestaltfi-
nally snappinginto place: "suddenlyI understoodthe Bi-
ble, I was notjust lookingat wordson the page,""Iknew
thatGodwas realandthatI was a sinner,"andso on. Once
the Christianpicturecame into focus in this way, people
gave up any self-consciousattemptto work Christianity
into the framesof their traditionalunderstandings. With
veryfew exceptions,Urapmintodayarestrikinglyuninter-
ested in the possibilityof syncretizingChristianandtradi-
tional ideas. Instead,their goal since the time of rebaibal
has beento reworktheirlives in whattheyunderstand to be
solely Christian terms.4
People's attemptsto Christianizetheir lives have re-
sultedoverthe last20 yearsin a riotof institutionalcreativ-
ity that has given contemporaryUrapminlife its shape.
Many of these new institutionsdo not look canonically
modem-group spirit possession, Holy Spirit medium-
ship, regularformalconfession, and a constantresortto
prayerin almostall situations,for example,all look almost
antimodemfroma Westernpointof view. But in Urapmin
they are all deeply informedby modem promisesof per-
sonalandsocial transformation. This is nowheremoreob-
vious thanin the ideas thatmarkUrapminunderstandings
of the transformative promiseof the modemlinguisticide-
ology that is centralto ProtestantChristianityand in the
new linguisticinstitutionof Christianprayer(Tok Pisin:
beten)to whichtheseunderstandings havegiven rise.
Oneof themoststrikingfeaturesof contemporary Urap-
min life is the frequencywith which and the diversityof
contextsin whichpeoplepray(beten)to theChristianGod.
Urapminminimallybegin andend theirdays with prayer,
and most people will pray many more times duringthe
day. Urapminprayalone andin groups,in the village,and
in the bush.Theyprayfor health,huntingsuccess,andgar-
den fertility;for protectionagainstevents foreseenin bad
dreams(lumtimafak);for the reliefof angerandothersin-
ful feelings (aget tem mafak);to bless meals eaten with
thosebeyondthe household;to give theirsins to God;and,
of course, simply to offer "praise"to God (Tok Pisin:
904 AMERICAN * VOL. 103, No. 4
ANTHROPOLOGIST * 2001
DECEMBER
amamasimGat). Even this list is not exhaustive,however,
for beyondtheirstandardopeningsandclosings thereis no
fixed contentof Urapminprayer(see below), and people
are constantlyinnovatingprayersin situationsthat make
themfeel the leastbit anxiousin eitherpositiveor negative
terms.This flexibilityhas allowedprayerto becomesome-
thingakinto the punctuationof Urapminsocial life, andit
is now the most routinepartof theirreligiouspractice.
The ubiquityandimportanceof prayerin contemporary
Urapminlife have to be understoodin relationto the way
ProtestantChristianityhandles speech more generally.
Withits rejectionof formalritual,Protestantismis proneto
appearas a religionthat is fundamentally,one might say
almostexclusively, constitutedthroughlanguage.Such at
leastis the way it appearsto the Urapmin.Urapminmakea
rigiddistinctionbetweenspeech(weng)andaction(kemin).
Forreasonsthatwill be apparentlater,they generallyvalue
actionover speech, andthus they are rarelyinclinedto at-
tenuate the division between these two phenomenaby
classifying kinds of speech as kinds of action. Although
theireffortsto keepthisdistinctionsharpsit uncomfortably
alongside our own relatively recent scholarly triumph
againsta similardistinctionin the Westerntradition(e.g.,
Austin[1975] andthe wide rangeof scholarshis workhas
influenced),we need to keep the Urapmincommitmentto
it firmlyin place in whatfollows.
The Urapminclassify ritualactivitiesas kindsof action.
In fact,for reasonsI will alludeto later,theyunderstandrit-
ual to be the most fundamentalform of action,the proto-
type of the category.To be sure,some of theirtraditional
ritualsinvolved a good deal of speech, but this speech,
when it was not the recitationof sacrednames or spells,
was held to be mendaciousand largely beside the point.
Urapminreligion,like thatof otherMountainOk groups,
was centered aroundelaborate,multistagemen's initia-
tions (ban) (Barth1975 andJorgensen1981 offer detailed
accounts of these initiations).At each stage, initiators
would offer verbalrevelationsof secretknowledge(weng
awem) that were provenfalse (famoul)at the next stage,
only to be replacedby furtherrevelationsthatwouldin turn
be provenfalse in the future.Men all rememberthatone of
the primarythings these initiationstaughtthem was that
what was said in them was not trustworthy.The things
done in the ritual-the beatingsadministered,the manipu-
lations of bones and vegetable and animal substances-
were important,but the words spoken for the most part
were not. Some early stage initiatesmightbelieve thatthe
oldermen knew thingsthatmadetheirspeechtrustworthy,
but as men became initiatorsthemselvesthey learnedthat
becausetoo much knowledgehad gone to the grave with
old men of the past who refusedto shareit, the searchfor
verbaltruthwas in vain.In the end,they came to doubtthe
value of prettymuch all that was said in ritualcontexts.
Whatwas importantaboutritualthenwas its qualityas ac-
tion, not the speech it contained.Women were largely
barredfrom this ritualsphere,but initiatorsmisled them
verballyas well aboutthe contentof these rites,and,thus,
adultwomen came to sharewith men a generaldistrustof
ritualspeech.
