EN BANC Our new Civil Code amply provides for the responsibility of common carrier to its
G.R. No. L-10126 October 22, 1957 passengers and their goods. For purposes of reference, we are reproducing the pertinent
SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN and the minors NORMA, LUZVIMINDA,
ELENITA, OSCAR and ALFREDO BATACLAN, represented by their Natural guardian,
SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
MARIANO MEDINA, defendant-appellant.
Lope E. Adriano, Emmanuel Andamo and Jose R. Francisco for plaintiffs-appellants.
Fortunato Jose for defendant and appellant.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Shortly after midnight, on September 13, 1952 bus no. 30 of the Medina Transportation,
operated by its owner defendant Mariano Medina under a certificate of public
convenience, left the town of Amadeo, Cavite, on its way to Pasay City, driven by its
regular chauffeur, Conrado Saylon. There were about eighteen passengers, including
the driver and conductor. Among the passengers were Juan Bataclan, seated beside
and to the right of the driver, Felipe Lara, sated to the right of Bataclan, another
passenger apparently from the Visayan Islands whom the witnesses just called Visaya,
apparently not knowing his name, seated in the left side of the driver, and a woman
named Natalia Villanueva, seated just behind the four last mentioned. At about 2:00
o'clock that same morning, while the bus was running within the jurisdiction of Imus,
Cavite, one of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal
or ditch on the right side of the road and turned turtle. Some of the passengers managed
to leave the bus the best way they could, others had to be helped or pulled out, while the
three passengers seated beside the driver, named Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan and
the woman behind them named Natalia Villanueva, could not get out of the overturned
bus. Some of the passengers, after they had clambered up to the road, heard groans
and moans from inside the bus, particularly, shouts for help from Bataclan and Lara, who
said they could not get out of the bus. There is nothing in the evidence to show whether
or not the passengers already free from the wreck, including the driver and the
conductor, made any attempt to pull out or extricate and rescue the four passengers
trapped inside the vehicle, but calls or shouts for help were made to the houses in the
neighborhood. After half an hour, came about ten men, one of them carrying a lighted
torch made of bamboo with a wick on one end, evidently fueled with petroleum. These
men presumably approach the overturned bus, and almost immediately, a fierce fire
started, burning and all but consuming the bus, including the four passengers trapped
inside it. It would appear that as the bus overturned, gasoline began to leak and escape
from the gasoline tank on the side of the chassis, spreading over and permeating the
body of the bus and the ground under and around it, and that the lighted torch brought by
one of the men who answered the call for help set it on fire.
That same day, the charred bodies of the four deemed passengers inside the bus were
removed and duly identified that of Juan Bataclan. By reason of his death, his widow,
Salud Villanueva, in her name and in behalf of her five minor children, brought the
present suit to recover from Mariano Medina compensatory, moral, and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of P87,150. After trial, the Court of First
Instance of Cavite awarded P1,000 to the plaintiffs plus P600 as attorney's fee, plus
P100, the value of the merchandise being carried by Bataclan to Pasay City for sale and
which was lost in the fire. The plaintiffs and the defendants appealed the decision to the
Court of Appeals, but the latter endorsed the appeal to us because of the value involved
in the claim in the complaint.
codal provisions:
ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons
of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance
over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them,
according to all the circumstances of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further
expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extra
ordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers is further set forth in articles
1755 and 1756.
ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as
human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.
ART. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove
that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and
1755
ART. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to
passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the former's employees,
although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority
or in violation of the order of the common carriers.
This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of their employees.
ART. 1763. A common carrier responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger
on account of the willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers,
if the common carrier's employees through the exercise of the diligence of a
good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.
We agree with the trial court that the case involves a breach of contract of transportation
for hire, the Medina Transportation having undertaken to carry Bataclan safely to his
destination, Pasay City. We also agree with the trial court that there was negligence on
the part of the defendant, through his agent, the driver Saylon. There is evidence to
show that at the time of the blow out, the bus was speeding, as testified to by one of the
passengers, and as shown by the fact that according to the testimony of the witnesses,
including that of the defense, from the point where one of the front tires burst up to the
canal where the bus overturned after zig-zaging, there was a distance of about 150
meters. The chauffeur, after the blow-out, must have applied the brakes in order to stop
the bus, but because of the velocity at which the bus must have been running, its
momentum carried it over a distance of 150 meters before it fell into the canal and turned
turtle.
There is no question that under the circumstances, the defendant carrier is liable. The
only question is to what degree. The trial court was of the opinion that the proximate
cause of the death of Bataclan was not the overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that
burned the bus, including himself and his co-passengers who were unable to leave it;
that at the time the fire started, Bataclan, though he must have suffered physical injuries,
perhaps serious, was still alive, and so damages were awarded, not for his death, but for
the physical injuries suffered by him. We disagree. A satisfactory definition of proximate
cause is found in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of American jurisprudence, cited by
plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. It is as follows:
 . . . 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any were already old, and that as a matter of fact, he had been telling the driver to change
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result the said tires, but that the driver did not follow his instructions. If this be true, it goes to
would not have occurred.' And more comprehensively, 'the proximate legal prove that the driver had not been diligent and had not taken the necessary precautions
cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by to insure the safety of his passengers. Had he changed the tires, specially those in front,
setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of with new ones, as he had been instructed to do, probably, despite his speeding, as we
events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, have already stated, the blow out would not have occurred. All in all, there is reason to
the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and believe that the driver operated and drove his vehicle negligently, resulting in the death
probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that of four of his passengers, physical injuries to others, and the complete loss and
the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and destruction of their goods, and yet the criminal case against him, on motion of the fiscal
intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act and with his consent, was provisionally dismissed, because according to the fiscal, the
or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. witnesses on whose testimony he was banking to support the complaint, either failed or
It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus overturns, and pins down a passenger, appear or were reluctant to testify. But the record of the case before us shows the
merely causing him physical injuries, if through some event, unexpected and several witnesses, passengers, in that bus, willingly and unhesitatingly testified in court
extraordinary, the overturned bus is set on fire, say, by lightning, or if some highwaymen to the effect of the said driver was negligent. In the public interest the prosecution of said
after looting the vehicle sets it on fire, and the passenger is burned to death, one might erring driver should be pursued, this, not only as a matter of justice, but for the promotion
still contend that the proximate cause of his death was the fire and not the overturning of of the safety of passengers on public utility buses. Let a copy of this decision be
the vehicle. But in the present case under the circumstances obtaining in the same, we furnished the Department of Justice and the Provincial Fiscal of Cavite.
do not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus, this for In view of the foregoing, with the modification that the damages awarded by the trial
the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, court are increased from ONE THOUSAND (P1,000) PESOS TO SIX THOUSAND
the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the (P6,000) PESOS, and from SIX HUNDRED PESOS TO EIGHT HUNDRED (P800)
coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only PESOS, for the death of Bataclan and for the attorney's fees, respectively, the decision
by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and appealed is from hereby affirmed, with costs.
that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light
with them, and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were
not available; and what was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion,
approach the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. In Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur.
other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a natural
sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the
call for outside help. What is more, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to
the negligence of the carrier, through is driver and its conductor. According to the
witness, the driver and the conductor were on the road walking back and forth. They, or
at least, the driver should and must have known that in the position in which the
overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and
soaked the area in and around the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when
spilled, specially over a large area, can be smelt and directed even from a distance, and
yet neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to
warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus. Said negligence on the
part of the agents of the carrier come under the codal provisions above-reproduced,
particularly, Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763.
As regard the damages to which plaintiffs are entitled, considering the earning capacity
of the deceased, as well as the other elements entering into a damage award, we are
satisfied that the amount of SIX THOUSAND (P6,000) PESOS would constitute
satisfactory compensation, this to include compensatory, moral, and other damages. We
also believe that plaintiffs are entitled to attorney's fees, and assessing the legal services
rendered by plaintiffs' attorneys not only in the trial court, but also in the course of the
appeal, and not losing sight of the able briefs prepared by them, the attorney's fees may
well be fixed at EIGHT HUNDRED (P800) PESOS for the loss of merchandise carried by
the deceased in the bus, is adequate and will not be disturbed.
There is one phase of this case which disturbs if it does not shock us. According to the
evidence, one of the passengers who, because of the injuries suffered by her, was
hospitalized, and while in the hospital, she was visited by the defendant Mariano Medina,
and in the course of his visit, she overheard him speaking to one of his bus inspectors,
telling said inspector to have the tires of the bus changed immediately because they
 FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 92087 May 8, 1992
SOFIA FERNANDO, in her behalf and as the legal guardian of her minor children,
namely: ALBERTO & ROBERTO, all surnamed FERNANDO, ANITA GARCIA,
NICOLAS LIAGOSO, ROSALIA BERTULANO, in her behalf and as the legal
guardian of her minor children, namely: EDUARDO, ROLANDO, DANIEL, AND
JOCELYN, all surnamed BERTULANO, PRIMITIVA FAJARDO in her behalf and as
legal guardian of her minor children, namely: GILBERT, GLEN, JOCELYN AND
JOSELITO, all surnamed FAJARDO, and EMETERIA LIAGOSO, in her behalf and as
guardian ad litem, of her minor grandchildren, namely: NOEL, WILLIAM,
GENEVIEVE and GERRY, all surnamed LIAGOSO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND CITY OF DAVAO, respondents.
From the said decision, the petitioners appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court
(now Court of Appeals). On January 3, 1986, the appellate court issued a decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the facts fully established and in the liberal
interpretation of what the Constitution and the law intended to protect
the plight of the poor and the needy, the ignorant and the
indigent –– more entitled to social justice for having, in the
unforgettable words of Magsaysay, "less in life," We hereby reverse
and set aside the appealed judgment and render another one:
1. Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiffs Dionisio Fernando,
Sofia Fernando and her minor children the following sums of money:
a) Compensatory damages for his death
P30,000.00

MEDIALDEA, J.: b) Moral damages P20,000.00

This is a petition for review on certiorari praying that the amended decision of the Court 2. Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiffs David Garcia and
of Appeals dated January 11, 1990 in CA-G.R. No. C.V. 04846, entitled "Sofia Fernando, Anita Garcia the following sums of money:
etc., et al. v. The City of Davao," be reversed and that its original decision dated January a) Compensatory damages for his death
31, 1986 be reinstated subject to the modification sought by the petitioners in their P30,000.00
motion for partial reconsideration dated March 6, 1986.
b) Moral damages P20,000.00
The antecedent facts are briefly narrated by the trial court, as follows:
3. Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff Rosalia Bertulano
From the evidence presented we see the following facts: On (sic) and her minor children the following sums of money
November 7, 1975, Bibiano Morta, market master of the Agdao Public
a) Compensatory damages for his death
Market filed a requisition request with the Chief of Property of the City
P30,000.00
Treasurer's Office for the re-emptying of the septic tank in Agdao. An
invitation to bid was issued to Aurelio Bertulano, Lito Catarsa, b) Moral damages P20,000.00
Feliciano Bascon, Federico Bolo and Antonio Suñer, Jr. Bascon won 4. Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff Primitiva Fajardo and
the bid. On November 26, 1975 Bascon was notified and he signed her minor children the following sums of money:
the purchase order. However, before such date, specifically
on November 22, 1975, bidder Bertulano with four other companions a) Compensatory damages for his death
namely Joselito Garcia, William Liagoso, Alberto Fernando and Jose P30,000.00
Fajardo, Jr. were found dead inside the septic tank. The bodies were b) Moral damages P20,000.00
removed by a fireman. One body, that of Joselito Garcia, was taken
5. Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiffs Norma Liagoso,
out by his uncle, Danilo Garcia and taken to the Regional Hospital but
Nicolas Liagoso and Emeteria Liagoso and her minor grandchildren
he expired there. The City Engineer's office investigated the case and
the following sums of money:
learned that the five victims entered the septic tank without clearance
from it nor with the knowledge and consent of the market master. In a) Compensatory damages for his death
fact, the septic tank was found to be almost empty and the victims P30,000.00
were presumed to be the ones who did the re-emptying. Dr. Juan b) Moral damages P20,000.00
Abear of the City Health Office autopsied the bodies and in his
reports, put the cause of death of all five victims as "asphyxia" caused The death compensation is fixed at P30,000.00 in accordance with
by the diminution of oxygen supply in the body working below normal the rulings of the Supreme Court starting with People vs. De la
conditions. The lungs of the five victims burst, swelled in Fuente, Nos. L-63251-52, December 29, 1983, 126 SCRA 518
hemmorrhagic areas and this was due to their intake of toxic gas, reiterated in the recent case of People vs. Nepomuceno, No. L-
which, in this case, was sulfide gas produced from the waste matter 41412, May 27, 1985. Attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000.00 for
inside the septic tank. (p. 177, Records) the handling of the case for the 5 victims is also awarded.
On August 28, 1984, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which No pronouncement as to costs.
reads: SO ORDERED. (Rollo, pp. 33-34)
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this case is hereby DISMISSED Both parties filed their separate motions for reconsideration. On January 11, 1990, the
without pronouncement as to costs. Court of Appeals rendered an Amended Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
SO ORDERED. (Records, p. 181)
 WHEREFORE, finding merit in the motion for reconsideration of the
defendant-appellee Davao City, the same is hereby GRANTED. The
decision of this Court dated January 31, 1986 is reversed and set
aside and another one is hereby rendered dismissing the case. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 25)
Hence, this petition raising the following issues for resolution:
1. Is the respondent Davao City guilty of negligence in the case at
bar?
2. If so, is such negligence the immediate and proximate cause of
deaths of the victims hereof? (p. 72, Rollo)
Negligence has been defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests
of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances
justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury (Corliss v. Manila Railroad
Company, L-21291, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 674, 680). Under the law, a person who
by his omission causes damage to another, there being negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done (Article 2176, New Civil Code). As to what would constitute a negligent
act in a given situation, the case of Picart v. Smith (37 Phil. 809, 813) provides Us the
answer, to wit:
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a
particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing
the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which
an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation?
If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts
the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the
discreet pater familias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence
in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal
judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers
what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of
ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent
man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the
light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the
particular case. Abstract speculation cannot here be of much value
but this much can be profitably said: Reasonable men govern their
conduct by the circumstances which are before them or known to
them. They are not, and are not supposed to be, omniscient of the
future. Hence they can be expected to take care only when there is
something before them to suggest or warn of danger. Could a prudent
man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the
course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take
precautions to guard against that harm.Reasonable foresight of harm,
followed by the ignoring of the suggestion born of this provision, is
always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. Stated in
these terms, the proper criterion for determining the existence of
negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent
when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have
foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable
warrant his foregoing the conduct or guarding against its
consequences. (emphasis supplied)
To be entitled to damages for an injury resulting from the negligence of another, a
claimant must establish the relation between the omission and the damage. He must
prove under Article 2179 of the New Civil Code that the defendant's negligence was the
immediate and proximate cause of his injury. Proximate cause has been defined as that
cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred (Vda.
de Bataclan, et al. v. Medina, 102 Phil. 181, 186). Proof of such relation of cause and
effect is not an arduous one if the claimant did not in any way contribute to the
negligence of the defendant. However, where the resulting injury was the product of the
negligence of both parties, there exists a difficulty to discern which acts shall be
considered the proximate cause of the accident. InTaylor v. Manila Electric Railroad and
Light Co. (16 Phil. 8, 29-30), this Court set a guideline for a judicious assessment of the
situation:
Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the
injured party shall be considered immediate causes of the
accident. The test is simple. Distinction must be made between the
accident and the injury, between the event itself, without which there
could have been no accident, and those acts of the victim not
entering into it, independent of it, but contributing to his own proper
hurt. For instance, the cause of the accident under review was the
displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to replace it. This
produced the event giving occasion for damages — that is, the
sinking of the track and the sliding of the iron rails. To this event, the
act of the plaintiff in walking by the side of the car did not contribute,
although it was an element of the damage which came to himself.
Had the crosspiece been out of place wholly or partly through his act
or omission of duty, that would have been one of the determining
causes of the event or accident, for which he would have been
responsible. Where he contributes to the principal occurrence, as one
of its determining factors, he can not recover. Where, in conjunction
with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may
recover the amount that the defendant responsible for the event
should pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent
for his own imprudence. (emphasis Ours)
Applying all these established doctrines in the case at bar and after a careful scrutiny of
the records, We find no compelling reason to grant the petition. We affirm.
Petitioners fault the city government of Davao for failing to clean a septic tank for the
period of 19 years resulting in an accumulation of hydrogen sulfide gas which killed the
laborers. They contend that such failure was compounded by the fact that there was no
warning sign of the existing danger and no efforts exerted by the public respondent to
neutralize or render harmless the effects of the toxic gas. They submit that the public
respondent's gross negligence was the proximate cause of the fatal incident.
We do not subscribe to this view. While it may be true that the public respondent has
been remiss in its duty to re-empty the septic tank annually, such negligence was not a
continuing one. Upon learning from the report of the market master about the need to
clean the septic tank of the public toilet in Agdao Public Market, the public respondent
immediately responded by issuing invitations to bid for such service. Thereafter, it
awarded the bid to the lowest bidder, Mr. Feliciano Bascon (TSN, May 24, 1983, pp. 22-
25). The public respondent, therefore, lost no time in taking up remedial measures to
meet the situation. It is likewise an undisputed fact that despite the public respondent's
failure to re-empty the septic tank since 1956, people in the market have been using the
public toilet for their personal necessities but have remained unscathed. The testimonies
of Messrs. Danilo Garcia and David Secoja (plaintiffs'-petitioners' witnesses) on this point
are relevant, to wit:
Atty. Mojica, counsel for defendant Davao City:
xxx xxx xxx
The place where you live is right along the Agdao creek, is that
correct?
DANILO GARCIA:
A Yes, sir.
Q And to be able to go to the market place, where you claim you
have a stall,, you have to pass on the septic tank?
A Yes, sir.
Q Day in and day out, you pass on top of the septic tank?
A Yes, sir.
Q Is it not a fact that everybody living along the creek passes on top
of this septic tank as they go out from the place and return to their
place of residence, is that correct?
And this septic tank, rather the whole of the septic tank, is covered by
lead . . .?
A Yes, sir. there is cover.
Q And there were three (3) of these lead covering the septic tank?
A Yes, sir.
Q And this has always been closed?
A Yes, sir. (TSN, November 26, 1979, pp. 21-23, emphasis supplied)
ATTY. JOVER, counsel for the plaintiffs:
Q You said you are residing at Davao City, is it not?
DAVID SEJOYA:
A Yes, sir.
Q How long have you been a resident of Agdao?
A Since 1953.
Q Where specifically in Agdao are you residing?
A At the Public Market.
Q Which part of the Agdao Public Market is your house located?
A Inside the market in front of the fish section.
Q Do you know where the Agdao septic tank is located?
A Yes, sir.
Q How far is that septic tank located from your house?
A Around thirty (30) meters.
Q Have you ever had a chance to use that septic tank (public toilet)?
A Yes, sir.
Q How many times, if you could remember?
A Many times, maybe more than 1,000 times.
Q Prior to November 22, 1975, have you ever used that septic tank
(public toilet)?
A Yes, sir.
Q How many times have you gone to that septic tank (public toilet)
prior to that date, November 22, 1975?
A Almost 1,000 times. (TSN, February 9, 1983, pp. 1-2)
The absence of any accident was due to the public respondent's compliance
with the sanitary and plumbing specifications in constructing the toilet and the
septic tank (TSN, November 4, 1983, p. 51). Hence, the toxic gas from the
waste matter could not have leaked out because the septic tank was air-tight
(TSN, ibid, p. 49). The only indication that the septic tank in the case at bar was
full and needed emptying was when water came out from it (TSN, September
13, 1983, p. 41). Yet, even when the septic tank was full, there was no report of
any casualty of gas poisoning despite the presence of people living near it or
passing on top of it or using the public toilet for their personal necessities.
Petitioners made a lot of fuss over the lack of any ventilation pipe in the toilet to
emphasize the negligence of the city government and presented witnesses to attest on
this lack. However, this strategy backfired on their faces. Their witnesses were not expert
witnesses. On the other hand, Engineer Demetrio Alindada of the city government
testified and demonstrated by drawings how the safety requirements like emission of
gases in the construction of both toilet and septic tank have been complied with. He
stated that the ventilation pipe need not be constructed outside the building as it could
also be embodied in the hollow blocks as is usually done in residential buildings (TSN,
November 4, 1983, pp. 50-51). The petitioners submitted no competent evidence to
corroborate their oral testimonies or rebut the testimony given by Engr. Alindada.
We also do not agree with the petitioner's submission that warning signs of noxious gas
should have been put up in the toilet in addition to the signs of "MEN" and "WOMEN"
already in place in that area. Toilets and septic tanks are not nuisances per se as
defined in Article 694 of the New Civil Code which would necessitate warning signs for
the protection of the public. While the construction of these public facilities demands
utmost compliance with safety and sanitary requirements, the putting up of warning signs
is not one of those requirements. The testimony of Engr. Alindada on this matter is
elucidative:
ATTY. ALBAY:
Q Mr. Witness, you mentioned the several aspects of the approval of
the building permit which include the plans of an architect, senitary
engineer and electrical plans. All of these still pass your approval as
building official, is that correct?
DEMETRIO ALINDADA:
A Yes.
Q So there is the sanitary plan submitted to and will not be approved
by you unless the same is in conformance with the provisions of the
building code or sanitary requirements?
A Yes, for private building constructions.
Q How about public buildings?
A For public buildings, they are exempted for payment of building
permits but still they have to have a building permit.
Q But just the same, including the sanitary plans, it require your
approval?
A Yes, it requires also.
Q Therefore, under the National Building Code, you are empowered
not to approve sanitary plans if they are not in conformity with the
sanitary requirements?
A Yes.
Q Now, in private or public buildings, do you see any warning signs in
the vicinity of septic tanks?
A There is no warning sign.
 Q In residential buildings do you see any warning sign?
A There is none.
ATTY. AMPIG:
We submit that the matter is irrelevant and immaterial, Your Honor.
ATTY. ALBAY:
But that is in consonance with their cross-examination, your Honor.
COURT:
Anyway it is already answered.
ATTY. ALBAY:
Q These warning signs, are these required under the preparation of
the plans?
A It is not required.
Q I will just reiterate, Mr. Witness. In residences, for example like the
residence of Atty. Ampig or the residence of the honorable Judge,
would you say that the same principle of the septic tank, from the
water closet to the vault, is being followed?
A Yes.
ATTY. ALBAY:
That will be all, Your Honor. (TSN, December 6, 1983, pp. 62-63)
In view of this factual milieu, it would appear that an accident such as toxic gas leakage
from the septic tank is unlikely to happen unless one removes its covers. The accident in
the case at bar occurred because the victims on their own and without authority from the
public respondent opened the septic tank. Considering the nature of the task of emptying
a septic tank especially one which has not been cleaned for years, an ordinarily prudent
person should undoubtedly be aware of the attendant risks. The victims are no
exception; more so with Mr. Bertulano, an old hand in this kind of service, who is
presumed to know the hazards of the job. His failure, therefore, and that of his men to
take precautionary measures for their safety was the proximate cause of the accident.
In Culion Ice, Fish and Elect. Co., v. Phil. Motors Corporation (55 Phil. 129, 133), We
held that when a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring
professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and
skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to do (emphasis
Ours). The fatal accident in this case would not have happened but for the victims'
negligence. Thus, the appellate court was correct to observe that:
. . . Could the victims have died if they did not open the septic tank
which they were not in the first place authorized to open? Who
between the passive object (septic tank) and the active subject (the
victims herein) who, having no authority therefore, arrogated unto
themselves, the task of opening the septic tank which caused their
own deaths should be responsible for such deaths. How could the
septic tank which has been in existence since the 1950's be the
proximate cause of an accident that occurred only on November 22,
1975? The stubborn fact remains that since 1956 up to occurrence of
the accident in 1975 no injury nor death was caused by the septic
tank. The only reasonable conclusion that could be drawn from the
above is that the victims' death was caused by their own negligence
in opening the septic tank. . . . (Rollo, p. 23)
Petitioners further contend that the failure of the market master to supervise the area
where the septic tank is located is a reflection of the negligence of the public respondent.
We do not think so. The market master knew that work on the septic tank was still
forthcoming. It must be remembered that the bidding had just been conducted. Although
the winning bidder was already known, the award to him was still to be made by the
Committee on Awards. Upon the other hand, the accident which befell the victims who
are not in any way connected with the winning bidder happened before the award could
be given. Considering that the case was yet no award to commence work on the septic
tank, the duty of the market master or his security guards to supervise the work could not
have started (TSN, September 13, 1983, p. 40). Also, the victims could not have been
seen working in the area because the septic tank was hidden by a garbage storage
which is more or less ten (10) meters away from the comfort room itself (TSN, ibid, pp.
38-39). The surreptitious way in which the victims did their job without clearance from the
market master or any of the security guards goes against their good faith. Even their
relatives or family members did not know of their plan to clean the septic tank.
Finally, petitioners' insistence on the applicability of Article 24 of the New Civil Code
cannot be sustained. Said law states:
Art. 24. In all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the
parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence,
ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age or other
handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection.
We approve of the appellate court's ruling that "(w)hile one of the victims was
invited to bid for said project, he did not win the bid, therefore, there is a total
absence of contractual relations between the victims and the City Government
of Davao City that could give rise to any contractual obligation, much less, any
liability on the part of Davao City." (Rollo, p. 24) The accident was indeed tragic
and We empathize with the petitioners. However, the herein circumstances
lead Us to no other conclusion than that the proximate and immediate cause of
the death of the victims was due to their own negligence. Consequently, the
petitioners cannot demand damages from the public respondent.
ACCORDINGLY, the amended decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 11, 1990
is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
 THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 72964 January 7, 1988
FILOMENO URBANO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court which
affirmed the decision of the then Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan City finding petitioner
Filomeno Urban guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide.
The records disclose the following facts of the case.
At about 8:00 o'clock in the morning of October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano
went to his ricefield at Barangay Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan located at about 100
meters from the tobacco seedbed of Marcelo Javier. He found the place where he stored
his palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal nearby which had
overflowed. Urbano went to the elevated portion of the canal to see what happened and
there he saw Marcelo Javier and Emilio Erfe cutting grass. He asked them who was
responsible for the opening of the irrigation canal and Javier admitted that he was the
one. Urbano then got angry and demanded that Javier pay for his soaked palay. A
quarrel between them ensued. Urbano unsheathed his bolo (about 2 feet long, including
the handle, by 2 inches wide) and hacked Javier hitting him on the right palm of his hand,
which was used in parrying the bolo hack. Javier who was then unarmed ran away from
Urbano but was overtaken by Urbano who hacked him again hitting Javier on the left leg
with the back portion of said bolo, causing a swelling on said leg. When Urbano tried to
hack and inflict further injury, his daughter embraced and prevented him from hacking
Javier.
Immediately thereafter, Antonio Erfe, Emilio Erfe, and Felipe Erfe brought Javier to his
house about 50 meters away from where the incident happened. Emilio then went to the
house of Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven but not finding him there, Emilio looked for
barrio councilman Felipe Solis instead. Upon the advice of Solis, the Erfes together with
Javier went to the police station of San Fabian to report the incident. As suggested by
Corporal Torio, Javier was brought to a physician. The group went to Dr. Guillermo
Padilla, rural health physician of San Fabian, who did not attend to Javier but instead
suggested that they go to Dr. Mario Meneses because Padilla had no available
medicine.
After Javier was treated by Dr. Meneses, he and his companions returned to Dr.
Guillermo Padilla who conducted a medico-legal examination. Dr. Padilla issued a
medico-legal certificate (Exhibit "C" dated September 28, 1981) which reads:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that I have examined the wound of Marcelo Javier,
20 years of age, married, residing at Barangay Anonang, San Fabian,
Pangasinan on October 23, 1980 and found the following:
1 -Incised wound 2 inches in length at the upper portion of the lesser
palmar prominence, right.
As to my observation the incapacitation is from (7-9) days period.
This wound was presented to me only for medico-legal examination,
as it was already treated by the other doctor. (p. 88, Original Records)
Upon the intercession of Councilman Solis, Urbano and Javier agreed to settle their
differences. Urbano promised to pay P700.00 for the medical expenses of Javier. Hence,
on October 27, 1980, the two accompanied by Solis appeared before the San Fabian
Police to formalize their amicable settlement. Patrolman Torio recorded the event in the
police blotter (Exhibit A), to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Entry Nr 599/27 Oct '80/103OH/ Re entry Nr 592 on page 257 both
parties appeared before this Station accompanied by brgy.
councilman Felipe Solis and settled their case amicably, for they are
neighbors and close relatives to each other. Marcelo Javier accepted
and granted forgiveness to Filomeno Urbano who shoulder (sic) all
the expenses in his medical treatment, and promising to him and to
this Office that this will never be repeated anymore and not to harbour
any grudge against each other. (p. 87, Original Records.)
Urbano advanced P400.00 to Javier at the police station. On November 3, 1980, the
additional P300.00 was given to Javier at Urbano's house in the presence of barangay
captain Soliven.
At about 1:30 a.m. on November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to the Nazareth General
Hospital in a very serious condition. When admitted to the hospital, Javier had lockjaw
and was having convulsions. Dr. Edmundo Exconde who personally attended to Javier
found that the latter's serious condition was caused by tetanus toxin. He noticed the
presence of a healing wound in Javier's palm which could have been infected by tetanus.
On November 15, 1980 at exactly 4:18 p.m., Javier died in the hospital. The medical
findings of Dr. Exconde are as follows:
Date Diagnosis
11-14-80 ADMITTED due to trismus
adm. at DX TETANUS
1:30 AM Still having frequent muscle spasm. With diffi-
#35, 421 culty opening his mouth. Restless at times. Febrile
11-15-80 Referred. Novaldin 1 amp. inj. IM. Sudden cessation of
respiration and HR after muscular spasm. 02 inhalation administered.
Ambo bag resuscitation and cardiac massage done but to no avail.
Pronounced dead by Dra. Cabugao at 4:18 P.M. PMC done and
cadaver brought home by relatives. (p. 100, Original Records)
In an information dated April 10, 1981, Filomeno Urbano was charged with the crime of
homicide before the then Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan City, Third Judicial District.
Upon arraignment, Urbano pleaded "not guilty." After trial, the trial court found Urbano
guilty as charged. He was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of from
TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision mayor, as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) years, FOUR
(4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as maximum, together with the
accessories of the law, to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Marcelo Javier, in the amount
of P12,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
costs. He was ordered confined at the New Bilibid Prison, in Muntinlupa, Rizal upon
finality of the decision, in view of the nature of his penalty.
The then Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the conviction of Urbano on appeal but
raised the award of indemnity to the heirs of the deceased to P30,000.00 with costs
against the appellant.
The appellant filed a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial. The motion for new trial
was based on an affidavit of Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven (Annex "A") which
states:
 That in 1980, I was the barrio captain of Barrio Anonang, San Fabian,
Pangasinan, and up to the present having been re-elected to such
position in the last barangay elections on May 17, 1982;
That sometime in the first week of November, 1980, there was a
typhoon that swept Pangasinan and other places of Central Luzon
including San Fabian, a town of said province;
That during the typhoon, the sluice or control gates of the Bued
irrigation dam which irrigates the ricefields of San Fabian were closed
and/or controlled so much so that water and its flow to the canals and
ditches were regulated and reduced;
That due to the locking of the sluice or control gates of the dam
leading to the canals and ditches which will bring water to the
ricefields, the water in said canals and ditches became shallow which
was suitable for catching mudfishes;
That after the storm, I conducted a personal survey in the area
affected, with my secretary Perfecto Jaravata;
That on November 5, 1980, while I was conducting survey, I saw the
late Marcelo Javier catching fish in the shallow irrigation canals with
some companions;
That few days there after,or on November l5, l980, I came to know
that said Marcelo Javier died of tetanus. (p. 33, Rollo)
The motion was denied. Hence, this petition.
In a resolution dated July 16, 1986, we gave due course to the petition.
The case involves the application of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code which provides
that "Criminal liability shall be incurred: (1) By any person committing a felony (delito)
although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended ..." Pursuant to
this provision "an accused is criminally responsible for acts committed by him in violation
of law and for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom." (People v.
Cardenas, 56 SCRA 631).
The record is clear that Marcelo Javier was hacked by the petitioner who used a bolo as
a result of which Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm; that on
November 14, 1981 which was the 22nd day after the incident, Javier was rushed to the
hospital in a very serious condition and that on the following day, November 15, 1981, he
died from tetanus.
Under these circumstances, the lower courts ruled that Javier's death was the natural
and logical consequence of Urbano's unlawful act. Hence, he was declared responsible
for Javier's death. Thus, the appellate court said:
The claim of appellant that there was an efficient cause which
supervened from the time the deceased was wounded to the time of
his death, which covers a period of 23 days does not deserve serious
consideration. True, that the deceased did not die right away from his
wound, but the cause of his death was due to said wound which was
inflicted by the appellant. Said wound which was in the process of
healing got infected with tetanus which ultimately caused his death.
Dr. Edmundo Exconde of the Nazareth General Hospital testified that
the victim suffered lockjaw because of the infection of the wound with
tetanus. And there is no other way by which he could be infected with
tetanus except through the wound in his palm (tsn., p. 78, Oct. 5,
1981). Consequently, the proximate cause of the victim's death was
the wound which got infected with tetanus. And the settled rule in this
jurisdiction is that an accused is liable for all the consequences of his
unlawful act. (Article 4, par. 1, R.P.C. People v. Red, CA 43 O.G.
5072; People v. Cornel 78 Phil. 418).
Appellant's allegation that the proximate cause of the victim's death
was due to his own negligence in going back to work without his
wound being properly healed, and lately, that he went to catch fish in
dirty irrigation canals in the first week of November, 1980, is an
afterthought, and a desperate attempt by appellant to wiggle out of
the predicament he found himself in. If the wound had not yet healed,
it is impossible to conceive that the deceased would be reckless
enough to work with a disabled hand. (pp. 20-21, Rollo)
The petitioner reiterates his position that the proximate cause of the death of Marcelo
Javier was due to his own negligence, that Dr. Mario Meneses found no tetanus in the
injury, and that Javier got infected with tetanus when after two weeks he returned to his
farm and tended his tobacco plants with his bare hands exposing the wound to harmful
elements like tetanus germs.
The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by Urbano was
infected with tetanus at the time of the infliction of the wound. The evidence merely
confirms that the wound, which was already healing at the time Javier suffered the
symptoms of the fatal ailment, somehow got infected with tetanus However, as to when
the wound was infected is not clear from the record.
In Vda. de Bataclan, et al. v. Medina (102 Phil. 1181), we adopted the following definition
of proximate cause:
xxx xxx xxx
... A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38,
pages 695-696 of American Jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-
appellants in their brief. It is as follows:
... "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred."And more
comprehensively, "the proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in
motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each
having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the
final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural
and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should,
as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable
ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to
some person might probably result therefrom." (at pp. 185-186)
The issue, therefore, hinges on whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause
from the time Javier was wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano from
any liability for Javier's death.
