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PECIAL ACTIO
REPORT
A U CA N LS
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tt tt O
NSEI-SHOTO
UNr.lASSIFIED
1945
OE
F i r s t Marine D i v i s i o n ,
F l e e t Marine Force,
c/o F l e e t Post O f f i c e , San Francisco, CONFIDENTIAL From: To : Via :
California.
10 July, 1945. The Commanding General* Commandant of the Marine Corps* (1) The Commanding General, III Amphibious Corps.
(2) The Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force,
Pacific.
(3) CINCPAC - CINCPOA. Aotion Report, NAN3EI SHOTO Operation, 1 Aroril 30 June, 1945, submission of. P a c i f i c F l e e t Confidential Letter 1CL-45. (A) Subject Report.
In accordance with the r e f e r e n c e , enclosure (A) 1. i s submitted herewith. 2. Each has been forwarded r e p o r t i n order to c o p i e s through the organization shown on d i s t r i b u t i o n l i s t the required number of copies o f subject preclude tne n e c e s s i t y of forwarding a l l chain of command.
P. A. d e l VALLE
DISTRIBUTION: CinC
Commander i n Chief, U, S. F l e e t .
Commandant of the Marine Corps.
CINCPAC - CINCPQA (3)
CG, FMF, PAC.
CG, 10th Army (2)
Commander in Chief, Soutnwest Pacific Areas.
CG, V Amphibious Corps
11 I
DECLASSIFIED
Subject: Action Report, NANSEI S O O Operation, 1 April HT 30 June, 1945, submission of. (Con^d). CO, 2d Marine D i v i s i o n . CO, 3rd Marine Division. CO, 4th Marine Division. CG, 5th Marine Division. CG, 6th Marine Division. Commander Third Amphibious Force. ANSCOL. Naval War College.
Command and General Staff School.
Marine Corps Schools (3)
Commander Amphibious Training Command Pacific.
Commander Amphibious Training Command Atlantic.
Commanding General Troop Training Unit Pacific.
Commanding General, Training Center, Fleet Marine Force,
Camp Lejeune.
Commanding General, Training Center, Fleet Marine Force,
Camp Pendleton.
Commander Third Fleet.
Commander Fifth Fleet.
CO, 8th Marines.
CG, XXIV Corps.
CG, 7th Infantry Division.
CG, 77th Infantry Division.
CG, 27th Infantry Division.
CG, 96th Infantry Division.
JttUSSIFB
TABLE of CONTENTS
Special Action Report
Nansei Shoto
Chapter Chapter I - Introduction
II - Task Organization
DECLteSfflED
CHAPTER I ; INTRODUCTION
SPECIAL ACTION REPORT -NANSEI SHOTO
INTRODUCTION Special Action Report Nansel Shoto Operations of the First Marine Division (Reinforced) against
the former Japanese island of O I A A are divided into three
KN W Phases for purposes of this report:
Phase I included training, planning and rehearsals conducted in the RUSSELL ISLANDS, G A A C N L Area. The movement UDLAA of t h i s Division to the target area concluded Phase I . Phase II began with the assault ship-to-shore movement on 1 April. 1945. Ground action in Central and Northern O I A A was included in t h i s phase which terminated on 22 April, 1945. KN W Phase I I I consisted of the battle for Southern OKINAWA the final destruction of organized resistance on the island, and the mopping up of enemy remnants. Phase III was o f f i c i a l l y terminated on 30 June, 1945. Phases I and II of First Marine Division operations on O I A A KN W provide few lessons for future study that may be included in an action report. The primary reason for this i s that the negligible enemy resistance i n this Division's zone of action provided few opportunities to discover the strengths and weaknesses of a combat organization. Weapons and equipment were not tested under conditions which would warrant qualified opinions on their e f f e c t i v e n e s s ; the only t a c t i c s employed were previously time-tested; and the lessons from Japanese t a c t i c s were almost completely non-existent* I t was during Phase III that the efficiency of this Division was tested and proved. In the protracted, fiercely-contested b a t t l e for Southern OKINAWA, valuable lessons were learned. I t i s the purpose of t h i s report to oroject these lessons against a background of the action as i t developed. While basic doctrine i n a l l cases was again oroved sound, i t i s necessary to point out the application of t h i s doctrine i n s p e c i f i c situations. Pertinent narratives, comments, and recommendations are grouped in the following chapters. Before the detailed operations of the First Marine Division can be analyzed, i t i s well to putline the over-all role played in the invasion of the NANSEI SHOTO. The task of the newlycreated U.S. Tenth Army and supporting units of the Unites jttffes
******* JLllT
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UNCLASSIFIED
Fleet was to continue the growing assault on the inner defense
lines of the Japanese Empire and to secure naval and air bases
for further blows against the enemy* Capture of principal
islands in the NANSEI SHOTO would provide these bases and secure
a r a sage to the China Seas, the coast of China, and the
approaches to the Japanese mainland*
As a part of this army, it was the mission of the First
Marine Division, functioning under the control of the III
Amphibious Corps, to defeat the enemy in its zone of action and
be prepared to carry out any further assigned operations. The
Division's initial assignment consisted of landing on the west
coast of OKINAWA and driving to the opposite coast on a proposed
timetable of fifteen days* As the action unfolded, initial
successes came with surprising ease. Central and Northern OKINAWA
fell quickly to Tenth Army forces* Major Japanese defenses were
located in Southern OKINAWA: in that area the decisive battles
of the island were fought*
The following chapters record the part played by the First
Marine Division in seourlng vital OKINAWA. The results of this
experience are incorporatea for the future benefit of those who
participated in the campaign and for those who may be faced with
comparable situations in the future*
3 Ji -
(HUISSYW**
Btcussro
UECmSIFltD
TASK ORGANIZATION
Special Action Report
Nansei Shoto
CT - 1
lBt Marines
Co A let Engr Bn
Co A 1st Plon Bn
Co A 1st Med Bn
Co A 1st MT Bn
Det Ord Co 1st Serv Bn
Atchd: 2d Plat, 1st Bomb Disposal Co
(less 2d and 3d Sqds)
Det S&S Co 1st Serv Bn
1st Plat 1st MP Co
Det 4th JASCO
Det 454th Amph Trk Co (Army) (3 DUKW)
CT - 5
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5th Marines
Co B 1st Engr Bn
Co B 1st Plon Bn
Co B 1st Med Bn
Co B 1st MT Bn
1st Amph Trac Bn (less Dets)
Det Ord Co 1st Serv Bn
Atchd: 3d Sod, 2d Plat, 1st Bomb Disposal Co
Det S&S Co 1st Serv Bn
2d Plat 1st MP Co
Det 454th Amph Trk Co (Army) (8 DUKW)
CT - 7 Col Edward W. SNEDEKER, USMC
7th Marines
Co C 1st Engr Bn
Co C 1st Plon Bn
Co C let Med Bn
Co C 1st MT Bn
8th Amph Trac Bn (less Dets)
Det Ord Co 1st Serv Bn
Atchd: 2d Sqd, 2d Plat, 1st Bonb Disposal Co
Det S&SJfct life, Serv Bn
Arty gp
11th Marines 3rd Amph Truck Co Det 454th Amph Truck Co (Army) (22 DUKW) VMO-3 Det 1st Amph Trao Bn (12 LVT)
Det 8th Amph Trac Bn (8 LVT)
Armd Amph Trac GP
3rd Armd Amph Bn (Prov)
LtCol A. J. STUART, USMC
Tk Gp
1st Tk Bn
Det 1st Amph Trac Bn (3 LVT)
Det 8th Amph Trac Bn (4 LVT)
Tk Malnt Plat, Ord Co, 1st Serv Bn
Col Francis I. FENTON, USMC
Engr gp
1st Engr Bn (less Cos A, B, C)
145th NCB (less Det)
Shore Party *Gp
1st Plon Bn (less Cos A, B, C) i 11th Special NCB Det 145th NCB Det 4th JASCO Replacement gp Serv Op
1st Serv Bn (less Dets)
1st MT Bn (less Cos A, B, C)
2d Plat 1st Laundry Co
MP gp
LtCol Austin C. SHOFNER, USMC
Col John KALUF, USMC
LtCol Robert g. BALLANCE, USMC
Ma J John I. WILLIAMSON, USMC
Army MP Co
1st MP Co (less 1st, 2d, 3rd Plats)
OKLASSIIW
Div Trs
Div Hq Bn (less 1st MP Co) 1st Med Bn ( less Cos As Bp C) 4th JA8C0 (less Dets) 454th Amph Truck Co (Army) (less Dets) (9 DUKW) Dets A-1& B-l AMG l?th & 18th G-10 Dispensary Units Assault Air Warning Teams 4th Prov Rkt Det 4th War Dog Plat
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CHAPTER
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PRELIMINARY PLANNING
SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
NANSEI SMOTO-
/7\
PERSONNEL ANNEX
Special Action Report
Nansei Shoto
Composition of the First Marine Division (Reinforced), for
the OKINAWA Operation was as follows:
First Marine Division:
Commanding General Major General Pedro A. del Valle Assistant Division Commander - Brigadier-General Louis R 0 Jones Chief of Staff Colonel Robert 0. Bare G - 1 LtCol Harold 0. Deakln
G - 2 G - 3 G - 4
LtCol. John W. Scott, Jr. LtCol. Russell E. Honsowetz LtCol Harvey C. Tschlrgi
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USMC 257-4,720
USN USA TOTAL
75-1,898
USN 188-2,921
14-280
USA 14-280
7,244
c.
At the time of embarkation the First Marine Division was b% over the authorized Table of Organization strength. The total sick in hospital was 240. After returning from the PALAU Operation, there remained attached to the Division 246 officers and 5,600 Marine enlisted who had served overseas nearly 30 months, and had participated in the GUADALCANAL, NEW BRITAIN, and PALAU Operations. It appeared that only half of these officers and about 3,000 men could"be rehabilitated in the United States after their lengthy tour in the combat zone. However, after a conference between G~l and the Chief of Staff, Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific, at Pearl Harbor, a partial solution to this problem was found, in that all the enlisted men could be rotated by diverting two additional Battle Replacement Drafts, the 23rd and 25th, to the First Marine Division. An extensive leave program for officers was also worked out, and53 officers elected to take thirty j3.ays_leaye_In the United States/ in view of the m\ rotated. ^Xn'addltio4, six went tof^fTfzii^j|r%*<^e|lfe MW|15ALAND
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INTELLIGENCE
Special Action Report
- NAN8EI SHOTO
Prior to landing on OKINAWA 3HIMA this Division oonduoted
a vigorous and comprehensive training and planning program.
The part played by the Division Intelligence Section consis
ted of conducting a school to train and Instruct Intelligence
personnel in their duties* Instruction was given in the
functions of combat intelligence, beach reconnaissance, and
Japanese language; regimental and division field exercises
were carried out.
Schoolst
An intelligence sohool for the enlisted personnel of
the various intelligence sections within the division was con
ducted by the D-2 section from 12 Deo ember to 5 January* It's
main aim was to present a baslo understanding of the organ
ization and function of intelligence agencies and the indiv
idual duties required of all such personnel* The training
was particularly adapted and well timed* since a large number
of new men had entered the D-2 section and were in need of
such instruction*
Among the variety of courses offered; certain ones of
basic importance were stressed* They were as follows: Map reading and orientation. Use of the compass and azimuth hikes*
Panoramic and planemetrlc sketching*
Construction and purpose of observation posts*
Form for and use of Periodic Report, Work Sheet,
Journal, Intelligence Plan and Annex*
(6) CP procedure*
Practical work in the field included CP procedure and the
function and organization of its various component parte.
One night was devoted to a compass march without benefit
of light, to test the ability to work under handicap and to
further facilitate the use of the compass*
At the conclusion of the school, a Division CPX was held allowing each enlisted man to perform the duties ft*"^3^1! R-2 and- D-2, ,of ,the .division. fl L F 1 -* i ^ ' \1)
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PEARL H R O on 17 November, 1944, while one o f f i c e r en route ABR baok from eeoorting a group of PWe from PELELIU to the Main land arrived at FMF, Pao. on 16 November, 1946*and vafi a s s i g n ed to the same type of duty as the others assumed upon t h e i r arrival* All personnel returned to the Division between 17 January and 15 February, 1946 Suoh training was found to be invaluable to both o f f i c e r s and men, and a greater effort to have a l l personnel participate in t h i s training between future operations i s recommended*
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Date Rec'd 27 Dec 44 27 Deo 44 28 Deo 44 9 9 9 5 8 Jan 45 Jan 45 Jan 45 Feb 45 Feb 45
Type Obi. Vert. Vert. Vert. Vert. Vert. Vert. Vert. Vert. Higi A l t . Obi. Vert. Vert. Vert. Vert. Vert. Vert-. Vert. Vert. Vert.
Scale
13 Feb 45 13 Feb 45
Photo coverage varied from poor to excellent but cover age capable of Interpretation was limited to approximately 5,00 yards inland, from the landing beaches and a narrow s t r i p along the opposite (East) ooast which included the en r. t i r e uifjagtf HANTO. ^
*
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- 5
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1:10,000 1:25,000
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In addition, a special map, HAGUSHI B A H area, scale EC 1:5,000, was prepared by the Division Mapping and Repro duction Section of beaches in the Division Z of A and inland approximately 6,000 yards, information being taken from the 1:25,000 Tactical Map, plus additional information from the most recent aerial photographs. This special 1:5,000 "Beach Area" map was f i r s t introduced in the planning and opera tional phase of the PALAD campaign and distributed to com pany commanders and platoon leaders. More than 600 copies were printed and the maps furnished to battalions in large quantities. One (1) copy only of a complete set of hydrographic charts pertaining to the area between F R O A and JAPAN OMS were furnished the D*-2 Section by CinCPAC-CinCPOA. These charts were received several days prior to embarkation. The f i r s t shipment of t a c t i c a l maps was received by the 1st Marine Division on 6 February, 1945, and there after at irregular intervals u n t i l 27 February, 1945, the l a s t s i x (6) boxes arriving one day after embarkation. Final distribution of maps was made to units afloat following the return to BANIKA and PAVUVU after rehearsal maneuvers at GUADALCANAL. On 5 January, 1945, the Division Relief Mapping Unit com pleted work on a r e l i e f map of the l e t Marine Division beaches on OKINAWA. A plastelena map mounted on plywood, scale app roximately 1:7,000, was prepared from an aerial sortie of 10 October, 1944. Special attention was given not only to the beaches and area of the a i r f i e l d s within l i m i t s of the map, but also to the road network and v i l l a g e s then e x i s t i n g . Oil color was applied to the model for greater definition of d e t a i l of airports, v i l l a g e s and road networks. The Division also received r e l i e f maps of i t s Z of A from CinCPAC-CinCPOA, FMF, Pac, III Phib Corps and A.T.B # , Camp Bradford, Va. These maps, cast in both p l a s t e r and rubber, were of two s c a l e s , 1:5,000 and 1:10,000. Each regimental headquarters and assault battalion was furnished with a r e l i e f map of i t s Z of A. Other units r e c e i v ing r e l i e f maps were 1st Engineer Bn, 1st Tank Bn, 1st Amph Trac Bn, the l a t t e r unit Jointly sharing i t s map with the 8th Armd Amph Trac Bn.
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12.
OPERATIONS ANNEX
Special Action Report
Nansei Shoto
Initial planning within the First Marine Division for
this operation was based od the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Intelligence study of the NANSEI SHOTO, OKINAWA GUNTO in
particular. The large scale plan was laid down in ComPhibsPac
Operation Plan Al-45. First detailed planning was taken from
this order and the tentative operation plan of the Tenth Army,
received 8 December.
The first basic conceptwhich was to undergo some changes
during the campaignwas as follows:
Phase I - capture of KERAMO RETTO, KEISE JIMA and
OKINAWA JIMA south of ISHIKAWA ISTHMUS.
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SUPPLY ANNEX
Special Action Report
NANSEI 3H0TC
The Division returned from the PALAU Operation in three
echelons, the last of which arrived at the rehabilitation area
in mid-November < Reequipping did not commence as soon as had
, been desiredo
Reequipping proceeded at a satisfactory rate0 However,
as in the past, the Division wan still receiving equipment and
supplies after transport and LSTs had been loaded. This was
particularly true in the erase of signal supplies0 Prior to
embarkation, orders were received to embark ninety days signal
supplies replenishments instead of the customary thirty days
replenishments,, This necessitated shipping bf air to the
serving depot many signal supply items In order to meet the
n
required deadline Steps were initiated early in the reequipping phase to
obtain fifty-five gallon water drumsc Previously, used
petroleum drums had been cleaned and sterilized and then used
as water containers This method was entirely unsatisfactory and
the problem of embarking five days water was solved by the
use of the new type galvanized water drum0
During the reequipping phase, full cooperation in all
supply matters was received from the Fourth Base Depot This contributed immeasurably to the high state of equipment
readiness of this Division for the OKINAWA Operation0
Logistical planning was based on two premises? first, that
landing beaches would be strongly defended, and secondly, that
the enemy would contest our advance determinedly from his
positions in the advantageous terrain.
For this reason, it was decided to land only dpeclfied
amounts of high priority orargo during the first dayQ High
priority cargo Included one unit of fire for all weapons, one
days' rations, one days0 water, sufficient fuel for tanks, DUKW's
and LVT's, necessary medical and signal supplies, fortification
materials and demolitions0 Priority cargo LCVP, LOK and LCT loads
were drawn up and presented to the Navy for final approval.
This plan, known as the, "hot cargo" plan, was then embodied in
CTF 53o2 Attack order0
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MEDICAL ANNEX
Special Action Report
Nansei 3hoto
MATERIAL
Upon return to PAVUVU from the PALAU Islands It was
necessary to reequip the medical department with many units
which had been lost in action0 Approximately one-half of
all medical units were lost in the PELELIU operation.
The Medical Supply Facilities at GUADALCANAL and
ESPIRITU SANTOS gradually supplied most of the necessary equipment and supplies to bring all medical activities up
to standard strength,, In many cases, due to shortages at
nearby medical supply facilities it was necessary to request
supplies from PEARL HARBORo The fault seems to lie in lack
of coordination between the various supply facilities.
Empty First Aid Jungle Kits for most all combat troops
were available, but there were no supplies with which to
equip them, e 0 g 0 , no vials for salt and Atabrlne tablets
and no bottles for fungicide solution. Such a situation is
regrettable because the^e kits were used both at CAPE GLOU
CESTER and PELELIU and were found to be far superior to the
standard first aid packet. Approximately 7000 were equipped
by utilizing such containers as could be procured by devious
mean So
Efforts were made to obtain adequate supplies of medi
cinal Brandy0 In combat, brandy has been found to be very
valuable in the treatment of combat fatigue, shock and ex
posure cases. However, due to disapproval of requisitions
by higher medical echelons, an adequate supply could not be
obtainedo
Plans were made to make extensive use of serum-albumin
in accordance with numerous directives from the Bureau of
Medicine and Surgery,,
All supplies and equipment not carried by combat units
were dispersed for transportation to the five medical com
panies.
^1
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SANITATION
Three sanitary squads were trained to operate with
each combat team to spray DDT on all bodies and assist in
mosquito and fly control. On previous operations these
squads had proven invaluable Their work was to be later
supplemented by the Malaria Control Unit. Prefabricated
seats were prepared and issued to all units for use on emp
ty 50 gallon drums as latrines. Each drum was to be buried
to about 3/4 of Its height and the seats close fitting to
avoid entrance and egress of flies. It was believed that
these fixtures would keep all the usual gastro-intestinal
diseases at a minimum. These drums also were to have 5 gal
lons of DDT in oil added to them before use.
All units were fully instructed in the value of sani
tation while in oombat.
PERSONNEL
Each combat team was assigned litter bearers for each
rifle company to evacuate casualties from the front lines
to aid stations. These litter bearers were trained in first
aid and the evacuation of casualties*
Each infantry battalion had 40 hospital corpsmen assign
ed, permitting t he use of two corpsmen to each platoonB
All medical personnel were brought up to authorized
strength.
CLASSIfliO
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After plans were made on that basis, the Division was.^ % assigned eleven (11) LSTs carrying LCTso This lovered * the available space by fifteen thousand (15000) square feeto Furthermore, all LSTs carrying an LOT had 12" 12" timber shoring on the tank deck to support the main deck which greatly hindered loading and movement of LVTso The tactical plan of employing LSTs was changed just
prior to loading* No representative of the LST Flotilla
was available during planning0 Arrival dates were unknown
and substitutions were made daily0 Proper planning was
consequently impossible
Many LST Captains firmly believed that their ships should not carry fuel or ammunition. Navy ammunition on top side was not stowed according to plan, and in many cases had to be restowed in order to load vehicles top side* Captains received confusing orders* For example, one LST left BANIKA for PAVUVU and was next heard of in TULAGI. Information concerning personnel and cargo which would be aboard LSTs upon their arrival at PAVUVU was Inaccurateo LST 949 arrived carrying 162 Navy passengers This worked an undue hardship on assault troops0 No loading schedule for LSTs could be followedo
Troops were alerted and broke camp but LSTs did not arrive
Other LSTs arrived unannounced, but with resultant delay
in loadingo
In spite of difficulties encountered, the embarkation
schedule was met and loading accomplishedo It is believed
that if recommendations made herein are followed, future
movements will be simplified,,
48
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MOVEMENT TO OBJECTIVE
Special Action Report
Nansei Shoto
Command post afloat for the First Marine Division was
established aboard the U3S APA BURLEIGH, flagship of TransRon
18, at 1600 on 28 February, lying in MAQUITTI BAY, RU3SELL
ISLANDS* The rear echelon of this organization remained
temporarily at the Division base camp at PAVUVU.
Portions of TransRon 18, with the reinforced division
embarked, sailed from the RUSSELLS at approximately 0600
1 March, 1945, bound for TASSAFARONGA, GUADALCANAL and seven
days of amphibious rehearsals before sailing for the target
On 6 March, following rehearsals,, ships returned to the
RUSSELLS for replenishment of supplies and refueling The
entire division convoy had rendevouzed in SUNLIGHT CHANNEL off
BANIKA ISLAND by 12 March, and on that same date the Northern
Tractor Flotilla, carrying assault elements of the Division, depar
ted for the target. At 0600 on 15 March Transport Group Baker
(TransRon 18), under command of Commodore Moyer, weighed anchor
in SUNLIGHT CHANNEL and departed the RUSSELLS for ULITHI in
the WESTERN CAROLINES, From that time to 21 March, this
Division was at sea enroute to ULITHI along a route generally
parallel to the Northern coast of NEW GUINEA
The convoy dropped anchor at approximately 1400 21 March
at ULITHI and remained there until 1530 on 27 March at which
time it departed for the NANSEI SHOTO, While in the CAROLINES
troops were sent ashore for conditioning and recreation and
final planning conferences were held aboard the various
flagships. After departure, all troops were thoroughly briefed
on the coming operation, making extensive use of materials
provided by various Intelligence sections and the Tenth Army.
All hands received literature relative to the target area,
officers held daily lectures and conferences, and detailed
maps and relief maps were placed in the enlisted men's mess halls.
In the morning of 31 March UDT reconnaissance teams were
taken on board from APDs, bringing late information on reefs,
beaches, tide conditions, and enemy shore defenses* All
reports were favorable, and as the convoy moved toward the
transport area it received word that preliminary air and naval
preparat3^m^4E|[j^Bafii^e^Lln6 o n schedule with excellei
ncf *
DECLASSIFIED
^ ^ ^ Y - v v ^ r - rffc.
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CMAPTEQ 3ZH
ASSAULT PMASE
Narrative Division Field Orders Tank Support Annex Artillery Annex Naval Gunfire Annex A i r Support Annex
3inal Annex Engineer Annex Logistics Annex Shore Party Annex Medical Annex Personnel Annex
-lU'-.USSUM
ASSAULT NARRATIVE
Special Action Report
Nansei Shoto
When assault waves, of the First Marine Division surged onto
the western slopes of OKINAWA JIMA on Easter morning of 1945
they cane expecting to wage one of the costliest battles yet
fought in the war against Japan and three days later on the
eastern beaches they were still looking for that battle. The
Division had raced across its nine-mile-wide zone of action
virtually "standing upH against light,scattered resistance
To the South, Array units of the XXIV Corps,' also operating
against negligible opposition, reached the east coast with
similar speed and swung South for a drive on the center of enemy
resistance above NAHA, principle city and capital of the island.
The American advance continued without pause till it reached the
Japanese defensive network running across the island generally
North of the NAHA-SHURI Line. There it was nalted by the enemy for
the first time, and our forces paused for an extended period to
bring reinforcements ashore and allow for extensive air, artillery
and naval gunfire preparation before renewing the attack.
The Sixth Marine Division, in assault on the left of this
organization, sped through its lightly held area and by 16 April
had elements patrolling the northern tip of the island. The only
heavy opposition found in its sector was on MOTOBU Peninsula, a
large area Jutting into the CHINA SEA north of ISHIKAWA ISTHMUS.
Initial action in the NANSEI SHOTO was something of a departure
from earlier campaigns of this Division, not only in the
surprising lack of resistance but in the type of warfare. Here
was the blitz-style war of speed and movement, combined with its lat
stages with the same type aggressive patrolling and mopping up
that this Division had seen earlier on GUADALCANAL and CAPE
GLOUCESTER.
The rolling checkerboard terrain of this Division's zone of
aetlon on OKINAWA was Ideally suited for defensive tactics* Most
of the First Marine Division sector was excellent defensive
country, gently rolling, but covered with a multitude of finger
ridges and interlocking valleys. A vast part of the area was
covered with emplacements in varying states of readiness^plainly
indicating earlier Jap Intentions to defend this area. The usual
caves, many of them civilian shelters, honeycombed the entire zone.
The hills and terraced fields were interlaced by, as one observer
put it, "an excellent network of very poor roads." Most of the
streams were spanned by narrow bridges which the enemy had made
littii^ntiMPt to destroy. The principle bridge over the BISHA
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The air battle raging off OKINAWA continued into the night
of 6~? April with the results going increasingly in American
favor though some Navy surface units were reported hit. There
was intermittent AA fire throughout the night, but no, bombs or
Red alerts in the Division ares,, Ground activity was nil.
Our patrols were operating in cooler weather and light rains
on 7 April Japs were still present in this sector and carrying
on harassing activity, but groups of four or five now were the
largest encountered by this organization0
By this date, morning and dusk patrols of Marine fighter units
were operating from YONTAN Airfield In support of our ground forces
and carrier-based aircraft0
The picture of the Japanese defensive plan on OKINAWA had been
greatly clarified by 8 April. The situation still was static in
the Marine's sector, but the XXIV Corps were now running into stiff
resistance in the south0 The enemy held strategic high ground
and was well dug in throughout the rugged terrain north of NAHA
and was reported using massed artillery in that area almost
the first instance in Pacific warfare0 It was now evident that
the Japanese commander Intended to make his stand in the south of
the island and had moved the majority of his troops and equipment
to that area. Intelligence estimated some 53,000 Japs in that
zone, including the 62nd Division, the 24th Division, and the
44th Independent Mixed Brigade. In the late evening of the
8th three battalions of the Eleventh Marines were ordered to stand
by to move to the support of the Army0
Patrolling remained the primary activity in the First Division
sector0 First Tank Bn carried out reconnaissance of all road
nets and drafted plans to furnish support in case of enemy counter
measures such as a paratroop landing or amphibious counter-
invasion,, All units reconnoitered beaches in a search for suicide
boats, motor torpedo boats, or midget submarines with no results.
Engineers were making steady progress on roads and bridges and had now put in sufficient water points to alleviate the previous shortage0 Light rains continued into the night and there was limited air
activity. Some fire was received in the sector of the First
Marines but it was traced to friendly units in the south.
Infiltration continued despite the fact that Division Intelligence
had ordered all able-bodied men to be treated as prisoners of war.
During the day two young men posing as women had been captured
and all indications pointed to their beijig- soldiers.
JI I ( * I /;p
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^SifiED
The situation saw.no change on the 13th of April, There was little activity in the First Marine Division sector, but four tanks of "CM Co, First Tank. Battalion fired 300 roundstheir first of the campaignwhile conducting a harassing indirect fire mission for the -Second Battalion, 3evetith Marines A house, believed to conceal an enemy C0Po, was knocked out with nine rounds,, On 15 April, Third Battalion, First Marines was moved to the
north, of the island and placed under the control of the Sixth
Marine Division to assist that Organization in covering its
extensive areac By this date the Sixth Division *|&$- encountering
stiff 'organized resistance on the MOTOBU Penin'sula0 All units of
CT-7 w e r e ^turned at the same time to this Division and our zone
of responsibility was extended to the road net marking the northern
boundary of the ISHIKAWA Isthmus0 All units continued patrol
!
activity but there was no contact with the enemy0 Air activity again held the spotlight on the night of the 15th0 There was repeated harassing action by Nip planes that managed to
sneak through our fighter screen Ack-ack downed two enemy
aircraft in the area of CT-70 Two bombs were dropped in that
sector bu' caused no damage, and one low-flying enemy craft was
over the Division C 0 P 0 but attempted no strafing or bombingo On
the ground, the Seventh Marines reported scattered activity and
four Japs killed, but all other sectors were quiet0
1 0
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Phase III
During the Spring days of late April the First Marine
Division continued its small-scale "guerilla war" in the
rolling country of central OKINAWA against scattered remnants
of a Japanese delaying force and waited for the Tenth Army's
decision on its future employment. On 27 April the decision
came: to be attached to the XXIV Army Corps. Division and
regimental staffs began immediate reconnaissance of southern
sectors and drafted tentative plans for executing a passage
of lines through the Army's 27th Infantry Division.
On 30 April the First Marine Division and attached units
initiated motor movement southward. Two assault regiments,
First Marines on the right, Fifth Marines on the left, had
passed through the three assault regiments of the 27th Infantry
Division by raid-afternoon of the first day of May, and MaJ. (Jen.
Pedro A. del Valle, by mutual agreement between the two
Division Commanders, assumed command from the 27th Infantry
Division, at 1400 that date. May brought with it cloudy, cool
weather, scattered rains and the opposition this Division
had not found when it landed one month earlier.v Field Order
No. 7-45 was issued, calling for the units first push to the
south, supported by tanks, air, naval gunfire, and artillery.
The objective was placed as the north bank of the ASA KAWA.
In its first day of action in the south the First Marine
Division was greeted by the determined, well-planned resistance
that it was to encounter throughout its hard-fought drive to
the southern tip of OKINAWA. Operating in continued light rains,
the Division Jumped off at 0930 on 2 May but was held to 200-300
yard advances. Right flank units attempted to move down the
west coast to the ASA KAWA Estuary line but were halted by
heavy flanking fire from the steep ridges Jutting northwestward
from the city of SHURI. Our forces were faced all along the
line by heavy artillery, mortar, and small arms fire.
This stiff enemy resistance Increased on the following day,
but the Fifth Marines in the center of our zone of action made
gains of 400 to 600 yards. The First Marines on the right,
however, were engaged in a heavy fire fight for the village of
NAKANISKI and were held to limited gains. Our forces, supported
by tractors of the Third Armored Amphibian Battalion, lying off
ASA KAWA Estuary, were able to move well ahead of our lines, but
then were hit with murderous flanking machine gun and mortar
fire from northwest of SHURI which exacted heavy casualties.
Four tanks were damaged by enemy fire and one temporarily
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LINES SHOW ENCIRCLEMENT 8 CAPTURE OF SHURI CASTLE BY "A" CO. 5 T H . MARINES.
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87
The first day of the month that was to see the end of the
battle for Southern OKINAWA brought our infantry forces to the
crest of the ridge overlooking the highway and the river valley
through which it runs. Rolling ahead against light opposition
on a one regimental front, this Division had occupied the ridge
by mid-afternoon, after overrunning enemy positions in the
vicinity of SHICHINA.
On 2 June, for the first time in eight days, tanks were
able to operate in support of our infantry but had been
Immobilized again by nightfall because of renewed heavy rain
squalls which turned to steady rains by evening. During the
day our forces breached the NAHA-YONABARU highway line and
crossed in several places, the river that flows parallel to the
road. The Fifth Marines pushed across the stream during the
early morning and seized the ridge guarding the approaches to
the village of TSUKASAN. In attempting to advance beyond this
ridge, however, troops were pinned down by intense rifle and
machine gun fire from the front and flanks. Throughout the
remainder of the day our advance was bitterly contested by
Japs strongly emplaced in the vicinity of Hill 69 and we
were limited to only local gains south of the river. The
bridge at 7869 G was destroyed by the enemy, but our troops
poured across the still intact railroad span to establish a
bridgehead on the south bank. On the Division right, the
Seventh Marines relieved the Twenty-Second and Twenty-Ninth
Marines of the Sixth Marine Division in their positions along
the KOKUBA GAWA. Patrols Immediately crossed the river and
gained the heights north of TOMIGUSUKU MURA, but were forced
to pull back in the face of heavy Jap mortar and machine gun
fire. A heavy artillery barrage was called down on the enemy
guns and two additional companies Joined the original forces
south of the estuary. By nightfall the entire Second Battalion
had regained the higi ground and dug in.
Just prior to midnight of the same day, the enemy launched
his first determined counter-attack since his withdrawal from
SHURI. The assault was turned bock by G Company of the Seventh
Marines with approximately 20 Japs killed.
A major breakthrough was scored by this Division on 3 ^une. Fast moving advance infantry elements advanced more than 2500 yards in outflanking Jap defenses north of GISUSHI and occupied Hill 57 west of that town. With two battalions of the Fifth Marines pinned down south of the NAHA-YONABARU highway by heavy rifle and machine gun fire, the Second Battalion, Fifth Marines moved through the Army zone of action on its left to the village of TERA, then struck westward against the enemy's flank. Remain ing elements of the Fifth immediately followed up.this sweeping "end run" by overrunning Jap positions in TSUKASAN and surrounding hills. , ^T j , w
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flote t h e Seventh Marines smashed to the coast of the China Sea
on the right of their zone, cutting the last escape route of
Jap forces on OROKU Peninsula, The Second Battalion, Seventh
Marines, after earlier overrunning vital Hill 108, reached the
high ground overlooking the beach in 7364 and 7365. On the
left of the regiment, the Third Battalion pushed almost 2000
yards in driving to the ridgeline running from ZAWA to the
coastal town of ITOMAN. Advancing abreast of the Seventh Marines,
elements of the Second Battalion, First Marines also were on
the northern outskirts of ZAWA, with the remainder of the
battalion holding favorable ground 200 yards farther north.
The Third Battalion, Flr6t Marines also moved almost 1500 yards
to reach positions along the northern slope of Hill 49 at 7662 C.
This drive to the coast, in addition to bringing our troops
into position to swing southward for a final drive against the
Japs in the south of the island, opened a water supply route via
LVT to our forward elements which had been operating under
critical supply and evacuation difficulties.
By nightfall of 8 June infantry forces of this Division had
expanded their foothold on the west coast of the island south
ward to the MUKUE GAWA. B 0 th the First and Seventh Marines had
Jumped off in early morning attack and rolled forward rapidly
against light opposition. The First Marines had patrols south
of the river toward YUZA, while on the Division right the
Seventh Marines swept through the village of ZAWA with few
enemy encountered and continued its push down the ridgeline
to a point south of ITOMAN.
Long-awaited supplies began to flow to our front line troops
via water on 8 June. An amphibian tractor group of eight cargo
tractors, supported by ten LVT(A)s, reached the newly-won
beeches at 7363 H during the morning with no opposition from
enemy guns. The convoy was covered by constant air patrol over
the email islands lying off the west coast, and the Sixth Marine
Division, from positions on OROKU Peninsula, laid smoke on
SENAGA SHI MA. The same tractors that brought in the supplies
were used in the evacuation of wounded later in the day. Follow
ing initial success with this supply route, tractors continued
to haul supplies into and evacuate from these beaches daily.
On 9 June, with advance elements of this Division now
probing the outposts of the Japs' last defense line remaining
on OKINAWA, enemy resistance began to show an increase. Our
units maintained pressure against the enemy line with aggressive
patrolling south of the MUKUE GAWA, but were limited to small
advances. In attempting to cross the river both the First and
Seventh Marines were met with heavy rifle and machine gun fire
and were forced to resort to small infiltrations to force the
stream. On the Division right, the Seventh Marines made two
YONTAN^
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two days had prevented physical contact with the Fifth Marines,
holding the Division left flank.
Under cover of darkness, beginning at 0200 on 17 June,
elements of the Sixth Marine Division relieved the rlgit
battalion of the Seventh Marines. On this same day two important
hills, guarding the right flank approaches to MAKABE and the
IBARU-KOMESU ridge, the last major enemy strongpoints in this
zone of action, fell to this Division. The Third Battalion,
Seventh Marines, pushing south from its line atop KUNISHI ridge,
moved 1400 yards across the plateau north of MEZADO to seize
the heights of Hill 69 and Hill 52 at 7459 H and I. The same
battalion later attempted to drive to the crest of Hill 79,
last barrier on the road to MAKABE, but was forced back by
heavy fire from strong defensive positions.
On the left, our forces were unable to advance because of
devastating enfilade fire from the vicinity of ARAGACHI in the
Army zone. In the early evening the Japs launched a last gasp
counter-attack against G Company of the Fifth, but it was
thrown back with heavy losses to the enemy.
Enemy defenses remaining in this Division's zone of action
were brought to the verge of final collapse on 18 June, with our
advance elements rolling forward to positions Just short of the
IBARU-KOMESU ridge. Fresh troops of the Eighth. Marines, which
had moved into the lines during the preceding night, smashed
southward to occupy a line west of MAKABE frcTi which they could
launch an assault against the last formidable hill mass barring
the Division's path to the southern coast. LMlts of the
attached regiment Jumped off in the early corning following a
concentrated night artillery bombardment and drove 1400 yards
before halting Just north of the KUWANGA-MAKABE road. As the
Eigith pushed ahead on the right, the First Battalion, Fifth
Marines crushed one of the two remaining enemy strongpoints
between our forces and MAKABE. This battalion moved rapidly
in a swing through the Eigith Marine zone, then struck Hill 79
at 7559 L from the west flank. As the attack moved forward all
along the front, other units of the Fifth Marines continued
reduction of remaining enemy pockets in the vicinity of
KUNISHI ridge.
Infantry forces of this Division climaxed a two-day
breakthrough of the final Japanese defenses on Southern
OKINAWA on 19 June, splitting the remaining enemy garrison
into twvo parts with a rapid drive to the sea the first
American troops to reach the southern tip of the island.
Shortly after 1600 right flank elements of the Ei^ith Marines
reached the beach after advancing more than 2500 yards and
overrunning the IBARU-KOMESU ridge.
They were closely followed by one company of the Third
Battalion, Fifth Marines, which l^ad enveloped the village of
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6TH. MAR. 01V. ft XXIV CORPS SECURED THEIR PORTION OF ISLAND 21 JUNE 1945
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90
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MAKABE from the west, then swung southward for the^iish across
the final ridge to the coast. Confuted Japanese forces attempted
a final stand on the beaches and cliffs rising from the sea,
closing to hand-to-hand combat, but they were quickly overrun.
Behind our fast-moving forward elements, however, the
enemy still was offering desperate resistance from several
strong pockets. The flank of this Division was under heavy
fire from Hill 81 on the left boundary. During the day the
height was under constant artillery, rocket, and mortar fire.
The Second Battalion, Fifth Marines, driving on the hill,
were receiving heavy enfilade fire all along its flank from
enemy positions in the vicinity of ARAGACHI.
By 20 June Hill 81 at 7559 Y had become the last major
point of enemy resistance confronting this Division. The
battle for Southern OKINAWA within this Division's zo.-e of
action had by that time virtually dissolved into the moDDing
up stage except for the drive against Hill 81. After three
days of concentrated pounding by artillery, naval gunfire, and
close-range fire from tanks and M-7s, the Japanese were still
defending the hill to the death. The Second Battalion, Fifth
Marines launched an assault on the 19th after keeping the hill
under night-long barrage. By afternoon one platoon had succeeded
in gaining positions on the slopes, but reinforcements were met
by heavy enemy fire from the crest and by enfilade fire from
the Army zone, and the platoon was forced to withdraw.
Mopping up operations were initiated throughout the
remainder of the Division zone. The Fifth Marines eliminated
the last vestige of enemy resistance around Hill 79 and the
village of MAKABE while the Seventh Marines continued to close
caves end mop up by-passed positions along the southern slope
of KUNISHI ridge.
The assault on Hill 81 continued through 20 June and by
the following day, after four days of fighting which included
bombardment by land, sea, and air, the hill was secured by the
Second Battalion, Fifth Marines. The battalion reached the crest
only after having had some companies driven from the hill on
two previous assaults.
With the conquest of Hill 81, organized enemy resistance
came to an end.in this Division's zone of action. And on the
same day, 22 June, Tenth Army headquarters wrote the official
finis to the battle for OKINAWA with a brief flag raising
ceremony and announcement th8t the island was secure.
From 22 June until 30 June the First Marine Division
cbmpleted mopping up the remaining Japanese in its zone of
action south of the NAHA-YONABARU lin^ -P^ica.anfl flrtWSff ft
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fOy
ISSIFIEL
Following are some of the more Important Field Orders issued by this command.
/ o<?
UECLASS
I .I U \ \ l r | y
In The F i e l d o
1830, 2 A p r i l , 1945.
1990=5=80
SSINED
Field Order
No. 2=45
MAPS? RYUKYU RETTO, l$25p000o
BSUK2U RETTO, lgl0,000o
Omittedo
TASK ORGANIZATION
1. Omittedo
2o This Div will organize and defend its present Z of A and conduct
mopping up operations. For defensive sectors see Opn Overlay
3, (a) CT-1 (less LT 3=1) defend sectors assigned. Patrol KATCHIN
Peninsulao See Opn Overlay.
(b) CT-5 defend sector assigned. See Opn Overlay.
(c) CT-7, Atchd Co C, 1st Tk Bn, becomes Corps Res. Move to
Corps Res area vicinity of village of ISHIKAWA. Report
to CO, III Phib Corps for further orders.
(d) 11th Mar defend sector assigned, prepared to furnish Arty
Spt fireso Patrol area shown in Opn Overlay. Coordinate
patrols with CT-1, CT=5 and Hq Coradt. See Opn Overlay.
(e) LT 3-1, Atchd 1st Tk Plat, organize and defend YONTAN Arfld
(f) 1st Tk Bn (less Dets) no change.
(x) (1) All units continue patrolling and mopping up within
sectors asslgnedc
(2) This order effective 0700 I, 6 April, 1945
4, Omittedo
5, Report location of CP's.
BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL del VALLE;
R. 0. BARE,
Colonel, Uo S. Marine Cores Chief of Staff.
A - O p e r a t i o n O v e r l a y , DISTRIBUTION Special.
ANNEX?
T'\ i
U LU Li \u%JU
pii n x \ H ^ P
"3
1990-5-80
Field'Order
Noc 3-45
MAPS? RYUKYU RETTO, ls25p000o
TA3K ORGANIZATION
(a) CT-S
5th Marines
Co B, 1st Med Bn
Plat Co B, 1st Engr Bn
Co B, 1st MT Bn
Det 4th JASCO
Det 4th War Dog Plat
(b) OT-1
1st Marines
Co A, 1st Med Bn
Plat Co A, 1st Engr Bn
Co A, 1st MT Bn
Det 4th JASCO
Det 4th War Dog Plat
(o) 3rd Bn, 7th Marines
(d) 11th Marines (less 2nd, 3rd,
4th Bns)
LtCol A. Jo Stuart, USMC
(e) 1st Tank Bn
Col Francis I. Fenton, USMC
(f) 1st Engr Bn (less Dets)
Col John Kaluf, USMC
(g) 1st Serv Bn
1st Serv Bn (less Dets)
Bomb Disposal Plat
(h) 1st MT Bn (less Cos A8 B and C)
(1) 1st Ron Co
(J) MP Go
Army MP Co
1st MP Co
LtCol Marion A Fawcett, USMC
IstCt Robert Powell, USMC
LtCol Austin Co Shofner,USMC
LtCol Hunter Hurst, USMC
Col Wilbert S Brown, USMC
Col Kenneth B0 Chappell, USMC
Col John H 0 Criebel, USMC
p r r . * . '~\ r\ r * ~ * *
-1
&-V ..
\f
US'
(k)
Div Trs
L ASblritU
j fi a* i r 5 r ft k
JttLASSIFIEb
(x) (1) Camouflage discipline will be rigidly enforced. ,- The practice of wearing exposed white undershirts or white outer clothing will be prohibited,, (2) Units with coastline in sector will continue search
for midget submarines, motor torpedo boats and
suicide boats0
4, 5. See current Adm 0
CPss See Annex'ABLE (Opn Overlay)0 location,.
Report changes in CP
DISTRIBUTION:
O-P-F-I-C-I-A-Ls
R. E. HONSOWETZ,
LtCol., USMC,
- ^
1(6 4
&>
<
*fe#'!30F
Fiel No 4-45
bLA^lntD
Col Kenneth Bo Cnappe11,USMC
( a )
CT-1
1 s t Marines ( l e s s LT 3-1)
Co A, 1 s t Med Bn
1st Plat, Co A, 1st Engr Bn
Co A, 1st MT Bn
Det 4th JA3C0
Det 4th War Dog Plat
(b) CT-5 5th Marines
Co B, 1st Med Bn
3rd.Plat, Co B, 1st Engr Bn
Co B, 1st MT Bn
Det 4th JA3C0
Det 4th War Dog Plat
(c) CT-7 7th Marines
Co C, 1st Med Bn
1st Plat, Co C, 1st Engr Bn
Co C, 1st MT Bn
Co C, 1st TK Bn
Det 4th JA3C0
Det 4th War Dog Plat
1st Section, 4th Prov Rkt Det
(d)
(e) (e)
11th Marines
U Lb i
//?
UNCtASSfflED
*I APgMtlth
UtilHtU
DECLASSINED
//?
I I - \ ^ *f* It*
.
ANNEX:
ABLE - Opn Overlay,
DISTRIBUTIONS
COFS D-l ,
D-2P
.___
.--
. 1 - 1
-.
D-3
.- 1
DSO -..-.-.-.-. 2 DEO - . 1 DivSurg . - . . . . . . 1 1st Marines .. .-. 2 5th Marines -. . . . 2 7th Marines . . 2 11th Marines . . 2 Engr Bn -. , 1 TankBn . .. 1 MedBn . . -.-.. 1 4th WarDogPlat .-.. 1 4thProvRktDet - - - . _ J 1 ' DivHqBn - . _ . . 1 IstMTBn ~ . 1 ServBn -,_-. ,___<-. . 1 Provost Marshal .> . 2 War Diary -. . . ~ 1 Special Action Report 1 ' FILE . 1 O-F-F-I-C-I-A-Ls
R0 E. H0NS0WET2,
LtCol., USMC,
D-3.
mrm ^
i
0015-AE
1990-5-80 485/389
: * * K h' v * t "
i 1 '
( -
'
A v-
t1 ^ W -
.< I n %j W i*
* *
LASSIFIED
Co) JJsJN
^ ^f
Pl&s, twe Plate in pilin high |rufi& v i c i n i t y village f HHf&egRA, prepare! to *elior e&U f i f f f - r fires n -targets ef eppertunity in l e t f pn @ f l i t Ren a On HmkMlU :SHIMA m& BSANZA IHIMA* Otherwise,, n hanfe*
'
&.3A
2=
JlECUSSIFitu
CGr, III.BhibCQaspg _ . . . _ 1 J r , , . . . B 5 , . , . . . CGP 6 t h MarDlv CGP 1 0 t h Army - - . - . _ _ . . , COr9 XXIV Corps . - CGc8 1 s t MarDlv _ . . . . ADC - - _ . . . . 2 1 2 2 1 1
DIS
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D_4 . . _ . _ , . , ,1 DSO - - - - . - - . . 1 DlvSurg , . ,. 1 1st Marines - ,. ., 2 5th Marines .' . . 2 7th Marines -........_ ..., ..-. . . 2 11th Marines ..... . ... 2 EngrBn .. . . . .. ,. .. 1 MedBn . - . , . . 4thWarDogPlat . .. 4thProvRktDet DivHqBn . . - . . ServBn . . . . . .._ Provost Marshal . . SrdArmdAmphBn -....-.... . .
Ren Co . . . . .