As I will discussin detailbelow, the Urapmindistrustof
ritualspeechis only one expressionof a verygeneralskep-
ticism towardthe reliabilityof the spoken word."Given
theirskepticismtowardspokenlanguagein bothritualand
everydaycontexts,it is a matterof some momentfor the
Urapminthatthey see Christianityas havingtransformed
theirreligiouslife by replacingmostoccasionsof religious
action with ones of religiousspeech.The churchservices
the Urapminoften hold twice daily, for example,are con-
structedprimarilyout of talk. The same is true for their
confessionrites(TokPisin:autimsin),the moralharangues
(weng kem) that provide the most public face of their
Christianlife outsideof church,theprayerhealingceremo-
nies thatgo on in people's houses,andthe innerspeechof
privateself-examinationthatall Urapminadultsclaim is a
crucial part of their Christianlives. Where ritual was,
UrapminChristianityseemsto say, therespeechshallbe.
As if this wholesale replacementof ritualaction with
speechwas nottroublesomeenoughfroman Urapminper-
spective,the problemsit raisesarecompoundedby the fact
thatmuchof this Christiantalkis talkabouttalk.Urapmin
religious discourse is peppered with reports of divine
speechdrawnfromthe Bible. Sermonsandotherreligious
discussionsreturnwith numbingconstancyto refrainsof
"thatis whatHe [God]said,""Thatis whatJesussaid,"or
"Thatis what it [the Bible] says."This ceaseless reliance
on reportedspeechis groundedin the verydefinitionof the
Christianlife as the Urapminunderstandit. For to be a
Christianconsists in "listening"to "God'stalk"(Gat ami
weng) so thatone can "hear,""follow,"and "obey"it (all
glosses on "tolisten,"weng senkamin).Thusthe Christian
life, when it does not consist in talkingto God in prayer,
very often consists in talkingaboutwhatGod has said so
thatit canbe heardandfollowed.In Christianity,then,talk
follows talkandcharterstalkthatproducesmoretalk.This
tightcircuitleaveslittleroomfor the kindof ritualaction-
initiation,sacrifice,tabooobservance,andso on-that was
so importantto traditionalUrapminreligiouspractice.
As much as they are committedto Christianity,many
Urapminstrugglewith its relianceon speech ratherthan
ritual action. One could illustrate this point by considering
the debates people sometimes have over the propriety of
the rituals they have had trouble giving up-pig sacrifice
and bridewealth exchange, for example-but in keeping
with my theme here I want to turn instead to a striking ver-
bal expression of people's disquiet over Christianity's
commitment to speech. This expression took the form of a
clich6 that I sometimes heard in church services and several
times discussed with pastors who used it spontaneously in
talkingto me. The clich6 has it that "Godis nothingbut
talk" (Gat ka weng katagup; Tok Pisin: Gat em i tok tasol).

The phrasewengkatagup,"nothingbuttalk"(TokPisin:
tok tasol), is a commonone in Urapminspeech.In my ex-
perienceit generallyhas stronglyderogatoryconnotations.
To say somethingis only talkin Urap,muchas in English,
is to dismiss it as unlikelyto transpire.The consistently
negative connotationsthe phrasecarriesrendersanoma-
lous its use by committedChristiansto characterizethe
ChristianGod. Thuswhen I firstheardpeople say "Godis
nothingbut talk,"it piqued my interest.I thoughtthat it
mightrepresentsome sortof criticaltearin the apparently
seamless fabricof Urapminpiety. Yet I was neverable to
get veryfarwiththis interpretationof it. WhenI askedpas-
tors whatthey meantby it, they always referredme to the
first verse of John'sgospel.Translatedfromthe Tok Pisin
versionthe Urapminuse, this verse reads"Longago Talk
existed. Talk existed alongsideGod. And Talk itself was
God" (N.B. Talk is capitalizedthroughout)(Anonymous
1978:166).6 Its worthnotingat the outsetthatnone of this
quite amountsto saying thatGod is nothingbut talk. But
even had the verse containedthis phrase,problemsof in-
terpretationwouldhave remained,for glosses on the verse
itself were extremelyhardto come by. People generally
claimed to find it one of the more crypticpassagesin the
Bible. This left my attemptsto garnera rich interpretation
of the phrase"Godis nothingbut talk"stalledin an exe-
geticalcul-de-sac.
It now seems to me thatthis phraseis importantto the
Urapmindespite its seeming evaluativeincoherencebe-
cause it said somethingtrueaboutChristianity-thatit is a
religion of talk-while at the same time its derogatory
overtones,however suppressed,indexed problemsmany
Urapmin people have with the Christianpromotionof
speech to the centerof religiouslife. It was, in short,over
preciselythe issues this phrasepointedto, ones of how to
positively value speech and understandits importancein
Christianity,thatpeople in Urapminwere strugglingmost
strenuouslywith modem linguisticideology in the relig-
ious guise in whichit hadenteredtheirlives.
Christianity, Modern Linguistic Ideology,
and Prayer
Many of the ways Protestantismhas been historically
entangledwith the contentof modernityare well known,
but its relationshipto modem linguisticideology has not
been widely examined.Before consideringthe Urapmin
encounterwith the Protestantversionof linguisticmoder-
nity,then,it will be helpfulto have a briefaccountof mod-
em linguisticideology moregenerally.At the heartof this
linguistic ideology is a tight coupling of intentionand
meaningthat is groundedin the postulationof a speaker
who has both an abilityand an inclinationto tell the truth.