We look into the nature of tetanus-
The incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time between injury and the
appearance of unmistakable symptoms, ranges from 2 to 56 days.
However, over 80 percent of patients become symptomatic within 14
days. A short incubation period indicates severe disease, and when
symptoms occur within 2 or 3 days of injury the mortality rate
approaches 100 percent.
 Non-specific premonitory symptoms such as restlessness, irritability,
and headache are encountered occasionally, but the commonest
presenting complaints are pain and stiffness in the jaw, abdomen, or
back and difficulty swallowing. As the progresses, stiffness gives way
to rigidity, and patients often complain of difficulty opening their
mouths. In fact, trismus in the commonest manifestation of tetanus
and is responsible for the familiar descriptive name of lockjaw. As
more muscles are involved, rigidity becomes generalized, and
sustained contractions called risus sardonicus. The intensity and
sequence of muscle involvement is quite variable. In a small
proportion of patients, only local signs and symptoms develop in the
region of the injury. In the vast majority, however, most muscles are
involved to some degree, and the signs and symptoms encountered
depend upon the major muscle groups affected.
Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of the first
symptom, an interval referred to as the onset time. As in the case of
the incubation period, a short onset time is associated with a poor
prognosis. Spasms are caused by sudden intensification of afferent
stimuli arising in the periphery, which increases rigidity and causes
simultaneous and excessive contraction of muscles and their
antagonists. Spasms may be both painful and dangerous. As the
disease progresses, minimal or inapparent stimuli produce more
intense and longer lasting spasms with increasing frequency.
Respiration may be impaired by laryngospasm or tonic contraction of
respiratory muscles which prevent adequate ventilation. Hypoxia may
then lead to irreversible central nervous system damage and death.
Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of at least 14
days and an onset time of more than 6 days. Trismus is usually
present, but dysphagia is absent and generalized spasms are brief
and mild. Moderately severe tetanus has a somewhat shorter
incubation period and onset time; trismus is marked, dysphagia and
generalized rigidity are present, but ventilation remains adequate
even during spasms. The criteria for severe tetanus include a short
incubation time, and an onset time of 72 hrs., or less, severe trismus,
dysphagia and rigidity and frequent prolonged, generalized
convulsive spasms. (Harrison's Principle of Internal Medicine, 1983
Edition, pp. 1004-1005; Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's body
depends on the incubation period of the disease.
In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when he
parried the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. This incident took place on October
23, 1980. After 22 days, or on November 14, 1980, he suffered the symptoms of tetanus,
like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The following day, November 15, 1980, he died.
If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by
tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have been
infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on
the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the
wound. Therefore, the onset time should have been more than six days. Javier, however,
died on the second day from the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the
time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed
him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with
tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's
death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22
days before he died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical
consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. (People v. Cardenas,
supra) And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused
caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The
medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound
by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was
wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the
crime. (People v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038).
Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and
its subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have
been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do.
As we ruled in Manila Electric Co. v. Remoquillo, et al. (99 Phil. 118).
"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if such
remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise
to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there
intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a
distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even
though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or
occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the
independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And
if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into
operation the instances which result in injury because of the prior
defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate
cause." (45 C.J. pp. 931-932). (at p. 125)
It strains the judicial mind to allow a clear aggressor to go scot free of criminal liability. At
the very least, the records show he is guilty of inflicting slight physical injuries. However,
the petitioner's criminal liability in this respect was wiped out by the victim's own act.
After the hacking incident, Urbano and Javier used the facilities of barangay mediators to
effect a compromise agreement where Javier forgave Urbano while Urbano defrayed the
medical expenses of Javier. This settlement of minor offenses is allowed under the
express provisions of Presidential Decree G.R. No. 1508, Section 2(3). (See also People
v. Caruncho, 127 SCRA 16).
We must stress, however, that our discussion of proximate cause and remote cause is
limited to the criminal aspects of this rather unusual case. It does not necessarily follow
that the petitioner is also free of civil liability. The well-settled doctrine is that a person,
while not criminally liable, may still be civilly liable. Thus, in the recent case ofPeople v.
Rogelio Ligon y Tria, et al. (G.R. No. 74041, July 29, 1987), we said:
xxx xxx xxx
... While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be
established beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of
evidence is required in a civil action for damages. (Article 29, Civil
Code). The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the
accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which
the civil liability might arise did not exist. (Padilla v. Court of Appeals,
129 SCRA 559).
The reason for the provisions of article 29 of the Civil Code, which
provides that the acquittal of the accused on the ground that his guilt
has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt does not necessarily
 exempt him from civil liability for the same act or omission, has been
explained by the Code Commission as follows:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal
case also releases him from civil liability is one of the most
serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given use
to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the
acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the
court as to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed
is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from
the criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil
liability cannot be demanded.
This is one of those causes where confused thinking leads
to unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such
reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between
criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to determine the
logical result of the distinction. The two liabilities are
separate and distinct from each other. One affects the social
order and the other, private rights. One is for the
punishment or correction of the offender while the other is
for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party.
The two responsibilities are so different from each other that
article 1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus:
"There may be a compromise upon the civil action arising
from a crime; but the public action for the imposition of the
legal penalty shall not thereby be extinguished." It is just
and proper that, for the purposes of the imprisonment of or
fine upon the accused, the offense should be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnity
the complaining party, why should the offense also be
proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or
violation of every private right to be proved only by a
preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved
person any less private because the wrongful act is also
punishable by the criminal law?
"For these reasons, the Commission recommends the
adoption of the reform under discussion. It will correct a
serious defect in our law. It will close up an inexhaustible
source of injustice-a cause for disillusionment on the part of
the innumerable persons injured or wronged."
The respondent court increased the P12,000.00 indemnification imposed by the trial
court to P30,000.00. However, since the indemnification was based solely on the finding
of guilt beyond reasonable doubt in the homicide case, the civil liability of the petitioner
was not thoroughly examined. This aspect of the case calls for fuller development if the
heirs of the victim are so minded.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned decision of the
then Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of homicide. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and,Cortes, JJ., concur.
 FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-65295 March 10, 1987
PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. and ARMANDO U. CARBONEL, petitioners,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and LEONARDO DIONISIO, respondents.
FELICIANO, J:
In the early morning of 15 November 1975 — at about 1:30 a.m. — private respondent
Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home — he lived in 1214-B Zamora Street, Bangkal,
Makati — from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss, the general manager of a
marketing corporation. During the cocktails phase of the evening, Dionisio had taken "a
shot or two" of liquor. Dionisio was driving his Volkswagen car and had just crossed the
intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets at Bangkal, Makati, not far
from his home, and was proceeding down General Lacuna Street, when his car
headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed. He switched his headlights on "bright" and
thereupon he saw a Ford dump truck looming some 2-1/2 meters away from his car. The
dump truck, owned by and registered in the name of petitioner Phoenix Construction Inc.
("Phoenix"), was parked on the right hand side of General Lacuna Street (i.e., on the
right hand side of a person facing in the same direction toward which Dionisio's car was
proceeding), facing the oncoming traffic. The dump truck was parked askew (not parallel
to the street curb) in such a manner as to stick out onto the street, partly blocking the
way of oncoming traffic. There were no lights nor any so-called "early warning" reflector
devices set anywhere near the dump truck, front or rear. The dump truck had earlier that
evening been driven home by petitioner Armando U. Carbonel, its regular driver, with the
permission of his employer Phoenix, in view of work scheduled to be carried out early the
following morning, Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car
to the left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. As a result of the
collision, Dionisio suffered some physical injuries including some permanent facial scars,
a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentures.
Dionisio commenced an action for damages in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga
basically claiming that the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent
manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump truck entrusted to him by his employer
Phoenix. Phoenix and Carbonel, on the other hand, countered that the proximate cause
of Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident,
while under the influence of liquor, without his headlights on and without a curfew pass.
Phoenix also sought to establish that it had exercised due rare in the selection and
supervision of the dump truck driver.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Dionisio and against Phoenix and Carbonel
and ordered the latter:
(1) To pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P 15,000.00 for
hospital bills and the replacement of the lost dentures of plaintiff;
(2) To pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P 1,50,000.-00 as
loss of expected income for plaintiff brought about the accident in
controversy and which is the result of the negligence of the
defendants;
(3) To pay the plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P 10,000. as
moral damages for the unexpected and sudden withdrawal of plaintiff
from his lifetime career as a marketing man; mental anguish,
wounded feeling, serious anxiety, social humiliation, besmirched
reputation, feeling of economic insecurity, and the untold sorrows and
frustration in life experienced by plaintiff and his family since the
accident in controversy up to the present time;
(4) To pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P 10,000.00 as
damages for the wanton disregard of defendants to settle amicably
this case with the plaintiff before the filing of this case in court for a
smaller amount.
(5) To pay the plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P 4,500.00 due
as and for attorney's fees; and
(6) The cost of suit. (Emphasis supplied)
Phoenix and Carbonel appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court. That court in CA-
G.R. No. 65476 affirmed the decision of the trial court but modified the award of
damages to the following extent:
1. The award of P15,000.00 as compensatory damages was reduced
to P6,460.71, the latter being the only amount that the appellate court
found the plaintiff to have proved as actually sustained by him;
2. The award of P150,000.00 as loss of expected income was
reduced to P100,000.00,basically because Dionisio had voluntarily
resigned his job such that, in the opinion of the appellate court, his
loss of income "was not solely attributable to the accident in
question;" and
3. The award of P100,000.00 as moral damages was held by the
appellate court as excessive and unconscionable and hence reduced
to P50,000.00.
The award of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P4,500.00 as
attorney's fees and costs remained untouched.
This decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is now before us on a petition for
review.
Both the trial court and the appellate court had made fairly explicit findings of fact relating
to the manner in which the dump truck was parked along General Lacuna Street on the
basis of which both courts drew the inference that there was negligence on the part of
Carbonel, the dump truck driver, and that this negligence was the proximate cause of the
accident and Dionisio's injuries. We note, however, that both courts failed to pass upon
the defense raised by Carbonel and Phoenix that the true legal and proximate cause of
the accident was not the way in which the dump truck had been parked but rather the
reckless way in which Dionisio had driven his car that night when he smashed into the
dump truck. The Intermediate Appellate Court in its questioned decision casually
conceded that Dionisio was "in some way, negligent" but apparently failed to see the
relevance of Dionisio's negligence and made no further mention of it. We have examined
the record both before the trial court and the Intermediate Appellate Court and we find
that both parties had placed into the record sufficient evidence on the basis of which the
trial court and the appellate court could have and should have made findings of fact
relating to the alleged reckless manner in which Dionisio drove his car that night. The
petitioners Phoenix and Carbonel contend that if there was negligence in the manner in
which the dump truck was parked, that negligence was merely a "passive and static
condition" and that private respondent Dionisio's recklessness constituted an intervening,
efficient cause determinative of the accident and the injuries he sustained. The need to
administer substantial justice as between the parties in this case, without having to
remand it back to the trial court after eleven years, compels us to address directly the
contention put forward by the petitioners and to examine for ourselves the record
pertaining to Dionisio's alleged negligence which must bear upon the liability, or extent of
liability, of Phoenix and Carbonel.
There are four factual issues that need to be looked into: (a) whether or not private
respondent Dionisio had a curfew pass valid and effective for that eventful night; (b)
whether Dionisio was driving fast or speeding just before the collision with the dump
truck; (c) whether Dionisio had purposely turned off his car's headlights before contact
with the dump truck or whether those headlights accidentally malfunctioned moments
before the collision; and (d) whether Dionisio was intoxicated at the time of the accident.
As to the first issue relating to the curfew pass, it is clear that no curfew pass was found
on the person of Dionisio immediately after the accident nor was any found in his car.
Phoenix's evidence here consisted of the testimony of Patrolman Cuyno who had taken
Dionisio, unconscious, to the Makati Medical Center for emergency treatment
immediately after the accident. At the Makati Medical Center, a nurse took off Dionisio's
clothes and examined them along with the contents of pockets together with Patrolman
Cuyno. 1 Private respondent Dionisio was not able to produce any curfew pass during
the trial. Instead, he offered the explanation that his family may have misplaced his
curfew pass. He also offered a certification (dated two years after the accident) issued by
one Major Benjamin N. Libarnes of the Zone Integrated Police Intelligence Unit of Camp
Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga, which was said to have authority to issue curfew
passes for Pampanga and Metro Manila. This certification was to the effect that private
respondent Dionisio had a valid curfew pass. This certification did not, however, specify
any pass serial number or date or period of effectivity of the supposed curfew pass. We
find that private respondent Dionisio was unable to prove possession of a valid curfew
pass during the night of the accident and that the preponderance of evidence shows that
he did not have such a pass during that night. The relevance of possession or non-
possession of a curfew pass that night lies in the light it tends to shed on the other
related issues: whether Dionisio was speeding home and whether he had indeed
purposely put out his headlights before the accident, in order to avoid detection and
possibly arrest by the police in the nearby police station for travelling after the onset of
curfew without a valid curfew pass.
On the second issue — whether or not Dionisio was speeding home that night — both
the trial court and the appellate court were completely silent.
The defendants in the trial court introduced the testimony of Patrolman Cuyno who was
at the scene of the accident almost immediately after it occurred, the police station where
he was based being barely 200 meters away. Patrolman Cuyno testified that people who
had gathered at the scene of the accident told him that Dionisio's car was "moving fast"
and did not have its headlights on. 2 Dionisio, on the other hand, claimed that he was
travelling at a moderate speed at 30 kilometers per hour and had just crossed the
intersection of General Santos and General Lacuna Streets and had started to
accelerate when his headlights failed just before the collision took place. 3
Private respondent Dionisio asserts that Patrolman Cuyno's testimony was hearsay and
did not fag within any of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule since the facts he
testified to were not acquired by him through official information and had not been given
by the informants pursuant to any duty to do so. Private respondent's objection fails to
take account of the fact that the testimony of Patrolman Cuyno is admissible not under
the official records exception to the hearsay rule 4 but rather as part of the res
gestae. 5 Testimonial evidence under this exception to the hearsay rule consists of
excited utterances made on the occasion of an occurrence or event sufficiently startling
in nature so as to render inoperative the normal reflective thought processes of the
observer and hence made as a spontaneous reaction to the occurrence or event, and
not the result of reflective thought. 6
We think that an automobile speeding down a street and suddenly smashing into a
stationary object in the dead of night is a sufficiently startling event as to evoke
spontaneous, rather than reflective, reactions from observers who happened to be
around at that time. The testimony of Patrolman Cuyno was therefore admissible as part
of theres gestae and should have been considered by the trial court. Clearly, substantial
weight should have been ascribed to such testimony, even though it did not, as it could
not, have purported to describe quantitatively the precise velocity at winch Dionisio was
travelling just before impact with the Phoenix dump truck.
A third related issue is whether Dionisio purposely turned off his headlights, or whether
his headlights accidentally malfunctioned, just moments before the accident. The
Intermediate Appellate Court expressly found that the headlights of Dionisio's car went
off as he crossed the intersection but was non-committal as to why they did so. It is the
petitioners' contention that Dionisio purposely shut off his headlights even before he
reached the intersection so as not to be detected by the police in the police precinct
which he (being a resident in the area) knew was not far away from the intersection. We
believe that the petitioners' theory is a more credible explanation than that offered by
private respondent Dionisio — i.e., that he had his headlights on but that, at the crucial
moment, these had in some mysterious if convenient way malfunctioned and gone off,
although he succeeded in switching his lights on again at "bright" split seconds before
contact with the dump truck.
A fourth and final issue relates to whether Dionisio was intoxicated at the time of the
accident. The evidence here consisted of the testimony of Patrolman Cuyno to the effect
that private respondent Dionisio smelled of liquor at the time he was taken from his
smashed car and brought to the Makati Medical Center in an unconscious
condition. 7 This testimony has to be taken in conjunction with the admission of Dionisio
that he had taken "a shot or two" of liquor before dinner with his boss that night. We do
not believe that this evidence is sufficient to show that Dionisio was so heavily under the
influence of liquor as to constitute his driving a motor vehicle per se an act of reckless
imprudence. 8 There simply is not enough evidence to show how much liquor he had in
fact taken and the effects of that upon his physical faculties or upon his judgment or
mental alertness. We are also aware that "one shot or two" of hard liquor may affect
different people differently.
The conclusion we draw from the factual circumstances outlined above is that private
respondent Dionisio was negligent the night of the accident. He was hurrying home that
night and driving faster than he should have been. Worse, he extinguished his headlights
at or near the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets and thus did
not see the dump truck that was parked askew and sticking out onto the road lane.
Nonetheless, we agree with the Court of First Instance and the Intermediate Appellate
Court that the legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was
the wrongful — or negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked in other words,
the negligence of petitioner Carbonel. That there was a reasonable relationship between
petitioner Carbonel's negligence on the one hand and the accident and respondent's
injuries on the other hand, is quite clear. Put in a slightly different manner, the collision of
Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the
truck driver's negligence.
The petitioners, however, urge that the truck driver's negligence was merely a "passive
and static condition" and that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was an "efficient
intervening cause and that consequently Dionisio's negligence must be regarded as the
legal and proximate cause of the accident rather than the earlier negligence of Carbonel.
We note that the petitioners' arguments are drawn from a reading of some of the older
cases in various jurisdictions in the United States but we are unable to persuade
ourselves that these arguments have any validity for our jurisdiction. We note, firstly, that
even in the United States, the distinctions between "cause" and "condition" which the
'petitioners would have us adopt have already been "almost entirely discredited."
Professors and Keeton make this quite clear:
 Cause and condition. Many courts have sought to distinguish
between the active "cause" of the harm and the existing "conditions"
upon which that cause operated. If the defendant has created only a
passive static condition which made the damage possible, the
defendant is said not to be liable. But so far as the fact of causation is
concerned, in the sense of necessary antecedents which have played
an important part in producing the result it is quite impossible to
distinguish between active forces and passive situations, particularly
since, as is invariably the case, the latter are the result of other active
forces which have gone before. The defendant who spills gasoline
about the premises creates a "condition," but the act may be culpable
because of the danger of fire. When a spark ignites the gasoline, the
condition has done quite as much to bring about the fire as the spark;
and since that is the very risk which the defendant has created, the
defendant will not escape responsibility. Even the lapse of a
considerable time during which the "condition" remains static will not
necessarily affect liability; one who digs a trench in the highway may
still be liable to another who fans into it a month afterward. "Cause"
and "condition" still find occasional mention in the decisions; but the
distinction is now almost entirely discredited. So far as it has any
validity at all, it must refer to the type of case where the forces set in
operation by the defendant have come to rest in a position of
apparent safety, and some new force intervenes. But even in such
cases, it is not the distinction between "cause" and "condition" which
is important but the nature of the risk and the character of the
intervening cause. 9
We believe, secondly, that the truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and
static condition" was rather an indispensable and efficient cause. The collision between
the dump truck and the private respondent's car would in an probability not have
occurred had the dump truck not been parked askew without any warning lights or
reflector devices. The improper parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk
of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna Street and for having so created this
risk, the truck driver must be held responsible. In our view, Dionisio's negligence,
although later in point of time than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to
the accident, was not an efficient intervening or independent cause. What the Petitioners
describe as an "intervening cause" was no more than a foreseeable consequent manner
which the truck driver had parked the dump truck. In other words, the petitioner truck
driver owed a duty to private respondent Dionisio and others similarly situated not to
impose upon them the very risk the truck driver had created. Dionisio's negligence was
not of an independent and overpowering nature as to cut, as it were, the chain of
causation in fact between the improper parking of the dump truck and the accident, nor
to sever the juris vinculum of liability. It is helpful to quote once more from Professor and
Keeton:
Foreseeable Intervening Causes. If the intervening cause is one
which in ordinary human experience is reasonably to be anticipated
or one which the defendant has reason to anticipate under the
particular circumstances, the defendant may be negligence among
other reasons, because of failure to guard against it; or the defendant
may be negligent only for that reason. Thus one who sets a fire may
be required to foresee that an ordinary, usual and customary wind
arising later wig spread it beyond the defendant's own property, and
therefore to take precautions to prevent that event. The person who
leaves the combustible or explosive material exposed in a public
place may foresee the risk of fire from some independent
source. ... In all of these cases there is an intervening cause
combining with the defendant's conduct to produce the result and in
each case the defendant's negligence consists in failure to protect the
plaintiff against that very risk.
Obviously the defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact
that the risk or a substantial and important part of the risk, to which
the defendant has subjected the plaintiff has indeed come to pass.
Foreseeable intervening forces are within the scope original risk, and
hence of the defendant's negligence. The courts are quite generally
agreed that intervening causes which fall fairly in this category will not
supersede the defendant's responsibility.
Thus it has been held that a defendant will be required to anticipate
the usual weather of the vicinity, including all ordinary forces of nature
such as usual wind or rain, or snow or frost or fog or even
lightning; that one who leaves an obstruction on the road or a railroad
track should foresee that a vehicle or a train will run into it; ...
The risk created by the defendant may include the intervention of the
foreseeable negligence of others. ... [The standard of reasonable
conduct may require the defendant to protect the plaintiff against 'that
occasional negligence which is one of the ordinary incidents of
human life, and therefore to be anticipated.' Thus, a defendant who
blocks the sidewalk and forces the plaintiff to walk in a street where
the plaintiff will be exposed to the risks of heavy traffic becomes liable
when the plaintiff is run down by a car, even though the car is
negligently driven; and one who parks an automobile on the highway
without lights at night is not relieved of responsibility when another
negligently drives into it. --- 10
We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the
"immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due
care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such
damages are subject to mitigation by the courts (Article 2179, Civil Code of the
Philippines).
Petitioners also ask us to apply what they refer to as the "last clear chance" doctrine. The
theory here of petitioners is that while the petitioner truck driver was negligent, private
respondent Dionisio had the "last clear chance" of avoiding the accident and hence his
injuries, and that Dionisio having failed to take that "last clear chance" must bear his own
injuries alone. The last clear chance doctrine of the common law was imported into our
jurisdiction by Picart vs. Smith 11 but it is a matter for debate whether, or to what extent,
it has found its way into the Civil Code of the Philippines. The historical function of that
doctrine in the common law was to mitigate the harshness of another common law
doctrine or rule that of contributory negligence. 12 The common law rule of contributory
negligence prevented any recovery at all by a plaintiff who was also negligent, even if the
plaintiff's negligence was relatively minor as compared with the wrongful act or omission
of the defendant. 13 The common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to
grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that the defendant had
the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so. 14 Accordingly, it is
difficult to see what role, if any, the common law last clear chance doctrine has to play in
a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute
bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in Article 2179 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines. 15
Is there perhaps a general concept of "last clear chance" that may be extracted from its
common law matrix and utilized as a general rule in negligence cases in a civil law
jurisdiction like ours? We do not believe so. Under Article 2179, the task of a court, in 7 TSN, 16 March 1978, pp. 18-19.
technical terms, is to determine whose negligence — the plaintiff's or the defendant's — 8 Compare Wright v. Manila Railroad Co., 28 Phil. 116 (1914), where it was held,
among others, that "[m]ere intoxication is not negligence, nor does the mere fact of
was the legal or proximate cause of the injury. That task is not simply or even primarily intoxication establish a want of ordinary care. It is but a circumstance to be
an exercise in chronology or physics, as the petitioners seem to imply by the use of considered with the other evidence tending to prove negligence. " Id, at 125.
terms like "last" or "intervening" or "immediate." The relative location in the continuum of 9 The Law on Torts [5th ed. 1984], pp. 277-278; emphasis supplied; footnotes
time of the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts or omissions, is only one of the omitted.
10 Ibid., pp. 303-305; emphasis supplied; footnotes omitted.
relevant factors that may be taken into account. Of more fundamental importance are the 11 37 Phil. 809 (1918).
nature of the negligent act or omission of each party and the character and gravity of the 12 Prosser & Keeton, supra note 9, p. 464 and note 11.
risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the community. The petitioners urge 13 See Rakes v. Manila Railroad Co., 7 Phil. 359, at 370 (1907).
that the truck driver (and therefore his employer) should be absolved from responsibility 14 MacIntyre The Rationale of Last Clear Chance, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 1225 (1940) and
for his own prior negligence because the unfortunate plaintiff failed to act with that James Last Clear Chance: A Transitional Doctrine, 47 Yale L.J. 704 (1938).
15 See Rakes, 7 Phil. at 374.
increased diligence which had become necessary to avoid the peril precisely created by 16 Poblete v. Fabros, 93 SCRA 202 (1979); Umali v. Bacani, 69 SCRA 263 (1976);
the truck driver's own wrongful act or omission. To accept this proposition is to come too and Saludares v. Martinez, 29 SCRA 745 (1969).
close to wiping out the fundamental principle of law that a man must respond for the 17 See Rakes v. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359, 370375 (1907), where
forseeable consequences of his own negligent act or omission. Our law on quasi-delicts the Court allocated the damages on a 50-50 basis between plaintiff and defendant
applying the notion of comparative negligence or proportional damages. Cf. Taylor v.
seeks to reduce the risks and burdens of living in society and to allocate them among the
Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co., 16 Phil. 8 at 29 (1910).
members of society. To accept the petitioners' pro-position must tend to weaken the very 18 Lanuzo v. Ping, 100 SCRA 205 (1980).
bonds of society.
Petitioner Carbonel's proven negligence creates a presumption of negligence on the part
of his employer Phoenix16 in supervising its employees properly and adequately. The
respondent appellate court in effect found, correctly in our opinion, that Phoenix was not
able to overcome this presumption of negligence. The circumstance that Phoenix had
allowed its truck driver to bring the dump truck to his home whenever there was work to
be done early the following morning, when coupled with the failure to show any effort on
the part of Phoenix to supervise the manner in which the dump truck is parked when
away from company premises, is an affirmative showing of culpa in vigilando on the part
of Phoenix.
Turning to the award of damages and taking into account the comparative negligence of
private respondent Dionisio on one hand and petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix upon the
other hand, 17 we believe that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by
allocating most of the damages on a 20-80 ratio. Thus, 20% of the damages awarded by
the respondent appellate court, except the award of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages
and P4,500.00 as attorney's fees and costs, shall be borne by private respondent
Dionisio; only the balance of 80% needs to be paid by petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix
who shall be solidarity liable therefor to the former. The award of exemplary damages
and attorney's fees and costs shall be borne exclusively by the petitioners. Phoenix is of
course entitled to reimbursement from Carbonel. 18 We see no sufficient reason for
disturbing the reduced award of damages made by the respondent appellate court.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent appellate court is modified by reducing
the aggregate amount of compensatory damages, loss of expected income and moral
damages private respondent Dionisio is entitled to by 20% of such amount. Costs
against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., is on leave.
Footnotes
1 TSN, 16 March 1978, pp. 25-26.
2 TSN, 16 March 1978, p. 13.
3 TSN, 23 February 1977, pp. 13-14; TSN, 7 October 1977, pp. 24-25.
4 Rule 130, Section 38,
5 Rules of Court. Rule 130, Section 36, Rules of Court.
6 People v. Berame, 72 SCRA 184 [1976]; McCormick on Evidence, Section 297
[3rd ed., 1984].
 SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 105410 July 25, 1994
PILIPINAS BANK, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND FLORENCIO REYES, respondents.
Gella Reyes Danguilan & Associates for petitioner.
Santos V. Pampolina, Jr. for private respondent.
PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision of the respondent court 1 in CA-G.R. CV No.
29524 dated May 13, 1992 which ordered petitioner to pay the private respondent the
sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as attorney's fees and cost of suit.
2
The facts as found both by the trial court and the respondent court are:
As payments for the purchased shoe materials and rubber shoes,
Florencio Reyes issued postdated checks to Winner Industrial
Corporation for P20,927.00 and Vicente Tui, for P11,419.50, with due
dates on October 10 and 12, 1979, respectively.
To cover the face value of the checks, plaintiff, on October 10, 1979,
requested PCIB Money Shop's manager Mike Potenciano to effect
the withdrawal of P32,000.00 from his savings account therein and
have it deposited with his current account with Pilipinas Bank (then
Filman Bank), Biñan Branch. Roberto Santos was requested to make
the deposit.
In depositing in the name of FLORENCIO REYES, he inquired from
the teller the current account number of Florencio Reyes to complete
the deposit slip he was accomplishing. He was informed that it was
"815" and so this was the same current account number he placed on
the deposit slip below the depositor's name FLORENCIO REYES.
Nothing that the account number coincided with the name Florencio,
Efren Alagasi, then Current Account Bookkeeper of Pilipinas Bank,
thought it was for Florencio Amador who owned the listed account
number. He, thus, posted the deposted in the latter's account not
noticing that the depositor's surname in the deposit slip was REYES.
On October 11, 1979, the October 10, check in favor of Winner
Industrial Corporation was presented for payment. Since the ledger of
Florencio Reyes indicated that his account had only a balance of
P4,078.43, it was dishonored and the payee was advised to try it for
next clearing.
On October 15, 1979, the October 10, 1979 check was redeposited
but was again dishonored. Likewise, the October 12, 1979 check in
favor of Vicente Tui when presented for payment on that same date
met the same fate but was advised to try the next clearing. Two days
after the October 10 check was again dishonored, the payee returned
the same to Florencio Reyes and demanded a cash payment of its
face value which he did if only to save his name. The October 12,
1979 check was redeposited on October 18, 1979, but again
dishonored for the reason that the check was drawn against
insufficient fund.
Furious over the incident, he immediately proceeded to the bank and
urged an immediate verification of his account.
Upon verification, the bank noticed the error. The P32,000.00 deposit
posted in the account of Florencio Amador was immediately
transferred to the account of Reyes upon being cleared by Florencio
Amador that he did not effect a deposit in the amount of P32,000.00.
The transfer having been effected, the bank then honored the
October 12, 1979, check (Exh. "C").
On the basis of these facts, the trial court ordered petitioner to pay to the private
respondent: (1) P200,000.00 as compensatory damages; (2) P100,000.00 as moral
damages; (3) P25,000.00 as attorney's fees, and (4) the costs of suit. On appeal to the
respondent court, the judgment was modified as aforestated.
In this petition for review, petitioner argues:
I. Respondent Court of Appeals erred on a matter of law, in not
applying the first sentence of Article 2179, New Civil Code, in view of
its own finding that respondent Reyes' own representative committed
the mistake in writing down the correct account number;
II. Respondent Court of Appeals erred, on a matter of law, in holding
that respondent Reyes has the right to recover moral damages and in
awarding the amount of P50,000.00, when there is no legal nor
factual basis for it;
III. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred, on a matter of law, in
holding petitioner liable for attorney's fees in the amount of
P20,000.00, when there is no legal nor factual basis for it.
We find no merit in the petition.
First. For Article 2179 3 of the Civil Code to apply, it must be established that private
respondent's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury. The
concept of proximate cause is well defined in our corpus of jurisprudence as "any cause
which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the result complained of and without which would not have occurred and from
which it ought to have been forseen or reasonably anticipated by a person of ordinary
case that the injury complained of or some similar injury, would result therefrom as a
natural and probable consequence." 4 In the case at bench, the proximate cause of the
injury is the negligence of petitioner's employee in erroneously posting the cash deposit
of private respondent in the name of another depositor who had a similar first name. As
held by the trial court:
xxx xxx xxx
Applying the test, the bank employee is, on that basis, deemed to
have failed to exercise the degree of care required in the performance
of his duties. As earlier stated, the bank employee posted the cash
deposit in the account of Florencio Amador from his assumption that
the name Florencio appearing on the ledger without, however, going
through the full name, is the same Florencio stated in the deposit slip.
He should have continuously gone beyond mere assumption, which
was proven to be erroneous, and proceeded with clear certainty,
considering the amount involved and the repercussions it would
create on the totality of the person notable of which is the credit
standing of the person involved should a mistake happen. The checks
issued by the plaintiff in the course of his business were dishonored
by the bank because the ledger of Florencio Reyes indicated a
balance insufficient to cover the face value of checks.
Second. In light of this negligence, the liability of petitioner for moral damages cannot be
impugned. So we held inBank of the Philippine Islands vs. IAC, et al. 5
The bank is not expected to be infallible but, as correctly observed by
respondent Appellate Court, in this instance, it must bear the blame
for not discovering the mistake of its teller despite the established
procedure requiring the papers and bank books to pass through a
battery of bank personnel whose duty it is to check and countercheck
them for possible errors. Apparently, the officials and employees
tasked to do that did not perform their duties with due care, as may
be gathered from the testimony of the bank's lone witness, Antonio
Enciso, who casually declared that "the approving officer does not
have to see the account numbers and all those things. Those are
very petty things for the approving manager to look into" (p. 78,
Record on Appeal). Unfortunately, it was a "petty thing," like the
incorrect account number that the bank teller wrote on the initial
deposit slip for the newly-opened joint current account of the Canlas
spouses, that sparked this half-a-million-peso damage suit against
the bank.
While the bank's negligence may not have been attended with malice
and bad faith, nevertheless, it caused serious anxiety,
embarrassment and humiliation to the private respondents for which
they are entitled to recover reasonable moral damages (American
Express International, Inc. IAC, 167 SCRA 209). The award of
reasonable attorney's fees is proper for the private respondent's were
compelled to litigate to protect their interest (Art. 2208, Civil Code).
However, the absence of malice and bad faith renders the award of
exemplary damages improper (Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp.
vs. Court of Appeals, 176 SCRA 778).
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied there being no reversible error in the
Decision of the respondent court. Cost against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

#Footnotes
1 Second Division composed of Justices Jose A.R. Melo (Chairman), Segundino
Chua (ponente) and Artemon D. Luna (member).
2 RTC of Biñan, Laguna, Br. XXV.
3 It states in part: "When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. . ."
4 People vs. Desalina, 57 OG 8694.
5 G.R. No. 69162, February 21, 1992, 206 SCRA 408, 413.
 THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 150304 June 15, 2005
QUEZON CITY GOVERNMENT and Engineer RAMIR J. TIAMZON, Petitioners,
vs.
FULGENCIO DACARA*, Respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The review of cases under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to errors of law.
Unless there is a showing that the findings of the lower court are totally devoid of support
or are glaringly erroneous, this Court will not analyze or weigh evidence all over again.
Under the circumstance, the factual findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals
affirming those of the trial courts will be conclusive upon the Supreme Court.
Furthermore, well-entrenched is the rule that points of law, theories, issues and
arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal or certiorari. Finally, this Court reiterates the principle that moral damages are
designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered, not to impose a penalty
on the wrongdoer. Hence, absent any definite finding as to what they consist of, the
alleged moral damages suffered would become a penalty rather than a compensation for
actual injury suffered.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
February 21, 2001 Decision2and the October 9, 2001 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-GR CV No. 29392. The challenged Decision disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated June 29, 1990 in Civil Case
No. Q-88-233 should beAFFIRMED, with costs against the appellants."4
The assailed Resolution denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The CA summarized the facts in this manner:
"Sometime on February 28, 1988 at about 1:00 A.M., Fulgencio Dacara, Jr., son of
Fulgencio P. Dacara, Sr. and owner of '87 Toyota Corolla 4-door Sedan with Plate No.