1
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0020-AE
1990=5=80
485/389
& $ &
No 6-45
MAPSs RYUKYU RETT09,ls25,000
Special Road Map, OKINAWA,
TASK ORGANIZATION
Col Kenneth B. Chappell, USMC
(a) CT-1
1st Marines
Co A, 1st Med Bn
Co A,1st Engr Bn
Co A, 1st MT Bn
Det 4th JASCO
1st Plat, 1st Ord Co
5th Marines
Co B, 1st Med Bn
Co B, 1st Engr Bn
Co B, 1st MT Bn
Det 4th JASCO
2nd Plat, 1st Ord Co
(c) CT-7
7th Marines
Co C, 1st Med Bn
Co C, 1st MT Bn
DUt 4th JASCO
3rd Plat, 1st Ord Co
Det 4th War Dog Plat
(d) 11th Marines
(e) 1st Tk Bn
1st Tk Bn
Co B, 713th Tk Bn
(f) 1st Engr Bn
1st Engr Bn (less Dets)
'n&S
18100,000,
/ t\ T- i
i V I
I t^^^*
I2.S
KSlHEtt
1st Serv Bn
1st Plat, Bomb Disposal Co
25th Depot Co (h) 1st MT Bn
#.S
. . . , ., ,.
.- . . LtCol Charles G Gaines, Jr, USMC
3o
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(b) CT-5
On 1 May, move by motor shuttling to Z of A of 27th Inf
Div detrucking at RJ Hwy 32 = Hwy 50 Upon detrucking,
move by marching and relieve elements of 106th and 105th
Inf Regts within assigned Z of A, Occupy and defend
lines held, prepared to Atk on order. See Annex BAKER
(March Table) and Annex CHARLIE (Opn Overlay)
(c) CT~7
On 2 Mayp move by motor shuttling to Z of A of 27th Inf
Div detrucking at RJ Hwy 32 - Hwy 16 Upon detrucking^,
move by marching to Res Area indicated in Annex CHARLIE
(Opn Overlay) and remain in this area in Div Resc See
Annex BAKER (March Table) and Annex CHARLIE (Opn Overlay)
(d) 11th Marines
Occupy p o s i t i o n s i n Div Z of A, prepared to f u r n i s h Arty Spt f i r e s o Report Bn p o s i t i o n s when located., See Annex CHARLIE (Opn O v e r l a y ) . (e) 1 s t Tk Bn On 30'.April, Move to Bivouac area indicated in Annex
CHARLIE (Opn Overlay)0 See Annex BAKER (March Table)
and Annex CHARLIE (Opn Overlay)0
(f) On 1 Mayp move to bivouac area indicated in Annex CHARLIE
(Opn Overlay)o 3ee Annex BAKER (March Table) and Annex
CHARLIE (Opn Overlay)o
(g) Serv G p
Move elements designated by Op Comdr to selected areas,
commencing 30 Aprilo Other elements remain present
location. Carry on normal functions.
W 1st MT Bn Provide motor transport to assist in carrying out troop
movements as outlined in Annex BAKER (March Table)
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(10 additional copies Annex BAKER) ~** ' * IstAraphTracBn 3rdArmdAmiDhBn - - - - - - T - T :--r-- l Ca, IHPhlbCorps CG, XXIV Corps --- * CGP 6thMarDiv l CG, 7thInfDiv -
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IN
BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL del VALLEs Rf Oo BARE, fl Col, U3MC, C of 3 DISTRIBUTIONS OFFICIALS Same as Field Order 6-45
r*\
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OPERATION OVERLAY
FIELD ORDER NO 6-45
lOOO 29 APRIL, 1945
.
/
r MARDW(REIN)
OFF-ICIA-L
MOKISOWCTZ.
G-^ DEL VALLE C G Scale- 1/D,000
6
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1990-5-80
_*.
I n The F l e l d
'i$ t ft ^ Q S C L l
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Field Order
No 16-45
MAP: RYUKYU RETTO, 1:25,000.
TASK ORGANIZATION
No change*
1. (a) See current Int summaries.
(b) (1) Tenth Army Atks to South at 0700, 11 May with Corps
abreast III Phib Corps on the right, to destroy
enemy forces in Southern OKINAWA. Initially it
will envelop and reduce the SHURI position (initial
Army objective) and divide enemy forces by seizing
the hill masses in the area KARA (7767) - KAMIZATO
(8066) (second Army objective).
(2) XXIV Corps Atks on our left at 0700, 11 May, envelopes
SHURI hill mass from the east and assists III Phib
Corps in reducing that position, and seizes portions
of Army objectives within 3 of A.
(3) III Phib Corp* Atks td the south at 0700, 11 May,
with two Divs abreast, 1st Mar Div on the left, and
malting main effort in the left, envelopes the SHURI
hill mass from the west and assists XXIV Corps in
reducing that position, and seizes portions of Army
objectives within Z of A. It will also capture
NAHA and OROKU Peninsula.
(4) 6th Mar Div Atks to the south at 0700, 11 May and
seizes that portion of the general line NAHA (7371 F) RJ (7669 L) - RJ (7869 G) within Z of A; assists
1st Mar Div by fire and movement; maintains contact
with 1st Mar Div; protects Corps right flank;
designates one RCT as Corps Res which will not be
committed without Corps approval.
(5) Army Atk will be preceded by air, Arty, and NGF
preparation.
(6) TAF, Tenth Army, continues air Spt.
(7) CTG 51.22 continues NGF Spt.
2. 1st Mar Div will:
(a) Atk to south within Z of A makin p^jrps mafn^Co1|.
-1- ;
L L* L jK u u ***
JIL
11
& &
7676
0-3
0-3
OPERATION OVERLAY
HELD ORDER NO 16-45
1 6 0 0 lO MAY, 1945
ST
OFFIC1ALMONSOW
G-5
EGLASSIF1EB
(a) See current I n t summaries. (b) (1) XXIV Corps continues envelopment of SHURI from the EAST with three Diva abreast, 96th Inf Div i n the c e n t e r , 77th Inf Div on the r i g h t and 7th Inf Div on the l e f t , (2) I I I Phib Corps continues Atk at 0730 24 May with two Dive abreast, 6th Mar Div on the right and 1 s t Mar Div on the l e f t , i n order to envelope SHURI from the West, (3) 6th Mar Div continues Atk at 0730 24 May. making main e f f o r t on the l e f t , and s e i z e s North bank of KOKUBA G W within Z of A, prepared for further A A Adv on order. 6th Mar Div w i l l p r o t e c t the Corps r i g h t (West) flank and maintain contact with 1 s t Mar Div. (4) I I I Corpe Arty continues i n general Spt. (5) Air and NGF on c a l l .
2.
1 s t Mar Div w i l l : (a) Complete r e l i e f of elements of 6 t h Mar Div within Z of A by 1600 23 May. (b) Continue Atk at 0730 24 May, making main e f f o r t on the l e f t and s e i z e 0 - 2 prepared f o r further Adv. (o) Maintain pressure on the enemy within Z of A and a s s i s t XXIV Corpe i n reduction of the SHURI p o s i t i o n . (d) After r e d u c t i o n of the SHURI p o s i t i o n , s e i z e North bank of KOKUBA G W w i t h i n Z of A, prepared f o r further Adv A A on order. (c) Maintain contact with XXIV Corps on the l e f t . ^ a r* M i r~J LD present front l i n e s . r For formation, boundaries, 1 c&3#ctjl\v*J \ e # pTpili 't'
_! J i t b L r*0 lULLL
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At 0730 24 May, resume Atk. a s s i s t e d by CT-5, and s e i s e 0-2 within Z of A, prepared for further Adv on o r d e r ,
(o) CT-7
DIT Res* Remain present looatlon prepared t o reinforce or r e l i e v e e i t h e r a s s a u l t CT. (d) 11th Mar Deliver f i r e s on c a l l , and h a r a s s i n g f i r e s on t h e SHURI p o s i t i o n . (e) 1 s t Tk Bn
Spt Atk.
(f) All other u n i t s no change. (x) Assault regiments w i l l exert continuous pressure on the enemy be conducting constant aggressive p a t r o l l i n g to the front and by l o c a l Tk-Inf action aimed a t softening the ais or o aches to t h e SHURI p o s i t i o n . Advantage w i l l be taken of every opportunity t o hold advanced p o s i t i o n s on favorable t e r r a i n features occupied by p a t r o l s . 4 . See current Adm Order. 5 . (1) Com normal. (2) Report any changes In CP l o c a t i o n . BY C M A D OP MAJOR GENERAL d e l VALLB: O MN R. 0 . BARE, Colonel. U. S. Marine Corps, Chief of S t a f f . DISTRIBUTION! S p e c i a l . 0-F-F-I-C-I-A-L;
1990.5-60
HWi
Field Order
No 36-45
MAP: RYUKYU RETTO, 1:25,000.
TASK ORGANIZATION
(a) CT-7
7th Marines
Co C, 1st MT Bn
2nd Plat, Co C, 1st Engr Bn
3rd Plat, Ord Co, 1st Serv Bn
Det 4th JASCO
3rd Plat, Co A, 1st Plon Bn
(b) CT-5
5th Marines
Co B. 1st MT Bn
3rd Plat, Co B, let Engr Bn
2nd Plat, Ord Co, 1st Serv Bn
Det 4th JASCO
2nd Plat, Co A, 1st Plon Bn
(c) CT-1
1st Marines
Co A, 1st MT Bn
3rd Plat, Co A, 1st Engr Bn
1st Plat, Ord Co, 1st Serv Bn
Det 4th JASCO
1st Plat, Co A, 1st Plon Bn
(d) 11th Marines
Air"*
Col Snedeker
Col Griebel
Col Mason
Col Brown
11th Marines
Det 3rd Armd Aaph Bn (four Plats)
(e) 1st Tk Bn
1st Tk Bn
Co B, 713th Tk Bn (less Dets)
Tk Maint Plat, Ord Co
(f) 1st Engr Bn
1st Engr Bn (less Dets)
* r<?>*
Ma J Drummond
LtCol Stuart
A ^
'Jf *
$< W"'
'7
Hi 0
LtCol Ballance
1st Plon Bn (less Deta)
(h) 1st Amph Trao Bn (1) 8th Amph Trae Bn (J) Serv Qp 1st 3err Bn (less Dets)
2nd Plat, Bomb Disposal Co
1st Plat, 3rd Ammo Co
3rd Sep Laundry Plat
Co C, 1st Plon Bn
(k) 1st MT Bn LtCol Gaines
LtCol Nohrden
LtCol Nerren
Col Kaluf
Col Chappell
1.
Hq Bn
1st Med Bn
Co B, 88th Chem Mortar Bn
4th Prov Rkt Det 4th War Dog Plat (a) See ourrent Int summaries. (b) (1) Tenth Army w i l l continue Atk to pursue and destroy enemy forces on Southern OKINAWA* (2) XXIV Corps w i l l make i t s main effort to s e i z e C A HN (7968), converging with III Phlb Corps in t h i s v i c i n i t y and then drive southeast to south coast O I A A to KN W prevent enemy from r e t i r i n g into CHINEN Peninsula. XXIV Corps w i l l maintain contact with III Phib Corps* (3) I I I Phib Corps w i l l : a. Drive southeast, making main effort to converge with XXIV Corps in v i c i n i t y of h i l l s north of TERA (7968) b. Secure N H port and a i r f i e l d . AA c. Seize CHIKUTO (7466) - T M S (7866) h i l l mass. O UU d# Continue Atk to south coast O I A A and destroy KN W remaining enemy; ff>fces i n Z of A. ^ - ^ ~ ~ ~ ?>
. 2 - 1 : : i
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with CT-7.
9 *
Dt
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NfilASSlflED
(c> C T - 1 (d) 11th Marines
Spt Atk. (e) 1 s t Tk Bn Details no change.
*i.-.t*i
In Dlv Res; remain present location prepared to reinforce, or pas8 through either assault CT. Expedite absorption of replacements and reorganization i n preparation for action i n the immediate future. Continue policing 3HURI area and la sten burial of enemy dead*
(f) 1st Engr Bn Normal missions. Expedite repair of designated routes and bridges needed to Spt assault elements* (g) 1st Pion Bm
Unload Dlv Rear Echelon upon arrival and commence construc
tion of camp at rehabilitation area.
(h) 1st Amph Trao Bn
Spt Opns of CT-7, Furnish three vehicles to CT-1 and two
vehicles to Evac Sta at 747 4-Y.
(1) 8th Amph Trac Bn
Spt Opns of C$-5.
(J) Serv 3p
Normal missions,
(k) 1st MT Bn
No anal missions.
(1) Dlv Trs
(!)
H q B n
U L
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OPERATION OVERLAY
FIELD ORDEQ NO 36-45
1200 Z JUNE 1945
DEL VALLE CG
Scale: l/5,000
G-5
1990-5-80 485/390
_ _ ^&
F i e l d Order No-. 49-45 MAP: RYUKYU RETTO, 1 : 2 5 , 0 0 0 . TASK ORGANIZATION (a) CT - 7 7 t h Marines Co C, 1 s t M Bn T 2nd P l a t Co C, 1 s t Engr Bn 3rd P l a t Ord Co, 1 s t Serv Bn 3rd P l a t Co A, 1 s t Pi on Bn Det 1 s t ASOO Det 1 s t Bomb Disposal Co (b) CT - 1 1 s t Marines
Co A, 1 s t M Bn
T 3rd P l a t Co A, 1 s t Engr Bn 1 s t P l a t Ord Co, 1st Serv Bn 1 s t P l a t Co A, 1 s t Pion Bn Det 1 s t ASOO ( c ) CT - 5 5th Marines Co B, 1 s t M Bn T 3rd P l a t Co B, 1 s t Engr Bn 2nd P l a t Ord Co, 1 s t Serv Bn 2nd P l a t Co A, 1 s t Pion Bn Det 1st ASOO
Det 1st Bomb Disposal Co
(d) CT - 8 (less 2d Bn, 10th Mar & Tk Co) 8th Marines
( e ) 11th Marines 11th Marines
2nd Bn, 10th Mar
VMO-3
( f) 1st Tk Bn
-1 Col BROW Col GRIEBEL Col SNEDEKER
Col MASON
Col WALLACE
v * * *"
Jt'k\
^
- - L i
% *
I.
Co B, 713th Tk Bn
Tk Maint Plat, Ord Co
One Co, 2nd Tk Bn
(g) 1st Engr Bn (less Dets) (h) 1st Plon Bn (less Dets) (1) Serv Gp 1st Serv Bn (less Det)
1st Plat, 1st Bomb Disposal Co
1st Plat, 3rd Ammo Co
3rd Separate Laundry Plat
Co C, 1st Pion Bn
(J) Dlv Trps Dlv Hdqrs Bn (less Dets 1st ASCO)
1st Med Bn
Co B, 89th Chem Mortar Bn 4 t h Prov Rkt Det 4th War Dog P l a t 1 s t Amph Trac Bn 8 t h Amph Trac Bn 3rd Armd Amph Bn 1 s t M Bn ( l e s s Dets) T 1. (a) Se? current I n t summaries (b) (1) Tenth Army w i l l continue Atk t o destroy enemy forces on Southern OKINAWA, (2) XXIV Corps w i l l make I t s main e f f o r t to s e i z e Y J A TZ DAKE-YAEJU DAKE H i l l mass. (3) I I I Phlb Corps w i l l continue Atk to south. Dlv i n Coros Res. (4) I I I Phib Corps Arty and 27th Div Arty w i l l the f i r e s of 11th Mar. 6 t h Mar reinforce
MaJ DRUMMOND L t C o l BALLANCE Col KALUF
Col CHAPPELL
(5) TAF, Tenth Army continues to provide Air Spt. (6) CTF 51 continues to provide NGF Sxt. 2 . 1 s t Mar Div w i l l Atk 0730, 15 June to s e i z e K W N A RIDGE. U AG LD l i n e s held at time of Atk. see Opn o v e r l a y .
-2
DEGLAS
LLASSIFIL
lUFTTl*\*T B-H
DISTRIBUTION:
Special.
O-F-F-I-C-I-A-L:
J$*
<Sth Manncs
A s s E M b u y AREA
^i
7663
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(d) C I - 8
(1) Continue to mop up enemy in Z of A S of Phase Line 1*;<& (2) On order Adv N from Phase Line 1 to Phase Line 2 and
on order from Phase Line 2 to Phase Line 3 mopping
up enemy remnants in Z of A,
(3) Coordinate Adv with CT-5.
(4) On completion of mopping up, be prepared to move on
order into designated assembly area.
(f) 1st Tk Bn - Spt mopoing up and on completion assemble
in present location*
(J) PIT Trs
(1) Ren Co continue patrolling Z of responsibility,
(k) Other Units - No change.
(x) (1) Caution will be exercised to prevent firing on
friendly Trs and installations.
(2) To insure coverage of area a line of skirmishers will
be used and any suspicious areas, especially cane
fields and scrub browth, will be burned or smoked prior
to Inf movement therein.
(3) All units will be prepared after monping up to move to
rehabilitation areas.
(4) There will be physical contact between adjacent units,
during the sweep N.
(5) All units will complete mopping up by OBOE plus TEN.
(a) In order that existing dumps of Japanese Ammo, mines,
shells, bombs, and demolitions may be disposed of immediately
by competent personnel, it is directed that units of the
Div make dally reports to the Div Ord 0 giving the TA
location, amounts, and types of such enemy supplies
located during the day. Tenth Army personnel will make
disposition.
(b) Mark and report to Div Ord 0 the location of those "duds"
and unexploded bombs which cannot be destroyed by unit
personnel in order that prompt action may be taken by
Bomb Disposal Units.
(c) Units.#ake immediate steps to recover all types of U. S.
kl
0-F-F-I-C-I-A-L:
ft. E. HONSOWETZ,
LtCol., USMC,
G-3.
Following are some of the more important Fragmentary Field Orders issued by this Command.
/frr
jm:
7- if
FIELD ORDER 7-46 X 77TH INF DIV ATKS 0900 2 MAY X NGF ENGAGES
TARGETS HIGH GROUND SOUTH BANK ASAKAWA ESTUARY 0830 - 0900 X
AIR STRIKES VICINITY AMIKE TOWN 0855 X AIR AND NGF ON CALL AFTER
0900 X 1ST MAR DIV ATKS 0900 2 MAY MAIN EFFORT ON LEFT AND SEIZES
OBJECTIVE LINE NORTH BANK ASAKAWA ESTUARY - 7674 GEORGE 4 - 7774
PETER 3 - 7774 XRAY 1 - 7874 WILLIAM 2 PREPARED FOR FURTHER
ADVANCE X ASSISTS ADVANCE 77TH INF DIV X LD PRESENT FRONT LINE X
BOUNDARIES NO CHANGE X CT-1 SEIZE OBJECTIVE LINE WITHIN Z OF A
PREPARED FOR FURTHER ADVANCE ON ORDER X CT-5 SEIZE OBJECTIVE
LINE WITHIN Z OF A PREPARED FOR FURTHER ADVANCE ON' ORDER X ASSIST
ADVANCE OF 307TH INF X CT-7 UPON ARRIVAL REMAIN RES AREA IN
DIV RES X 11TH MilR SPT ATK X FIRE PREPARATION 0830-0840 AND
0850-0900 X 1ST TK BN SPT ATK X OTHER UNITS NORMAL MISSIONS X
CONTACT RIGHT TO LEFT X
FIELD ORDER 10-45 X CT-7 WITH 3RD ARMD AMPH BN ATCHD IN DIV RES X
AS CT-1 ADVANCES COMPLETE OCCUPATION OF RES AREA SHOW ON OVERLAY X
OCCUPY AND DEFEND THIS AREA PAYING PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO BEACH
DEFENSE X CONDUCT MOPPING UP OPERATIONS X PRIORITY ON HWY NO 1
TO CT-1 X OTHER DETAILS NO CHANGE X
FIELD ORDER 12-45 X NGF WILL FIRE PREPARATION ON HIGH (BOUND SOUTH
OF ASA-KAWA ESTUARY FROM 0900 TO 0915 6 MAY X AIRCRAFT WILL BE ON
STATION COMMENCING 0915 FOR CALL MISSIONS AND FOR ATKS ON TARGETS
OF OPPORTUNITY X 1ST MAR DIV RESUMES ATK 0900 6 MAY X LD PRESENT
FRONT LINES X FOR FORMATION BOUNDARIES AND OBJECTIVES SEE OVERLAY X
CT-I MAKING MAIN EFFORT ON RIGHT SEIZE 0-1 AND 0-2 WITHIN Z OF A X
CT-5 SEIZE 0-2 WITHIN Z OF A X COORDINATE ADV WITH 3p7TH JNF M D
ASSIST ADV OF THAT^UNIT X CT-7 PASSftf*gU&&jAN^1^i;r^(l|f^BR|
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1ST MAR AND SEIZE 0 - 2 WITHIN Z OF A X DESIGNATE ONE BN TO BE COMMITTED ONLY WITH AUTHORIZATION BY DIV X 11TH MAR DELIVER FIRES 0*1 CALL X WHEN 2ND BN 5TH MAR I S RELIEVED BY 77TH INF DIV 3RD BN 7TH MAR REVERTS TO PARENT CONTROL X OTHER DETAILS NO CHANGE X
FIELD ORDER 1 4 - 4 5 X 1ST MAR DIV RESUMES ATK 1 2 0 0 9 MAY IN ORDER TO SEIZE 0 - 1 AND 0 - 2 X FOR FORMATION BOUNDARIES OBJECTIVES SEE OVERLAY X LD PRESENT FRONT LINES X CT-1 SEIZE 0 - 1 AND 0 - 2 WITHIN Z OF A X CT-5 SEIZE 0 - 1 AND 0 - 2 WITHIN Z OF A X CT-7 I N DIV RES X REMAIN I N DIV RES AREA PREPARED TO REINFORCE OR PASS THROUGH EITHHR ASSAULT CT X 11TH MAR FIRE PREPARATION COMMENCING 1 2 0 0 TO BE LIFTED ON CALL OF INF COMERS X OTHER DETAILS NO CHANGE X
FIELD ORDER 1 8 - 4 5 X 1ST MAR DIV RESUMES ATK 1 3 MAY AND SEIZES 0 - 2 AND 0 - 3 PREPARED FOR FURTHER ADV X TIME OF ATK 0 7 3 0 X LD PRESENT FRONT LINES X FOR FORMATION BOUNDARIES AND OBJECTIVES SEE OVERLAY X CT-5 MOVE ONE BN TO RES AREA I N REAR 0 * CT-1 X AREA TO BE SELECTED BY CT COMDR X CO B 88TH CHEM MORTAR 3N PLACE 2 PLATS IN DIRECT SPT OF CT-7 AND ONE PLAT I N DIRECT 3PT OF CT-1 X OTHER DETAILS NO CHANGE X
FIELD ORDER 2 0 - 4 5 X I I I PHIB CORPS CONTINUES ATK 0 6 3 0 1 7 MAY X AIR AND NGF ON CALL X 1ST MAR DIV CONTINUES AT* 0 6 3 0 1 7 MAY AND SEIZES 0 - 1 PREPARED FOR FURTHER ADV X FORMATION AND BOUNDARIES NO CHANGE X LD PRESENT FRONT LINES X FOR OBJECTIVE SEE OVERLAY X CT-5 SEIZE 0 - 1 WITHIN Z OF A PREPARED FOR FURTHER ADV ON ORDER X CT-7 SEIZE 0 - 1 WITHIN Z OF A PREPARED FOR FURTHER ADV ON ORDER X CT-1 IN DIV RES X REMAIN PRESENT LOCATION PREPARED TO RELIEVE OR REINFORCE EITHER ASSAULT CT X 11TH MAR DELIVER FIRES ON CALL X 1ST TANK BN SPT ATK WITH COS A AND B IN DIRECT 3PT OF CT-5 AND CO C IN DIRECT SPT OF CT-7 X OTHER UNITS NO CHANGE X OTHER DETAILS NO CHANGE X
FIELD ORDER 2 3 - 4 5 X I I I PHIB CORPS RESUMES ATK AT 0 7 3 0 2 0 MAY X RIGHT REGIMENT OF 77TH INF DIV WILL ATK TO SOUTH AT 0 7 3 0 2 0 MAY COORDINATING WITH CT-1 AND WILL SEIZE. HIGH GROUND IN TA 7 3 7 3 N.O, 3 X AIR STRIKE ON TARGETS IN TA 7 8 7 2 QR 0 6 3 0 TO 0 7 1 5 X 1ST MAR DIV CONTINUES ATK 0 7 3 0 2 0 MAY AND SEIZES C - 2 P ^ ' ^ R E D FOR FURTHER ADV X LD PRESENT FRONT LINES X FOR FORMATION BOUNDARIES OBJECTIVE AND SCHEME OF MANEUVER SEE OVERLAY X CT-5 MAKING MAIN
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OPERATION OVERLAY
FIELD ORDER. MO. 1 0 - 4 5
1400 4KAAV^*94-&
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O-F-F-t-C-l-A-L
HONSOWETZ D E L VALLE
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OPERATION O V E R L Y
FIELD ORDER. NO. lfc-45
1600
12. MAY,
1^45
1ST MAR.DN.(REIN:)
ca
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577
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- in -. 5
OPERA^OU OVERLAY
FIELD OQPEli. MO. 2 0 - - 4 5
7e>74
noo l e M A V A ^ f t
1*T KAAU..SMV.CR.EIN}
O-F-F-l-C-l-A-U HOUSOVNETZ. d-3 D E L VAA.LE Map Pef. R.^uK^u QgWo s c a l e - 1/Z.5.POO
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11
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76H3
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OPERAT\ON OVERIAY
FIELD ORDER MO. Z2>-45
1160 1QMAV,1Q45
ecale-l/5,000
UiELLASS
EFFORT ON THE RIGHT 3 EIZE 0 - 2 WITHIN Z OF A PREPARED FOR FURTHER ADV ON ORDER X CT-1 MAKING MAIN EFFORT ON THE LEFT WITHIN OWN Z OF A AND WITHIN Z OF A OF 77TH INF DIV A3 FAR EAST AS ROAD , 7 8 7 3 D 2 D 4 J 5 S 5 SEIZE 0 - 2 PREPARED FOR FURTHER ADV ON ORDER X COORDINATE ADV WITH TROOPS OF 77TH INF DIV W O WILL ADV TO 30TTTH H ALONG EAST SIDE OF ROAD 7 8 7 3 D2 L4 J 5 S5 X CT-7 IN DIV RES X REMAIN I N RES AREA AND REORGANIZE PREPARED TO RELIEVE OR REINFORCE EITHER ASSAULT CT X 11TH MAR SPT ATK X 1ST TK BN SPT ATK X OTHER DETAILS NO CHANGE X
FIELD ORDER 2 5 - 4 5 X I I I PHIB CORPS .RESUMES ATK 0 7 3 0 2 2 MAY X AIR STRIKE ON ENEMY STRONGPOINT I N TA 7 7 7 0 Q,R,V,W 0 6 3 0 TO 0 7 1 5 2 2 MAY WEATHER PERMITTING X 1ST MAR DIV CONTINUES ATK 0 7 3 0 2 2 MAY IN ORDER TO S EIZE 0 - 2 AND 0 - 3 PREPARED FOR FURTHER ADV X LD PRESENT FRONT LINES X FOR FORMATION BOUNDARIES OBJECTIVES AND SCHEME OF MANEUVER SEE OVERLAY X CT-5 SEIZE 0 - 2 AND 0 - 3 WITHIN Z OF A PREPARED FOR FURTHER ADV ON ORDER X CT-1 SEIZE 0 - 2 AND 0 - 3 WITHIN Z OF A PREPARED FOR FURTHER ADV ON ORDER X OTHER UNITS NO CHANGE X UNITS MAY CROSS BOUNDARIES OF ADJACENT UNITS AS NECESSARY BY COORDINATING WITH AND OBTAINING PERMISSION OF UNITS CONCERNED X OTHER DETAILS NO CHANGE X
FIELD ORDER 3 0 - 4 5 X I I I PHIB CORPS RESUMES ATK 0 7 3 0 2 9 MAY X COMMENCING 0 6 3 0 2 9 MAY HUNTER-KILLER AIRCRAFT WILL SEARCH SOUTHERN OKINAWA FOR TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY X 1ST MAR DIV CONTINUES ATK TO THE SOUTH 0 7 3 0 2 9 MAY X LD PRESENT FRONT LINES X FORMATION AND BOUNDARIES NO CHANGE X RCN CO RECONNOITER TA>3 7 6 7 0 , 7 6 7 1 , 7 7 7 1 . 7 7 7 2 AND DETERMINE ENEMY STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION THEREIN X CT-5 ADV TO THE SOUTHEAST AND SEIZE THE NOSE IN TA 7 7 7 2 R , S , T , THE HIGH GROUND IN THE GENERAL AREA 7 7 7 1 S AND OTHER FAVORAELE POSITIONS I N THESE AREAS X SPT OPERATIONS OF RCN CO X CT-1 COORDINATING ATK WITH 77TH I N F DIV SEIZE HIGH GROUND SOUTH OF WANA DRAW AND THAT PORTION OF SHURI WITHIN Z OF A X 11TH MAR SPT ATK X 1ST TK BN BE PREPARED TO SPT ATK WHEN AND WHERE GROUND CONDITIONS PERMIT X LIMIT OF ADV NAHA-YONABARU ROAD ( 7 7 6 9 - 7 9 6 9 ) X OTHER DETAILS NO CHANGE X
FIELD ORDER 3 1 - 4 5 X I I I PHIB CORPS RESUMES ATK T<" SOUTH AT 0 7 3 0 3 0 MAY X COMMENCING 0 6 3 0 3 0 MAY HUNTER-KILLER AIRCRAFT WILL SEARCH SOUTHERN OKINAWA FOR TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY X 1ST MAR DIV CONTINUES ATK TO SOUTH AT 0 7 3 0 3 0 MAY IN ORDER TO SEIZE HILL 9 8 AND CONTINUES REDUCTION OF ENEMY POSITIONS IN SHURI X LD PRESENT FRONT LINES X FOR FORMATION BOUNDARIES AND SCHEME OF MANEUVER SEE OVERLAY X
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FIELD ORDER 32-45 X CANCEL FIELD ORDER 7-1-45 X 1ST MAR DIV
CONTINUES REDUCTION OF ENEMY POSITIONS IN SHURI ON 70 MAY AND
REORGANIZES PREPARATORY TO RESUMPTION OF ADV TO THE SOUTH X FOR
FORMATIONS AND 30UNDARIES SEE OVERLAY X CT-5 CONSOLIDATE PRESENT
POSITIONS AND REORGANIZE PREP.ARATORY TO RESUMPTION OF ADV TO THE
SOUTH X PATROL AGGRESSIVELY TO THE FRONT AND FLANKS X CT-1
CONTINUE REDUCTION OF ENEMY POSITIONS IN SHURI X TAKE ADVANTAGE
OF ALL OPPORTUNITIES TO OCCUPY FAVORABLE TERRAIN FEATURES COVERED
BY PATROLS X OTHER DETAILS NO CHANGE X
FIELD ORDER 38-45 X CANCEL FIELD ORDER 37-45 X ATK 0730 4 JUNE X CT-7 SEIZE THAT PORTION OF LINE IWA-SHINDAWAKU-HANJA WITHIN Z OF A X CT-1 MOVE SOUTH THROUGH Z OF A OF 96TH INF DIV TO VICINITY OF TERA X MEET 77TH INF DIV GUIDES AT RJ 7971 UV AT 0530 X RELIEVE ELEMENTS OF CT-5 ON HILLS 57 AND 107 X THEN SEIZE THAT PORTION OF LINE IWA-SHINDAWAKU-HANJA WITHIN Z OF A X CT-5 SEIZE HILL 107 X THEN UPON RELIEF BY CT-1 REVERT TO DIV RES X MOP UP BETWEEN T5UKASAN AND GISUSHI X OTHER UNITS NO CHANGE X
FIELD ORDER 42-45 X 1ST MAR DIV ATKS 0730 8 JUNE TO SEIZE OBOE
FIVE AND OTHER FAVORABLE TERRAIN FEATURES IN THE VICINITY THEREOF X
CT-1 SEIZE OBOE FIVE WITHIN Z OF A X CT-7 SEIZE OBOE FIVE WITHIN
Z OF A X REPORT FAVORABLE LOCATIONS ALONG COAST FOR LANDING SUPPLY
LVT'S X BE PREPARED TO COVER LANDING OF THESE VEHICLES X 1ST TK
BN BE PREPARED TO MOVE ON ORDER ON ROUTES TO BE DESIGNATED ONE CO
TO SPT CT-1 AND ONE CO TO SPT CT-7 X OTHER DETAILS NO CHANGE X
FIELD ORDER 45-45 X 1ST MAR DIV ATK 0730 11 JUNE 1945 IN ORDER TO
SEIZE OBJECTIVE SHOWN ON OPN OVERLAY X LD PRESENT FRONT LINES X FOR
FORMATION AND BDYS SEE OPN OVERLAY X CT_7 SEIZE KUNISHI RIDGE IN
Z OF A PREPARED FOR FURTHER ADV ON ORDER X SEE OPN OVERLAY X CT-l
SEIZE HILL 69 AND KUNISHI RIDGE IN Z OF A PREPARED FOR FURTHER ADV
ON ORDER X COORDINATE ADV WITH 96TH INF DIV X SEE OPN OVERLAY X
CT-5 RESPONSIBLE FOR SECURITY OF DIV RIGHT FLANK WITHIN ASSEMBLE
AREA X SEE OPN OVERLAY X 11TK MAR FURNISH SPT FIRES X 1ST EN OR BN
EXPEDITE BUILDING OF DESIGNATED BRIDGES AND BYPASSES AND REMOVAL OF
MINE FIELDS IN ORDER TO FACILITATE FWD J^VEMENT OF TKS Am) INF X
.111
11
OPERATION OVf.R)-JW
HE U> OR.DEQ. KiO. 25-45
1 A 3 0 Z l K AY, 1 9 4 6
A
O-F-F-t-C-l-A-L HONSOWE"
DEL VALLE CO
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11
7678
OPERATION OVERLAY
FIELD ORDER MO ? M 5
1 9 0 0 2 9 MAY, 1949
7675
S0T3
2 1 0 0 29 MAY, 1945
I T MAR DIV(REIN)
5 t h Marines
ASSEMBLV
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FIELD ORDER 4 6 - 4 5 X 1ST MAR DIV ATK 1 2 JUNE SEIZE KUNISHI RIDGE AND OTHER FAVORABLE TERRAIN FEATURES IN VICINITY THEREOF X CT-7 ATK 0 3 3 0 SEIZE KUNISHI RIDGE IN Z OF A X CT-1 ATK 0 7 3 0 SEIZE KUNISHI RIDGE IN Z OF A X CT-5 HAVE ONE BN PREPARED TO MOVE ON ORDER TO VICINITY OF TERA X NO ILLUMINATION SOTTTH OF DAKITON AFTER 0 2 4 5 EXCEPT IN CASE OF EMERGENCY X 3RD ARMD AMPH BN REVERTS THIS DIV 1 2 0 8 0 0 JUNE X MOVE TO ASSEMBLY AREA VICINITY OF ITOMAN X FURNISH SPT FIRES FOR CT-7 X OTHER UNITS NO CHANGE X OTHER. DETAILS NO CHANGE X
FIELD ORDER 4 7 - 4 5 X 1ST MAR DIV ATK 0 7 3 0 1 3 JUNE X CT-1 SEIZE KUNISHI RIDGE I N Z OF A, COORDINATE ADV WITH 96TH INF DIV X CT-7 SEIZE REMAINDER OF KUNISHI AND MEZADO RIDGES IN Z OF A. ASSIST THE ADV OF CT-1 X 1ST ENGR BN INSTALL BRIDGES OR BY-PASSES AT 7 3 6 2 DOG. AND ROGER X NO ILLUMINATION SOUTH OF DAKITON BETWEEN THE HOURS OF 2 0 3 0 AND 2 4 0 0 , 1 2 JUNE, IN ORDER TO ASSIST THE ADV OF ELEMENTS OF CT-7 t o KUNISHI RIDGE X 4TH RKT DET RECONNOITER FOR ROUTES TO FIRING POSITIONS IN DIV Z OF A X OTHER UNITS NO CHANGE X OTHER DETAILS NO CHANGE X
FIELD ORDER 4 8 - 4 5 X 1ST MAR DIV RESUMES ATK 0 3 3 0 , 1 4 JUNE X CT-1 ATK 0 3 3 0 SEIZE KUNISHI RIDGE IN Z OF A, COORDINATE ADV WITH 96TH INF DIV X CT-7 ATK 0 7 3 0 SEIZE MEZADO. HILL 6 9 AND KUWANGA RIDGE I N Z OF A X 1ST E G R 3N EXPEDITE REMOVAL OF MINEFIELDS AND NB BUILDING OF DESIGNATED BRIDGES X NO ILLUMINATION EXCEPT IN EMERGENCY SOUTH OF DAKITON AFTER 0 2 4 5 X OTHER UNITS NO CHANGE X OTHER DETAILS NO CHANGE X
FIELD ORDER 5 0 - 4 5 X 1ST MAR DIV ATK 0 7 3 0 1 6 JUNE MAKING MAIN EFFORT ON RIGHT, SEIZE MEZADO RIDGE IN ORDER TO PERMIT PASSAGE OF 6TH MAR DIV OiT THE RIGHT ON 1 7 JUNE X CT-7 SEIZE MEZADO RIDGE, AND OTHER FA ARABLE TERRAIN I N VICINITY THEREOF X CT-5 SPT ATK OF CT-7 BY FIRE. CONTINUE REDUCTION OF ENEMY POSITIONS ON KUNISHI RIDGE X CONDUCT AGGRESSIVE PATROLLING TO FRONT AND ELANKS X CT-8 CONTINUE MOVE TO ASSEMBLY AREA AND PREPARATIONS TO MOVE INTO FRONT LINES X 2ND PLAT, B CO, 713TH TK BN DETACHED 1ST TK BN ATTACHED 6TH MAR DIV EFFECTIVE 1 2 0 0 16 JUNE X 1 PLAT CO B , 88TH CHEM MORTAR BN DIRECT SPT CT-5 AS OF TIME OF EFFECTED RELIEF X CONTACT RIGHT TO LEFT X DIRECT COMMUNICATION AUTHORIZED BETWEEN RELIEVING UNITS AND UNITS RELIEVED X OTHER UNITS NO CHANGE X OTHER DETAILS NO CHANGE X
J 8?
FIELD ORDER 5 2 - 4 5 X 1ST MAR DIV ATK 0 7 3 0 1 8 JUNE X CT-8 PASS THRPT-3H C T - 7 , ATK 0 7 3 0 18 JUNE X SEIZE FAVORABLE TERRAIN IN VICINITY OF 0 - 1 IN Z OF A PREPARED TO CONTINUE ATK ON ORDER TO SEIZE IBARU-KOMES^ RIDGE IN Z OF A X CT-5 SEIZE 0 - 1 I N Z OF A PREPARED TO CONTINUE ATK ON ORDER X MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH 96TH INF DIV X CT-7 DIV RES X UPON BEING PASSED THROUGH. MOP UP ON POSITION THEN MOVE TO DESIGNATED ASSEMBLY AREA X CO B, 88TH CHEM VORTAR 3N SPT ATK, ONE PLAT DIRECT SPT C T - 8 , 2 PLATS DIRECT SPT CT-5 X 4TK PROV RKT DET SPT CT-5 X DET BOMB DISPOSAL CO DETACHED CT-7 ATTACHED CT-8 X OTHER UNITS AND DETAILS NO CHANGE X
FIELD ORDER 6 2 - 4 5 X 1ST MAR DIV CONTINUES MOPPING UP, POLICE AND SALVAGE I N Z OF A X CT'S 5 AND 8 WILL CARRY OUT SCHEDULE AS SHOWN ON OPN OVERLAY X CT-5 COORDINATE ADV WITH XXIV CORPS X CT-7 EFFECTIVE 0 7 3 0 , 2 8 JUNE, CEASE PATROLLING UNTIL FURTHER ORDERS X CT-1 CONTINUE PRESENT MISSION X OTHER UNITS AND DETAILS NO CHANGE X
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OPERATION OVERLAY
FIELD ORDER NO 62-45
1 5 0 0 2 7 JUNE 1942F
ST
DEL VALLE
CG
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/93
* *
*
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IT HAS
* *
*
*
*
t h e l a t e Genera l
*
*
*
*
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*
mUSSIFiE
a v a i l a b l e u n t i l a f t e r tanks had returned from the f i n a l man euvers. Considerable time was devoted to i n d i r e c t l a y i n g of tanks and i n d i r e c t f i r i n g . Each company averaged f i r i n g a t o t a l of f i f t e e n hundred rounds with good r e s u l t s . A uniform r e v i s e d tank-infantry SOP, based on p r e vious combat, was prescribed for the e n t i r e D i v i s i o n . fci. Special Preparations Maintenance
-4*k
(a) Sections of track block were spot-welded around the turret and front slope p l a t e , with the track guides t o ward the armor face. Experience at PELELIU had proven that t h i s extra track saved at l e a s t three tanks from penetration by armor-piercing p r o j e c t i l e s of approximately 75mm caliber and had lessened considerably the effect of several other h i t s . (b) Beach matting was welded on hangers on tank sponsons as protection against magnetic mines and A gre T nades. (c) Armor plate was welded on a l l spoke-type bogle wheels and rear i d l e r s . (d) Brackets for support of the SCR-300 radios were Improvised and welded in turrets of a l l command tanks* (e) Tank-infantry phone boxes, of one-quarter inch armor, were constructed and welded on the right rear bustle of a l l tanks. (f) Vision cupolas were i n s t a l l e d on a total of f i f t y tanks. Hatch hinge pins were d r i l l e d so that hatches could be opened approximately three inches to allow tank commanders better vision when required. (g) Duck-bill extended track end-connectors were i n s t a l l e d on a l l tanks* (h) Increased capacity ready racks were Installed in a l l tank t u r r e t s . ( l ) New flame thrower units were Installed after old u n i t s were removed. (J) All doors on ammunition racks were cut off* (k) Chains were welded on eeoape hatches to prevent t h e i r loss* (1) Wheeled vehicles were water-proofed* (m) Standard deep-water fording k i t s were welded and i n s t a l l e d on a l l tanks* (n) T-6 Flotation Devices were i n s t a l l e d on a t o t a l of s i x tanks. (Army technicians with special training a s s i s t ed*dn t h i s inatfiHilation).
- DECLftSM
HB
Spare parts for a l l weapons were carried t o the t a r get by t h i s organization. Some c r i t i c a l items, among which were .30 caliber M solenoids and .45 caliber p i s t o l parts G were needed and supply depots could not furnish them. The 75mm tank guns, M-3, were in good condition following the P e l e l i u operation. A 75mm gun was removed from a tank and set up for Instructional purposes. Each tank l e f t the training area with four machine guns (complete, c a l . . 3 0 , ML919A4), and four spare machine gun barrels. An ext.ra twenty machine guns (complete), and five hundred barrels were carried by the Battalion Ordnance Section. The following i s the composition of the ammo stow age with which each tank l e f t for the target!
40 rds 15 rds 10 rds 20 rds 15 rds 6,750 rds 12 H.E., M-43, SC, w/PDF, M-48. H.E., M-48, SC, w/fuze TSQ-M-54.
12
H.E., M-48, SC, w/fuze T-105 and booster T-l. APC,-M-61, w/BDP M-66A1, w/tracer. Smoke, WP, M-64, w/PDP, M-57. Caliber .30, MG, belted 4-AP, 1-tracer. Grenades, hand, (4 Fragmentation M-II, 4 H.p. Smoke, M-8, 2 W.P. M-15,2 Thermite, incendiary, M-14.) S h e l l s , smoke, 2" M-3.
Supply In practically every instance, higher echelon supply agencies offered f u l l cooperation in meeting supply problems of t h i s organization, during the training and pre-embark at ion period. Requests for special operational items were acted upon promptly and particular effort was made to expedite d e l i v e r i e s . Several items of c r i t i c a l supplies arrived either Just prior to embarkation or during rehearsals. I t i s believed,, however, that the delay resulted more from lack of shipping and necess ary time than inefficiency on the part of supply agencies. 34 exerted f u l l effort in expediting delivery of 11 tank requirements and in laying plans for the beaching of "hot cargo" on LOVE DAY. and a v a i l a b i l i t y of balanced supplies thereafter.
Communi cations
During the training period a large amount of repair and maintenance work was performed and radios were i n s t a l l e d .
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Communications (Cont'd)
Five l i n e duty men were adequately trained to operate the t e l e phone switchboard and to do l i n e and telephone maintenance work. They were also given instruction in the operation of the SCR-SLO as were the reconnaissance personnel in each com pany. This training was not as adequate as was desired. There was neither time nor additional personnel to take over radio repair duties so that these personnel could be better trained. As a result repair work was l e s s e f f i c i e n t and slower than would have been necessary had additional communications personnel been available* Extensive experimentation was carried out with tankinfantry telephone systems u t i l i z i n g the normal tank i n t e r phone c i r c u i t before deciding in favor of the sound-powered phone system. Following t h i s decision i t was necessary to substitute a single headphone unit of the sound-powered head and chest set for the sound-powered headset TS-10 originally planned upon due to unavailability of the l a t t e r . I n s t a l l a t i o n of the tank-infantry telephone was delayed considerably due to delayed delivery of the sound-powered u n i t s . I n s t a l l ation on a l l tanks was effected prior to embarkation but too l a t e for maneuvers, Again, in the case of the SCH-300 radios, delayed delivery held up i n s t a l l a t i o n u n t i l Just prior to embarkation. A system was devised whereby the SCH-300 used the same antenna as the SCR-508 (or 528), thus speeding up i n s t a l l a t i o n , which was effected i n a l l command tanks prior to embarkation. For further l i a i s o n between units a frequency was designed for TK-INF-ARTY common use. This frequency i s common to both the SCR-600 series radios used by the a r t i l l e r y .and infantry and the SCR-500 series radios used by t h i s organiza tion. Depot signal supply and repair was generally poor and greatly handicapped the Division in tank-infantry training, i t being virtually impossible to carry out r e a l i s t i c tank-infan try training with neither interphones, SCR-300rs or SCR 510's none of which were provided in time for training or maneuvers i n spite of repeated requests. Miscellaneous - Two tongue-like metal extensions were welded bn the ramps of the two LOT'e which were employed in the transport of tanks ashore. A similar procedure had been followed with LCT's u t i l i z e d in the Pelellu operation where i t was found that these extensions (four f e e t long,
'
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eighteen Inches wide, and made of one-half inch s t e e l p l a ting) - when the tank t r a c k s ran over them, held the ramp down u n t i l r e a r waterproofing was clear of the ramp. P r a c t i c e landings of tanks in an LCT and an LSM were c a r r i e d out. I t was found that an LCT, loaded with f i v e tanks M4A2 and an LVT-4, although overloaded, was seaworthy. I t was noted however, in the case of the LSM with only one tank aboard, t h a t t h i s craft beached in seven to eight feet of water. A minimum of tanks was therefore loaded in t h i s craft. Landing and Passage of Reef Fifty M4A2 medium tanks and t h r e e tank r e t r i e v e r s were embarked f o r t h e t a r g e t area. Shipping furnished for
t h i s t r a n s p o r t of tanks consisted of two LSDs, one LST, and four LSM's. Each of the LSD's was loaded d i f f e r e n t l y - one had a t o t a l of sixteen LGM'g #6 with t a n k s , and 1 the other a r r i v ed at t h e t a r g e t with two LCT's #6, and six LOH s #6. Every effort was made to get as many as possible, of the tanks be longing to the two a s s s u l t companies on LSD's, thus p r e s e r ving company control and t a c t i c a l u n i t y . Although the LSD on which a p a r t of Company !,C" embarked l e f t the staging area with t h r e e LCT's #6, each loaded with five tanks and one LVT #4 guide, one LCT was recalled enroute to the t a r g e t . In i t s stead was s u b s t i t u t e d the six LCM^s # 6 . Although t h i s organ i z a t i o n r e l a t e d i t s experience i n the landing at PELELIU, dur ing which LCT's were loaded with the five tanks and one guide, the Navy Transport Group Commander believed that an LCT #6 loaded t h u s l y would not prove seaworthy in a rough sea. The change i n LCT #6 loads meant the l o s s of a second LVT #4 guide. The LCT's were loaded one with f i v e tanks, the other with four tanks and one guide. The l o s s of the LVT guides, used to lead tanks from fringing coral reef to beach, could conceivably have e i t h e r cost t h i s organization t h e l o s s of several tanks in bomb c r a t e r s and potholes and/or delayed the shoreward move ment of tanks considerably. Fortunately, because the landing was v i r t u a l l y unopposed, tanks were allowed adequate time t o form up at reef, behind a v a i l a b l e guides, for the run to the beach. The s i x T~6 tanks, together with one LVT #4 guide, were embarked on an LST. These f l o t a t i o n tanks, per Commander Amphibious Group Four attack order, were t o have been launched from reserve LST area CH^ELIE, in time to meet the remaining Company MCW a s s a u l t tanks to r e a r of Line of Departure no l a t e r than H p l u s 20 on LOVE VCs ,However, in d i r e c t v i o l a t i o n of 3.