This ideology understandsspeakersto attemptin most
cases accuratelyto representtheirthoughtsandin doingso
to reportthoughtsthatare themselvesaccuratein relation
ROBBINs / MODERNITY,LANGUAGE,AND PRAYER 905
to the world or are appropriately hedged if they are not.
The expectationthat subjects speak truthfullyin these
ways-saying what they mean and meaning what they
say-grounds the tightcouplingof intentionandmeaning
because withoutthatexpectationa graspof the speaker's
intentionwouldbe of only dubiousworth.
This modem linguistic ideology that ties intention,
meaning,and truthfulnesstightlytogetheris well attested
in the unwittingethnographyof modernitythatgoes under
the nameof the philosophyof language(cf. Duranti1993:
25-27; Keane 1997a:680;Silverstein1979). It is central,
for example,to the work of Grice (1989), Austin (1975),
Searle (1969), and those who follow them. Furthermore,
an impressiveif eclecticgroupof scholarshas also in more
wittingfashion approachedthe historicaldevelopmentof
this ideology qua ideology.Whatthey show conclusively
is that the promisesthis ideology makes about language
and the linguisticsubjectare fundamentalto many of the
institutionalexperimentsthat have characterizedmoder-
nityin the West.Thus,Luhmann(1984) andShapin(1994)
demonstratethatthe ideologicalcreationof the truth-tell-
ing subjectwas crucialto the developmentof modem sci-
ence. Foucault(1978;see also DreyfusandRabinow1983)
in a similarway shows how the possibilityof telling the
truthof the self in confessionalandothercontextswas cen-
tralto the emergenceof modemindividualism,a pointalso
made by Trilling (1972) in a somewhatdifferent way.
Habermas(e.g., 1998), for his part,uses the model of the
honestcommunicatorto groundwhathe considersa fully
modem emancipatorypolitics, while Simmel (1950:313)
arguesthatthe grandscale and complexdivision of labor
characteristicof modem societies dependon the assump-
tion of the truthfulspeakerif they areto be viable.
To this list of institutionsin which modem linguistic
ideology is embeddedhas to be addedthat of Protestant-
ism. Keane(1997a) has recentlyremindedus how central
the intention/meaning/truth modelhasbeento the constitu-
tion of Protestantismas a distinctkindof Christianity.This
is crucialto my argumenthere,for it is throughProtestant-
ism that the Urapminhave most forcefullyencountered
thatmodelandthe ideologythatproducesit.7It is thispoint
thatI now wantto explore.
In lightof the importancesecrecyheld in theirtradition-
al religion,it is perhapsnot surprisingthat the Urapmin
tendto distinguishtheirtraditionalpastandtheirChristian
presentnot as contrastingperiodsof darknessandlightbut
as ones of hiddennessandopenness:the modempresentis
a time when importantreligiousand social informationis
in the "open"(kem diim), ratherthan "hidden"(bantap).
The promiseof openness,of sharedthoughts,feelings,and
knowledge,is one of the most importantones modernity
has madeto the Urapmin.Yet, consideredin these terms,
the realizationof the Urapminmodernizingprojecthas en-
counteredconsiderable difficultywhenit comesto language.
906 * VOL. 103, No. 4
AMERICANANTHROPOLOGIST * DECEMBER
Forwhile theyrecognizethatas modem,Christiansubjects
they are supposedto speaktruthfullyat all times by accu-
ratelyand openlyrepresentingtheirinnerstatesin speech,
their traditionallinguistic ideology does not constitute
them as subjectscapableof performingin this way. Tryas
they might,they find it hardto believe thatlanguagewill
ever be able to expressadequatelywhat it is peoplethink,
feel, or desire.
To understandwhy this is so, we have to flesh out the
accountof traditionalUrapminlinguisticideology I began
to develop earlierwhen consideringthe Urapmindistinc-
tion betweenspeechandaction.The partof theirlinguistic
ideology thatthe Urapminmost frequentlyexpressexplic-
itly is thatwhichholds thatthoughts,feelings, anddesires
are hidden in the human heart (aget-the seat of all
thoughtandfeeling) andcannotbe reliablycommunicated
throughspeech(weng).Too muchcan happenbetweenthe
heartandthe mouth,Urapminsay, for one to imaginethat
words reveal what a person thinks. People thus distrust
words, and the possibility of knowing what others are
thinkingon the basis of whatthey have said andthe possi-
bility of derivingthe meaningof whatis saidby relatingit
to the intentionsthat producedit are not even regulating
ideals forthem.The assumptionthatspeechis unreliableis
verygeneral,andit governsUrapminapproachesto speech
in a wide varietyof domains(I discuss this in moredetail
in Robbins2001a). As a result,the Urapminaccordknowl-
edge gained throughspeech a very low epistemological
value, andpeopleare alwayscarefulto distinguishknowl-
edge theyhavelearnedonly by hearingit (weng senkamin)
from that much more reliableknowledge that they have
gainedthroughseeingit (tamin).The hearing/seeingoppo-
sition in regardto receptionclearly parallelsthe speak-
ing/actingdistinctionthatUrapminpeople use to evaluate
production.Andjust as the speaking/actingoppositionhas
been troubledby the Christianreplacementof ritualaction
with speech, that of hearing/seeinghas also been chal-
lengedby ideasthatChristianityhas introduced.