877 (sic), while driving the said vehicle, rammed into a pile of earth/street diggings found
at Matahimik St., Quezon City, which was then being repaired by the Quezon City
government. As a result, Dacarra (sic), Jr. allegedly sustained bodily injuries and the
vehicle suffered extensive damage for it turned turtle when it hit the pile of earth.
"Indemnification was sought from the city government (Record, p. 22), which however,
yielded negative results. Consequently, Fulgencio P. Dacara (hereinafter referred to as
FULGENCIO), for and in behalf of his minor son, Jr., filed a Complaint (Record, p. 1) for
damages against the Quezon City and Engr. Ramir Tiamzon, as defendants, before the
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 101, Quezon City,
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-88-233. FULGENCIO prayed that the amount of not less
than P20,000.00 actual or compensatory damages, P150,000.00 moral
damages, P30,000.00 exemplary damages, and P20,000.00 attorney's fees and costs of
the suit be awarded to him.
"In an Answer with Affirmative and/or Special Defenses (Record, p. 11), defendants
admitted the occurrence of the incident but alleged that the subject diggings was
provided with a moun[d] of soil and barricaded with reflectorized traffic paint with sticks
placed before or after it which was visible during the incident on February 28, 1988 at
1:00 A.M. In short, defendants claimed that they exercised due care by providing the
area of the diggings all necessary measures to avoid accident. Hence, the reason why
Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. fell into the diggings was precisely because of the latter's
negligence and failure to exercise due care."5
After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 101, Quezon City,
rendered its Decision6 dated June 29, 1990. The evidence proffered by the complainant
(herein respondent) was found to be sufficient proof of the negligence of herein
petitioners. Under Article 2189 of the Civil Code,7 the latter were held liable as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises above considered, based on the quantum of
evidence presented by the plaintiff which tilts in their favor elucidating the
negligent acts of the city government together with its employees when
considered in the light of Article 2189, judgment is hereby rendered ordering
the defendants to indemnify the plaintiff the sum of twenty thousand pesos as
actual/compensatory damages, P10,000.00 as moral damages,P5,000.00 as
exemplary damages, P10,000.00 as attorney's fees and other costs of suit."8
In their appeal to the CA, petitioners maintained that they had observed due diligence
and care in installing preventive warning devices, and that it was in fact the plaintiff who
had failed to exercise prudence by driving too fast to avoid the diggings. Moreover, the
lower court allegedly erred in using Article 2189 of the Civil Code, which supposedly
applied only to liability for the death or injuries suffered by a person, not for damage to
property.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA agreed with the RTC's finding that petitioners' negligence was the proximate
cause of the damage suffered by respondent. 9 Noting the failure of petitioners to present
evidence to support their contention that precautionary measures had indeed been
observed, it ruled thus:
"x x x. Sadly, the evidence indicates that [petitioners] failed to show that they placed
sufficient and adequate precautionary signs at Matahimik Street to minimize or prevent
the dangers to life and limb under the circumstances. Contrary to the testimony of the
witnesses for the [petitioners], namely Engr. Ramir Tiamzon, Ernesto Landrito and
Eduardo Castillo, that there were signs, gasera which was buried so that its light could
not be blown off by the wind and barricade, none was ever presented to stress and prove
the sufficiency and adequacy of said contention."10
Further upholding the trial court's finding of negligence on the part of herein petitioners,
the CA gave this opinion:
"x x x. As observed by the trial court, the negligence of [petitioners] was clear based on
the investigation report of Pfc. William P. Villafranca stating to the effect 'that the subject
vehicle rammed into a pile of earth from a deep excavation thereat without any warning
devi[c]e whatsoever and as a consequence thereof, Dacara, Jr. lost control of his driven
car and finally turned-turtle causing substantial damage to the same.' As a defense
against liability on the basis of quasi-delict, one must have exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family which [petitioners] failed to establish in the instant case."11
Whether Article 2189 is applicable to cases in which there has been no death or physical
injury, the CA ruled in the affirmative:
"x x x. More importantly, we find it illogical to limit the liability to death or personal injury
only as argued by appellants in the case at bar applying the foregoing provisions. For,
injury is an act that damages, harms or hurts and mean in common as the act or result of
inflicting on a person or thing something that causes loss, pain, distress, or impairment.
Injury is the most comprehensive, applying to an act or result involving an impairment or
destruction of right, health, freedom, soundness, or loss of something of value."12
Hence, this Petition.13
Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues for our consideration:
"1. The Honorable Court of Appeals decided a question of law/substance
contrary to applicable law and jurisprudence when it affirmed the award of
moral damage suit (sic) the amount of P10,000.00.
2. The Honorable Court of Appeals decided a question of law/substance
contrary to applicable law and jurisprudence when it affirmed the award of
exemplary damage sin (sic) the amount of P5,000.00 and attorney's fee in the
[a]mount of P10,000.00.
3. The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred and/;or (sic) had acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack and/or excess of jurisdiction when
it refused to hold that respondent's son in the person of Fulgencio Dacara, Jr.
was negligent at the time of incident."14
Because the issues regarding the liability of petitioners for moral and exemplary
damages presuppose that their negligence caused the vehicular accident, we first
resolve the question of negligence or the proximate cause of the incident.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Negligence
Maintaining that they were not negligent, petitioners insist that they placed all the
necessary precautionary signs to alert the public of a roadside construction. They argue
that the driver (Fulgencio Dacara Jr.) of respondent's car was overspeeding, and that his
own negligence was therefore the sole cause of the incident.
Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, such that the result
would not have occurred otherwise.15 Proximate cause is determined from the facts of
each case, upon a combined consideration of logic, common sense, policy and
precedent.16
What really caused the subject vehicle to turn turtle is a factual issue that this Court
cannot pass upon, absent any whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment by the lower
courts or an ample showing that they lacked any basis for their conclusions. 17 The
unanimity of the CA and the trial court in their factual ascertainment that petitioners'
negligence was the proximate cause of the accident bars us from supplanting their
findings and substituting these with our own. The function of this Court is limited to the
review of the appellate court's alleged errors of law. It is not required to weigh all over
again the factual evidence already considered in the proceedings below.18Petitioners
have not shown that they are entitled to an exception to this rule. 19 They have not
sufficiently demonstrated any special circumstances to justify a factual review.
That the negligence of petitioners was the proximate cause of the accident was aptly
discussed in the lower court's finding, which we quote:
"Facts obtaining in this case are crystal clear that the accident of February 28, 1988
which caused almost the life and limb of Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. when his car turned turtle
was the existence of a pile of earth from a digging done relative to the base failure at
Matahimik Street nary a lighting device or a reflectorized barricade or sign perhaps which
could have served as an adequate warning to motorist especially during the thick of the
night where darkness is pervasive.
"Contrary to the testimony of the witnesses for the defense that there were signs, gasera
which was buried so that its light could not be blown off by the wind and
barricade, none was ever presented to stress the point that sufficient and adequate
precautionary signs were placed at Matahimik Street. If indeed signs were placed
thereat, how then could it be explained that according to the report even of the
policeman which for clarity is quoted again,none was found at the scene of the accident.
xxxxxxxxx
"Negligence of a person whether natural or juridical over a particular set of events is
transfixed by the attending circumstances so that the greater the danger known or
reasonably anticipated, the greater is the degree of care required to be observed.
xxxxxxxxx
"The provisions of Article 2189 of the New Civil Code capsulizes the responsibility of the
city government relative to the maintenance of roads and bridges since it exercises the
control and supervision over the same. Failure of the defendant to comply with the
statutory provision found in the subject-article is tantamount to negligence per se which
renders the City government liable. Harsh application of the law ensues as a result
thereof but the state assumed the responsibility for the maintenance and repair of the
roads and bridges and neither exception nor exculpation from liability would deem just
and equitable."20 (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners belatedly point out that Fulgencio Jr. was driving at the speed of 60
kilometers per hour (kph) when he met the accident. This speed was allegedly well
above the maximum limit of 30 kph allowed on "city streets with light traffic, when not
designated 'through streets,'" as provided under the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code (Republic Act 4136). Thus, petitioners assert that Fulgencio Jr., having violated a
traffic regulation, should be presumed negligent pursuant to Article 2185 21 of the Civil
Code.22
These matters were, however, not raised by petitioners at any time during the trial. It is
evident from the records that they brought up for the first time the matter of violation of
RA 4136 in their Motion for Reconsideration23 of the CA Decision dated February 21,
2001. It is too late in the day for them to raise this new issue. It is well-settled that points
of law, theories or arguments not brought out in the original proceedings cannot be
considered on review or appeal.24 To consider their belatedly raised arguments at this
stage of the proceedings would trample on the basic principles of fair play, justice, and
due process.25
Indeed, both the trial and the appellate courts' findings, which are amply substantiated by
the evidence on record, clearly point to petitioners' negligence as the proximate cause of
the damages suffered by respondent's car. No adequate reason has been given to
overturn this factual conclusion.
Second Issue:
Moral Damages
Petitioners argue that moral damages are recoverable only in the instances specified in
Article 221926 of the Civil Code. Although the instant case is an action for quasi-delict,
petitioners contend that moral damages are not recoverable, because no evidence of
physical injury were presented before the trial court.27
To award moral damages, a court must be satisfied with proof of the following requisites:
(1) an injury -- whether physical, mental, or psychological -- clearly sustained by the
claimant; (2) a culpable act or omission factually established; (3) a wrongful act or
omission of the defendant as the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant;
and (4) the award of damages predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219.28
Article 2219(2) specifically allows moral damages to be recovered for quasi-
delicts, provided that the act or omission caused physical injuries. There can be no
recovery of moral damages unless the quasi-delict resulted in physical injury. 29 This rule
was enunciated in Malonzo v. Galang30 as follows:
"x x x. Besides, Article 2219 specifically mentions 'quasi-delicts causing physical injuries,'
as an instance when moral damages may be allowed, thereby implying that all other
quasi-delicts not resulting in physical injuries are excluded, excepting of course, the
special torts referred to in Art. 309 (par. 9, Art. 2219) and in Arts. 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30,
32, 34 and 35 on the chapter on human relations (par. 10, Art. 2219)."
In the present case, the Complaint alleged that respondent's son Fulgencio Jr. sustained
physical injuries. The son testified that he suffered a deep cut on his left arm when the
car overturned after hitting a pile of earth that had been left in the open without any
warning device whatsoever.
It is apparent from the Decisions of the trial and the appellate courts, however, that no
other evidence (such as a medical certificate or proof of medical expenses) was
presented to prove Fulgencio Jr.'s bare assertion of physical injury. Thus, there was no
credible proof that would justify an award of moral damages based on Article 2219(2) of
the Civil Code.
Moreover, the Decisions are conspicuously silent with respect to the claim of respondent
that his moral sufferings were due to the negligence of petitioners. The Decision of the
trial court, which summarizes the testimony of respondent's four witnesses, makes no
mention of any statement regarding moral suffering, such as mental anguish,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, social humiliation and the like.
Moral damages are not punitive in nature, but are designed to compensate and alleviate
in some way the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly
inflicted on a person.31 Intended for the restoration of the psychological or
emotional status quo ante, the award of moral damages is designed to compensate
emotional injury suffered, not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer.
For the court to arrive upon a judicious approximation of emotional or moral injury,
competent and substantial proof of the suffering experienced must be laid before it.
Essential to this approximation are definite findings as to what the supposed moral
damages suffered consisted of; otherwise, such damages would become a penalty
rather than a compensation for actual injury suffered.32
Furthermore, well-settled is the rule that moral damages cannot be awarded -- whether
in a civil33 or a criminal case34 -- in the absence of proof of physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
social humiliation, or similar injury.35 The award of moral damages must be solidly
anchored on a definite showing that respondent actually experienced emotional and
mental sufferings. Mere allegations do not suffice; they must be substantiated by clear
and convincing proof.36
Third Issue:
Exemplary Damages
Petitioners argue that exemplary damages and attorney's fees are not recoverable.
Allegedly, the RTC and the CA "did not find that petitioners were guilty of gross
negligence in the performance of their duty and responsibilities."37
Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right. 38 While granting them is
subject to the discretion of the court, they can be awarded only after claimants have
shown their entitlement to moral, temperate or compensatory damages. 39 In the case
before us, respondent sufficiently proved before the courts a quo that petitioners'
negligence was the proximate cause of the incident, thereby establishing his right to
actual or compensatory damages. He has adduced adequate proof to justify his claim for
the damages caused his car. The question that remains, therefore, is whether exemplary
damages may be awarded in addition to compensatory damages.
Article 2231 of the Civil Code mandates that in cases of quasi-delicts, exemplary
damages may be recovered if the defendant acted with gross negligence.40 Gross
negligence means such utter want of care as to raise a presumption that the persons at
fault must have been conscious of the probable consequences of their carelessness, and
that they must have nevertheless been indifferent (or worse) to the danger of injury to the
person or property of others. 41 The negligence must amount to a reckless disregard for
the safety of persons or property. Such a circumstance obtains in the instant case.
A finding of gross negligence can be discerned from the Decisions of both the CA and
the trial court. We quote from the RTC Decision:
"Sad to state that the City Government through its instrumentalities have (sic) failed to
show the modicum of responsibility, much less, care expected of them (sic) by the
constituents of this City. It is even more deplorable that it was a case of a street digging
in a side street which caused the accident in the so-called 'premier city.'"42
The CA reiterated the finding of the trial court that petitioners' negligence was clear,
considering that there was no warning device whatsoever43 at the excavation site.
The facts of the case show a complete disregard by petitioners of any adverse
consequence of their failure to install even a single warning device at the area under
renovation. Considering further that the street was dimly lit, 44 the need for adequate
precautionary measures was even greater. By carrying on the road diggings without any
warning or barricade, petitioners demonstrated a wanton disregard for public safety.
Indeed, the February 28, 1988 incident was bound to happen due to their gross
negligence. It is clear that under the circumstances, there is sufficient factual basis for a
finding of gross negligence on their part.
Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be imposed by way
of example or correction for the public good. The award of these damages is meant to be
a deterrent to socially deleterious actions.45Public policy requires such imposition to
suppress wanton acts of an offender.46 It must be emphasized that local governments
and their employees should be responsible not only for the maintenance of roads and
streets, but also for the safety of the public. Thus, they must secure construction areas
with adequate precautionary measures.
Not only is the work of petitioners impressed with public interest; their very existence is
justified only by public service. Hence, local governments have the paramount
responsibility of keeping the interests of the public foremost in their agenda. For these
reasons, it is most disturbing to note that the present petitioners are the very parties
responsible for endangering the public through such a rash and reckless act.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages
is DELETED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
*
Although the Petition mentions "Fulgencio Dacara" as the respondent, the body of the Petition,
as well as the records of the case, mentions "Fulgencio P. Dacara Sr." as the proper
respondent.
1
Rollo, pp. 10-30.
2
Id., pp. 36-41. Third Division. Penned by Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole, with the concurrence
of Justices Fermin A. Martin Jr. (Division chairman) and Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos (member).
3
Id., pp. 53-54.
4
Assailed Decision, p. 5; rollo, p. 40.
5
CA Decision, pp. 1-2; id., pp. 36-37.
6
Penned by Judge Pedro T. Santiago; rollo, pp. 55-62.
7 41
"Art. 2189. Provinces, cities, and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or Amedo v. Rio Y Olabarrieta, Inc., 95 Phil. 33, 37, May 24, 1954; Benguet Electric
injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, Cooperative, Inc. v. CA,378 Phil. 1137, 1151, December 23, 1999.
42
public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision." RTC Decision, p. 7; rollo, p. 61.
8 43
RTC Decision, p. 8; rollo, p. 62. CA Decision, p. 4; rollo, p. 39.
9 44
Assailed Decision, p. 5; rollo, p. 40. Petitioners' Memorandum, p. 20 (rollo, p. 113); RTC Decision, p. 3 (rollo, p. 57).
10 45
Id., p. 4; rollo, p. 39. Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. CA, supra, p. 1151.
11 46
CA Decision, pp. 4-5; id., pp. 39-40. Civil Aeronautics Administration v. CA, 167 SCRA 28, November 8, 1988.
12
Id., pp. 5 & 40.
13
The case was deemed submitted for decision on May 20, 2004, upon this Court's receipt of
respondent's delayed, anemic 4-page Memorandum, signed by Atty. Romulo R. Candoy.
Petitioners' Memorandum, signed by Atty. Felixberto F. Abad, was received by this Court on
March 5, 2003.
14
Petitioners' Memorandum, pp. 14-15; rollo, pp. 107-108; all caps in the original.
15
Raynera v. Hiceta, 306 SCRA 102, 108, April 21, 1999.
16
Sangco, Torts and Damages (1993), Vol. I, p. 90.
17
Tañedo v. CA, 252 SCRA 80, January 22, 1996; Engineering & Machinery Corporation v.
CA, 252 SCRA 156, January 24, 1996.
18
Kierulf v. CA, 269 SCRA 433, 442, March 13, 1997 (citing Gaw v. IAC, 220 SCRA 405, March
24, 1993).
19
Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium (1999), Vol. I, pp. 542-543. Fuentes v. CA, 268 SCRA
703, 708-709, February 26, 1997; Solid Homes, Inc. v. CA; 275 SCRA 267, 279; July 8,
1997; Spouses Quisumbing v. Manila Electric Company, 380 SCRA 195, April 3, 2002.
20
RTC Decision, pp. 6-8; rollo, pp. 60-62.
21
"Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a
motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic
regulation."
22
Petitioners' Memorandum, pp. 37-40; rollo, pp. 129-132.
23
Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, pp. 6-8; rollo, pp. 47-49.
24
Remman Enterprises, Inc. v. CA, 268 SCRA 690, February 26, 1997; Hufana v. Genato, 365
SCRA 385, September 17, 2001
25
De Rama v. CA, 353 SCRA 94, 105, February 28, 2001 (citing San Juan Structural and Steel
Fabricators, Inc. v. CA, 296 SCRA 631, 649, September 29, 1998).
26
"Article 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34,
and 35.
The parents of the female [who was] seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred
to in No. 3 of this article, may also recover moral damages.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the
action mentioned in No. 9 of this article, in the order named."
27
Petitioners' Memorandum, pp. 16-25; rollo, pp. 109-118.
28
Expertravel & Tours, Inc. v. CA, 368 Phil. 444, 448, June 25, 1999.
29
Strebel v. Figueras, 96 Phil. 321, 330, December 29, 1954; Expertravel Tours, Inc. v.
CA, supra, p. 449.
30
Malonzo v. Galang, 109 Phil. 16, 20, July 27, 1960, per Reyes, J.
31
Expertravel & Tours, Inc. v. CA, supra (citing Dee Hua Liong Electrical Equipment Corp. v.
Reyes, 145 SCRA 713, 719, November 25, 1986).
32
Malonzo v. Galang, supra, p. 21.
33
Dee Hua Liong Electrical Equipment Corp. v. Reyes, supra; Mahinay v. Velasquez, Jr., 419
SCRA 118, January 13, 2004; Malonzo v. Galang, supra.
34
People v. Baydo, 273 SCRA 526, June 17, 1997; People v. Serzo Jr., 274 SCRA 553, June
20, 1997;People v. Teodoro, 280 SCRA 384, October 9, 1997; People v. Villanueva, 408 SCRA
571, August 11, 2003; People v. Escarlos, 410 SCRA 463, September 10, 2003.
35
Art. 2217 of the New Civil Code.
36
Mahinay v. Velasquez Jr., supra, p. 121.
37
Petitioners' Memorandum, p. 27; rollo, p. 120.
38
Article 2233 of the New Civil Code.
39
Article 2234, id.
40
Article 2231, id.
 EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15674 October 17, 1921
CONSOLACION GABETO, in her own right and as guardian ad litem of her three
children, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AGATON ARANETA, defendant-appellant.
Jose E. Locsin for appellant.
Block, Johnston and Greenbaum for appellee.
STREET, J.:
This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo by Consolacion Gabeto,
in her own right as widow of Proceso Gayetano, and as guardian ad litem of the three
children, Conchita Gayetano, Rosita Gayetano, and Fermin Gayetano, for the purpose of
recovering damages incurred by the plaintiff as a result of the death of the said Proceso
Gayetano, supposedly cause by the wrongful act of the defendant Agaton Araneta. Upon
hearing the evidence, his Honor, Judge L. M. Southworth, awarded damages to the
plaintiff in the amount of P3,000, from which judgment the defendant appealed.
It appears in evidence that on August 4, 1918. Basilio Ilano and Proceso Gayetano took
a carromata near Plaza Gay, in the City of Iloilo, with a view to going to a cockpit on
Calle Ledesma in the same City. When the driver of the carromata had turned his horse
and started in the direction indicated, the defendant, Agaton Araneta, stepped out into
the street, and laying his hands on the reins, stopped the horse, at the same time
protesting to the driver that he himself had called this carromata first. The driver, one
Julio Pagnaya, replied to the effect that he had not heard or seen the call of Araneta, and
that he had taken up the two passengers then in the carromata as the first who had
offered employment. At or about the same time Pagnaya pulled on the reins of the bridle
to free the horse from the control of Agaton Araneta, in order that the vehicle might pass
on. Owing, however, to the looseness of the bridle on the horse's head or to the
rottenness of the material of which it was made, the bit came out of the horse's mouth;
and it became necessary for the driver to get out, which he did, in order to find the bridle.
The horse was then pulled over to near the curb, by one or the other — it makes no
difference which — and Pagnaya tried to fix the bridle.
While he was thus engaged, the horse, being free from the control of the bit, became
disturbed and moved forward, in doing which he pulled one of the wheels of the
carromata up on the sidewalk and pushed Julio Pagnaya over. After going a few years
further the side of the carromata struck a police telephone box which was fixed to a post
on the sidewalk, upon which the box came down with a crash and frightened the horse to
such an extent that he set out at full speed up the street.
Meanwhile one of the passengers, to wit. Basilio Ilano, had alighted while the carromata
was as yet alongside the sidewalk; but the other, Proceso Gayetano, had unfortunately
retained his seat, and after the runaway horse had proceeded up the street to a point in
front of the Mission Hospital, the said Gayetano jumped or fell from the rig, and in so
doing received injuries from which he soon died.
As to the facts above stated the evidence cannot be said to be materially in conflict; but
there is decided conflict upon the point of the exact relation of the defendant Agaton
Araneta, to the runaway. The evidence for the plaintiff on this point consists chiefly of the
testimony of Julio Pagnaya and of Basilio Ilano. They both say that while yet in the
middle of the street, the defendant jerked the bridle, which caused the bit to come out of
the horse's mouth, and Julio says that at that juncture the throat latch of the bridle was
broken. Be this as it may, we are of the opinion that the mere fact that the defendant
interfered with the carromata by stopping the horse in the manner stated would not make
him liable for the death of Proceso Gayetano; because it is admitted by Julio Pagnaya
that he afterwards got out of the carromata and went to the horse's head to fix the bridle.
The evidence is furthermore convincing to the effect that, after Julio Pagnaya alighted,
the horse was conducted to the curb and that an appreciable interval of time elapsed —
same witnesses say several minutes — before the horse started on his career up the
street. 1awph
It is therefore evident that the stopping of the rig by Agaton Araneta in the middle of the
street was too remote from the accident that presently ensued to be considered the legal
or proximate cause thereof. Moreover, by getting out and taking his post at the head of
the horse, the driver was the person primarily responsible for the control of the animal,
and the defendant cannot be charged with liability for the accident resulting from the
action of the horse thereafter.
Julio Pagnaya testifies to one fact which, if it were fully accredited, would possibly put a
different complexion on the case; for he says that when the horse was pulled over to the
curb, the defendant, by way of emphasizing his verbal denunciation of Pagnaya,
gesticulated with one of his arms and incidentally brought his hand down on the horse's
nose. This, according to Pagnaya, is what made the horse run away. There is no other
witness who testifies to this; and it is noteworthy that Basilio Ilano does not mention it. A
decided preponderance of the evidence in our opinion is against it.
The evidence indicates that the bridle was old, and the leather of which it was made was
probably so weak as to be easily broken. Julio Pagnaya had a natural interest in refuting
this fact, as well as in exculpating himself in other respects; and we are of the opinion
that the several witnesses who testified for the defendant gave a more credible account
of the affair than the witnesses for the plaintiff. According to the witnesses for the
defendant, it was Julio who jerked the rein, thereby causing the bit it come out of the
horse's mouth; and they say that Julio, after alighting, led the horse over to the curb, and
proceeded to fix the bridle; and that in so doing the bridle was slipped entirely off, when
the horse, feeling himself free from control, started to go away as previously stated.
Upon the whole we are constrained to hold that the defendant is not legally responsible
for the death of Proceso Gayetano; and though reluctant to interfere with the findings of
fact of a trial court when there is a conflict of testimony, the evidence in this case so
clearly preponderates in favor of the defendant, that we have no recourse but to reverse
the judgment.
The judgment will therefore be reversed, and the defendant will be absolved from the
complaint; and it is so ordered, without express finding as to costs of either instance. So
ordered.
Johnson, Araullo, Avanceña and Villamor, JJ., concur.
 EN BANC
G.R. No. 130068 October 1, 1998
FAR EASTERN SHIPPING COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY, respondents.
G.R. No. 130150 October, 1998
MANILA PILOTS ASSOCIATION, petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY and FAR EASTERN SHIPPING
COMPANY, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
These consolidated petitions for review on certiorari seek in unison to annul and set
aside the decision 1 of respondent Court of Appeals of November 15, 1996 and its
resolution 2 dated July 31, 1997 in CA-G.R. CV No. 24072, entitled "Philippine Ports
Authority, Plaintiff-Appellee vs. Far Eastern Shipping Company, Senen C. Gavino and
Manila Pilots' Association, Defendants-Appellants," which affirmed with modification the
judgment of the trial court holding the defendants-appellants therein solidarily liable for
damages in favor of herein private respondent.
There is no dispute about the facts as found by the appellate court,
thus —
. . . On June 20, 1980, the M/V PAVLODAR, flying under the flagship
of the USSR, owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping
Company (FESC for brevity's sake), arrived at the Port of Manila from
Vancouver, British Columbia at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning.
The vessel was assigned Berth 4 of the Manila International Port, as
its berthing space. Captain Roberto Abellana was tasked by the
Philippine Port Authority to supervise the berthing of the vessel.
Appellant Senen Gavino was assigned by the Appellant Manila Pilots'
Association (MPA for brevity's sake) to conduct docking maneuvers
for the safe berthing of the vessel to Berth No. 4.
Gavino boarded the vessel at the quarantine anchorage and
stationed himself in the bridge, with the master of the vessel, Victor
Kavankov, beside him. After a briefing of Gavino by Kavankov of the
particulars of the vessel and its cargo, the vessel lifted anchor from
the quarantine anchorage and proceeded to the Manila International
Port. The sea was calm and the wind was ideal for docking
maneuvers.
When the vessel reached the landmark (the big church by the Tondo
North Harbor) one-half mile from the pier, Gavino ordered the engine
stopped. When the vessel was already about 2,000 feet from the pier,
Gavino ordered the anchor dropped. Kavankov relayed the orders to
the crew of the vessel on the bow. The left anchor, with two (2)
shackles, were dropped. However, the anchor did not take hold as
expected. The speed of the vessel did not slacken. A commotion
ensued between the crew members. A brief conference ensued
between Kavankov and the crew members. When Gavino inquired
what was all the commotion about, Kavankov assured Gavino that
there was nothing to it.
After Gavino noticed that the anchor did not take hold, he ordered the
engines half-astern. Abellana, who was then on the pier apron,
noticed that the vessel was approaching the pier fast. Kavankov
likewise noticed that the anchor did not take hold. Gavino thereafter
gave the "full-astern" code. Before the right anchor and additional
shackles could be dropped, the bow of the vessel rammed into the
apron of the pier causing considerable damage to the pier. The
vessel sustained damage too, (Exhibit "7-Far Eastern Shipping).
Kavankov filed his sea protest (Exhibit "1-Vessel"). Gavino submitted
his report to the Chief Pilot (Exhibit "1-Pilot") who referred the report
to the Philippine Ports Authority (Exhibit 2-Pilot"). Abellana likewise
submitted his report of the incident (Exhibit "B").
Per contract and supplemental contract of the Philippine Ports
Authority and the contractor for the rehabilitation of the damaged pier,
the same cost the Philippine Ports Authority the amount of
P1,126,132.25 (Exhibits "D" and "E"). 3
On January 10, 1983, the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA, for brevity), through the
Solicitor General, filed before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 39, a complaint
for a sum of money against Far Eastern Shipping Co., Capt. Senen C. Gavino and the
Manila Pilots' Association, docketed as Civil Case No. 83-14958, 4 praying that the
defendants therein be held jointly and severally liable to pay the plaintiff actual and
exemplary damages plus costs of suit. In a decision dated August 1, 1985, the trial court
ordered the defendants therein jointly and severally to pay the PPA the amount of
P1,053,300.00 representing actual damages and the costs of suit. 5
The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals and raised the following issues: (1) Is
the pilot of a commercial vessel, under compulsory pilotage, solely liable for the damage
caused by the vessel to the pier, at the port of destination, for his negligence? and (2)
Would the owner of the vessel be liable likewise if the damage is caused by the
concurrent negligence of the master of the vessel and the pilot under a compulsory
pilotage?
As stated at the outset, respondent appellate court affirmed the findings of the court a
quo except that if found no employer-employee relationship existing between herein
private respondents Manila Pilots' Association (MPA, for short) and Capt. Gavino. 6 This
being so, it ruled instead that the liability of MPA is anchored, not on Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, but on the provisions of Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65, 7 and
accordingly modified said decision of the trial court by holding MPA, along with its co-
defendants therein, still solidarily liable to PPA but entitled MPA to reimbursement from
Capt. Gavino for such amount of the adjudged pecuniary liability in excess of the amount
equivalent to seventy-five percent (75%) of its prescribed reserve fund. 8
Neither Far Eastern Shipping Co. (briefly, FESC) nor MPA was happy with the decision
of the Court of Appeals and both of them elevated their respective plaints to us via
separate petitions for review on certiorari.
In G. R. No. 130068, which was assigned to the Second Division of this Court, FESC
imputed that the Court of Appeals seriously erred:
1. in not holding Senen C. Gavino and the Manila Pilots' Association
as the parties solely responsible for the resulting damages sustained
by the pier deliberately ignoring the established jurisprudence on the
matter;
2. in holding that the master had not exercised the required diligence
demanded from him by the circumstances at the time the incident
happened;
 3. in affirming the amount of damages sustained by the respondent
Philippine Ports Authority despite a strong and convincing evidence
that the amount is clearly exorbitant and unreasonable;
4. in not awarding any amount of counterclaim prayed for by the
petitioner in its answer; and
5. in not granting herein petitioner's claim against pilot Senen C.
Gavino and Manila Pilots' Association in the event that it be held
liable. 9
Petitioner asserts that since the MV PAVLODAR was under compulsory pilotage at the
time of the incident, it was the compulsory pilot, Capt. Gavino, who was in command and
had complete control in the navigation and docking of the vessel. It is the pilot who
supersedes the master for the time being in the command and navigation of a ship and
his orders must be obeyed in all respects connected with her navigation. Consequently,
he was solely responsible for the damage caused upon the pier apron, and not the
owners of the vessel. It claims that the master of the boat did not commit any act of
negligence when he failed to countermand or overrule the orders of the pilot because he
did not see any justifiable reason to do so. In other words, the master cannot be faulted
for relying absolutely on the competence of the compulsory pilot. If the master does not
observe that a compulsory pilot is incompetent or physically incapacitated, the master is
justified in relying on the pilot. 10
Respondent PPA, in its comment, predictably in full agreement with the ruling of
respondent court on the solidary liability of FESC, MPA and Capt. Gavino, stresses the
concurrent negligence of Capt. Gavino, the harbor pilot, and Capt. Viktor
Kabankov, * shipmaster of MV Pavlodar, as the basis of their solidary liability for
damages sustained by PPA. It posits that the vessel was being piloted by Capt. Gavino
with Capt. Kabankov beside him all the while on the bridge of the vessel, as the former
took over the helm of MV Pavlodar when it rammed and damaged the apron of the pier
of Berth No. 4 of the Manila International Port. Their concurrent negligence was the
immediate and proximate cause of the collision between the vessel and the pier — Capt.
Gavino, for his negligence in the conduct of docking maneuvers for the safe berthing of
the vessel; and Capt. Kabankov, for failing to countermand the orders of the harbor pilot
and to take over and steer the vessel himself in the face of imminent danger, as well as
for merely relying on Capt. Gavino during the berthing procedure. 11
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 130150, originally assigned to the Court's First Division
and later transferred to the Third Division. MPA, now as petitioner in this case, avers that
respondent court's errors consisted in disregarding and misinterpreting Customs
Administrative Order No. 15-65 which limits the liability of MPA. Said pilots' association
asseverates that it should not be held solidarily liable with Capt. Gavino who, as held by
respondent court is only a member, not an employee, thereof. There being no employer-
employee relationship, neither can MPA be held liable for any vicarious liability for the
respective exercise of profession by its members nor be considered a joint tortfeasor as
to be held jointly and severally liable. 12 It further argues that there was erroneous
reliance on Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 and the constitution and by-laws of
MPA, instead of the provisions of the Civil Code on damages which, being a substantive
law, is higher in category than the aforesaid constitution and by-laws of a professional
organization or an administrative order which bears no provision classifying the nature of
the liability of MPA for the negligence its member pilots. 13
As for Capt. Gavino, counsel for MPA states that the former had retired from active
pilotage services since July 28, 1994 and has ceased to be a member of petitioner pilots'
association. He is not joined as a petitioner in this case since his whereabouts are
unknown. 14
FESC's comment thereto relied on the competence of the Court of Appeals in construing
provisions of law or administrative orders as bases for ascertaining the liability of MPA,
and expressed full accord with the appellate court's holding of solidary liability among
itself, MPA and Capt. Gavino. It further avers that the disputed provisions of Customs
Administrative Order No. 15-65 clearly established MPA's solidary liability. 15
On the other hand, public respondent PPA, likewise through representations by the
Solicitor General, assumes the same supportive stance it took in G.R. No. 130068 in
declaring its total accord with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that MPA is solidarily
liable with Capt. Gavino and FESC for damages, and in its application to the fullest
extent of the provisions of Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 in relation to MPA's
constitution and by-laws which spell out the conditions of and govern their respective
liabilities. These provisions are clear and unambiguous as regards MPA's liability without
need for interpretation or construction. Although Customs Administrative Order No. 15-
65 is a mere regulation issued by an administrative agency pursuant to delegated
legislative authority to fix details to implement the law, it is legally binding and has the
same statutory force as any valid statute. 16
Upon motion 17 by FESC dated April 24, 1998 in G.R. No. 130150, said case was
consolidated with G.R. No. 130068. 18
Prefatorily, on matters of compliance with procedural requirements, it must be mentioned
that the conduct of the respective counsel for FESC and PPA leaves much to be desired,
to the displeasure and disappointment of this Court.