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the above order, the Commanding Officer, U.S.S. LST #628, refused to launch these tanks at a l l without direct orders from higher authority. I t was especially important that the T-6 tanks be in position to go in with the assault tanks as planned, since any delay would result in a receding t i d e and l e s s e n the chance of these f l o t a t i o n tanks, with their bulky pontoons, negotiating the reef successfully. At H plus 60, after much argument, these s i x tanks were finally launched, out of p o s i t i o n , f u l l y ten miles from the beach and did not reach the Line of Departure u n t i l H plus 5 hours. I t was necessary that two Headquarters tanks in LCM1s #6 wait until 1330 at the Line of Departure off Blue Beach, to guide the T-6 tanks toward t h e i r previously designated sector at the reef off ELue Beach. As a result of t h i s delay none of these tanks beached until 1445, at which time the tide condition made beaching extremely d i f f i c u l t . Cne tank was l o s t and a l l suffered from sea water damage, having been in the water over f i v e hours. Meanwhile the LCM1 s #6 and the LCTs #6 made the run from the Line of Departure to the reef and from there to Beach ELue 2 on time and. with l i t t l e d i f f i c u l t y . Condition of reef was moderately smooth and high t i d e enabled LCM's to cross over the fringing resf and beach in water which aver aged three feet in depth. Tanks launched from LCT ramps, with one exception, had no trouble in following guides in from reef to beach. One tank however, was l o s t between reef and beach in a bomb crater. Due to several tanks removing t h e i r water proofing on the beach, t h i s tank had to swing wide and in doing so ran off into a pothole and sank. The LCM's #6 and the LCTfs proved to be satisfactory as tank landing craft. With regard to the L M # 6 , care must be exercised to ascertain C that the tank i s In the exact center of the LCM, otherwise i t may capsize In a heavy sea. Further, t h i s type craft pre sents a smaller, l e s s lucrative target to enemy f i r e , and i f sunk, only one tank would be l o s t . While the L M #6 i s not C suitable for transport of tank dozer because of width of dozer blade, i t w i l l accommodate the tank r e t r i e v e r , and i s consider ed the most satisfactory type of tank landing craft yet used * by t h i s organization. M Four medium tanks together with an LVT #4 guide and other heavy gear belonging to other u n i t s , were loaded on each of the four LSM's furnished for the operation. Nearly a l l the tanks transported on t h i s type ship belonged to the reserve company which was scheduled to land, on Beach Blue 2 , approx imately one hour after assault tanks reached beach. The plan
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c a l l e d f o r LSM1 s l e a v i n g the Line of Departure two abreast then dropping t h e i r ramps on the r e e f , from which point tanks with g u i d e s would proceed shoreward. The f i r s t two ships arrived at t h e reef on schedule and attempted t o land t a n k s . The f i r s t tank to be landed dropped i n t o a deep pothole with t h s r e s u l t a n t l o s s 1 of the tank and one man by drowning, whereupon both LSi-1 s then p u l l e d rsmps, with no further l a n d ing of tanks, and sought a more fevorable r e e f . This search met with l i t t l e success however, c h i e f l y because the LSM's, heavy i n the bow, had to wait for a t i d e which would permit them t o beach on the r e e f , wait f o r the t i d e to recede, then d i s c h a r g e the t a n k s . Of the four LSM's employed, two f i n a l l y landed t h e i r tanks on beach Yellow Two, l a t e afternoon of LOVE DAY, a t h i r d got i t s tanks ashore on noon of LOVE -plus ONE, and the l a s t LSM landed four tanks on LOVE plus TWO. The LSM has c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s somewhat s i m i l a r to the LST end i s s a t i s f a c t o r y f o r landing tanks on a sharply sloping beach. Orientation Tank r e c o n n a i s s a n c e - l i a i s o n personnel were landed with a s s a u l t i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n s 1 headquarters i n advance of t a n k s , and succeeded i n meeting t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e u n i t ' s tanks on the beach and guiding them inland v i a most d i r e c t and s u i t able r o u t e s , to r e s p e c t i v e supported infantry u n i t s , thus ex p e d i t i n g considerably i n i t i a l contact between tanks and i n f a n t r y . All such personnel had the additional mission of being e s p e c i a l l y watchful f o r enemy land mines. In the l a t t e r connection, engineers attached t o a s s a u l t regiments had the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o e i t h e r c l e a r or p l a i n l y mark a l l mines found covering routes which had been^previously t e n t a t i v e l y s e l e c t e d f o r use of tanks i n g e t t i n g off beaches. No tanks were d i s a b l e d by enemy mines during the l a n d i n g . I t was decided, with regard to the time of l a n d ing t a n k s , that en advance reconnaissance s e c t i o n , made up of tank p e r s o n n e l , would land with the F i f t h Wave and make a r e p o r t / v i a r a d i o , on the general condition of reef and beach a r e a s , and make recommendations regarding the a d v i s a b i l i t y of l a n d i n g a s s a u l t tanks ahead of t h e reserve b a t t a l i o n s of a s s a u l t regiments. The d e c i s i o n regarding t h i s early l a n d i n g , ahead' of Ninth Wave, rather then i n Fourteenth Wave, was l e f t s o l e l y 'with Commanding O f f i c e r , Tank G-roup. Because reef and beach conditions were favorable and enemy o p p o s i t i o n to t h e landing was so meager, i t was d e cided to execute t h e Early Landing Plan. Reserve t a n k s , those from the LSM's and two LCK's as w e l l as the LST t a n k s , 4.
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Oontrol This B a t t a l i o n , t o g e t h e r with the Tank OrdnanceMaintenance Platoon and a detachment from the Eighth Amphi bian T r a c t o r B a t t a l i o n , was organized as a Tank Group, under control of Commending Officer, t h i s B a t t a l i o n . Since t h i s Division was landing two Regiments in a s s a u l t , a tank, company, reinforced by one platoon of tanks, was assigned i n i t i a l l y in d i r e c t support of each of t h e two a s s a u l t Regiments, The remaining tank company, l e s s detach ments, plus Headquarters and Service Company, formed the Division Tank Reserve Group. On the morning of LOVE plus ONE the two detach ed tank platoons reverted to parent control and increased the reserve s t r e n g t h . Under the above arrangement, with tank companies in d i r e c t support of, r a t h e r than attached t o , regimental com bat teams, the Battalion assumed r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for and con t r o l of supply of a l l companies. I t i s f e l t t h a t the above arrangement has the major advantage over the attachment of tanks to combat teams t h a t control i s c e n t r a l i z e d . Available tanks are assigned to i n f a n t r y elements most in need of them. This g r e a t e r f l e x i b i l i t y i s e s p e c i a l l y Important i n the matter of countering l o s s e s and meeting changes i n tank requirements, p a r t i c u l a r l y with the comparatively small number of tanks a l l o t t e d a Marine Tank Battalion f o r support of a Division. T a c t i c a l Employment Due to t h e lack of strong enemy opposition to our l a n d i n g , and t h e continued disorganization of the enemy for t h r e e weeks following, i n f a n t r y u n i t s moved f a s t a s s i s t e d by close tank support. From time of landing u n t i l LOVE plus FOUR, when t h i s Division assigned defensive s e c t o r s , only ten rounds of 75mm ammo and a few" thousand rounds of .30 c a l i b e r were expended in action against t h e enemy. At t h i s time one company was detached to Seventh Marines Reinforced, i t s e l f detached in reserve for Third Amphibious Corps. 1 The remainder of the B a t t a l i o n , including two companies of tanks, moved to DERAG-AV/A and set up bivouac, where the B a t t a l i o n , l e s s detach ments, remained for t h e balance of the two phases covered by this report. While set up at DERAG-AWA, t h i s organization t i e d in i t s area defense with t h a t of the F i r s t Marine Regiment. The two tank companies then under Battalion control made ex t e n s i v e reconnaissance of the e n t i r e Division defensive sec t o r . Each company was however a d d i t i o n a l l y assigned a. regimen t a l s e c t o r of primary r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and was placed in general 6.
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support of t h a t regiment. Arrangements were made to lend maximum support to the t a c t i c a l plans of the various sector commanders. The Battalion was In t h i s way organized as a mobile Division Armored Reserve, prepared t o operate in any defensive s e c t o r , with p a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n devoted to the best r o u t e s to be followed in r e p e l l i n g possible enemycounter-attacks or counter-landings. Tank dozers were employed to remove road blocks and f i l l in bomb c r a t e r s on routes s u i t a b l e for tank movement. A f u l l scale r e h e a r s a l over road6 throughout the Division Sec t o r was carried out with two tank companies and Headquarters and Service Company p a r t i c i p a t i n g . This timed rehearsal was carried out early - Just as soon as " jeep" reconnaissance and clearing of routes had been completed. Armored p a t r o l s of platoon strength, with infan t r y f i r e teams r i d i n g on t a n k s , were employed in general mop ping up and p a t r o l operations. One rapid advance consisted solely of i n f a n t r y and w,ar dogs riding on tanks. This combina tion was successfully used for the f i r s t time in m i l i t a r y h i s tory. While in t h i s defensive role t h i s organization sent l i a i s o n - o b s e r v a t i o n groups to tank u n i t s of XXIV Army Corps and Sixth Marine Division. Valuable information was gained. On three occasions tank platoons were tempora r i l y assigned to and based with infantry b a t t a l i o n s defend ing e s p e c i a l l y important i s o l n t e d s e c t o r s . a v h i l e Company n0 was detached to Seventh Mar i n e s , i t furnished armored p a t r o l s to t h a t organization and f i r e d several supporting missions. Both d i r e c t and i n d i r e c t f i r i n g wa.s done, with r e s u l t s in a l l instances reported as e x c e l l e n t . Tanks furnished overhead support for infantry advances and also covered infantry evacuation of wounded by f i r e and use of smoke. Terrain in t h i s area, v i c i n i t y of ISHIKAV/A, was not suited for concerted tank action. Tanks were confined to narrow roads and could only support, by d i r e c t and i n d i r e c t overhead f i r e , infantry elements moving forward i n t o the rugged i n t e r i o r . 7. Japanese. Anti-Tank Methods - Because of the fast moving offensive ^niL s c a t t e r e d l i g h t enemy opposition, no d i r e c t contact was made with enemy tanks, A guns, or T c l o s e - i n a t t a c k s . No tanks were l o s t to enemy action. Some s c a t t e r e d mines were removed, roadblocks, canals, e t c . , were t*-nk dozered and fords constructed around blown bridges.
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S p e c i a l Equipment - The t a n k - d o z e r again proved v e r y v a l u a b l e I n t h e f i l l i n g of bomb c r a t e r s , d i t c h e s , c a n a l s , e t c . and removal of road b l o c k s . Six tank d o z e r s were l a n d e d and a l l remained o p e r a t i o n a l . The t a n k r e t r i e v e r was I n d i s p e n s a b l e f o r r e c o v e r i n g bogged t a n k s , e s p e c i a l l y on t h e beach d u r i n g LOVE DAI, and i n r e p a i r i n g suspension s y s t e m s . Extended t r a c k end c o n n e c t o r s were observed t o i n c r e a s e c o n s i d e r a b l y t h e a b i l i t y of t h e tank t o n e g o t i a t e soft t e r r a i n . Although tank commanders had l i t t l e n e c e s s i t y f o r o p e r a t i n g with h a t c h e s c l o s e d , i t i s knox-m from e x p e r i e n c e a t P e l e l i u t h a t t h e i n s t a l l a t i o n of v i s i o n cupolas w i l l n o t only i n c r e a s e tank o p e r a t i n g e f f i c i e n c y but c o n t r i b u t e ' m a t e r i a l l y to t h e saving of l i v e s of many tank men i n h e a v i e r combat o p e r a t i o n s . The flamethrower E4R2-5R1, while not y e t used i n combat, proved d u r i n g p r a c t i c e f i r i n g s t o have a b e t t e r i g n i t i o n system t h a n t h e E4-5 flamethrower used a t P e l e l i u . Espe c i a l l y t h e E5R1 gun w i l l stand up b e t t e r under rough h a n d l i n g . 9. Supply .- Since t h i s B a t t a l i o n assumed r e s p o n s i - ' b i l l t y f o r t h e supply of a l l coaroonent u n i t s , S-4 s e t UP at noon on LOVE DAY at t h e D i v i s i o n Shore P a r t y OP. B a t t a l i o n supply p e r s o n n e l were p o s t e d on a l l beaches- t o m a i n t a i n a c o n s t a n t watch f o r tank s u p p l i e s r e a c h i n g Beach and D i v i s i o n dumps. A p o s i t i v e guide system was a c t i v a t e d , i n s u r i n g prompt d e l i v e r y of s u p p l i e s of c o r r e c t t y p e and q u a n t i t y t o Company Forward Dumps as soon as t h e y r e a c h e d t h e beach. The f o l l o w i n g g e n e r a l o b s e r v a t i o n s may be made: (a) Tank s u p p l i e s d i d not r e a c h t h e beach i n s u f f i c i e n t and balanced q u a n t i t i e s u n t i l LOVE p l u s FIVE d a y s . (b) The Shore P a r t y d i d not at any s t a g e know t h e r u a n t i t y , t y p e o r l o c a t i o n of tank s u p p l i e s i n beach dumps. ( c) Shore P a r t y p e r s o n n e l were not s u f f i c i e n t l y i n s t r u c t e d i n r e c o g n i t i o n of t a n k s u p p l i e s . (d) No a c t i o n was r e c e i v e d on emergency r e q u e s t s u n t i l D i v i s i o n a g e n c i e s assumed c o n t r o l of beach dumps on approx i m a t e l y LOVE p l u s t h r e e d a y s . (e) I n s e v e r a l i n s t a n c e s , l o a d i n g of s u p p l i e s was s e r i o u s l y d e l a y e d due t o t h e Shore P a r t y dumps suddenly r u n n i n g s h o r t of working p a r t y p e r s o n n e l . (f) Shore P a r t y p e r s o n n e l made every e f f o r t t o e x p e d i t e d e l i v e r i e s but a p p a r e n t l y were handicapped by i n t e r f e r e n c e from h i g h e r a u t h o r i t y .
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Fuel and ammunition supply l e v e l s b u i l t up t h r o ugh LCVE p l u s THREE would have presented serious problems under normal operating c o n d i t i o n s . There was a c r i t i c a l shortage of t r a n s p o r t a t i o n u n t i l LOVE plus FIVE days, when a l l Batta l i o n t r a n s p o r t a t i o n was finally^ beached. I n i t i a l l y additional t r f n s p o r t a t i o n was secured by S-4 from D i v i s i o n P o o l s . No d i f f i c u l t y was encountered witty supply of r a t i o n s and water. S-4 employed SCR-509 radios f o r d i r e c t l a t e r a l communications with h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s on a l l beaches and f o r communications forward. 10. Maintenance - Following the landing, constant maintenance was performed on a l l tanks. This was e s p e c i a l l y true of the T-6 t a n k s , the engines of which were damaged by s a l t water. The D i e s e l Engine has again proved h i g h l y s a t i s factory and capable of taking considerable sustained abuse. The Ordnance-Maintenance Platoon attached to t h i s o r g a n i z a t i o n performed a l l echelons of maintenance on M7s, and m a t e r i a l l y a s s i s t e d the Battalion Maintenance Section in the maintenance of tanks. I t was completely ashore with f u l l equip ment by LOVE p l u s FIVE. 11. Communlc at1on s - Tank B a t t a l i o n Headquarters was i n i t i a l l y aboard LSD # ? . Communications were e s t a b l i s h e d at H minus 90 with a l l three tank companies, ut>on launching of LCMs and LCT's from LSD's, By use of an S0IU5O9 pack s e t communications were set up f i r s t between B a t t a l i o n Headquarters and the a s s a u l t Tank Reconnaissance Group ashore, then with the tank companies ashore, during movement shoreward of B a t t a l i o n Headquarters. Tank B a t t a l i o n Headquarters landed at 1530, LOVE Di&, set up i n the v i c i n i t y of SO BE, and communications were e s t a b l i s h e d by 1 6 3 0 . At no time t h e r e a f t e r was t h i s B a t t a l i o n out of con t a c t with any company f o r a period longer than one hour. The SCR-508 again proved h i g h l y e f f i c i e n t , f l e x i b l e and dependable. The main weak p o i n t s are the overheating of the SCR-508 t r a n s m i t t e r and the p i t t i n g of the p o i n t s of i t s dynamotor s t a r t i n g r e l a y . The SOR-510 has one disadvan t a g e i n that i t i s e a s i l y Jarred o f f frequency and r e q u i r e s communications personnel f o r e f f i c i e n t o p e r a t i o n . Another drawback i s the comparatively short range of the SCR-510 s e t . When h i g h ground I n t e r v e n e s , the e f f e c t i v e range of t h i s s e t drops as* low as two m i l e s . One SCR-508 per company, mounted i n a J - t o n 4x4 truck with a twelve v o l t a u x i l i a r y system would g r e a t l y s i m p l i f y e x i s t i n g communications, problems. The
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p r e s e n t TBA allowances of Test Equipment T*ould be adequate i f s u p p l i e d . One hundred percent replacement p a r t s (as nor mally supplied with a l l Navy radio s e t s ) f o r the SCR-500 s e r i e s would g r e a t l y a s s i s t i n t h e maintenance and r e p a i r of p r e s e n t equipment, which has g e n e r a l l y been very e f f i c i e n t , g i v i n g only the normal amount of trouble to be expected. Basic radio n e t s were found to be inadequate i n one c a s e . Due to the use of B a t t a l i o n frequency f o r supply purposes during the landing o p e r a t i o n , t h e channel was o v e r crowded. The B a t t a l i o n Supply Net should have a separate f r e quency. In a l l o t h e r cases b a s i c radio n e t s were adequate. I n t e r f e r e n c e from o t h e r n e t s on t h e same or adja cent f r e q u e n c i e s was very heavy, p a r t i c u l a r l y so on LOVE DiiY. w h i l e the B a t t a l i o n remained i n v i c i n i t y of the beach. I n t e r f e r e n c e on B a t t a l i o n frequency was noted i n a l e s s e r degree than on the company f r e q u e n c i e s . The SCR-300 set has been used very l i t t l e in the tanks to d a t e but i t s operation has been s a t i s f a c t o r y . The sound-powered t a n k - i n f a n t r y phone, also used l i t t l e during the phases covered, seem6 t o work much b e t t e r than any o t h e r system d e v i s e d t o d a t e . R e e l s used have a tendency to short out and develop "dead spots" which s e r i o u s l y impair opera ting efficiency. 12. Ordnance - No major damage t o weapons was exper i e n c e d . Some d e f e c t s were found i n the 75mm ammunition. The W.P. M64 w/fuze M57 p r o j e c t i l e was found' to be l o o s e i n the case thereby causing s e p a r a t i o n . This ammunition however, was used a f t e r the case had been recrimped to the p r o j e c t i l e . Another l o t of W.P. M64, w/fuze M57, was found to be t e n p e r cent dud 8. Re comm end at i on s (1) That the one-ton "recon", I n t e r n a t i o n a l , be r e p l a c e d by a t h r e e - q u s r t e r ton Dodge t r u c k . (2) That T-6 f l o t a t i o n d e v i c e s not be used on f u t u r e o p e r a t i o n s except p o s s i b l y as a s u b s t i t u t e f o r the armored amphibian on beaches of favorable c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . (3) Thrt a new or improved s t a r t e r be i n s t a l l e d on M5 I n t e r n a t i o n a l t r u c k s . (4) That a t e n - t o n wrecker be authorized f o r Tank B a t t c l l c n Maintenance Section . (5) That each tank company be supplied one "weasel" f o r reconnaissance purposes. (6) That each tank company be supplied one SCR 508 mounted i n a one-quarter ton 4x4 truck with a twelve v o l t a u x i l i a r y system ( d e c r e r s e ^x4 trucks with SCR-510 p r o p o r t i o n ate! vj. r * t 9t 13.
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(7) That a s p e c i a l modified exhaust adapter be I n s t a l l e d on a l l tanks i n such a manner as to enable the t i g h t e n i n g of tank tracks without removing the adapter. The adapter does not hinder the performance of the tank and p r e vents dust from being blown up, thus enabling the e n g i n e ' t o r e c e i v e cleaner a i r . From the standpoint of tank-infantry o p e r a t i o n s the adapter prevents exhaust fumes and dust from blowing back i n t o the f a c e s of the i n f a n t r y . (8) That the t r a c t o r , TD-18, be retained i n the T/0 of a Marine Tank Battalion and that an operator for same be authorized. (9) That eight Amphibian T r a i l e r s be furnished t h i s organization f o r beaching of c r i t i c a l supplies i n the i n i t i a l s t a g e s of a landing operation. (10) That both ends of "Hot Cargo" Tank Gun cloverlefcfs be c l e a r l y painted or marked for quick i d e n t i f i c a t i o n i n beach dumps during early stages and t h a t , i n com bat loading Tank lun Ammunition aboard s h i p , i t be placed i n p i l e s widely separated from howitzer ammunition i f p o s s i b l e . (11) That additional communications personnel
be provided i n the T/0 of a Marine Tank B a t t a l i o n , as f o l l o w s : Increase the present t o t a l of t h r e e communications personnel i n each of the t h r e e l i n e companies to t e n , as f o l l o w s : Four ( 1 7 4 ) , and s i x radio operators (voice) per company. Increase communications personnel i n Battalion Headquarters to eighteen as f o l l o w s : Three ( 1 7 4 ) , three radio operators ( v o i c e ) , three radio operators (CW)-(776), three switchboard operators, four linemen, t e l e p h o n e , one Wire Chief, one Communications Chief. (12) That more research be devoted to the develop ment of a rugged waterproofed, sound-powered telephone with s e l f - r e t r a c t i n g cord for use i n tank-infantry communications. (13) That the Landing Ship Medium not be used for transport and combat landing of tanks i n future o p e r a t i o n s . Without a. very s t e e p , favorable beach c l e a r of r e e f s t h i s type c r a f t i s 1not s u i t e d f o r tank landing o p e r a t i o n s . (14) That further a t t e n t i o n be given at once t o t h e technique of mine d e t e c t i o n , marking, and removal. (15) That a l l higher operational s t a f f s contain a tank s t a f f s e c t i o n or s u b - s e c t i o n . (16) That the T/0 f o r the Marine Tank Company i n c l u d e one a d d i t i o n a l o f f i c e r f o r reconnaissance and l i a i s o n purposes. (17) That the T/0 f o r a Marine Tank Battalion be changed to four eighteen-tank companies with f i v e - t a n k p l a t o o n s , company headquarters platoon to include three tanks, two of -13
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Page I. II. III. IV. V. VI. VII. VIII. IX . X. XI. XII. XIII. XIV. XV. XVI. XVII. PREPARATION OPERATIONAL CHRONOLOGY CONTROL BATTALION FORWARD DISPLACEMENT INTELLIGENCE SECTION PERSONNEL COMMUNICATIONS SUPPLY MAINTENANCE ORDNANCE FLAMETHROWER TANKS TANK-INFANTRY
TANK-ARTILLEHY
1 fc 19 19 *0 z7 s7 *9 34 38 41 44 51 53 54 54
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ik B a t t a l i o n
'on, F l e e t Marine Force
c/o F l e e t Post O f f i c e , San F r a n c i s c o , C a l i f o r n i a .
S e r i a l : 024 4 J u l y , 1945.
. Tank Support Annex Special, Action, Re port - S o u t h e m Okinawa. I. IRE PARA TI ON:
Following the completion of Phases I and I I i n CENTRAL OKIK&sVA t h e F i r s t Tank B a t t a l i o n c a r r i e d out equip ment overhaul and d a i l y p r e v e n t i v e maintenance on a l l t a n k s and wheeled v e h i c l e s t o r e s t o r e a l l equipment t o peak o p e r a t i n g e f f i c i e n c y i n p r e p a r a t i o n for f u r t h e r o p e r a t i o n s . A t r a i n i n g schedule was followed i n each company, c o n c u r r e n t l y w i t h t h i s maintenance work. On 27 A p r i l the B a t t a l i o n was a l e r t e d f o r movement t o SOUTHERN OKINAWA., e f f e c t i v e 1 May. Although many of t h e t a n k s were o l d , a l l were i n e x c e l l e n t mechanical c o n d i t i o n . Movement o r d e r s were r e c e i v e d 29 A p r i l , e f f e c t i v e 0 5 3 0 , 30 A p r i l . The B a t t a l i o n convoy l e f t t h e bivouac a r e a a t DERAGArtA a t 0530, 30 A p r i l , and began movement, i n four (4) s e r i a l s , each s e p a r a t e d by f i f t e e n minute time i n t e r v a l s , t o a p r e v i o u s l y s e l e c t e d b a t t a l i o n bivouac a r e a , .Vest of M CHINA TO town. This a r e a was chosen f o l l o w i n g a A two-day r e c o n n a i s s a n c e of t h e 27TH DIVISION r e a r a r e a s and f r o n t l i n e s b y t h e commanding o f f i c e r , s t a f f , and company commanders on 28-29 A p r i l . I n moving South, t h e order o f companies was BAKER, ABLE, CHARLIE, and HEADQUARTERS AND SLRVTCSL. -Vorthy of n o t e i s t h e f a c t t h a t t h e e n t i r e convoy, composed of some n i n e t y - s i x (96) v e h i c l e s , i n c l u d i n g f o r t y seven' (47) t a n k s , covered t h e d i s t a n c e of a p p r o x i m a t e l y f i f t e e n (15) m i l e s w i t h o u t i n t e r r u p t i o n s . There were no major mechanical f a i l u r e s en^route and convoy d i s c i p l i n e was e x c e l l e n t . A i l companies moved i n t o d e s i g i a t e d a r e a s and had r e v e t t e d , by u s e ' o f tank d o z e r s , and camouflaged t a n k s and v e h i c l e s by 1300. Throughout o p e r a t i o n s i n CENTRAL OKINAWA t h i s b a t t a l i o n had m a i n t a i n e d o b s e r v a t i o n - l i a i s o n groups w i t h 24TH itRMY CORPS1 t a n k b a t t a l i o n s i n a c t i o n on t h e SOUTHERN OKINAWA , f r o n t and was t h e r e f o r e f a m i l i a r with JAEkNESc a n t i t a n k weapons and t e c h n i q u e a s w e l l a s g e n e r a l t e r r a i n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . On 1 May t h e b a t t a l i o n j o i n e d i n a c t i v e combat i n support of the D i v i s i o n ' s d r i v e on SHUBI. - 1
DECLASS I
II.
OPERATIONAL CHRONOLOGY:
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3Q P r i l , 194 ? R e l i e f of the 27CH ARMY DIVISION by the FIRST MARINE DIVISION having been completed t h i s d a t e , the F i r s t Tank B a t t a l i o n was ordered t o support the DIVISION a t t a c k 1 May. Accordingly ABLE Company was placed i n d i r e c t s u p port of CT-1, BAKER Company i n d i r e c t support of CT-5, and CHARLES Company in D i v i s i o n Tank Reserve, a v a i l a b l e t o r e i n f o r c e or r e l i e v e e i t h e r or both a s s a u l t companies, a s ordered. Company ttBw, 713th Armored Flamethrower b a t t a l i o n , a t t a c h e d t o F i r s t Tank B a t t a l i o n t h i s date and placed in battalion reserve. 1 Mav. 1QAS Company "A", r e i n f o r c e d with flame t a n k s , sup ported the F i r s t Marines i n the a t t a c k on and seizure of the v i l l a g e of YAFUSU and adjacent ground. Napalm employed e x t e n s i v e l y . E x t e n s i v e mining encountered. A l l other elements continued reconnaissance and preparations t o Join i n b a t t l e . Reconnaissance of MACHINATO AIRJISLD completed, and n e c e s s a r y orders i s s u e d t o a l l companies i n order t h a t the b a t t a l i o n might r e p e l a day or n i ^ i t enemy mechanized counter-attack t h a t a r e a . 2 May. 19 2,5 Company &", r e i n f o r c e d by one tank platoon and one flame p l a t o o n , supported the F i r s t Marines advance Southeast of IAFUSU and v i c i n i t y of KUR&N. Overhead f i r e employed l a t t e r s e c t o r . Enemy a r t i l l e r y , mortars and i n f a n t r y f i r e heavy. Action heavy. Company "B", r e i n f o r c e d by one flame platoon^ supported F i f t h Marines a t t a c k i n s e c t o r North of DAKESHI. Ground boggy and r e s t r i c t e d . L i ^ i t tank a c t i o n . Remaining elements in b a t t a l i o n r e s e r v e . Company *", 713th Armored Flamethrower B a t t a l i o n , moved from bivouac at CHIYDNNA t o F i r s t Tank B a t t a l i o n bivouac v i c i n i t y of M CHINA TO town. A 3 Mav. 19/.5 Company "A**, r e i n f o r c e d by one tank platoon and pne flame p l a t o o n , supported the F i r s t l/krines a t t a c k v i c i n i t y of v i l l a g e of ASA. E x t e n s i v e mining. Mortar f i r e heavy. Y/.P. smoke used v e r y e f f e c t i v e l y t o mark enemy automatic weapon empla cements Company "B", reinforced by a flame platoon, supported the F i f t h Marines, a t t a c k i n g Northwest of AYJACHA. C.P. T-105 fuze v e r y e f f e c t i v e in tank d e s t r u c t i o n of numer ous enemy r e i n f o r c e d - c o n c r e t e p i l l b o x e s . I n f a n t r y support of tanks and a r t i l l e r y smoke support and coordination both excellent. $#
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Remaining elements in Battalion r e s e r v e . I May. 1QA.S Company "A", reinforced by one tank platoon and one flame platoon supported the F i r s t Marines. Tanks, from MaCHINiiTO AIRFIELD, delivered overhead f i r e t o cover i n f a n t r y advance i n t o high ground South and Southeast of ASA. KAtfA ESTUARY. Extensive mining. Company "B", reinforced by one tank platoon and one flame platoon, supported the Fifth Marines in advance t o the 0-2 l i n e . Enemy grenadiers and satchel-charge c a r r i e r s were encountered for the f i r s t time in t h i s s e c t o r . Evacuation of i n f a n t r y wounded by both tanks and flame t a n k s . Tank-infantry a t t a c k well coordinated and i n f a n t r y fire-teams support of tanks e x c e l l e n t . Action heavy along e n t i r e Division f r o n t .
5 May. lQ/,5
Company "A", reinforced by a platoon of flame t a n k s , supported the F i r s t Marines. Tanks f i r e d from a draw Southeast of NAKANISHE on numerous caves, pillboxes, and b u r i a l v a u l t s Southwest of AWAGHA. AT fire and mining heavy. Flame tanks not employed because of limited t e r r a i n . Company tB", reinforced by a platoon of flame t a n k s , supported Third B a t t a l i o n , Fifth Marines, in advance //est of ArfVACHa. Many enemy k i l l e d in open a f t e r leaving caves a s tanks be^in f i r i n g . Infantrymen r i d i n g inside tanks helped designate t a r g e t s t o tank commanders and t u r r e t gunners. Action heavy in s p i t e of limited t e r r a i n . Company f,Cw, reinforced by a platoon of flame t a n k s , supported F i r s t B a t t a l i o n , Fifth Marines. Enemy's f i r s t use of thermite grenades against t a n k s , Snoke, (75mm Y/.P. and M-3 2" Snoke Bombs) helped evacuation of several wounded i n f a n t r y . Tanks working forward of i n f a n t r y a s s a u l t elements successfully called f o r and adjusted a r t i l l e r y f i r e on enemy p o s i t i o n s . Ammunition expenditure heavy and flame tanks very effective against l a r g e , deep caves. Mining noted t h i s s e c t o r f o r f i r s t time. 6 May. 1945 Company "A", reinforced by four platoons of tanks and a platoon of flame tanks, supported t h e F i r s t i/kr i n e s . Tanks, while operating East across t h e r a i l r o a d track in a draw Southwest of AWACHA, were subjected t o unusually heavy and a c c u r a t e enemy 47mm AT f i r e . A H three tanks of one platoon were h i t a t o t a l of ten times by a well-concealed enemy AT gun, believed located East of the r a i l r o a d t r a c k , in t h e high ground between A A H and DAKESHI. Enemy AT gunners WCA m*.-': j $^<& ? *
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10 May. 1QL<>
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12 May. 1QA.S (Cont'd) a c r o s s the North-South r a i l r o a d and drove East up the W N AA Draw t o the v i l l a g e of W N i t s e l f . Multitudinous caves AA and bunkers, a l l a l i v e with JAPANESE, were attacked with great e f f e c t on the South s i d e of WMA Ridge', head of W N AA Draw, and South Wall of wANA Draw. In a d d i t i o n cave and gun p o s i t i o n s l o c a t e d on the Northwest face of the c l i f f c i t y of f o r t r e s s SHURI now l a y exposed t o tank guns a t r a n g e s from n i n e hundred t o f i f t e e n hundred yards. This tank a t t a c k c o n s t i t u t e d the f i r s t penetra t i o n of the JAPANESE f i n a l i n n e r d e f e n s e s before SHURI by e n v e l o p i n g DAKESHI and W N R i d g e s . I t was e x p l o i t e d and AA caused obvious consternation among the JAPANESL who were ob served swarming from cave t o cave. Heavy c a s u a l t i e s were i n f l i c t e d by shrapnel f i r e . This penetration was e x p l o i t e d by r e l i e f of tanks on s t a t i o n by t h i s h e a v i l y reinforced tank company. Extremely heavy a c t i o n . Company "CM, r e i n f o r c e d by one p l a t ben of tanks and one flame p l a t o o n , and employing the TD-18 armored dozer, supported the Seventh Marines drive South up DAKESHI Ridge. Heavy a c t i o n i n reduction of innumerable caves, tombs, and bunker p o s i t i o n s . The small B a t t a l i o n r e s e r v e , c o n s i s t i n g s o l e l y of Headquarters tank s e c t i o n of Company *E", dispatched a t 1200 t o support the F i f t h Marines in e l i m i n a t i o n of a pocket of r e s i s t a n c e encountered by that Regiment in mopping up oper ations. 13 May. 1QA.5 Company '&', reinforced by a platoon of tanks and a flame s e c t i o n , supported the F i r s t Marines, a s heavy a c t i o n continued in the W N Draw a r e a . Several enemy p o s i t i o n s in AA W N Ridge destroyed by t a n k s . In t h i s comparatively open AA t e r r a i n , i n f a n t r y f i r e teams from covered p o s i t i o n s behind t e r r a c e s some one hundred yards d i s t a n t , furnished adequate p r o t e c t i o n t o t a n k s , and incurred v e r y l i g i t c a s u a l t i e s from the heavy mortar f i r e d i r e c t e d a t tank f i r i n g p o s i t i o n s . Company n C w , r e i n f o r c e d by three platoons of tanks and a platoon of flame t a n k s , and again making e f f e c t i v e use of armored TD-18, supported Seventh Marines i n drive t o take h i g i ground dominating v i l l a g e of DAKESHI. Preceding the general advance, t a n k s , covered by f i r e teams, crossed f i l l over drainage d i t c h and, making a s i n g l e enveloping move ment, advanced i n t o p o s i t i o n s from which enemy p o s i t i o n s on r e v e r s e s l o p e s of DAKESHI Ridge were d e s t r o y e d . Tanks moved on i n t o v i l l a g e , but heavy mortar f i r e kept i n f a n t r y on Northern slope of Ridge. Satchel charge a t t a c k s numerous.
-DECLASSIFIED
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1L May. 1Q A.S Company nA.", reinforced by two platoons of tanks and a platoon of flame tanks, continued t o support the F i r s t Marines by "processing" M A V i l l a g e and the w a l l s South of WANA. Tanks moved forward i n t o p o s i t i o n s from which t h e reverse slope of 'tfANA Ridge and the v i l l a g e were s u b j e c t e d t o c l o s e - i n , d i r e c t f i r e . This a c t i o n b e i n g carried on concurrently with tank operations v i c i n i t y of EAKESHI, c o n s t i t u t e d a c l o s e l y coordinated double envelopment of WANA-DA-KESHI Ridges and, most important, thoroughly destroyed enemy p o s i t i o n s on r e v e r s e s l o p e s of these Ridges, e v e n t u a l l y making i t p o s s i b l e for i n f a n t r y t o t a k e , and hold, t h i s high ground, prepared for an a l l - o u t a s s a u l t on SHURI H i l l . Company "CM, reinforced by three tank platoons and a flame platoon, and armored TD-18, supported the Seventh Marines from f i r i n g p o s i t i o n s l o c a t e d on DAXESEH Ridge. The v i l l a g e was s u b j e c t e d t o heavy f i r e a s was a l s o the North s l o p e s of W N Ridge. Enemy had blown c r a t e r s , during pre AA c e d i n g n i g h t , in b e s t tank route l e a d i n g i n t o DAK&SHI thereby temporarily r e s t r i c t i n g tank movement South- Enemy mortar and AT f i r e , from SHURI H i l l , was p a r t i c u l a r l y heavy and a c c u r a t e . Eight tanks were h i t a t o t a l of seventeen times by 47mm AT f i r e . I t was e v i d e n t , at t h i s t i m e , that the enemy was making f r a n t i c use of every p o s s i b l e weapon a v a i l a b l e t o him t o stop our t a n k s . Replacement AT weapons were brought forward n i ^ i t l y and emplaced where accurate f i r e could be d e l i v e r e d upon tanks working forward of e n t i r e D i v i s i o n f r o n t in W N Draw. AA Heavy a c t i o n a l o n g e n t i r e f r o n t . More tanks, h a d . t h e y been a v a i l a b l e , could have been employed t o great advantage
15 Mav. 1Q2L5
Company ^B", reinforced by a platoon of tanks and a flame p l a t o o n , supported the F i f t h Marines, f o l l o w i n g r e l i e f of F i r s t ftkrines. Action in t h i s s e c t o r remained heavy a s r e l a y s of tanks advanced through the YiANA Draw and s h e l l e d SHURI and i t s d e f e n s e s . Enemy used AT grenades for f i r s t time i n t h i s . sector. Company WCW, reinforced by a platoon of tanks and a platoon of flame t a n k s , supported Seventh Marines. Due t o i n f a n t r y r e o r g a n i z a t i o n , no tanks were committed. Tank elements s h i f t e d at llflO t o r e i n f o r c e Company ^B" i n W K Draw. AA 16 Mav. 1QA.5 F i r s t Tank B a t t a l i o n , l e s s Company "C n , and using ox*e f&aa&e. glajy^n^ supported* the Second B a t t a l i o n , F i f t h Marines,
- 7
DECLASSED
S1F1ED
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16 May. 1QA/5 ( C o n t ' d ) employing r e l a y s of t w e l v e t o f i f t e e n t a n k s e a c h deep i n W N Draw. Over f i v e t h o u s a n d rounds of 75mm f i r e d N o r t h AA i n t o WANA R i d g e , E a s t i n t o head of W N Draw and SHURI AA C i t y and South i n t o H i l l 55 and SHUEI C i t y . Flame used with success in burning W N . v i l l a g e . AA W W Company C , r e i n f o r c e d by one flame p l a t o o n s u p p o r t e d t h e d r i v e of t h e Seventh Marines South a g a i n s t W N R i d g e . H u l l d e f i l a d e f i r i n g p o s i t i o n s a l o n g DA.KKSHI AA Ridge were a g a i n employed t o d e l i v e r overhead f i r e a g a i n s t WANA R i d g e . S u p p o r t i n g a c c u r a t e t a n k f i r e , i n c l u d i n g s h r a p n e l and M54 time f i r e , played a major r o l e i n r e p e l l i n g two enemy c o u n t e r - a t t a c k s launched a l o n g W N Ridge from t h e AA East. E x t e n s i v e m i n i n g , heavy AT gun o p p o s i t i o n and many a t t e m p t e d c l o s e - i n a t t a c k s c h a r a c t e r i z e d t h e enemy's d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o s t o p our t a n k s . E x t r e m e l y heavy a c t i o n along e n t i r e Division f r o n t . 17 May. 1QL.5 Company Bn, r e i n f o r c e d by f o u r p l a t o o n s of t a n k s and a p l a t o o n of flame t a n k s , s u p p o r t e d F i f t h M a r i n e s . A c t i o n was a ^ i n c o n c e n t r a t e d i n W N Draw a s t a n k s con A& t i n u e d t o pound h e a v i l y enemy p o s i t i o n s on SHUKE R i d g e . Tanks covered i n f a n t r y w h i l e t h e y dug i n on forward p o s i t i o n s and a l s o were used t o h a u l food, w a t e r , and ammuni tion t o front l i n e elements. Heavy m i n i n g . Company W C", r e i n f o r c e d by a p l a t o o n of flame t a n k s supported t h e Seventh b r i n e s i n a s s i s t i n g i n f a n t r y advance t o p o s i t i o n s on W N Ridge- When t h i s ground was AA made u n t e n a b l e i n l a t e a f t e r n o o n , t a n k s covered i n f a n t r y w i t h d r a w a l . TD-18 dozed out d r a i n a g e d i t c h i n v a l l e y , making a r o u t e t a n k s used i n moving South of DtiKESHI. Enemy threw smoke grenades a t t a n k s p r i o r t o attempting several unsuccessful close-in satchel-charge attacks. A c t i o n heavy a l o n g e n t i r e f r o n t . N e a r l y s i x t h o u s a n d rounds 75mm ammunition expended. 18 Mav. 1915 Company , f B", r e i n f o r c e d by one p l a t o o n of t a n k s and one flame p l a t o o n s u p p o r t e d F i f t h M a r i n e s , from p o s i t i o n s i n W N Draw. Numerous SHURI H i l l emplacements, r e o c c u p i e d AA d u r i n g p r e v i o u s n i g h t , d e s t r o y e d . Supply of f r o n t l i n e i n f a n t r y c o n t i n u e d . Flame a g a i n used a g a i n s t WANA. Mining con tinued heavy.
6ECLAS#*
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18 May. 1Q u> ( C g r ^ ' ^ Company w C n , reinforced by two platoons of tanks and a flame p l a t o o n , supported Seventh Marines by d i r e c t over head f i r e a s i n f a n t r y a g i i n attempted to occupy tfANa Ridge. Furnished smoke i n h e l p i n g t o e f f e c t evacuation of wounded. Action moderately heavy along e n t i r e f r o n t . Company "Bw, reinforced by a platoon of tanks and a platoon of flame t a n k s , supported F i f t h Marines in continuing d e s t r u c t i o n of enemy emplacements, v i c i n i t y of H i l l 55, from f i r i n g p o s i t i o n s in W N Draw. Undoubtedly AA many of these emplacements are e i t h e r improved or newlyconstructed during darkness* Company n C", reinforced by two platoons of tanks and a platoon of flame tanks, supported the Seventh Regiment, i n d e l i v e r i n g d i r e c t overhead f i r e , a s s i s t i n g i n f a n t r y a s s a u l t a g a i n s t W N Ridge. AA Mining heavy. Several n e w l y - l a i d mines along entire front. Attached a r t i l l e r y forward observers, operating
from i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n O.P.*s with tank company commanders,
furnished several v e r y e f f e c t i v e f i r e missions t o support
and conceal advance of tanks in both s e c t o r s .
20 May. 1QA.5 Company MAM, r e i n f o r c e d by two platoons of tanks and a s e c t i o n of flame tanks supported the F i r s t Marines 1 advance i n t o the suburbs of SHURI. Iknks and cover i n g i n f a n t r y f i r e teams accomplished the f i r s t a c t u a l pene t r a t i o n of SHURI. FLame tanks were p a r t i c u l a r l y e f f e c t i v e i n burning out the v i l l a g e , d e s t r o y i n g many machine gun em placements. Following t h i s reduction of enemy r e s i s t a n c e , i n f a n t r y elements moved i n t o the v i l l a g e and attempted to hold the r i d g e south of v i l l a g e , but were driven back off s l o p e by heavy enemy f i r e d e l i v e r e d from SHURI H i l l t o the
West.
S p e c i a l tank hunter groups employing grenades and s a t c h e l charges, again made f r a n t i c attempts t o h a l t the tank advances. Company "BM, r e i n f o r c e d by a platoon of tanks and a s e c t i o n of flame tanks supported the Fifc;h Marines* f i r i n g from the W N Draw, i n t o SHURI H i l l a / / t h e infantry AA advanced t o take H i l l 5 5 . At 1100 a platoon of tanks from the Division Qknk Reserve was dispatched t o add extra f i r e power t o t h i s d r i v e . A squad of e n g i n e e r s , working under covering tank f i r e ' d i d e x q e l l e n t work .in removing an e x t e n s i v e mine f i e l d l a i d # a c r o s s ^tank^re^it/s through 'flANA Draw.
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2D Mav. 1QIJ5 (Cont'd) Supply runs were made by tanks in both s e c t o r s . A c t i o n extremely heavy. 31 May 1945 Company "A", reinforced by two platoons of tanks and a s e c t i o n of flame t a n k s , supported F i r s t Marines, again moving i n t o t h e small v i l l a g e a t the Northern t i p of SHUEI t o mop up enemy who had i n f i l t r a t e d i n t o v i l l a g e f o l l o w i n g i n f a n t r y withdrawal of previous e v e n i n g , Flame again employ ed v e r y e f f e c t i v e l y . Enemy produced another of h i s AT weapons. While tanks were preceding i n f a n t r y return t o the v i l l a g e , one tank had ten square-shaped charges, about the s i z e of a # 2 can, p r o j e c t e d a t i t from d i s t a n c e s estimated to be t h i r t y t o seventy f i v e y a r d s . This charge had two *V "-shaped f i n s on the end of i t , which helped t o control i t s f l i g h t , and i s b e l i e v e d to have *been a l o c a l improvisation t o d i s a b l e t a n k s . Company ^BM, r e i n f o r c e d by a s e c t i o n of flame t a n k s , supported the F i f t h Marines a s i n f a n t r y further con s o l i d a t e d t h e i r p o s i t i o n s on H i l l 55. I n f a n t r y , f i r i n g t r a c e r s , helped tanks by d e s i g n a t i n g t a r g e t s l o c a t e d North o f H i l l 55 Tank f i r i n g p o s i t i o n s l o c a t e ^ s l i g h t l y Southwest of H i l l 5 5 . Observed f i r e was d e l i v e r e d a g a i n s t reverse s l o p e s of high ground i n t h i s v i c i n i t y a s an a r t i l l e r y F . O . , r i d i n g i n s i d e a tank, c a l l e d f o r and e f f e c t i v e l y a d j u s t e d a r t i l l e r y f i r e i n t o t h i s d e f i l a d e d area with t e l l i n g e f f e c t . Extremely heavy a c t i o n a l o n g e n t i r e D i v i s i o n ; > front. 22 May. 1915 Company *&", r e i n f o r c e d by a platoon of tanks and a s e c t i o n of flame t a n k s , supported F i r s t Marines. Heavy r a i n s of the previous n i g i t made tank movement through W N AA Draw an i m p o s s i b i l i t y . Accordingly a l l tanks secured f o r the day a t 1 0 3 0 . Company *BW, r e i n f o r c e d by a platoon of tanks and a s e c t i o n of flame t a n k s , was t o have supported the F i f t h Marines, but a l l tanks were secured a t 0800 because of t e r r a i n c o n d i t i o n s due t o r a i n . ?r1 May. iq/i5 Company &", r e i n f o r c e d by a platoon of tanks and s e c t i o n of flame t a n k s , supported the F i r s t Marines. Only two tanks moved forward t o Northern SHUEI where boggy t e r r a i n
23 May. 1915' ( Cont'd) **-*. ' / ,'!;,/ i " Prohibited forward movement. Company *BW, reinforced by a platoon of tanks and a s e c t i o n of flame tanks, supported F i f t h Marines, v i c i n t y H i l l 55 o n l y . Action was very l i m i t e d due to mud and poor v i s i b i l i t y . One tank h i t what was apparently e i t h e r a delayed a c t i o n or e l e c t r i c a l l y - c o n t r o l l e d mine. PA. Mav to 31 Mav. 1915 Due t o continued d a i l y r a i n s , which made a quagmire out of a l l road n e t s , no movement of tanks from the bivouac area took p l a c e . Continued d a i l y l i a i s o n with a l l regiments and d a i l y reconnaissance. Badly needed tank maintenance was continued by a l l companies througiout t h i s period of i n a c t i v i t y . 1 June, 191L5 Bains slackened and e x t e n s i v e reconnaissance of D i v i s i o n f r o n t made. At 1500 Company ", l e s s heavy maintenance u n i t s , d i s p l a c e d South in convoy t o NAHA., where bivouac was e s t a b l i s h e d for the n i g h t , prior t o continuing in support of the F i f t h Marines the following day. 9 June. 1915 Reconnaissance of the Division s e c t o r continued with a view t o forward displacement of the B a t t a l i o n . Company ", in s p i t e of washed-out roads and blown b r i d g e s , supported F i f t h Marines. One platoon of tanks cleaned out machine gun p o s i t i o n s and s n i p e r s , enabling the F i r s t B a t t a l i o n to s e i z e high ground v i c i n i t y of SHICHINA. -} June. 1915 The e n t i r e B a t t a l i o n , l e s s heavy maintenance u n i t s , d i s p l a c e d South in convoy t o v i l l a g e of SHICHINA. Roads v e r y muddy. ^ ^ ^^ There was no tank a c t i o n due to unfavorable weather and road c o n d i t i o n s . (t June. 1915 Because of v e r y poor condition of roads and b r i d g e s tanks could not cross the NAEA-"YONABARU V a l l e y . Engi n e e r s were n o t i f i e d of t h e s e conditions and rendered prompt assistance. C o m p Q n y c w > supported the Seventh Marines. A platoon of tanks supported the Second B a t t a l i o n by f i r i n g -11
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/ . J u n e . 1QA.5 ( C o n t ' d ) from t h e N o r t h e r n bank of t h e KOKUBA G W a t enemy machine A A gun p o s i t i o n s l o c a t e d on t h e Southern bank of t h i s r i v e r , E a s t of TQMIGUSUKI. 5 J u n e . 1Q15 Made an e x t e n s i v e r e c o n n a i s s a n c e of the TOMUSU TERA-CHAN a r e a , checking on t h e c o n d i t i o n of r o a d s capable of s u p p o r t i n g t a n k s and s e e k i n g a l o c a t i o n f o r f u r t h e r f o r ward d i s p l a c e m e n t of the B a t t a l i o n , , Company MC" a c t i o n s u p p o r t e d t h e Seventh Mar i n e s . Two t a n k s covered e n g i n e e r s d u r i n g t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of a b r i d g e a c r o s s the KGKUBA GAtfA. Enemy a u t o m a t i c wea pons l o c a t e d on h i g h ground South of t h e r i v e r and which had been d i s r u p t i n g b r i d g e c o n s t r u c t i o n , were s i l e n c e d . 6 J u n e , 1945 E x t e n s i v e r e c o n n a i s s a n c e of D i v i s i o n forward area continued. Company MCM s u p p o r t e d t h e Seventh M a r i n e s ,
two t a n k s c o n t i n u i n g e x a c t l y t h e same mission a s d e s c r i b e d
in 5 June, above.