Urapminproblemswith the hearing/seeingopposition
centeron issues of listeningand follow from the way the
Urapmindistrustof speech leads them to construethe se-
miotic processwherebymeaningis produced.Given that
speech cannotconvey people's intentions,it shouldcome
as no surprisethat for the Urapminits meaning is not
groundedin them.Instead,listenersareresponsibleforcre-
ating the meaning of what they hear (for discussion of
comparablecases, see Duranti 1992; Kochman 1981;
Kulick 1992, 1998; Schieffelin 1986, 1990; Silverstein
1998).8 This listener orientationof Urapminand, more
generally,PapuaNew Guineanlinguisticideology is very
pronouncedand is embeddedin broaderideologies of so-
cial action,ideologies discussedby Wagner(1974, 1977)
and Strathern(1988) in termsof the notion of elicitation.
Accordingto these models,Melanesianssee socialityas a
process wherebypeople discover their own capacitiesin
2001
the effectsthey registeron others.Sociallife becomesthen
a processin which each actortriesto createcontextsthat
otherswill completeby relatingto him or her. Only when
people do performsuch acts of completiondoes the origi-
nal act have meaningandthe originalactorbecome a sub-
ject appropriate to thatsortof action.In this run-it-up-the-
flagpole-and-see-who-salutes notionof semiotic function,
others give one's actions meaning,just as they do one's
speech.
Fromthe pointof view of modem linguisticand social
ideology, including its Protestantform, this decentered
model of speech and action encouragesan irresponsible
disregardfor thepowerone's own intentionshaveto create
meaningand shape social life. For ProtestantUrapmin,a
crucialproblemthusbecomesthe one of how to makeone-
self a responsiblespeakerwhose speechtruthfullyconveys
one's intentionsand createscontexts for which one can
take responsibility.AlthoughUrapminlinguisticideology
still does not let them constitutethemselvesas such sub-
jects in everydayspeech,it does let themdo so in Christian
prayer,prayerthatis oftenintonedout loudin the presence
of othersand servesto communicatewith them as well as
with God.
Two aspectsof prayercome to the fore when we con-
sider how it allows people to constitutethemselves as
truthfulspeakersin ways thatthey cannotin othergenres
of speech.The firstis prayer'sformulaic,ritualizedquali-
ties. Like otherritualactions,Urapminprayershave dis-
crete beginnings.To begin a prayer,one first asks all of
those presentto close theireyes. Once people have closed
theireyes andthusmarkeda discretebreakwiththe flow of
social life up to thatpoint,the personprayingwill use one
of severalformulaeto call out to God andmarkthe formal
beginningof the prayer("God,we are yourchildren"and
"God,we are yourpiglets"aretwo of the most common).
Withthesetwo openingmovesin place,it is impossiblefor
thoseprayingor listeningto doubtthatan act of prayerhas
begun.Along with these openings,prayersalso have pat-
ternedclosings,whereinthe personprayingintonesthat"I
have spoken(or asked)sufficientlyandwhatI have said is
true"(afenko-this metalinguisticstatementof truthis a
calque from the English use of amen that draws on its
originalHebrewmeaningandis neverused in referenceto
speech in this way in othercontexts).With this ending,
eyes open,markingthe returnto life outsideof prayer.
The Urapminunderstand all ritualsto be discrete,formal
events of this kind.They also understandthemto commit
thosewho participatein themto the goals at whichtheyare
aimed.Thiscommitmentis groundedin participation itself
andis not a functionof the intentionsof participants.9 One
cannotprayfor somethingwithoutcommittingto wanting
it to happen,just as one cannotsacrificea pig withoutin-
tendingto give it to a spiritor engage in a disputesettle-
ment exchange withoutintendingto settle the disputein
question. Complete in themselves, requiringno human

follow-throughto accomplish their goals, ritual actions
commit participantsto the intentionsthat animatethem
whetheror not the participantsthemselvesundertookthe
ritualwith those intentionsin theirhearts.People's com-
mitmentsto the intentionsthey displayin ritualarefurther
fixed by the widespreadbelief thatif one laterdoes some-
thingthatcontradictswhatone committedto in ritual,one
opens oneselfup to mysticaldanger.In the past,the source
of this danger was often opaque, but now people feel
stronglythatGod will punishin the futurethosewhose ac-
tions contradictwhat they have said in prayer.Once ex-
pressedin ritual,then,people's intentionstake on a fixity
and an "onthe record"qualitythatthey cannotachievein
anyotherway. (Inpassing,I mightnotethatthisis why, for
the Urapmin,ritualis the prototypeof the categoryaction.)
For Urapmin, prayer is primarilyritual ratherthan
speech. As such it sharesin the generalritualcapacityto
fix commitment.But at the same time, prayeris not com-
pletelylackingin the qualitiesof speech,andthisallowsits
capacity to fix commitmentto function differentlythan
that of all otherrituals.Most Urapminritualshave fixed,
singularends.Thereareritualsto curesickness,to remove
anger,to ensuregood hunting,and so on. Prayer,by con-
trast,is open-endedin its goals. For betweentheirstand-
ardizedopeningsandclosings, prayersaregovernedby no
formula,andpeoplecan expressall sortsof intentionsand
informationwithinthem,the truthof whichthey can pub-
licly committhemselvesto in the act of praying.Thereis
thusfar greaterroomfor people to puttheirown stampon
the kindsof commitmentsthey makein prayerthanthereis
in any otherkind of ritual.In effect, prayerallows people
to combinethe ritualist'sabilitypubliclyto fix his or her
intentionswiththe languageuser'sinfiniteabilityto create
novel utterances.This is a combinationthat goes a long
way towardconstitutingthe truthfulsubjectin Urapmin.