Sec. 2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure 19 incorporates the former Circular
No. 28-91 which provided for what has come to be known as the certification against
forum shopping as an additional requisite for petitions filed with the Supreme Court and
the Court of Appeals, aside from the other requirements contained in pertinent provisions
of the Rules of Court therefor, with the end in view of preventing the filing of multiple
complaints involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals or different
divisions thereof or any other tribunal or agency.
More particularly, the second paragraph of Section 2, Rule 42 provides:
xxx xxx xxx
The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a
certification under oath that he has not theretofore commenced any
other action involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or
agency; if there is such other action or proceeding, he must state the
status of the same; and if he should thereafter learn that a similar
action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other
tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid
courts and other tribunal or agency thereof within five (5) days
therefrom. (Emphasis ours.)
For petitions for review filed before the Supreme Court, Section 4(e), Rule 45
specifically requires that such petition shall contain a sworn certification against
forum shopping as provided in the last paragraph of Section 2, Rule 42.
The records show that the law firm of Del Rosario and Del Rosario through its associate,
Atty. Herbert A. Tria, is the counsel of record for FESC in both G.R. No. 130068 and
G.R. No. 130150.
G.R. No. 130068, which is assigned to the Court's Second Division, commenced with the
filing by FESC through counsel on August 22, 1997 of a verified motion for extension of
time to file its petition for thirty (30) days from August 28, 1997 or until September 27,
1997. 20 Said motion contained the following certification against forum
shopping 21 signed by Atty. Herbert A. Tria as affiant:
CERTIFICATION
AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING
I/we hereby certify that I/we have not commenced any other action or
proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; that to the best of
my own knowledge, no such action or proceeding is pending in the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency;
that if I/we should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding
has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency, I/we undertake to report that
fact within five (5) days therefrom to this Honorable Court.
This motion having been granted, FESC subsequently filed its petition on
September 26, 1997, this time bearing a "verification and certification against
forum-shopping" executed by one Teodoro P. Lopez on September 24,
1997, 22 to wit:
VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION
AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING
in compliance with Section 4(e), Rule 45 in relation to Section 2, Rule
42 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
I, Teodoro P. Lopez, of legal age, after being duly sworn, depose and
state:
1. That I am the Manager, Claims Department of Filsov Shipping
Company, the local agent of petitioner in this case.
2. That I have caused the preparation of this Petition for Review
on Certiorari.
3. That I have read the same and the allegations therein contained
are true and correct based on the records of this case.
4. That I certify that petitioner has not commenced any other action or
proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme Court or Court
of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency, that to the best of my
own knowledge, no such action or proceeding is pending in the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or any other tribunal or agency,
that if I should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has
been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency, I undertake to report the
fact within five (5) days therefrom to this Honorable Court. (Italics
supplied for emphasis.)
Reviewing the records, we find that the petition filed by MPA in G.R. No. 130150 then
pending with the Third Division was duly filed on August 29, 1997 with a copy thereof
furnished on the same date by registered mail to counsel for FESC. 23 Counsel of record
for MPA. Atty. Jesus P. Amparo, in his verification accompanying said petition dutifully
revealed to the Court that —
xxx xxx xxx
3. Petitioner has not commenced any other action or proceeding
involving the same issues in this Honorable Court, the Court of
Appeals or different Divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or
agency, but to the best of his knowledge, there is an action or
proceeding pending in this Honorable Court, entitled Far Eastern
Shipping Co., Petitioner, vs. Philippine Ports Authority and Court of
Appeals with a Motion for Extension of time to file Petition For Review
by Certiorari filed sometime on August 18, 1987. If undersigned
counsel will come to know of any other pending action or claim filed
or pending he undertakes to report such fact within five (5) days to
this Honorable Court. 24 (Emphasis supplied.)
Inasmuch as MPA's petition in G.R. No. 130150 was posted by registered mail on
August 29, 1997 and taking judicial notice of the average period of time it takes local mail
to reach its destination, by reasonable estimation it would be fair to conclude that when
FESC filed its petition in G.R. No. 130068 on September 26, 1997, it would already have
received a copy of the former and would then have knowledge of the pendency of the
other petition initially filed with the First Division. It was therefore incumbent upon FESC
to inform the Court of that fact through its certification against forum shopping. For failure
to make such disclosure, it would appear that the aforequoted certification accompanying
the petition in G.R. No. 130068 is defective and could have been a ground for dismissal
thereof.
Even assuming that FESC had not yet received its copy of MPA's petition at the time it
filed its own petition and executed said certification, its signatory did state "that if I should
thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or any other tribunal or agency, I undertake to
report the fact within five (5) days therefrom to this Honorable Court." 25 Scouring the
records page by page in this case, we find that no manifestation concordant with such
undertaking was then or at any other time thereafter ever filed by FESC nor was there
any attempt to bring such matter to the attention of the Court. Moreover, it cannot feign
non-knowledge of the existence of such other petition because FESC itself filed the
motion for consolidation in G.R. No. 130150 of these two cases on April 24, 1998.
It is disturbing to note that counsel for FESC, the law firm of Del Rosario and Del
Rosario, displays an unprofessional tendency of taking the Rules for granted, in this
instance exemplified by its pro forma compliance therewith but apparently without full
comprehension of and with less than faithful commitment to its undertakings to this Court
in the interest of just, speedy and orderly administration of court proceedings.
As between the lawyer and the courts, a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to
the court. 26 He is an officer of the court exercising a privilege which is indispensable in
the administration of justice. 27 Candidness, especially towards the courts, is essential for
the expeditious administration of justice. Courts are entitled to expect only complete
honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading before them. 28 Candor in all dealings is
the very essence of honorable membership in the legal profession. 29 More specifically, a
lawyer is obliged to observe the rules of procedure and not to misuse them to defeat the
ends of justice. 30 It behooves a lawyer, therefore, to exert every effort and consider it his
duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. 31 Being an officer of
the court, a lawyer has a responsibility in the proper administration of justice. Like the
court itself, he is an instrument to advance its ends — the speedy, efficient, impartial,
correct and inexpensive adjudication of cases and the prompt satisfaction of final
judgments. A lawyer should not only help attain these objectives but should likewise
avoid any unethical or improper practices that impede, obstruct or prevent their
realization, charged as he is with the primary task of assisting in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice. 32
Sad to say, the members of said law firm sorely failed to observe their duties as
responsible members of the Bar. Their actuations are indicative of their predisposition to
take lightly the avowed duties of officers of the Court to promote respect for law and for
legal processes. 33 We cannot allow this state of things to pass judicial muster.
In view of the fact that at around the time these petitions were commenced, the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure had just taken effect, the Court treated infractions of the new
Rules then with relative liberality in evaluating full compliance therewith. Nevertheless, it
would do well to remind all concerned that the penal provisions of Circular No. 28-91
which remain operative provides, inter alia:
3. Penalties. —
xxx xxx xxx
(c) The submission of a false certification under Par. 2 of the Circular
shall likewise constitute contempt of court, without prejudice to the
filing of criminal action against the guilty party. The lawyer may also
be subjected to disciplinary proceedings.
It must be stressed that the certification against forum shopping ordained under the
Rules is to be executed by thepetitioner, and not by counsel. Obviously it is the
petitioner, and not always the counsel whose professional services have been retained
for a particular case, who is in the best position to know whether he or it actually filed or
caused the filing of a petition in that case. Hence, a certification against forum shopping
by counsel is a defective certification. It is clearly equivalent to non-compliance with the
requirement under Section 2, Rule 42 in relation to Section 4, Rule 45, and constitutes a
valid cause for dismissal of the petition.
Hence, the initial certification appended to the motion for extension of time to file petition
in G.R. No. 130068 executed in behalf of FESC by Atty. Tria is procedurally deficient.
But considering that it was a superfluity at that stage of the proceeding, it being
unnecessary to file such a certification with a mere motion for extension, we shall
disregard such error. Besides, the certification subsequently executed by Teodoro P.
Lopez in behalf of FESC cures that defect to a certain extent, despite the inaccuracies
earlier pointed out. In the same vein, we shall consider the verification signed in behalf of
MPA by its counsel, Atty. Amparo, in G.R. No. 130150 as substantial compliance
inasmuch as it served the purpose of the Rules of informing the Court of the pendency of
another action or proceeding involving the same issues.
It bears stressing that procedural rules are instruments in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice. They should be used to achieve such end and not to derail it. 34
Counsel for PPA did not make matters any better. Despite the fact that, save for the
Solicitor General at the time, the same legal team of the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG, for short) composed of Assistant Solicitor General Roman G. Del Rosario and
Solicitor Luis F. Simon, with the addition of Assistant Solicitor General Pio C. Guerrero
very much later in the proceedings, represented PPA throughout the appellate
proceedings in both G.R. No. 130068 and G.R. No. 130150 and was presumably fully
acquainted with the facts and issues of the case, it took the OSG an inordinately and
almost unreasonably long period of time to file its comment, thus unduly delaying the
resolution of these cases. It took several changes of leadership in the OSG — from
Silvestre H. Bello III to Romeo C. dela Cruz and, finally, Ricardo P. Galvez — before the
comment in behalf of PPA was finally filed.
In G.R. No. 130068, it took eight (8) motions for extension of time totaling 210 days, a
warning that no further extensions shall be granted, and personal service on the Solicitor
General himself of the resolution requiring the filing of such comment before the OSG
indulged the Court with the long required comment on July 10, 1998. 35This, despite the
fact that said office was required to file its comment way back on November 12,
1997. 36 A closer scrutiny of the records likewise indicates that petitoner FESC was not
even furnished a copy of said comment as required by Section 5, Rule 42. Instead, a
copy thereof was inadvertently furnished to MPA which, from the point of view of G.R.
No. 130068, was a non-party. 37 The OSG fared slightly better in G.R. No. 130150 in that
it took only six (6) extensions, or a total of 180 days, before the comment was finally
filed. 38 And while it properly furnished petitioner MPA with a copy of its comment, it
would have been more desirable and expedient in this case to have furnished its therein
co-respondent FESC with a copy thereof, if only as a matter of professional courtesy. 39
This undeniably dilatory disinclination of the OSG to seasonably file required pleadings
constitutes deplorable disservice to the tax-paying public and can only be categorized as
censurable inefficiency on the part of the government law office. This is most certainly
professionally unbecoming of the OSG.
Another thing that baffles the Court is why the OSG did not take the inititive of filing a
motion for consolidation in either G.R. No. 130068 or G.R. No. 130150, considering its
familiarity with the background of the case and if only to make its job easier by having to
prepare and file only one comment. It could not have been unaware of the pendency of
one or the other petition because, being counsel for respondent in both cases, petitioner
is required to furnish it with a copy of the petition under pain of dismissal of the petition
for failure otherwise. 40
Besides, in G.R. 130068, it prefaces its discussions thus —
Incidentally, the Manila Pilots' Association (MPA), one of the
defendants-appellants in the case before the respondent Court of
Appeals, has taken a separate appeal from the said decision to this
Honorable Court, which was docketed as G.R. No. 130150 and
entitled "Manila Pilots' Association, Petitioner, versus Philippine Ports
Authority and Far Eastern Shipping Co., Respondents." 41
Similarly, in G.R. No. 130150, it states —
Incidentally, respondent Far Eastern Shipping Co. (FESC) had also
taken an appeal from the said decision to this Honorable Court,
docketed as G.R. No. 130068, entitled "Far Eastern Shipping Co. vs.
Court of Appeals and Philippine Ports Authority." 42
We find here a lackadaisical attitude and complacency on the part of the OSG in the
handling of its cases and an almost reflexive propensity to move for countless
extensions, as if to test the patience of the Court, before favoring it with the timely
submission of required pleadings.
It must be emphasized that the Court can resolve cases only as fast as the respective
parties in a case file the necessary pleadings. The OSG, by needlessly extending the
pendency of these cases through its numerous motions for extension, came very close
to exhausting this Court's forbearance and has regrettably fallen short of its duties as the
People's Tribune.
The OSG is reminded that just like other members of the Bar, the canons under the
Code of Professional Responsibility apply with equal force on lawyers in government
service in the discharge of their official tasks. 43These ethical duties are rendered even
more exacting as to them because, as government counsel, they have the added duty to
abide by the policy of the State to promote a high standard of ethics in public
service. 44Furthermore, it is incumbent upon the OSG, as part of the government
bureaucracy, to perform and discharge its duties with the highest degree of
professionalism, intelligence and skill 45 and to extend prompt, courteous and adequate
service to the public. 46
Now, on the merits of the case. After a judicious examination of the records of this case,
the pleadings filed, and the evidence presented by the parties in the two petitions, we
find no cogent reason to reverse and set aside the questioned decision. While not
entirely a case of first impression, we shall discuss the issues seriatim and, correlatively
by way of a judicial once-over, inasmuch as the matters raised in both petitions beg for
validation and updating of well-worn maritime jurisprudence. Thereby, we shall
write finis to the endless finger-pointing in this shipping mishap which has been stretched
beyond the limits of judicial tolerance.
The Port of Manila is within the Manila Pilotage District which is under compulsory
pilotage pursuant to Section 8, Article III of Philippine Ports Authority Administrative
Order No. 03-85, 47 which provides that:
Sec. 8. Compulsor Pilotage Service. — For entering a harbor and
anchoring thereat, or passing through rivers or straits within a pilotage
district, as well as docking and undocking at any pier/wharf, or shifting
from one berth or another, every vessel engaged in coastwise and
foreign trade shall be under compulsory pilotage. . . .
In case of compulsory pilotage, the respective duties and responsibilities of the
compulsory pilot and the master have been specified by the same regulation in this wise:
Sec. 11. Control of vessels and liability for damage. — On
compulsory pilotage grounds, the Harbor Pilot providing the service to
a vessel shall be responsible for the damage caused to a vessel or to
life and property at ports due to his negligence or fault. He can only
be absolved from liability if the accident is caused by force majeure or
natural calamities provided he has exercised prudence and extra
diligence to prevent or minimize damage.
The Master shall retain overall command of the vessel even on
pilotage grounds whereby he can countermand or overrule the order
or command of the Harbor Pilot on beard. In such event, any damage
caused to a vessel or to life and property at ports by reason of the
fault or negligence of the Master shall be the responsibility and
liability of the registered owner of the vessel concerned without
prejudice to recourse against said Master.
Such liability of the owner or Master of the vessel or its pilots shall be
determined by competent authority in appropriate proceedings in the
light of the facts and circumstances of each particular case.
Sec. 32. Duties and responsibilities of the Pilot or Pilots' Association.
— The duties and responsibilities of the Harbor Pilot shall be as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
f) a pilot shall be held responsible for the direction of a vessel from
the time he assumes his work as a pilot thereof until he leaves it
anchored or berthed safely; Provided, however, that his responsibility
shall cease at the moment the Master neglects or refuses to carry out
hisorder.
Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 issued twenty years earlier likewise provided in
Chapter I thereof for the responsibilities of pilots:
Par. XXXIX. — A Pilot shall be held responsible for the direction of a
vessel from the time he assumes control thereof until he leaves it
anchored free from shoal: Provided, That his responsibility shall
cease at the moment the master neglects or refuses to carry out his
instructions.
xxx xxx xxx
Par. XLIV. — Pilots shall properly and safely secure or anchor
vessels under their control when requested to do so by the master of
such vessels.
I. G.R. No. 130068
Petitioner FESC faults the respondent court with serious error in not holding MPA and
Capt. Gavino solely responsible for the damages cause to the pier. It avers that since the
vessel was under compulsory pilotage at the time with Capt. Gavino in command and
having exclusive control of the vessel during the docking maneuvers, then the latter
should be responsible for damages caused to the pier. 48 It likewise holds the appellate
court in error for holding that the master of the ship, Capt. Kabankov, did not exercise the
required diligence demanded by the circumstances. 49
We start our discussion of the successive issues bearing in mind the evidentiary rule in
American jurisprudence that there is a presumption of fault against a moving vessel that
strikes a stationary object such as a dock or navigational aid. In admiralty, this
presumption does more than merely require the ship to go forward and produce some
evidence on the presumptive matter. The moving vessel must show that it was without
fault or that the collision was occasioned by the fault of the stationary object or was the
result of inevitable accident. It has been held that such vessel must exhaust every
reasonable possibility which the circumstances admit and show that in each, they did all
that reasonable care required. 50 In the absence of sufficient proof in rebuttal, the
presumption of fault attaches to a moving vessel which collides with a fixed object and
makes a prima facie case of fault against the vessel. 51 Logic and experience support this
presumption:
The common sense behind the rule makes the burden a heavy one.
Such accidents simply do not occur in the ordinary course of things
unless the vessel has been mismanaged in some way. It is nor
sufficient for the respondent to produce witnesses who testify that as
soon as the danger became apparent everything possible was done
to avoid an accident. The question remains, How then did the
collision occur? The answer must be either that, in spite of the
testimony of the witnesses, what was done was too little or too late or,
if not, then the vessel was at fault for being in a position in which an
unavoidable collision would occur. 52
The task, therefore, in these cases is to pinpoint who was negligent — the
master of the ship, the harbor pilot or both.
A pilot, in maritime law, is a person duly qualified, and licensed, to conduct a vessel into
or out of ports, or in certain waters. In a broad sense, the term "pilot" includes both (1)
those whose duty it is to guide vessels into or out of ports, or in particular waters and (2)
those entrusted with the navigation of vessels on the high seas. 53However, the term
"pilot" is more generally understood as a person taken on board at a particular place for
the purpose of conducting a ship through a river, road or channel, or from a port. 54
Under English and American authorities, generally speaking, the pilot supersedes the
master for the time being in the command and navigation of the ship, and his orders
must be obeyed in all matters connected with her navigation. He becomes the
master pro hac vice and should give all directions as to speed, course, stopping and
reversing anchoring, towing and the like. And when a licensed pilot is employed in a
place where pilotage is compulsory, it is his duty to insist on having effective control of
the vessel, or to decline to act as pilot. Under certain systems of foreign law, the pilot
does not take entire charge of the vessel, but is deemed merely the adviser of the
master, who retains command and control of the navigation even in localities where
pilotage is compulsory. 55
It is quite common for states and localities to provide for compulsory pilotage, and safety
laws have been enacted requiring vessels approaching their ports, with certain
exceptions, to take on board pilots duly licensed under local law. The purpose of these
laws is to create a body of seamen thoroughly acquainted with the harbor, to pilot
vessels seeking to enter or depart, and thus protect life and property from the dangers of
navigation. 56
In line with such established doctrines, Chapter II of Customs Administrative Order No.
15-65 prescribes the rules for compulsory pilotage in the covered pilotage districts,
among which is the Manila Pilotage District,
viz. —
PARAGRAPH I. — Pilotage for entering a harbor and anchoring
thereat, as well as docking and undocking in any pier or shifting from
one berth to another shall be compulsory, except Government
vessels and vessels of foreign governments entitled to courtesy, and
other vessels engaged solely in river or harbor work, or in a daily ferry
service between ports which shall be exempt from compulsory
pilotage provisions of these regulations: provided, however, that
compulsory pilotage shall not apply in pilotage districts whose
optional pilotage is allowed under these regulations.
Pursuant thereto, Capt. Gavino was assigned to pilot MV Pavlodar into Berth 4 of the
Manila International Port. Upon assuming such office as compulsory pilot, Capt. Gavino
is held to the universally accepted high standards of care and diligence required of a
pilot, whereby he assumes to have skill and knowledge in respect to navigation in the
particular waters over which his license extends superior to and more to be trusted than
that of the master. 57A pilot 57 should have a thorough knowledge of general and local
regulations and physical conditions affecting the vessel in his charge and the waters for
which he is licensed, such as a particular harbor or river.
He is not held to the highest possible degree of skill and care, but must have and
exercise the ordinary skill and care demanded by the circumstances, and usually shown
by an expert in his profession. Under extraordinary circumstancesm, a pilot must
exercise extraordinary care. 58
In Atlee vs. The Northwesrern Union Packet Company. 59 Mr. Justice Miller spelled out in
great detail the duties of a pilot:
. . . (T)he pilot of a river steamer, like the harbor pilot, is selected for
his personal knowledge of the topography through which he steers
his vessel. In the long course of a thousand miles in one of these
rivers, he must be familiar with the appearance of the shore on each
side of the river as he goes along. Its banks, towns, its landings, its
houses and trees, are all landmarks by which he steers his vessel.
The compass is of little use to him. He must know where the
navigable channel is, in its relation to all these external objects,
especially in the night. He must also be familiar with all dangers that
are permanently located in the course of the river, as sand-bars,
snags, sunken rocks or trees or abandoned vessels orbarges. All this
he must know and remember and avoid. To do this, he must be
constantly informed of the changes in the current of the river, of the
sand-bars newly made,of logs or snags, or other objects newly
presented, against which his vessel might be injured.
xxx xxx xxx
It may be said that this is exacting a very high order of ability in a
pilot. But when we consider the value of the lives and property
committed to their control, for in this they are absolute masters, the
high compensation they receive, the care which Congress has taken
to secure by rigid and frequent examinations and renewal of licenses,
this very class of skill, we do not think we fix the standard too high.
Tested thereby, we affirm respondent court's finding that Capt. Gavino failed to measure
up to such strict standard of care and diligence required of pilots in the performance of
their duties. Witness this testimony of Capt. Gavino:
Court: You have testified before that the reason why the vessel bumped
the pier was because the anchor was not released immediately or as
soon as you have given the order. Do you remember having srated that?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q And you gave this order to the captain of the vessel?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q By that testimony, you are leading the Court to understand that if that
anchor was released immediately at the time you gave the order, the
incident would not have happened. Is that correct?
A Yes, sir, but actually it was only a presumption on my part because
there was a commotion between the officers who are in charge of the
dropping of the anchor and the captain. I could not understand their
language, it was in Russian, so I presumed the anchor was not dropped
on time.
Q So, you are not sure whether it was really dropped on time or not?
A I am not sure, your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
Q You are not even sure what could have caused the incident. What
factor could have caused the incident?
A Well, in this case now, because either the anchor was not dropped on
time or the anchor did not hold, that was the cause of the incident, your
Honor. 60
It is disconcertingly riddled with too much incertitude and manifests a seeming
indifference for the possibly injurious consequences his commands as pilot may have.
Prudence required that he, as pilot, should have made sure that his directions were
promptly and strictly followed. As correctly noted by the trial court —
Moreover, assuming that he did indeed give the command to drop the
anchor on time, as pilot he should have seen to it that the order was
carried out, and he could have done this in a number of ways, one of
which was to inspect the bow of the vessel where the anchor
mechanism was installed. Of course, Captain Gavino makes
reference to a commotion among the crew members which
supposedly caused the delay in the execution of the command. This
account was reflected in the pilot's report prepared four hours later,
but Capt. Kavankov, while not admitting whether or not such a
commotion occurred, maintained that the command to drop anchor
was followed "immediately and precisely." Hence, the Court cannot
give much weight or consideration to this portion of Gavino's
testimony." 61
An act may be negligent if it is done without the competence that a reasonable person in
the position of the actor would recognize as necessary to prevent it from creating an
unreasonable risk of harm to another. 62 Those who undertake any work calling for
special skills are required not only to exercise reasonable care in what they do but also
possess a standard minimum of special knowledge and ability. 63
Every man who offers his services to another, and is employed, assumes to exercise in
the employment such skills he possesses, with a reasonable degree of diligence. In all
these employments where peculiar skill is requisite, if one offers his services he is
understood as holding himself out to the public as possessing the degree of skill
commonly possessed by others in the same employment, and if his pretensions are
unfounded he commits a species of fraud on every man who employs him in reliance on
his public profession. 64
Furthermore, there is an obligation on all persons to take the care which, under ordinary
circumstances of the case, a reasonable and prudent man would take, and the omission
of that care constitutes negligence. 65Generally, the degree of care required is graduated
according to the danger a person or property attendant upon the activity which the actor
pursues or the instrumentality which he uses. The greater the danger the greater the
degree of care required. What is ordinary under extraordinary of conditions is dictated by
those conditions; extraordinary risk demands extraordinary care. Similarly, the more
imminent the danger, the higher the degree of care. 66
We give our imprimatur to the bases for the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that Capt.
Gavino was indeed negligent in the performance of his duties:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . As can be gleaned from the logbook, Gavino ordered the left
anchor and two (2) shackles dropped at 8:30 o'clock in the morning.
He ordered the engines of the vessel stopped at 8:31 o'clock. By
then,Gavino must have realized that the anchor did not hit a hard
object and was not clawed so as to reduce the momentum of the
vessel. In point of fact, the vessel continued travelling towards the
pier at the same speed. Gavino failed to react, At 8:32 o'clock, the
two (2) tugboats began to push the stern part of the vessel from the
port side bur the momentum of the vessel was not contained. Still,
Gavino did not react. He did not even order the other anchor and two
(2) more shackles dropped to arrest the momentum of the vessel.
Neither did he order full-astern. It was only at 8:34 o'clock, or four (4)
minutes, after the anchor was dropped that Gavino reacted. But his
reaction was even (haphazard) because instead of arresting fully the
momentum of the vessel with the help of the tugboats, Gavino
ordered merely "half-astern". It took Gavino another minute to order a
"full-astern". By then, it was too late. The vessel's momentum could
no longer be arrested and, barely a minute thereafter, the bow of the
vessel hit the apron of the pier. Patently, Gavino miscalculated. He
failed to react and undertake adequate measures to arrest fully the
momentum of the vessel after the anchor failed to claw to the seabed.
When he reacted, the same was even (haphazard). Gavino failed to
reckon the bulk of the vessel, its size and its cargo. He erroneously
believed that only one (1) anchor would suffice and even when the
anchor failed to claw into the seabed or against a hard object in the
seabed, Gavino failed to order the other anchor dropped immediately.
His claim that the anchor was dropped when the vessel was only
1,000 feet from the pier is but a belated attempt to extricate himself
from the quagmire of his own insouciance and negligence. In sum,
then, Appellants' claim that the incident was caused by "force
majeure" is barren of factual basis.
xxx xxx xxx
The harbor pilots are especially trained for this job. In the Philippines,
one may not be a harbor pilot unless he passed the required
examination and training conducted then by the Bureau of Custom,
under Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65, now under the
Philippine Ports Authority under PPA Administrative Order 63-85,
Paragraph XXXIX of the Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65
provides that "the pilot shall be held responsible for the direction of
the vessel from the time he assumes control thereof, until he leaves it
anchored free from shoal: Provided, that his responsibility shall cease
at the.moment the master neglects or refuse(s) to carry out his
instructions." The overall direction regarding the procedure for
docking and undocking the vessel emanates from the harbor pilot. In
the present recourse, Gavino failed to live up to his responsibilities
and exercise reasonable care or that degree of care required by the
exigencies of the occasion. Failure on his part to exercise the degree
of care demanded by the circumstances is negligence (Reese versus
Philadelphia & RR Co. 239 US 363, 60 L ed. 384, 57 Am Jur, 2d page
418). 67
This affirms the findings of the trial court regarding Capt. Gavino's negligence:
This discussion should not however, divert the court from the fact that
negligence in manuevering the vessel must be attributed to Capt.
Senen Gavino. He was an experienced pilot and by this time should
have long familiarized himself with the depth of the port and the
distance he could keep between the vessel and port in order to berth
safely. 68
The negligence on the part of Capt. Gavino is evident; but Capt. Kabancov is no less
responsible for the allision. His unconcerned lethargy as master of the ship in the face of
troublous exigence constitutes negligence.
While it is indubitable that in exercising his functions a pilot is in sole command of the
ship 69 and supersedes the master for the time being in the command and navigation of a
ship and that he becomes master pro hac vice of a vessel piloted by him, 70 there is
overwhelming authority to the effect that the master does not surrender his vessel to the
pilot and the pilot is not the master. The master is still in command of the vessel
notwithstanding the presence of a pilot. There are occasions when the master may and
should interfere and even displace the pilot, as when the pilot is obviously incompetent
or intoxicated and the circumstances may require the master to displace a compulsory
pilot because of incompetency or physical incapacity. If, however, the master does nor
observe that a compulsory pilot is incompetent or physically incapacitated, the master is
justified in relying on the pilot, but not blindly. 71
The master is not wholly absolved from his duties while a pilot is on board his vessel,
and may advise with or offer suggestions to him. He is still in command of the vessel,
except so far as her navigation is concerned, and must cause the ordinary work of the
vessel to be properly carried on and the usual precaution taken. Thus, in particular, he is
bound to see that there is sufficient watch on deck, and that the men are attentive to their
duties, also that engines are stopped, towlines cast off, and the anchors clear and ready
to go at the pilot's order. 72
A perusal of Capt. Kabankov's testimony makes it apparent that he was remiss in the
discharge of his duties as master of the ship, leaving the entire docking procedure up to
the pilot, instead of maintaining watchful vigilance over this risky maneuver:
Q Will you please tell us whether you have the right to intervene in
docking of your ship in the harbor?
A No sir, I have no right to intervene in time of docking, only in case there
is imminent danger to the vessel and to the pier.
Q Did you ever intervene during the time that your ship was being docked
by Capt. Gavino?
A No sir, I did not intervene at the time when the pilot was docking my
ship.
Q Up to the time it was actually docked at the pier, is that correct?
A No sir, I did not intervene up to the very moment when the vessel was
docked.
xxx xxx xxx
Atty. Del Rosario (to the witness)
Q Mr. Witness, what happened, if any, or was there anything unusual that
happened during the docking?
A Yes sir, our ship touched ihe pier and the pier was damaged.
Court (to the witness)
Q When you said touched the pier, are you leading the court to
understand that your ship bumped the pier?
A I believe that my vessel only touched the pier but the impact was very
weak.
Q Do you know whether the pier was damaged as a result of that slight or
weak impact?
A Yes sir, after the pier was damaged.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Being most concerned with the safety of your vessel, in the
maneuvering of your vessel to the port, did you observe anything irregular
in the maneuvering by Capt. Gavino at the time he was trying to cause the
vessel to be docked at the pier?
A You mean the action of Capt. Gavino or his condition?
Court:
Q Not the actuation that conform to the safety maneuver of the ship to the
harbor?
A No sir, it was a usual docking.
Q By that statement of yours, you are leading the court to understand that
there was nothing irregular in the docking of the ship?
A Yes sir, during the initial period of the docking, there was nothing
unusual that happened.
Q What about in the last portion of the docking of the ship, was there
anything unusual or abnormal that happened?
A None Your Honor, I believe that Capt. Gavino thought that the anchor
could keep or hold the vessel.
Q You want us to understand, Mr. Witness, that the dropping of the
anchor of the vessel was nor timely?
A I don't know the depth of this port but I think, if the anchor was dropped
earlier and with more shackles, there could not have been an incident.
Q So you could not precisely tell the court that the dropping of the anchor
was timery because you are not well aware of the seabed, is that correct?
A Yes sir, that is right.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Alright, Capt. Kavankov, did you come to know later whether the anchor
held its ground so much so that the vessel could not travel?
A It is difficult for me to say definitely. I believe that the anchor did not
hold the ship.
Q You mean you don't know whether the anchor blades stuck to the
ground to stop the ship from further moving?
A Yes sir, it is possible.
Q What is possible?
A I think, the 2 shackles were not enough to hold the vessel.
Q Did you know that the 2 shackles were dropped?
A Yes sir, I knew that.
Q If you knew that the shackles were not enough to hold the ship, did you
not make any protest to the pilot?
A No sir, after the incident, that was my assumption.
Q Did you come to know later whether that presumption is correct?
A I still don't know the ground in the harbor or the depths.
Q So from the beginning, you were not competent whether the 2 shackles
were also dropped to hold the ship?
A No sir, at the beginning, I did not doubt it because I believe Capt.
Gavino to be an experienced pilot and he should be more aware as to the
depths of the harbor and the ground and I was confident in his actions.
xxx xxx xxx
Solicitor Abad (to the witness)
Q Now, you were standing with the pilot on the bridge of the vessel before
the inicident happened, were you not?
A Yes sir, all the time, I was standing with the pilot.
Q And so whatever the pilot saw, you could also see from that point of
view?
A That is right.
Q Whatever the piler can read from the panel of the bridge, you also could
read, is that correct?
A What is the meaning of panel?
Q All indications necessary for men on the bridge to be informed of the
movements of the ship?
A That is right.
Q And whatever sound the captain . . . Capt. Gavino would hear from the
bridge, you could also hear?
A That is right.
Q Now, you said that when the command to lower the anchor was given,
it was obeyed, is that right?
A This command was executed by the third mate and boatswain.
Court (to the witness)
Q Mr. Witness, earlier in today's hearing, you said that you did not
intervene with the duties of the pilot and that, in your opinion, you can only
intervene if the ship is placed in imminent danger, is that correct?
A That is right, I did say that.
Q In your observation before the incident actually happened, did you
observe whether or not the ship, before the actual incident, the ship was
placed in imminent danger?
A No sir, I did not observe.
Q By that answer, are you leading the court to understand that because
you did not intervene and because you believed that it was your duty to
intervene when the vessel is placed in imminent danger to which you did
not observe any imminent danger thereof, you have not intervened in any
manner to the command of the pilot?
A That is right, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Assuminp that you disagreed with the pilot regarding the step being
taken by the pilot in maneuvering the vessel, whose command will prevail,
in case of imminent danger to the vessel?
A I did nor consider the situation as having an imminent danger. I believed
that the vessel will dock alongside the pier.
Q You want us to understand that you did not see an imminent danger to
your ship, is that what you mean?
A Yes sir, up to the very last moment, I believed that there was no
imminent danger.
Q Because of that, did you ever intervene in the command of the pilot?
A Yes sir, I did not intervene because I believed that the command of the
pilot to be correct.
Solicitor Abad (to the witness)
Q As a captain of M/V Pavlodar, you consider docking maneuvers a
serious matter, is it not?
A Yes sir, that is right.
Q Since it affects not only the safety of the port or pier, but also the safety
of the vessel and the cargo, is it not?
A That is right.
Q So that, I assume that you were watching Capt. Gavino very closely at
the time he was making his commands?
A I was close to him, I was hearing his command and being executed.
Q And that you were also alert for any possible mistakes he might commit
in the maneuvering of the vessel?
A Yes sir, that is right.
Q But at no time during the maneuver did you issue order contrary to the
orders Capt. Gavino made?
A No sir.
Q So that you were in full accord with all of Capt. Gavino's orders?
A Yes sir.
Q Because, otherwise, you would have issued order that would
supersede his own order?
A In that case, I should t,ke him away from his command or remove the
command from him.
Court (to the witness)
Q You were in full accord with the steps being taken by Capt. Gavino
because you relied on his knowledge, on his familiarity of the seabed and
shoals and other surroundings or conditions under the sea, is that
correct?