7 J u n e , ;<H*i That p o r t i o n of t h e B a t t a l i o n l o c a t e d a t SHICHINA p r e p a r e d t o d i s p l a c e forward 8 J u n e . No tank action. 8 J u n e . 19L5 At 0600 B a t t a l i o n began movement South, by company convoys, t o bivouac a r e a a t TOMUSU. Company '&" s e n t f o u r t a n k s t o t h e F i r s t Mar i n e s for s u p p o r t of t h e i r a t t a c k , but no t a n k s were committed. 9 J u n e , 1945 E x t e n s i v e r e c o n n a i s s a n c e of t h e D i v i s i o n f o r ward a r e a resumed with a view t o f u r t h e r forward d i s p l a c e m e n t of t h e B a t t a l i o n , i n o r d e r t h a t t a n k s might be more r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e t o support t h e impending D i v i s i o n a t t a c k a g a i n s t t h e s t r o n g l y - h e l d KTJNISHI Ridge s e c t o r . Company "A" s u p p o r t e d t h e F i r s t J f a r i n e s . One p l a t o o n covered t h e S o u t h e r l y i n f a n t r y advance from f i r i n g p o s i t i o n s North of t h e MUKUE G W and TERA-YUZA R a i l r o a d . A A . Tank f i r e c o n c e n t r a t e d a g a i n s t h i l l West of YUZA. L i g h t a c t i on
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10 June. 1QA5 Commencing a t 0600, that portion of the B a t t a l i o n a t TCMUSU d i s p l a c e d South, by company convoys, t o a bivouac West of AWA. Company "A", reinforced by one platoon of tanks and a s e c t i o n of flame tanks, supported the F i r s t Marines. Tanks pushed across the M K E G W over a ford constructed DU A A before dawn and from f i r i n g p o s i t i o n s near H i l l 59, South of the TERA-YUZA Railroad, destroyed many enemy emplacements l o c a t e d on H i l l 69 and in 0ZAT0 and YUZA a r e a s . This was the s t a r t of the p r o c e s s i n g " which enabled i n f a n t r y t o e v e n t u a l l y s e i z e t h i s o b j e c t i v e , prior t o t h e i r attack a g a i n s t XUNISII Ridge. n Action moderately heavy. Company C", reinforced by a s e c t i o n of flame t a n k s , supported the Seventh Marines. These tanks a l s o used the ford a c r o s s MUKUli GAWA, then swung southwest a l o n g the road which p a r a l l e l s the TERA-TTOZA Railroad. Tanks p r e ceded i n f a n t r y advance through the v i l l a g e of TERA, Light action. Mining and what i s b e l i e v e d t o have been d i r e c t heavy c a l i b e r a r t i l l e r y were both heavy. 11 June, 194? Company MAM, reinforced by two platoons of tanks and a s e c t i o n of flame tanks, supported F i r s t Marines by con t i n u i n g d e s t r u c t i o n of enemy p o s i t i o n s located on reverse slope of H i l l 69 and YUZA H i l l . E f f e c t i v e use of flame tanks. Tanks moved down the road, running Southwest from 0ZAT0 through KUNISHI Ridge, a s s a u l t e d H i l l 69 f r o n t a l l y and then s p l i t and a s s a u l t e d reverse slopes by double envelopment enabling i n f a n t r y t o s e i z ,f the H i l l . e Company "C , r e i n f o r c e d by a platoon of tanks and a s e c t i o n of flame t a n k s , supported Seventh Marines. Again a c t i o n was l i g h t in t h i s s e c t o r a s l i t t l e r e s i s t a n c e was met in and around TERA and TERA. Draw. Mining and d i r e c t f i r e a r t i l l e r y remained e x tremely heavy. IZ June, 19 45 Company *&", r e i n f o r c e d by two platoons of tanks and a s e c t i o n of flame tanks, supported the F i r s t Marines. No tanks were committed a s the e n t i r e day was spent by Engineers removal of mines from tank routes l e a d i n g South from H i l l 69 t o KUNISHI Ridge, and by heavy a r t i l l e r y and NGF b l a s t i n g of enemy d i r e c t f i r e a r t i l l e r y suspected p o s i t i o n s which had roads- in t h i s s e c t o r so a c c u r a t e l y covered.
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12 June. 1915 (Cont'd) Company "C", r e i n f o r c e d by a platoon of tanks and a s e c t i o n of flame tanks, supported the Seventh Marines. Tanks experienced considerable d i f f i c u l t y i n moving South from TERA over the narrow roads l e a d i n g i n t o TERA Draw, from which t h e "processing" of t h e forward s l o p e s of KUNISHI Ridge began. Extensive tank dozering cleared tank r o u t e s both along the Coastal Road and TERA-KUNISHI Road, enabling tanks t o c r o s s AT d i t c h and c l o s e to the base of KUNISHI Ridge and b l a s t and burn numerous emplacements, Flame tanks very effective. In a d d i t i o n tanks b e ^ n what turned out t o be an e x t e n s i v e "ferrying" system in t h i s s e c t o r . Troops and s u p p l i e s , ( f o o d , ammunition, water, grenades, wire and blood plasma), were carried forward from TERA t o p o s i t i o n s along KUNISHI Road cut on KUNISHI Ridge, thereby r e i n f o r c i n g two companies which had made a s u c c e s s f u l advance during darkness the previous n i g h t . , On re/turning each tank e v a c uated wounded i n f a n t r y . Because t h i s one thousand yard s t r e t c h of open t e r r a i n was swept by heavy enemy automatic f i r e , tanks were the only p o s s i b l e overland means for t h i s reinforcement, supply, and evacuation. Heavy a c t i o n . H June, JL94S Company "A", r e i n f o r c e d by two platoons of tanks and a s e c t i o n of flame tanks, supported the F i r s t Marines. No tanks committed. Engineer clearance of heavily-mined a r e a s continued, while i n f a n t r y reorganized. Company "C", reinforced by two platoons of tanks and a s e c t i o n of flame t a n k s , supported the Seventh Marines. "Processing" of the forward slopes of KUNISHI Ridge continued both from p o s i t i o n s in T&Bk Draw and along the c o a s t a l road, where, a f t e r considerable tank dozer work, tanks advanced South a l o n g the road, through a break i n the sea w a l l , and, from p o s i t i o n s a l o n g the reef, took p o s i t i o n s on the Western end of KUNISHI Ridge under f i r e . Tanks continued t o carry forward from TERA t o KUNISHI Ridge troops and s u p p l i e s returning with wounded. Flame tanks were employed most e f f e c t i v e l y , burning out enemy p o s i t i o n s l o c a t e d in caves and b u r i a l v a u l t s a t the base of KUNISHI. Action moderate. AT guns and mines encountered. The a r t i l l e r y F.O. teams from F i r s t B a t t a l i o n Eleventh Marines, were again a t t a c h e d t o t h e B a t t a l i o n and were employed v e r y e f f e c t i v e l y for the balance of the campaign
- 14
228
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1L June. ^Qy^
* *
Company "A", reinforced by a platoon of tanks and a s e c t i o n of flame t a n k s , supported F i r s t Marines. From, p o s i t i o n s l o c a t e d South and East of K i l l 69 tanks began heavy "processing" of enemy p o s i t i o n s l o c a t e d a l o n g the base of the .Ridge, and a l o n g the road leading t o East end of KUNI3HI V i l l a g e . Company n C", reinforced by three platoons of tanks and a s e c t i o n of flame t a n k s , supported the Seventh Marines, lank elements pushed a l o n g the coastal road and TERA. V a l l e y t o reach f i r i n g p o s i t i o n s from which Western and Northern KDNISHI Ridge -was again subjected t o heavy tank f i r e . Other u n i t s and the flame section drove South through the Ridge and began the a l l - i m p o r t a n t destruction of enemy p o s i t i o n s l o c a t e d on reverse s l o p e s and MEZADO Ridge forward s l o p e s . Very e f f e c t i v e use of napalm. Supply, reinforcement, and evacuation in both sectors continued on l a r g e s c a l e . AT and l a r g e - c a l i b e r d i r e c t a r t i l l e r y f i r e continued heavy. Heavy a c t i o n along e n t i r e f r o n t . Exten s i v e dozering. The one platoon in Division Tank Reserve was committed a t llfiO t o f u r t h e r support Seventh Iforines.
1? June, 1945.
Company *&, reinforced by two platoons of tanks and a s e c t i o n of flame tanks, supported the F i r s t Marines, by continuing t o d e l i v e r heavy f i r e a g a i n s t the" forward s l o p e s and base of KDNISHI Ridge, from f i r i n g p o s i t i o n s South of H i l l 6 9W W . Company C , reinforced by two platoons of tanks and a s e c t i o n of flame t a n k s , supported Seventh Mar i n e s . Action continued in the area South of KUNISHI Ridge a s tanks and flame tanks accomplished further destruction of enemy d e f e n s e s on reverse slopes of KUNISHI, a s w e l l a s those in MEZADO and on reverse slopes of MEZADO Ridge Flame tanks expended three thousand three hun dred g a l l o n s of napalm, destroying many cave emplacements a l o n g D i v i s i o n front and i g i i t i n g one large ammunition dump. AT and mortar f i r e continued heavy. Action heavy. 16 June. 1QL.5 Company ", r e i n f o r c e d by a platoon of tanks and a s e o t i o n of flame tanks, supported the F i f t h Marines, by continuing d e s t r u c t i o n of enemy p o s i t i o n s l o c a t e d on Northern s l o p e s of KUNISHE Ridge. - 15
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16 June. 1QA5 I Cont'd) Company ,CW, r e i n f o r c e d by three p l a t o o n s of tanks and a s e c t i o n of flame t a n k s , supported Seventh Marines, by further reduction of enemy opposition concen t r a t e d a l o n g reverse s l o p e s of KUNISHI Ridge and forward s l o p e of MEZA.DO Ridges. Supply and evacuation continued. One tank alone evacuated f o r t y - s i x c a s u a l t i e s . Elements of Company *&", Second Tank B a t t a l i o n , a r r i v e d and were placed i n D i v i s i o n Tank Reserve. 17 June. 1QA.5
Company t*BTf
, reinforced by a platoon of tanks
n (Company A, Second Tank B a t t a l i o n ) , supported the F i f t h
Marines. Mission remained same a s previous day a s heavy
f i r e was again d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t Northern s l o p e s of KUNISHI
R i d g e . In mid-efternoon however, following e x t e n s i v e
armored dozering, one tank, protected by f i r e teams, pushed
South througi the cut i n KUNISHI Ridge, East of KUNISHI
V i l l a g e , and observed nature of t e r r a i n and tank routes
running South. Once again an infantryman r i d i n g i n platoon
command tank was h e l p f u l ni n t a r g e t d e s i i a t i o n .
Company w C , r e i n f o r c e d by two platoons of tanks and a flame tank, supported the Seventh Marines* a t t a c k on MEZADO Ridge. Enemy 75mm AT f i r e , from the high ground, v i c i n i t y of ARAGACHI, was p a r t i c u l a r l y heavy and a c c u r a t e l y covered the road running Southeast below KUNISII V i l l a g e . L a r g e - s c a l e supply and evacuation continued both s e c t o r s . Remaining elements of Company MA*, Second Tank B a t t a l i o n , arrived and joined the D i v i s i o n Tank Reserve. 18 June. 1QLI Company WBW, r e i n f o r c e d by two platoons of tanks and a s e c t i o n of flame tanks supported the F i f t h Marines, pushing South through the cut East of KUNISHI V i l l a g e and d e s t r o y i n g enemy p o s i t i o n s on the reverse slope of KUNISHI Ridge. Other u n i t s began the d e s t r u c t i o n of enemy em placements on H i l l 79. Flame tanks were e s p e c i a l l y e f f e c t i v e i n t h i s a r e a . D i v i s i o n Tank Reserve, c o n s i s t i n g of one tank platoon and one flame tank, committed a t 1230 t o further support a t t a c k a g a i n s t H i l l 7? Mining e x t e n s i v e . Company MA, Second Tank B a t t a l i o n , supported Eighth Marines' a t t a c k South from MEZADO Ridge t o MaKABE. Narrow, ; tycggy roads channelized and hampered tank movements in t h i s s e c t o r . > * Continued evacuation of wounded in both s e c t o r s . Actiien: heavy^^ft^and mortar f i r e p a r t i c u l a r l y heavy ai d accurate.
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three t i m e s in order t o keep within c l o s e operating range of the f r o n t . Time required for tanks to reach the front ranged from f i v e t o twenty minutes. Displacement in r e s p e c t t o the front i s shown by d a t e s on a t t a c h e d o v e r l a y , Appendix # 1 . A l l tanks returned to the B a t t a l i o n lark e v e r y n i g h t . B a t t a l i o n heavy maintenance d i s p l a c e d f o r ward only once - from MACHINATO t o v i c i n i t y of ZArtA b i v o u a c . B. C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of B a t t a l i o n Bivouacs Areas s e l e c t e d f o r b a t t a l i o n bivouac were in each case d e f i l a d e d from enemy observation and a r t i l l e r y f i r e , p o s s e s s e d two or more r o u t e s of a c c e s s and provided firm f o o t i n g . When n a t u r a l concealment did not e x i s t , camouflage n e t s were used e x t e n s i v e l y . C. S e c u r i t y - Equipment and tanks were dugi n by dozer when rock w a l l s , e t c . , did not o f f e r p r o t e c t i o n . D i s p e r s a l was g e n e r a l l y l i m i t e d t o only f i f t y f e e t in the i n t e r e s t of c l o s e - i n s e c u r i t y . SOP c a l l e d for the c o o r d i n a t i o n of a l l s e c u r i t y by the Headquarters and s e r v i c e Com pany Commander and c o n s t r u c t i o n , under h i s d i r e c t i o n , of a complete perimeter of a t l e a s t s i n g l e strand t r i p wire ( w i t h cans) before f i r s t n i g h t f a l l , and l a y i n g of complete concertina perimeter as soon a s p r a c t i c a b l e . Ground machine gun and r i f l e p o s t s were l o c a t e d v i c i n i t y of perimeter wire and i n a d d i t i o n one crewman remained on guard a t each tank. Some twenty JAPANESE were k i l l e d a l o n g perimeter wire through out the operation, h a l f of whom were carrying demolition charges. No tanks were destroyed and no personnel l o s t while i n bivouac due t o any cause whatsoever. V. INTELLIGENCE SECTION A. Performance of 5-2 Section
1 . The S-2 succeeded throughout the oper a t i o n in e v a l u a t i n g and d i s s e m i n a t i n g information t o subordi nate u n i t s with a minimum of d e l a y . This was accomplished through the careful study of a l l information r e c e i v e d from h i g h e r echelons and subordinate u n i t s , the preparation of maps, o v e r l a y s , s k e t c h e s , and memos for subordinate u n i t s , and the dissemination of information v e r b a l l y and by radio where speed was e s s e n t i a l . I t was further a s s i s t e d by such measures as the i n t e r r o g a t i o n of a POtf from the 27th Tank Regiment and by the 3-2 a c t i n g a s an a e r i a l observer in d i r e c t radio contact with the t a n k s . Close l i a i s o n with G-2 was maintained throughout t h e o p e r a t i o n , r e p o r t s being sub m i t t e d t o that o f f i c e d a i l y and o f t e n e r a s warranted.
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2. Maps and A e r i a l hotos a . Three r e v i s i o n s of t h e t a c t i c a l map, 1/25,000,^were s u p p l i e d by h i $ i e r e c h elon d u r i n g the o p e r a t i o n , t h e f i n a l r e v i s i o n b e i n g t h e only one t h a t was s u f f i c i e n t l y a c c u r a t e and r e l i a b l e . A l l maps were s u p p l i e d in s u f f i c i e n t quantities. b . A e r i a l p h o t o g r a p h i c coverage was g e n e r a l l y adequate and i n c l u d e d s p e c i a l l y r e q u e s t e d s t e r e o p a i r s of c e r t a i n key a r e a s . Only one copy of each s e t of photos was s u p p l i e d which n e c e s s i t a t e d t h e i r s t u d y by company o f f i c e r s a t the B a t t a l i o n CP r a t h e r than on t h e ground where t h e y would have been of g r e a t e r value 3. Enemv T a c t i c s and Defensive Organization 1. General: a . The JAPANESE defense of OKINAWA was based l a r g e l y on the s k i l l f u l o r g a n i z a t i o n of s u c c e s s i v e r i d g e l i n e s and h i l l m a s s e s . ach of these r i d g e l i n e s was honey-combed by an i n t r i c a t e r e i n f o r c e d cave and t u n n e l network c o n t a i n ing f i r i n g positions for r i f l e s , auto m a t i c weapons, and AT guns, e t c . A n p o s i t i o n s had numerous e x i t s on r e v e r s e s l o p e s , a l l o w i n g the enemy t o p l a c e heavy m o r t a r and grenade f i r e on the c r e s t s and forward s l o p e s a f t e r t h e i r occupation by our i n f a n t r y and f u r t h e r a l l o w i n g him t o execute a withdrawal wi.th minimum l o s s e s when he so d e s i r e d . b . That t h e enemy e a r l y became aware t h a t t a n k s c o n s t i t u t e d t h e major t h r e a t t o t h i s type of defense h a s been r e p e a t e d l y borne out by t r a n s l a t i o n s of enemy o r d e r s and documents and by P W i n t e r r o g a t i o n s . O The enemy c o r r e c t l y assumed t h a t a r t i l l e r y and a i r s t r i k e s would have l i t t l e e f f e c t on t h i s type of p o s i t i o n , and t h a t t h e only e f f e c t i v e method of o v e r coming t h i s defense would be by l a r g e c a l i b e r d i r e c t f i r e , capable of p e n e t r a t i n g cave e n t r a n c e s and embrasures*
v.v
^>r,v ^
*3r
Furthermore the reduction of such a defense would require a weapon capable of d i r e c t f i r e on reverse s l o p e s . c . Thus the enemy was faced with the n e c e s s i t y of e s t a b l i s h i n g an adequate a n t i tank defense which he appears to have attempted, by using a plan i n v o l v i n g three s t e p s : ( l ) To separate our i n fantry from our tanks by the use of a r t i l l e r y , mortars, and grenades, and small arms f i r e ; (2) To s t o p or slow the progress of the tanks by the use of mines, AT guns, and o b s t a c l e s ( n a t u r a l and a r t i f i c i a l ; (.3) To d e s t r o y the tanks by c l o s e - i n a s s a u l t with smoke, i n c e n d i a r i e s , and d e m o l i t i o n s . As a coordinated measure t h i s plan f a i l e d l a r g e l y because s t e p ( l ) was never s u c c e s s f u l l y completed. How e v e r , the enemy achieved considerable success with s t e p (2) and obtained zero r e s u l t s with s t e p (.3) except in those cases where our tanks were aban doned in front of f r i e n d l y l i n e s . A c t i v e Defenses: a . The Vfam AT gun was the e f f e c t i v e back bone of the enemy a c t i v e a n t i - t a n k d e fense and proved i t s e l f capable of pene t r a t i n g any part of the M4 armor with the exception of the front slope p l a t e . These guns were .invariably w e l l con cealed i n cave type emplacements and often had one or more a l t e r n a t e p o s i t i o n s branching from the same t u n n e l . They were g e n e r a l l y emplaced so a s to flank the l o g i c a l tank approaches to a d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n and although the f i e l d of f i r e was u s u a l l y quite l i m i t ed, there were often two guns covering the same a r e a . The 47mm AT gun was most often employed a t ranges from two hun dred t o s i x hundred yards and with few e x c e p t i o n s , f i r e d only a t the sponsons, suspension systems, or r e a r of our t a n k s .
-W&ttASSIFIE
- 23 -
DECLMHH#ED
53?
tank crews prevented the s u c c e s s f u l completion of t h e s e a t t a c k s . e. Miscellaneous: (1) AT r i f l e grenades were encountered often but were not a major problem. Penetration of the tank armor was achieved in only one c a s e , the g r e nade making a hole the s i z e of a p e n c i l in the front slope p l a t e . (2) The enemy completely destroyed a t o t a l of seventeen tanks by the use of demolition or i n c e n d i a r i e s a f t e r the t?nks had been damaged and abandoned forward of f r i e n d l y lines. (3) Several d i s a b l e d tanks were crudely booby-trapped by the enemy and on s e v e r a l occasions destroyed tanks were used a s p o s i t i o n s f o r machine guns and grenade d i s c h a r g e r s . (4) In one instance a group of f i v e enemy s o l d i e r s were detected at dusk f o l l o w i n g i n the tanks' d u s t - t r a i n s as they were returning t o bivouac. They were armed with grenades and ; demolition charges. (5) On another i n s t a n c e ten square-shaped charges about the s i z e of a #2 can were projected a t our tanks from ranges between t h i r t y and s e v e n t y f i v e yards, but only one detonated and i t caused no drrage. These charges were f i t t e d with a V-shaped f i n and might w e l l have been impro v i s e d by a s i n g l e unit a s t h i s was t h e i r only appearance. Bassive Defenses? a . The enemy made e x t e n s i v e use of mines of v a r i o u s t y p e s , and t h i s was the g r e a t e s t s i n g l e cause of damage t o our t a n k s . Ceramic and s i n g l e horn conical mines were the most common encountered, yard s t i c k , tapemeasure, and k e t t l e mines were found l e s s o f t e n . There i s some evidence that e l e c t r i c a l l y c o n t r o l l e d mines may have been used. At l e a s t one
of our tanks h i t a burled a e r i a l bomb and in several i n s t a n c e s they were seen and destroyed or avoided, hut i t can not be said that they were employed e x t e n s i v e l y a s mines in t h i s D i v i s i o n ' s Z of A. Mine f i e l d s were g e n e r a l l y hap hazard, there being no i n d i c a t i o n that mines were l a i d in d e f i n i t e p a t t e r n s . Most of the mines were encountered on roads and the areas adjacent t h e r e t o . Often the enemy l a i d mines a t n i g h t in areas our tanks had been operating in during the day and sometimes l a i d them in the tracks made by the tanks. H.B., c a n n i s t e r , and machine gun f i r e were employed with some success in d e tonating mines in suspected a r e a s . b. Obstacles (1) Four AT d i t c h e s were encountered in t h i s D i v i s i o n ' s Z of A. They were from one hundred to s i x hundred yards in length and averaged ten t o twelve f e e t in width and f i v e t o eight f e e t in depth. They were a l l well placed but only two were covered by AT guns. A l l of these d i t c h e s were s u c c e s s f u l l y crossed with the a i d of tank d o z e r s . (2) Road blocks encountered c o n s i s t e d of l o o s e stoned p i l e d about f i v e f e e t high and they were e a s i l y e l i m i n a ted by tank d o z e r s . None were found fo contain mines and none were cover ed by AT guns. (3) The enemy destroyed n e a r l y a l l the bridges of any consequence and often destroyed portions of road f i l l s . Such action was only p a r t i a l l y s u c e s s f u l as a delaying, a c t i o n , a s cur tanks were u s u a l l y able to find a l t e r n a t e r o u t e s and t o construct by-passes and fords with l i t t l e l o s s of time. The g r e a t e s t d i f f i c u l t y was f i l l i n g blown roads, due t o the f a c t that the roads were narrow and material for f i l l i n g purposes was u s u a l l y not at hand. The enemy could have delayed our advance more s u c c e s s f u l l y had he chosen t o e f f e c t a more thorouft destruction of the 1 * ^ . ^ i s t i n e read n e t .
DECLfiSSffffD
23?
Qit^SlFltO
C. R e s u l t s jof Enemy A n t i - t a n k Measures; flanks Damaged bv Enemv A c t i o n CAUSa Mines Heavy A r t y & M o r t a r s 75mm S a t c h e l Charge A . T . Grenade 20*im TOTAL DAMAGED TOTALLY DISABLED 30 1 20 2 14 1 3 1 1 (very sligjit)0 31 22 15 4 1 5 1
>;#**'
'
&
TOT&L
5
1
4>
0
74
F.T. Tanks Damaged by Enemy A c t i o n
79
2 1 3 0
2 1 3
Of t h e s e v e n t y - f o u r t a n k s damaged p l u s t h r e e t h a t were bogged down, f i f t e e n were d e s t r o y e d by enemy demo l i t i o n s o r i n c e n d i a r i e s a f t e r b e i n g abandoned and seven were d e s t r o y e d by f r i e n d l y t a n k f i r e t o prevent t h e i r use by t h e enemy. Thus a t o t a l of t w e n t y - s e v e n t a n k s were t o t a l l y l o s t . I n ' a d d i t i o n t h e two F . T . t a n k s damaged by mines were d e s t r o y e d by enemy d e m o l i t i o n s o r i n c e n d i a r i e s a f t e r b e i n g abandoned. D. Damage I n f l i c t e d on. Enemv By. Tank A c t i o n :
1 . No a t t e m p t can be made t o a s c e r t a i n a c c u r a t e l y t h e l a r g e number of weapons and emplacements d e s t r o y e d by our t a n k s , a l t h o u g h t a n k p e r s o n n e l a c t u a l l y observed t h e d e s t r u c t i o n of many weapons i n c l u d i n g 47mm AT guns, a r t i l l e r y p i e c e s , m o r t a r s , and a u t o m a t i c weapons. I t i s i m p o r t a n t . t h a t nfiny c a p t u r e d enemy documents and POW i n t e r r o g a t i o n s e s t a b l i s h e d t h e f a c t t h a t t h e enemy was t r y i n g d e s p e r a t e l y t h r o u g h o u t t h e o p e r a t i o n t o r e d u c e t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s of our t a n k s . 2 . I t i s e q u a l l y t r u e t _ a t no a c c u r a t e e s t i n a t e can be made of t h e p e r s o n n e l c a s u a l t i e s i n f l i c t e d on t h e eneD.y by t a n k s and flamethrower t a n k s , but i t can be s a f e l y s t a t e d t h a t t h e y were e x t r e m e l y h i g h .
%
-,*Vi t '>v,,
#t4Kw<
,. '-..*-.^i)sflB.
VI. casualties!
UNIT DRVJRIA KLA DAI WIA AI SICK TOTAL QM O M OM OM O O C M ENL C M ENL C M ENL C M ENL C M ENL C M ENL C M M L C M H&S Co. 2 - 4 i - 0 0 - 5 3 - 9 "A" Co. 1-0 0 - 6 3-50 0 - 1 l -15 5 -72 f w E Co. 1-2 5-53 0 - 3 0 - 7 6 -65 "C" Co. 0 - 2 0 - 1 4-14 1-0 5-17 Ord P l a t 0 - 1 0 - 1 0 - 2 '"Co, 713 T k B n 3-17 0 - 1 0 - 2 3-20 A"Co,2d T k B n <dN TOTAL 1-0 1-10 0 - 1 17 -119 2 - 6 1 -30 ?? -186 RETURNED 9 - 8 6 2 - L 0 -?1 11 -111 z z = REMAINING 1-0 1-10 0 - 1 6 - 53 & - 2 1-9 11-75 B. Medical - J o unusual d i f f i c u l t i e s were'en
countered in the Medical f i e l d .
1. Percentages of Casualties in and out of
tanks!
KLA KIA WIA WIA i n s i d e tank outside tank i n s i d e tank outside tank 63% 37$ 65$ 35$
2 . Nitrogen poisoning was noted to cause mild headaches and in some i n s t a n c e s nose bleeds among approximately
75$ of a l l tank crewmen C h a r a c t e r i s t i c ^ only of heavy action
and due in part t o inoperative v e n t i l a t i o n blowers on many old
t a n k s . No p a r t s for sane a v a i l a b l e .
VII. CC&fliONIGATICNS
27 -
DECbWO
><//
im&SIFIED
B. I n t e r f e r e n c e - Interference from other n e t s on t h e same or adjacent frequencies was very heavy and almost continuous d u r i n g the operation. However, only a t d i s t a n c e s of three miles or more was i t impossible t o work through the u n i n t e n t i o n a l Running, some enemy jamming was encountered on 25.0 me^icycles. This jamming was continuous wave type and was strong enou^i t o blank out s i g n a l s from the SCR-^lO's. Side-tuning picked up the signal but d i s t o r t i o n was g r e a t . C. Personnel - Additional communication p e r sonnel was the g r e a t e s t need of the communication s e c t i o n . Although a t one time ten a d d i t i o n a l men in Headquarters and Service Company were assigned t o communication duty, the number of communication personnel was s t i l l inadequate t o properly maintain communications. For example, i t was n e c e s s a r y for approximately eight days t o maintain two complete communication centers with twenty-four hour operation of both switchboard and r a d i o . Suqh a s i t u a t i o n w i l l not be a t a l l uncommon in any operation on a large land mass due t o slow moving maintenance equipment and dumps lagging behind as the B a t t a l i o n CP moves c l o s e l y behind the front l i n e s . D. Materiel - The present radio equipment proved e x c e l l e n t , r e q u i r i n g only normal maintenance. How ever, there i s s t i l l a great need for an SCR-5O8 mounted in a i - t o n Zpc4 truck in each company. The two such s e t s furnished by Corps proved t o be of inestimable value in maintaining c o n t r o l . SuPflv - Signal supply during t h i s oper ation was very s a t i s f a c t o r y in most c a s e s . However, s h o r t age of a small number of items, in p a r t i c u l a r the supply of H5-3O T-17, t u b e s , and c r y s t a l s were d e f i n i t e l y i n a d e quate. F. Radio Maintenance - Radio maintenance functioned most e f f i c i e n t l y . Improvised one ton company communication t r a i l e r s , equipped with Homelite power, spare s e t s , b a t t e r i e s , t u b e s , e t c . , proved very v a l u a b l e . A l l radio equipnent was generally kept operative and no tanks deadlined for any appreciable time. G. Tank-Infantry Phones - Sound-powered t a n k i n f a n t r y phones were of great value althou^i few remained s a t i s f a c t o r i l y operative throughout the long o p e r a t i o n . , A s e l f r e t r a c t i n g cord feature i s urgently needed t o prevent dragging and ripping out of phones. Many tanks used a very simple expedient a f t e r regular phones became i n o p e r a t i v e .
.*
n r r i ACCtciLn
A sound-powered phone was attached t o each end'of ''a* twenty f o o t - c o r d and c o i l e d and kept in the t u r r e t . Upon occasion rtQ t a l k , t o i n f a n t r y , one phone was dropped out through the p i s t o l , port and allowed to drop t o the ground t o the prone infantryman and pulled hack i n t o t u r r e t upon comple t i o n of c o n v e r s a t i o n . H. fiteynrab-py - 11 b a t t a l i o n n e t s were kept oper a t i v e , although a t time;s the use of r e l a y s t a t i o n s was r e quired. A l l companies; and most s t a f f s e c t i o n s , including supply, leaned h e a v i l y on radio communication. Communications were g e n e r a l l y e x c e l l e n t and contributed immeasureably t o t h e . c o n t r o l . a n d combat e f f i c i e n c y of the B a t t a l i o n . VIII. SUPPLY
A. General - A l l phases of combat supply were again c o n t r o l l e d and coordinated by S-4 in the manner pre s c r i b e d in B a t t a l i o n Administrative Order Number 1-45, and i n accordance w i t h armored force d o c t r i n e . Rapid tank i n f a n t r y advances, adverse weather and road conditions and extremely heavy ammunition and f u e l expenditures put an unprecedented strain on organ i z a t i o n supply f a c i l i t i e s . I t i s t o the s p e c i a l credit of personnel of t h i s s e c t i o n that supply always succeeded in keeping a b r e a s t of the f a s t moving s i t u a t i o n and that tank o p e r a t i o n s were n e v e r h a l t e d or r e s t r i c t e d a t any time by lack of s u p p l i e s . Tank radio was e f f e c t i v e l y and e x t e n s i v e l y used i n connection with forward displacement of s u p p l i e s t o tank r a l l y i n g p o i n t s . B. Shortages - A number of v i t a l l y important items were not carried by higher echelon l o c a l supply in s u f f i c i e n t q u a n t i t y and, as a r e s u l t , c r i t i c a l shortages e x i s t e d throughout t h e p e r i o d . Chief of these were a s f o l l o w s : 7$mm Gun Ammo, p a r t i c u l a r l y EE. At several s t a g e s WP, HE, M48, s t e e l case, super, w/fuze PD M48, and HE M54 fuze had t o be s u b s t i t u t e d . Tanks, medium, M/,A2. Tanks, medium, M4A2, p a r t s . Tanks, medium, MZ,A2, w/dozer. V e h i c l e , Tank Recovery, p a r t s . Truck, 2 i - T , 6x6, cargo, parts Solenoids. Truck, 2J-T, Machine a i o p , ML6Al,w/load nA".
The major shortages l i s t e d d i r e c t l y e f f e c t e d The causes apparently the o r ^ n i z a t i o n 1 s combat e f f i c i e n c y . o r i g i n a t e d e i t h e r in higher echelon long-range planning or e x i g e n c i e s i n the o v e r a l l supply p i c t u r e with which Ic V r echelon s e c t i o n s are not acquainted. Supply a g e n c i e s on OKINiWA made p e r s i s t e n t attempts t o procure c r i t i c a l i t e m s , but l a s t minute s t e p s could not p o s s i b l y r e l i e v e the s i t u a tion. The v e r y e x t e n s i v e employment of tanks made i t v i t a l l y n e c e s s a r y that adequate q u a n t i t i e s and t y p e s of r e p l a c e ment v e h i c l e s , spare p a r t s , and ammunition be a c t u a l l y on
hand a t l o c a l dumps and r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e . This e s s e n t i a l
reserve did not e x i s t .
Replacement tank supply by Supply Service e c h e l o n s was inadequate and appeared t o completely break down. Replacement tanks were r e c e i v e d ( l ) inadequate i n number and a t no time brou^it the B a t t a l i o n up t o authorized strength (2) were changed from M4A2 to M/3 models and (3) were d e
l i v e r e d t o t h i s tank b a t t a l i o n , while on the move and locked
i n combat, in an e n t i r e l y unserviceable c o n d i t i o n . Changing
of types of replacements from M4&2 t o M4A3 n e c e s s i t a t e d t h a t
tank crews t r a i n e d in operation of one model were required
t o a t t a c k the enemy in tanks with unfamiliar instruments and
c o n t r o l s . This break down in higher supply planning i s t o
be p a r t i c u l a r l y deplored. As t o s e r v i c a b i l i t y of almost a l l
replacement M^A.2 tanks r e c e i v e d , t h e i r condition i n d i c a t e d
an u t t e r lack of care of any kind while in storage and e n -
r o u t e . They were d e l i v e r e d t o t h i s tank b a t t a l i o n (which
was forced t o pick them up a t unloading beaches twenty m i l e s
t o the rear because t h e y were i n o p e r a t i v e ) with such major
d e f e c t s a s cracked engine b l o c k s , cracked engine heads,
burnt out frozen c l u t c h e s , rusted i n o p e r a t i v e governors, c o n t r o l boxes and machine guns and 75mm parts r u s t e d and corroded beyond a l l r e p a i r . They were m i s s i n g sucn combat e s s e n t i a l s - t o c i t e only a few - a s si<5hts f o r 75mm, p e r i s copes, r a d i o headphones, and towing c a b l e s . I t i s emphasized here that t h i s equipment was d e l i v e r e d t o t h i s tank b a t t a l i o n , while in heavy a c t i o n , with no shops or parts a v a i l a b l e , and a l r e a d y overburdened by combat maintenance. These tanks may be a c c u r a t e l y described n o t only as junk but r u s t y junk. C Supply Structure - The supply structure and d i s t r i b u t i o n of supply personnel were adapted t o the changing s i t u a t i o n througiout the displacements Southward. Supply S i t u a t i o n Numbers 2, 3 , 4, and 5, a s s e t f o r t h i n B a t t a l i o n A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Order 1-45 > were employed in v a r i o u s s t a g e s of the o p e r a t i o n . Each proved h i g h l y s a t i s f a c t o r y . Assignments of B a t t a l i o n transportation and B a t t a l i o n working p a r t i e s were again under the control of t h i s s e c t i o n an arrangement n e c e s s a r y t o the e f f i c i e n t coordina t i o n of supply ^ s h u t t l i n g . Each was handled on a " p r i o r i t i e s "
yiECLftSSIFIED
b a s i s , t h e r e b y i n s u r i n g the employment t o b e s t advantage of a l l a v a i l a b l e equipment and manpower. D.
.,>
Below a r e given g e n e r a l , o v e r a l l breakdowns of e x p e n d i t u r e s , t o n n a g e s , and t r u c k l o a d s r e q u i r e d t o h a u l o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s u p p l i e s , i n c l u d i n g t h o s e of a t t a c h e d u n i t s , during the e n t i r e operation: 1. Ammunition a . Expended (Rounds) J S h e l l , f i x e d , HE, M48, supercharged, w / f u z e , PD, M48, 75mm gun * S h e l l , f i x e d , HE, M48, supercharged, w / f u z e , T-SQ,, M54, 75mm gun P r o j e c t i l e , f i x e d , A . P . C . , M63A1, and t r a c e r , 75mm gun S h e l l , f i x e d , smoke phosphorus, "W.P., M64, w/fuze, PD., M57, 75mm gun S h e l l , f i x e d , c a n n i s t e r , T-30,75mm How S h r a p n e l , f i x e d , M 1 , 75mm gun K Bomb, smoke, M l / L , M3, f / 2 " Mortar K Comp. Fuze, PD., CP, T-105, w / b o o s t e r , e x t r a I l l u m i n a t i o n , M83AI, 60mm mortar G-rena de s , han d: F r a g . , M 11 K VP, 10.5 HC, KB -. I n c e n d . , M14 --" Snoke , c o l o r e d , MIS, Orange .30 C a l i b e r : AP T r a c e r , b e l t e d ( 4~l) .45 C a l i b e r , b a l l , M1911 .30 C a l i b e r , AP, M2, 8/cp/bl, (Rifle) .30 C a l i b e r , b a l l , Ml (Carbine) b . T o t a l Tonnage c . T o t a l Truck Loads 2. White Gas 80 Octane Fuel a . Expended: 5,550 41,900 41,579 13,328 10,905 :4,46l 173 3,163 1,860 3,819 166 327 2^ 863 75 101 3,107,500 17,574 2,200 1,300 1,239 250
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ - -
- - - - , - - - -
"
"
506 t o n s 125 l o a d s
Type "B" Type "C" Type "K" Type "10 in 1 " PX Components Coffee Fruits Juices Bread b . T o t a l Tonnage - - - - - c . T o t a l Truck Loads 4. Spare P a r t s a. Items!
1,785 r a t i o n s
30,203 "
1,831 "
15,713 "
- 35,900 "
- 34,680
6,490 "
800 "
,f
33,857 150 t o n s . 50 l o a d s .
Batteries - - - - - - - - - - - 56O l b s Bogie T i r e s 8,280 " Track Connectors - - - - - - - - - - 365 w Bo^ie Wheels 14,910 " B a t t e r i e s (l2v) 7,534 " Track R o l l e r s 400 " Tank R a d i a t o r s 400 " Sprockets . 185 Battery ^cid 24O " Truck T i r e s 4,200 " Jeep Tires 1,200 " Power U n i t s , M/^2 10,000 " Power U n i t s , M/^3 4,000 " Power U n i t s , M l , Y/recker 1,600 " Track " H 5 tons Salvage -. 10 " Miscellaneous 5
k
' -/ j
b . T o t a l Tonnage
- -
i5 7 t o n s ifi l o a d s
5 . T o t a l Tonnage and Truck Loads (Consolidated) a . Ammunition b . Fuel c. Bations d . Spare l a r t s e . Quartermaster f. Communication * Grand Total Tons 1,239 506 150 157 18 2 2,072 Truck Loads
1 Truck, i - T , 4x4, cargo ' June 1'Truck, 2g-T, 6x6, cargo June J 4 Tanks June I3 ranks May 2 . I n d i v i d u a l Equipment and Clothing - Losses under t h e s u b j e c t h e a d i n g s , a l t h o u g h c o n s i d e r a b l e , a r e consider ed normal f o r the type and l e n g t h of o p e r a t i o n i n v o l v e d . 3 . LOVij p l u s Six - An a c c u r a t e count of t h e
l o s s e s on t h i s shipment cannot be submitted a t t h i s t i m e . I t
i s e s t i m a t e d , however, t h a t p r a c t i c a l l y a l l cots and o f f i c e r ' s
b e d d i n g and c l o t h i n g r o l l s shipped were l o s t , and t h i s i n
s p i t e of c o n s t a n t b e a c h - w a t c h i n g d u r i n g the unloading p e r i o d .
Tank w a t e r p r o o f i n g , g a l l e y g e a r , a few o f f i c e r ' s bedding and
c l o t h i n g r o l l s , and a small q u a n t i t y of m i s c e l l a n e o u s gear
a r r i v e d i n s a t i s f a c t o r y c o n d i t i o n -
F, MsL.1or I t e m s Received - The b e l o w - l i s t e d major i t e m s were r e c e i v e d from h i g h e r echelon supply d u r i n g the p e r iod1 * Tank, Medium, M/A2 23 Tank, Medium, M4A3 -13 .# - 33
2</7
ft
if. Ma.jor Items Received - ( Cont'd) Vehicle, Tank Recovery, M32B3 - Truck, 2i-T, 6x6, cargo Truck, 1-T, 4x4, cargo - - - - Trailer, water, 2-v;, 300 gal. 1 1 2 3
( *L!ostly inoperative and received only a few days before end of operation) Gr. Transportation - Battalion transportation was heavily taxed and generally was operated to capacity continuously "by day and by night. O occasions i t was inade n quate and V^LS supplemented by G-4. During'a very few slack days a few surplus trucks were furnished G-4 for other use. E. Attached Units - Company "B", 713th Armored Flamethrower Battalion, U.S. *-rmy, was supplied ammunition, fuel, rations, and miscellaneous requirements, exclusive of clothing, by this organization, from 1 Liay, 19 45, and through out the period. All classes of required items were furnished
Company "A", Second Tank Battalion, Second Mar in e Division,
beginning with the date of i t s attachment, 14 June, 1945>
and throughout the period. Indirect vision cupolas were in
stalled on command tanks during period attachment.
I . Rer>orts and Records - The period evidenced marked cooperation by reporting units in providing prompt and reasonably accurate data covering periodic expenditures and requirements. The S-4 section received daily, at pre scribed hours, from company executive officers, Battalion and company ordnance NCOs, Battalion and company maintenance officers, a l l necessary information concerning equipment, supplies, transportation requirements, and working p a r t i e s . Accurate, prompt reports were furnished to higher echelons as prescribed by those echelons. IX. M&.BTTEMHKCE
A. Tank Maintenance Ordnance Platoon - This unit was attached throughout the operation and supplemented Head quarters and Service Maintenance Section in performance of third, fourth, and fifth echelon repairs, under direction of " the Battalion Maintenance Officer.
- 34
QECLA&iA
UL.ULft<
B. Parts Supply - Replenishment spare*fcefc'rtfs',' both tank and wheeled v e h i c l e , were received only in n e g l i gible q u a n t i t i e s . Therefore, upon exhaustion of i n i t i a l supply, cannibalization (often under f i r e ) a^ain constituted the chief source of p a r t s . C Replacement Tanks - Old M/^.2 replacements, worn out in service and received inoperative- added to the normal b a t t l e maintenance load. Only a few of these inoper a t i v e tanks could be r e b u i l t i n time to join in action b e fore the close of the campaign and these broke down several times d a i l y .
::
* v\ f{.
-* " * <
-"
F n flCOinr
35
G. I l l hib COPES Ordnance Center - A Corps Ordnance Center was a c t i v a t e d during the operation. I t rendered valuable a s s i s t a n c e on a small .scale by doing weld i n g , furnishing some large p a r t s such a s transmissions and f i n a l d r i v e s salvaged by the Center from destroyed tanks* use of i t s tank conveyor,' providing certain supplies and procurement of certain p a r t s and supplies from-^nay and ICavy a g e n c i e s . I t was handicapped by l a t e a c t i v a t i o n , i n adequate equipment, and p a r t i c u l a r l y no supply pool of r e placement tanks and p a r t s . The service rendered in spite of these handicaps, i t i s f e l t , proved the idea most sound. I t i s believed t h a t a Corps maintenance agency, stocked with a pocl of replacement, tanks and p a r t s and adequately equipped would rrove of great v a l u e . I t would, of course, serve two or more tank b a t t a l i o n s and i t i s thought that a c t i v a t i o n of such an agency would preclude many of the serious t r o u b l e s experienced in connection with replacement t a n k s , p a r t s , and maintenance. H. Summary - Battalion and Company Maintenance Sections were hard pressed due to b a t t l e and operational m a t e r i e l c a s u a l t i e s r e s u l t a n t from sustained heavy a c t i o n . They were handicapped by receipt of replacement tanks in extremely d e t e r i o r a t e d condition and by receipt of spare p a r t s in n e g l i g i b l e q u a n t i t i e s only. However, being f u l l y aware of the great need for tanks a t the f r o n t , the b e s t was done with what was a v a i l a b l e , and working day and nig&t, the maximum number of tanks were kept in a c t i o n . Maintenance i s proud of the following record. Action p a r t i c i p a t e d in r e s u l t e d in t h i s B a t t a l i o n having one hundred and s i x t y - t h r e e tanks damaged t o the extent of r e q u i r i n g major maintenance work t o r e p a i r them (enemy and o p e r a t i o n a l ) . The maintenance s e c t i o n s of t h i s B a t t a l i o n were able t o r e p a i r one hundred and t h i r t y s i x tanks of the t o t a l one hundred and s i x t y - t h r e e tanks t h a t had been damaged. Thus l o s i n g completely twenty-seven t a n k s , the majority of which were t o t a l l y destroyed and the remainder beyond the r e p a i r f a c i l i t i e s of t h i s B a t t a l i o n . Foregoing f i g u r e s do not include tanks of two attached tank companies.