But if prayer'sritualqualities are one supportfor its
truthproducingability,the otheris anchoredin the factthat
in being addressedto God prayeris aimedat a new kindof
listener.In Urapminunderstanding,God, unlike people,
can see insidethe humanheart.Because God knows what
one thinksand becauseHe also condemnsuntruthfulness,
Urapminbelieve thata personwill neverknowinglylie to
God. Althoughspeechis still an imperfectmedium,when
one hears people assert somethingin prayerone can as-
sumethatthey believe in the truthof whatthey say. In this
way, the creationof a new kindof omniscientlistenerelic-
its a new kind of truthfulspeaker.This may look like an
odd chain of causality, but it is consistent with those Mela-
nesian linguistic and social ideologies that proclaim that
those who listen and react in important respects create
those who speak and act. By acting as a listener who can
connect intention and speech, God makes of the Urapmin
speakers who can do the same. In making God as listener
the central actor in this transformation,Urapmin linguistic
ROBBINS / MODERNITY,LANGUAGE, AND PRAYER 907
ideology is changingin ways thatarethemselvesgiven by
thatideology(Sahlins1992)butat the sametimepushthat
ideology well beyondits usuallimits.Prayer,thatis to say,
is a genre in which the Urapminattain the truth-telling
goals of the new ideologyby employingmeansthatdo not
flout the skepticalconcernsof the old. This is a point,then,
at which the choice betweenconvergenceand divergence
seems at best to be forcedandat worstto misframethe is-
sues local modernitiesraiseforus. I will returnto thispoint
brieflyin my conclusion.
But, beforeconcluding,I needto makeone furtherset of
ethnographicobservations.The extentto which the Urap-
min are coming to inhabitmodem linguisticideologyand
to work with the possibilitiesfor new kinds of linguistic
agency it opensup is evidentin some of the uses to which
they putprayer.It is in theseuses thatwe see themworking
to create new linguisticinstitutionsthat will redeemthe
promises modem linguisticideology has made to them.
The recentuse of prayerto performapology and resolve
disputesis a good exampleof such institutionalcreation.
Because the traditionalspeakerin Urapminwas unableto
convey intentionor, betterput,becauselistenerswere un-
willing to assumea connectionbetweenspeechand inten-
tion, it is not surprisingthattherewas traditionallyno ver-
bal formof apologyin Urapmin.When offense was given
or harmdone,reparationwas madethroughexchangeritu-
als called "buyingthe shame"(fitomsanin) or "buyingthe
anger"(aget atulsanin)of the offendedparty.Onlyby un-
dertakingsuch ritualsof disputeresolutioncould people
demonstratetheirsincereintentionto bringproblemsto an
end.
Urapminstill frequentlyresortto these rituals,buteven
moreoftentheyturnto prayerto allow themto conveythat
they aresorryandthattheyintendto let theirangergo. Just
as is the case when one participatesin an exchangeritual,
when one gives his or her angerto God in prayer,those
whom one has offended have to accept that one is no
longerangry.
The way this workscan be illustratedthroughan analy-
sis of an apologeticprayerthatwas deliveredduringa Sun-
day morningchurchservice. Up until the momentwhen
the prayerwas spoken,this servicehad been marredby a
tense disputethathadtakenup muchof the morning.The
pastorsanddeaconsof the churchhad in recentdays been
angrythatpeoplewerenot comingto confessionandwere
not coming quicklyto serviceswhen the churchbell rang.
They raisedthis issue at the beginningof the service,anda
heatedgeneraldiscussionfollowedin whichthe congrega-
tion respondedby expressingdissatisfactionwith the way
the churchofficials had been leading their own personal
lives. After the argumenthad gone on for more than an
hour,the leadingpastor,a mannamedPita,took the unto-
wardstep of suggestingthatthe congregationsimply end
the service at this point, skippingthe Bible readingand
908 AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST * VOL. 103, No. 4 * DECEMBER2001
sermon that are at its center. "Let us just pray," he said,
"and go home."
Following his call, the congregation began a noisy col-
lective prayer. Shortly after everyone began to pray, Pita's
voice rose above the rest, and as their prayers subsided, he
carried on alone. This is his prayer, picked up at the point
where his voice becomes dominant:'"
Thankyou fatherGod.
I am angry about your work. Your work is not in good
shape.A man [Satan]has come andmadeus uninterested,and
so FatherGod,you arelookingat me.
God, thereis a problemaboutyour work.I have been an-
gry. My hearthas becomeheavy.God,now thetime has come
for me to do your work, and I want to do your work. I am
readyto do it, but they arealways uninterestedin me. Thatis
whatthey have been doing. This is not very good, and God I
pray to you. It is you God that I am asking. The kinds of
thoughtsI am having aboutthis in my heart,heavy thoughts
are coming up, angry thoughtsare coming up. This is not a
problemwith the workof this ground,no God, it is a problem
with yourwork.
I am angryaboutthis, and so God, please, you must have
pity on me. This is why I am prayingto you.