A Yes sir, that is right.
xxx xxx xxx
Solicitor Abad (to the witness)
Q And so after the anchors were ordered dropped and they did not take
hold of the seabed, you were alerted that there was danger already on
hand?
A No sir, there was no imminent danger to the vessel.
Q Do you mean to tell us that even if the anchor was supposed to take
hold of the bottom and it did not, there was no danger to the ship?
A Yes sir, because the anchor dragged on the ground later.
Q And after a few moments when the anchor should have taken hold the
seabed bur not done (sic), as you expected, you already were alerted that
there was danger to the ship, is that correct?
A Yes sir, I was alerted but there was no danger.
Q And you were alerted that somebody was wrong?
A Yes sir, I was alerted.
Q And this alert vou assumed was the ordinary alertness that you have for
normal docking?
A Yes sir, I mean that it was usual condition of any man in time of docking
to be alert.
Q And that is the same alertness when the anchor did not hold onto the
ground, is that correct?
A Yes sir, me and Capt. Gavino (thought) that the anchor will hold the
ground.
Q Since, as you said that you agreed all the while with the orders of Capt.
Gavino, you also therefore agreed with him in his failure to take necessary
precaution against the eventuality that the anchor will not hold as
expected?
Atty. Del Rosario:
May I ask that the question . . .
Solicitor Abad:
Never mind, I will reform the question.
xxx xxx xxx
Solicitor Abad (to the witness)
Q Is it not a fact that the vessel bumped the pier?
A That is right, it bumped the pier.
Q For the main reason that the anchor of the vessel did not hold the
ground as expected?
A Yes sir, that is my opinion. 73
Further, on redirect examination, Capt. Kabankov fortified his apathetic assessment of
the situation:
Q Now, after the anchor was dropped, was there any point in time that
you felt that the vessel was in imminent danger.
A No, at that time, the vessel was not in imminent, danger, sir. 74
This cavalier appraisal of the event by Capt. Kabankov is disturbingly antipodal to Capt.
Gavino's anxious assessment of the situation:
Q When a pilot is on board a vessel, it is the piler's command which
should be followed at that moment until the vessel is, or goes to port or
reaches port?
A Yes, your Honor, but it does not take away from the Captain his
prerogative to countermand the pilot.
Q In what way?
A In any case, which he thinks the pilot is not maneuvering correctly, the
Captain always has the prerogative to countermand the pilot's order.
Q But insofar as competence, efficiency and functional knowledee of the
seabed which are vital or decisive in the safety (sic) bringing of a vessel to
the port, he is not competent?
A Yes, your Honor. That is why they hire a pilot in an advisory capacity,
but still, the safety of the vessel rest(s) upon the Captain, the Master of
the vessel.
Q In this case, there was not a disagreement between you and the
Captain of the vessel in the bringing of the vessel to port?
A No, your Honor.
Court:
May proceed.
Atty. Catris:
 In fact, the Master of the vessel testified here that he was all along in
conformity with the orders you, gave to him, and, as matter of fact, as he
said, he obeyed all your orders. Can you tell, if in the course of giving
such normal orders for the saf(e) docking of the MV Pavlodar, do you
remember of any instance that the Master of the vessel did not obey your
command for the safety docking of the MV Pavlodar?
Atty. del Rosario:
Already answered, he already said yes sir.
Court:
Yes, he has just answered yes sir to the Court that there was no
disagreement insofar as the bringing of the vessel safely to the port.
Atty. Catris:
But in this instance of docking of the MV Pavlodar, do you remember of a
time during the course of the docking that the MV Pavlodar was in
imminent danger of bumping the pier?
A When we were about more than one thousand meters from the pier, I
think, the anchor was not holding, so I immediately ordered to push the
bow at a fourth quarter, at the back of the vessel in order to swing the bow
away from the pier and at the same time, I ordered for a full astern of the
engine. 75
These conflicting reactions can only imply, at the very least, unmindful
disregard or, worse, neglectful relinquishment of duty by the shipmaster,
tantamount to negligence.
The findings of the trial court on this aspect is noteworthy:
For, while the pilot Gavino may indeed have been charged with the
task of docking the vessel in the berthing space, it is undisputed that
the master of the vessel had the corresponding duty to countermand
any of the orders made by the pilot, and even maneuver the vessel
himself, in case of imminent danger to the vessel and the port.
In fact, in his testimony, Capt. Kavankov admitted that all throughour
the man(eu)vering procedures he did not notice anything was going
wrong, and even observed that the order given to drop the anchor
was done at the proper time. He even ventured the opinion that the
accident occurred because the anchor failed to take hold but that this
did not alarm him because.there was still time to drop a second
anchor.
Under normal circumstances, the abovementioned facts would have
caused the master of a vessel to take charge of the situation and see
to the man(eu)vering of the vessel himself. Instead, Capt. Kavankov
chose to rely blindly upon his pilot, who by this time was proven ill-
equipped to cope with the situation.
xxx xxx xxx
It is apparent that Gavino was negligent but Far Eastern's employee
Capt. Kavankov was no lesss responsible for as master of the vessel
he stood by the pilot during the man(eu)vering procedures and was
privy to every move the latter made, as well as the vessel's response
to each of the commands. His choice to rely blindly upon the pilot's
skills, to the point that despite being appraised of a notice of alert he
continued to relinquish control of the vessel to Gavino, shows
indubitably that he was not performing his duties with the diligence
required of him and therefore may be charged with negligence along
with defend;int Gavino. 76
As correctly affirmed by the Court of Appeals —
We are in full accord with the findings and disquisitions of the Court a
quo.
In the present recourse, Captain Viktor Kavankov had been a mariner
for thirty-two years before the incident. When Gavino was (in) the
command of the vessel, Kavankov was beside Gavino, relaying the
commands or orders of Gavino to the crewmembers-officers of the
vessel concerned. He was thus fully aware of the docking maneuvers
and procedure Gavino undertook to dock the vessel. Irrefragably,
Kavankov was fully aware of the bulk and size of the vessel and its
cargo as well as the weight of the vessel. Kavankov categorically
admitted that, when the anchor and two (2) shackles were dropped to
the sea floor, the claws of the anchor did not hitch on to any hard
object in the seabed. The momentum of the vessel was not arrested.
The use of the two (2) tugboats was insufficient. The momentum of
the vessel, although a little bit arrested, continued (sic) the vessel
going straightforward with its bow towards the port (Exhibit "A-1 ).
There was thus a need for the vessel to move "full-astern" and to
drop the other anchor with another shackle or two (2), for the vessel
to avoid hitting the pier. Kavankov refused to act even as Gavino
failed to act. Even as Gavino gave mere "half-astern" order,
Kavankov supinely stood by. The vessel was already about twenty
(20) meters away from the pier when Gavino gave the "full-astern"
order. Even then, Kavankov did nothing to prevent the vessel from
hitting the pier simply because he relied on the competence and plan
of Gavino. While the "full-astern'' maneuver momentarily arrested the
momentum of the vessel, it was, by then, too late. All along,
Kavankov stood supinely beside Gavino, doing nothing but relay the
commands of Gavino. Inscrutably, then, Kavankov was negligent.
xxx xxx xxx
The stark incompetence of Kavankov is competent evidence to prove
the unseaworthiness of the vessel. It has been held that the
incompetence of the navigator, the master of the vessel or its crew
makes the vessel unseaworthy (Tug Ocean Prince versus United
States of America, 584 F. 2nd, page 1151). Hence, the Appellant
FESC is likewise liable for the damage sustained by the Appellee. 77
We find strong and well-reasoned support in time-tested American maritime
jurisprudence, on which much of our laws and jurisprudence on the matter are based, for
the conclusions of the Court of Appeals adjudging both Capt. Gavino and Capt.
Kabankov negligent.
As early as 1869, the U.S. Supreme Court declared, through Mr. Justice Swayne, in
The Steamship China vs. Walsh, 78 that it is the duty of the master to interfere in cases of
the pilot's intoxication or manifest incapacity, in cases of danger which he does not
foresee, and in all cases of great necessity. The master has the same power to displace
the pilot that he has to remove any subordinate officer of the vessel, at his discretion.
In 1895, the U.S. Supreme Court, this time through Mr. Justice Brown, emphatically ruled
that:
Nor are rye satisfied with the conduct of the master in leaving the
pilot in sole charge of the vessel. While the pilot doubtless
supersedes the master for the time being in the command and
navigation of the ship, and his orders must be obeyed in all matters
 connected with her navigation, the master is not wholly absolved from
his duties while the pilot is on board, and may advise with him, and
even displace him in case he is intoxicated or manifestly incompetent.
He is still in command of the vessel, except so far as her navigation is
concerned, and bound to see that there is a sufficient watch on deck,
and that the men are attentive to their duties.
. . . (N)orwithstanding the pilot has charge, it is the duty of the master
to prevent accident, and not to abandon the vessel entirely to the
pilot; but that there are certain duties he has to discharge
(notwithstanding there is a pilot on board) for the benefit of the
owners. . . . that in well conducted ships the master does not regard
the presence of a duly licensed pilot in compulsory pilot waters as
freeing him from every, obligation to attend to the safety of the vessel;
but that, while the master sees that his officers and crew duly attend
to the pilot's orders, he himself is bound to keep a vigilant eye on the
navigation of the vessel, and, when exceptional circumstances exist,
not only to urge upon the pilot to use every precaution, but to insist
upon such being taken. 79 (Italics for emphasis.)
In Jure vs. United Fruit Co., 80 which, like the present petitions, involved compulsory
pilotage, with a similar scenario where at and prior to the time of injury, the vessel was in
the charge of a pilot with the master on the bridge of the vessel beside said pilot, the
court therein ruled:
The authority of the master of a vessel is not in complete abeyance
while a pilot, who is required by law to be accepted, is in discharge of
his functions. . . . It is the duty of the master to interfere in cases of
the pilot's intoxication or manifest incapacity, in cases of danger
which he does not foresee, and in all cases of great necessity. The
master has the same power to displace the pilot that he has to
remove any subordinate officer of the vessel. He may exercise it, or
not, according to his discretion. There was evidence to support
findings that piaintiff's injury was due to the negligent operation of the
Atenas, and that the master of that vessel was negligent in failing to
take action to avoid endangering a vessel situated as the City of
Canton was and persons or property thereon.
A phase of the evidence furnished support for the inferences . . . that
he negligently failed to suggest to the pilot the danger which was
disclosed, and means of avoiding such danger; and that the master's
negligence in failing to give timelt admonition to the pilot proximately
contributed to the injury complained of. We are of opinion that the
evidence mentioned tended to prove conduct of the pilot, known to
the master, giving rise to a case of danger or great necessity, calling
for the intervention of the master. A master of a vessel is not without
fault in acquiescing in canduct of a pilot which involves apparent and
avoidable danger, whether such danger is to the vessel upon which
the pilot is, or to another vessel, or persons or property thereon or on
shore. (Emphasis ours.)
Still in another case involving a nearly identical setting, the captain of a vessel alongside
the compulsory pilot was deemed to be negligent, since, in the words of the court, "he
was in a position to exercise his superior authority if he had deemed the speed
excessive on the occasion in question. I think it was clearly negligent of him not to have
recognized the danger to any craft moored at Gravell Dock and that he should have
directed the pilot to reduce his speed as required by the local governmental
regulations. His failure amounted to negligence and renders the respondent
liable." 81 (Emphasis supplied.) Though a compulsory pilot might be regarded as an
independent contractor, he is at all times subject to the ultimate control of the ship's
master. 82
In sum, where a compulsory pilot is in charge of a ship, the master being required to
permit him to navigate it, if the master observes that the pilot is incompetent or physically
incapable, then it is the dury of the master to refuse to permit the pilot to act. But if no
such reasons are present, then the master is justified in relying upon the pilot, but not
blindly. Under the circumstances of this case, if a situation arose where the master,
exercising that reasonable vigilance which the master of a ship should exercise,
observed, or should have observed, that the pilot was so navigating the vessel that she
was going, or was likely to go, into danger, and there was in the exercise of reasonable
care and vigilance an opportunity for the master to intervene so as to save the ship from
danger, the master should have acted accordingly. 83 The master of a vessel must
exercise a degree of vigilance commensurate with the circumstances. 84
Inasmuch as the matter of negligence is a question of fact, 85 we defer to the findings of
the trial court, especially as this is affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 86 But even beyond
that, our own evaluation is that Capt. Kabankov's shared liability is due mainly to the fact
that he failed to act when the perilous situation should have spurred him into quick and
decisive action as master of the ship. In the face of imminent or actual danger, he did not
have to wait for the happenstance to occur before countermanding or overruling the pilot.
By his own admission, Capt. Kabankov concurred with Capt. Gavino's decisions, and this
is precisely the reason why he decided not to countermand any of the latter's orders.
Inasmuch as both lower courts found Capt. Gavino negligent, by expressing full
agreement therewith Capt. Kabankov was just as negligent as Capt. Gavino.
In general, a pilot is personally liable for damages caused by his own negligence or
default to the owners of the vessel, and to third parties for damages sustained in a
collision. Such negligence of the pilot in the performance of duty constitutes a maritime
tort. 87 At common law, a shipowner is not liable for injuries inflicted exclusively by the
negligence of a pilot accepted by a vessel compulsorily. 88 The exemption from liability
for such negligence shall apply if the pilot is actually in charge and solely in fault. Since,
a pilot is responsible only for his own personal negligence, he cannot be held
accountable for damages proximately caused by the default of others, 89 or, if there be
anything which concurred with the fault of the pilot in producing the accident, the vessel
master and owners are liable.
Since the colliding vessel is prima facie responsible, the burden of proof is upon the
party claiming benefit of the exemption from liability. It must be shown affirmatively that
the pilot was at fault, and that there was no fault on the part of the officers or crew, which
might have been conducive to the damage. The fact that the law compelled the master to
take the pilot does not exonerate the vessel from liability. The parties who suffer are
entitled to have their remedy against the vessel that occasioned the damage, and are not
under necessity to look to the pilot from whom redress is not always had for
compensation. The owners of the vessel are responsible to the injured party for the acts
of the pilot, and they must be left to recover the amount as well as they can against him.
It cannot be maintained that the circumstance of having a pilot on board, and acting in
conformity to his directions operate as a discharge of responsibility of the
owners. 90 Except insofar as their liability is limited or exempted by statute, the vessel or
her owner are liable for all damages caused by the negligence or other wrongs of the
owners or those in charge of the vessel. Where the pilot of a vessel is not a compulsory
one in the sense that the owner or master of the vessel are bound to accept him, but is
employed voluntarily, the owners of the vessel are, all the more, liable for his negligent
act. 91
In the United States, the owners of a vessel are not personally liable for the negligent
acts of a compulsory pilot, but by admiralty law, the fault or negligence of a compulsory
pilot is imputable to the vessel and it may be held liable therefor in rem. Where, however,
by the provisions of the statute the pilot is compulsory only in the sense that his fee must
be paid, and is not in compulsory charge of the vessel, there is no exemption from
liability. Even though the pilot is compulsory, if his negligence was not the sole cause of
the injury, but the negligence of the master or crew contributed thereto, the owners are
liable. 92 But the liability of the ship in rem does not release the pilot from the
consequences of his own negligence. 93 The rationale for this rule is that the master is
not entirely absolved of responsibility with respect to navigation when a compulsory pilot
is in charge. 94
By way of validation and in light of the aforecited guidepost rulings in American maritime
cases, we declare that our rulings during the early years of this century in City of Manila
vs. Gambe, 95 China Navigation Co., Ltd. vs. Vidal, 96 and Yap Tica & Co. vs.
Anderson, et al. 97 have withstood the proverbial test of time and remain good and
relevant case law to this day.
City of Manila stands for the doctrine that the pilot who was in command and complete
control of a vessel, and not the owners, must be held responsible for an accident which
was solely the result of the mistake of the pilot in not giving proper orders, and which did
not result from the failure of the owners to equip the vessel with the most modern and
improved machinery. In China Navigation Co., the pilot deviated from the ordinary and
safe course, without heeding the warnings of the ship captain. It was this careless
deviation that caused the vessel to collide with a pinnacle rock which, though uncharted,
was known to pilots and local navigators. Obviously, the captain was blameless. It was
the negligence of the pilot alone which was the proximate cause of the collision. The
Court could not but then rule that —
The pilot in the case at bar having deviated from the usual and
ordinary course followed by navigators in passing through the strait in
question, without a substantial reason, was guilty of negligence, and
that negligence having been the proximate cause of the damages, he
is liable for such damages as usually and naturally flow therefrom. . . .
. . . (T)he defendant should have known of the existence and location
of the rock upon which the vessel struck while under his control and
management. . . . .
Consistent with the pronouncements in these two earlier cases, but on a slightly different
tack, the Court in Yap Tico & Co. exonerated the pilot from liability for the accident where
the orders of the pilot in the handling of the ship were disregarded by the officers and
crew of the ship. According to the Court, a pilot is ". . . responsible for a full knowledge of
the channel and the navigation only so far as he can accomplish it through the officers
and crew of the ship, and I don't see chat he can be held responsible for damage when
the evidence shows, as it does in this case, that the officers and crew of the ship failed to
obey his orders." Nonetheless, it is possible for a compulsory pilot and the master of the
vessel to be concurrently negligent and thus share the blame for the resulting damage as
joint tortfeasors, 98 but only under the circumstances obtaining in and demonstrated by
the instant petitions.
It may be said, as a general rule, that negligence in order to render a person liable need
not be the sole cause of an injury. It is sufficient that his negligence, concurring with one
or more efficient causes other than piaintiff's, is the proximate cause of the injury.
Accordingly, where several causes combine to produce injuries, a person is not relieved
from liability because he is responsible for only one of them, it being sufficient that the
negligence of the person charged with injury is an efficient cause without which the injury
would not have resulted to as great an extent, and that such cause is not attributable to
the person injured. It is no defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the injury
would not have resulted from his negligence alone, without the negligence or wrongful
acts of the other concurrent rortfeasor. 99 Where several causes producing an injury are
concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have
happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be
had against any or all of the responsible persons although under the circumstances of
the case, it may appear that one of them was more culpable, and that the duty owed by
them to the injured person was not the same. No actor's negligence ceases to be a
proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors. Each
wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the
sole cause of the injury. 100
There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of
them are liable for the total damage. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts
or omissions of two or more persons, although acting independently, are in combination
the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, it is impossible to
determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury and either of them is
responsible for the whole injury. Where their concurring negligence resulted in injury or
damage to a third party, they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the
resulting damage under Article 2194 101 of the Civil Code. 102
As for the amount of damages awarded by the trial court, we find the same to be
reasonable. The testimony of Mr. Pascual Barral, witness for PPA, on cross and redirect
examination, appears to be grounded on practical considerations:
Q So that the cost of the two additional piles as well as the (two) square
meters is already included in this P1,300,999.77.
A Yes sir, everything. It is (the) final cost already.
Q For the eight piles.
A Including the reduced areas and other reductions.
Q (A)nd the two square meters.
A Yes sir.
Q In other words, this P1,300,999.77 does not represent only for the six
piles that was damaged as well as the corresponding two piles.
A The area was corresponding, was increased by almost two in the actual
payment. That was why the contract was decreased, the real amount was
P1,124,627.40 and the final one is P1,300,999.77.
Q Yes, but that P1,300,999.77 included the additional two new posts.
A It was increased.
Q Why was it increased?
A The original was 48 and the actual was 46.
Q Now, the damage was somewhere in 1980. It took place in 1980 and
you started the repair and reconstruction in 1982, that took almost two
years?
A Yes sir.
Q May it not happen that by natural factors, the existing damage in 1980
was aggravated for the 2 year period that the damage portion was not
repaired?
A I don't think so because that area was at once marked and no vehicles
can park, it was closed.
Q Even if or even natural elements cannot affect the damage?
A Cannot, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q You said in the cross-examination that there were six piles damaged by
the accident, but that in the reconstruction of the pier, PPA drove and
 constructed 8 piles. Will you explain to us why there was change in the
number of piles from the original number?
A In piers where the piles are withdrawn or pulled out, you cannot re-drive
or drive piles at the same point. You have to redesign the driving of the
piles. We cannot drive the piles at the same point where the piles are
broken or damaged or pulled out. We have to redesign, and you will note
that in the reconstruction, we redesigned such that it necessitated 8 plies.
Q Why not, why could you not drive the same number of piles and on the
same spot?
A The original location was already disturbed. We cannot get required
bearing capacity. The area is already disturbed.
Q Nonetheless, if you drove the original number of piles, six, on different
places, would not that have sustained the same load?
A It will not suffice, sir. 103
We quote the findings of the lower court with approval.
With regards to the amount of damages that is to be awarded to
plaintiff, the Court finds that the amount of P1,053,300.00 is justified.
Firstly, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur best expounded upon in the
landmark case of Republic vs. Luzon Stevedoring Corp. (21 SCRA
279) establishes the presumption that in the ordinary course of events
the ramming of the dock would not have occurred if proper care was
used.
Secondly, the various estimates and plans justify the cost of the port
construction price. The new structure constructed not only replaced
the damaged one but was built of stronger materials to forestall the
possibility of any similar accidents in the future.
The Court inevitably finds that the plaintiff is entitled to an award of
P1,053,300.00 which represents actual damages caused by the
damage to Berth 4 of the Manila International Port. Co-defendants
Far Eastern Shipping, Capt. Senen Gavino and Manila Pilots
Association are solidariiy liable to pay this amount to plaintiff.104
The Solicitor General rightly commented that the adjudicated amount of
damages represents the proportional cost of repair and rehabilitation of the
damaged section of the pier. 105
Except insofar as their liability is limited or exempted by statute, the vessel or her owners
are liable for all damages caused by the negligence or other wrongs of the owners or
those in charge of the vessel. As a general rule, the owners or those in possession and
control of a vessel and the vessel are liable for all natural and proximate damages
caused to persons or property by reason of her negligent management or navigation. 106
FESC's imputation of PPA's failure to provide a safe and reliable berthing place is
obtuse, not only because it appears to be a mere afterthought, being tardily raised only
in this petition, but also because there is no allegation or evidence on record about Berth
No. 4 being unsafe and unreliable, although perhaps it is a modest pier by international
standards. There was, therefore, no error on the part of the Court of Appeals in
dismissing FESC's counterclaim.
II. G.R. No. 130150
This consolidated case treats on whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding MPA
jointly and solidarily liable with its member pilot. Capt. Gavino, in the absence of
employer-employee relationship and in applying Customs Administrative Order No. 15-
65, as basis for the adjudged solidary liability of MPA and Capt. Gavino.
The pertinent provisions in Chapter I of Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 are:
PAR. XXVII. — In all pilotage districts where pilotage is compulsory,
there shall be created and maintained by the pilots or pilots'
association, in the manner hereinafter prescribed, a reserve fund
equal to P1,000.00 for each pilot thereof for the purpose of paying
claims for damages to vessels or property caused through acts or
omissions of its members while rendered in compulsory pilotage
service. In Manila, the reserve fund shall be P2,000.00 for each pilot.
PAR. XXVIII. — A pilots' association shall not be liable under these
regulations for damage to any vessel, or other property, resulting from
acts of a member of an association in the actual performance of his
duty for a greater amount than seventy-five per centum (75%) of its
prescribed reserve fund; it being understood that if the association is
held liable for an amount greater than the amount above-stated, the
excess shall be paid by the personal funds of the member concerned.
PAR. XXXI. — If a payment is made from the reserve fund of an
association on account of damages caused by a member thereof, and
he shall have been found at fault, such member shall reimburse the
association in the amount so paid as soon as practicable; and for this
purpose, not less than twenty-five per centum of his dividends shall
be retained each month until the full amount has been returned to the
reserve fund.
PAR. XXXIV. — Nothing in these regulations shall relieve any pilots'
association or members thereof, individually or collectively, from civil
responsibility for damages to life or property resulting from the acts of
members in the performance of their duties.
Correlatively, the relevant provisions of PPA Administrative Order No. 03-85, which
timery amended this applicable maritime regulation, state:
Art. IV
Sec. 17. Pilots' Association — The Pilots in a Pilotage District shall
organize themselves into a Pilots' Association or firm, the members of
which shall promulgate their own By-Laws not in conflict with the rules
and regulations promulgated by the Authority. These By-Laws shall
be submitted not later than one (1) month after the organization of the
Pilots' Association for approval by the General Manager of the
Authority. Subsequent amendments thereto shall likewise be
submitted for approval.
Sec. 25. Indemnity Insurance and Reserve Fund —
a) Each Pilots' Association shall collectively insure its
membership at the rate of P50,000.00 each member to
cover in whole or in part any liability arising from any
accident resulting in damage to vessel(s), port facilities and
other properties and/or injury to persons or death which any
member may have caused in the course of his performance
of pilotage duties. . . . .
b) The Pilotage Association shall likewise set up and
maintain a reserve fund which shall answer for any part of
the liability referred to in the immediately preceding
paragraph which is left unsatisfied by the insurance
proceeds, in the following manner:
 1) Each pilot in the Association shall contribute
from his own account an amount of P4,000.00
(P6,000.00 in the Manila Pilotage District) to the
reserve fund. This fund shall not be considered
part of the capital of the Association nor charged
as an expense thereof.
2) Seventy-five percent (75 %) of the reserve fund
shall be set aside for use in the payment of
damages referred to above incurred in the actual
performance of pilots' duties and the excess shall
be paid from the personal funds of the member
concerned.
xxx xxx xxx
5) If payment is made from the reserve fund of an
Association on account of damage caused by a
member thereof who is found at fault, he shall
reimburse the Association in the amount so paid
as soon as practicable; and for this purpose, not
less than twenty-five percentum (25 %) of his
dividend shall be retained each month until the full
amount has been returned to the reserve fund.
Thereafter, the pilot involved shall be entitled to
his full dividend.
6) When the reimbursement has been completed
as prescribed in the preceding paragraph, the ten
percentum (10%) and the interest withheld from
the shares of the other pilots in accordance with
paragraph (4) hereof shall be returned to them.
c) Liability of Pilots' Association — Nothing in these
regulations shall relieve any Pilots' Association or members
thereof, individually or collectively, from any civil,
administrative and/or criminal responsibility for damages to
life or property resulting from the individual acts of its
members as well as those of the Association's employees
and crew in the performance of their duties.
The Court of Appeals, while affirming the trial court's finding of solidary liability on the
part of FESC, MPA and Capt. Gavino, correctly based MPA' s liability not on the concept
of employer-employee relationship between Capt. Gavino and itself, but on the
provisions of Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65:
The Appellant MPA avers that, contrary to the findings and
disquisitions of the Court a quo, the Appellant Gavino was not and
has never been an employee of the MPA but was only a member
thereof. The Court a quo, it is noteworthy, did not state the factual
basis on which it anchored its finding that Gavino was the employee
of MPA. We are in accord with MPA's pose. Case law teaches Us
that, for an employer-employee relationship to exist, the confluence of
the following elements must be established: (1) selection and
engagement of employees; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power
of dismissal; (4) the employer's power to control the employees with
respect to the means and method by which the work is to be
performed (Ruga versus NLRC, 181 SCRA 266).
xxx xxx xxx
The liability of MPA for damages is not anchored on Article 2180 of
the New Civil Code as erroneously found and declared by the Court a
quo but under the provisions of Customs Administrative Order No. 15-
65, supra, in tandem with the by-laws of the MPA. 107
There being no employer-employee relationship, clearly Article 2180 108 of the Civil Code
is inapplicable since there is no vicarious liability of an employer to speak of. It is so
stated in American law, as follows:
The well established rule is that pilot associations are immune to
vicarious liability for the tort of their members. They are not the
employer of their members and exercise no control over them once
they take the helm of the vessel. They are also not partnerships
because the members do not function as agents for the association or
for each other. Pilots' associations are also not liable for negligently
assuring the competence of their members because as professional
associations they made no guarantee of the professional conduct of
their members to the general public. 109
Where under local statutes and regulations, pilot associations lack the necessary legal
incidents of responsibility, they have been held not liable for damages caused by the
default of a member pilot. 110 Whether or not the members of a pilots' association are in
legal effect a copartnership depends wholly on the powers and duties of the members in
relation to one another under the provisions of the governing statutes and regulations.
The relation of a pilot to his association is not that of a servant to the master, but of an
associate assisting and participating in a common purpose. Ultimately, the rights and
liabilities between a pilots' association and an individual member depend largely upon
the constitution, articles or by-laws of the association, subject to appropriate government
regulations. 111
No reliance can be placed by MPA on the cited American rulings as to immunity from
liability of a pilots' association in ljght of existing positive regulation under Philippine law.
The Court of Appeals properly applied the clear and unequivocal provisions of Customs
Administrative Order No. 15-65. In doing so, it was just being consistent with its finding of
the non-existence of employer-employee relationship between MPA and Capt. Gavino
which precludes the application of Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
True. Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 does not categorically characterize or
label MPA's liability as solidary in nature. Nevertheless, a careful reading and proper
analysis of the correlated provisions lead to the conclusion that MPA is solidarily liable
for the negligence of its member pilots, without prejudice to subsequent reimbursement
from the pilot at fault.
Art. 1207 of the Civil Code provides that there is solidary liability only when the obligation
expressly so states, or when the law or the nature of the obligation requires solidarity.
Plainly, Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65, which as an implementing rule has the
force and effect of law, can validly provide for solidary liability.We note the Solicitor
General's comment hereon, to wit:
. . . Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 may be a mere rule and
regulation issued by an administrative agency pursuant to a
delegated authority to fix "the details" in the execution or enforcement
of a policy set out in the law itself. Nonetheless, said administrative
order, which adds to the procedural or enforcing provisions of
substantive law, is legally binding and receives the same statutory
force upon going into effect. In that sense, it has equal, not lower,
 statutory force and effect as a regular statute passed by the 7 Revised Rules and Regulations Governing Pilotage Districts, Pilots and Pilots
legislature. 112 Association and Rates of Pilotage Fees in the Philippines, dated September 1, 1965
and approved on October 13, 1965; 61 O.G. No., 51, 8217-8237, December 20,
MPA's prayer for modification of the appellate court's decision under review by 1965.
exculpating petitioner MPA "from liability beyond seventy-five percent (75 %) of Reserve 8 Rollo, G.R. No. 130068, 83; Rollo, G.R. No. 130150, 46.
9 Ibid., id., 43.
Fund" is unnecessary because the liability of MPA under Par. XXVIII of Customs 10 Ibid., id., 44-53.
Administrative Order No. 15-65 is in fact limited to seventy-five percent (75 %) of its * Also spelled as "Kavankov" elsewhere in the records.
prescribed reserve fund, any amount of liability beyond that being for the personal 11 Rollo, G.R. No. 130068, 229-230.
account of the erring pilot and subject to reimbursement in case of a finding of fault by 12 Rollo, G.R. No. 130150, 10-11.
the member concerned. This is clarified by the Solicitor General: 13 Ibid., id., 12-18.
14 Ibid., id., 4.
Moreover, contrary to petitioner's pretensions, the provisions of 15 Ibid., id., 62-66.
Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 do not limit the liability of 16 Ibid., id., 95-98.
17 Ibid., id., 103-106.
petitioner as a pilots' association to an absurdly small amount of 18 Ibid., id., 108; Minute resolution of the First Division dated July 8, 1998.
seventy-five per centum (75 %) of the member pilots' contribution of 19 Effective July 1, 1997, per resolution of the Supreme Court in Bar Matter No. 803,
P2,000.00 to the reserve fund. The law speaks of the entire reserve adopted in Baguio City on April 8, 1997.
fund required to be maintained by the pilots' association to answer 20 Rollo, G.R. No. 130068, 3-4.
(for) whatever liability arising from the tortious act of its members. 21 Ibid., id., 4.
22 Ibid., id., 56-57.
And even if the association is held liable for an amount greater than 23 Rollo, G.R. No. 130150, 48.
the reserve fund, the association may not resist the liability by 24 Ibid., id., 23.
claiming to be liable only up to seventy-five per centum (75 %) of the 25 Rollo, G.R. No. 130068, 57.
reserve fund because in such instance it has the right to be 26 Canon 10, Code of Professional Responsibility.
27 Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1992 ed., 109.
reimbursed by the offending member pilot for the excess. 113 28 Canon 22, Canons of Professional Ethics; Chavez vs. Viola, Adm. Case No.
WHEREFORE, in view of all of the foregoing, the consolidated petitions for review are 2152, April 19, 1991, 196 SCRA 10.
29 Cuaresma vs. Daquis, et al., G.R. No. L-35113, March 25, 1975, 63 SCRA 257;
DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto.
Libit vs. Oliva, et al. A.C. No. 2837, October 7, 1994, 237 SCRA 375.
Counsel for FESC, the law firm of Del Rosario and Del Rosario, specifically its associate, 30 Rule 10.03, Canon 10, Code of Professional Responsibility.
Atty. Herbert A. Tria, is REPRIMANDED and WARNED that a repetition of the same or 31 Canon 12, Code of Professional Responsibility.
32 Chua Huat, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 53851, July 9, 1991, 199
similar acts of heedless disregard of its undertakings under the Rules shall be dealt with SCRA 1, jointly deciding G.R. No. 63863.
more severely. 33 Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility.
34 Gabriel, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-43757-58, July 30, 1976, 72
The original members of the legal team of the Office of the Solicitor General assigned to SCRA 273.
this case, namely, Assistant Solicitor General Roman G. Del Rosario and Solicitor Luis 35 Rollo, G.R. No. 130068, 221-242.
F. Simon, are ADMONISHED and WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts 36 Ibid., id., 196.
of unduly delaying proceedings due to delayed filing of required pleadings shall also be 37 Ibid., id., 242-243; Affidavit of service by Heidi B. Garcia, Records Officer III,
dealt with more stringently. Office of the Solicitor General.
38 Rollo, G.R. No. 130150, 86-101.
The Solicitor Genral is DIRECTED to look into the circumstances of this case and to 39 Ibid., id., 102; Affidavit of service by Ofelia P. Panopio, Records Officer IV, Office
adopt provident measures to avoid a repetition of this incident and which would ensure of the Solicitor General.
40 Sec. 3, in relation to Section 5, Rule 45.
prompt compliance with orders of this Court regarding the timely filing of requisite 41 Rollio, G.R. No. 130068, 222.
pleadings, in the interest of just, speedy and orderly administration of justice. 42 Ibid., G.R. No. 130150, 89.
43 Canon 6, Code of Professional Responsibility.
Let copies of this decision be spread upon the personal records of the lawyers named 44 Sec. 2, R.A. No. 6713, entitled "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
herein in the Office of the Bar Confidant. Officials and Employees."
SO ORDERED. 45 Sec. 4(b), ibid.
46 Sec. 4(e), ibid.
Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Panganiban, Martinez, 47 Rules and Regulations Governing Pilotage Services, The Conduct of Pilots and
Quisumbing and Purisima, JJ., concur. Pilotage Fees in Philippine Ports, dated March 21, 1985, 81 O.G. No. 18, 1872-
1887.