SIRED
'^ -- >^
BECLA
2J
FIRST TANK BATTALION TANK RECORD (Does n o t i n c l u d e flame t a n k s of Company " B " , 7 1 3 t h Armored F l a m e t h r o w e r B a t t a l i o n ( P r o v ) , o r t a n k s of Company f & " , Second Tank B a t t a l i o n ) ' Repaired & Replaced Replenishment In S e r v i c e * Tanks R e c e i v e d Date Operational Damaged L o s t M4A2 MAA3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 S 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 May May I^ay kay ^ay May May May May May May May May May May May May May May May May May 15a y May May May May May May May i&y June June June June June June June 47 46 45 44 41 43 41
1 2
41 37 39 39 38 39 39 36 37 38 -33 33 30 31 31 35 34 35 34 34 35 36 37 38 39 39 39 39 39 39
. :, \ i *
4 3 5 3 6
1 0
0 0 0
1
0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
1
2
- 3
- 0
1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
- 7
1 6 1 0 2 8 4
3
8
5 5 5 4 7 6 3 3 3
9
-
o
l l
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 2 0 2 1 1 1 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
- 6 - 2 - 2
- 5 - 3
- 2
6 6 4 3 7
0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
1
0
1
0 0 0 0 0
**
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1
0 0 0 0 0 0
4
0 0 0
1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
- 4
- 0 - 0 - 0
- 37 -
DECtAWED
Date 6 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 June June June June June June June June June June June June June June June
Operational 39 39 38 39 30 29 29 28 21 19 22 IS 20 25 28
Damaged o o o 9 i 2 3 7 2 3 6 19 4 3 7 163
Lost 0 0 0 o 2 1 2 0 4 i 1 9 2 0 0 28
Total
* Replacement t a n k s r e q u i r i n g mors t h a n normal t u n e ups and small r e p a i i s when r e c e i v e d hy t h i s B a t t a l i o n was p l a c e d on t h a t d a y ' s damaged t a n k l i s t , ** Denotes M3233 R e t r i e v e r ( F o r d ) . X.
ORDNANCE
A. Ammunition - The t o t a l ammunition expended by t h i s B a t t a l i o n and a l l a t t a c h e d u n i t s was a s f o l l o w s * S h e l l , f i x e d , H . E . , M48, S.C. w / P . D . F . , M48, 75mm Gun. 13,328 r d s . S h e l l , f i x e d , H . 2 . , M48, S.C. w/fuze TSQ, M54, 75mm Gun. Sh e l 1 , f ixe d, smoke, p h o s p h o r u s , W . P . , 4, ll r d s . M63, w/fuze P . D . , M57, 75mm Gun. S h r a p n e l , f i x e d , M 1 , 75mm Gun. K 3,163 r d s . P r o j e c t i l e , f i x e d , ^PC, M6lAl, w /BDF 10,905 r d s . M66A1, and t r a c e r , 75mm Gun. 173 r d s .
G a n n i s t e r , f i x e d , T30, 75mm How. T o t a l 75mm ammunition expended - 73,609 r o u n d s .
41,579 r d s .
; #- 3
ZTl
BEGUSSIFIED
3,107,500 r d s . C a r t r i d g e , .30 c a l . , b e l t e d , 4"A.P. 1 tracer. 1,300 r d s . C a r t r i d g e , .30 c a l . , Carbine, Ml. 2,200 r d s . C a r t r i d g e , .30 c a l . , Ml. 1 7 , 5 7 4 r d s . C a r t r i d g e , b a l l , .45 c a l . 1,860 r d s . Bomb, smoke, M l / L 2" M o r t a r , M3, K complete round. 166 r d s . S h e l l i l l i m i n a t i n g , M83A1, w/fuze t i m e , ( f i x e d ) M65, 60mm Mortar. 327 Grenades, hand f r a g m e n t a t i o n , M I I A l . K 863 Grenades, hand smoke, HC, M8. 101 Grenades, hand, smoke, HC, Orange, K18. 204 Grenades, hand, i n c e n d i a r y , Ml4. 3,819 g a l s .Napalm (6f* m i x ) . 452 b o t t l e s 002.
: f ; :?*;
3 . Ammunition Supply - 75mm gun ammunition of t h e H . S . t y p e became a c r i t i c a l h i g h e r echelon s h o r t a g e a f t e r one week of a c t i o n and remained in t h a t s t a t e d u r i n g t h e oper a t i o n . A l l o t h e r t y p e s of ammunition was a v a i l a b l e in s u f f i c i e n t q u a n t i t y throughout t h e o p e r a t i o n . C. Remarks Concerning Ammunition
1 . E x c e l l e n t r e s u l t s were o b t a i n e d from the ammunition used on t h i s o p e r a t i o n . 2 . Very few duds were r e p o r t e d in t h e 75mm t y p e , however t h e 2 n smoke bombs were a p p r o x i m a t e l y o n e - t h i r d duds. 3 . E e p o r t s have been submitted t o h i g h e r echelon re g i r d i n g t h e improper packing of .30 c a l i b e r , 4 AP - 1 t r a c e r . 4. The C.P. T-105 fuze when a t t a c h e d t o HJS. M48 proved t o be v e r y e f f e c t i v e a g a i n s t c o r a l and concrete em pla cement s . 5 . l a i r r e s u l t s were o b t a i n e d from S h r a p n e l , with fuze set on t w o - t e n t h s second. This time g i v i n g t h e p r o j e c t i l e a cannister effect at a n e a r l y fixed range. 6 . C a n n i s t e r a l s o was used on s h o r t - r a n g e targets. 7. The F i r s t Tank B a t t a l i o n expended a p p r o x i m a t e l y t h r e e tiUBS t h e maximum ammunition expended b y a n y Marine Tank B a t t a l i o n i n a n y p r e v i o u s o p e r a t i o n .
-/;i.<
i DEMMD
ssiflEB
D S-pare Parts and qui-omen t - Ma j o r r e p a i r work on tanks during the operation was as follows: 1* Replaced: 2 2 3 3 3 1 10 350 50 2 Gun t u b e s , 75mm, M3. un U n i t s , with r e c o i l mechanism and combination mount 1&3J&-1* E l e v a t i n g Mech. (complete) Turret Drive motors. Traverse Pumps. Traverse Motor. Chains, c a b l e s , chain, t e r m i n a l s , and l i n k p i n s . B a r r e l s , .30 c a l i b e r , M1919A4, B.M.G. Covers, .30 c a l i b e r , M1919.&4, B.M.G. Periscope h o l d e r s .
2. Repaired: 25 30 c a l i b e r s o l e n o i d s .
3 . Many smaller repairs on ordnance items too numerous t o mention were a l s o performed by t h i s s e c t i o n . A l l spare p a r t s for ordnance items were a v a i l a b l e a t supply depots and ordnance companies except the .30 c a l i b e r solenoid. This solenoid has been a c r i t i c a l shortage in a l l t h e a t e r s for several months. This section modified t h e .50 c a l i b e r a v i a t i o n solenoid and i n s t a l l e d several in tanks for t e s t . This t e s t proved s a t i s f a c t o r y and the solenoids a r e s t i l l in o p e r a t i o n , thereby r e p l a c i n g a l l shortages in t h i s B a t t a l i o n . 4. The replacement tanks received by t h i s B a t t a l i o n required major ordnance r e p a i r work before t h e v e h i c l e s were ready for a c t i o n . The b e l o w - l i s t of major o r d nance items and ordnance spare p a r t s were minimum needed to put these tanks i n t o a c t i o n , not properly equip the tanks 2 Periscope Holders. 4 P e r i s c o p e s , M4 (complete w/telecopes 1438) 12 Periscopes, M6. 30 Periscopes, M4-M6, head assembly. 1 Telescope, M70 F. 4 Gyro-Control Boxes 2. .30 c a l i b e r Machine Guns, M1919A4, unserviceable 8 A r t i l l e r y Gun Books
0|p
23.
FLAMETHROWER TANKS
**.
In a d d i t i o n a l a r g e amount of ordnance
s p a r e p a r t s and ordnance a c c e s s o r i e s were n o t i n c l u d e d in
t h e s e replacement t a n k s and were f u r n i s h e d by t h i s s e c t i o n
A . General - Company t B " , 713th Armored Flame thrower B a t t a l i o n was a t t a c h e d t o t h i s tank b a t t a l i o n on 1 May and r e p o r t e d t h a t d a t e with f o u r t e e n CB-El flamethrower mount ed i n M4AI medium t a n k s , company motor t r a n s p o r t , and main tenance equipment. The f i r s t platoon of t h i s company was d e _ . t a c h e d t o the SIXTH MARINE DIVISION on 11 May, r e v e r t e d back on 14 June and again a t t a c h e d to SIXTH MARINE DIVISION on 18 June for remainder of o p e r a t i o n . This f la me throwing tank com pany, p r i o r t o i t s a t t a c h m e n t t o t h i s B a t t a l i o n , h a v i n g a l r e a d y engaged i n some t h r e e weeks a c t i o n on t h e 24th CORPS f r o n t , m a i n t a i n e d a c o n s i s t e n t l y o u t s t a n d i n g record of p e r formance i t s f i f t y - t h r e e days of a c t i o n - w i t h t h e FIRST Liiw-RlNji, DIVISION. The e n t i r e company was hard working, e f f i c i e n t , a g g r e s s i v e and most a b l y l e d . I t rendered i n v a l u a b l e s e r v i c e . B.' Use - Flame t a n k s were used a s s p e c i a l purpose t a n k s - Line t a n k s (with i n f a n t r y a s s i s t an ce) s e l e c t e d flame t a r g e t s and c a l l e d up the flame t a n k s in much the same manner a s tank d o z e r s a r e c a l l e d up. Line t a n k s i n v a r i a b l y covered them w h i l e t h e y were in o p e r a t i o n and coached t h e i r f i r e by r a d i o . C. Target s - Flamethrower t a n k s were used p r i n c i p a l l y and most e f f e c t i v e l y a g a i n s t rocky c r a g s , reverse r i d g e s (by high a n g l e ) and a g a i n s t towns. Flame proved t o be t"he most, and a t t i r e s t h e o n l y , e f f e c t i v e weapon a g a i n s t such t a r g e t s - . D. Report of ComTJanv Commander - Inasmuch a s the 713th Armored Flamethrower B a t t a l i o n i s t h e f i r s t organ i z a t i o n of i t s type t o be formed and t h e only one t h a t has en {taped in s u s t a i n e d a c t i o n , i t i s thought most worth-while t o ' i n c l u d e here t h e S p e c i a l Action Report of Company Tt B". The Report covers only t h e p e r i o d of attachment t o t^his B a t t a l i o n , 1 l&y t o 23 June and t h e Chronology h a s been ommit t e d due t o broad i n c l u s i o n in t h e f o r e g o i n g Chronology of t h i s B a t t a l i o n . The Report f o l l o w s : "Summary* Flamethrowers from t h i s company have always o p e r a t e d a s p a r t of a Ta nk -In fan try-Flame th^o-.ver team. This team has been found t o be v e r y e f f e c t i v e , with t h e 75mm f i r s t t h o r o u g h l y s h o o t i n g up Infantry an a r e a , then t h e FTs moving in t o b u r n .
:;
- BEC&
was always close enough to keep any enemy satchel charge men from sneaking in and knocking out the FTs. Fire team from reserve companies seem to be a very e x c e l l e n t method of p r o t e c t i o n - They have no o t h e r job than t o p r o t e c t PTs and a r e well pro t e c t e d themselved by the tanks and FTs. Neither tanks nor i n f a n t r y were ever too f a r away from FTs for s u i t a b l e p r o t e c t i o n . Our FTs o c c a s i o n a l l y went in with no f i r e teams, but never without t a n k s . Numerous occasions have a r i s e n where, a l though the tanks have shot a number of rounds of 75*am ammunition, the enemy would only be driven out of t h e i r p o s i t i o n s by the flame or the prox imity of i t . Targets for the FTs are many and v a r i e d and a l l types have been encountered on t h i s operation. Area burning i s not an effective use of the FT a s i t has been found that portable flamethrowers and sniper p a t r o l s could do the work. During the days spent a i d i n g mopping up operations i t has been f e l t by the officers and men of t h i s company t h a t t h e y have been called out on missions which could much b e t t e r be done by the i n f a n t r y themselves with less waste of fuel and manpower. Communications: Communication has been e x c e l l e n t between our own FTs and between us and Marine t a n k s . I n f a n t r y communi cation has been a l i t t l e mixed up due t o the f a c t t h a t we have no phones on our FTs for commun i cu t i en - H owev e r , th e f ew t ime s tha t we have had no commun.ications we have found t h a t by 1 a d e t a i l e d d e s c r i p t i o n of route and t a r g e t i t has been possible t o o p e r a t e . Both our own and Marine E&intenance has been very e f f e c t i v e . Liii.tenance: Both our own maintenance and S&rine Tank B a t t a l i o n maintenance has been very e f f e c t i v e . Due t o the types of engines, conditions of the FTs, and the number of days in operation, maintenance has been very busy, but has somehow managed t o keep a maximum number of v e h i c l e s operative a t a l l times. Our maintenance has aided the F i r s t Tank B a t t a l i o n maintenance crews with p a r t s and r e t r i e v i n g work and has in turn been aided in t h e same way by company and headquarters maintenance. Supply: Our Supply has been a very e f f e c t i v e u n i t , a c t i n g under our supply o f f i c e r s . Supply r o u t e s have been long and roads impassable a t times, but we have
2r^
turpi AV
> '>*:
1\
D. That flame t h r o w i n g t a n k s be made out of r e g u l a r t a n k s r a t h e r than from s a l v a g e d t a n k s . They have t o go t o t h e same p l a c e s and e n c o u n t e r t h e same f i r e a s r e g u l a r t a n & s . T h e r e f o r e , t h e y n e e d t h e same p r o t e ct ion E . That f i r e teams from r e s e r v e company of i n f a n t r y be always used w i t h FTs for p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t s a t c h e l charge men and t h e y n e v e r be used w i t h o u t r e g u l a r t a n k s t o t a k e care of l a r g e c a l i b e r weapons and t o e v a c u a t e crews i f IT i s knocked out F . T h a t , i f p o s s i b l e , t h e y p u t a 360 degree t r a v e r s e on t h e s e FTs t o h e l p them p r o t e c t t h e m s e l v e s . A l s o , t h a t b o u n c i n g B e t t y " mines be i n s t a l l e d on t u r r e t t o use a g a i n s t enemy i n f a n t r y . " / s / ROBERT L . HOFFMAN ROBERT L . HOFJMAN C a p t . , Cav., (Armd) Commanding-. XII. TaflK-INFANTRY
A. General - Tanks fought a t a l l t i n e s a s i n f a n t r y t a n k s and f u n c t i o n e d a s a major d i r e c t f i r e c l o s e support weapon, At no time did t a n k s o p e r a t e beyond t h e o b s e r v a t i o n and, cover of i n f a n t r y . T e r r a i n and d e n s i t y a s w e l l a s t y p e of u n d e r g r o i n d enemy d e f e n s e s p r e c l u d e d s u c c e s s f u l p a n z e r a t t a c k and none was a t t e m p t e d by t h i s B a t t a l i o n . Such t a c t i c s a t tiroes a t t e m p t e d by o t h e r i'jJS'JE ARMY t a n k u n i t s met with d i s a s t e r i n each c a s e . B . T a n k - I n f a n t r y Backg:round - Tanks had proven an i n v a l u a b l e c l o s e s u p p o r t weapon d u r i n g t h e C^tE GLOUCtuSTi: %R and IAIAU o p e r a t i o n s and t h e i r e f f i c i e n t employment was n o t a new m a t t e r t o t h i s D i v i s i o n . A h i g h l y e f f e c t i v e b a t t l e proven T a n k - I n f a n t r y SOP h?-d been used in t r a i n i n g and numer ous r e f i n e m e n t s in t e c h n i q u e of employment had been d e v e l o p ed t o a h i g h degree p r i o r t o t h i s o p e r a t i o n . Of p a r t i c u l a r importance and i n e s t i i o a b l e v a l u e was t h e p r i o r e s t a b l i s h m e n t between i n f a n t r y and t a n k u n i t s of mutual t r u s t and p r i d e in each o t h e r and a r e a l i z a t i o n of t h e power of t h e combined team.
2J8
iwfenSSIrlEB
C Technique of iimplovment - The current t a n k i n f a n t r y SOP proved effective t o a high degree. No basic changes were required and hence the tank-infantry team fought as i t had t r a i n e d .
1. Tanks, a r t i l l e r y , rockets, e t c . , l a i d
down heavy n e u t r a l i z a t i o n fire and i n f a n t r y preceded by
tanks moved forward and seized ground. This type of a t t a c k
however successfully secured ground only r e l a t i v e l y l i g i t l y
defended. Against areas embodying Heavy underground f o r t i
f i c a t i o n s , i t only succeeded in temporarily n e u t r a l i z i n g
the enemy, often permitting the infantry to move forward
only t o find i t s e l f in possession of ground swept by enemy
f i r e from several d i r e c t i o n s the moment supporting n e u t r a l
i z a t i o n f i r e ceased. No movement was possible on the s e
cured objective and no c i r c u l a t i o n t o the r e a r . Such ground
'became untenable and n e c e s s i t a t e d withdrawals with heavy l o s s e s and no ground gain the net r e s u l t . 2. A second method, developed by t h i s Division e a r l y in the operation, was far more successfully employed a g a i n s t heavy enemy f o r t r e s s defensive a r e a s . I t consisted of the preparatory point destruction of cave, bunker and tomb emplacements by tanks covered by fire teams p r i o r to a general t ank-in fan t r y advance. Tanks and flame tanks ranged out to p o s i t i o n s up t o eight hundred yards beyond our front l i n e s , systematically destroyed p o s i t i o n s on forward and reverse slopes within t h a t distance by point 75mm gunfire i n t o cave i n t e r i o r s and by flame a t t a c k . In a d d i t i o n , tanks destroyed in a similar fashion enemy d i r e c t f i r e p o s i t i o n s on forward slopes for an a d d i t i o n a l f i f t e e n hundred yards t o the front beyond the f a r t h e s t point of tank advance. In order t o give the enemy no opportunity; t o reorganize and r e i n f o r c e , two r e l a y s of tanks were necess a r y t o permit rearming while maintaining a continuous a t t a c k . This "processing" (term mutually coined by tank and infantry officers) then permitted the i n f a n t r y to advance l i n e s some five hundred yards with r e l a t i v e l y ligjit l o s s e s , using the n e u t r a l i z a t i o n support f i r e s of preceding tanks and a r t i l l e r y . E s p e c i a l l y important was the f a c t t h a t ground so gained by "processing" was tenable and h e l d . The procedure was then repeated in a zone extended f a r t h e r t o the f r o n t . The f o r e going t a n k - i n f a n t r y technique enabled the FIRST DIVISION t o s t e a d i l y , though slowly, advance a g i i n s t f o r t r e s s SHUKL and e v e n t u a l l y f i r s t penetrate i t s l a s t defenses while a l l other elements of TMTH ARMY facing SHUEL had long been brought to a v i r t u a l h a l t .
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' I n f a n t r y Coverage of Tanks - JABiN^SCi close a s s a u l t tank hunters employing a v a r i e t y of techniques in innumerable attempted a t t a c k s on tanks r e q u i r e d the c l o s e s t of i n f a n t r y coverage. This coverage vjas c o n s i s t e n t l y e f f e c t i v e l y provided by the three superb i n f a n t r y regiments of the Division, Not a single tank in a c t i o n was destroyed or even stopped by tank hunters during t h e PAIAU and OKIr:^;^ operations although JAPANESE doctrine on QKIKA<A emphasized t h i s as a primary method to stop ,our t a n k s . I t should be s t a t e d here a s a t r i b u t e t o t h i s D i v i s i o n ' s i n f a n t r y t h a t a l l other tank b a t t a l i o n s in TciftOH ABMY l o s t a sizeable number of tanks by JAErtNiiSci close a s s a u l t . 1- This p o s i t i v e i n f a n t r y coverage r e q u i r e s simply that s p e c i f i c i n f a n t r y u n i t s , having no other d u t i e s , be assigned t o cover t a n k s . They must be i n , or m a i n t a i n , a position from which the tanks a r e kept under constant observation and from which accurate 'and i n s t a n taneous f i r e can be d e l i v e r e d . This coverage was provided in three p r i n c i p a l ways. They were used both in general a t t a c k s and in t a n k - i n f a n t r y preparatory "processing"t a . By t h r e e or fur man f i r e teams c l o s e l y accompanying each tank. Used in r u b b l e , hi^h. v e g e t a t i o n , e t c . F i r e teams used protection of tank h u l l a ^ i i n s t f i r e from known d i r e c t ions. b . Coverage by f i r e teams moving from cover to cover by bounds at d i s t a n c e s from respective tanks up to three hundred yards. This method was used in fields, etc. c. Coverage by s p e c i f i c a l l y d e s i g i a t e d platoon, squad, e t c . , of the front l i n e s occupying favorable p o s i t i o n s on c r e s t s . Frequently used when tanks operated over v a l l e y or canyon floors when our i n f a n t r y h e l d one side or wall closely a d j a c e n t . 2 . Best r e s u l t s were obtained by u t i l i z i n g f i r e teams frori support platoons or companies r a t h e r than front l i n e , e q u a l l y important was preliminary b r i e f i n g in each new zone. Best r e s u l t s were obtained when tank platoon l e a d e r s
- 46
'ZGO
regiment t o another in l i g i t of unforseen mid-day develop ments, and committed elements of the tank reserve when needed. He a l l o c a t e d d a i l y the tank support furnished (with approval of G-3) in view of t e r r a i n , enemy d i s p o s i t i o n and Division scheme of maneuver. QQ one occasion when two or more f u l l tank companies were employed in the same i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n s e c t o r , he functioned in a s i m i l a r manner a s described for the tank company commander. 3 . F i r e teams and other i n f a n t r y design
ated t a r g e t s for tanks by t a n k - i n f a n t r y phone, arm and
hand s i g n a l s , smoke and t r a c e r s . In close country t h e y
s i m i l a r i l y coached the tanks in maintenance of d i r e c t i o n .
4. Usually tank b a t t a l i o n 0P f s were e s t a b ^ l i s h e d alongside a s s a u l t tank company commander's OP's. These OP's were manned by a SC& 509 radio team in charge of a B a t t a l i o n Staff Officer. This maintained the b a t t a l i o n r a d i o n e t and t i e d i t in with respective companies ( o t h e r wise d i f f i c u l t as the tank company commander's SGR 509 must normally be maintained on h i s company n e t ) . The Staff Officer in charge of the OP f u r t h e r was of great a s s i s t a n c e t o the company commander, handling for him a l l r e p o r t s to and from the"Tank B a t t a l i o n CP. This system of b a t t a l i o n OP's not only solved a communication problem but a l s o was conducive to b e t t e r control. 5. I n f a n t r y commanders soon developed great s k i l l in planning t h e i r a t t a c k s to make the f u l l e s t use of tank support and u t i l i z e d the technical advice of tank o f f i c e r s f u l l y and gave careful consideration to t h e i r recommendations and s p e c i a l requirements. No tanks were l o s t due to a r b i t r a r y o r d e r s . A high degree of coordi nation and cooperation e x i s t e d between tanks and i n f a n t r y personnel of a l l r a n k s . I n f a n t r y learned the value of tanks and came t o lean h e a v i l y upon them. On the other hand tank personnel were d a i l y witnesses of the common-place d a i l y heroism of the front l i n e Marine I n f a n t r y and were i n s p i r e d to do t h e i r b e s t in a s s i s t i n g the i n f a n t r y a s much and in every way p o s s i b l e . y# Miscellaneous l a n k - I n f a n t r y Employment - Dur ing the OKINAV/AN Campaign tank elements of t h i s b a t t a l i o n performed a v a r i e t y of miscellaneous s e r v i c e s for the i n f a n t r y . Common sense in implementation of the mission and d e s i r e t o lend maximum h e l p t o our fine i n f a n t r y was the guiding rule (and not the f i e l d manual) m
nrp,
_
JUU X C
1. Tanks rendered v a l u a b l e s e r v i c e by
the emergency e v a c u a t i o n and supply of forward i s o l a t e d
i n f a n t r y u n i t s throughout t h e o p e r a t i o n .
a . In accordance with the Division SOP ( s p e c i a l s i g i a l e t c . ) , tanks s e v e r a l times s u c c e s s f u l l y s t r a d d l e d f i r e swept wounded and evacuated them i n t o t h e t a n k v i a t h e bottom escape h a t c h . b . Wounded were evacuated on s t r e t c h e r s on t h e a f t e r h u l l . c . Tanks moved a t slow speed (forward and r e v e r s e ) l e n d i n g t h e s h e l t e r of the h u l l t o l i t t e r b e a r e r s exposed t o heavy f i r e from only one d i r e c t i o n . d . Tanks provided smoke (2 W Smoke Bomb and 75mm V/P) t o cover l i t t e r b e a r e r s . e . Tanks f r e q u e n t l y c a r r i e d s u p p l i e s t o forward u n i t s whose h a n d . c a r r i e r s otherwise had to cross a u t o m a t i c f i r e swept open ground. f. While e v a c u a t i o n and supply was by no means a primary r o l e f o r t a n k s , such r u n s were often combined with n o r mal n e c e s s a r y tank movements. P e r haps more important than the a c t u a l a s s i s t a n c e thus r e n d e r e d i n f a n t r y u n i t s in d i r e s t r a i t s was the r e s u l t a n t drawing t o g e t h e r of t a n k p e r s o n n e l and i n f a n t r y . ,2. Tank borne r e i n f o r c e m e n t , e v a c u a t i o n and supply played a major r o l e i n the s e i z u r e of XUNISHI Ridge, f i n a l 32nd Ai&iY d e f e n s i v e l i n e - Our i n f a n t r y , by a b o l d s u r p r i s e n i ^ i t a t t a c k i n i t i a l l y s e i z e d a small s e c t i o n of t h e v e r y c r e s t of KIMISHI Ridge. Upon a r r i v a l of d a y l i g h t t h e enemy s t i l l h e l d a d j a c e n t s e c t i o n s of t h e c r e s t and p o s i t i o n s a l l a l o n g t h e R i d g e ' s lower s l o p e s which com manded t h e one thousand yard wide v a l l e y t o t h e North and r e a r . During the f i r s t day t a n k s f e r r i e d up a t h i r d company of r e i n f o r c e m e n t s i n s i d e t a n k s and s i m i l a r l y evacuated l a r g e numbers of accumulated wounded. During the second n i g h t , b y s u r p r i s e n i g h t maneuver t h e major elements of t h r e e additional infantry b a t t a l i o n s seized ridge-top positions. However throughout t h e n e x t s e v e r a l days a l l d a y l i g h t c i r c u l a t i o n t o t h e r e a r was d e n i e d except by t a n k s . During t h i s p e r i o d l a r g e s c a l e t a n k e v a c u a t i o n , s u p p l y , and r e i n f o r c e m e n t s t o KUNISHI Ridge i n s u r e d t h e s u c c e s s of i n f a n t r y n i ^ i t a t t a c k and t e n d e r e d t&9* r i d g e t e n a b l e . During t h i s p e r i o d the
- 49
*SIFIED
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i i
f o l l o w i n g .equated t o t a l s , were, j b r a n s ^ o r t e d :
R e i n f o r c i n g t r o o p s with equipment c a r r i e d forward - 550 bounded e v a c u a t e d from Ridge t o r e a r - -*115G " S u p p l i e s (plasma, ammo, w a t e r , e t c . ) - - - - - - 90 t o n s (est) I n c l u d > s a v e r y s m a l l number of non-wounded t r a n s p o r t e d t o r e a r t o make r e p o r t s , e t c . During t h e f i r s t day and a h a l f a l l wounded had t o be l o a d e d v i a t h e ; t a n k bottom escape h a t ch i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e f o r e g o i n g v i t a l r o l e of e v a c u a t i o n and r e i n f o r c e m e n t e x e c u t e d by t a n k s , t h e y d e l i v e r e d t h e u s u a l p o i n t g u n f i r e d e s t r u c t i v e support f i r e s a g a i n s t caves and emplacements on t h e forward and r e v e r s e s l o p e s of KUNISEH R i d g e . Flame was used e x t e n s i v e l y . Tanks moving out on f i r i n g m i s s i o n s p i c k e d up s u p p l i e s and r e i n f o r c e m e n t s and dropped them off a t the Ri&ge. A f t e r completion of f i r e m i s s i o n s ( e x p e n d i t u r e of a l l ammo) t h e y p i c k e d up wounded on t h e r e t u r n t r i p . In a d d i t i o n , i t was found n e c e s s a r y t o a s s i g n one p l a t o o n of t a n k s i n each r e g i m e n t a l s e c t o r t o do n o t h i n g b u t make f e r r y r u n s . A l l members of t a n k crews of such tanks e x c e p t t h e t a n k commander and d r i v e r were d i s mounted t o make a d d i t i o n a l room i n s i d e the t a n k h u l l . I t was found t h a t ; such t a n k s could c a r r y s i x infantrymen with e q u i p ment i n s i d e t h e t a n k a n d . e v a c u a t e : a s many a s seven wounded. Other t a n k s covered t h e movement -of the t r o o p - l a d e n t a n k s * xeq nil While r e c e n t m i l i t a r y h i s t o r y makes f r e q u e n t mention of the; . - t r a n s p o r t a t i o n of i n f a n t r y on t s n k s , i t i s b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e t r a n s p o r t a t i o n of complete t a c t i c a l r e i n f o r c i n g i n f a n t r y u n i t s i n s i d e tanks was executed f o r t h e f i r s t time d u r i n g t h e B a t t l e of KuTHail Ridge^., 3 . I n f a n t r y Off l e e r s : made f r e q u e n t ' a n d ' ^ v a l u a b l e employment of tanks, by going forward i n t a n k s "dur i n g " p r o c e s s i n g " r u n s to view ground , o c c a s i c n a l l y n o t v i s i b l e from OP'sv Normally t h i s , I s n e i t h e r ^ n e c e s s a r y n;or d e s i r a b l e b u t i n unusual c i r c u m s t a n c e s - w h e r e .the ground "over,.,vhich an a t t a c k had t o be planned was n o t v i s i b l e from ^ ' s or by o t h e r forward r e c o n n a i s s a n c e , i t . ; d e f i n i t e l y p r o v e d to be a most p r o f i t a b l e e x p e d i e n t . . .hebmov bod 0 #xscfer. 4 . , Tank o f f i cce rrs m ^ tamis,.^on o.cca.^s i tw S S ^ ci " of 1 e s ^ l ^ ^ v M ^ ^ ' ysrrie ^ ^cise r e g i s t r a t i o n . . o f 4.2m<S<$&^WTMM^/?%W*8? ed -pre. i the in:f c n t r y i n p r e p a r a t i o n : o n i g W f f %fo
- ' 11 -
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3 facing of a r t i l l e r y on targets of oppor tunity by tank officers in tanks calling for, and adjusting, a r t i l l e r y fire, Artillery Employment with First Battalion Eleventh b r i n e s in Primary Support of First Tank Battalion - I t having been proved during the early days of the operation that extensive a r t i l l e r y support of tanks not only could be, but must be, employed, the First Battalion, Eleventh Itarines was placed in primary support of th6 First Tank Battalion. This direct a r t i l l e r y support was characterized by; 1. with minimum delay. irompt a r t i l l e r y support of tank action B.
2. No disruption of infantry sector's a r t i l l e r y support by additional burden of demands of tank a r t i l l e r y support as heretofore. 3. Very extensive use of sustained smoke screens to blind A gun positions. Screen's prompt and T very efficiently maintained. 4. Extensive and effective use of a r t i l l e r y f i r e s , particularly 155mm, to destroy and neutralize A guns. T This was speedily obtained and adjusted by l - l l FO's. 5. Tank officers in tanks calle*d for and adjusted fires on targets of opportunity. 6. Air burst a r t i l l e r y fire placed ahead of advancing tanks to destroy close assault teams in spider holes, e t c . ,
-'DECLA
24>
nriPit** lflF!l
A . General - E n g i n e e r s were e x t e n s i v e l y em ployed i n e f f e c t i n g t h e prompt passage of t a n k s . A n e l e ments of the F i r s t E n g i n e e r B a t t a l i o n extended t h i s B a t t a l i o n t h e f u l l e s t c o o p e r a t i o n . Tank r o u t e s g e n e r a l l y were b l o c k e d by e x t e n s i v e demolition of b r i d g e s and f i l l s and by heavy m i n i n g . B . B r i d g i n g and Construction of Tank Routes - En n e e r s o p e r a t i n g i n conjunction with t a n k dozers and the TD 18 Armored t r a c t o r dozer of t h i s B a t t a l i o n performed i n v a l u a b l e s e r v i c e s in c o n s t r u c t i n g r o u t e s of tank a c c e s s t o zones which t h e JAPANESE had f e l t confident t o be e n t i r e l y i n a c c e s s i b l e t o our t a n k s . L i s t e d below a r e the p r i n c i p a l ( b u t n o t a l l ) zones by which Engineer armored dozers b r i d g i n g and demolition teams l a r g e l y prepared a c c e s s tank r o u t e s * 1. Railroad f i l l b l a s t e d to effect t o SUGAR LOAF HILL and v i c i n i t y . 2. Stream doze red in five p l a c e s t o a c c e s s t o DaKESil Ridge and v i c i n i t y . 3. ',/ANA V a l l e y .
KOKUBA
passage effect
Ford c o n s t r u c t e d to e f f e c t passage t o
5 . Ford c o n s t r u c t e d a c r o s s MUKUE Ga^'A p r o v i d i n g a c c e s s t o e n t i r e KUNI SHI Ridge s e c t o r . 6 . Road dozered t o ^ i n t a n k a c c e s s t o r e v e r s e s i d e of H i l l 8 1 . C. Mine D e t e c t i o n and Removal
1 . Enemy mining was e x t e n s i v e and e f f e c t i v e . E n g i n e e r mine d e t e c t o r s and c l e a r a n c e a g e n c i e s were g e n e r a l l y unable t o cope with t h e s i t u a t i o n . A l a r g e number of t a n k s were d e s t r o y e d o r p u t out of a c t i o n a s a r e s u l t throughout the entire operation. 2 . E n g i n e e r s on many o c c a s i o n s d i d most e x c e l l e n t work in mine d e t e c t i o n and removal. A n o t e w o r t h y
- 53 -
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example may be c i t e d i n the t a k i n g of SUGaa 1X5A#-&11 whef# E n g i n e e r s , a d v a n c i n g on h a n d s and toiees in f r o n t of a d v a n c i n g t a n k s e f f e c t e d t a n k a c c e s s t o t h e r e v e r s e ^srtte ; Of the H i l l 9 and e n a b l i n g t h e r e c a p t u r e and h o l d i n g "Sf rthat^MMM&rJH ^rq 3 . Mine clearanqeReam's Use$ We;re"La iiJiQ^: su0L[: : a t t a c h e d t o i n f a n t r y r e g i m e n t s . lifogfiienej?efsoSiSl ^St^1 t ? ^ t i m e s accompanied t a n k r e c o n n a i s s a n c e p a r t i e s . '&m& & yy^n /.- 4 . Lline -f r ^ S ,^ m ? f t r 4 ^ ; s ' -: ' ^ t , l i ' Jl>e came / ambulance t r a i l s , s u p p l y tra!ifs, L ;an/i M^&s,/'.; MliTe; r^ii6;v^ti "' a : ? for a d v a n c i n g t ^ n k r , f i l e m e n t t r a . . t K r a ^ a i r e c r r f ^ e O T f f W a '';- *** o t h e r a n a * i T - - .f ,+ > - , , . . ' J r l - v i ^ /
w i t r A ^ ^ ^ d V | ^ c e ^ ^ e a t f t f ; i ; ci r ^ a [j & t f % J f r a t f $ r : a n d 1 f f e cE ' aB e ~ t i v e n e ss* or >the t a n k " a t t a c k . ' fei"e % e w t ? r a i 'aiitf ^etiova !1 age^g^^j^rOjY^d^ due. to, i n s u f f i c i e n t p e r sonnel, anci eq.uipnent ng&ee^"ii&A.-^rl^liL Ijjmsmwifcs ,-should,, o ; H be g r e a t l y expanded and e l e m e n t s %^dtkt^^^^^^^Swd -^Uo dip%^^4p|C^ tjie g t g p ^ ^ a ^ a l ^ p n s &~ dj&^3^3ftfe r mine e x c a v a t o r t a n k s should' be" provldect a x ^ 2 m 1 ^ | ^ a c t ^,. K p m^Jie problem i s s e r i o u s and demands an e a r l y s o l u t i o n . i-essd-Aim od es30Qi3
proved a powerful weapon a g a i n s t 3d* %nj&>x>z%RB 7> ^^ AT g u n s . " Sain Daj^ejjg 3 ^ f % 3 S ^ = ^ B i jx^ ^ i e - i? S ^ F?-a? ffiS7' nir . ri J s m a l l s e c t i o n s o f h i l l s i d e s i K n o w n T o in cluiy" ^3r%iffl I ^c^TO(t^ J U an d whose^ojca^fcjyan, cj^uld np.t Jae,exactl: y ;pinpoint e d . Thi s t r e a t m e n t proved viary <ej?&oti^'er&/& o c c a s i o n s 'when heavy a r t i ofTen i n ^ p e n e t r a t i o n of fifflttftfcffifiiwcq; l l e r y had f a i l e d .* ^Jset defen^esj^ 3 a 9 0 Q i j ^ a 3 j - l X i ^ 0 J 5 9 l s s 0 j , bBO% ^ B . Technique. - NGF used was ^obta^in-'e-d'^yife^ue3l?9V t o i n f a n t r y s e c t o r , c o l a n d e r s . T h e , , i n f a n t r y ,sectgr T s ^ ^ ? _ l i a i son and s p o t t i n g % g e r ere t ftfwiwii^feir normal c a p a Q j ^ ^ . v . - w . t t o of n,ot,e, however, i s t h e f a c t t h a t in a t l e a s t one v c a ( s e i ^ L . N ^ i p d i ^ e r ' s i g h t e d ttffi giar : :flash and de s t r o y e d . an ATgOUfejoriUills. IWL I n i t i a t i v e . , . ; ; .. , ; ; : ; - ;;;;' - - 7-7 L ^?Oi:laiio-^K^I^TIQK n o ! J O B "to JUO o JE>8YO^J8SJ5 -,- m """ rEDllB^eqo a i j fne sxld +00 - h'&i A i r Support - No d i r e c t support of t a n k s by a i r c i ^ m ^ ^ t e m p t e . 4 . " . . 1*0 n e c e s s i t y o r need t h e r e f o r e a r o s e
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due t o t h e slowness of t h e a d v a n c e . A r t i l l e r y a t a l l t i n e s
was w i t h i n s u p p o r t i n g d i s t a n c e and provided more p o s i t i v e
and p r e c i s e support than w i t h i n the c a p a b i l i t i e s of a i r
craft.
B . A i r Spot - A i r Spot by an a i r b o r n e t a n k
o f f i c e r i n d i r e c t r a d i o communication with a t t a c k i n g t a n k
companies proved i n v a l u a b l e d u r i n g the b a t t l e of KUNISHI
Ridge and was' employed i n a c t i o n f o r the f i r s t time i n Marine Corps H i s t o r y . For two consecutive days every a t t e m p t t o push t a n k elements E a s t v i a t h e v a l l e y South of KUNISHI V i l l a g e were stopped cold by high v e l o c i t y 75mm AT g u n f i r e , w i t h t h e d e s t r u c t i o n of 1 s e v e r a l t a n k s by armor p i e r c i n g high e x p l o s i v e s h e l l . NO , heavy a r t i l l e r y , s p e c i a l o b s e r v a t i o n , c o v e r i n g tanks and a l l o t h e r methods h i t h e r t o so s u c c e s s f u l in e l i m i n a t i n g AT guns were u n s u c c e s s f u l l y t r i e d . An OY plane was r e q u e s t e d and g r a n t e d f o r 18 J u n e . S-2, t h i s b a t t a l i o n , a f t e r c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h s u r v i v o r crewmen of t a n k s h i t and c a r e f u l a n a l y s i s of a e r i a l p h o t o g r a p h s , went a l o f t e a r l y 18 J u n e . He manned an SGR 5Q9 r a d i o (antenna p r o t r u d i n g h o r i z o n t a l l y through the Cub door) on t a n k b a t t a l i o n f r e q u e n c y . Hovering a l o f t over t h e advancing t a n k s and in d i r e c t r a d i o communication w i t h them, he s p o t t e d t h e muzzle b l a s t of a cave-emplaced 75mm gun i n t h e s u s p e c t e d s e c t o r d u r i n g t h e f i r s t h a l f h o u r . T h i s gun was immediately brought under f i r e by t a n k s and M7 s and d e s t r o y e d . Tanks 'were then able t o c l o s e on H i l l 7} and p a s s t h r o u g h LlfcZADO V i l l a g e . L a t e r in the day t h i s t a n k a i r spot l o c a t e d a s e c t i o n of 47mm AT guns f i r i n g v i c i n i t y H i l l 81 and c a l l e d for and a d j u s t e d both heavy a r t i l l e r y and NGF. One gun was d e f i n i t e l y d e s t r o y e d and t h e o t h e r p r o b a b l y s o . Tank a i r spot was continued most of t h e f o l l o w i n g day b u t l i t t l e AT gun r e s i s t a n c e was encountered d u r i n g t h e b r i e f remainder of t h e o p e r a t i o n . XVII. OPINIONS AND BEQQMMDA.TIONS OF IKE QQLMANDSR A. Opinions
1 . That tanks played a major r o l e in t h i s D i v i s i o n ' s v i c t o r i o u s a s s a u l t of SHURI and KUNISHI Ridge, the two p r i n c i p a l b a t t l e s of the o p e r a t i o n . 2. That tank support, employing t h i s D i v i s i o n ' s h i g h l y developed t a n k - i n f a n t r y technique, enabled t h e FIRST MARINE DIVISION t o drive slowly but without a h a l t i n t o the h e a r t of SHURI while a l l other TENTH A M units f a c R Y i n g ' t h i s , . f o r t r e s s were brought t o a s t a n d s t i l l before i t .
3 . That t h i s Division was "Handicapped - t o cost of l&rines* l i v e s - by the present organic inade quacy of the Marine Tank B a t t a l i o n aggravated by i n e f f i c i e n c y of h i ^ i e r echelon supply and service as pertained t o t a n k s . 4. That tank action was i n t e g r a t e d , t o a degree h i t h e r t o unattained in the Marine Corps., with the e f f o r t of a l l other arms with proportionate increase in the D i v i s i o n ' s o v e r a l l f i t t i n g power. 5. That the two p r i n c i p a l t a c t i c a l lessons learned concerning tank-in fan t r y action a r e ! a . That the t a n k - i n f a n t r y preparatory "processing" of ground to the front a s described, i s necessary before launching a. general t a n k - i n f a n t r y advance in order t o economically reduce heavily f o r t i f i e d cave-type f i e l d works. b . That in order to destroy enemy under ground f o r t i f i c a t i o n s on ridges and h i l l s i t i s p a r t i c u l a r l y important that tanks gain access t o the enemy's reverse slope i n s t a l l a t i o n s . Analysis of the seizure of DkKjiSHI, -,ANA and KUiVISHI Ridges, H i l l s 79, 69, 61 and SUG&R LOAF w i l l reveal t h a t none were completely secured u n t i l t a n k s gained access to reverse slope cave entrances, e t c . B. Recoinmendations - That the e n t i r e f i e l d of tanks in the Marine Corps be reviewed a s a question of high p o l i c y which has a r i s e n a s the r e s u l t of the elevation of the tank from the r o l e of a minor supporting weapon t o t h a t of a major one. That t h i s review be made t o the end t h a t the Marine Tank B a t t a l i o n be expanded t o a s t r e n g t h commen s u r a t e with current increased combat employment and v a l u e , and, t o the strength l e v e l of s i m i l a r armored or^Lnizations in world contemporary m i l i t a r y f o r c e s . That t h i s expansion be r a d i c a l and immediate - t o e f f e c t creation of a Marine Tank B a t t a l i o n b a s i c a l l y comprising a strong Headquarters and Service Company, four Tank Companies, and a f u l l Flame thrower Tank Company. And that t h i s review be extended to
- 56
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include procurement, supply and service agencies of the l&rine Corps to effect badly needed increased continuity and efficiency in the functioning of those agencies as per t a i n s to tanks.
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ARTILLERY ANNEX
SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
NANSEI 3H0T0
INTRODUCTION
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Control of VMO-3 was taken over by III Phib Corps Arty-- on L \ 2. Until the battalions were committed in the south, air observation was not required by this regiment However, after the committment, organic air observation of the Army Dlv Artys was not sufficient to provide for our battalions. Losses in both VMO-3 and VMO-6 had reduced the number of planes to the point where both III Phib Corps Arty and 11th and 15th Marines could not be adequately supplied. Planes were assigned to 11th Marines battalions on an hour-to-hour basis, so that air observation was both insufficient and unpredictable. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The following comments on various artillery aspects
covering the whole period and recommendations for possible
improvements are submitted. It is realised that many
conditions suggested for improvement were beyond division
control In this operation. Because of the urgency of sub
mitting this report, additional comments will not be made
until a later report.
TRAINING
Artillery training at PAVUVU was makeshift. No suit
able artillery range exists there. Training was confined
to school and drill in restricted areas. Little firing and
no RSOPs (Field problems) were possible.
The training on GUADALCANAL, on the other hand offered
excellent opportunities for battery, battalion, and regimental
problems - both firing and non-firing. Frequent and effective
practice was made in conduct of fire, massing of battalion
and regimental fires, and displacements.
Three serious factors hampered training which on the
'hole was most beneficial. First, the major portion of the
training was conducted with approximately 60# officer
strength. Field officers and captains were almost non-existent.
Consquently, many positions were unfilled throughout all
exercises and many personnel were fulfilling duties which they
would not carry out on the operation. When replacements
arrived (most of them at or near the end of the GUADALCANAL
period), the majority of Junior officers were completely
untrained in field artillery, and field officers and captains
occupied positions with which they had little chance to be
come j^am.|^ain^*ii(econd, only limited opportunities were
offered for combined training with infantry.
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ARTILLERY ANNEX
S p e c i a l Action Report
Nansei Shoto
INTRODUCTION This report covers the period from 1 May, 1945, to the
completion o f the OKINAWA Campaign. I t does not include
any of the period from 9 April, 1945, to 1 May, 1945, while
the b a t t a l i o n s of t h i s regiment were attached to the XXIV
Corps (Army).
In support of the F i r s t Marine Division the b a t t a l i o n s f i r e d almost continuously for f i f t y - o n e (51) consecutive days and expended a t o t a l of 223,891 rounds of ammunition ( 1 s t Bn - 72,700 rounds, 2nd Bn - 49,850 rounds, 3rd Bn 46,716 rounds, 4 t h Bn - 54,625 rounds). For the e n t i r e operation the regiment expended 304,089 rounds, and in so doing the 1 s t Bn expended 100,570 rounds of t h i s t o t a l MISSION AND ORGANIZATION OF THE ARTILLERY: The a r t i l l e r y was organized so that there was a 105ram
Howitzer B a t t a l i o n i n d i r e c t support of each combat team.
That i s , 2-11 i n d i r e c t support of CT-5, 3-11 i n d i r e c t
support of CT-1, and 4-11 i n d i r e c t support of CT-7, t h i s
arrangement was followed throughout the campaign. 1-11 was
i n general support being capable of rendering close i n
suDoort along the e n t i r e D i v i s i o n front and r e i n f o r c i n g
the f i r e s of any of the d i r e c t support b a t t a l i o n s . An
a d d i t i o n a l mission of the F i r s t B a t t a l i o n was to give d i r e c t
supoort to the tanks operating i n the D i v i s i o n ' s zone of
a c t i o n . L i a i s o n and forward observers were attached to each
tank company.