God, it is yourwork,and I wantto do yourwork.I was do-
ing it, and the church said "no." This is what I am angry
about.
I have been angry, and God I am prayingto you. These
kindsof thoughtsI have been thinking,I have not given them
to the church.No, I still have them,andso God I prayto you.
You be with me. You clear away the dirty things, the dirty
thingsI havedone. Aboutthis,I amaskingyou pleaseto clear
it away. This prayercomes to you, and so you God can clear
this angeraway.
And God, you send your peacefulnessdown and you help
us sheep.You help themandcontinuelookingafterthem.
I have been sayingwe family [alimal] have not beendoing
your work well God. [He is prayingcompletelyalone at this
point.] I have been angry aboutthis, this problemwith your
work. I was angryabout this problemwith your work. You
must clear away this angerand put me inside your own new
life.
Eachof us in the churchtoo, pastors,deaconstoo, brothers,
and sisters, we [ningkil nuyo] have been arguingback and
forthaboutyour work. So God, you! Clearaway this anger,
and God put [give us] your new life [inside of us], give us
nothingbutyourpeacefulness.
We brothersand sisters [ningkil],we family [alimal]must
continueto worshipin church.That is why I call to you. It
would be bad if a man comes into our midst and destroysit
like that.He will bringall kindsof things,all kindsof behav-
ior inside. Please, you clear this away, and then God remain
with us.
I amcallingto you, andnow my angerI leave it to God.
I haveaskedsufficiently,andit is true.
This prayer largely ended the dispute that provoked it. It
did this by compelling those who heard it to accept that
Pita, their leading pastor, had forsaken his anger. After it
was over the service went on, and the issues that had occu-
pied the congregationfor so much of the morningnever
came up in churchagain.
Forpresentpurposes,I wantto makeonly a few analytic
points aboutthis prayer,points thattouch on aspectsof it
thatarecommonto manyUrapminprayers.Firstof all, it is
clearlyan expressionon Pita'spartof a willingnessto give
up the angerthathas broughthim into this dispute.If not
preciselyan apology,it is an offeringof peace.As such,it
is aimednot only at God but also at the restof the congre-
gation,who heretakeon the participantrole of sanctioned
"overhearers"(cf. Goffman 1981) or even that of what
Levinson(1988:196)in anotherconnectioncalls "targeted
overhearers"who are expectedto understandthatwhatis
said is in some respectsaddressedto them.Pita's aware-
ness of theseoverhearersis signaledby his occasionaluse,
increasingas he goes on, of firstpersonpluralsubjectcon-
structionsandby his referenceto alimal,a termthattrans-
lates as "family"but is also used to referto the congrega-
tion as a whole, andto ningkil,which refersto age-mates
and has the sense of "brothersand sisters."At the same
time as he signalsthis awarenesshowever,Pitarepeatedly
makes it clearthatGod is his primaryaddressee.All pra-
yers, no matterhow much they play to the gallery (and
manydo so even moreextensivelythanthis one),havethis
featureof a constantreiterationof the speaker'sintention
to addressGod. This reiterationis not merely rhetorical,
and prayersare not in any way productionsdesignedonly
for overhearers(cf. Heritage 1985:99), for as I argued
above it is only by virtueof being addressedto God that
whatis saidin prayerbecomestrueforthose who overhear
it. It is this needto keep God in the positionof officialad-
dresseethatshapesthe constantreturnin prayerto phrases
like "God,I am prayingto you" even when speakersare
very muchconcernedwith expressingtheirfeelings or in-
tentionsto thosewho overhearwhatthey arein the firstin-
stancesayingto God.
People moreandmoreresortto these dispute-resolving
prayers,for they work just as reliably as exchangeand
have a flexibilitythat exchange does not. It would have
taken weeks to arrangefor all the exchanges needed to
bring to a close a majorargumentsuch as the one that
Pita's prayerended in minutes.It should be noted thatit
was able to effect such speedy resolutionnot simply be-
cause it allowedPitato act as a truthfulspeakercapableof
verbally conveying his intention to end the dispute. Also
crucial to the production of this effect was the fact that his
audience was constituted of people capable of listening for
the truthof what he said, something they had not been able
to do in the past. This points out a final aspect of the way
Christian linguistic ideology has transformed the semiotic
capacities of Urapmin subjects. Just as God makes people
truthful speakers by virtue of His ability to hear them as
such, so too does He model for those who overhear the
qualities of a listening subject who can accomplish this
feat. He furthertrains people to seek the truth in speech by

demandingthatthey approachhis own verbalproductions
as completelyhonestand veridical.In these ways, truthful
speakers become matched with listeners who can hear
them, completinga circuitthat allows Urapminto voice
modernity,as they wouldsay, in the open.