Narvasa, C.J. and Mendoza, J., are on official leave. 48 Rollo, G.R. No. 130068, 45-50.
49 Ibid., id., 50-53.
Footnotes 50 Bunge Corporation vs. M.V. Furness Bridge, 558 F.2d 790 (1977).
1 Rollo, G.R. No. 130068, 61-83; Rollo, G.R. No. 130150, 24-46; per Justice Romeo 51 Canal Barge Company, Inc. vs. Mary Kathryn Griffith, 480 F.2d 11
J. Callejo, Sr.,ponente, with the concurrence of Justices Pedro A. Ramirez and (1973), citing The Oregon, 158 U.S. 186, 39 Law Ed. 943 (1895).
Pacita Cañizares-Nye. 52 Patterson Oil Terminals vs. The Port Covington, 109 F. Supp. 953, 954 (E.D. Pa.
2 Ibid., id., 85; ibid., id., 47. 1952), cited in Bunge Corporation vs. M.V. Furness Bridge, supra, Fn 50.
3 Ibid., id., 61-63; ibid., id., 24-26. 53 48 C.J., Pilots, §§ 1-2, 1183-1184; 70 C.J.S., Pilots, § 1, 1061.
4 Original Record, 1-6. 54 48 Am Jur, Shipping, § 192, 133; Hernandez and Peñasalas, Philippine Admiralty
5 Ibid., 292-301; per Judge Abelardo M. Dayrit. and Maritime Law, 1987 edition, 368.
6 Rollo, G.R. No. 130068, 65-66; Rollo, G.R. No. 130150, 28-29. 55 Ibid., id., § 193, 133; Op. cit., 369.
56 48 C.J., Pilots, § 30, 1192; 48 Am Jur, Shipping, § 204; 139.
57 48 Am Jur, Shipping, § 194, 134. 105 Comment, 18; Rollo, G.R. No. 130068, 238.
58 48 C.J., Pilots, § 67, 1201; 70 C.J.S., Pilots, § 14(b), 1080. 106 58 C.J., Shipping, §§ 417-418, 297-298.
59 22 Law. Ed. 619. 107 Rollo, G.R. No. 130068, 65-66; Rollo, G.R. No. 130150, 28-29.
60 TSN, May 24, 1984, 8-10. 108 Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for
61 Regional Trial Court Decision, 10; Original Record, 300. one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
62 57A Am Jur 2d, Negligence, § 153, 214. responsible.
63 Prosser, Law of Torts, § 32, 164. xxx xxx xxx
64 Cooley, Torts, 647, cited in Wilson v. Charleston Pilots Association, et al., 57 Fed. Employers shall be liable for the damagas caused by their employees and
227 (1893). household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the
65 Davidson Steamship Company vs. United States, 205 U.S. 186, 51 Law, Ed. 764 former are not engaged in any business or industry.
(1907). xxx xxx xxx
66 57A Am Jur 2d, Negligence, § 169, 224-225. 109 Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law, 1987 edition, 437; Guy
67 Court of Appeals Decision, 13-15; Rollo, G.R. No. 130068, 73-74, 75. vs. Donald, supra, Fn 70; The Manchioneal, 243 Fed. 801 (1917); 48 Am Jur,
68 Regional Trial Court Decision, 10; Original Record, 300. Shipping, § 196, 135.
69 The Oregon, infra., Fn 79. 110 48 C.J., Pilots, § 75, 1203.
70 Guy vs. Donald, 157 F 527. 111 70 C.J.S., Pilots, § 17, 1083.
71 70 C.J.S., Pilots, § 14, 1078-1079; 48 C.J., Pilots, § 64, 1199; 80 C.J,S, Shipping, 112 Rollo, G.R. No. 130150, 93.
§ 64, 782. 113 Rollo, G.R. No. 130150, 99.
72 48 Am Jur, Shipping, § 125, 89.
73 TSN, May 23, 1984, 6-8, 13-17, 38-40, 46-52.
74 Ibid., May 24, 1984, 40.
75 TSN, May 24, 1984, 16-19.
76 Original Record, 300-301.
77 Rollo, G.R. No. 130068, 79-80, 81.
78 74 U.S. 67; Union Shipping & Trading Co., Ltd. vs. United States, 127 F.2d, 771
(1942).
79 The Oregon, 158 U.S. 186, 39 Law Ed, 943.
80 6 F.(2d), 7 (1925).
81 The Emma T. Grimes, Mulqueen v. Cunard S.S. Co., Limited, 2 F. Supp, 319
(1933).
82 Burgess vs. M/V Tamano, et al., 564 F.2d 964 (1977).
83 Hinman v. Moran Towing & Transportation Co., Inc., et al. 268 N.Y.S.; 409
(1934).
84 Canada S.S. Lines v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., C.C.A. 111., 81 F.2d 100.
85 Davidson Steamship Company vs. United States, supra, Fn 65.
86 Banson vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 110580, July 13, 1995, 246 SCRA
42; Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company of Manila vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R.
Nos. 114841-42, August 23, 1995, 247 SCRA 606; Acebedo Optical Co., Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 118833, November 29, 1995, 250 SCRA 409.
87 48 C.J., Pilots § 66, 1200.
88 Homer Ramsdell Transportation vs. La Compagnie Generale Transatlantique,
182 U.S. 1155, 1161.
89 70 C.J.S., Pilots § 14(d), 1080-1081.
90 The Steamship China vs. Louis Walsh, supra, Fn 78.
91 58 C.J., Shipping, § 417, 297.
92 Ibid., id., § 421, 301-302.
93 Burgess, et al. v. M/V Tamano, et al., supra, Fn 82.
94 80 C.J.S., Shipping, § 65(b), 792; Dampskibsselskabet Atlanta A/S vs. United
States, 31 F.(2d) 961 (1929); Union Shipping & Trading Co., Limited vs. United
States, supra, Fn 78.
95 6 Phil. 49 (1906).
96 22 Phil. 121 (1912).
97 34 Phil. 626 (1916).
98 Jure vs. United Fruit Co., supra, Fn 80; The Emma T. Grimes, Mulqueen vs.
Cunard S.S. Co., Limited, supra, Fn 81.
99 65 C.J.S., Negligence § 110, 1184-1189.
100 Ibid., id., id., 1194-1197.
101 Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-
delict is solidary.
102 Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts and Damages, 1984 ed., 259-260; Dimayuga
vs. Philippine Commercial & Industrial Bank, et al., G.R. No. 42542, August 5, 1991,
200 SCRA 143; Ouano Arrastre Service, Inc. vs. Aleonar, etc., et al., G.R. No.
97664, October 10, 1991, 202 SCRA 619; Singapore Airlines Limited vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 107356, March 31, 1995, 243 SCRA 143; Inciong, Jr. vs.
Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 96405, June 26, 1996, 257 SCRA 578.
103 TSN, January 23, 1984, 12-15.
104 Original Record, 301.
 EN BANC
G.R. No. L-21512 August 31, 1966
PROSPERO SABIDO and ASER LAGUNDA, petitioners,
vs.
CARLOS CUSTODIO, BELEN MAKABUHAY CUSTODIO and THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS,respondents.
Sabido, Sabido and Associates for petitioners.
Ernesto S. Tengco for respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Prospero Sabido and Aser Lagunda seek the review by certiorari of a decision of the
Court of Appeals, affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, sentencing the
Laguna-Tayabas Bus Co., Nicasio Mudales, and herein petitioners. Prospero Sabido and
Aser Lagunda, to jointly and severally indemnify Belen Makabuhay Custodio and her
son, Agripino Custodio Jr., in the sum of P6,000 and to pay the costs of the suit.
The facts are set forth in the decision of the Court of Appeals from which we quote:
Upon a careful study and judicious examining of the evidence on record, we
are inclined to concur in the findings made by the trial court. Here is how the
Court a quo analyzed the facts of this case:
"In Barrio Halang, Municipality of Lumban, Province of Laguna, two
trucks, one driven by Nicasio Mudales and belonging to Laguna-
Tayabas Bus Company, and the other driven by Aser Lagunda and
owned by Prospero Sabido, going in opposite directions met each
other in a road curve. Agripino Custodia a passenger of LTB bus, who
was hanging on the left side as truck was full of passengers was
sideswiped by the track driven by Aser Lagunda. As a result, Agripino
Custodio was injured and died (Exhibit A).
"It appears clear from the evidence that Agripino Custodio was
hanging on the left side of the LTB bus. Otherwise, were he sitting
inside the truck, he could not have been struck by the six by six truck
driven by Aser Lagunda. This fact alone, of allowing Agripino
Custodio to hang on the side of the truck, makes the defendant
Laguna Tayabas Bus Company liable for damages. For certainly its
employees, who are the driver and conductor were negligent. They
should not have allowed Agripino Custodio to ride their truck in that
manner.
"To avoid any liability, Aser Lagunda and Prospero Sabido throw all
the blame on Nicasio Mudales. From the testimony, however, of
Belen Makabuhay, Agripino Custodio's widow, we can deduce that
Aser Lagunda was equally negligent as Nicasio Mudales. Belen
testified that the 6 x 6 truck was running fast when it met the LTB
Bus. And Aser Lagunda had time and opportunity to avoid the mishap
if he had been sufficiently careful and cautious because the two
trucks never collided with each other. By simply swerving to the right
side of the road, the 6 x 6 truck could have avoided hitting Agripino
Custodio. It is incredible that the LTB was running on the middle of
the road when passing a curve. He knows it is dangerous to do so.
We are rather of the belief that both trucks did not keep close to the
right side of the road so they sideswiped each other and thus Agripino
Custodio was injured and died. In other words, both drivers must
have drive in their trucks not in the proper lane and are, therefore,
both reckless and negligent.
"We might state by way of additional observations that the sideswiping of the
deceased and his two fellow passengers took place on broad daylight at about
9:30 in the morning of June 9, 1955 when the LTB bus with full load to
passengers was negotiating a sharp curve of a bumpy and sliding downward a
slope, whereas the six by six truck was climbing up with no cargoes or
passengers on board but for three helpers, owner Sabido and driver Lagunda
(tsn. 308-309, Mendoza). Under the above-stated condition, there exists strong
persuasion to accept what Belen Makabuhay and Sofia Mesina, LTB
passengers, had testified to the effect that the 6 x 6 cargo truck was running at
a fast rate of speed (tsn. 15, 74, 175 Mendoza). From the lips of no less than
driver Lagunda himself come the testimonial admission that the presence of
three hanging passengers located at the left side of the bus was noted when
his vehicle was still at a distance of 5 or 7 meters from the bus, and yet despite
the existence of a shallow canal on the right side of the road which he could
pass over with ease, Lagunda did not care to exercise prudence to avert the
accident simply because to use his own language the canal "is not a passage
of trucks."
Based upon these facts, the Court of First Instance of Laguna and the Court of Appeals
concluded that the Laguna-Tayabas Bus Co. — hereinafter referred to as the carrier —
and its driver Nicasio Mudales (none of whom has appealed), had violated the contract
of carriage with Agripino Custodio, whereas petitioners Sabido and Lagunda were guilty
of a quasi delict, by reason of which all of them were held solidarity liable in the manner
above indicated.
Petitioners now maintain: (1) that the death of Agripino Custodio was due exclusively to
the negligence of the carrier and its driver; (2) that petitioners were not guilty of
negligence in connection with the matter under consideration; (3) that petitioners cannot
be held solidarily liable with the carrier and its driver; and (4) that the complaint against
petitioners herein should be dismissed.
With respect to the first two (2) points, which are interrelated, it is urged that the carrier
and its driver were clearly guilty of negligence for having allowed Agripino Custodio to
ride on the running board of the bus, in violation of Section 42 of Act No. 3992, and that
this negligence was the proximate cause of Agripino's death. It should be noted,
however, that the lower court had, likewise, found the petitioners guilty of contributory
negligence, which was as much a proximate cause of the accident as the carrier's
negligence, for petitioners' truck was running at a considerable speed, despite the fact
that it was negotiating a sharp curve, and, instead of being close to its right side of the
road, said truck was driven on its middle portion and so near the passenger bus coming
from the opposite direction as to sideswipe a passenger riding on its running
board.1äwphï1.ñët
The views of the Court of Appeals on the speed of the truck and its location at the time of
the accident are in the nature of findings of fact, which we cannot disturb in a petition for
review by certiorari, such as the one at bar. At any rate, the correctness of said findings
is borne out by the very testimony of petitioner Lagunda to the effect that he saw the
passengers riding on the running board of the bus while the same was still five (5) or
seven (7) meters away from the truck driven by him. Indeed, the distance between the
two (2) vehicles was such that he could have avoided sideswiping said passengers if his
truck were not running at a great speed.
Although the negligence of the carrier and its driver is independent, in its execution, of
the negligence of the truck driver and its owner, both acts of negligence are the
proximate cause of the death of Agripino Custodio. In fact, the negligence of the first two
(2) would not have produced this result without the negligence of petitioners' herein.
What is more, petitioners' negligence was the last, in point of time, for Custodio was on
the running board of the carrier's bus sometime before petitioners' truck came from the
opposite direction, so that, in this sense, petitioners' truck had the last clear chance.
Petitioners contend that they should not be held solidarily liable with the carrier and its
driver, because the latter's liability arises from a breach of contract, whereas that of the
former springs from a quasi delict. The rule is, however, that
According to the great weight of authority, where the concurrent or successive
negligent acts or omission of two or more persons, although acting
independently of each other, are, in combination, the direct and proximate
cause of a single injury to a third person, and it is impossible to determine in
what proportion each contributed to the injury, either is responsible for the
whole injury, even though his act alone might not have caused the entire injury,
or the same damage might have resulted from the acts of the other tort-
feasor ... . (38 Am. Jur. 946, 947.)
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
petitioners herein. It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro,
JJ., concur.
Regala, J., is on leave.
 FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 66102-04 August 30, 1990
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND CASIANO PASCUA,
ET AL., respondents.
Santiago & Santiago for petitioner.
Federico R. Vinluan for private respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate
Court (now Court of Appeals) dated July 29, 1983 in AC-G.R. Nos. CV-65885, CV-65886
and CV-65887 which reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Court) of Pangasinan dated December 27, 1978; and its resolution dated November
28, 1983 denying the motion for reconsideration.
It is an established principle that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are final and
may not be reviewed by this Court on appeal. However, this principle is subject to certain
exceptions. One of these is when the findings of the appellate court are contrary to those
of the trial court (see Sabinosa v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-
47981, July 24, 1989) in which case, a re-examination of the facts and evidence may be
undertaken. This is Our task now.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
About 11:00 o'clock in the morning on December 24, 1966, Catalina Pascua, Caridad
Pascua, Adelaida Estomo, Erlinda Meriales, Mercedes Lorenzo, Alejandro Morales and
Zenaida Parejas boarded the jeepney owned by spouses Isidro Mangune and Guillerma
Carreon and driven by Tranquilino Manalo at Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga bound for
Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan to spend Christmas at their respective homes. Although
they usually ride in buses, they had to ride in a jeepney that day because the buses were
full. Their contract with Manalo was for them to pay P24.00 for the trip. The private
respondents' testimonial evidence on this contractual relationship was not controverted
by Mangune, Carreon and Manalo, nor by Filriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation,
Inc., the insurer of the jeepney, with contrary evidence. Purportedly riding on the front
seat with Manalo was Mercedes Lorenzo. On the left rear passenger seat were Caridad
Pascua, Alejandro Morales and Zenaida Parejas. On the right rear passenger seat were
Catalina Pascua, Adelaida Estomo, and Erlinda Meriales. After a brief stopover at
Moncada, Tarlac for refreshment, the jeepney proceeded towards Carmen, Rosales,
Pangasinan.
Upon reaching barrio Sinayoan, San Manuel, Tarlac, the right rear wheel of the jeepney
was detached, so it was running in an unbalanced position. Manalo stepped on the
brake, as a result of which, the jeepney which was then running on the eastern lane (its
right of way) made a U-turn, invading and eventually stopping on the western lane of the
road in such a manner that the jeepney's front faced the south (from where it came) and
its rear faced the north (towards where it was going). The jeepney practically occupied
and blocked the greater portion of the western lane, which is the right of way of vehicles
coming from the north, among which was Bus No. 753 of petitioner Philippine Rabbit Bus
Lines, Inc. (Rabbit) driven by Tomas delos Reyes. Almost at the time when the jeepney
made a sudden U-turn and encroached on the western lane of the highway as claimed
by Rabbit and delos Reyes, or after stopping for a couple of minutes as claimed by
Mangune, Carreon and Manalo, the bus bumped from behind the right rear portion of the
jeepney. As a result of the collision, three passengers of the jeepney (Catalina Pascua,
Erlinda Meriales and Adelaida Estomo) died while the other jeepney passengers
sustained physical injuries. What could have been a festive Christmas turned out to be
tragic.
The causes of the death of the three jeepney passengers were as follows (p. 101,
Record on Appeal):
The deceased Catalina Pascua suffered the following injuries, to wit:
fracture of the left parietal and temporal regions of the skull; fracture
of the left mandible; fracture of the right humenous; compound
fracture of the left radious and ullma middle third and lower third;
fracture of the upper third of the right tibia and fillnea; avulsion of the
head, left internal; and multiple abrasions. The cause of her death
was shock, secondary to fracture and multiple hemorrhage. The
fractures were produced as a result of the hitting of the victim by a
strong force. The abrasions could be produced when a person falls
from a moving vehicles (sic) and rubs parts of her body against a
cement road pavement. . . .
Erlinda Mariles (sic) sustained external lesions such as contusion on
the left parietal region of the skull; hematoma on the right upper lid;
and abrasions (sic) on the left knee. Her internal lesions were:
hematoma on the left thorax; multiple lacerations of the left lower lobe
of the lungs; contusions on the left lower lobe of the lungs; and simple
fractures of the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th ribs, left. The
forcible impact of the jeep caused the above injuries which resulted in
her death. . . .
The cause of death of Erlinda or Florida Estomo (also called as per
autopsy of Dr. Panlasiqui was due to shock due to internal
hemorrhage, ruptured spleen and trauma. . . .
Caridad Pascua suffered physical injuries as follows (p. 101, Record on Appeal):
. . . lacerated wound on the forehead and occipital region, hematoma
on the forehead, multiple abrasions on the forearm, right upper arm,
back and right leg. . . .
The police investigators of Tacpal and policemen of San Manuel, Tarlac, Tarlac, upon
arrival at the scene of the mishap, prepared a sketch (common exhibit "K" for private
respondents "19" for Rabbit) showing the relative positions of the two vehicles as well as
the alleged point of impact (p. 100, Record on Appeal):
. . . The point of collision was a cement pave-portion of the Highway,
about six (6) meters wide, with narrow shoulders with grasses beyond
which are canals on both sides. The road was straight and points 200
meters north and south of the point of collision are visible and
unobstructed. Purportedly, the point of impact or collision (Exh. "K-4",
Pascua on the sketch Exh. "K"-Pascua) was on the western lane of
the highway about 3 feet (or one yard) from the center line as shown
by the bedris (sic), dirt and soil (obviously from the undercarriage of
both vehicles) as well as paint, marron (sic) from the Rabbit bus and
greenish from the jeepney. The point of impact encircled and marked
with the letter "X" in Exh. "K"-4 Pascua, had a diameter of two meters,
the center of which was about two meters from the western edge of
cement pavement of the roadway. Pictures taken by witness Bisquera
in the course of the investigation showed the relative positions of the
point of impact and center line (Exh. "P"-Pascua) the back of the
Rabbit bus (Exh. "P"-1-Pascua"), the lifeless body of Catalina Pascua
(Exh. "P-2 Pascua"), and the damaged front part of the Rabbit bus
 (Exh. "P-3 Pascua"). No skid marks of the Rabbit bus was found in
the vicinity of the collision, before or after the point of impact. On the
other hand, there was a skid mark about 45 meters long purportedly
of the jeepney from the eastern shoulder of the road south of, and
extending up to the point of impact.
At the time and in the vicinity of the accident, there were no vehicles following the
jeepney, neither were there oncoming vehicles except the bus. The weather condition of
that day was fair.
After conducting the investigation, the police filed with the Municipal Court of San
Manuel, Tarlac, a criminal complaint against the two drivers for Multiple Homicide. At the
preliminary investigation, a probable cause was found with respect to the case of
Manalo, thus, his case was elevated to the Court of First Instance. However, finding no
sufficiency of evidence as regards the case of delos Reyes, the Court dismissed it.
Manalo was convicted and sentenced to suffer imprisonment. Not having appealed, he
served his sentence.
Complaints for recovery of damages were then filed before the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan. In Civil Case No. 1136, spouses Casiano Pascua and Juana Valdez sued
as heirs of Catalina Pascua while Caridad Pascua sued in her behalf. In Civil Case No.
1139, spouses Manuel Millares and Fidencia Arcica sued as heirs of Erlinda Meriales. In
Civil Case No. 1140, spouses Mariano Estomo and Dionisia Sarmiento also sued as
heirs of Adelaida Estomo.
In all three cases, spouses Mangune and Carreon, Manalo, Rabbit and delos Reyes
were all impleaded as defendants. Plaintiffs anchored their suits against spouses
Mangune and Carreon and Manalo on their contractual liability. As against Rabbit and
delos Reyes, plaintiffs based their suits on their culpability for a quasi-delict. Filriters
Guaranty Assurance Corporation, Inc. was also impleaded as additional defendant in
Civil Case No. 1136 only.
For the death of Catalina Pascua, plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 1136 sought to collect the
aggregate amount of P70,060.00 in damages, itemized as follows: P500.00 for burial
expenses; P12,000.00 for loss of wages for 24 years; P10,000.00 for exemplary
damages; P10,000.00 for moral damages; and P3,000.00 for attorney's fees. In the
same case, plaintiff Caridad Pascua claimed P550.00 for medical expenses; P240.00 for
loss of wages for two months; P2,000.00 for disfigurement of her face; P3,000.00 for
physical pain and suffering; P2,500.00 as exemplary damages and P2,000.00 for
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
In Civil Case No. 1139, plaintiffs demanded P500.00 for burial expenses; P6,000.00 for
the death of Erlinda, P63,000.00 for loss of income; P10,000.00 for moral damages and
P3,000.00 for attorney's fees or total of P80,000.00.
In Civil Case No. 1140, plaintiffs claimed P500.00 for burial expenses; P6,000.00 for the
death of Adelaide, P56,160.00 for loss of her income or earning capacity; P10,000.00 for
moral damages; and P3,000.00 for attorney's fees.
Rabbit filed a cross-claim in the amount of P15,000.00 for attorney's fees and expenses
of litigation. On the other hand, spouses Mangune and Carreon filed a cross-claim in the
amount of P6,168.00 for the repair of the jeepney and P3,000.00 for its non-use during
the period of repairs.
On December 27, 1978, the trial court rendered its decision finding Manalo negligent, the
dispositive portion of which reads (pp. 113-114, Record on Appeal):
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court is of the opinion and so holds:
1) That defendants Isidro Mangune, Guillerma Carreon and
Tranquilino Manalo thru their negligence, breached contract of
carriage with their passengers the plaintiffs' and/or their heirs, and
this Court renders judgment ordering said defendants, jointly and
severally, to pay the plaintiffs —
a) In Civil Case No. 1136, for the death of Catalina Pascua, to pay
her heirs the amounts of P12,000.00 for indemnity for loss of her life;
P41,760.00 for loss of earnings; P324.40 for actual expenses and
P2,000.00 for moral damages;
b) In the same Civil Case No.1136 for the injuries of Caridad Pascua,
to pay her the amounts of P240.00 for loss of wages, P328.20 for
actual expenses and P500.00 for moral damages;
c) In Civil Case No.1139 for the death of Erlinda Meriales, to pay her
heirs (the plaintiffs) the amount of P12,000.00 — for indemnity for
loss of her life; P622.00 for actual expenses, P60,480.00 for loss of
wages or income and P2,000.00 for moral damages;
d) In Civil Case No. 1140, for the death of Erlinda (also called Florida
or Adelaida Estomo), to pay her heirs (the plaintiff the amount of
P12,000.00 for indemnity for the loss of her life; P580.00 for actual
expenses; P53,160.00 for loss of wages or income and P2,000.00 for
moral damages.
2) The defendant Filriters Guaranty Insurance Co., having contracted
to ensure and answer for the obligations of defendants Mangune and
Carreon for damages due their passengers, this Court renders
judgment against the said defendants Filriters Guaranty Insurance
Co., jointly and severally with said defendants (Mangune and
Carreon) to pay the plaintiffs the amount herein above adjudicated in
their favor in Civil Case No. 1136 only. All the amounts awarded said
plaintiff, as set forth in paragraph one (1) hereinabove;
3) On the cross claim of Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. ordering the
defendant, Isidro Mangune, Guillerma Carreon and Tranquilino
Manalo, to pay jointly and severally, cross-claimant Phil. Rabbit Bus
Lines, Inc., the amounts of P216.27 as actual damages to its Bus No.
753 and P2,173.60 for loss of its earning.
All of the above amount, shall bear legal interest from the filing of the
complaints.
Costs are adjudged against defendants Mangune, Carreon and
Manalo and Filriters Guaranty.
SO ORDERED
On appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court reversed the above-quoted decision by
finding delos Reyes negligent, the dispositive portion of which reads (pp. 55-57, Rollo):
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the lower court's decision
is hereby REVERSED as to item No. 3 of the decision which reads:
3) On the cross claim of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. ordering the
defendants Isidro Mangune, Guillerma Carreon and Tranquilino
Manalo, to pay jointly and severally, the amounts of P216.27 as
actual damages to its Bus No. 753 and P2,173.60 for loss of its
earnings.
and another judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs-
appellants Casiana Pascua, Juan Valdez and Caridad Pascua,
ordering the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and its driver Tomas
 delos Reyes to pay the former jointly and severally damages in (1) That the unrebutted testimony of his passenger plaintiff Caridad Pascua
amounts awarded as follows: that a long ways (sic) before reaching the point of collision, the Mangune
For the death of Catalina Pascua, the parents and/or heirs are awarded jeepney was "running fast" that his passengers cautioned driver Manalo to slow
down but did not heed the warning: that the right rear wheel was detached
Civil Case No. 1136 —
causing the jeepney to run to the eastern shoulder of the road then back to the
a) Indemnity for the loss of life — P12,000.00 concrete pavement; that driver Manalo applied the brakes after which the
b) Loss of Salaries or earning capacity — 14,000.00 jeepney made a U-turn (half-turn) in such a manner that it inverted its direction
c) Actual damages (burial expenses) — 800.00 making it face South instead of north; that the jeepney stopped on the western
d) For moral damages — 10,000.00 lane of the road on the right of way of the oncoming Phil. Rabbit Bus where it
e) Exemplary damages — 3,000.00 was bumped by the latter;
f) For attorney's fees — 3,000.00 (2) The likewise unrebutted testimony of Police Investigator Tacpal of the San
————— Manuel (Tarlac) Police who, upon responding to the reported collission, found
Total — P38,200.00 (sic) the real evidence thereat indicate in his sketch (Exh. K, Pascua ), the tracks of
For the physical injuries suffered by Caridad Pascua: the jeepney of defendant Mangune and Carreon running on the Eastern
shoulder (outside the concrete paved road) until it returned to the concrete road
Civil Case No. 1136
at a sharp angle, crossing the Eastern lane and the (imaginary) center line and
a) Actual damages (hospitalization expenses) — P550.00 encroaching fully into the western lane where the collision took place as
b) Moral damages (disfigurement of the evidenced by the point of impact;
face and physical suffering — 8,000.00
(3) The observation of witness Police Corporal Cacalda also of the San Manuel
c) Exemplary damages — 2,000.00 Police that the path of the jeepney they found on the road and indicated in the
————— sketch (Exh. K-Pascua) was shown by skid marks which he described as
Total — P10,550.00 "scratches on the road caused by the iron of the jeep, after its wheel was
For the death of Erlinda Arcega Meriales. the parents and/or heirs: removed;"
Civil Case No. 1139 (4) His conviction for the crime of Multiple Homicide and Multiple Serious
a) Indemnity for loss of life — P12,000.00 Physical Injuries with Damage to Property thru Reckless Imprudence by the
b) Loss of Salary or Earning Capacity — 20,000.00 Court of First Instance of Tarlac (Exh. 24-Rabbit) upon the criminal Information
c) Actual damages (burial expenses) — 500.00 by the Provincial Fiscal of Tarlac (Exh. 23-Rabbit), as a result of the collision,
d) Moral damages — 15,000.00
and his commitment to prison and service of his sentence (Exh. 25-Rabbit)
upon the finality of the decision and his failure to appeal therefrom; and
e) Exemplary damages — 15,000.00
f) Attorney's fees — 3,000.00 (5) The application of the doctrine of res-ipsa loquitar (sic) attesting to the
circumstance that the collision occured (sic) on the right of way of the Phil.
—————
Rabbit Bus.
Total — P65,500.00
For the death of Florida Sarmiento Estomo: The respondent court had a contrary opinion. Applying primarily (1) the doctrine of last
clear chance, (2) the presumption that drivers who bump the rear of another vehicle
Civil Case No. 1140
guilty and the cause of the accident unless contradicted by other evidence, and (3) the
a) Indemnity for loss of life — P12,000.00 substantial factor test. concluded that delos Reyes was negligent.
b) Loss of Salary or Earning capacity — 20,000.00
The misappreciation of the facts and evidence and the misapplication of the laws by the
c) Actual damages (burial expenses) — 500.00
respondent court warrant a reversal of its questioned decision and resolution.
d) Moral damages — 3,000.00
e) Exemplary damages — 3,000.00 We reiterate that "[t]he principle about "the last clear" chance, would call for application
in a suit between the owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. It does not arise
f) Attorney's fees — 3,000.00
where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual
————— obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and
Total — P41,500.00 its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence." This
With costs against the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. was Our ruling in Anuran, et al. v. Buño et al., G.R. Nos. L-21353 and L-21354, May 20,
1966, 17 SCRA 224. 1 Thus, the respondent court erred in applying said doctrine.
SO ORDERED.
On the presumption that drivers who bump the rear of another vehicle guilty and the
The motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the present petition. cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other evidence, the respondent court said
The issue is who is liable for the death and physical injuries suffered by the passengers (p. 49, Rollo):
of the jeepney? . . . the jeepney had already executed a complete turnabout and at
The trial court, in declaring that Manalo was negligent, considered the following (p. 106, the time of impact was already facing the western side of the road.
Record on Appeal): Thus the jeepney assumed a new frontal position vis a vis, the bus,
 and the bus assumed a new role of defensive driving. The spirit
behind the presumption of guilt on one who bumps the rear end of
another vehicle is for the driver following a vehicle to be at all times
prepared of a pending accident should the driver in front suddenly
come to a full stop, or change its course either through change of
mind of the front driver, mechanical trouble, or to avoid an accident.
The rear vehicle is given the responsibility of avoiding a collision with
the front vehicle for it is the rear vehicle who has full control of the
situation as it is in a position to observe the vehicle in front of it.
The above discussion would have been correct were it not for the undisputed fact that
the U-turn made by the jeepney was abrupt (Exhibit "K," Pascua). The jeepney, which
was then traveling on the eastern shoulder, making a straight, skid mark of
approximately 35 meters, crossed the eastern lane at a sharp angle, making a skid mark
of approximately 15 meters from the eastern shoulder to the point of impact (Exhibit "K"
Pascua). Hence, delos Reyes could not have anticipated the sudden U-turn executed by
Manalo. The respondent court did not realize that the presumption was rebutted by this
piece of evidence.
With regard to the substantial factor test, it was the opinion of the respondent court that
(p. 52, Rollo):
. . . It is the rule under the substantial factor test that if the actor's
conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another, the
fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the
extent of the harm or the manner in which it occurred does not
prevent him from being liable (Restatement, Torts, 2d). Here, We find
defendant bus running at a fast speed when the accident occurred
and did not even make the slightest effort to avoid the accident, . . . .
The bus driver's conduct is thus a substantial factor in bringing about
harm to the passengers of the jeepney, not only because he was
driving fast and did not even attempt to avoid the mishap but also
because it was the bus which was the physical force which brought
about the injury and death to the passengers of the jeepney.
The speed of the bus was calculated by respondent court as follows (pp. 54-55, Rollo):
According to the record of the case, the bus departed from Laoag,
Ilocos Norte, at 4:00 o'clock A.M. and the accident took place at
approximately around 12:30 P.M., after travelling roughly for 8 hours
and 30 minutes. Deduct from this the actual stopover time of two
Hours (computed from the testimony of the driver that he made three
40-minute stop-overs), We will have an actual travelling time of 6
hours and 30 minutes.
Under the circumstances, We calculate that the Laoag-Tarlac route
(365 kms.) driving at an average of 56 km. per hour would take 6
hours and 30 minutes. Therefore, the average speed of the bus, give
and take 10 minutes, from the point of impact on the highway with
excellent visibility factor would be 80 to 90 kms. per hour, as this is
the place where buses would make up for lost time in traversing busy
city streets.
Still, We are not convinced. It cannot be said that the bus was travelling at a fast speed
when the accident occurred because the speed of 80 to 90 kilometers per hour,
assuming such calculation to be correct, is yet within the speed limit allowed in
highways. We cannot even fault delos Reyes for not having avoided the collision. As
aforestated, the jeepney left a skid mark of about 45 meters, measured from the time its
right rear wheel was detached up to the point of collision. Delos Reyes must have
noticed the perilous condition of the jeepney from the time its right rear wheel was
detached or some 90 meters away, considering that the road was straight and points 200
meters north and south of the point of collision, visible and unobstructed. Delos Reyes
admitted that he was running more or less 50 kilometers per hour at the time of the
accident. Using this speed, delos Reyes covered the distance of 45 meters in 3.24
seconds. If We adopt the speed of 80 kilometers per hour, delos Reyes would have
covered that distance in only 2.025 seconds. Verily, he had little time to react to the
situation. To require delos Reyes to avoid the collision is to ask too much from him.
Aside from the time element involved, there were no options available to him. As the trial
court remarked (pp. 107-108, Record on Appeal):
. . . They (plaintiffs) tried to impress this Court that defendant de los
Reyes, could have taken either of two options: (1) to swerve to its
right (western shoulder) or (2) to swerve to its left (eastern lane), and
thus steer clear of the Mangune jeepney. This Court does not so
believe, considering the existing exigencies of space and time.
As to the first option, Phil. Rabbit's evidence is convincing and
unrebutted that the Western shoulder of the road was narrow and had
tall grasses which would indicate that it was not passable. Even
plaintiffs own evidence, the pictures (Exhs. P and P-2, Pascua) are
mute confirmation of such fact. Indeed, it can be noticed in the picture
(Exh. P-2, Pascua) after the Rabbit bus came to a full stop, it was
tilted to right front side, its front wheels resting most probably on a
canal on a much lower elevation that of the shoulder or paved road. It
too shows that all of the wheels of the Rabbit bus were clear of the
roadway except the outer left rear wheel. These observation
appearing in said picture (Exh P-2, Pascua) clearly shows coupled
with the finding the Rabbit bus came to a full stop only five meters
from the point of impact (see sketch, Exh. K-Pascua) clearly show
that driver de los Reyes veered his Rabbit bus to the right attempt to
avoid hitting the Mangune's jeepney. That it was not successful in
fully clearing the Mangune jeepney as its (Rabbit's) left front hit said
jeepney (see picture Exh. 10-A-Rabbit) must have been due to
limitations of space and time.