SUPPORTING ARTILLERY F O CORPS: RM The o r g a n i z a t i o n of the supporting and r e i n f o r c i n g a r t i l l e r y of Corps changed from time to time throughout the o p e r a t i o n . While the Division was attached to the XXIV Corps, the 27 Div Arty, and the 3rd 155mm Howitzer B a t t a l i o n were assigned the mission of r e i n f o r c i n g the f i r e s of t h i s regiment. However, when the D i v i s i o n reverted to control of the I I I Phib Corps on the 7 t h of May, 1945, the 2nd prov FA Group was assip-ned the mission of r e i n f o r c i n g the f i r e s of the 11th Marines. This arrangement continued throughout the operation. The 2nd Prov FA Group c o n s i s t e d of three (3) 155ram Howitzer b a t t a l i o n s , namely the 3rd and 6 t h 155mm Howitzer B a t t a l i o n s (Marine) and the 145th FA B a t t a l i o n (Army 155mm How. Later the 145th FA B a t t a l i o n was replaced by the 1 s t 155mra How Bn (Marine). . ft p Q J O O I 1JT
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This arrangement was i d e a l , g i v i n g us three medium a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n s on which we could c a l l d i r e c t l y to handle any m i s s i o n s we had for them. And of course no c l e a r a n c e from Corps Arty was necessary except when m i s s i o n s i n v o l v e d l a r g e expenditure of ammunition such as preparations and night harassing m i s s i o n s . Control of these b a t t a l i o n s was maintained under the group headquarters. Requests for medium a r t i l l e r y were made by regiment to the group FDC and never d i r e c t l y to one of the b a t t a l i o n s . The Foley Group, c o n s i s t e d of tne 7 t h , 8th, and 9th 155mm Gun B a t t a l i o n s , was i n general support of the Corps. However, r e q u e s t s for support from t h i s group were made d i r e c t to the group headquarters, no clearance from Corps A r t i l l e r y was r e q u i r e d . This arrangement functioned so smoothly that r e q u e s t s
for medium a r t i l l e r y by our d i r e c t support b a t t a l i o n s and
a i r observers were answered and f i r e d e l i v e r e d on the
t a r g e t almost as quickly as f i r e d e l i v e r e d by our own
general support b a t t a l i o n s .
LIAISON WITH ADJACENT ARTILLERY UNITS: L i a i s o n was maintained throughout the operation with the adjacent Army D i v i s i o n a l A r t i l l e r y , An exchange of l i a i s o n o f f i c e r s was made. That i s , we sent an o f f i c e r to the adjacent a r t i l l e r y CP and they i n turn sent one o f f i c e r to our C?m D i r e c t telephone communication was establibh.'xL between FDC1 s and was maintained by both o r g a n i z a t i o n s . While the 6 t h Marine D i v i s i o n was o p e r a t i n g on the flank of the 1 s t Marine D i v i s i o n , an exchange of l i a i s o n o f f i c e r s between the two a r t i l l e r y regiments was not made. During the t r a i n i n g p e r i o d , the regiments had worked t o g e t h e r , and one combined e x e r c i s e (with Corps Arty) had been held so each regiment had a c l e a r understanding of the o t h e r s t e c h n i q u e . Therefore, i t was f e l t that an exchange of l i a i s o n was not n e c e s s a r y . However, d i r e c t wire communication was e s t a b l i s h e d between the two regimental FDC's. FIRING CHARTS A*!D PHOTOGRAPHS: The RYUKYU-RETTO, 1:25,000 map, 1 s t , 2nd, and 3rd Re v i s i o n s was used throughout as the f i r i n g chart. This map proved to be e x c e l l e n t i n both h o r i z o n t a l and v e r t i c a l c o n t r o l . Although c e r t a i n areas showed only scanty d e t a i l (due to i n s u f f i c i e n t photo coverage), the coast l i n e and
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road n e t s were, with few exceptions, very accurately l o c a t e d . On the l a t e r e d i t i o n s , the ground forms were more t r u l y portrayed. The high q u a l i t y of horizontal control was proven time and again by the accuracy of transfers fired without adjustment. V e r t i c a l control proved to be as r e l i a b l e as h o r i z o n t a l for a r t i l l e r y purposes, as evidenced by the proper height of burst which was almost always obtained when f i r i n g time t r a n s f e r s . This l a t t e r feature i s new to b a t t l e maps used by t h i s D i v i s i o n to date, and i t i s hoped that future maos w i l l continue t h i s high standard. The lithographed mosaics on the reverse of each map sheet were almost v a l u e l e s s for s e l e c t i n g point t a r g e t s . The photographs used were often poor and the reproduction destroyed much of the d e t a i l . One copy of a l l s o r t i e s flown by Tenth Army covering our D i v i s i o n z one of action was furnished to regiment. This supply was s u f f i c i e n t for a e r i a l photographic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n at regiment, but did not permit d i s t r i b u t i o n to b a t t a l i o n s . Normal d i s t r i b u t i o n of photos for higher echelons did not include coverage outside our zone of a c t i o n . Since many t a r g e t s appropriate for our a r t i l l e r y l i e out s i d e our zone, i t is" f e l t that standard d i s t r i b u t i o n should i n c l u d e an area at l e a s t 1000 yards wide on each flank of the D i v i s i o n . The regimental a e r i a l photographer did e x c e l l e n t work i n providing s p e c i a l v e r t i c a l and oblique coverage of areas r e q u i r i n g s p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n . Organic reproduction f a c i l i t i e s were used for development and p r i n t i n g , permitted rapid d i s t r i b u t i o n . This feature was most helpful throughout the operation. Copies of a gridded mosaic, aporoximately 1:5,000 were furnished to regiment and each b a t t a l i o n and proved very u s e f u l i n r e s t i t u t i n g t a r g e t s . A gridded mosaic, 1:25,000, i n s u f f i c i e n t numbers for a l l observers, would be extremely u s e f u l . The great d e t a i l would permit more accurate l o c a t i o n o f t a r g e t s and reduce the number of rounds required for adjustment. During the l a s t few weeks of the camoaign the 3nd Battalion used a grid s h e e t , gridded to conform to 1:25,000 map, as a f i r i n g chai"t. The prescribed map was used for VCO data. I t was found by u s i n g t h i s method one map rtKrt establishment from a new p o s i t i o n oroved very s a t i s f a c t o r y throughout the zone o f f i r i n g . The' errors Introduced by attempting to match unmatched* s h e e t s j>t a mao were overcome . t h u s preventing the ^estafeliphm.enj o f % e ^ e m l maoK" as f i r e was s h i f t e d
18T
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from one s e c t o r to another. CHECK POINTS AND REGISTRATIONS: Each b a t t a l i o n s e l e c t e d i t s own base p o i n t for each p o s i t i o n occupied by choosing a p o i n t i d e n t i f i a b l e on chart and ground. Check p o i n t s were s e l e c t e d by observers i n the same way. Regiment was informed of l o c a t i o n o f each check p o i n t so chosen and assigned a number to i t , and a l s o kept a record of c o r r e c t i o n s obtained from each r e g i s t r a t i o n . Plans were made f o r coordination of r e g i s t r a t i o n among b a t t a l i o n s , i . e . , to have a l l b a t t a l i o n s r e g i s t e r on a comnon check p o i n t , but massing o f f i r e s continued to be so accurate throughout the o p e r a t i o n t h a t i t never became necessary to put t h i s plan i n t o e f f e c t . Occasionally e x c e s s i v e c o r r e c t i o n s were obtained from a c e r t a i n check p o i n t ; t h i s point was then discarded and another, more a c c u r a t e l y l o c a t e d , was used. R e g i s t r a t i o n s , except for adjusted fuze s e t t i n g , were infrequent a f t e r the f i r s t two or three days i n a p o s i t i o n . Metro c o r r e c t i o n s , combined with D- and d e f l e c t i o n c o r r e c t i o n changes, worked out as a c c u r a t e l y as r e s e n t r e g i s t r a t i o n s . The majority o f r e g i s t r a t i o n s were oerformed by AO. Road Junctions and coast l i n e t e r r a i n f e a t u r e s were most frequently used as b e i n g most e a s i l y i d e n t i f i a b l e and most permanent. A t r i b u t e to the accuracy of the chart was rendered by one b a t t a l i o n which was forced to r e g i s t e r on a h i l l t o p and obtained nor mal c o r r e c t i o n s . MASSED FIRES: This o p e r a t i o n was p a r t i c u l a r l y n o t a b l e , as far as t h i s D i v i s i o n was concerned, for the amount and weight of a r t i l l e r y a v a i l a b l e at any p o i n t i n the D i v i s i o n zone of a c t i o n at any t i m e . The organic d i v i s i o n a l a r t i l l e r y was always d i r e c t l y r e i n f o r c e d by a minimum of t h r e e , and as many as seven b a t t a l i o n s . In a d d i t i o n , most u n i t s of I I I Phlb Corps and XXIV Corps A r t i l l e r y were a v a i l a b l e on c a l l , and frequently a r t i l l e r y o f d i v i s i o n of the two c o r o s . In p a r t i c u l a r , a r t i l l e r y of flank d i v i s i o n s was quickly a v a i l a b l e . Massed f i r e s of four or f i v e b a t t a l i o n s were a common occurrence, and the maximum i n massed f i r e s c o n t r o l l e d by t h i s D i v i s i o n was twenty-two (22) b a t t a l i o n s (from 75mm How t o 8rt How) the town of MAKABE. "TOT" became a by-word of the campaign. Although not a new procedure, t h i s method was not e x t e n s i v e l y p r a c t i c e d by t h i s D i v i s i o n p r i o r to t h i s o p e r a t i o n . I t was g e n e r a l l y
" "0ECLn9StHtU
f e l t by a l l observers, a r t i l l e r y and Infantry a l i k e , that "Time on Target" was by far the most e f f e c t i v e way of bringing doim massed f i r e s . Standard methods of f i r e d i r e c t i o n were used i n ureparing data for TOT ! s. Regimental FDC assigned to each b a t t a l i o n p a r t i c i p a t i n g , the target area, method of attack, and ammunition. Time was controlled by Regimental FDC who gave "mark" 60 seconds before the time the p r o j e c t i l e s were to reach the t a r g e t . Each b a t t a l i o n FDC picked up the time by s t o p watch and gave the command to f i r e to each battery defending on i t s time or f l i g h t . On one occasion, where battalion" of the XXIV Corps, far removed i n point of communications, were p a r t i c i p a t i n g , a clock time was given a f t e r an accurate time check. In general, however, the "mark" system i s much p r e f e r a b l e , as i t provides actual s p l i t - s e c o n d timing with r e s u l t a n t greater impact e f f e c t . Massed f i r e s of more than one b a t t a l i o n following adjust ment were i n f r e q u e n t . The few that were used however, showed excellent result. The key to raDid and accurate massing of f i r e s i s communications. By i n s t a l l i n g a complete Fire Direction wire n e t , with switchboard i n Regimental FDC, conference c a l l s among a l l b a t t a l i o n FDC's and regiment, and b a t t a l i o n FDC1s of groups and regiments u s i n g a similar communication s e t - u p , were s e t up immediately. Units without the Fire D i r e c t i o n net and switchboard found i t more d i f f i c u l t to p a r t i c i p a t e i n TOT1 s or other massed f i r e s . Although massed f i r e s were used on a l a r g e r s c a l e than ever before i n t h i s D i v i s i o n ' s h i s t o r y , i t i s f e l t that too much importance may have been attached to the sound and fury of the d i s p l a y . E s p e c i a l l y against an enemy who kept himself and h i s weapons protected i n deeo c a v e s . A well conducted p r e c i s i o n adjustment which sealed a cave or d e f i n i t e l y knocked out a f i e l d - p i e c e , was more e f f e c t i v e than seven or e i g h t b a t t a l i o n s hammering a h i l l t o p from which a l l the enemy had r e t i r e d i n t o a s i x t y - f o o t deep cave. PREPARATIONS AND PREPARED FIRES: Preparations were f i r e d as requested by the infantry regimental commanders, and as ordered by D i v i s i o n . These planned f i r e s were prepared by regiment upon the request
^87
of the infantry and recommendations of the a r t i l l e r y l i a i s o n officers. However, i t i s f e l t that in many i n stances full benefit from these preparations was not realized. Division orders covering the next days attack would s t a t e a definite time for the infantry to launch i t s attack. Preparations were scheduled based on the hour of attack as ordered by Division. However, i t was not always possible for the infantry to launch the attack at the ordered hour. The preparation was fired regardless of readiness of the infantry and i t s benefit was l o s t because the infantry could not make their attack u n t i l they were ready, which in many cases was two to three hours after the preparation had been fired. I t i s f e l t that whenever possible, preparations should be delivered on call of the infantry regimental commander and not at a definite time determined the night proceed ing the attack. I f i t i s a coordinated Division attack of two or more regiments and a preparation i s required, i t s duration should be determined far enough in advance so that a l l Dlanning by a l l arms can be carefully completed. But the hour at which the preparation i s to be fired should not be determined u n t i l the day of the attack and after a l l infantry units have reported to Division that they are ready to attack. During each day's operation, direct support battalions delivered preparations reinforced by the general support a r t i l l e r y on call of the infantry they were supporting, as intermediate objectives were attacked, and these were not fired u n t i l the infantry reported ready. In this way the infantry was able to take full advantages of the a r t i l l e r y f i r e and launch i t s attack with success. The planning of night defensive fires was always done by the direct support b a t t a l i o n s , regiment in turn coordinating the fires between battalions and adjacent a r t i l l e r y u n i t s . Reinforcing battalions of Corps as well as our own general supoort battalions were registered on normal Darrages and this support was balanced between d i r e c t support battalions by regiment based on their request ard the situation for the night. Direct suuoort battalions submitted requests for add i t i o n a l harassing^ fires to regiment. These were combined with harassing fires originated by regiment. Our own
CECLA3PD
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general support b a t t a l i o n handled as many of these as was p o s s i b l e , and the remainder were submitted to Corps A r t i l l e r y . A l l harassing f i r e s were coordinated with D i v i s i o n Naval Gunfire e l i m i n a t i n g a l l unnecessary duplication of f i r e s . The TIC was s e t up with three men and an o f f i c e r . One man was experienced i n keeping maps and other Two-section work. Two of the men were without t>revious experience i n t h e work. Later i n the operation the TIC o f f i c e r became 3-2 and the men of the TIC combined with the S-2 Section and performed interchangeably. This provided f i v e men and two o f f i c e r s i n the s e c t i o n . Personnel with Division l i a i s o n o f f i c e r added two more to the t o t a l a v a i l a b l e . There was work for a l l of them. The c l e r i c a l work consisted of keeping a card index on a l l t a r g e t s , two up to date maos, two overlays, one show i n g a l l enemy b a t t e r i e s , the other showing r e c e n t l y a c t i v e enemy b a t t e r i e s . This together with a board showing r e c e n t l y a c t i v e enemy b a t t e r i e s , action taken, date. time, concen t r a t i o n number, and r e s u l t s of f i r e were the worfc of the TIC S e c t i o n . The g r e a t e s t source of information and the greate3t re ed for i t s proper dissemination was found i n the a r t i l l e r y . Hence the TIC operated in the FDC, and f u l f i l l e d the func t i o n a l o b j e c t of both TIC and S-2. A d i r e c t l i n e conaected the FDC with a r t i l l e r y l i a i s o n at D i v i s i o n . With the Eleventh Marine l i a i s o n o f f i c e r were the D i v i s i o n a i r and naval gunfire o f f i c e r s . NCP and air t a r g e t information as well as API information derived at D i v i s i o n were thereby added to our sources of information. Targets obtained by TIC were checked against the card index, given to the aoorooriate arm or assigned to a i r soot for search. The information was passed on to proper l i a i s o n o f f i c e r s and recorded on a card for f i l i n g a f t e r b e i n g placed on the map i f important. The l i a i s o n o f f i c e r s , a r t i l l e r y i n t e l l i g e n c e s e c t i o n and the operations s e c t i o n of the regiment were mutually cognizant of information. CO'PITER BATTERY: When p r a c t i c a b l e , the b a t t a l i o n s operated f l a s h bases and the regiment operated one c o n t i n u a l l y . At the s t a r t of Southern campaign for the El event If* f * U < , Tnird pnib CorDs
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sound ranging gave sound ranging spots by d i r e c t wire t o the regimental FDC. This l a s t e d u n t i l Corps took o v e r . Air spot and s h e l l i n g reports w i t h a l l of i t t i e d together w i t h API completed the agencies for l o c a t i n g enemy b a t t e r i e s . A l l enemy b a t t e r i e s were p l o t t e d on a r o l l e d down a c e t a t e o v e r l a y on the TIC map. Various symbols i n d i c a t e d source. This was sup Diem en ted' by another overlay of r e c e n t l y a c t i v e enemy b a t t e r i e s and a board showing those a c t i v e enemy b a t t e r i e s by t a r g e t square, d a t e , and time a c t i v e , a c t i o n taken and r e s u l t s ; e s p e c i a l l y u s e f u l i f renorts i n d i c a t e d the b a t t e r y as again a c t i v e . The information on the b a t t e r i e s was also kept, as a t a r g e t i n an index file. The s h e l l i n g reports were relayed to Corns A r t i l l e r y and i f azimuth was given, t h i s was p l o t t e d on the mar? and the r e l a t i o n to p r e v i o u s l y l o c a t e d enemy b a t t e r i e s was thus e v i d e n t . I t became SOP to take under f i r e immediately a l l f l a s h base i n t e r s e c t i o n s . Beacuse of the accuracy of the survey and the p r a c t i c e of t h e s e teams i n o b t a i n i n g f i v e i d e n t i c a l readings before reporting, and i n computing a l l coor d i n a t e s , i t was found that these i n t e r s e c t i o n s were e x tremely a c c u r a t e . The use of the map and other information a v a i l a b l e determined the amount of f i r e to be given each t a r g e t . In some i n s t a n c e s i d e n t i c a l reports were turned i n to FDC from d i f f e r e n t OP*s. The f l a r h bases were used t o adjust f i r e on the b a t t e r i e s , but the prevalence of f l a r e s and i n t e r v e n i n g d e f i l a d e areas made t h i s d i f f i c u l t . There was only one r e o o r t o f such a l o c a t i o n being a c t i v e a f t e r f i r e had been l a i d down on i t . S h e l l i n g r e p o r t s , because of the usual i n a c c u r a c i e s of f l a s h bang and of estimated azimuth, were used mainly as c o r r e l a t i v e information. But as t h i s regiment r e c e i v e d s e v e r a l reports p l o t t i n g i n the same v i c i n i t y , that area i f p r e v i o u s l y a c t i v e was f i r e d upon. The enemy was a c t i v e at night i n the great majority of c a s e s so that r e s u l t s were unobserved. I t became n e c e s s ary to keet) a l i s t of areas for a i r search the next day. These r e p o r t s were valuable but the l i m i t a t i o n on the rjlanes a v a i l a b l e , r e g i s t r a t i o n , and more important and a c t i v e t a r g e t s on the next day did not give us f u l l use o f t h i s means of check. Air spot l o c a t e d enemy b a t t e r i e s , but the camouflage minded Jap made t h i s d i f f i
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API, although handicapped by limited coverage and delay in obtaining photos, picked out from t h e i r study valuable t a r g e t s , l i k e l y gun p o s i t i o n s , and looked over areas that we had fired upon from f l a s h base l o c a t i o n s . One ereat use of API was to l o c a t e areas for TOT's and i t i s f e l t that t h i s contribution to counter-battery f i r e for these strong p o i n t s were usually centered around enemy guns. Our own a e r i a l photos taken by our photographer were used, but the quantity was very l i m i t e d . Other r e l a t e d information came by i n t e r r o g a t i o n of Drisoners and cantured documents, but because of the general l o c a t i o n rather than the p i n - p o i n t , f i r e could not p r o f i t a b l y be c a l l e d down on these t a r g e t s . Three Third Phib Coros 155 How Bn's were used for the greater part of the campaign as r e i n f o r c i n g a r t i l l e r y and were thus the main o u t f i t s used i n counter-battery f i r e . When ammunition allotment permitted, several b a t t a l i o n s f i r i n g TOT was the method of attack. SURVEY: I n i t i a l l y , p o s i t i o n areas were l o c a t e d by traverse from XXIV Corps p l a c e marks, b a t t e r i e s being l a i d by base angle with r e g i s t r a t i o n by one gun r>er b a t t a l i o n . R e g i s t r a t i o n corrections proved moderate, but no smaller than those obtained i n the e a r l i e r phase of the operation, where l o c a t i o n of b a t t e r i e s was by Inspection and d i r e c t i o n obtained from e i t h e r map or n e e d l e . All Instruments were d e c l i n a t e d at Corps s t a t i o n s . Regimental survey i n t h i s r>hase was concerned with extending Corr>s control forward and e s t a b l i s h i n g bases for f l a s h ranging and Corps sound ranging microphones. Survey personnel manned these f l a s h OP 1 e, the r e s u l t s obtained proving of great value throughout the operation. Displacements at t i n e s outstripped Corps and regimen t a l c o n t r o l , so b a t t a l i o n s reverted to the o r i g i n a l s y s tem of l o c a t i o n by i n s p e c t i o n or by traverse from a l o c a l I . P . Re-computation of r e g i s t r a t i o n corrections on a Corps-control basis showed no s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e s , so the f i n a l displacements found a l l b a t t a l i o n s using i n s p e c t i o n or l o c a l I . P . data. I t i s I n t e r e s t i n g to note that magnetic aberrations were almost completely absent from the area, no reported needle reading d i f f e r i n g from Corps
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BHMKIFIEU
: -
d i r e c t i o n by more than four (4) mile. This factor, combined with the excellence of the msp i t s e l f , undoubtedly con tributed to the success of the survey system followed. No target area survey was attempted, targets being obtained from the map, gridded mosaics, and r e s t i t u t i o n from v e r t i c a l and oblique photographs by the photo i n t e r pretation section.
METEOROLOGY: As noted above, a majority of our f i r i n g was done with
metro corrections. Weather conditions were f a i r l y constant over short periods of time, and normal metro procedure was used throughout. Because of the large number of a r t i l l e r y u n i t s in direct communication with the regim ent, metro messages were always available at two or three hour i n t e r v a l s except when the c e i l i n g was very low. Raw i n g p a r t i a l me a 8 ages were obtained on a few occasions from XXIV Corps Observation Battalion when viausl obser vation was impossible. Due to a shortage of hydrogen and to the numerous other sources of metro data, t h i s regiment made i t s own observations only i n special cases; e . g . , prior to preparations, during c l o s e - i n night harassing fires. OBSERVATION - AIR: As in previous operations, the a i r OP proved invalu able for search, conduct and surveillance of f i r e , and i n t e l l i g e n c e reports. The p i l o t s and observers, for the most part previously experienced, turned in excellent Jobs in spite of heavy A f i r e and planes flown greatly i n A excess of the prescribed number of hours. The e f f e c t i v e ness of our a r t i l l e r y was, as usual, increased tremendously by t h i s agency. Aerial observation throughout was controlled by regiment. Planes reported to regiment on station and were assigned to a battalion for f i r e missions, generally the general support b a t t a l i o n . Search was directed by regiment. Assign ments were made to battalions other than general support for special missions, including r e g i s t r a t i o n s . Because of a shortage of Planes, i t was generally impossible to keep more than one plane on station during a l l day-light hours, with one on c a l l at the f i e l d . This shortage was f e l t on several occasions when two or three planes on s t a t i o n would have been mast useful.
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These f a c t o r s made the a i r OP l e s s e f f i c i e n t and e f f e c t i v e than d e s i r a b l e for t h i s D i v i s i o n on t h i s operation. F i r s t , there was an o v e r a l l shortage of planes throughout I I I Phib Corps. I l l Phlb Corps A r t i l l e r y took over a l l a r t i l l e r y planes and apportioned them to Corns and D i v i s i o n a l a r t i l l e r y . This regiment was a l l o t e d so few that at times planes were a v a i l a b l e only on an hour-to-hour b a s i s . U n t i l NMO-7 arrived, i t was often d i f f i c u l t even to r e l i e v e our one plane on s t a t i o n . Second, many of VMO-3's planes passed the standard maximum l e n g t h of s e r v i c e early i n the operation. In add i t i o n to e x c e s s i v e wear and tear, damage from enerav f i r e kept many planes grounded. Excellent maintenance kept l o s t time to a minimum under the circumstances, but on the whole, too many of the too few planes were on the ground too l o n g . Third, the base for VMO-3 planes and observers was at YONTAN A i r f i e l d throughout the operation, far from regim e n t a l headquarters. Communications, by TCS radio, were d i f f i c u l t at best and impossible a f t e r 2000 due to C W I n t e r f e r e n c e . The proper l i a i s o n between observers and S-3 and S-2 was Impossible to maintain. Observers had to be b r i e f e d on s t a t i o n and report r e s u l t of search on s t a t i o n . During the l a s t four days of the operation, the observers O A were based at I T M N A i r f i e l d and picked UP by Dlanes from YONTAN for each f l i g h t . This set-up permitted direct wire communication and made complete b r i e f i n g of observers p o s s i b l e . The i d e a l set-up a base for planes near enough to a r t i l l e r y headquarters to permit d i r e c t wire communications and to allow the observers to report in person to the regimental FDC whenever necessary was never achieved. A fourth d i f f i c u l t y was solved before i t became s e r i o u s . Trouble was experienced with RCA type radios i n the p l a n e s . Some of t h e s e were replaced with SCR-610 radios and t h e r e a f t e r communications were adequate. However, t h i s arrangement made i t necessary for ground s t a t i o n s to have two radios always ready for spot u s e . I t i s d e f i n i t e l y f e l t that the e f f i c i e n c y a r t i l l e r y would have been increased one hundred per had a l l of the air-sr>ot planes been a v a i l a b l e . all air of the cent
I f i t i s contemplated that there w i l l be needs of t h i s type of plane by other agencies of the D i v i s i o n , steps should be taken to obtain more planes. Never, except in
DttUSSIFILD
extreme emergencies, should the twelve planes of VMO-3 have any m i s s i o n i n b a t t l e except i n carrying of a r t i l l e r y o b s e r v e r s for a i r - s p o t . COMMUNICATIONS: The SOP for a r t i l l e r y communications was observed through out the o p e r a t i o n . At times combat c o n d i t i o n s made s l i g h t changes i n t h e normal t>rocedure n e c e s s a r y . These v a r i a t i o n s are of i n t e r e s t and are noted i n the d i s c u s s i o n . Wire as a means of communication was s a t i s f a c t o r y . The u s u a l trouble with amphibious t r a c t o r s c u t t i n g and break i n g wire was experienced. However, during the wet weather tracked v e h i c l e s were confined more or l e s s to main roads a i d i n g m a t e r i a l l y problems confronting the communicator. Also c o n s i d e r a b l e wire was l a i d i n open t e r r a i n , and e x c e l l e n t f a c i l i t i e s for over-heading l i n e s were o f t e n present. Over one thousand miles of wire was l a i d during the o p e r a t i o n by the regiment. Wire was l a i d to a l l r e i n f o r c i n g a r t i l l e r y u n i t s . In a d d i t i o n , wire communication was maintained w i t h other a r t i l l e r y u n i t s when coordination o f f i r e s was n e c e s s a r y . This meant l a y i n g numerous l o n g l i n e s t h a t are not considered i n the A r t i l l e r y SOP. A 48-drop switchboard (BD96) was employed and on s e v e r a l o c c a s i o n s a l l the drops were i n use and many of t h e s e were p a r t i e d . Two (2) twelve (12) drop switchboards (BD72) were maintained i n the regimental FDC. These were u s u a l l y f i l l e d to c a p a c i t y . At times the b a t t a l i o n s were q u i t e s c a t t e r e d and the d i s t a n c e between them was c o n s i d e r a b l e . To ease the s t r a i n on wire communication a forward board was used with s u c c e s s . This gave an a l t e r n a t e means of communication and aided m a t e r i a l l y during d i s p l a c e m e n t s . Radio communication brought f o r t h many problems. The few F f r e q u e n c i e s that were made a v a i l a b l e were so c l u t t e r e d M up with t r a f f i c from Army and Navy s t a t i o n s that s e v e r a l were of l i t t l e p r a c t i c a l v a l u e . As a r e s u l t , the regimental C r e l i e d almost completely on w i r e . I t was found that the O p r e s e n t TO f o r communication personnel was inadequate to l a y and s e r v i c e the l i n e s required. At one p o s i t i o n the regiment had over 212 m i l e s of wire i n u s e . I t was necessary to augment the CP s e c t i o n with l i n e personnel needed for
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o t h e r t a s k s . Three F channels are a minimum r e q u l r e M men J ? e J \ a t a l i o n - A r t i l l e r y should have f i r s t p r i o r i t y i n SCR-610 frequency assignments. This would eliminate h a l t i n g f i r e missions because of i n t e r f e r e n c e from nona r t i l l e r y service units. Three big frequency changes were made. Each came when a great percentage of our radio s e t s were with FO teams causing considerable inconvenience. Obtaining spare parts for SCR-608 s e t s was p r a c t i c a l l y out of the question. As a r e s u l t , s e v e r a l radios that were g r e a t l y needed were out of a c t i o n for lack of minor p a r t s . The RCA type radios used In the O a i r - s p o t planes were Y gradually replaced by SCR-610 s e t s . Although the RCA type radio performs w e l l when new and has man/ c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s t h a t are p r e f e r a b l e , i t was found that the SCR-610 s e t i s more dependable i n wet weather, i s e a s i e r to keet> i n r e p a i r , and much more simple to operate. DISPLACEMENTS: Because of the lack of adequate transportation and i n view of the f a c t that the two and one-half ton s i x by s i x ( 2 | - t o n , 6x6) prime movers could not operate in *he mud and c o n d i t i o n s which p r e v a i l e d , a l l b a t t a l i o n s had great d i f f i c u l t y i n making displacements. The s i t u a t i o n developed that the b a t t a l i o n s had to d i s p l a c e during an extremely rainy period of the campaign. To do so the b a t t a l i o n s had to borrow M 5 t r a c t o r s from the Army a r t i l l e r y u n i t s , and TD-18 t r a c t o r s from Marine 155mm howitzer b a t t a l i o n s . Had not these v e h i c l e s been a v a i l a b l e , the displacements would have been impossible. As there were never more than two b a t t a l i o n s In d i r e c t support at any one time, d i r e c t support b a t t a l i o n s were allowed to d i s p l a c e by b a t t a l i o n ; that i s , the e n t i r e b a t t a l i o n came' out of action at one time. One of the two general support b a t t a l i o n s would take over and handle a l l m i s s i o n s of the d i r e c t support b a t t a l i o n u n t i l i t s d i s placement had been completed. This was done merely by the general support b a t t a l i o n s e t t i n g i t s 608 radio up on the f r e q u e n c i e s of the b a t t a l i o n d i s p l a c i n g . Also when p o s s i b l e the phone l i n e s to l i a i s o n o f f i c e r s with the Infantry regiment were extended to the b a t t a l i o n handling the miss i o n s f o r the d i r e c t support battalion*. -' 13
I t was f e l t safe to make displacement in this manner because there was always sufficient reinforcing a r t i l l e r y available.
M T R TRANSPORT: OO The I n t e r n a t i o n a l 2-ton 6x6 proved i t s e l f an e x c e l l e n t v e h i c l e r e q u i r i n g few r e p a i r s even when operated under the most arduous circumstances. The parts most frequently r e p l a c e d were the l e v e r shaft studs i n the s t e e r i n g gear.
Out of seventy-five (75) trucks i n this operation, t h i s oartlcular part was broken and replaced in nineteen (19) trucks. This particular oart was not available from regular sources of suooly but had to be made from materials at hand.
The l e a s t e f f i c i e n t vehicle used in t h i s regiment dur ing the operation was the International 1-ton 4x4. To maintain forty-three (43) of these trucks required the replacement of more parts than to maintain seventy-five (75) 2|-ton 6x6 trucks. The greatest weakness i n the 1-ton 4x4 was the spider and side gears in the d i f f e r e n t i a l assembly. In the forty-three (43) 1-ton trucks in the operation, twenty-seven (27) s e t s of spider and side gears were replaced. The experience of t h i s operation, plus a l l previous experiences, have only added further proof to the s a t i s f a c t i o n of a l l ranks of this regiment that t h i s truck i s absolutely u s e l e s s for military purooses. All other tyoes of v e h i c l e s , -ton 4x4 (Jeep) and M29C Cargo and Personnel Carrier (weasel), operated s a t i s f a c t o r i l y with comparatively l i t t l e repair. The mobility of t h i s organization was not as great as was desired on several occasions due to the lack of trans portation. This organization was only Dermitted to bring about seventy-five per cent of the transoortation author ized by the Tables of Organization. There were two prin cipal disadvantages a r i s i n g from this situation; (1) the mobility of the regiment as a whole was decreased since i t was necessary to transfer vehicles from one b a t t a l i o n to another when any battalion was to displace, the a l t e r native being numerous shuttle t r i p s ; (2) due to the limited amount of transoortation available, vehicles were used frequently when they should have been deadlined for preventive maintenance servicing.
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The dependence of the regiment entirely upon wheeled
vehicles nearly resulted In complete Immobility of the
regiment during one period of especially heavy rainfall.
Had it not been for the co-operation of certain Army
organizations in providing M-5 tractor T>rime movers to aid
in displacement during this period, the regiment would
have been nearly immobile.
AMMUNITION:
Due to circumstances beyond our control, ammunition
supply was not always adequate. However, it was felt that
on some instances there was a lack of coordination between
the Three and Four Sections of higher echelon. Twice
during this operation Corps Field Orders allowed the ex
penditure of a certain amount of ammunition during a def
inite period of time. However, sufficient ammunition to
coincide with the attack order was not orovided and the
Four Section went so far as to issue orders limiting the
expenditure of ammunition that conflicted with the attack
order.
I *
-16 J
tank personnel were prepared to r e c e i v e t i n e f i r e over them I f necessarv to discourage enemy personnel from c l o s i n g In on a tank and d i s a b l i n g i t , or from wrecking one that had been p r e v i o u s l y stopped. A great many missions were f i r e d for the tanks, the majority of which were smoke. While no f i r e was brought a c t u a l l y over the tanks, several missions as c l o s e i n as 100 yards were f i r e d . Liaison was good, the f i r e was extremely e f f e c t i v e , and there were no occasions when tanks were damaged by our f i r e . The accuracy of the pack howitzer and the f a c t that the medium tank w i l l sustain without damage a l l except a d i r e c t h i t from the weapon, make t h i s use of a pack howitzer b a t t a l i o n an e f f e c t i v e o n e . The armored amphibian t r a c t o r s could a l s o be used for t h i s m i s s i o n . However, l i a i s o n o f f i c e r s and forward observers would have to come from the a r t i l l e r y . The m i s s i o n s could have been performed through normal a r t i l l e r y l i a i s o n and FO f e. but the system employed was rapid and e f f e c t i v e , and i t avoided tying up infantry d i r e c t support b a t t a l i o n s with a d d i t i o n a l unrelated m i s s i o n s . This use of a pack nowltzer b a t t a l i o n i s considered normal and i s recom mended. Employment i n t h i s manner does not replace infantry f i r e support teams I t augments them, p a r t i c u l a r l y under c o n d i t i o n s of t e r r a i n and enemy action which render the i n f a n t r y - t a n k f i r e support teams i n e f f e c t i v e . COORDINATION BETWEEN ARTILLERY, NGF, AND AIR: Coordination between a r t i l l e r y , NGF, and a i r , on the whole during the campaign was e x c e l l e n t . However, there were several Instances when a i r and NGF did not consult the a r t i l l e r y or coordinate t h e i r missions with the a r t i l l e r y . I t i s f e l t that several a i r missions could have been handled as w e l l , i f not b e t t e r , by a r t i l l e r y f i r e had the a r t i l l e r y been consulted. Throughout the campaign the D i v i s i o n NGF and a i r o f f i c e r s , stayed at the D i v i s i o n CP and an a r t i l l e r y l i a i s o n o f f i c e r from regiment was sent to D i v i s i o n to work with these o f f i c e r s . The a r t i l l e r y regimental FDC stayed with the a r t i l l e r y CP. Prior to the operation i t was planned that the FDC would be l o c a t e d not more than 600 yards from the D i v i s i o n CP. But t h i s was not e f f e c t e d u n t i l the l a t t e r phases o f the o p e r a t i o n . The FDC had to be near i t s b a t t a l i o n s for control and communication r e a s o n s . The D i v i s i o n A r t i l l e r y O f f i c e r , or i n h i s absence a f i e l d o f f i c e r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , -was always at D i v i s i o n CP.
' DECiMflE
A d i r e c t telephone l i n e was maintained between the FDC and the. coordination center ( a r t i l l e r y , NGF and a i r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ) at D i v i s i o n G-3 S e c t i o n . In t h i s way the three arms coordinated t h e i r missions and the FDC could be c o n s u l t e d without d i f f i c u l t y . Also the exchange of i n f o r mation between the two agencies was e x c e l l e n t . Air, NGF, and G-2 API t a r g e t s were thus reported to the TIC, as w e l l as a r t i l l e r y t a r g e t s from i t s own 3 - 2 . With t h i s set-up the a r t i l l e r y commander ( o v e r - a l l coordinator of the three arms) was not forced to stay at the D i v i s i o n CP, but wa6 free to confer with a l l echelons and attend to h i s other d u t i e s with the a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n s and keep an eye on h i s regimental and b a t t a l i o n FDC's. When not at the coordination center, the D i v i s i o n A r t i l l e r y O f f i c e r or h i s e x e c u t i v e were constantly a v a i l a b l e at the regimental FDC. In the lower echelon, i n f a n t r y regiment and b a t t a l i o n s , again the a r t i l l e r y , NGF and ai'r o f f i c e r s worked together as a team i n the employment of t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e arms. But i n a l l cases the a r t i l l e r y l i a i s o n o f f i c e r i n the lower echelong was not consulted by the l o c a l commander i n the making of the f i n a l d e c i s i o n as to which arm should be u s e d . Frequently, observers i n a Naval alr^spot plane would find t a r g e t s which NGF could not handle. In these cases the m i s s i o n s were turned over to the a r t i l l e r y . That i s , the naval observer would send h i s t a r g e t and spots to the NGF l i a i s o n o f f i c e r , these i n turn were relayed through a r t i l l e r y channels to the b a t t a l i o n to which the mission was a s s i g n e d . Plans VICTOR and NEGAT were seldom used. P r i o r to an a i r s t r i k e a l l echelons of the a r t i l l e r y were n o t i f i e d o f the time and place of the s t r i k e . Observers and a i r s e n t r i e s , at t h e gun p o s i t i o n s , then stopped the f i r e when the planes were over the t a r g e t and making t h e i r runs. With t h i s method the time during which the a r t i l l e r y could not f i r e was kept to a minimum. Unfortunately, NGF support ships did not f o l l o w t h i s procedure. When an a i r s t r i k e was even mentioned, NGF ceased u n t i l reassured l o n g a f t e r that the a i r mission was completed. Considering the l i m i t a t i o n o f ammunition and l i f e o f a gun tube i n naval a r t i l l e r y , i t i s b e l i e v e d that e x c e s s i v e u s e of NGF was made'in t h i s o p e r a t i o n . After f i e l d a r t i l l e r y i s ashore, NGF should be used as r e i n f o r c i n g only on m i s s i o n s so deep or so s i t u a t e d that a r t i l l e r y oannot ftkSl1^^*! reach them as e f f e c t i v e l y as NXtf\_ AllJIgF
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d e l i b e r a t e and observed on productive t a r g e t s during d a y l i g h t , NGrF ammunition should otherwise be conserved for i t s deadly harassing effect at n i g h t . I t s s t a r s h e l l illumination i n Invaluable a t n i g h t , but t h i s use became an abuse and misuse.
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The most accurate main battery fire ever delivered for this
Division on a shore installation was delivered by the battleship
COLORADO on SHURI CASTLE. No correction was necessary
greater than 150 yards and frequently the initial salvo was a
direjt hit.
When the report reached Division that the enemy was evacuating
SHURI under cover of rain and low-ceiling, the USS NEW YORK was
requested to send up its plane to investigate. Thirteen
minutes after the request was received the battleship had opened
fire. Other fire support ships, as well as artillery and air,
were quickly brought to bear on the target with devastating
results, the roads becoming littered with enemy dead and wounded.
Ships were positioned throughout the operation to give the
most effective line of fire to the desired" target. In this
manner, Naval Gunfire was enabled to hammer reverse slooes and
to fire into draws in which it is normally difficult to obtain
results.
4.2 Mortars and 5* Rockets from LCl(G)s and LSM(R)s were
utilized with excellent results on the southern ridges where
the ships could use their own spot. 40mm. fire from ships was
also effective on these beach areas.
Harassing fire from the fire support ships was utilized
nightly against enemy personnel. Roads, supply dumps, known
or suspected strongpoints, towns and villages were constantly
under area fire at night. Star shells from the ships hindered
enemy infiltration In strength. On at least one occasion,
ships broke up an attempted counter-landing behind our front
lines.
SHIP ASSIGNMENTS
Generally, three ships were assigned for support of the
Division. Each assault regiment was assigned a minimum of one
fhip per day and the third ship was used by the Division for
deep suooort fires. On occasions where extra fire support was
desired"by the regiments, as when a target required larger
caliber guns than the regiments1 direct suoport ships could
handle, the Division ship was assigned to a Naval Gunfire
spotter to fire the mission. Air soot was provided for each
ship, either by the shio*s own aircraft or by specially trained
pilots from VOF squadrons. Air spotters did an excellent Job
though they were frequently handicapped by poor observation
conditions caused by,,.rain and low-hanging clouds.
--
DECL
- \ * t . A: ' - m*x ** %*f''^*m e x t r a f i r e support was d e s i r e d , additional ships were furnished f o r the d i v i s i o n s ' "use. For night i l l u m i n a t i o n a minimum of one ship per regiment was assigned but where the t a c t i c a l s i t u a t i o n warranted it as many as three were furnished. SFCP OPERATIONS SFCP SOP as prescribed by F l e e t Marine Force, P a c i f i c was followed i n i t s e n t i r e t y by the D i v i s i o n Shore Fire Control p a r t i e s Each b a t t a l i o n was furnished with a Marine O f f i c e r s p o t t e r , an e n l i s t e d a s s i s t a n t s p o t t e r and communication Dersonnel to do the a c t u a l s p o t t i n g of Naval Gunfire. A Naval O f f i c e r with communication personnel was assigned to each b a t t a l i o n for l i a i s o n p u r p o s e s . Each regiment had a naval o f f i c e r with communication personnel to coordinate the functioning of the b a t t a l i o n SFC Teams, The D i v i s i o n NGF Team was composed of a Major ( a r t i l l e r y ) , a Captain ( a r t i l l e r y ) , a Naval Lieutenant and communication personnel to s u p e r v i s e the functioning within the D i v i s i o n and to coordinate NGF support with adjacent u n i t s . SFCP COMMUNICATIONS Communications throughout the Southern OKINAWA Campaign were e n e r a l l y good. Each s p o t t e r and N O with the b a t t a l i o n s was L urnishea an SCR 694 r a d i o , an SCR 300 radio, and wire communications. The SCR 694 was used for communication between the NLO, s p o t t e r , and f i r i n g ship on assigned f i r e support f r e q u e n c i e s . In cases where t h e b a t t a l i o n s allowed use of t h e i r a s s i g n e d channel, the SCR 300 was used f o r communication between s p o t t e r and the NLO. Fire commands were given by the s p o t t e r to the NLO over the SCR 300 who i n turn relayed over the SCR 694 to t h e f i r e support s h i p . This method, because i t provides for g r e a t e r m o b i l i t y of the* s p o t t e r , i s the most e f f e c t i v e means of s p o t t i n g Naval Gunfire. P r o v i s i o n s should be made to furnish Naval Gunfire w i t h assigned SCR 300 channels. The SCR 694 radio was used most o f t h e time for a l l s p o t t i n g functions and normally performed very s a t i s f a c t o r i l y . Hoi*ever, t h i s s e t I s much too s e n s i t i v e for prolonged operations under severe adverse f i e l d c o n d i t i o n s , and should be replaced a f t e r t h e i n i t i a l phase of the a s s a u l t by a s t u r d i e r s e t .
Regimental NLO's were equipped with TBX(8) radios with which they* monitored a l t e r n a t e l y the Naval Gunfire Common and the f i r e support frequency of t h e i r a s s a u l t b a t t a l i o n s . The performance of t h e TBX(8) r a d i o s was more than s a t i s f a c t o r y , but the regimental NLO1 s should be equloped with at l e a s t two s e t s to permit them t o monitor at a l l times the f i r e support frequency and the Naval Gunfire Common. The SCR 300 i s s u e d to regiments was of no b e n e f i t
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as f r e q u e n c i e s were not a v a i l a b l e . The d i v i s i o n Naval Gunfire party was equipped with a TCS r a d i o , a TBX(8) radio and an SCR 300. The l a t t e r was of no use to the D i v i s i o n due to the l a c t of a frequency. The TCS was used f o r communication with the f i r i n g ship assigned t o the D i v i s i o n . The TBX(8) was used f o r communication with t h e Naval Gunfire control o f f i c e r and the D i v i s i o n was at no time out of contact* COORDINATION WITHIN DIVISION E x c e l l e n t coordination of e f f o r t by the various SFCP's w i t h i n the D i v i s i o n was evidenced* B a t t a l i o n p a r t i e s cleared with adjacent u n i t s before f i r i n g at t a r g e t s out of t h e i r zone of a c t i o n 0 I t i s due t o t h i s e x c e l l e n t coordination t h a t , while more Naval Gunfire was used oa t h i s i s l a n d than any other i s l a n d in- the P a c i f i c ^ not one casualty r e s u l t e d from t h e f i r i n g of naval v e s s e l s by t h i s Divisio.no COORDINATION WITH ADJACENT UNITS L i a i s o n with the Shore F i r e Control P a r t i e s of adjacent u n i t s was maintained to a high degree of e f f i c i e n c y . Permission to f i r e upon t a r g e t s out of the D i v i s i o n ' s zone of a c t i o n was r e a d i l y o b t a i n e d . I f for some reason, the SFCP's of t h i s D i v i s i o n were unable to take under f i r e t a r g e t s which could be observed by any adjacent u n i t these u n i t s responded quickly and c h e e r f u l l y t o r e q u e s t s for a s s i s t a n c e * This D i v i s i o n quickly cleared for f i r i n g t a r g e t s within i t s zone that were harassing adjacent u n i t s and many times f i r e d missions that were to the b e n e f i t of t h e s e u n i t s . Targets observed by one u n i t were quickly relayed t o o t h e r u n i t s and front l i n e information was frequently interchanged i n order t h a t a l l s a f e t y f a c t o r s might be observed* COORDINATION BETWEEN ARTILLERY, NAVAL GUNFIRE AND AIR The Target Information Center was l o c a t e d near the a r t i l l e r y regimental FDC while the D i v i s i o n SFCP and Air L i a i s o n Party were s e t up t o g e t h e r at the D i v i s i o n CP. A d i r e c t wire l i n e was l a i d to t h e regimental FDC, In t h i s manner D i v i s i o n a r t i l l e r y was l e s s c o n j e s t e d , and the D i v i s i o n Commander had r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the t h r e e supporting arms within reach at a l l t i m e s . By t h i s means a l s o the a r t i l l e r y r e c e i v e d the b e n e f i t of D i v i s i o n API as w e l l as t h a t of i t s own s e c t i o n . Other Target Information coming i n t o the n2tt and "3W S e c t i o n s of D i v i s i o n was immediately passed to a r t i l l e r y over t h e d i r e c t wire l i n e .
#r
- 4
309
SSIFIED
During the entire operation there was an= officii of ihef **^
G-2 Section assigned to keep the Artillery,.Naval Guntire, and Air LiaiaCn personnel Informed as to all targets uncovered
by API, prisoner Interrogation or translation of enemy
documents. In addition to target information records kept
by TIC this officer kept a card index of all targets and
action taken as well as results which aided materially in
assuring adequate fire on all targets and helped to eliminate
duplication of fire on any one target.
Battalion NLO's cleared targets with the regimental NLO's,
who In turn coordinated with the Artillery Liaison Officer of
the direct support battalion before firing. When targets were
of an emergency nature, or fleeting targets of opportunity,
they were taken under fire without clearance by spotters, if
this fire did not endanger friendly troops.
On three different occasions planes from the U3S NEW YORK
spotted artillery fire from the 11th Marinea onto targets
which Naval Gunfire was unable to hit. On one occasion, fire
from the 11th Marines upon an enemy machine gun position was
directed from the conning tower of the US3 TUSCALOOSA by the
gunnery officer of that vessel. These variations from stand
ard procedure required excellent coordination, perfect communi
cations and a knowledge and understanding of available
weapons. It is a credit to all concerned that these missions
were successfully and effectively accomplished.