In closing up these ethnographicconsiderations,I want
to dwell for a momenton the innovationof the participant
role of the overhearer.Even as I cameto expectto encoun-
ter it on a daily basis, the split addressof Urapminprayer
was alwaysstrikingto me in the field.Takingthe formof a
kind of sacralizedstage whisper,prayer'srelianceon the
mediationof a divinethirdpartyalwaysseemed awkward
to me, even if thatthirdpartywas whatallowedpeople to
speak the truthto each other.Laterit occurredto me that
part of the Urapmincomfort with this form of sociality
mightbe accountedfor by the fact that,for them,Christi-
anityitself seems largelyoverheard,a matterof listeningto
what God tells othersin the Bible. But even moreimpor-
tant,I have come to think,particularlyafterreadingsome
of Keane's (1997a, n.d.) recentwork on the way Protes-
tantismdownplaysthe objectsandwordsthatconnectpeo-
ple to one another,is the way the Urapminmaintaina
markedawarenessof andworryoverthe fact thatall com-
municationis mediated.In the past,it was objectsthatcar-
ried this mediatingload in exchangeor languagethatcar-
ried it somewhat poorly in speech. Now it is not only
objectsand speech thatmediatebetweenpeople, it is also
God. In all cases, though,the Urapminattendas much or
sometimesmoreto the fact of mediationas they do to the
messages these mediations convey. Western linguistic
modernity,by contrast,tendsto downplaythe fact of me-
diationin its valuationon transparency,clarity,accuracy
etc." This modemobliviousnessof mediationis a statethe
Urapminare not willing to enter,and it is this unwilling-
ness thatkeeps theirmodernitydecidedlylocal even as that
modernityteachesthemhow to speakthe truth.12
Conclusions
One could point in conclusionto a varietyof reasons
one mightwantto studylocal modernitiesthatareengaged
with capitalM modernityas I have done here.Given con-
straintsof space,I wantto focus only on one rationalehere.
This rationaleis foundedon the convictionthata studyof
local modernities that gives credit to the role played within
them by the cultural content of modernity may returnto the
comparative side of anthropology's project some of the
critical force it sometimes has difficulty conjuring up at
present. In these self-consciously multicultural, globaliz-
ing times, reports of cultural difference do little to disrupt
our own settled understandings.Canons of appreciationare
in place that at once respect these differences and in doing
so dull any critical edge they might have. Through such ap-
preciative containment, Western elites now politically
manage cultural differences but do not struggle with the
ROBBINS / MODERNITY, LANGUAGE, AND PRAYER 909
contentof those differencesas somethingthatmightchal-
lenge theirown outlooks.In doing so, they avoidprecisely
those kinds of culturalstruggleswith othernessthat local
modemsembrace.In studyinglocal modernities,then,we
mightregaina sense of the stakesforwhichthesestruggles
can be fought.
In this regard,consideragain the case of the Urapmin
confrontationwith linguisticmodernity.At the center of
this strugglefor the Urapminis an attemptto accommo-
date a traditionallistener-orientedsemioticto the speaker-
orientedone of modernity.In the case of prayerthis ac-
commodationhas been smootherthanit has been in other
genresof speech,buteven hererapprochement has had to
pass through agency listening,throughthe ear of
the of
God, in orderto take place. The logic of listeninghas left
its markon their modem linguisticideology by making
sincerespeech somethingthey can only overhear.This is
what makesUrapminlinguisticmodernitya local one and
what makesits adventamongthem partof a struggleand
not a rout.But if, followingEnglundandLeach(2000), we
addressonly the indigenizingaspectof this struggle,if we
ignoretheenormouseffortsUrapminpeoplearemakingto
talk to each otherin new ways, we equallyindigenizethe
Urapminfor ourselvesby placingthemin preformedcate-
goriesof anthropologicalunderstanding thatneed no revi-
sion to take theircase in. The approachof this articlehas
askedus to considerthe benefitsof forestallingthis move,
of focusingon the struggleitself andin so doingtakingon
a versionof thatstruggleas ourown by refusingto natural-
ize the Urapminas eithertraditionalor modem.
Were we to undertakethis exercise, we would quickly
have to confrontsome of the limits of our own linguistic
ideology. Foremostamongthese wouldbe the dominance
withinit of the intention/meaning/truth modelandthe sin-
cere speakerit posits.Thismodelhas putthe agencyof lis-
teningverymuchin the shade.Therehave to be surebeen
hintsof the powerof listeningin the literatureof sociolin-
guistics.They have arisenin particularin accountsof Pa-
cific andAfricanAmericanlinguisticideologies,in discus-
sions of religiouslanguageand of audienceroles, and in
sometimes implicit ways in considerationsof resistance
andappropriation (criticalcommentarieson the modelcan
be foundin the workscited on page 906 as well as in Du
Bois 1992; Duranti1993; Keane 1997a, 1997b;Rosaldo
1982; Woolard1998). But notwithstandingthe important
points made in these literatures,the critiqueof the inten-
tion/meaning/truthaspect of linguistic modernity has
lagged far behind that of its emphasison the referential
overthepragmaticfunctionof language.Moreto thepoint,
the criticalliteratureon this aspectof linguisticmodernity
has not yet coalescedinto an ethnographyof listeningthat
would rival in sophisticationthe ethnographyof speaking
thatplayedsuch a key role in moving sociolinguisticsbe-
yond the modemrn ideologicalemphasison reference.This
910 AMERICANANTHROPOLOGIST * VOL. 103, No. 4 * DECEMBER2001
articlehas triedto bringthe Urapminstrugglewithlinguis-
tic modernityto bearon the constructionof anethnography
of listening of this kind and, in doing so, to illustratethe
way in whichthe studyof local modemitiesas modemities
mightnot dissolve ourdisciplinein a welterof similarities,
an ever narrowingspace in which hell is other modems,
but wouldinsteadallow it to continueto developby facing
squarelythe kinds of differencesand struggleswith them
thatnow shapelife in manypartsof the world.