Plaintiffs alternatively claim that defendant delos Reyes of the Rabbit
bus could also have swerved to its left (eastern lane) to avoid
bumping the Mangune jeepney which was then on the western lane.
Such a claim is premised on the hypothesis (sic) that the eastern lane
was then empty. This claim would appear to be good copy of it were
based alone on the sketch made after the collision. Nonetheless, it
loses force it one were to consider the time element involved, for
moments before that, the Mangune jeepney was crossing that very
eastern lane at a sharp angle. Under such a situation then, for driver
delos Reyes to swerve to the eastern lane, he would run the greater
risk of running smack in the Mangune jeepney either head on or
broadside.
After a minute scrutiny of the factual matters and duly proven evidence, We find that the
proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of Manalo and spouses Mangune
and Carreon. They all failed to exercise the precautions that are needed precisely pro
hac vice.
In culpa contractual, the moment a passenger dies or is injured, the carrier is presumed
to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, and this disputable presumption may
only be overcome by evidence that he had observed extra-ordinary diligence as
prescribed in Articles 1733, 1755 and 1756 of the New Civil Code 2 or that the death or
injury of the passenger was due to a fortuitous event 3 (Lasam v. Smith, Jr., 45 Phil. 657).
The negligence of Manalo was proven during the trial by the unrebutted testimonies of
Caridad Pascua, Police Investigator Tacpal, Police Corporal Cacalda, his (Manalo's)
conviction for the crime of Multiple Homicide and Multiple Serious Injuries with Damage
to Property thru Reckless Imprudence, and the application of the doctrine ofres ipsa
loquitur supra. The negligence of spouses Mangune and Carreon was likewise proven
during the trial (p. 110, Record on Appeal):
To escape liability, defendants Mangune and Carreon offered to show
thru their witness Natalio Navarro, an alleged mechanic, that he
periodically checks and maintains the jeepney of said defendants, the
last on Dec. 23, the day before the collision, which included the
tightening of the bolts. This notwithstanding the right rear wheel of the
vehicle was detached while in transit. As to the cause thereof no
evidence was offered. Said defendant did not even attempt to explain,
much less establish, it to be one caused by a caso fortuito. . . .
In any event, "[i]n an action for damages against the carrier for his failure to
safely carry his passenger to his destination, an accident caused either by
defects in the automobile or through the negligence of its driver, is not a caso
fortuito which would avoid the carriers liability for damages (Son v. Cebu
Autobus Company, 94 Phil. 892 citing Lasam, et al. v. Smith, Jr., 45 Phil. 657;
Necesito, etc. v. Paras, et al., 104 Phil. 75).
The trial court was therefore right in finding that Manalo and spouses Mangune and
Carreon were negligent. However, its ruling that spouses Mangune and Carreon are
jointly and severally liable with Manalo is erroneous The driver cannot be held jointly and
severally liable with the carrier in case of breach of the contract of carriage. The rationale
behind this is readily discernible. Firstly, the contract of carriage is between the carrier
and the passenger, and in the event of contractual liability, the carrier is exclusively
responsible therefore to the passenger, even if such breach be due to the negligence of
his driver (see Viluan v. The Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. L-21477-81, April 29,
1966, 16 SCRA 742). In other words, the carrier can neither shift his liability on the
contract to his driver nor share it with him, for his driver's negligence is his. 4 Secondly, if
We make the driver jointly and severally liable with the carrier, that would make the
carrier's liability personal instead of merely vicarious and consequently, entitled to
recover only the share which corresponds to the driver, 5 contradictory to the explicit
provision of Article 2181 of the New Civil Code. 6
We affirm the amount of damages adjudged by the trial court, except with respect to the
indemnity for loss of life. Under Article 1764 in relation to Article 2206 of the New Civil
Code, the amount of damages for the death of a passenger is at least three thousand
pesos (P3,000.00). The prevailing jurisprudence has increased the amount of P3,000.00
to P30,000.00 (see Heirs of Amparo delos Santos, et al. v. Honorable Court of Appeals,
et al., G.R. No. 51165, June 21, 1990 citing De Lima v. Laguna Tayabas Co., G.R. Nos.
L-35697-99, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 70).
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Intermediate
Appellate Court dated July 29, 1983 and its resolution dated November 28, 1983 are
SET ASIDE. The decision of the Court of First Instance dated December 27, 1978 is
REINSTATED MODIFICATION that only Isidro Mangune, Guillerma Carreon and Filriters
Guaranty Assurance Corporation, Inc. are liable to the victims or their heirs and that the
amount of indemnity for loss of life is increased to thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00).
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (Chairman), Cruz, Gancayco and Griño-Aquino JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 In this case, an improperly parked passenger jeepney was bumped from behind by
a speeding truck with such violence that three of its passengers died whereas two
other passengers suffered injuries. The representatives of the dead and of the
injured passengers filed suits to recover damages against the driver and the owners
of the truck and also against the driver and the owners of the jeepney. The trial court
rendered judgment absolving the driver and the owners of the jeepney but required
the driver and the owners of the truck to compensate the victims. The Plaintiffs
appealed insisting that the driver and the owners of the jeepney should also be
made liable. The appellate court, relying on the doctrine of last clear chance,
affirmed the trial court's decision. The plaintiffs then filed a petition for review
on certiorari before this Court. We modified the questioned decision by making all
the defendants solidarity liable.
2 Articles 1733, 1755 and 1756 of the New Civil Code, respectively provides:
ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of
public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the
circumstances of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in
articles 1734, 1735, and 1746. Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for
the safety of the passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756.
ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as
human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.
ART. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that
they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755.
3 Article 1174 of the New Civil Code provides:
ART. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise
declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption
of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen,
or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.
4 Article 1759 of the New Civil Code provides:
ART. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers
through the negligence or wilful acts of the former's employees, although such
employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the
orders of the common carriers.
This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised
all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their
employees.
5 Article 1217 of the New Civil Code provides:
ART. 1217. Payment made by one of the solidary debtors extinguishes the
obligation. If two or more solidary debtors offer to pay, the creditor may choose
which offer to accept.
He who made the payment may claim from his codebtors only the share which
corresponds to each, with the interest for the payment already made. If the payment
is made before the debt is due, no interest for the intervening period may de
demanded.
When one of the solidary debtors cannot, because of his insolvency, reimburse his
share to the debtor paying the obligation, such share shall be borne by all his co-
debtors, in proportion to the debt of each.
6 Article 2181 of the New Civil Code provides:
ART. 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees
may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim.
same case with NEGLIGENCE
 EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15688 November 19, 1921
REMIGIO RODRIGUEZ, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, defendant-appellant.
Orense & Vera for appellant.
Domingo Imperial for appellees.
STREET, J.:
This action was instituted jointly by Remigio Rodrigueza and three others in the Court of
First Instance of the Province of Albay to recover a sum of money of the Manila Railroad
Company as damages resulting from a fire kindled by sparks from a locomotive engine
under the circumstances set out below. Upon hearing the cause upon the complaint,
answer and an agreed statement of facts, the trial judge rendered judgment against the
defendant company in favor of the plaintiffs and awarded to them the following sums
respectively as damages, to wit, (1) to Remigio Rodrigueza, P3,000; (2) to Domingo
Gonzaga, P400; (3) to Cristina Luna, P300; and (4) to Perfecta Losantas, P150; all with
lawful interest from March 21, 1919. From this judgment the defendant appealed.
The facts as appearing from the agreed statement, in relation with the complaint, are to
the effect that the defendant Railroad Company operates a line through the district of
Daraga in the municipality of Albay; that on January 29, 1918, as one of its trains passed
over said line, a great quantity of sparks were emitted from the smokestack of the
locomotive, and fire was thereby communicated to four houses nearby belonging to the
four plaintiffs respectively, and the same were entirely consumed. All of these houses
were of light construction with the exception of the house of Remigio Rodrigueza, which
was of strong materials, though the roof was covered with nipa and cogon. The fire
occurred immediately after the passage of the train, and a strong wind was blowing at
the time. It does not appear either in the complaint or in the agreed statement whose
house caught fire first, though it is stated in the appellant's brief that the fire was first
communicated to the house of Remigio Rodrigueza, from whence it spread to the others.
In the fourth paragraph of the complaint — which is admitted to be true — it is alleged
that the defendant Railroad Company was conspicuously negligent in relation to the
origin of said fire, in the following respects, namely, first, in failing to exercise proper
supervision over the employees in charge of the locomotive; secondly, in allowing the
locomotive which emitted these sparks to be operated without having the smokestack
protected by some device for arresting sparks; thirdly, in using in its locomotive upon this
occasion Bataan coal, a fuel of known inferior quality which, upon combustion, produces
sparks in great quantity.
The sole ground upon which the defense is rested is that the house of Remigio
Rodrigueza stood partly within the limits of the land owned by the defendant company,
though exactly how far away from the company's track does not appear. It further
appears that, after the railroad track was laid, the company notified Rodrigueza to get his
house off the land of the company and to remove it from its exposed position.
Rodrigueza did not comply with this suggestion, though he promised to put an iron roof
on his house, which he never did. Instead, he changed the materials of the main roof to
nipa, leaving the kitchen and media-aguas covered with cogon. Upon this fact it is
contended for the defense that there was contributory negligence on the part of Remigio
Rodrigueza in having his house partly on the premises of the Railroad Company, and
that for this reason the company is not liable. This position is in our opinion untenable for
the reasons which we shall proceed to state.
In the first place, it will be noted that the fact suggested as constituting a defense to this
action could not in any view of the case operate as a bar to recovery by the three
plaintiffs other than Remigio Rodrigueza, even assuming that the fire was first
communicated to his house; for said three plaintiffs are in nowise implicated in the act
which supposedly constitutes the defense. In this connection it will be observed that the
right of action of each of these plaintiffs is totally distinct from that of his co-plaintiff, so
much so that each might have sued separately, and the defendant if it had seen fit to do
so, might in this case have demurred successfully to the complaint for misjoinder of
parties plaintiff. The fact that the several rights of action of the different plaintiffs arose
simultaneously out of one act of the defendant is not sufficient of itself to require, or even
permit, the joinder of such parties as coplaintiffs in a single action (30 Cyc., 114) if
objection had been made thereto. Domingo Gonzaga, Cristina Luna, and Perfecta
Losantas are therefore entitled to recover upon the admitted fact that this fire originated
in the negligent acts of the defendant; and the circumstance that the fire may have been
communicated to their houses through the house of Remegio Rodrigueza, instead of
having been directly communicated from the locomotive, is immaterial. (See 38 Am.
Dec., 64, 77; 1 11 R. C. L., 968-971; Kansas City, etc. Railroad Co. vs. Blaker, 64 L. R.
A., 81 Pennsylvania Railroad Co. vs. Hope, 80 Pa. St., 373; 21 Am. Rep. 100.)
With respect to the case of Remegio Rodrigueza it is to be inferred that his house stood
upon this ground before the Railroad Company laid its line over this course; and at any
rate there is no proof that this plaintiff had unlawfully intruded upon the railroad's property
in the act of building his house. What really occurred undoubtedly is that the company,
upon making this extension, had acquired the land only, leaving the owner of the house
free to remove it. Hence he cannot be considered to have been a trespasser in the
beginning. Rather, he was there at the sufferance of the defendant company, and so
long as his house remained in this exposed position, he undoubtedly assumed the risk of
any loss that might have resulted from fires occasioned by the defendant's locomotives if
operated and managed with ordinary care. But he cannot be held to have assumed the
risk of any damage that might result from the unlawful negligence acts of the defendant.
Nobody is bound to anticipate and defend himself against the possible negligence of
another. Rather he has a right to assume that the other will use the care of the ordinary
prudent man. (Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Co. vs. Hendrickson, 80 Pa. St., 182;
21 Am. Rep., 97.)
In the situation now under consideration the proximate and only cause of the damage
that occurred was the negligent act of the defendant in causing this fire. The
circumstance that Remigio Rodrigueza's house was partly on the property of the
defendant company and therefore in dangerous proximity to passing locomotives was an
antecedent condition that may in fact have made the disaster possible, but that
circumstance cannot be imputed to him as contributory negligence destructive of his right
of action, because, first, that condition was not created by himself; secondly, because his
house remained on this ground by the toleration, and therefore with the consent of the
Railroad Company; and thirdly, because even supposing the house to be improperly
there, this fact would not justify the defendant in negligently destroying it. (Grand Trunk
Railway of Canada vs. Richardson, 91 U. S., 454; 23 L. ed., 356; Norfolk etc. Ry.
Co. vs. Perrow, 101 Va., 345, 350.)lawphil.net
The circumstance that the defendant company, upon planting its line near Remigio
Rodrigueza's house, had requested or directed him to remove it, did not convert his
occupancy into a trespass, or impose upon him any additional responsibility over and
above what the law itself imposes in such situation. In this connection it must be
remembered that the company could at any time have removed said house in the
exercise of the power of eminent domain, but it elected not to do so.
Questions similar to that now before us have been under the consideration of American
courts many times, and their decisions are found to be uniformly favorable to recovery
where the property destroyed has been placed in whole or in part on the right of way of
the railroad company with its express or implied consent. (L. R. Martin Timber
Co. vs. Great Northern Railway Co., 123 Minn., 423; Ann. Cas., 1915A, p. 496, note;
Burroughs vs.Housatonic R.R. Co., 15 Conn., 124; 38 Am. Dec., 64; 74; Southern Ry.
Co. vs. Patterson, 105 Va. 6; 8 Ann. Cas., 44.) And the case for the plaintiff is apparently
stronger where the company constructs its line in proximity to a house already built and
fails to condemn it and remove it from its right of way.
From what has been said it is apparent that the judgment appealed from is in all respect
in conformity with the law, and the same is accordingly affirmed, with costs.
So ordered.

Johnson, Araullo, Avanceña and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1
Burroughs vs. Housatonic R. R. Co.
 THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-68102 July 16, 1992
GEORGE MCKEE and ARACELI KOH MCKEE, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JAIME TAYAG and ROSALINDA
MANALO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-68103 July 16, 1992
CARMEN DAYRIT KOH, LETICIA KOH, JULIETA KOH TUQUERO, ARACELI KOH
MCKEE, ANTONIO KOH and ELIZABETH KOH TURLA, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JAIME TAYAG and ROSALINDA
MANALO, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Petitioners urge this Court to review and reverse the Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in C.A.-G.R. CV Nos. 69040-41, promulgated on 3 April 1984, which set aside its
previous Decision dated 29 November 1983 reversing the Decision of the trial court
which dismissed petitioners' complaints in Civil Case No. 4477 and Civil Case No. 4478
of the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Pampanga entitled
"Carmen Dayrit Koh, Leticia Koh, Julieta Koh Tuquero, Araceli Koh McKee and Elizabeth
Koh Turla vs. Jaime Tayag and Rosalinda Manalo," and "George McKee and Araceli Koh
McKee vs. Jaime Tayag and Rosalinda Manalo," respectively, and granted the private
respondents' counterclaim for moral damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
The said civil cases for damages based on quasi-delict were filed as a result of a
vehicular accident which led to the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee and Loida
Bondoc and caused physical injuries to George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee
and petitioner Araceli Koh McKee.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 68102, parents of the minors George Koh McKee, Christopher
Koh McKee and the deceased Kim Koh McKee, were the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
4478, while petitioner Carmen Dayrit Koh and her co-petitioners in G.R. No. 68103, who
are the wife and children, respectively, of the late Jose Koh, were the plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 4477. Upon the other hand, private respondents are the owners of the cargo
truck which figured in the mishap; a certain Ruben Galang was the driver of the truck at
the time of the accident.
The antecedent facts are not disputed.
Between nine and ten o'clock in the morning of 8 January 1977, in Pulong Pulo Bridge
along MacArthur Highway, between Angeles City and San Fernando, Pampanga, a
head-on-collision took place between an International cargo truck, Loadstar, with Plate
No. RF912-T Philippines '76 owned by private respondents, and driven by Ruben
Galang, and a Ford Escort car bearing Plate No. S2-850 Pampanga '76 driven by Jose
Koh. The collision resulted in the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee and Loida
Bondoc, and physical injuries to George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and
Araceli Koh McKee, all passengers of the Ford Escort.
Jose Koh was the father of petitioner Araceli Koh McKee, the mother of minors George,
Christopher and Kim Koh McKee. Loida Bondoc, on the other hand, was the baby sitter
of one and a half year old Kim. At the time of the collision, Kim was seated on the lap of
Loida Bondoc who was at the front passenger's seat of the car while Araceli and her two
(2) sons were seated at the car's back seat.
Immediately before the collision, the cargo truck, which was loaded with two hundred
(200) cavans of rice weighing about 10,000 kilos, was traveling southward from Angeles
City to San Fernando Pampanga, and was bound for Manila. The Ford Escort, on the
other hand, was on its way to Angeles City from San Fernando. When the northbound
car was about (10) meters away from the southern approach of the bridge, two (2) boys
suddenly darted from the right side of the road and into the lane of the car. The boys
were moving back and forth, unsure of whether to cross all the way to the other side or
turn back. Jose Koh blew the horn of the car, swerved to the left and entered the lane of
the truck; he then switched on the headlights of the car, applied the brakes and
thereafter attempted to return to his lane. Before he could do so, his car collided with the
truck. The collision occurred in the lane of the truck, which was the opposite lane, on the
said bridge.
The incident was immediately reported to the police station in Angeles City;
consequently, a team of police officers was forthwith dispatched to conduct an on the
spot investigation. In the sketch 1 prepared by the investigating officers, the bridge is
described to be sixty (60) "footsteps" long and fourteen (14) "footsteps" wide — seven
(7) "footsteps" from the center line to the inner edge of the side walk on both
sides. 2 Pulong Pulo Bridge, which spans a dry brook, is made of concrete with soft
shoulders and concrete railings on both sides about three (3) feet high.
The sketch of the investigating officer discloses that the right rear portion of the cargo
truck was two (2) "footsteps" from the edge of the right sidewalk, while its left front
portion was touching the center line of the bridge, with the smashed front side of the car
resting on its front bumper. The truck was about sixteen (16) "footsteps" away from the
northern end of the bridge while the car was about thirty-six (36) "footsteps" from the
opposite end. Skid marks produced by the right front tire of the truck measured nine (9)
"footsteps", while skid marks produced by the left front tire measured five (5) "footsteps."
The two (2) rear tires of the truck, however, produced no skid marks.
In his statement to the investigating police officers immediately after the accident,
Galang admitted that he was traveling at thirty (30) miles (48 kilometers) per hour.
As a consequence of the collision, two (2) cases, Civil Case No. 4477 and No. 4478,
were filed on 31 January 1977 before the then Court of First Instance of Pampanga and
were raffled to Branch III and Branch V of the said court, respectively. In the first, herein
petitioners in G.R. No. 68103 prayed for the award of P12,000.00 as indemnity for the
death of Jose Koh, P150,000.00 as moral damages, P60,000.00 as exemplary damages,
P10,000.00 for litigation expenses, P6,000.00 for burial expenses, P3,650.00 for the
burial lot and P9,500.00 for the tomb, plus attorney's fees. 3 In the second case,
petitioners in G.R. No. 68102 prayed for the following: (a) in connection with the death of
Kim McKee, the sum of P12,000.00 as death benefit, P3,150.00 for funeral services,
P3,650.00 for the cemetery lot, P3,000.00 for the tomb, P50,000.00 as moral damages,
P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P2,000.00 as miscellaneous damages; (b) in the
case of Araceli Koh McKee, in connection with the serious physical injuries suffered, the
sum of P100,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages,
P12,000.00 for loss of earnings, P5,000.00 for the hospitalization expenses up to the
date of the filing of the complaint; and (c) with respect to George McKee, Jr., in
connection with the serious physical injuries suffered, the sum of P50,000.00 as moral
damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages and the following medical expenses:
P3,400 payable to the Medical Center, P3,500.00 payable to the St. Francis Medical
Center, P5,175.00 payable to the Clark Air Base Hospital, and miscellaneous expenses
amounting to P5,000.00. They also sought an award of attorney's fees amounting to 25%
of the total award plus traveling and hotel expenses, with costs. 4
On 1 March 1977, an Information charging Ruben Galang with the crime of "Reckless
Imprudence Resulting to (sic) Multiple Homicide and Physical Injuries and Damage to
Property" was filed with the trial court. It was docketed as Criminal Case No. 3751 and
was raffled to Branch V of the court, the same Branch where Civil Case No. 4478 was
assigned. 5
In their Answer with Counterclaim in Civil Case No. 4477, private respondents asserted
that it was the Ford Escort car which "invaded and bumped (sic) the lane of the truck
driven by Ruben Galang and, as counterclaim, prayed for the award of P15,000.00 as
attorney's fees, P20,000.00 as actual and liquidated damages, P100,000.00 as moral
damages and P30,000.00 as business losses. 6 In Civil Case No. 4478, private
respondents first filed a motion to dismiss on grounds of pendency of another action
(Civil Case No. 4477) and failure to implead an indispensable party, Ruben Galang, the
truck driver; they also filed a motion to consolidate the case with Civil Case No. 4477
pending before Branch III of the same court, which was opposed by the plaintiffs. 7 Both
motions were denied by Branch V, then presided over by Judge Ignacio Capulong.
Thereupon, private respondents filed their Answer with Counter-claim 8 wherein they
alleged that Jose Koh was the person "at fault having approached the lane of the truck
driven by Ruben Galang, . . . which was on the right lane going towards Manila and at a
moderate speed observing all traffic rules and regulations applicable under the
circumstances then prevailing;" in their counterclaim, they prayed for an award of
damages as may be determined by the court after due hearing, and the sums of
P10,000.00 as attorney's fees and P5,000.00 as expenses of litigation.
Petitioners filed their Answers to the Counterclaims in both cases.
To expedite the proceedings, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4478 filed on 27 March 1978
a motion to adopt the testimonies of witnesses taken during the hearing of Criminal Case
No. 3751, which private respondents opposed and which the court denied. 9 Petitioners
subsequently moved to reconsider the order denying the motion for
consolidation, 10 which Judge Capulong granted in the Order of 5 September 1978; he
then directed that Civil Case No. 4478 be consolidated with Civil Case No. 4477 in
Branch III of the court then presided over by Judge Mario Castañeda, Jr.
Left then with Branch V of the trial court was Criminal Case No. 3751.
In the civil cases, the plaintiffs presented as witnesses Araceli Koh McKee, Fernando
Nuñag, Col. Robert Fitzgerald, Primitivo Parel, Eugenio Tanhueco, Carmen Koh and
Antonio Koh, 11 and offered several documentary exhibits. Upon the other hand, private
respondents presented as witnesses Ruben Galang, Zenaida Soliman, Jaime Tayag and
Roman Dayrit. 12
In the criminal case, the prosecution presented as witnesses Mrs. Araceli McKee, Salud
Samia, Pfc. Fernando Nuñag, Dr. Ramon Panlilio, Dr. Robert Fitzgerald, Dr. Roberto
Yuson, Dr. Hector, Ulanday, Pfc. Benigno de Leon, Marina Bolos, Primitivo Parel,
Rogelio Pineda, Benito Caraan and Eugenio Tanhueco, and offered several
documentary exhibits. 13 Upon the other hand, the defense presented the accused
Ruben Galang, Luciano Punzalan, Zenaida Soliman and Roman Dayrit, and offered
documentary exhibits. 14
On 1 October 1980, Judge Capulong rendered a decision against the accused Ruben
Galang in the aforesaid criminal case. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered
finding the accused Ruben Galang guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged in the information and after applying the provisions
of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code and indeterminate sentence
law, this Court, imposes upon said accused Ruben Galang the
penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor as minimum to two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as
maximum; the accused is further sentenced to pay and indemnify the
heirs of Loida Bondoc the amount of P12,000.00 as indemnity for her
death; to reimburse the heirs of Loida Bondoc the amount of
P2,000.00 representing the funeral expenses; to pay the heirs of
Loida Bondoc the amount of P20,000.00 representing her loss of
income; to indemnify and pay the heirs of the deceased Jose Koh the
value of the car in the amount of P53,910.95, and to pay the costs. 15
The aforecited decision was promulgated only on 17 November 1980; on the same day,
counsel for petitioners filed with Branch III of the court — where the two (2) civil cases
were pending — a manifestation to that effect and attached thereto a copy of the
decision. 16
Upon the other hand, Judge Mario Castañeda, Jr. dismissed the two (2) civil cases on 12
November 1980 and awarded the private respondents moral damages, exemplary
damages and attorney's fees. 17 The dispositive portion of the said decision reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the preponderance of evidence to be in favor
of the defendants and against the plaintiffs, these cases are hereby
ordered DISMISSED with costs against the plaintiffs. The defendants
had proven their counter-claim, thru evidences (sic) presented and
unrebutted. Hence, they are hereby awarded moral and exemplary
damages in the amount of P100,000.00 plus attorney's fee of
P15,000.00 and litigation expenses for (sic) P2,000.00. The actual
damages claimed for (sic) by the defendants is (sic) hereby
dismissing for lack of proof to that effect (sic). 18
A copy of the decision was sent by registered mail to the petitioners on 28 November
1980 and was received on 2 December 1980. 19
Accused Ruben Galang appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals.
The appeal was docketed as C.A.-G.R. Blg. 24764-CR and was assigned to the court's
Third Division. Plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478 likewise separately appealed
the 12 November 1980 decision to the appellate court. The appeals were docketed as
C.A.-G.R. No. 69041-R and C.A.-G.R. No. 69040-R, respectively, and were assigned to
the Fourth Civil Cases Division.
On 4 October 1982, the respondent Court promulgated its decision 20 in C.A.-G.R. Blg.
24764-CR affirming the conviction of Galang. 21 The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
DAHIL DITO, ang hatol na paksa ng naritong paghahabol ay Aming
pinagtitibay sa kanyang kabuuan. Ang naghahabol pa rin ang
pinagbabayad ng gugol ng paghahabol.
A motion for reconsideration of the decision was denied by the respondent Court in
its Kapasiyahan promulgated on 25 November 1982. 22 A petition for its review 23 was
filed with this Court; said petition was subsequently denied. A motion for its
reconsideration was denied with finality in the Resolution of 20 April 1983. 24
On 29 November 1983, respondent Court, by then known as the Intermediate Appellate
Court, promulgated its consolidated decision in A.C.-G.R. CV Nos. 69040 and
69041, 25 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from it hereby reversed and set
aside and another one is rendered, ordering defendants-appellees to pay
plaintiffs-appellants as follows:
For the death of Jose Koh:
P 50,000.00 as moral damages
P 12,000.00 as death indemnity
P 16,000.00 for the lot and tomb (Exhs. U and U-1)
P 4,000.00 expenses for holding a wake (p. 9, tsn
April 19, 1979)
 P 950.00 for the casket (Exh. M)
P 375.00 for the vault services (Exhs. V and V-1)
For the death of Kim Koh McKee:
P 50,000.00 as moral damages
P 12,000.00 as death indemnity
P 1,000.00 for the purchase of the burial lot (Exh. M)
P 950.00 for funeral services (Exh. M-1)
P 375.00 for vault services (Exhs. V and V-1)
For the physical injuries suffered by George Koh McKee:
P 25,000.00 as moral damages
P 672.00 for Clark Field Hospital (Exh. E)
P 4,384.00 paid to Angeles Medical Clinic (Exhs. D,
D-1 and
D-2)
P 1,555.00 paid to St. Francis Medical Center (Exhs.
B and B-1)
For the physical injuries suffered by Araceli Koh McKee:
P 25,000.00 as moral damages
P 1,055.00 paid to St. Francis Medical Center (Exhs.
G and
G-1)
P 75.00 paid to St. Francis Medical Center (Exhs. G-2
and G-3)
P 428.00 to Carmelite General Hospital (Exh. F)
P 114.20 to Muñoz Clinic (Exh. MM)
For the physical injuries suffered by Christopher Koh McKee:
P 10,000.00 as moral damages
P 1,231.10 to St. Francis Medical Center (Exhs. L
and L-1)
P 321.95 to F.C.E.A. Hospital (Exhs. G and D-1)
In addition, We award P10,000.00 as counsel (sic) fees in Civil Case No.
4477 and another P10,000.00; as counsel (sic) fees in Civil Case No.
4478.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 26
The decision is anchored principally on the respondent Court's findings that it was Ruben
Galang's inattentiveness or reckless imprudence which caused the accident. The
appellate court further said that the law presumes negligence on the part of the
defendants (private respondents), as employers of Galang, in the selection and
supervision of the latter; it was further asserted that these defendants did not allege in
their Answers the defense of having exercised the diligence of a good father of a family
in selecting and supervising the said employee. 27This conclusion of reckless imprudence
is based on the following findings of fact:
In the face of these diametrically opposed judicial positions, the
determinative issue in this appeal is posited in the fourth assigned
error as follows:
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD THE (sic) DRIVER OF
THE TRUCK STOPPED HIS TRUCK BLEW HIS HORN SWITCHED
ON HIS HEADLIGHTS AND COULD NOT SWERVE TO THE RIGHT.
Supportive of plaintiffs' version, principal witness Araceli Koh McKee testified thus:
Q What happened after that, as you approached the bridge?
A When we were approaching the bridge, two (2) boys tried to cross the
right lane on the right side of the highway going to San Fernando. My
father, who is (sic) the driver of the car tried to avoid the two (2) boys who
were crossing, he blew his horn and swerved to the left to avoid hitting the
two (2) boys. We noticed the truck, he switched on the headlights to warn
the truck driver, to slow down to give us the right of way to come back to
our right lane.
Q Did the truck slow down?
A No, sir, it did not, just (sic) continued on its way.
Q What happened after that?
A After avoiding the two (2) boys, the car tried to go back to the right lane
since the truck is (sic) coming, my father stepped on the brakes and all
what (sic) I heard is the sound of impact (sic), sir. (tsn, pp. 5-6, July 22,
1977); or (Exhibit "O" in these Civil Cases).
xxx xxx xxx
Q Mrs. how did you know that the truck driven by the herein accused,
Ruben Galang did not reduce its speed before the actual impact of
collision (sic) as you narrated in this Exhibit "1," how did you know (sic)?
A It just kept on coming, sir. If only he reduced his speed, we could have
got (sic) back to our right lane on side (sic) of the highway, sir. (tsn. pp.
33-34 July 22, 1977) or (Exhibit "O" in these Civil Cases) (pp. 30-31,
Appellants' Brief).
Plaintiffs' version was successfully corroborated to Our satisfaction by the following facts
and circumstances:
1. An impartial eye-witness to the mishap, Eugenio Tanhueco,
declared that the truck stopped only when it had already collided with
the car:
xxx xxx xxx
Tanhueco repeated the same testimony during the hearing in the
criminal case:
xxx xxx xxx
Tanhueco could (sic) not be tagged as an accommodation witness
because he was one of the first to arrive at the scene of the accident.
As a matter of fact, he brought one of the injured passengers to the
hospital.
We are not prepared to accord faith and credit to defendants'
witnesses, Zenaida Soliman, a passenger of the truck, and Roman
Dayrit, who supposedly lived across the street.
Regarding Soliman, experience has shown that in the ordinary course
of events people usually take the side of the person with whom they
are associated at the time of the accident, because, as a general rule,
they do not wish to be identified with the person who was at fault.
Thus an imaginary bond is unconsciously created among the several
persons within the same group (People vs. Vivencio, CA-G.R. No.
00310-CR, Jan. 31, 1962).
With respect to Dayrit, We can not help suspecting (sic) that he is an
accommodation witness. He did not go to the succor of the injured
persons. He said he wanted to call the police authorities about the
mishap, but his phone had no dial tone. Be this (sic) as it may, the
trial court in the criminal case acted correctly in refusing to believe
Dayrit.
2. Exhibit 2, the statement of Galang, does not include the claim that
Galang stopped his truck at a safe distance from the car, according to
plaintiffs (p. 25, Appellants' Brief). This contention of appellants was
completely passed sub-silencio or was not refuted by appellees in
their brief. Exhibit 2 is one of the exhibits not included in the record.
According to the Table of Contents submitted by the court below, said
Exhibit 2 was not submitted by defendants-appellees. In this light, it is
not far-fetched to surmise that Galang's claim that he stopped was an
eleventh-hour desperate attempt to exculpate himself from
imprisonment and damages.
3. Galang divulged that he stopped after seeing the car about 10
meters away:
ATTY. SOTTO:
Q Do I understand from your testimony that inspite of the fact
that you admitted that the road is straight and you may be able
to (sic) see 500-1000 meters away from you any vehicle, you
first saw that car only about ten (10) meters away from you for
the first time?
xxx xxx xxx
A I noticed it, sir, that it was about ten (10) meters away.
ATTY. SOTTO:
Q So, for clarification, you clarify and state under your oath that
you have (sic) not noticed it before that ten (10) meters? (Tsn. 3
to 5, Sept. 18, 1979). (p. 16, Appellants' Brief)
Galang's testimony substantiate (sic) Tanhueco's statement that
Galang stopped only because of the impact. At ten (10) meters away,
with the truck running at 30 miles per hour, as revealed in Galang's
affidavit (Exh. 2; p. 25, Appellants' brief), it is well-nigh impossible to
avoid a collision on a bridge.
5. Galang's truck stopped because of the collision, and not because
he waited for Jose Koh to return to his proper lane. The police
investigator, Pfc. Fernando L. Nuñag, stated that he found skid marks
under the truck but there were not (sic) skid marks behind the truck
(pp. 19-20, t.s.n., Nov. 3, 1978). The presence of skid marks show
(sic) that the truck was speeding. Since the skid marks were found
under the truck and none were found at the rear of the truck, the
reasonable conclusion is that the skid marks under the truck were
caused by the truck's front wheels when the trucks (sic) suddenly
stopped seconds before the mishap in an endeavor to avoid the
same. But, as aforesaid, Galang saw the car at barely 10 meters
away, a very short distance to avoid a collision, and in his futile
endeavor to avoid the collision he abruptly stepped on his brakes but
the smashup happened just the same.
For the inattentiveness or reckless imprudence of Galang, the law
presumes negligence on the part of the defendants in the selection of
their driver or in the supervision over him. Appellees did not allege
such defense of having exercised the duties of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of their employees in their
answers. They did not even adduce evidence that they did in fact
have methods of selection and programs of supervision. The
inattentiveness or negligence of Galang was the proximate cause of
the mishap. If Galang's attention was on the highway, he would have
sighted the car earlier or at a very safe distance than (sic) 10 meters.
He proceeded to cross the bridge, and tried to stop when a collision
was already inevitable, because at the time that he entered the bridge
his attention was not riveted to the road in front of him.