The close contact employed by these supporting arms was
highly effective in furnishing each arm with the type target
it was best suited to destroy. This method of coordination
should be preserved in future operations.
PERSONNEL
Personnel of the SFCP were highly trained. Officer
personnel were all thoroughly indoctrinated in Naval Gunfire
nd had received additional training under the direction of
naval Gunfire.Section, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. Their
knowledge and understanding of the capabilities and limitations
of Naval Gunfire served to produce the most efficient use of
this invaluable supporting weapon.
Several casualties were suffered by SFCP personnel but
due to a higily efficient replacement program the Naval Gunfire
teams were never short of needed personnel. Enlisted replace
ments were rapidly furnished for communication duties by the
First Assault Signal Company. Officer personnel was furnished
by theJJaval Gunfire. Section, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.
Two NLcrs and one NGF spotter were sent to this Division prior
to the OKINAWA Campaign as Mon the spot" replacements. A
dispatch to Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force, --*-*
promptly
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the nature of some of the targets available, ( I . e . the SHDRI Castle) a l l three arms were employed on one particular target. This was found to be highly successful. There were several instances of the employment of a l l three supporting arms simultaneously on targets within a r e l a t i v e l y small area and there were no recorded cases of aircraft being h i t by our own Naval Gunfire or A r t i l l e r y . During the entire operation there was an officer of the G-2 Section assigned to keep the A r t i l l e r y . Naval Gunfire, and Air Liaison personnel Informed as to a l l targets uncovered by API, prisoner interrogation or translation of enemy documents. In addition to target information records kept by TIC this o f f i c e r kept a oard index of a l l targets and action taken as well as r e s u l t s which aided materially in assuring adequate f i r e on a l l targets and helped to eliminate duplication of f i r e on any one target. Plans Victor or Negat were used very l i t t l e and were, for the majority of the air s t r i k e s , unnecessary. I t i s believed that Plan Victor and Plan Negat are not necessary, for aircraft can, through proper briefing, operate i n an area where Naval Gunfire ana Artillery are f a l l i n g . The Control Station i s informed as to the acirauth and direction of fire of Naval Gunfire and A r t i l l e r y ; p i l o t s can then be Informed as to the aafe direction from which to make their attack. COORDINATION OF FRONT LINE UNITS I t was generally necessary for the Control Station to clear with adjacent front l i n e battalions before running a c a l l s t r i k e . In many cases i t was further necessary to clear with more than one unit on either or both flanks of the unit requesting the air s t r i k e . *t can be e a s i l y seen i n an operation of t h i s s i z e (where on an average there were four d i v i s i o n s in the l i n e ) that certain requests would be sub mitted requiring clearance from an adjacent d i v i s i o n within one corps and at times with a division of the adjacent corps. In oases of clearing with adjacent battalions of t h i s Division only there was very l i t t l e delay as the front l i n e clearance was requested via the SAR net. There was only one instanoe where two men were injured in an adjacent unit of t h i s Division during the carrying out of a strike for another unit of t h i s Division, and in that case clearance had been obtained. Where clearance had to be obtained from units of another d i v i s i o n of the Third Amphibious Corps, the process was more involved and A required more, time. However, in general the s i t u a t i o n was -handled hf use of the SAR net and was eecured promptly enough.
v , .
..
*-
- 2 VH
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of However, In the case
having to clear a missffm wTth^a** unit of the adjacent Corps the situation l e f t much to be desired. Due to the fact that the XXIV Corps Control Station was on a different frequency the front l i n e clearance had to be secured via t a c t i c a l wire either by the Control Station or the Divisions concerned. This caused much delay and in several instances resulted in Strike Groups of the XXIV Corps h i t t i n g the l i n e s of units of this Division. EXECUTION OF MISSIONS As the operation progressed the execution of the missions improved considerably. However, the problem of aircraft f a i l ing to report on station on time caused a large number of s t r i k e s to be cancelled. Since Air Support i s to aid the Infantry i t i s most l o g i c a l that the Infantry should not change their attack plans as a result of aircraft falling to check in on station at the previously designated time. In many cases, particularly i n early morning attacks prior to the Jump-off the coordination of f i r e s Naval Gunfire, Artillery and Air were timed to the minute and the failure of aircraft to be on s t a t i o n resulted in a period when the enemy was not subjected to any of our supporting f i r e s . This i s a most important item and i n future operations every effort should be made by a l l hands to correct i t . Aircraft must be on station on tlme There were instances of the delay of aircraft due to being unable to l o c a t e the target resulting in the cancelling of s t r i k e s . However, when i t was possible for front l i n e units to display panels and mark the target, as i t was in the majority of the cases, the execution of the strikes was highly satisfactory. AIR LIAISON PARTIES The function of the Air Liaison Parties was excellent both for air strikes and a i r supply drops. The fact that there was a large percentage of the officers and men who were experienced showed i n the way the net was conducted. Good Judgement was generally shown in requests for air support and in the targets selected. The ALPs demonstrated a thorough knowledge of communication doctrine and procedure.
The present communication equipment supplied the ALPs i s considered satisfactory although i t i s believed that i f the radio Jeeps were replaced with radio weasels i t would enable the battalion vehicular radio equipment to keep up with the movements of the battalion during Inclement weatner when the roads become^veryjniddy.
- 3
om&siHi
AIR OBSERVATION
The use of air observation continued to show its relative
merits and its importance. The use of the air observer was
coordinated with the use of artillery spotting planes to give
the maximum amount of aerial observation obtainable.
AIR SUPPLY DROPS
Air supply drop was the determining factor in this
Division's rapid advance southward after the SHURI break
through. Had it not been for Air Supply the troops would have been unable to receive any type of supplies for, due to the
heavy rains, the roads became impassable and it was impossible to supply them even ty tracked vehicles. A total of 561 TPM
loads of supplies were dropped totaling nearly 400,000 pounds
of all types of supplies. During the initial phases of Supply Drops the weather was in several instances hazardous for
flying, however, the pilots did an excellent Job of bringing
the supplies to the front line units even though in several
cases it was necessary to drop bv instruments and radar. The pilots of VMTB 232 did excellent work during this period.
AIR EVACUATION
Air evacuation by light aircraft from Just in rear of the
front lines was not instituted by this Division until late in
the campaign. However, during the period of 13 days in which
air evacuation was employed a total of 641 casualties were
removed to rear areas. The initial evacuations were made from
a straight stretch of highway 1200 feet long and 12 feet wide
that was clear of most hazards. Later on a small strip was
built from which the aircraft could operate more freely.
Many lives were saved as a result of the lessening of time
required to transfer casualties from front line aid stations
to the base hospitals. During the peak of evacuations there
was one casualty leaving the air strip every 17 minutes.
RECOMMENDATIONS
It is recommended that the Control Stations be provided
with additional radio equipment to Permit them to monitor the
nets of adjacent Control Stations. It is impossible for the
battalion and regimental ALPs to monitor their own frequencies
and those of another Control Net as well. This would
facilitate the obtaining of front line clearance of adjacent
units operating under different control station!
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JIEHASSIHE
(e) Dtirlng the period of almost continuous
rain for two weeks the maintenance of wire lines was
extremely difficult. After several days of rain Jeeps
could not operate at all, and the few weasels available
to communication units proved valuable. However as the
roads became worse due to the continued rainfall and
heavy traffic even the weasels became useless and tne
use of 2-1/2 ton, 6x6, trucks became necessary. The
weasel is a valuable supplement to the Jeep for wire
laying and line maintenance, but it is by no means a
substitute due to its snorter life and greater maint
enance required. The rainy period was a trying one to
wire personnel but all hands exerted themselves to tne
utmost and the decrease in communications efficiency
was slight.
(f) Telegraph service was not employed within
this division although in some locations direct simplex
telephone circuits were installed between the Division
Message Center and Regimental Message Centers. Tne tel
ephone system of the Artillery Regiment, centering around
a TC-4, was operated in a normal manner and gave excell
ent service. As in previous operations, the Switchboards
BD-71 and BD-72 were not entirely satisfactory due to
their poor ratio of weight and bulk to capacity for tel
ephone lines and their vulnerability to moisture.
Infantry Regiments made use of their TC-416 except
during rapidly moving situations. All TC-4's tnat were
used performed in a satisfactory manner.
(g) The T/0 allowance of wire personnel is gener
ally adequate provided the men allowed are furnished In
proper quantity, rank and speciality. Tnis division suff
ered a serious handicap in that this operation' was begun
with a shortage of 219 wiremen and suffered 38 casualitiee
(9 KIA and 29 WIA). This shortage was further complicated
by a large shortage in rank and tne failure to have re
ceived any substantial amount of promotions for over a
year. A small number of radio personnel were used as wire-
men and a considerable number of basics were field trained
and used as wire personnel. In tnis latter matter, the
quantity of basics thus absorbed for communication duty
reached tne saturation point with a shortage still ex
isting. None of the replacement communication personnel
received during the operation were wiremen.
3. RADIO COMMUNICATIONS
Ii
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***! -
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0!t!E
ULULAOJH i t
age in rated personnel and the nearly total absense of promotions. The casualities suffered by radio personnel added uo to 49 with 2 KIA and 47 WIA, A 1-^rge majority of the ^ev communications replacements received during the operation were radio repairmen and technicians with only one radio operator (^SN776) being received.
4,
MESSAGE CENTER
(a) Message Center operation was normal and efficiently conducted. 3cheduled 8nd special messenger service was operated and good service was given except during the period of heavy rains when the speed of mes sengers was greatly reduced. Jeer* travel was impossible ^or a number of days and messenger runs h^d to be made by 2^-ton, 6x6, trucks, or on foot. Sufficient weasels we^e not available to r>ermit their use by the Division Message Center. (b) The cryptographic aid9 employed during this operational period we-e CSP-1500 (Hagelin), CCBP 0130-D3 (Assault Code)'and CSP-2156 (Shckle) Plus a class 2 ashore allowance. These were adequate and were r>roperly used. Navajo talkers were widely used to safeguard class ified information on voice circuits. Their performance while Blow ws satisfactory and further training should Improve their speed. All incoming messages were screened and marked for distribution by a Communication Assistant to the Chief of Staff. This provided F>Y\ excellent solution for the problem of setting up the distribution for each message received & sent. Separate cooies were made for each office to which the messnge was routed. (c) The present Marine Corns Field Message Book
is excellent for field use in lower echelon command ^osts
but is not satisfactory for use at a Division Headouarters
as it is too small. The form N.M.C. 929 A&I WAS sucess fully used.
(d) The T/O allowance of personnel for Message
Center is adeouate for operations. This Division was
short 18 Message Center men u oon embarkation and suffered
7 casualities, all WIA. The Message Center personnel
were also affected by the general l*ck of rated men andi
promotions.
5,
SIGNAL SUPPLY
The Signal Supply situation was generally satisfactory, despite the extended period of operations. The items in most critial need were; Wire W-1.30 en DR-8's; Wire V-110-B on DR-4'3; SCR-536'sj^ SfceX qu; - 8
S5
- 9 -
DESmfi
33/
6,
RECOMMENDATIONS.
FIED
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26 27 13 0 0 6 5
( 4 ) Headquarters Company, Infantry B a t t a l i o n . Sig-192 Radio Set SCR-300 Sig-204 Radio Set SCR.608 ( i n Truck, 1 / 4 - t o n , 4x4) Sig-237 S t e e l Helmet^ Navy Type Sig-249 Te jegraph Set TGk-5 Carrier, Cargo M-29-0 9 0 5 2 0 12 1 0 0 1
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( 9 ) Headquarters and Service b a t t e r y , A r t i l l e r y Regiment (Communication Platoon) Carrier, Cargo, M-29-C (10) Headquarters and Service Company, Motor Transport B a t t a l i o n . A , TL-135 Axte, HL-27B Case, MCS-2 Chest, BC-5 C l i p , TL-123 lineman' s Equipment MTE-1 S i g - 2 0 7 / 4 Radio Set M Z Sig-211 Switchboard BD-72 Sig-242 Tag MC-72 Sig-245 Tape TL-83 Sig-253 Telephone EE-8 Sig-260 Terminal S t r i p TM-iS4 Sig-297 Wire, W-110-B on DR-4, miles 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Field telephoneman (C?)64l)13 Radio Operator (CP)(776) 13 Radar beacon Operator (CP) 0 Private First Class/Private
Field Te Jephoneman
13 (CP)(64i) 0 Radio 0perator(CP)(776) Air Liaison Section
Captain
Air Liaison Officer (ACI)
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- 17
JDELJ1?C!
ANNEX
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bridglng u n t i l L/6 and no damage was done* But had there been a need fpr bridging before this time the results could have been ery s e r i o u s . Also note that some galley lumber was l e f t on the beach at PAVUVU. This was due to the fact that loading spaoe was cut down at the l a s t minute. Because of a need for heavy equipment in the earlj stages of the operation i t i s suggested that a higher unloading priority be given to the shipping with engineer equlDment aboard. Supply has been very good on the whole. I t has hot been satisfactory, however, in regards to spare parts. The replenishment on truck and Jeep parts has been very slow and on heavy equipment not at a l l / Equipment was deadlined for twenty days because requisitions were not f i l l e d . The acute situation on spare parts for motor transport and heavy equipment i s due to the fact that most of the items were not issued when requisitioned by this organization in staging area. All vehicles and equipment brought forward were in an operating condition when unloaded. Lettered companies moved south with their respective combat teams on 30 April, 1945, and remained with them until 5 May, 1945, at which time they reverted to battalion control. One platoon was then detached to each combat team to perform necessary engineer tasks and allowed to c a l l upon the Battalion for additional engineer equipment needed. This system was used u n t i l the completion of the operation on 22 June. 1945, On 17 June, 1945, a platoon of engineers were attached to Combat Team Eight to support the advance of their infantry. During Phase I I I the platoons under battalion control were employed in road and bridge construction, maintaining bridge guards, water supply and performing other engineer t a s k s .
MINE R M V L AND T N - ENaiNEER T A S E OA AK EM The removal of mines assumed great importance in expediting f i r s t , the movements of tanks and second, the movement of supplies to the front l i n e s . Although the enemy made extensive use of mines the damage caused was relatively minor, due to close l i a i s o n between the engineers and infantry and tank u n i t s . Most of the mines were placed in the shoulders and tracks of the roads and at intersections. The only real mine-field pattern consisted of two (2) rows of mines in the tracks of a one-lane road staggered at five (5) pace i n t e r v a l s . This pattern was used several times. A great number of mines were scattered in open f i e l d s and valleys apparently for harassing purposes. A total of three hundred
- 3
L'LASSIi
^3
MfiUttW
and f i f t e e n (315) mines were reported and another estimated three hundred (300) were removed but unreported due to the exigencies of combat. The mines encountered were single horn anti-boat mine, terra cotta mine, wooden box mine, yardstick mine, tape measure mine and two new tyoes. One of these was a twenty-eight inch (28*) diameter anti-tank mine and the other was a small serrated anti-personnel mine. Many of the mines had a booster charge of picric attached to them which proved to be very e f f e c t i v e . Most of the mine removal was done by probing, augmented by the standard mine detectors* Probing proved to be most satisfactory slnoe the detectors picked up a l l small fragments and caused frequent delays. I t i s believed that mine detectors would prove useful i n many instances i f highly trained operators were available. Such training would require months of work rather than days. Mines were de-loused by fuse removal or detonation i n place. Tank-engineer teams worked successfully in many instances when tank approaches were mined. Much of this work i n front of the tanks was done under heavy enemy f i r e and no doubt saved many tanks. The use of the "Demolition Snake" was anticipated i n the W N D A Area to clear a path for tanks AA RW but due to the d i f f i c u l t y in c o l l e c t i n g the necessary parts the device was only p a r t i a l l y assembled when a break through was made by our troops. An attempt should be made to carry a complete "Snake" unit on the next operation and other mine removal devices suoh as the tank f l a i l and r o l l e r . Engineer Battalion equipment damaged by land mines included two (2) TD-18 Dozers, one (1) D-8 Dozer, one (1) Motor Patrol, one (1) P u l l Grader, one (1) Cargo truck and three (3) Dump truoks.
DEMOLITIONS
Extensive use was made of heavy demolitions in closing
oaves and destroying emplacments. Approximately sixty
thousand (60,000) pounds of explosives were used in closing
a total of three hundred and thirty-four (334) caves and
numerous gun emplacements. It was found that the most
efficient method of cave closing is to use a five (5) man
demolition team. More men than that are not needed for the
Job and fewer casualties are received. In this respect, unit
commanders should at all times consult the engineer officer
attaohed to his unit for an estimate of the personnel and
equipment needed for a given Job since often more men and
ear were requested than were actually needed to do the Job*
n most instances the engineers received excellent cooperation
in their 1B avy demolition work. Occasionally there was an
insufficiency of explosives In the unit quartermasters1 dumps
and it is recommended that extra demolitions be carried by
~~ D t R W ^
JEDLASSIFIED
BRID&INS
<.;;
them to meet emergencies which arise when supply l i n e s lengthen and roads become Impassable. Enemy demolitions can be classed as good, H demolished E most of the important bridges and blew many effective road craters which were well placed in deep cuts or large f i l l s .
Pre-fabricated bridging was found to be Indispensable to the advance of the Division front. Nine (9) Bailey Bridges, two (2) 35-ton Temporary Pier Bridges, one (1) 10-20-ton Temporary Pier Bridge and one (1) 25-35-ton Pontoon Bridge , were erected during this period. All bridges were marked as to speed, load l i m i t and type of t r a f f i c . Bridging in general was satisfactory, but Division Engineer Battalions should be allowed by Corps to establish forward Bailey Bridge dumps to expedite erection since a bridge of the Bailey type i s generally needed on short order. Since this Battalion had p r a c t i c a l l y no training in the ereotion of the Bailey Bridge prior to leaving PAVUVu some d i f f i c u l t y was encountered in night erection. In addition to t h i s , flares usually illuminated the bridge s i t e and drew considerable enemy f i r e . Night errection of this bridge may prove satisfactory on the next operation i f the Engineer Battalion i s allowed sufficient time from camp construction to properly train these men. The decision as to the type of bridge crossing should be made by the engineer o f f i c e r , of the combat team, and not by infantry or tank personnel. Often there are fords or culverts that can serve as temporary expedients until a more permanent structure can be erected. ROAD CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE. Road construction and maintenance for the Engineer Battalion was of paramount importance since the Division 1 s zone of action covered ground which had no existing roads that could be used as MSK's without a great deal of work. In general the roads were sufficient for sui^ply except for a period of approximately eighteen (18) days from 15 May to 1 June, 1945, when torrential rains made t r a f f i c over d i r t roads impossible. Two (2) coral p i t s , three (3) rubble p i t s and one (1) sand p i t were worked for road surfacing by two (2) threequarter yard shovels. Routes #1, 9, 34, 36, 37, 40, 44 and 153 were maintained and several new sections of road b u i l t . Many tank t r a i l s were b u i l t with armored bulldozers which were constantly employed on and in front of the front l i n e s .
"*-'.l **
i*
V
DETOlFIED
^Yr
S1FIEH
TRAFFIC C N R L OTO Traffic control was carried out by a platoon of MP's working with the Engineer Battalion. This system proved to he very s a t i s f a c t o r y and i t i s strongly recommended that on future operations the Engineers be allowed to work out the t r a f f i c control plan i n close coordination with the Military P o l i c e , I t i s particularly necessary i n country i n which t r a f f i c c i r c u l a t i o n i s one-way only. Realizing the varied functions of the Military Police Company and i t s limited personnel i t i s also recommended that a greater number of men be assigned 1to t r a f f i c control since this i s an important faotor i n keeping MST s open. All roads were marked with Route number and directional
signs and a l l towns were pas ted with names.
C B STRIPS U Two (2) cub strips were built for evacuation of wounded.
MAINTENANCE OF EQUIPMENT
Once again the operations of the Battalion were hindered
by a serious lack of spare parts both for heavy equipment
and motor transport. At times thirty percent (30) of the
engineer equipment was dead lined due to the lack of spare
parts, which condition was relieved only by the determination
and ingenuity of the officers and men in that section* Before each operation numerous requisitions have been submitted to
base depots but have not been filled, which condition can be
relieved only by pressure from higher authority.
The resupply of both parts and equipment damaged beyond
repair was non-existent. Not one piece of equipment destroyed
by shell fire or mines was replaced. The only emergency
requisition filled was one for parts for a motor patrol.
The parts were flown from GUAM but the time lapse was in excess
of thirty days before the piece of equipment was off the
deadline. In short the field deoot serving this organization
had completely inadequate facilities in this respect. This
lack of resupply coupled with the initial shortage of spare
Darts caused a difficult and nearly disastrous situation
that could have brought the operations of this Battalion to
a near standstill. It is restated that this deplorable
condition was alleviated only by the ingenuity and
resourcefulness of the officers and men in the Battalion
Equipment Section.
*m
JELLIFIED
WATER SUPPLY
Water supply was eminently s a t i s f a c t o r y during t h i s period* Average d a l l y output was 70,000 gallons and a t o t a l o f 17 water p o i n t s was operated using streams and springs* Surface water treatment followed tie method e s t a b l i s h e d by Tenth Army I . e . : a d d i t i o n of c h l o r i n e , f i l t e r alum, and soda ash followed by one (1) hour s e t t l i n g before f i n a l f i l t e r i n g . This method insured the e l i m i n a t i o n of flukes and c y s t s thought to be present i n the surface water on t h i s i s l a n d . At no time did the D i v i s i o n suffer from a lack of p u r i f i e d water. TRAINING SCHEDULE After PELELIU t h i s B a t t a l i o n was put to work on camp c o n s t r u c t i o n and a l i m i t e d period a f t e r January 1 , 1945, devoted to t r a i n i n g . This t r a i n i n g was of considerable value but the time a l l o t t e d for i t was d e f i n i t e l y i n s u f f i c i e n t . The t r a i n i n g of engineer personnel i n road construction, bridge e r e c t i o n , demolition and water supply, cannot be accomplished overnight contrary to popular b e l i e f . A minimum of three months should be allowed t h i s B a t t a l i o n for t r a i n i n g i f i t i s to enter the next operation f u l l y prepared for i t s Job. During t h i s time the B a t t a l i o n should be completely r e l i e v e d of camp c o n s t r u c t i o n , RECOMMENDATIONS In summation, the following recommendations are made as a r e s u l t of c l o s e observation during the OKINAWA Campaign: (1) Time be allowed for complete I n v e s t i g a t i o n of a l l methods of mine removal for tanks, Including thorough t r a i n i n g of s k i l l e d operators for the e l e c t r i c and radar-type d e t e c t o r s . (2) A l l u n i t s be thoroughly i n d o c t r i n a t e d to consult t h e i r engineer o f f i c e r s before making d e c i s i o n s concerning engineer tasks such as bridge e r e c t i o n and heavy d e m o l i t i o n s . (3) S u f f i c i e n t M i l i t a r y P o l i c e personnel be assigned to work i n c l o s e coordination with the engineers to maintain proper t r a f f i c c o n t r o l . (4) Recognition be taken of the f a o t that u n l e s s a supply of spare parts for heavy equipment and motor* transport be made a v a i l a b l e to t h i s b a t t a l i o n before the next o p e r a t i o n , i t s operational e f f i c i e n c y w i l l be s e r i o u s l y impaired.
<%$; -HZ
HECIASMD
IASSIHED
LOGISTICS ANNEX
Special Action Report
Nansei Shoto
Unloading Report
%--
v^-*
20
3o
The rapid advance of front lines promted many urgent calls for vehicles0 This was so con trary to planning during the loading phase * . * that?, "added-to the notable slowness of LCT launchin&s, these* requests could be filled h ' only ill part; Vehicle requests further con fused the unloading procedure of designated selected cargo0 W&:
4a
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8 April, 1945
9 April, 1945
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ENCLOSURE E
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ENCLOSURE
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MOTOR
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ENCLOSURE E?
3-7^
U\S!!F
* OECLA
37*
Headquarters and Service Company landed on call at v " 1402 on the left flank of Beach Yellow One, set up the
Division Shore Party Command Post and assumed control of
operations of Beaches Blue One and Two and Yellow One and
Twoc
A reconnaissance was made of Beach Yellow Three to
determine the feasibility of using Beach Yellow Three for
the direct landing of small craft Beach conditions Justi
fied the intended use of Yellow Three and at 1530 Company
H B
A was called ashore to land on Beach Yellow Two and pre
pare Yellow Three for the receiving of cargo0 Company nAw
landed at 1800 and set up a defense of the right flank of
Yellow Twoo
The 29th and 32nd Replacement Drafts were called on to
the beach and arrived in the late afternoon of LOVE Dayc
These troops were utilized that night in the preparation of
the Beach Defense0 The defenses were strengthened by the
strategic use of armored amphibian tractors which were not
required for the support of front line troops0
Communications between the beach and the ships was
established by Naval Beach Parties who landed with the com
mand elements of each beach Lateral telephone and radio
communication between the beaches and telephone communica
tion between the dumps and the command post of each beach
was established by the JASCO elements in the afternoon of
LOVE DayQ
Due to the fact that transfer barges did not arrive on
the transfer line at schedule time, priority cargo was
transferred by hand from small boats at the edge of the
reef to LVTs for further transportation to the dumps and
direct delivery to front line troops0 By 1800 of LOVE Day
only six of the twelve transfer barges had arrived to com
mence transfer of cargo as planned0 Unloading of priority
cargo continued on a full scale until the morning of LOVE
plus two days, at which time general unloading of assault
shipping commenced*
TThe unloading of priority cargo was seriously impeded
by the late arrival of barge mounted cranes which were to
establish the transfer llne0 These barges which were car
ried aboard LSTs were to have proceeded immediately to the
APA's and AKA 0 s, receive their cranes and then proceed to
the transfer linec Two of the barges were lost in transit
to the target area and the full transfer line was not esta
blished until LOVE plus two days0
v All evacuation stations were operated under the direction " of the Senior Medical Officer of the Battalion,, With the
completion of unloading of assault shipping all evacuation
stations were operated " y the Battalion Medical personnel
b and all stations except one on Beach Yellow Two were closed.,
Casualties were evacuated from the beach by LVT6 and DUKWs
to the transfer line and there loaded aboard small boats to
LST (H)s for further disposition to the Hospital ships
PI A^tnrn
nrn ^iFiFn
%# * * &MEDXCAL ANNEX
Special Action Report
Nansei Shoto
Medical planning was in accordance with directives from
higher authority and with SoOPo, and based upon experience
gained in previous operations. The medical plan has shown the
benefit of proper planning prior to the operation,.
Late in January 1945 a Medical Officer, with wide experien
ce in clinical medicine, was assigned temporary duty as the rep
resentative of the Division Surgeon to investigate health con
ditions found in the operations at LEYTE, GUAM and SAIPAN, His
investigations showed that this step was invaluable in the pro
per planning of an operation. Many of the diseases expected on
OKINAWA were found in LEYTE. As a result of this investigation
proper recommendations were mp.de to the staff, resulting in no
cases of Schistosomiasis and negligible dysenteries, in spite
of the fact that great numbers of streams have been found to be
contaminated,.
Loading of medical supplies, equipment and personnel was
done in such a way as to give maximum dispersal,,
Sanitary conditions aboard the various ships were excell
ent* Daily inspections by troop and ship's medical officers
maintained a very high degree of sanitation Sick call showed
a negligible amount of sicknesses requiring hospitalization.
Heads were adequate. Galleys and messing facilities were excell
ent, galley personnel of the ships were aided by troop cooks
and messmen0
Medical personnel attached to the line Battalions and Reg iments landed with their units at various times on LOVE DAY, The Medical Battalion started landing on Love plus One and by Love plus Six all medical battalion personnel and equipment was ashore without loss, On Love plus Five Medical Companies "D" - "E" and H&S Medical Battalion started erection of the Division Field Hospital Patients were received on Love plus Seven0 The Field Hospital was located on the main North-South
highway and provided easy access for ^j^ttl^tf|s.j|Ewc|y|ion pro-
0&^::^:%i**& '*
ceeded smoothly Cover was partly natural and partly artific ial9 camouflage nets being used to great advantage0 The wards, admission tent, laboratory, pharmacy, operating room and X-Ray were dug in to a depth of three or four feet and banked with sand bagSo All essential departments were light proofed and all work was able to continue in emergencies0 Sufficient cots' were set up to care for 200 cases, with a reserve oh hand to expand to 400 in an emergency^ Evacuation for the first week was from the beaches to LST (H) 949 and 950, which had been designated as casualty receiving shipso All evacuation was promptand all casualties received adequate treatment in a very short while after being wounded. After the first week all evac uations were through the Division Field Hospital and the III Corps Evacuation Hospital N d 30 A total of 460 combat casualties were treated, of these
524 were evacuated and 136 returned to duty0 Three died of
wounds while under treatment0 Disease and injuries (acciden
tal) totalled 1084, of these 447 were evacuated, 60? returned
to duty and 4 died0 A grand total of 1544 cases were treated0
At this time a total break down by types is not available0
One Hospital Corpsman and 19 marine enlisted personnel are
attached to combat teams to serve as sanitary squads* Their
function is immediate non-specific insect control in the combat
area during the assault phase0 These teams are supplied with
DDT in Oil and spraying equipment and have proven invaluable in
their specific taskSo
Until water points could be established and tested, all
water used by this Division was either obtained from ships or
was combat loaded at the staging area0 The first water point
used distillation, later the method involved filtration and
chlorinatlon was adopted,. As water points were established,
weekly analysis was maintained,, No outbreaks of any water borne diseases have been encounteredo
C" and HK" rations have been used by combat troops and
have been satisfactory as to quantity and quality* A number of
10 in 1 rations have been used, and have proven far superior to
all other ratlonso No hot food has been prepared until screened
galleys were available^ as well as boiling water for cleansing
[Q outbreaks of any gastrointestinal diseases have fe^T'e^flc'o'Sn^eredo
2c
ASSiFIE
**>^
' - > * i #
*-
?*Y
doubled In efficiency if the Army style Jeep ambulance were a doptedo Our present type carries two stretchers and the Army
type carries four stretchers.
The full allowance of quartermaster supplies were carried
and have been adequate. Some losses in smail items occured at
the beaches on landing. These items weres storage tents, tent
poles, shovels, picks and other engineering tools0 These loss
es were replaced in a short while. Resupply has been adequate.
Prior to the operation, each medical company was issued 200'
suits of khakio This practice is considered ideal and should
always be continued, as morale of evacuees is greatly elevated
by bathing and having clean uniforms. Supplies have been
adequate with the exception of ward tents. Each Medical Com
pany could operate much more efficiently with 5 ward tents each0
Bakery equipment should be incorporated into the galley equip
ment of each Medical Battalion, the value of good hot food being
ea-sily seen0 Supplies and equipment are suitable.
Epidemic and Malaria Control equipment and supplies have
been adequate,, Fifty men with heavy equipment were assigned to
this unit from the attached Construction Battalion and proved
to be valuable. This practice should be continued so that a
high degree of efficiency can be maintained. These same person
nel should remain attached to this unit for the entire operation
both for operation and administration purposes. This would pre
vent the loss of trained personnel and discipline would be im
proved,
RECOMMENDATIONSi
(1) That unit commanders be held strictly accountable for
sanitation in their area3, ,
(2) That the amount of large ambulances be increased, A
total of twenty-five (25) is considered to be the minimum num
ber that will enable the Medical Battalion to properly evacuate
patients over large land masses that will invariably be en
countered in future operations,
(3) That steps be taken to replace all International Ambu lances with Dodge Ambulances0
nr '] .v?tirirn
Phase I I I
On 30 A p r i l 1945 when elements of t h e D i v i s i o n s t a r t e d moving t o t h e Southern S e c t o r "ABLE" Medical Company was moved n e a r ISA (TA 8280-X) and immediately s t a r t e d r e c e i v i n g c a s u a l t i e s on t h e same d a t e . Due t o the r>roxlmlty of the main NorthSouth Highway "BAKER" Medical Company was moved on the f o l l o w i n g day t o J o i n "ABLE" Company and form an advanced D i v i s i o n F i e l d H o s p i t a l . C a s u a l t i e s were r e c e i v e d i n p;ood c o n d i t i o n end i n s u b s t r n t i a l numbers. This advanced F i e l d H o s p i t a l w?s l o c a t ed behind a l a r g e r i d g e which p r o v i d e d ample r>rbtectlon from t h e o c c a s i o n a l enemy a r t i l l e r y s h e l l s e n c o u n t e r e d . Keeping pace w i t h t h e t a c t i c a l s i t u a t i o n "CHARLIE" Medical Company on 2 May 1945 was moved t o UCHITOMARI (TA 7877-K), r e c e i v i n g c a s u a l t i e s on t h e same d a y . With t h i s Medical Company l o c a t e d a p r o x i m a t e l y two miles s o u t h of the advanced F i e l d H o s p i t a l , and on t h e main North-South Highway, a smooth r u n n i n g c a s u a l t y e v a c u a t i o n system was e s t a b l i s h e d . The main D i v i s i o n H o s p i t a l composed of H&S Medical B a t t a l i o n , "DOG" and "EASY" Medical Companies remained n e a r CHIBANA (TA 8788-H) u n t i l 24 May 1945 a t which time i t was moved n e a r FUTE4A (TA 8 0 8 3 - 1 ) . P r i o r t o t h i s time and w h i l e under t h e XXIV Corps t h e chain of e v a c u a t i o n had been from our advanced F i e l d H o s p i t a l s t o t h r e e Army F i e l d H o s p i t a l s i n c l o s e proxim i t y . During t h i s p e r i o d t h e Army Medical D e p a r t m e n t ' s c o o p e r a t i o n was a t a l l times e x c e l l e n t , a d d i t i o n a l ambulances, s u p p l i e s and l a u n d r y s e r v i c e s were g l a d l y f u r n i s h e d at a l l t i m e s . Without t h e s e a d d i t i o n a l ambulances our s i t u a t i o n would have been c r i t i c a l . I t was d e s i r e d t o move t h r e e Medical Companies f u r t h e r South d u r i n g t h e l a s t week i n May, but t h e Impassable roads made t h i s i m p o s s i b l e and no moves could be made u n t i l 7 June 1945 a t which time "ABLE" Medical Company was moved t o NAHA (TA 7 3 7 2 - T ) . The move ^Tas s t a r t e d a t dawn and by 1600 t h e same day c a s u a l t i e s were b e i n g r e c e i v e d and t r e a t e d . No attempt was made t o u t i l i z e any b u i l d i n g s i n t h e c i t y as i t has been found t h a t a much b e t t e r s i t e f o r a h o s p i t a l can be o b t a i n e d by u t i l i z i n g a b u l l d o z j r . t o push away a l l pf^tfrtff; fcul&d-Jhngw, Kiiwkpther
?tf
mmm
Evacuation throughout the Campaign was novel in that at one time or another everything with wings, wheels or tracks was
**4* ' ;: J">4w# - 3
yLnaCTWLU
3/^
utilized. During the heavy rains of late May and early June evacuation was greatly hampered by knee-deep mud on all roads, and for several days the only vehicles able to get through were 2% ton 6X6 trucks; even the amphibious tractors were bogged down many times. The break-through of the Seventh Regiment to the coast near ITOMAN allowed the collecting section of "CHARLIE Medical Company to reach this area by water while fighting was still going on both Worth and South of this point. The roads to the East still being nothing more then a quagmire, a method of evacuation had to be devised. A t the suggestion of and through arrangements made by the G^4 Section of this Division, evacua tion by Cub Plane was initiated, using a paved road that stop ped approximately 400 yards North of the collecting station. This road worked excellently as a cub strip and from 11 June 1945 until 30 June 1945, 503 of our casualties and approximate ly 200 from other units were evacuated in this manner. These casualties were flown in a matter of a few minutes to the Cub strip located near the Division Field Hospital where a Medical Offie er and sufficient ambulances were standing by to transfer them to the indicated hospitals in the rear areas. This method of evacuation should occupy paramount consideration in planning future operations, as a strip can easily be prepared and in most cases existing roads may easily be utilized. The primary thought of a casualty is to get out of the area. The Cub evac uation provides a rapid and safe method of getting casualties to hospitals in the rear. Experience has shown that this met hod of evacuation is a definite morale booster as well as life saving in that definitive surgery can be initiated much sooner. V/eesels were found to be pracically useless for evacuation be cause of their ability to carry such small numbers of casualties and their inability to negotiate heavy mud. Evacuation on fut ure operations x^ill be extremely difficult unless the T/A of ambulances is increased materially, a more detailed study of this subject will be presented in the subsequent paragraph con cerning Motor Transport. Another important factor in evacua tion is the crying need for tra lned litter bearers, it is be lieved that a minimum of 100 personnel should be assigned each line Regiment as litter bearers. In those periods when the Div ision is out of combat these personnel could very well be used as service troops. DDT continues to be the ideal chemical in fly and mosquito control, it is believed that the high toxicity of Sodium Arseni te precludes it's use around combat troops. The Epidemic and Malaria Control Unit attached to this Division has been inval uable. '
*w'*iWi ^^ ->##
j
51o
***.
S p e c i a l Action Report Nansei Shotc CASUALTIES AND REPLACEMENTS B a t t l e C a s u a l t i e s s u s t a i n e d i n the OKINAWA o p e r a t i o n a r e summar ized: KIA OFF. SKL. F i r s t Marine Division Attached Units F i r s t Marine D i v i s i o n Reinforced Combat Team E i g h t 2dMarDiv
54 1079 1 16
260 5993
8 105 1
1
12
11 1
139 4 143
55 1095
1 48
12
12
A breakdovn by o r g a n i z a t i o n f o r each month i s shown below, Navy c a s u a l t i e s b e i n g shown i n p a r e n t h e s i s : KIA OFF. F i r s t Marines
April May June
TOTAL
VIA 1SML. 15
OFF.
2 ( 1)
ENL.
11
7
18
261 dc) go ( 1)
356 (11) 9
4g 15 ( 1) 65 ( 2) 45 ( 2) 67 ( 2) 6 ( 1) 41
26 ( 2)
3
% 1533 (29) 385 ( 4) 1961 (33) 29 1022 597 1648 ( 1) (24) (13) (38)
9 3 12
4 U
c
17
( 1) (14) ( 3) (18)
^1
DE64&S
1 s t Engineer Bn. -April May June TTL OA l 6 t Pioneer Bn. i^ril May June TOTAL Division Hq. Bn. April May June TOTAL 1st Tank fti.
April
May
June
TOTAL
1st Service Bn. April May June TOTAL 1st Mot. Trans. April May June TOTAL
VIA OCT, l e t M e d i c a l Bn. 4*11 May June TOTAL ML. ( 1) ( g ) ( l) (10) OFT. ( 1) ( i) ( 2) SKI, 1 3 (33} 1 (22) 5 (55)
First Marine Division 4>rU 7 May 33 June llf TOTiL 5*1 1st Anph. Tree. &u 4>ril May Jane TOTiL 8th imph. Trac. &u ifcril May June TOTiL 3rd Ann* ioqpih* n ipril May June TOTAL 3 r d Anph. Truck Co. ipril May June TOTAL l e t Assault Sig. Co. April May June TOTAL
27 1^7 77 251
( ( ( (
3) 3) 3) 9)
1 2 3
k 9 13 1 7 1 1 9 6
1 1 2
1 1
2 8 2 2
1 1
2(1) 2 k ( 1)
-3
?*
WIA _ _
fc
OFT.
3SNL.
2
2
2 2
k
4 t h War Dog P i t . 4>rll May June TOTAL VMO # 3 April May June TOTAL M i l t . Govt. D e t . B - 1 0 April May June TOTAL 2Sth fiepln Kraft April May June
TOTAL
1 1
1 3 4 1
. 4
2 2
2
. 2
7(1)
7 ( 1 )
April May June TOTAL Co.B, 8 6 t h Chem.M. Bn. April Mfl * y, June
TOTAL
2 2
10 8 18
i4 2
16
fiECLASStniB
3f.
KIA
OFF. Attached Units ipril May fune TOTAL Summary Total
USMC USE USA GHAND TOTAL 55 55 10*& 51 1095 DIED QF WOUNDS
April OFF. ENL. May OFF. 256 10 2 268 1 1 ENL. 6(1) 7 2 15 ( 1) OFF.
WIA
ENL. 31 ( 2) ^ 20 ( k) 99 ( 6)
1 5 ( 1) 1 7(1)
First Marines Fifth Marinea Seventh Marines 1 Eleventh Marines 1st Engineer & 1st Pioneer &u Division H<i. Bn. 1st Tank fti. 1st Service Bn. 1st Mot. Trans. S i . 1st Medical ftu TOTAL, letMarBlv 1
1 k 2 7 2 9
1 1 2 1
36 18 28 1 3
3 1 " -
10 17 13 ( l ) 1 " 1 1 "'
1 6
2 -
88 1
U
-
U3 ( l )
1
UU ( 1)
89
-5
By Organization
* MIA^.002%
By O l a s Q i f i c a t
DEW8IFIED
*
MORALE:
The morale of the reinforced Division at the time of
the landing was excellent. It was, in fact, strengthened
by the amazing lack of resistance and the rapid advance
aeros8 central OKINAWA. The cool weather was a welcome
relief after almost two years in the tropics, as was the
change in scenery.
In view of tne fact that the Division was scheduled for early withdrawal from the target, no appreciable amount of recreation equipment was carried.* Movie equip ment was, however, Included in the scheduled L / 6 ship ping, and movies were made available to units who desired to show them on L / 17. Enemy air activity interfered with attempted programs in most cases, but the attempt to provide movies was nevertheless a factor in maintaining nigh morale. Ten-in-one rations, the new rtCH rations and the early
establishment of the Division Bakery contributed to the
well-being of the troops. Gratuitous issue of PX supplies,
and the many comfort items furnished by the Red Cross were
well received. Separate recommendations concerning aug
menting gratuitous issues have been initiated and directed
to the proper Marine Corps supply agencies.
Postal service throughout the campaign was excellent.
For the most part, airmail service to and from tfte United
States was tne fastest experienced by this Division since
its departure overseas in the Spring of 1942. Parcel Post,
however, including magazines normally distributed by the
Recreation Ori'icer, accumulated due to the changed desti
nation of the rear echelon. Some 720u bags were unloaded
from tnree snipsnot rear ecnelon snipeand the storage
and transportation of this one item was a heavy task to
place on tne already overburdened motor transport.
As the end of tne eighty tnree day operation approach
ed, morale was naturally lowered by reason of having been
employed steadily wlthouu relief from the front lines for
the last fifty five days. This, comolned with the directed
change in renabiiination areafrom HAWAII to OKINAWA where
it was once again necessary to build a campcaused a con
siderable let-down in morale.
16 80 40 78
1429
0 3 0 0 35
16 83 40 78
1464
**S
CHAPTER :m...
-INTELLIGENCE...
SPECIAL ACTION REPORT NANSEI SHOTO...
Vor
INTELLIGENCE
Special Action Reaort
NAN3EI SHOTO
Reconnaissance and Observation Posts:
The 1st Reconnaissance Company landed on LOVE DIUS one.
On LOVE t>lus two the company was motorized and made a recon
naissance in force along the right flank of the Division Z
of A to the East Coast. This mission enabled right flank
units to advance rapidly to their objective in column.
Following this mission the company was employed in mop
ping up operations and providing security patrols in various
sectors of the Division defense sector.
Six weeks orior to embarkation higher headauarter3 in
formed the Division that it would be authorized to send a
total of seven men, one each from the assault battalions, and
one from Division Headquarters, to accompany UDT personnel on
beach reconnaissance of the Target. Division Intelligence
Section set up a school of two weeks duration in order to
train the personnel chosen for this mission. On 20 March,
1945, three officers and four enlisted were flown to LETE
where they Joined the UDT assigned to carry on the recon
naissance. On LOVE minus three and LOVE minus two, two recon
naissance missions were carried out of beach and reef con
ditions, and much valuable negative Information was obtained.
On LOVE minus one the Division personnel returned to those
ships where their respective unit commanders were embarked
and made their reports from information from questioning UDT
swimmers. This Information proved to be of great value and
supplemented that from other sources.
The Division Reconnaissance Company was assigned the
responsibility of operating all observation posts established
by Division. However, due to the rapidity of advance and
the lack of strong organized resistance by the enemy in the
Division Z of A, it was not deemed necessary to establish
Division OPs. After the first several days, OPs were set
ut) by Regiments in their defensive sectors.
Prisoners of War:
The nature of the campaign within the Z of A of the 1st Marine Division rendered the information gained from the questioning of local civilians, OKINAWA Home Guard personnel f little tactical Importance. From the an&.Jsna f&eJX** - 1
*>
MMS1F1E'
.*'+
* i , *
Hi
Ho*
UCLA3& IL
males of m i l i t a r y age who were suspected end h e l d , during the p e r i o d of confusion r e s u l t i n g from ordere and counter orders i s s u e d by D i v i s i o n and Military Government o f f i c i a l s , as p o t e n t i a l l y dangerous to the carrying out and accomplish ment of our m i s s i o n . I t was f e l t that the unique nature of the campaign o f f ered an e x o e l l e n t opportunity to use e n l i s t e d personnel as r e g u l a r i n t e r r o g a t o r s . They were used to supplement the r o u t i n e q u e s t i o n i n g of reguler PWs by o f f i c e r s of the Lang uage S e c t i o n . The venture, under the circumstances, nroved s u c c e s s f u l , but not without s t r i c t supervision and careful checking by language o f f i c e r s . In a l l the questioning con ducted at the stockade language e n l i s t e d men and o f f i c e r s were used as i n t e r r o g a t o r s and not merely as i n t e r p r e t e r s . The information gained which could have been converted i n t o t a c t i c a l use was so l i m i t e d by the rapid advance across the i s l a n d t h a t i t s value was governed by the changing s i t u a t i o n . Information from c i v i l i a n s and prisoners aided i n con firming the presence of u n i t s suspected of being i n the v i c i n i t y , a s s i s t e d i n e s t a b l i s h i n g the complete Order of B a t t l e of our Z of A, and helped by d i s c l o s i n g both s p e c i f i c and general areas to which the c i v i l population had evac u a t e d . The knowledge of one c i v i l i a n , a dope addict, proved of value t o the XXIV Corps and he was taken d i r e c t l y to t h e i r headquarters. Other c i v i l i a n s had information about t h e southern area of OKINAWA but for the most part i t s gen e r a l i n t e r e s t proved greater than i t s m i l i t a r y v a l u e . Captured Documents: During the campaign a large amount of printed 8nd written material was turned i n to the language s e c t i o n for evaluation and t r a n s l a t i o n . Due t o the fact that the D i v i s i o n Z of A was i n a t h i c k l y populated area a preponderance of material turned i n was c i v i l i a n l i t e r a t u r e and of no m i l i t a r y v a l u e . A l l material was scanned and c l a s s i f i e d into s i x groups. (1) (2) (3) (4) '> * Combat (recent operational orders, defense p l a n s , 00B information, and maps showing defensive i n s t a l l a t i o n s , road and t r a i l n e t s ) * U l t r a (material of current i n t e r e s t to I I I Phib Corps and other f o r c e s operating in the area) Corps (material of current i n t e r e s t to I I I Phib Corps and other f o r c e s operating in the a r e a ) . Routine (material which i s of l i t t l e Immediate value to higher echelon but Important s t r a t e g i c -
i^-aiiy., -, *.:. ;v
_,^ . v"ir5r *
*" fctf Civil affairs (documents and material of interest to the Military Government Section such as docu ments of banks and business concerns, birth cer t i f i c a t e s , insurance p o l i c i e s , e t c . ) . (6) Souvenir (material of no strategic or military value). Two (2) officer interpreters were assigned to each of the assault regiments and one (1) to the reserve regiment. Due to the nature of t h i s operation, these officers were employed mainly on patrols searching for documents and rounding up c i v i l i a n s . When possible the documents were sorted into appropriate groups and sent on to D-2. Whenever documents of immediate value to the regiment were discovered, they were verbally translated to the R-2 who entered the import ant d e t a i l s in the Journal and disseminated the information by telephone and messenger. Rather than make detailed trans l a t i o n , i t proved more expedient to take that Information im portant to the regiment in question and then forward the docu ment immediately to the translators section, D-2, marked "Imm ediate Attention". Other documents primarily of interest to Division were marked "CombatM and sent on at once by D-2 Liaison team messenger* Routine material was sent to Division C by regular P messenger run or by other available transportation. Material of no strategic or t a c t i c a l value was retained in regiment stamped by officer Interpreters and returned to the battalions as souvenirs. When conditions permitted three (3) officer interpreters and one ( l ) enlisted man were on duty in the translation sec t i o n . Due to the great number of c i v i l i a n s , i t was often im possible to retain t h i s many men in the Division CP. Upon arr i v a l at Division CP, documents were sorted into appropriate categories and those of Importance were translated' immediately and given to D-2 for dissemination. Documents having mainly 00B information were turned over to the officer interpreter specializing in such information. Maps bearing useful information were translated at onoe or sent to Corps immediately. Translations were marked with date and number of trans l a t i o n . Such numbers were consecutive for the whole operation*
^s^fefca' 4 :-.;$
4.