Notes
Acknowledgments. This article is based on research in
Papua New Guinea (carriedout between January 1991 and
February 1993) supportedby the Wenner-GrenFoundation,
the National Science Foundation,and the University of Vir-
ginia. I thank the anthropologydepartmentof the University
of Papua New Guinea, the Institute of Papua New Guinea
Studies, and the governmentof the SandaunProvincefor their
assistance duringthis period of research.Versions of this pa-
per have been delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Ameri-
can Anthropological Association (1999), the University of
Chicago, and the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences So-
ciales, Paris.I thankthose who offered commentsat these oc-
casions and others who have responded to the argumentin
manuscript.In particular,I thank David Akin, Roy D'An-
drade, Stephane Breton, Manuela Carneiro da Cunha,
JonathanFriedman,Susan Gal, MauriceGodelier,Don Gard-
ner, Judith Irvine, Dan Jorgensen, Nancy Munn, Marshall
Sahlins, Bambi Schieffelin, Michael Silverstein, Rupert
Stasch, Kit Woolard, and several anonymous reviewers for
American Anthropologistfor suggestions and questions that
led me to rework various parts of the article. Several recent
and not so recent conversationswith Miyako Inoue were in-
strumentalin helping me begin to approachsome of the basic
issues addressedhere. The responsibilityfor the final product
is, of course, mine alone.
1. Englund and Leach do not employ the terminology of
convergence and divergence, and in fact they claim to work
beyond notions of "tradition"and "modernization"(2000:
244), but their analytic practice nevertheless illustrateswell
the corollaryof the divergenceview I am consideringhere.
2. The Urapminare not uniqueamong PapuaNew Guinea
groups in terms of the importance language ideology has
played in their encounterwith modernity.Schieffelin (1996,
2000) and Kulick (1992) discuss comparablecases in similar
terms.
3. Terms in the Uraplanguageare given without an identi-
fier. Termsin neo-MelanesianTok Pisin, the most widespread
lingua francain PapuaNew Guineaand a languagethatis very
importantin UrapminChristiandiscourse,are notedas such.
4. I am not arguinghere thatthereare no domains in which
traditionalculturalideas are not still in play or in which the
Urapmin bring Christianand traditionalideas into relation
with one anotherbut, rather,that in their own understanding
the Urapminare aiming to adoptChristianityon its own terms
to as greatan extent as possible.
5. I emphasize that I am discussing spoken language here,
for the Urapminapproachthe new Christianphenomenonof
writtenlanguagedifferentlythanthey do speech. I discuss this
differencein more detail elsewhere(Robbins 1997; cf. Schief-
felin 2000).
6. In Tok Pisin the passagereads:"Bipo truTok i stap. Tok
i stap wantaimGod. Na tok em yet i God."
7. I should make it clear thatI do not mean to suggest that
the intention/meaning/truthmodel represents the whole of
modern linguistic ideology. It is, however, an importantas-
pect of that ideology and one that is elaboratedat many sites
(Philips2000) and subjectto a good deal of speakerawareness
(Silverstein 1981). My discussion in the previous two para-
graphsis in partmeantto documentthe extent of this elabora-
tion and awareness. The Urapmin have had to reckon with
these aspects of modernlinguistic ideology precisely because
they are so extensively and explicitly elaboratedin the Protes-
tantculturethe Urapminareconfronting.
8. As Irvine (1996:132) points out, those who study lan-
guage have recently replacedthe folk notion of "hearer"with
the analytic one of "addressee"and in doing so have suc-
ceeded in productively complicating their understandingof
the participantstructureof speech events. In relation to this
move, my reliance on the termlistenermight seem to be a re-
gression to borrowingfrom a folk model (albeit this time an
Urapminone). But my choice of this termis a consideredone.
The term addressee still assumes that the speaker's intention
defines if not the meaning of what is said, then at least the
audienceto which it is addressed(cf. Kochman1981). This is
not an assumptionthatthe Urapminmake in any simple sense.
Underlying these terminological issues is, as Silverstein
(1998:142-143) has recentlyargued,the point thatwe need to
attend to the possibility that some linguistic ideologies may
distributesemiotic agency in ways differentthanour own.
9. This of course accords perfectly with Rappaport's
(1979, 1999) theoryof the generalnatureof ritualaction. I am
not making a case for its generaltruthhere, however, but am
ratherarguingthatit is at least an Urapminmodel and as such
is one thatis relatedto theirideologies of personhoodand lan-
guage as well as of ritual. I consider Rappaport'stheory and
its relation to Urapmin and other Melanesiancases in detail
elsewhere(Robbins2001b).
10. Like many prayers,this one was deliveredin a mixture
of Tok Pisin and Urap.The translationwas made from a tape.
I have interpolateda few wordsin brackets.In a few cases that
I will discuss below, I have also put in bracketsthe original
UraptermsthatPita used.
11. Giddens's (1990) discussion of modernityas "disem-
bedding"providesa useful referencepoint here that startsnot
frommodernlinguistic ideology per se but fromthe broadcul-
turalchangesthatare linkedto it.
12. The argumentaboutoverhearingthatI have made here
bears comparison with Urban's (1988:397) argumentabout
overhearingas a way of gaining access to anotherperson's
"innerself' in the context of ritualwailing amongAmerindian
groupsin Brazil (see also Graham1995:124).
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