On the question of damages, the claims of appellants were amply
proven, but the items must be reduced. 28
A motion for reconsideration alleging improper appreciation of the facts was
subsequently filed by private respondents on the basis of which the respondent Court, in
its Resolution of 3 April 1984, 29 reconsidered and set aside its 29 November 1983
decision and affirmed in toto the trial court's judgment of 12 November 1980. A motion to
reconsider this Resolution was denied by the respondent Court on 4 July 1984. 30
Hence, this petition.
Petitioners allege that respondent Court:
I
. . . COMMITTED A VERY SERIOUS AND GRAVE ERROR WHEN
IT TOTALLY REVERSED ITS DECISION BY MERELY BASING IT
FROM (sic) A MERE "PRESUMPTION," TOTALLY DISREGARDING
THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' DRIVER'S ADMISSIONS AND
CONFESSIONS, WHO EXCLUSIVELY COMMITTED THE
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT (sic), FURTHER, IT ALSO
DISREGARDED THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AND FOUND IN THE
RECORDS; THEREFORE, RESPONDENT COURT'S
RESOLUTIONS (ANNEXES A and B, PETITION) ARE CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS, PURELY BASED ON SPECULATIONS,
CONJECTURES AND WITHOUT SURE FOUNDATION IN THE
EVIDENCE.
II
. . . GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND ERRED WHEN IN
EFFECT IT DISREGARDED A DOCTRINE LAID DOWN BY THIS
HONORABLE COURT BY STATING AMONG OTHERS, "IT
CANNOT CATEGORICALLY ADOPT THE FINDINGS OF GUILT IN
THE CRIMINAL CASE WHERE THE DRIVER OF THE TRUCK
INVOLVED IN THE ACCIDENT WAS INDICTED.
III
. . . PATENTLY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AND MADE A MISLEADING PRONOUNCEMENT, WHEN IT HELD:
"IT IS THUS INCUMBENT UPON THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS
(APPELLEES WRONGLY MENTIONED IN THE RESOLUTION) TO
PROVE THEIR ALLEGATIONS THAT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF
THE ACCIDENT WAS THE NEGLIGENCE OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS' DRIVER.
IV
. . . COMMITTED ANOTHER GRIEVIOUS (sic) ERROR;
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND CITED
ANOTHER CASE WHICH IS CLEARLY INAPPLICABLE TO THESE
CASES.
V
. . . COMMITTED A PATENT ERROR AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN ADOPTING THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL
 COURT WHICH ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND CONTRARY
TO THE EVIDENCE FOUND IN THE RECORDS, SPECIALLY THEY
(sic) ARE CONTRARY TO THE ADMITTED FACTS AND JUDICIAL
ADMISSIONS MADE BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' DRIVER.
VI
. . . EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AND GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT AWARDED
DAMAGES TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WHEN SAID
AWARD IS NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE, IN THE RECORDS,
AND SAID AWARD IS NOT ALLOWED BY LAW AND THE
CONSISTENT DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT.
VII
. . . EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AND GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
ERRONEOUSLY SET ASIDE ITS DECISION AWARDING
DAMAGES TO PETITIONERS WHICH IS CLEARLY IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE EVIDENCE, THE LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE RELATIVE TO THE AWARD OF DAMAGES. 31
In the Resolution of 12 September 1984, We required private respondents to Comment
on the petition. 32 After the said Comment 33 was filed, petitioners submitted a
Reply 34 thereto; this Court then gave due course to the instant petitions and required
petitioners to file their Brief, 35 which they accordingly complied with.
There is merit in the petition. Before We take on the main task of dissecting the
arguments and counter-arguments, some observations on the procedural vicissitudes of
these cases are in order.
Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478, which were for the recovery of civil liability arising from
a quasi-delict under Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, were filed
ahead of Criminal Case No. 3751. Civil Case No. 4478 was eventually consolidated with
Civil Case No. 4477 for joint trial in Branch III of the trial court. The records do not
indicate any attempt on the part of the parties, and it may therefore be reasonably
concluded that none was made, to consolidate Criminal Case No. 3751 with the civil
cases, or vice-versa. The parties may have then believed, and understandably so, since
by then no specific provision of law or ruling of this Court expressly allowed such a
consolidation, that an independent civil action, authorized under Article 33 in relation to
Article 2177 of the Civil Code, such as the civil cases in this case, cannot be
consolidated with the criminal case. Indeed, such consolidation could have been farthest
from their minds as Article 33 itself expressly provides that the "civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence." Be that as it may, there was then no legal impediment against such
consolidation. Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court, which seeks to avoid a
multiplicity of suits, guard against oppression and abuse, prevent delays, clear
congested dockets to simplify the work of the trial court, or in short, attain justice with the
least expense to the parties litigants, 36 would have easily sustained a consolidation,
thereby preventing the unseeming, if no ludicrous, spectacle of two (2) judges
appreciating, according to their respective orientation, perception and perhaps even
prejudice, the same facts differently, and thereafter rendering conflicting decisions. Such
was what happened in this case. It should not, hopefully, happen anymore. In the recent
case of Cojuangco vs. Court or Appeals, 37 this Court held that the present provisions of
Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court allow a consolidation of an independent civil
action for the recovery of civil liability authorized under Articles 32, 33, 34 or 2176 of the
Civil Code with the criminal action subject, however, to the condition that no final
judgment has been rendered in that criminal case.
Let it be stressed, however, that the judgment in Criminal Case No. 3751 finding Galang
guilty of reckless imprudence, although already final by virtue of the denial by no less
than this Court of his last attempt to set aside the respondent Court's affirmance of the
verdict of conviction, has no relevance or importance to this case.
As We held in Dionisio vs. Alvendia, 38 the responsibility arising from fault or negligence
in a quasi-delict is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code. And, as more concretely stated in the concurring
opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes, "in the case of independent civil actions under the new
Civil Code, the result of the criminal case, whether acquittal or conviction, would be
entirely irrelevant to the civil action." 39 In Salta vs. De Veyra and PNB vs.
Purisima, 40 this Court stated:
. . . It seems perfectly reasonable to conclude that the civil actions
mentioned in Article 33, permitted in the same manner to be filed
separately from the criminal case, may proceed similarly regardless
of the result of the criminal case.
Indeed, when the law has allowed a civil case related to a criminal
case, to be filed separately and to proceed independently even during
the pendency of the latter case, the intention is patent to make the
court's disposition of the criminal case of no effect whatsoever on the
separate civil case. This must be so because the offenses specified in
Article 33 are of such a nature, unlike other offenses not mentioned,
that they may be made the subject of a separate civil action because
of the distinct separability of their respective juridical cause or basis of
action . . . .
What remains to be the most important consideration as to why the decision in the
criminal case should not be considered in this appeal is the fact that private respondents
were not parties therein. It would have been entirely different if the petitioners' cause of
action was for damages arising from a delict, in which case private respondents' liability
could only be subsidiary pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. In the
absence of any collusion, the judgment of conviction in the criminal case against Galang
would have been conclusive in the civil cases for the subsidiary liability of the private
respondents. 41
And now to the merits of the petition.
It is readily apparent from the pleadings that the principal issue raised in this petition is
whether or not respondent Court's findings in its challenged resolution are supported by
evidence or are based on mere speculations, conjectures and presumptions.
The principle is well-established that this Court is not a trier of facts. Therefore, in an
appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, only questions of law
may be raised. The resolution of factual issues is the function of the lower courts whose
findings on these matters are received with respect and are, as a rule, binding on this
Court. 42
The foregoing rule, however, is not without exceptions. Findings of facts of the trial
courts and the Court of Appeals may be set aside when such findings are not supported
by the evidence or when the trial court failed to consider the material facts which would
have led to a conclusion different from what was stated in its judgment. 43The same is
true where the appellate court's conclusions are grounded entirely on conjectures,
speculations and surmises 44 or where the conclusions of the lower courts are based on
a misapprehension of facts. 45
It is at once obvious to this Court that the instant case qualifies as one of the
aforementioned exceptions as the findings and conclusions of the trial court and the
respondent Court in its challenged resolution are not supported by the evidence, are
based on an misapprehension of facts and the inferences made therefrom are manifestly
mistaken. The respondent Court's decision of 29 November 1983 makes the correct
findings of fact.
In the assailed resolution, the respondent Court held that the fact that the car improperly
invaded the lane of the truck and that the collision occurred in said lane gave rise to the
presumption that the driver of the car, Jose Koh, was negligent. On the basis of this
presumed negligence, the appellate court immediately concluded that it was Jose Koh's
negligence that was the immediate and proximate cause of the collision. This is an
unwarranted deduction as the evidence for the petitioners convincingly shows that the
car swerved into the truck's lane because as it approached the southern end of the
bridge, two (2) boys darted across the road from the right sidewalk into the lane of the
car. As testified to by petitioner Araceli Koh McKee:
Q What happened after that, as you approached the
bridge?
A When we were approaching the bridge, two (2)
boys tried to cross the right lane on the right side of
the highway going to San Fernando. My father, who
is (sic) the driver of the car tried to avoid the two (2)
boys who were crossing, he blew his horn and
swerved to the left to avoid hitting the two (2) boys.
We noticed the truck, he switched on the headlights
to warn the truck driver, to slow down to give us the
right of way to come back to our right lane.
Q Did the truck slow down?
A No sir, it did not, just (sic) continued on its way.
Q What happened after that?
A After avoiding the two (2) boys, the car tried to go
back to the right lane since the truck is (sic) coming,
my father stepped on the brakes and all what (sic) I
heard is the sound of impact (sic), sir. 46
Her credibility and testimony remained intact even during cross examination. Jose Koh's
entry into the lane of the truck was necessary in order to avoid what was, in his mind at
that time, a greater peril — death or injury to the two (2) boys. Such act can hardly be
classified as negligent.
Negligence was defined and described by this Court in Layugan vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 47 thus:
. . . Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable
man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the
conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which
a prudent and reasonable man would not do (Black's Law Dictionary,
Fifth Edition, 930), or as Judge Cooley defines it, "(T)he failure to
observe for the protection of the interests of another person, that
degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances
justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury." (Cooley on
Torts, Fourth Edition, vol. 3, 265)
In Picart vs. Smith (37 Phil 809, 813), decided more than seventy
years ago but still a sound rule, (W)e held:
The test by which to determine the existence of
negligence in a particular case may be stated as
follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use that(reasonable care and
caution which an ordinarily prudent person would
have used in the same situation?) If not, then he is
guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts
the standard supposed to be supplied by the
imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamiliasof
the Roman
law. . . .
In Corliss vs. Manila Railroad Company, 48 We held:
. . . Negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It is
a relative or comparative, not an absolute, term and its application
depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and
vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require. Where the
danger is great, a high degree of care is necessary, and the failure to
observe it is a want of ordinary care under the circumstances. (citing
Ahern v. Oregon Telephone Co., 35 Pac. 549 (1894).
On the basis of the foregoing definition, the test of negligence and the facts obtaining in
this case, it is manifest that no negligence could be imputed to Jose Koh. Any
reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have tried to avoid running over the two
boys by swerving the car away from where they were even if this would mean entering
the opposite lane. Avoiding such immediate peril would be the natural course to take
particularly where the vehicle in the opposite lane would be several meters away and
could very well slow down, move to the side of the road and give way to the oncoming
car. Moreover, under what is known as the emergency rule, "one who suddenly finds
himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best
means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if
he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a
better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his
own negligence." 49
Considering the sudden intrusion of the two (2) boys into the lane of the car, We find that
Jose Koh adopted the best means possible in the given situation to avoid hitting them.
Applying the above test, therefore, it is clear that he was not guilty of negligence.
In any case, assuming, arguendo that Jose Koh is negligent, it cannot be said that his
negligence was the proximate cause of the collision. Proximate cause has been defined
as:
. . . that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred. And more
comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in
motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each
having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the
final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural
and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should,
as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable
ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to
some person might probably result therefrom. 50
Applying the above definition, although it may be said that the act of Jose Koh, if at all
negligent, was the initial act in the chain of events, it cannot be said that the same
caused the eventual injuries and deaths because of the occurrence of a sufficient
intervening event, the negligent act of the truck driver, which was the actual cause of the
tragedy. The entry of the car into the lane of the truck would not have resulted in the
collision had the latter heeded the emergency signals given by the former to slow down
and give the car an opportunity to go back into its proper lane. Instead of slowing down
and swerving to the far right of the road, which was the proper precautionary measure
under the given circumstances, the truck driver continued at full speed towards the car.
The truck driver's negligence becomes more apparent in view of the fact that the road is
7.50 meters wide while the car measures 1.598 meters and the truck, 2.286 meters, in
width. This would mean that both car and truck could pass side by side with a clearance
of 3.661 meters to spare. 51 Furthermore, the bridge has a level sidewalk which could
have partially accommodated the truck. Any reasonable man finding himself in the given
situation would have tried to avoid the car instead of meeting it head-on.
The truck driver's negligence is apparent in the records. He himself said that his truck
was running at 30 miles (48 kilometers) per hour along the bridge while the maximum
speed allowed by law on a bridge 52 is only 30 kilometers per hour. Under Article 2185 of
the Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the
mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. We cannot give credence to private
respondents' claim that there was an error in the translation by the investigating officer of
the truck driver's response in Pampango as to whether the speed cited was in kilometers
per hour or miles per hour. The law presumes that official duty has been regularly
performed; 53 unless there is proof to the contrary, this presumption holds. In the instant
case, private respondents' claim is based on mere conjecture.
The truck driver's negligence was likewise duly established through the earlier quoted
testimony of petitioner Araceli Koh McKee which was duly corroborated by the testimony
of Eugenio Tanhueco, an impartial eyewitness to the mishap.
Araceli Koh McKee testified further, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Q Mrs. how did you know that the truck driven by the
herein accused, Ruben Galang did not reduce its
speed before the actual impact of collision as you
narrated in this Exhibit "1," how did you know?
A It just kept on coming, sir. If only he reduced his
speed, we could have got (sic) back to our right lane
on side (sic) of the highway, sir. (tsn, pp. 33-34, July
22, 1977) or (Exhibit; "O" in these Civil Cases) (pp.
30-31, Appellants' Brief) 54
while Eugenio Tanhueco testified thus:
Q When you saw the truck, how was it moving?
A It was moving 50 to 60 kilometers per hour, sir.
Q Immediately after you saw this truck, do you know
what happened?
A I saw the truck and a car collided (sic), sir, and I
went to the place to help the victims. (tsn. 28, April
19, 1979)
xxx xxx xxx
Q From the time you saw the truck to the time of the
impact, will you tell us if the said truck ever stopped?
A I saw it stopped (sic) when it has (sic) already
collided with the car and it was already motionless.
(tsn. 31, April 19, 1979; Emphasis Supplied). (p. 27,
Appellants' Brief). 55
Clearly, therefore, it was the truck driver's subsequent negligence in failing to take the
proper measures and degree of care necessary to avoid the collision which was the
proximate cause of the resulting accident.
Even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent, the doctrine of last clear chance finds application
here. Last clear chance is a doctrine in the law of torts which states that the contributory
negligence of the party injured will not defeat the claim for damages if it is shown that the
defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the
consequences of the negligence of the injured party. In such cases, the person who had
the last clear chance to avoid the mishap is considered in law solely responsible for the
consequences thereof. 56
In Bustamante vs. Court of Appeals, 57 We held:
The respondent court adopted the doctrine of "last clear chance." The
doctrine, stated broadly, is that the negligence of the plaintiff does not
preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it
appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and
prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff
notwithstanding the plaintiff's negligence. In other words, the doctrine
of last clear chance means that even though a person's own acts may
have placed him in a position of peril, and an injury results, the injured
person is entitled to recovery (sic). As the doctrine is usually stated, a
person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an
accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or that of
a third person imputed to the opponent is considered in law solely
responsible for the consequences of the accident. (Sangco, Torts and
Damages, 4th Ed., 1986, p. 165).
The practical import of the doctrine is that a negligent defendant is
held liable to a negligent plaintiff, or even to a plaintiff who has been
grossly negligent in placing himself in peril, if he, aware of the
plaintiff's peril, or according to some authorities, should have been
aware of it in the reasonable exercise of due care, had in fact an
opportunity later than that of the plaintiff to avoid an accident (57 Am.
Jur., 2d, pp. 798-799).
In Pantranco North Express, Inc., vs. Baesa, 58 We ruled:
The doctrine of last clear chance was defined by this Court in the
case of Ong v. Metropolitan Water District, 104 Phil. 397 (1958), in
this wise:
The doctrine of the last clear chance simply,
means that the negligence of a claimant does not
preclude a recovery for the negligence of
defendant where it appears that the latter, by
exercising reasonable care and prudence, might
have avoided injurious consequences to claimant
notwithstanding his negligence.
The doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff was guilty of
prior or antecedent negligence but the defendant, who had the last
fair chance to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so, is made
liable for all the consequences of the accident notwithstanding the
prior negligence of the plaintiff [Picart v. Smith, 37 Phil. 809 (1918);
Glan People's Lumber and Hardware, et al. vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, Cecilia Alferez Vda. de Calibo, et al., G.R. No.
70493, May, 18, 1989]. The subsequent negligence of the defendant
in failing to exercise ordinary care to avoid injury to plaintiff becomes
the immediate or proximate cause of the accident which intervenes
between the accident and the more remote negligence of the plaintiff,
 thus making the defendant liable to the plaintiff [Picart v. 5 Record on Appeal, 121-124.
Smith, supra]. 6 Id., 226-227.
7 Id., 22-25; 26-28; 28-32; 34-36.
Generally, the last clear chance doctrine is invoked for the purpose of 8 Id., 39-43.
making a defendant liable to a plaintiff who was guilty of prior or 9 Record on Appeal, 45-48; 49-52; 52-53.
10 Id., 53-57.
antecedent negligence, although it may also be raised as a defense 11 Id., 91, 92, 100, 101, 103, 104 and 105.
to defeat claim (sic) for damages. 12 Record on Appeal, 107, 109, 111 and 112.
13 Id., 124, et seq.
Applying the foregoing doctrine, it is not difficult to rule, as We now rule, that it was the
14 Id., 138, et seq.
truck driver's negligence in failing to exert ordinary care to avoid the collision which was, 15 Id., 160-161.
in law, the proximate cause of the collision. As employers of the truck driver, the private 16 Record on Appeal, 120-121.
respondents are, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, directly and primarily liable for the 17 Id., 86-120.
resulting damages. The presumption that they are negligent flows from the negligence of 18 Id., 119-120.
19 Id., 6.
their employee. That presumption, however, is only juris tantum, not juris et de 20 Per Associate Justice Onofre A. Villaluz, concurred in Associate Justices Crisolito
jure. 59 Their only possible defense is that they exercised all the diligence of a good Pascual and Guillermo P. Villasor.
father of a family to prevent the damage. Article 2180 reads as follows: 21 Annex "C" of Petition; Rollo, 69-77.
22 Annex "C-1," Id.; Id., 78.
The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for 23 G.R. No. 62713.
one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom 24 Annex "D," Petition, op. cit.; Rollo, op. cit., 79.
one is responsible. 25 Per Associate Justice Porfirio V. Sison, concurred in by Associate Justices
Abdulwahid A. Bidin, Marcelino R. Veloso and Desiderio P. Jurado.
xxx xxx xxx 26 Rollo, 88-89.
27 Id., 88.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees 28 Rollo, 83-88.
and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned 29 Rollo, 61-65.
tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or 30 Id., 67.
industry. 31 Rollo, 213-214.
32 Rollo, 150.
xxx xxx xxx 33 Id., 157-175.
34 Id., 185-198.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the 35 Id., 199.
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence 36 Caños vs. Peralta, 115 SCRA 843 [1982], citing 1 C.J.S. 1342-1343.
of a good father of a family to prevent damage. 37 203 SCRA 619 [1991].
38 102 Phil. 443 [1957].
The diligence of a good father referred to means the diligence in the selection and 39 At page 447.
supervision of employees. 60The answers of the private respondents in Civil Cases Nos. 40 117 SCRA 212, 218-219 [1982]; see also Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, 176
4477 and 4478 did not interpose this defense. Neither did they attempt to prove it. SCRA 591 [1989]; Andamo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 191 SCRA 195 [1990].
41 Martinez vs. Barredo, 81 Phil. 1 [1948]; Miranda vs. Malate Garage and Taxicab,
The respondent Court was then correct in its Decision of 29 November 1983 in reversing Inc., 99 Phil. 670 [1956]; Manalo vs. Robles Transportation Co., Inc., 99 Phil. 729
the decision of the trial court which dismissed Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478. Its [1956].
assailed Resolution of 3 April 1984 finds no sufficient legal and factual moorings. 42 FNCB Finance vs. Estavillo, 192 SCRA 514 [1990]; Rañeses vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 187 SCRA 397 [1990]; Remalante vs. Tibe, 158 SCRA 138 [1988].
In the light of recent decisions of this Court, 61 the indemnity for death must, however, be 43 Capco vs. Macasaet, 189 SCRA 561 [1990].
increased from P12,000.00 to P50,000.00. 44 Orcino vs. Civil Service Commission, 190 SCRA 815 [1990]; Tupue vs. Urgel,
161 SCRA 417 [1988], Tolentino vs. De Jesus, 56 SCRA 167 [1974].
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution of the 45 Pajunar vs. Court of Appeals, 175 SCRA 464 [1989]; Sese vs. Intermediate
respondent Court of 3 April 1984 is SET ASIDE while its Decision of 29 November 1983 Appellate Court, 152 SCRA 585 [1987].
46 TSN, 22 July 1977, 5-6; Exhibit "O," Rollo, 83.
in C.A.-G.R. CV Nos. 69040-41 is REINSTATED, subject to the modification that the
47 167 SCRA 363 [1988].
indemnity for death is increased from P12,000.00 to P50,000.00 each for the death of 48 27 SCRA 674 [1969].
Jose Koh and Kim Koh McKee. 49 Gan vs. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 378 [1988], citing Siegl vs. Watson, 195
NW 867 and others.
Costs against private respondents. 50 Vda. de Bataclan vs. Medina, 102 Phil. 181 [1957], citing 38 Am. Jur. 695-696.
SO ORDERED. 51 Rollo, 148.
52 Section 53, Motor Vehicle Law.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Romero, JJ., concur. 53 Section 2 (m), Rule 131, Revised Rules of Court.
Bidin, J., took no part. 54 Rollo, 83-84.
55 Id., 84.
56 Ong vs. Metropolitan Water District, 104 Phil. 405 [1958]; Del Prado vs. Manila
Footnotes Electric Co., 52 Phil. 900) [1929]; Picart vs. Smith, 37 Phil. 809 [1918].
1 Exhibit "S". 57 193 SCRA 603 [1991].
2 In the sketch plan prepared by Geodetic Engr. Benito J. Caraan [Exhibit "Y"], the 58 179 SCRA 384 [1989].
bridge is estimated to be 42.15 meters in length and 7.5 meters in width. 59 Ramos vs. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Go., 19 SCRA 289 [1967], citing Bahia vs.
3 Record an Appeal, 220. Litonjua, 30 Phil. 624 [1915].
4 Id., 16-18. 60 Ramos vs. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., supra.
61 People vs. Sison, 189 SCRA 643 [1989]; People vs. Narit, 197 SCRA 334 [1991];
People vs. Tiozon, 198 SCRA 368 [1991]; People vs. Lubreo, 200 SCRA 11 [1991];
Dangwa Trans., Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 202 SCRA 574 [1991].
 EN BANC
G.R. No. L-29745 June 4, 1973
MERCEDES M. TEAGUE, petitioner,
vs.
ELENA FERNANDEZ, et al., respondent.
Jose W. Diokno for petitioner.
Jose G. Gatchalian for respondents.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
The facts are stated in the decision of the Court of Appeals as follows:
The Realistic Institute, admittedly owned and operated by defendant-
appellee Mercedes M. Teague was a vocational school for hair and
beauty culture situated on the second floor of the Gil-Armi Building, a
two-storey, semi-concrete edifice (Exhs. "C", "C-1" to "C-5" and "4")
located at the corner of Quezon Boulevard and Soler Street, Quiapo,
Manila. The said second floor was unpartitioned, had a total area of
about 400 square meters, and although it had only one stairway, of
about 1.50 meters in width, it had eight windows, each of which was
provided with two fire-escape ladders (Exh. "4"), and the presence of
each of said fire-exits was indicated on the wall (Exh. "5").
At about four o'clock in the afternoon of October 24, 1955, a fire broke
out in a store for surplus materials located about ten meters away
from the institute. Soler Street lay between that store and the institute.
Upon seeing the fire, some of the students in the Realistic Institute
shouted 'Fire! Fire!' and thereafter, a panic ensued. Four
instructresses and six assistant instructress of the Institute were
present and they, together with the registrar, tried to calm down the
students, who numbered about 180 at the time, telling them not to be
afraid because the Gil-Armi Building would not get burned as it is
made of concrete, and that the fire was anyway, across the street.
They told the students not to rush out but just to go down the stairway
two by two, or to use the fire-escapes. Mrs. Justitia Prieto, one of the
instructresses, took to the microphone so as to convey to the
students the above admonitions more effectively, and she even
slapped three students in order to quiet them down. Miss Frino
Meliton, the registrar, whose desk was near the stairway, stood up
and tried with outstretched arms to stop the students from rushing
and pushing their way to the stairs. The panic, however, could not be
subdued and the students, with the exception of the few who made
use of fire-escapes kept on rushing and pushing their way through the
stairs, thereby causing stampede therein.
Indeed, no part of the Gil-Armi Building caught fire. But, after the
panic was over, four students, including Lourdes Fernandez, a sister
of plaintiffs-appellants, were found dead and several others injured on
account of the stampede.
xxx xxx xxx
The injuries sustained by Lourdes Fernandez consisted of lacerations in both eyes and
on the upper lip, contused abrasions in different parts of the body, internal hemorrhage
and fractures in the second and third right ribs. The cause of death, according to the
autopsy report, was "Shock due to traumatic fractures of the ribs with perinephric
hematoma and lacerations of the conjunctiva of both eyes."
The deceased's five brothers and sisters filed an action for damages against Mercedes
M. Teague as owner and operator of Realistic Institute. The Court of First Instance of
Manila found for the defendant and dismissed the case. The plaintiffs thereupon
appealed to the Court of Appeals, which by a divided vote of 3 to 2 (a special division of
five members having been constituted) rendered a judgment of reversal and sentenced
the defendant to pay damages to the plaintiffs in the sum of P11,000.00, plus interest at
the legal rate from the date the complaint was filed.
The case came up to this Court on a petition for review filed by the defendant below.
The decision of the appellate court declared that the defendant, hereinafter to be referred
to as the petitioner, was negligent and that such negligence was the proximate cause of
the death of Lourdes Fernandez. This finding of negligence is based primarily on the fact
that the provision of Section 491 Of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila had not
been complied with in connection with the construction and use of the Gil-Armi building
where the petitioner's vocational school was housed. This provision reads as follows:
Sec. 491. Firepro of partitions, exits and stairways. — ... All buildings
and separate sections of buildings or buildings otherwise known as
accessorias having less than three stories, having one or more
persons domiciled therein either temporarily or permanently, and all
public or quasi-public buildings having less than three stories, such as
hospitals, sanitarium, schools, reformatories, places of human
detention, assembly halls, clubs, restaurants or panciterias, and the
like, shall be provided with at least two unobstructed stairways of not
less than one meter and twenty centimeters in width and an
inclination of not less than forty degrees from the perpendicular, in
case of large buildings more than two stairways shall likewise be
provided when required by the chief of the fire department, said
stairways shall be placed as far apart as possible.
The alleged violation of the ordinance above-quoted consisted in the fact that the second
storey of the Gil-Armi building had only one stairway, 1.5 meters wide, instead of two of
at least 1.2 meters each, although at the time of the fire the owner of the building had a
second stairway under construction.
In ruling that such non-compliance with the City Ordinances was an act of negligence
and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the death of Lourdes Fernandez,
reliance is based on a number of authorities in the American jurisdiction, thus: .
The mere fact of violation of a statute is not sufficient basis for an
inference that such violation was the proximate cause of the injury
complained. However, if the very injury has happened which was
intended to be prevented by the statute, it has been held that
violation of the statute will be deemed to be proximate cause of the
injury. (65 C.J.S. 1156).
The generally accepted view is that violation of a statutory duty
constitutes negligence, negligence as a matter or law, or, according
to the decisions on the question, negligence per se for the reason that
non-observance of what the legislature has prescribed as a suitable
precaution is failure to observe that care which an ordinarily prudent
man would observe, and, when the state regards certain acts as so
liable to injure others as to justify their absolute prohibition, doing the
forbidden act is a breach of duty with respect to those who may be
injured thereby; or, as it has been otherwise expressed, when the
 standard of care is fixed by law, failure to conform to such standard is
negligence, negligence per se or negligence in and of itself, in the
absence of a legal excuse. According to this view it is immaterial,
where a statute has been violated, whether the act or omission
constituting such violation would have been regarded as negligence
in the absence of any statute on the subject or whether there was, as
a matter of fact, any reason to anticipate that injury would result from
such violation. .... (65 C.J.S. pp. 623-628).
But the existence of an ordinance changes the situation. If a driver
causes an accident by exceeding the speed limit, for example, do not
inquire whether his prohibited conduct was unreasonably dangerous.
It is enough that it was prohibited. Violation of an ordinance intended
to promote safety is negligence. If by creating the hazard which the
ordinance was intended to avoid it brings about the harm which the
ordinance was intended to prevent, it is a legal cause of the harm.
This comes only to saying that in such circumstances the law has no
reason to ignore the causal relation which obviously exists in fact.
The law has excellent reason to recognize it, since it is the very
relation which the makers of the ordinance anticipated. This court has
applied these principles to speed limits and other regulations of the
manner of driving. (Ross vs. Hartman, 139 Fed. 2d 14 at 15).
... However, the fact that other happenings causing or contributing
toward an injury intervened between the violation of a statute or
ordinance and the injury does not necessarily make the result so
remote that no action can be maintained. The test is to be found not
in the number of intervening events or agents, but in their character
and in the natural and probable connection between the wrong done
and the injurious consequence. The general principle is that the
violation of a statute or ordinance is not rendered remote as the
cause of an injury by the intervention of another agency if the
occurrence of the accident, in the manner in which it happened, was
the very thing which the statute or ordinance was intended to Prevent.
(38 Am Jur 841).
The petitioner has raised a number of issues. The first is that Section 491 of the Revised
Ordinances of the City of Manila refers to public buildings and hence did not apply to the
Gil-Armi building which was of private ownership. It will be noted from the text of the
ordinance, however, that it is not ownership which determines the character of buildings
subject to its requirements, but rather the use or the purpose for which a particular
building is utilized. Thus the same may be privately owned, but if it is devoted to any one
of the purposes mentioned in the ordinance — for instance as a school, which the
Realistic Institute precisely was — then the building is within the coverage of the
ordinance. Indeed the requirement that such a building should have two (2) separate
stairways instead of only one (1) has no relevance or reasonable relation to the fact of
ownership, but does have such relation to the use or purpose for which the building is
devoted.
It is next contended that the obligation to comply with the ordinance devolved upon the
owners of the building and therefore it is they and not the petitioner herein, who is a
mere lessee, who should be liable for the violation. The contention ignores the fact that it
was the use of the building for school purposes which brought the same within the
coverage of the ordinance; and it was the petitioner and not the owners who was
responsible for such use.
The next issue, indeed the basic one, raised by the petitioner is whether or not the failure
to comply with the requirement of the ordinance was the proximate cause of the death of
Lourdes Fernandez. The case of Villanueva Vda. de Bataclan, et al. vs. Medina, G. R.
No. L-10126, October 22, 1957, is cited in support of the contention that such failure was
not the proximate cause. It is there stated by this Court:
The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury,
either immediately or by settling other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a
close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final
event in the chain immediately affecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should,
as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable
ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to
some person might probably result therefrom.
Having in view the decision just quoted, the petitioner relates the chain of events that
resulted in the death of Lourdes Fernandez as follows: (1) violation of ordinance; (2) fire
at a neighboring place; (3) shouts of "Fire!, Fire!"; (4) panic in the Institute; (5) stampede;
and (6) injuries and death.
As thus projected the violation of the ordinance, it is argued, was only a remote cause, if
at all, and cannot be the basis of liability since there intervened a number of independent
causes which produced the injury complained of. A statement of the doctrine relied upon
is found in Manila Electric Co. vs. Remoquillo, L-8328, May 18, 1956, wherein this Court,
citing Corpus Juris said:
A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if
such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give
rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there
intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a
distinct, successive unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even
though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or
occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the
independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And
if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into
operation the circumstances which result in injury because of the prior
defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate
cause. (45 C.J. p. 931.)
According to the petitioner "the events of fire, panic and stampede were independent
causes with no causal connection at all with the violation of the ordinance." The
weakness in the argument springs from a faulty juxtaposition of the events which formed
a chain and resulted in the injury. It is true that the petitioner's non-compliance with the
ordinance in question was ahead of and prior to the other events in point of time, in the
sense that it was coetaneous with its occupancy of the building. But the violation was a
continuing one, since the ordinance was a measure of safety designed to prevent a
specific situation which would pose a danger to the occupants of the building. That
situation was undue overcrowding in case it should become necessary to evacuate the
building, which, it could be reasonably foreseen, was bound to happen under emergency
conditions if there was only one stairway available. It is true that in this particular case
there would have been no overcrowding in the single stairway if there had not been a fire
in the neighborhood which caused the students to panic and rush headlong for the stairs
in order to go down. But it was precisely such contingencies or event that the authors of
the ordinance had in mind, for under normal conditions one stairway would be adequate
for the occupants of the building. Thus, as stated in 38 American Jurisprudence, page
841: "The general principle is that the violation of a statute or ordinance is not rendered
remote as the cause of an injury by the intervention of another agency if the occurrence
of the accident, in the manner in which it happened, was the very thing which the statute
or ordinance was intended to prevent." To consider the violation of the ordinance as the
proximate cause of the injury does not portray the situation in its true perspective; it
would be more accurate to say that the overcrowding at the stairway was the proximate
cause and that it was precisely what the ordinance intended to prevent by requiring that
there be two stairways instead of only one. Under the doctrine of the cases cited by the
respondents, the principle of proximate cause applies to such violation.
A procedural point mentioned by the petitioner is that the complaint did not specifically
allege that the ordinance in question had been violated. The violation, however, as an
act of negligence which gave rise to liability, was sufficiently comprehended within
paragraph 7 of the complaint, which reads: .
Par. 7. That the death of Lourdes Fernandez was due to the gross
negligence of the defendant who failed to exercise due care and
diligence for the safety of its students in not providing the building
with adequate fire exits and in not practicing fire drill exercises to
avoid the stampede, aside from the fact that the defendant did not
have a permit to use the building as a school-house.
The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs.
Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Castro and Barredo, JJ., reserve their votes.