^ir
CO
I
W ^ * * A division field problem was held on GUADALCANAL during
January, 1945 which included a Command Poet Exercise Intell
igence information was instigated by Division, and the same
Information was disseminated back to D-2 by lower echelons.
This enabled the Division Intelligence Section to keep a
close check on how information was disseminated by Regiment
and Battalion Intelligence Sections. Wire and radio, comm
unications were established between all units participating,
and a complete test of communications was observed. The
functioning of the Division Combat Intelligence Section was
stressed during this exercise.
The Combat Intelligence Section functioned in the follow
ing manner during the operation:
(1) (2) Liaison team for each Infantry Regiment consisting
of one (1) officer and three (5) enlisted men.
Sufficient officers and enlisted personnel were
selected to run the Division Intelligence Sec
tion on a twenty-four (24) hour basis. One (1)
officer was charged with the responsibility of
handling all Intelligence reports required by
hi^ier echelons; he had no other duties to
perform.
The Japanese Language Section was organized in the follow ing manner for the operation:
2) 3) (4)
\l)
Interrogation Section.
Translation Section, Order of B a t t l e . Psychological Warfare.
In addition, language personnel were assigned to the following u n i t 8 : (1) (2) Infantry Regiments M i l i t a r y P o l i c e Company
When the t a c t i c a l s i t u a t i o n permitted, Division Language personnel a s s i s t e d the Counter-intelligence Corps which were attached to us by TENTH Army. After landing at OKINAWA they a s s i s t e d i n i n t e r r o g a t i o n and segregation of c i v i l i a n s and army personnel. Maps and Relief Models, Procurement and Distribution; With regard to accuracy, d e t a i l , general value and quan t i t y , maps furnished for the OKINAWA operation were notably superior i n a l l r e s p e c t s to previous operations. Favorable comments was noted from the infantry regiments, p a r t i c u l a r l y with the 1:5,000, 1:10,000 and 1:25,000 maps. I t i s recom mended t h a t maps of these scales in q u a n t i t i e s sufficient to meet the demands of combat and landing teams for future amph ibious landings, p a r t i c u l a r l y those covering the immediate beachhead a r e a s . The superimposed numbered and l e t t e r e d grid square sys tem on l i n e maps and t a c t i c a l maps found great favor in a l l u n i t s , experience having been gained in use of such system, f i r s t used by t h i s Division in the PALAIJ campaign. A r t i l l e r y and a i r u n i t s expressed great s a t i s f a c t i o n with t h i s system. One f e a t u r e regarding maps for t h i s operation was the fact t h a t a 100 percent map reserve was available over and above the o r i g i n a l allotment to the Division. After ample d i s t r i b u t i o n was made to a l l u n i t s , Division's immediate r e s e r v e , l e s s necessary combat maps carried by D-2, were box ed for d e l i v e r y at the t a r g e t area on LOVE plus 7. However, due t o the swiftness of our advance and great distances cov ered by a t t a c k i n g t r o o p s , Infantry u n i t s were c a l l i n g for addi t i o n a l maps of t e r r a i n immediately to t h e i r front after the f i r s t few days* To f u r t h e r complicate matters, the ship bear ing map boxes scheduled-for LOVE plus ^ i d jipt arrive u n t i l
Hl4 A
Which of these units were assigned to the 2nd and 3rd Bn's
is not clear, but evidence from the dead and oaptured indicates
the 44th Airfield Bn, the 6th Fortress Construction Duty Unit,
and the 503rd Spec Guard Engr Unit constituted their main
strength*
Less than half the members of this regiment had rifles.
There were 55 LMGs (often as few as 2 per company) in the
regiment; 10 HMGs; 5 AA Mach Cannon (20mm); and 18 grenade
dischargers* No heavier weapons were included* In retreat
the regiment was able to emplaoe some bombs and dynamite as
mines or booby-traps, but it abandoned more of such materials
than it used* A very few airplane machine guns appear to have
been taken along in retreat.
DEGLASSfW
y/s
:
1
> ' ; - .
" V .:
ie decision to leave only t h i s inadequate foroe in a defense of the YONTAN and KATENA a i r f i e l d s evidently was made in January, 1945. A naval battery (manning two 6-inch guns) on KATCHIN Peninsula was withdrawn, and i t s guns aban doned. The 5th Co, 12th Independent Infantry Battalion, 62nd Division, which had been on duty at OUSHIKAWA, apparently was pulled back to the main defense sector at about the same time* Only the 2nd Co, 12th Independent Infantry Battalion, - about 120 men - was l e f t , at HANZA (in the 6th Marine Division Z of A). I t became "regimental reserve n for the 1st Specially Or ganized Regiment. An original intention to defend the Z of A of the 1st Marine Division i s indioated by the military roads; concrete s h e l t e r s or earth revetments for tanks or v e h i c l e s ; A guns, T FA and AAA emplacements; bomb shelters and caves; and inf antry trench systems, which were scattered throughout the area. However, they never were occupied. Organization and Tactics: w The enemy in the Division's Z of A adopted a course of action l e a s t suspeoted of him namely, a general withdrawal
from the area. This retreat was accomplished some time prior to our landing. Documentary evidence i s insufficient at t h i s time to e s t a b l i s h the date of that action more c l o s e l y , a l though the probability i s that the withdrawal was neither conceived nor effeoted before 21 March, 1945.
In the planning phase of the OKINAWA operation i t was believed that t h i s Division would be opposed by approximately 8,500 enemy troops whose major strength lay in two infantry battalions and their attached a r t i l l e r y , and one probable a r t i l l e r y regiment. This estimate was set from aerial photo graphs, a rather in ac our ate method of determining infantry organization, and extremely meager documentary evidence. On LOVE-Day there was no manifestation of t h i s number of troops, and I d e n t i f i c a t i o n of u n i t s to date has established not 8,500 but only about 2,150 enemy in our zone when we landed. As y e t , the enemy has not been encountered by t h i s Division in any strength greater than one company. The Division Z of A had been prepared for defense. Aer i a l photographs indicated a moderate to strong beach defense i n depth with echeloned strong points ocoupying the high ground up to 6,000 yards in the rear of the landing beaches (nhotographic coverage beyond that point was inadequate) YofaTAN and KATENA a i r f i e l d s appeared to be defended by one - 12 -
OECLASQiniu
infantry battalion each, located in a perimeter defense with supporting a r t i l l e r y on the high ground immediately behind them, a defense that overflowed v e i l into this Division Z of A# None of these defenses were ocoupled on LOVE-Day; the landing was unopposed on a l l unit fronts, The ever-present i n f i l t r a t o r was, of course, encountered in the Division 2 of A# He i n f l i c t e d some casualties, but the effectiveness of his measures to harass our forces remains doubtful. There were several ambushes of our patrols by squads and other small for ces of the enemy* Some passive defense measures were encoun tered. A few roads were mined, several bridges blown, oaves and equipment booby-trapped. But generally speaking, we may consider enemy forces in t h i s Division's Z of A to have effec ted an almost oomplete withdrawal. In arriving at a r e l i a b l e conclusion to explain t h i s un
expected t a c t i c a l decision, the following facts, brought to
l i g h t by c i v i l i a n testimony, P interrogation, translation of
W captured documents and other souroes have been established:
(1) (2) (3) (4) There never were many soldiers i n the Division Z of A, and those troops there l e f t the area three to ten days before our landing. Y N A and K T N a i r f i e l d s were never used exten OTN AEA sively. In November, 1944, one division of the forces garrisoned on O I A A l e f t , and these troops KN W have been "pioked up" in FORMOSA. Total troops on OKINAWA are now estimated to have numbered approximately 52,000 on LOVE-Day. This figure has been reached from the three specific souroes l i s t e d above. The enemy situation after LOVE plus ten, i f not confirmatory, was not at variance with t h i s estimate. On or about LOVE plus eleven, TENTH Army troops driv ing South on O I A A contacted what appeared to be KN W the OPLR for a large troop concentration. Earlier (LOVE plus eight) a map captured by t h i s Division i d e n t i f i e d troops in the NAHA-SHURI area whose numbers would t o t a l , by T/0 strength, about 34,000* Japanese forces in South CHINA have been strengthened in anticipation of an a l l i e d landing there.
(5)
(6)
The enemy probably f e l t that his forces on O I A A were in KN W s u f f i c i e n t to hold the two important areas in the Southern onethird and most m i l i t a r i l y important portion of the Island the/YOJjTAN-KATENA a i r f i e l d area and the NAHA-SHURI sector. The l a t H r ^ c i i i d e s ,the ; island*s; two ohief towns and three main
*** V,.. A
- 13
<//?
QttlSSIfJED
However, in sr>ite of the incontestable fact that the NAHA SHURI area is the more important of the two, nevertheless, the
YONTAN-KATENA area, though secondary in importance, would have
been of great tactical importance in denying us the aDDroaches
to the enemy's hub of resistance oentered about the strongly
fortified SHDRI district.
The terrain which characterizes the YONTAN-KATENA zone
does not lend itself so well to the defense as that which lies
on the approaches to SHURI from the north, but none the less,
an enemy as experienced and as determined as the Japanese could
have held that area against the 1st and 6th Marine Divisions
for at least two weeks. Had the enemy employed his infantry
with his customary disregard for human life, he could have made
our advance across the central part of OKINAWA so costly, that
the two Marine Divisions would not have been prepared for fur
ther offensive action for some months, and he would therefore
have greatly lessened the pressure on his forces defending
the Southern lines of defense.
By sacrificing a portion of his artillery and mortars, of
which he has great concentrations in OKINAWA, and by assigning
to elements of his infantry the suicidal mission of defending
Central OKINAWA to the death, a doctrine which is the rule with
him rather than the exception, the enemy could have wreaked
havoc on the two assault Marine Divisions as they crossed the
difficult reef defending the beaches on which we landed. He
could have taken advantage of the observation which the high
ground inland offered him, and forced us to sacrifice men and
materiel out of proportion to his own losses, while we advanced
across the unfavourable terrain which rises inland from the
narrow coastal plain.
The enemy's great tactical error was to permit two Corps
of American troops to get a firm foothold on OKINAWA, and to
land unmolested their prodigious amounts of materiel. The
enemy must compensate for the material disadvantage under
which he has to combat us, by displaying a greater willingness
to sacrifice human lives, and, when he can, he must also make
every effort to reduce that margin between his material resour
ces and ours. Since we are on the offensive, and must
- 14
v/r
With few exceptions, a l l eneiry equipment encountered by t h i s Division on OKINAWA was of o r t h o d o x design and manufac t u r e . Small numbers of nearly a l l standard infantry weapons. - 15
^te****'*8*^
H
9/
. A So "and including 37mm) wero Captured, although there was a notable absence of H O and mortars, the only examples of Ms the former being one ( l ) Type 92 Lewis, .303 (several a i r craft MGs,- including Type 89 Vickers, .303, and a Type 100, 7.92mm, twin mount were found), and of the l a t t e r six (6) 50 m grenade dischargers, Type 89. m No f i e l d or mountain a r t i l l e r y was either captured or
observed, although some 105 m ammunition was found caohed
m in a burial vault. Heavy caliber mortar and a r t i l l e r y s h e l l s
were reported f a l l i n g i n nearly a l l areas, but fragments r e
covered were too minute for i d e n t i f i c a t i o n .
Mines and booby-traps were widespread. Some roads were mined by 63 kg. (and larger) aerial bombs set nose up in the ground; caves, by aerial bombs and Dutch land mines. In some Instances equipment and household furnishings were booby-trap ped with improvised pressure or pull devices (wooden boxes and/or t i n cans containing an explosive and a push-pull i g n i t e r or fuse cord). Several similarly fabricated home-made hand grenades were also found. Naval weapons captured Include two (2) six-inch coastal defense guns emplaced in casemates on the high ground of KATCHIN H N O overlooking the sea and eleven (11) "suicide" AT motor torpedo boats. Four (4) aircraft fighters, were captured. General equipment was encountered in much larger quan t i t y than were weapons. Considerable communications and e l e c t r i c a l gear was found, including one ( l ) small radio station, numerous f i e l d and aircraft radios, four (4) radar vans, trans formers, generators, and spare parts. Seven (7) trucks in operational condition were captured and put to use. Considerable a i r f i e l d and aircraft equipment, demolitions, and engineering gear was encountered, and large dumps of medi cal and quartermaster supplies, gasoline, and fuel were l o c a t ed. A large proportion of the supplies (and motor transport) were u t i l i z e d by the military government. Three (3) new or otherwise significant developments may be noted. One i s the ever-increasing evidence of hurried production i n small arms; most of the r i f l e s captured were badly machined, poorly finished, and had stocks that were hardly more than the original stock blanks. Second, several
Y "fl 4J
- 16
***>;/*
i \ i
DECLAS
**/
USLASSlHtD
MCUSSIFIFD
INTELLIGENCE
DE
i" "~
i"elon OPs from 1 May until the close of the
OKINAWA operation. One platoon of the company was
detached for this mission. The OP was usually locat
ed from 200 to 500 yards behind the lines and was able
to keep the G-2 and G-3 Sections well informed con
cerning both friendly and enemy movements. The OP
was probably most effective in locating enemy OPs and
other small concentrations. A large 20-power Japa
nese scope was used and terrain afforded excellent
vantage points. During the last two weeks of the
operation, two OPs were maintained between 1900 and
0550 in order to obtain a fix on Red artillery flashes.
Communications:
Communication with G-2 was maintained by direct
wire, supplemented by an SCR 610 radio in the event
the former failed.
PRISONERS OF WAR:
Interrogation:
Notwithstanding the difficulties which were posed
at times, by inclement weather and lack of transporta
tion, the procedure of interrogating Prisoners of War
at the various levels within the Division adhered to
the SOP. Brief and pertinent information was gained
at regiment and complete interrogation reports were
submitted and attached to the daily periodic reports
at Division. The mechanical process of evacuating
Prisoners of War from their places of capture
eventually to the Division stockade was on the whole
satisfactory. Failure in some cases served to remind
that the successful execution of the procedure was
at the mercy of transportation.
Interrogation work was unmarked by any outstand
ing developments. Three language officers were kept
well occupied in questioning Prisoners of War and pre
senting their information in a succinct and readable
report. In the closing stages, when the opposition
disintegrated and Prisoners of War were lees valuable,
- 2
DECLA
DECLASSIFIED
**?
Vo^
(6)
defensive Installations).
Ultra (material of immediate concern to
higher echelon, such as codes).
Corps (material of current interest to III
Phib Corps and other forces operating in the
area).
Routine (material which is of little imme
diate value to higher echelon but important
strategically).
Civil affairs (documents and material of in
terest to Military Government Section such as
documents of banks and business concerns,
birth certificates, insurance policies, etc.).
Souvenir (material of no strategic military
value).
OOB. However, s u r p r i s i n g l y enough, considering the f a c t that our l i n e s were s t a b i l i z e d f o r some days a t various p o i n t s , a l a r g e amount of material of immediate value (both OOB and otherwise) was found and t r a n s l a t e d . COUNTERINTELLIGENCE: At the time the D i v i s i o n entered the l i n e on Southern OKINAWA i t was apparent that several enemy c a p a b i l i t i e s e x i s t e d requiring c o u n t e r i n t e l l i g e n c e measures. With the probable heavy i n f l u x of refugee c i v i l i a n s through our l i n e , the enemy could begin an i n t e n s i f i e d plan of i n f i l t r a t i o n of s o l d i e r s d i s g u i s e d a s c i v i l i a n s f o r the purpose of espionage and sabotage. Upon gaining a c c e s s to our rear areas, s t r i c t c i v i l i a n c o n t r o l would be required to apprehend these agents and t o prevent espionage and sabotage. The enemy could d i s patch Jap s o l d i e r s to pose as f r i e n d l y n a t i v e s i n M i l i tary Government camps f o r the purpose of securing p o s i t i o n s of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y under Military Government J u r i s d i c t i o n . The p o l i c y was e s t a b l i s h e d and adhered to of g a i n ing c o n t r o l of a l l c i v i l i a n refugees from the time they were apprehended, and maintaining t h i s control u n t i l evacuation to the rear area camps. Consequently, no c i v i l i a n s were permitted to be out of the compounds without armed guard e s c o r t . The r a t i o of one guard to twelve i n d i v i d u a l s was maintained. Personnel of the 310th Counter I n t e l l i g e n c e Corps Detachment were attached to G-2 f o r the purpose of accomplishing c i v i l i a n screening i n accordance with procedure d i r e c t e d by Headquarters, Tenth Army. The i n i t i a l plan developed and coordinated by G-2, G-l, CICt and M i l i t a r y Government, was as f o l l o w s : (1) Mobile C o l l e c t i o n Point. M i l i t a r y Govern ment and the D i v i s i o n Provost Marshal operated the Mobile Forward C o l l e c t i o n Point with the o b j e c t i v e of g i v i n g the RCTs the g r e a t e s t p o s s i b l e a s s i s t a n c e i n evacuating c i v i l i a n r e f u g e e s from the t a c t i c a l zone e x p e d i t i o u s l y . Refugees were transported immediately to the M i l i t a r y Government C o l l e c t i n g Point, given medical treatment, and prepared f o r further evacuation to the r e a r . At t h i s p o i n t a l l males 15-45 years of
7 -
Lw^/iWWi
holding the Individual concerned for a detailed spe-'*/ clal interrogation. Tentative disposition of the re fugee was determined at the completion of this check, their nationality as OKINAWANS having been previously established by the CIC Aides. All those of Prisoner of War status or those classified as potentially dan gerous, were turned over to the Provost Marshal for detention. Those of no further intelligence value were released to Military Government. The completed questionnaires were assigned file numbers and indexed as to subject and geographic location. At the close of the campaign, upon completion of the CIC mission in the 1st Marine Division Z of A, these files were avail able to the CIC Detachment under Island Command for use in the control of civilians throughout the island. . (5) Security Check: Throughout the campaign, the
310th CIC Detachment made security checks of various
types to determine the existence of security viola
tions or laxity which would be of possible aid to
enemy intelligence ( i.e. handling, storage, and
transmission of classified documents). Radio security
in general was considered satisfactory. Check of
security as to use and storage of Millies and Mollies
by the units using them indicated that adequate pre
cautions were taken. One instance of temporary loss
was reported but investigation established that there
had been no compromise of security. No reports of
blackout violations were received.
(6) Additional use of CIC Aides: By use of the
specially qualified and trained CIC Aides as inter
mediaries, successful use was made of a sound truck in
persuading groups of OKINAWANS to surrender. Consid
erable reasoning was necessary In some instances to
overcome the Japanese propaganda with which the natives
had been indoctrinated.
(7) Results of Counter Measures: With the strict
control of civilians in the Division Z of A, movement
by enemy agents on any roads within the sector was
prevented. On the night of 4-5 May the enemy attemp
ted counterlandings in large numbers in our rear area
north of MACHINATO. Most of these forces were quickly
mopped up by our patrols. Examination of the bodies
and equipment of tfie Japs showed them to be armed with
i*mfo^**?*
- 9
% *
*"- - v ~*&vM!m*v **** "* %0$0 ;rous an occasional interrogator was loaned to
this Division by III Phib Corps. In addition, one offi
cer previously hospitalized in Pearl Harbor rejoined
the Division on 28 May, and a new enlisted language
man Joined on 13 June. This gain was partially offset
by the loss of one officer by transfer to FMFPAC on 12
June. Shortly after 0-Day, (22 June, 1945) one officer
and one enlisted man, who were attempting to get Japan
ese soldiers and civilians out of caves, became casual
ties when their sound truck hit a mine. They were both
evacuated, leaving the total number of language person
nel one less than on L-Day.
^RiBWIoWi'
Maps:
Throughout the campaign on Southern OKINAWA,
maps of the same scale as those listed in the Central
OKINAWA operation were used. In addition, three re
visions of the tactical map, scale 1:25,000, were
printed by Tenth Army, these revisions containing
additional terrain information and contour lines ob
tained from later photo coverage, plus transposal of
similar information from captured Japanese battle
maps. A complete replica of another captured Jap map,
covering the NAHA-YONABARU line and Southern portion
of OKINAWA, scale 1:10,000, was also printed and dis
tributed. The third revision of the 1:25,000 tactical
map was also "blown upH to scale 1:10,000 and distri
buted.
During the operation, the tactical map, scale
1:25,000, was used as the Division's official battle
map. The 1:10,000 maps were occasionally used by
platoon leaders because of their greater clarity of
small portions of terrain.
The revised maps were vast Improvements over the
original maps used in the Central OKINAWA campaign,
according tc reports and comments by Regimental, Bat-
BWSjWt*,*
j^-:**^t
talion and assault unit officers. Higher Headquarters made the revisions available promptly and generally in sufficient quantity to permit adequate distribution
down to platoon leaders. The numerous printings and
revisions by higher Headquarters enabled this Division to keep an almost constant flow of maps going to lover units, particularly during the heavy rain period in
May when inclement weather took a heavy toll of maps
in assault units. The Division's map reserve, never
at planned strength (100J&), was, in most cases, able
to meet the problem of re-supply for lower units.
"" *
^3 8
DECHWWFIED
1 5
^MimiM
rii aocinrn
e ^ ...a'f t. ..^Ft*
- 18
CLASSIFIED
Mosaics:
A 1:7,000 Grldded Uncontrolled Mosaic, prepared by III Phib Corps, proved almost Indispensable throughout the latter part of the campaign. It was made available in sufficient quantities to be distributed to all com pany commanders and,platoon leaders. It was clear In detail and tremendous!^ simplified the problem of orien tation, both as to troopsandto photographs. Prior to the time this mosaic was received, the 1:16,000 Con trolled Mosaic, prepared by JCIRdPAO-OlKCIOA, was used* Although preferable to the map, this mosaic was extremely poor in detail 4- particularly: in the Southern part of OKINAWA, below SHURI. Tenth Army furnished portions of this mosaic which were gridded and contoured. These were available in great quantity and were distributed to the Regiments for the platoon leader' s use. During the operation, fifteen photo interpretation
reports consisting of identification of military Instal
lations, terrain studies, damage assessments, and report
on bridge conditions were prepared and distributed as an
annex to the G-2 Periodic Report. It was soon observed
that the mere listing of targets proved of little value ,
to anyone concerned, due to the inability to pin-point
the defenses on the map. The military installation re
ports were written with the idea of enabling the aerial
observer for artillery and naval gunfire, as well as air
strikes to locate accurately definite targets. This was
done by giving a brief description of the target area
and the target within this area. Excellent results were
obtained in this way.
Interpretation for front line units was done chiefly
by annotating the obliques before distributing them to
lower echelons. Only in this manner could defenses imme
diately confronting the assault troops be pin-pointed.
As the whole island of OKINAWA was filled with possible
defensive positions, an attempt was made to pick out the
strongest areas as area targets for artillery and naval
gunfire. Since nearly every ridge encountered by the
Division contained caves, scattered fox holes and rifle
pits, most of them prepared some time before, it was
believed that a listing of every installation such as
these, could mean no more to the subordinate units than
that opposition could be expected from every ridge which
**>&mmm*0&r^:l*
- 19
CLTOSTTI
**3
JF
strip within a feasible distance of the Division CP that could be used. It was the duty of the API Section to divide the TUTXB between the assault Regiments, prepare sortie plots, annotate the prints as to defenses, the
names of towns, and the coordinates of a definite point,
and arrange for delivery to the Regiments. Photographs
received'in time to to.of use to the unit that day were
dispatched to the Regiment immediately by Jeep. If not,
they were sent by the next message center run.
It is planned that in future operations, a part of
the API Section will operate at the nearest air strip,
so that they will be able to process all photographs
immediately and arrange for delivery to the assault units by *air drop" within the minimum amount of time. The use of "air drops* of course depends to a large extent on the situation, but if available and the distance from the
Photographic Unit and assault Regiments is very great, it is by far the most satisfactory method of delivery.
Relief Maps:
Showing considerable aptitude at improvising, the
Relief Happing Section, l6t Engineer Battalion, prepared
three relief model8 of key terrain features in the Divi
sion's Z of A during the campaign on Southern OKINAWA.
On 28 April, 1945, work was started on the first
model, which encompassed terrain in the Division's Z of
A from the high ridge north and east of AWACHA extending
down to and including NAHA-KO, NAHA and the KOKUBA-GAWA;
from the west coast extending east to the northern end
of SHURI.
This map, fashioned of plastelena mounted on ply
wood, scale approximately 1:8,000, was prepared from
available aerial sorties, aerial mosaics, captured Jap
maps and the 1:25,000 tactical map. Available photo
coverage was so inadequate that it was necessary to
supplement this data by making both ground and aerial
reconnaissance of the area.
Special attention was given not only to the general
land masses, but also to the airport, rivers, road net
works, and towns existing at that time. Oil color was
applied to the above mentioned features for greater
* * t
"
&
&
OICLRSSM
*V
To:
<"/?
SHIMA.
1. The forces under your command have fought
bravely and well, and your Infantry tactics
have merited the respect of your opponents,
in the battle of OKINAWA SHIMA.
2. Like myself, you are an Infantry general
long schooled and 'practiced in infantry war
fare. You fully know the pitiful plight of
your defense forces. You know'that no rein
forcements can reach you. I believe therefore,
that you understand as clearly as I, that the
destruction of all Japanese resistance on the
island is merely a matter of days, and that
this will entail the necessity of my killing
the vast majority of your remaining troops.
3. My forces now firmly hold, and will con
tinue to hold, nearly all of OKINAWA SHIMA,
so that even at the present time it is fulfil
ling its function as an American base of
attack against the Japanese homeland. Since
your purpose in defending the island was to
prevent such use, and your purpose has been
thwarted, you are now following a course of
resistance which is of no value to the stra
tegy of defense of the Japanese homeland, and
which, in fact, is further depleting the re
serve of physically fit young men who must
rebuild Japan after the war.
4. As an infantry general, you comprehend
that one of the most Important duties in the
code of military leadership is that of respon
sibility for the welfare of one!s men. If
there is any possible means by which a command
ing officer can preserve the lives of his men
after the outcome of the battle has been de
cided, it is his honor-bound duty to employ
such means.
5. Although I will prosecute every battle re
lentlessly until final victory in this war
has been won, I also feel that in accordance
with the humanitarian standards of the United
States and the rest of the civilised world,
****'* -**
_24_
rirp
CUT
IFIED
* . *
- 25
DECLAWEB
JI*.
V H W v t r W w l "
none dared to accept the chance to surrender inasmuch as a combat team of the XXIV Army Corps on an adjacent h i l l s i d e was f o l l o w i n g the more orthodox system of r e ducing the pocket of r e s i s t a n c e through the use of flame throwers and tanks. The f o l l o w i n g day several c i v i l i a n s were persuaded to come out of hiding but no m i l i t a r y personnel were encountered. On OBOE p l u s 3, while continuing the loud speaker campaign, the truck carrying the MPA #L h i t a mine, d e s t r o y i n g the truck and injuring the o f f i c e r and e n l i s t e d man from the D i v i s i o n G-2 Language Unit, n e c e s s i t a t i n g t h e i r evacuation from the combat zone. During the OKINAWA campaign the h e a v i e s t l e a f l e t bombardment to date i n the P a c i f i c was carried out. It i s d i f f i c u l t to determine what percentage of the l a r g e number of p r i s o n e r s taken l a i d down t h e i r arms because of our propaganda appeal. During the l a s t s i x weeks of the campaign every prisoner interrogated by the 1 s t Marine D i v i s i o n I n t e l l i g e n c e Section was questioned concerning our l e a f l e t s . A high percentage of those questioned had seen one or more of the l e a f l e t s and some who had not seen them had at l e a s t heard of them. I t i s d i f f i c u l t to determine the percentage of p r i s oners who surrendered s o l e l y because of the l e a f l e t s . However, the number who were i n part influenced by them i s undoubtedly c o n s i d e r a b l e . I t i s worse than treason f o r a w e l l i n d o c t r i n a t e d Japanese m i l i t a r y person to d e s e r t rather than d i e or commit s u i c i d e . As a r e s u l t , a high percentage of those who are teken prisoner w i t h out any r e s i s t a n c e w i l l r a t i o n a l i z e h i s a c t i o n , seeking always to J u s t i f y h i s breaking of the w a r r i o r ' s code. In s p i t e of t h i s nearly u n i v e r s a l tendency on the part of the Japanese to deny d i r e c t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r sur rendering, there were a few who admitted having organ i z e d small surrender groups and who came i n i n accor dance with i n s t r u c t i o n s given on the l e a f l e t s . Among attached labor personnel and r e c e n t l y con s c r i p t e d defense troops there i s a greater response. I t was noticed t h a t these l e s s w e l l indoctrinated men surrendered i n g r e a t e r numbers. However, i t was en couraging to note t h a t a s the campaign reached i t s climax more o f f i c e r s and men from r e g u l a r l y organized
_27_ iirfH U A t f i r
Vxy
There was no widespread concerted effort on the part of the enemy to disseminate propaganda among Blue forces* However, on three occasions Japanese-prepared propaganda l e a f l e t s were found within t h i s D i v i s i o n ' s Z of A. The f i r s t one (#1) was taken from the body of an enemy s o l dier found in a cave at TA 7975-N, by members of H & S Co., 1st Engr. Bn., on 13 May, 1945. Leaflet Number 2 (#2) and number 3 (#3) were taken together by troops of "GeorgeM Company, 2nd Battalion, 1 s t Marines. They were found on an enemy s o l d i e r ' s body in TA 7873-1, 23 May. Leaflet number 2 was written by brush in script on one of the 1:25,000 Blue Forces map sheet8 for central OKINAWA. An oral report from troops of the 77th Division r e l a t e s that an identioal l e a f l e t was found in their Z of A. Leaflet Number 3, l i k e Number 1, was reproduced by mimeograph on cheap quality paper and i s of i n t e r e s t largely because i t outlines the extravagant claims made by Japanese Army leaders to their own troops. All three l e a f l e t s are reproduced below, #1, Comrades.1
" ^28
rrWiTMnF
MUSE1FIE
#2
Think you old mother gazing at west sky and wait
ing for you come home.
Think your sweetheart embracing your portrait and
crying hot tears.
You never die.1 Your youth is only once for all.1
?ry
JUUSSiFiED
y**K'
DE&LMSU*
dash into the battle and die for the Emperor. Officers kicked the men around and showed no consideration for
their comfort. Strangely enough, however, even after
becoming prisoners, enlisted men were very reluctant
to criticize their officers in any way. Food became
scarce. The troops complained about the poor cooking.
In at least one Instance a sergeant was reduced to PFC
and assigned to line duty because he turned out such
poor meals. The officers issued detailed instructions
about cooking and how to maintain healthful conditions
while living in caves.
Rifle ammunition was scarce. Knowledge of this
fact was bad for morale of the troops, who had no
special desire to resort to suicide missions with
satchel charges and grenades. Orders were issued to
secure grenades and other supplies from the Americans
whenever possible and to conserve supplies and equip
ment in every conceivable way.
In spite of all the factors mentioned above, which
no doubt had a serious depressing effect on the morale
of the Japanese, the average infantryman continued to
fight desperately and to die at his post. It is use
less to say that because his morale is low, the Jap
soldier will not fight. The OKINAWA home guard may
have tried to escape, but as long as the regular Army
man had anyone to command him, he fought on. Of
course this was partly due to a deep-seated fear of
surrender and the widespread belief that the Americans
killed all prisoners. When, near the end, organized
resistance became impossible, more and more of them
v/ho could not bring themselves to the point of com
mitting suicide, laid down their arms and came into
Blue lines to surrender.
In the sense of will to fight and die for hie
country, the Jap soldier's morale was excellent
throughout the campaign. In general, he had confid
ence in his officers, especially in Lt. Gen. USHIJIMA,
and obeyed orders without question.
But morale in the sense of faith in victory was
at a very low ebb. After all, these men had seen
American might with their own eyes.
32
'%
ni
* fifiir
YSZ
% i*'
DttUSSiFIED
Order of Battle:
ii *
33 -
0KWSSIFIED
one company of the 22nd Ind. A/T Gun Bn., and the 32nd
Ind. A/T Gun Co., all of which had 47mm guns; and two
companies of the 81st F. AAA Bn., which had 75mm D/P
Guns. An unidentified unit or units also employed
four 37mm A/T guns against the Division in the same
period. Some of these units had seen heavy fighting
in April, but at least eighteen 47mm and six 75mm, in
addition to the four 37mm guns, remained when the 1st
Marine Division entered the lines.
Four additional 47mm A/T guns were employed a galnst the 1st Marine Division in the KUNISHI-MEZADO
sector, by the remnants of the 3rd Ind. A/T Gun Bn.
Tank destroyer teams, armed with demolitions,
A/T mines and A/T grenades, were detailed from infan
try units or were organized from second-line troops
and attached to the infantry on a liberal scale
throughout the operation.
Mortars:
In addition to approximately two hundred and
fifty 50mm grenade dischargers, which were organic in
rifle companies, forty eight 81mm or 90mm mortars of
the 1st Light Mortar Bn. and at least three 320mm
spigot mortar8 of the 1st Arty. Mortar Regt. were em
ployed against the 1st Marine Division during May.
One 320mm mortar and a few grenade dischargers
were left to delay the advance around TOHTGUSUKU MURA.
Intense mortar and grenade discharger fire was
encountered once more when the Division attacked the
KUNISHI-MEZADO area, where the remnants of the 7th
and 8th Companies, 2nd Light Mortar Bn., were in sup
port of the 32nd Inf. Regt.
Artillery:
Three battalions totalling thirty-six 15cm howit
zers (2nd Bn, 1st Med. Arty. Regt., and 1st and 2nd
Bn, 23rd Med Arty. Regt. ) and one battalion of six
15cm guns (100th Heavy Arty. Bn.) covered the enemy's
entire front north of SHURI. They entered the month
of May with 25-30 pieces operating. Several 12cm to
itii
*~sr
9(,0
^- w *T 22r lD
~* *
**^*ftwfWi
Kuissino
Infantry:
*&>! '-J#"V
38
Wz
JttfiUSEIFIED
""
i
_ _
*"' ' * ** < * *
mass - on the forward s l o p e , the c r e s t , and the reverse s l o p e . Automatic weapons, r i f l e , and knee mortar f i r e was d e l i v e r e d from the f r o n t a l p o s i t i o n s and from f l a n k i n g caves on adjacent h i l l s . 81mm and 90mm mortar f i r e and a r t i l l e r y f i r e of a l l c a l i b e r s were coordinated with small arms and machine gun f i r e . Once t h i s f i r e was n e u t r a l i z e d , the forward s l o p e s of the h i l l mass secured, and the c r e s t of the h i l l reached, severe infantry wea pons f i r e was r e c e i v e d from that area and from some of the r e v e r s e slope p o s i t i o n s that faced forward up the hill. Heavy weapons f i r e was coordinated with that de l i v e r e d l o c a l l y i n an a l l - o u t e f f o r t to force our w i t h drawal. Of the three phases, perhaps t h i s defense of the r i d g e c r e s t was the most f i e r c e . A h i l l could not be secured u n t i l the rear slope was occupied and cleared of a l l enemy troops, a task the Japanese opposed w i t h extreme t e n a c i t y . For with the c r o s s - c o r r i d o r , t e r r a i n pattern over which we were forced to operate, reverse slope d e f e n s e s , i n addition to preventing flanking a t t a c k s , formed more o f t e n than not one s i d e of a "pocket". From these well-hidden and sometimes almost i n a c c e s s i b l e p o s i t i o n s , the enemy fought with s k i l l and desperation. Grazing, e n f i l a d e machine gun f i r e was d e l i v e r e d from each c r e v i c e and corner, knee mortar f i r e f e l l on our troops from out of nowhere and mortar s h e l l s were lobbed i n t o the v a l l e y w i t h extreme accuracy and frequency. Here t o o , the en emy employed to b e s t advantage h i s a n t i - t a n k t a c t i c s , an element of h i s defense d i s c u s s e d separately. The enemy attempted only one (1) major counter a t t a c k a g a i n s t TENTH Army f o r c e s , that being an a l l - o u t l a n d , sea, and a i r a s s a u l t on the night of 4-6 May. This attack f a i l e d primarily because i t was l o o s e l y executed, although the idea - heavy a i r s t r i k e s , l a n d i n g s behind our l ^ n e s , and a land thrust a g a i n s t the Blue l e f t f r o n t - was a w e l l - c o n c e i v e d one. A l l other o f f e n s i v e a c t i o n was i n the form of small attempts at p e n e t r a t i o n and g e n e r a l l y haphazard night i n f i l t r a t i o n s . Artillery: The Japanese employed artillery^ in Southern
OKINAWA to a greater extent than ever before in the
ations of fire
pacific War. However, although on
received were heavy until the sy
LULndtull \
Y6j
Other a n t i - t a n k a c t i o n s had the following r e s u l t s : Cause Mines A/T grenades 20mm A/T fire Damaged 30 5 1 Damaged beyond r e p a i r * 1 0 0
F i f t e e n a d d i t i o n a l tanks were damaged beyond r e p a i r by enemy demolition teams o p e r a t i n g a t night a g a i n s t tanks l e f t i n the f i e l d . As can be observed from the above t a b l e , i n a d d i t i o n to h i s three-phase a t t a c k the enemy made extensive use of mines a g a i n s t our t a n k s . Generally t h i s damage* was i n f l i c t e d by a n t i - v e h i c u l a r mine f i e l d s placed on and along side r o a d s . However, i n several infltanoes the enemy s p e c i f i c a l l y , under cover of darkness, l a i d mines where tanks had been o p e r a t i n g i n the d a y l i g h t hours. Engineer: The enemy employed mines, anti-personnel, and anti-
vehicular, to a considerable but not extensive degree.
Usually these weapons wers buried along roads and in areas
where traffic was expected. The patterns were vague and
uncertain and it appeared that little planned, systematic
mining was done. The fact that the enemy often used roads
only a day or a few hours before Blue forces controlled
them may account for this apparent tactical blunder. The
incidence of hasty mining - sometimes by night infiltra
tors in rear areas - was much greater than that of planned
and deliberated mining.
2quipment (new development):
Enemy equipment encountered by this Division in
Southern OKINAWA was generally commensurate, in volume
and quality, with the Japanese forces engaged. With the
exception of two new type mines, all materiel was stan
dard.
Infantry weapons captured or destroyed were ortho
dox. Rifles and LMGs encountered were almost all Model
99, 7.7mm; HMOs Model 92. Mortars included all standard
'-*i^i^r:i-^v^ v - * * ^
- 42
43 -
IED
EClASJflf
ESW&SIFIED
*^mm ^BW MM m m W
W
mm
m wfW ^W
nrfitJifflfi
V L U LI I U U I 1 I
WW
f
RIFLE
LMG
^
*IFIE
- 45 -
DFPMAAtT
IFIED
were captured.
The extent to which the enemy employed radio in
conjunction with his OP18 is not definitely known.
Comparatively few radios were captured. On several
occasions, however, Japanese radio conversations
were intercepted on frequencies used by Blue nets.
Japanese 00B may be considered fair. Only limit
ed knowledge of what he knew concerning the identities
of the forces opposing him Is as yet available. The
first notation Indicative of the enemy's cognizance
of this Division was in an undated document captured
16 May by the 96th Inf. Div., although the enemy had
"identifled" two Marine Divisions early in the cam
paign. These previous documents named the organiza
tions as the 5th and 6th Marine Divisions.
- 47
V?/
CUAPTEQ. HX".
*?3
RESULTS OF OPERATIONS
Speclai Action Report
Nan e e l Shoto
1 . Area secured See attached map and overlay, 2 , Enemy c a s u a l t i e s The following casualties were Inflicted on the enemy
by this Division from 1 April, 1945 through 30 June, 1945.
a. Phase II (1 April, 1945 through 30 April, 1945)
Enemy dead Military PaW
687 27
b . Phase I I I (1 May, 1945 through 30 June, 1945) Enemy dead M i l i t a r y PsW 16,932 499 17,619 526
3 . Operational material damage to enemy The f o l l o w i n g enemy equipment was captured or destroyed on OKINAWA by the F i r s t Marine D i v i s i o n during the period 1 A p r i l , 1945, through 30 June, 1945. MACHINE GPN3 L G M
HMG
Gap 112 26 1 2 10
56 0
Pes
Total 210 58 1 6 10
12.7 13mm A/C M G MORTARS 50mm G/d Type 89 50mm Type 98 70mm Barrage 81mm 90mm &20mm {m&tfgot)
98 33 0 4 0
79 3
6 3 10 2 - 1
0 1 8
135 3 6 4 18
yf5tnfc^if itU
ARTILLERY 20mm AA 25mm AA 37mm AT 40mm AA 47mm AT 75mm AA Dp (88) 70mm Howitzer
75mm Field Piece
3" Naval Guns
3" CD
105mm Field piece 15cm Field Piece 6" CD Guns Unstated caliber Cap Pes Total
10 0 3 1 14 11 2 23 2 1 8 7 2 0
10 12 2 0 13 2 0 17 0 0 0 15 0 5
20 12 5 1 27 13 2
40 2
1
8 22 2 5
KIA
0 First Marine Division CT - 8 Other attached units TOTAL E
WIA 0 E
MIA
DOW
0
-
J
12
-
54 1079 1 1 48 16
11 139
1 1
JL
56 1143
277 6339
12
12 143
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OKINAWA SHIMA
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RYUKYU-RETTO 1:25,000
10
AHA SE
SHEET 3625-IV SE
108
69
{>
261S(" 32
^5L5L
31
76
12'30'
12'30"
3157000yds.|\J
26 10'
CONVERSION GRAPH N O T at the scale of t h e m a p . Meters Feet
12737'30W
105^000ydi^_
Il070
71
T1072 P
S 40T1073P
"1074 P
A.M.S. L891
First Edition ( A M S 1 ) , 1 9 4 4 ; R e v i s e d ( A M S 2 ) , 1 9 4 4 .
P O A 1 (Revision of First Edition A M S 2)
T1076 P
7*77 P
1 Mile
Q42'3^
T1078P
T1080P
P81P
S
May
JP7"45'
1945
26-10'
3 000
F~
10 000
'
Prepared under t h e direction of t h e Chief of Engineers by the A r m y M a p Service ( G E A M ) , U. S. A r m y , W a s h i n g t o n , D. C. C o m p i l e d in 1 9 4 4 f r o m aerial photography d a t e d Sept. and Oct. 1 9 4 4 by s t e r e o p h o t o g r a m m e t r i c and p h o t o - p l a n i m e t r i c m e t h o d s , by reference to U. S. H y d r o g r a p h i c C h a r t 1 9 1 2 , 1 9 4 2 . by U. S. G . S. H y d r o g r a p h y c o m p i l e d by H y d r o g r a p h i c Office, U. S. Navy, 1 9 4 4 . All place n a m e s are t r a n s c r i b e d according to t h e Modified Hepburn (Romaji) System. Revised by 6 4 t h . Engr. Top. Bn. U S A F C P B C J a n . 1 9 4 5 utilizing 1633 rd. Engineer Photomapping Platoon multiplex a e r o - p r o j e c t o r s from vertical and oblique photography 10 Oct. 1 9 4 4 . Revised by the 3 0 t h Engr. Base Top. Bn. USAFPOA April 1 9 4 5 ,
3RD REVISION
1000 1000
DIAGRAM
INDEX TO
BOUNDARIES
INDEX TO ADJOINING
SHEETS
^ 9,000
3
CONTOUR INTERVAL 10 AND 20 METERS
A p p r o x i m a t e Contours S h o w n in Areas of Sparsely Controlled
w
'
12752'30"
3625 I NW
WTt
i "C"
NOTE: M a p sources and photographs are not reconcilable. Therefore this sheet does not m a t c h with adjoining sheets.
3625-IV SE g
T O G I V E G R I D A N D TARGET-AREA R E F E R E N C E S O N T H I S S H E E T FIGURES. IGNORE the SMALLER figures printed around the margin of the map. These are for finding the full co-ordinates. USE ONLY THE LARGER FIGURES PRINTED IN THE MARGIN OR ON THE FACE OF THE MAP. Viz. lOgrpo POINT WANA REFERENCE
PROJECTION
MlN. Z O N E
2605'
North Take South edge of square in which point lies, and read the figure printed opposite this line on East or West margin or on the line itself on the face of the map. Estimate tenths Northwards North 779737 DESIGNATOR 7773 NOTE: OFFICERS USING THIS MAP WILL HARK HEREON CORRECTIONS AND ADDITIONS WHICH COME TO THEIR ATTENTION AND NAIL DIRECT TO THE C H I E F OF ENGINEERS. W A S H I N G T O N . D. C. Photo stereo trom OKINAWA-KEN A . NAKAGAMI-GUN 6 " focal length a . URASOE M U R A b. NISHIBARA-MURA
50 p 5,000
(Multiplex)
FOR S T A N D A R D M I L I T A R Y G R I D East Take West edge of square in which point lies, and read the figure printed opposite this line on North or South margin or on the line itself on the face of the map. Estimate tenths Eastwards East STANDARD MILITARY GRID REFERENCE
= 4,000 Prefectural Road Road, 2-4 meters wide Track and Trail
2,000
LEGEND
=
= Railroad 3 ' 6 " g a u g e - s t e a m Railroad 3 ' 6 " g a u g e - e l e c t r i c Railroad 2 ' 6 " narrow g a u g e Railroad 2 ' 6 " narrow g a u g e - h o r s e - d r a w n Soundings F a t h o m line 1 1 1 1 1 1 ELECTRIFIED | I I I I I , , , 1 HORSE-DRAWN 1 ' 1 ' 1 ' 10 * line ..,-. o
GLOSSARY
.gun -gusuku (-jo) 737 -kawa (-gawa) -ken -ko (minato) county castle rivpr prefecture harbor -mura -saki (-zaki,-misaki) -se (-ze) -shima (-jima) -yama (-zan,-san) township cape reef, shoal island mountain
Use diagram APPROXIMATE MEAN DECLINATION 1 9 4 4 FOR CENTER OF SHEET NO A N N U A L MAGNETIC CHANGE only fo obtain north south numerical line, edge connect or the values. the map GRID on map.
v e r t i c a l p h o t o s of
M<
I n t e n s i f i e d f r o m p h o t o s of 1 2 ' f o c a l l e n g t h or l o n g e r
B. S H I M A J I R I - G U N c. d. MAWASHI-MURA HAEBARU-MURA
e. OROKU M U R A f. g
Road in built-up areas = 1,000 Mud or tidal flats Rice field Orchard Sea Wall _ _. .
FOR T A R G E T - A R E A
magnetic * P * o n the
TOMIGUSUKU-n
Take NUMBER of the 1000 yard square in which the point lies Take LETTER of the 200 yard square in which the point lies. TARGET AREA DESIGNATOR (Locates within 200-yard square)
-kuchi ( g u c h i ) channel HYDROGRAPHIC DATUM: APRROXIMATE LEVEL OF LOWEST LOW WATER REEFS MAY BE COVERED AT LOW WATER
KOCHINDA-MURA
value and
of
the
angle
h.ozATO-MURA
7773 Q
MAGNETIC scale
NORTH,as edge
L i m i t i n g d a n g e r line or l o w w a t e r
degree
at the north
NAHA SE
1075 1076
FIRST
EDITION-AMS
3
5 4 3 2 1 0
- L L L L J I 1 I J_
SHEET 3625-IV SE
12745' 2615'
1077
42'30
1078
1079
31
76
31
75
31
74
31
73
31
72
12'30'
12'30'
31
7 1
31
70
31
69
31
68
3157000yds. |\|
31
67
2610' 70 10
71
10
72
40' 10
73
10
74
10
75
10
76
10 7 7
42'30"
l0
78
10g0
10
81
12745'
A.M.S. L091
First Edition (AMS 1), 1944; revised (AMS 3 ) , 1944.
I N D E X T O A D J O I N I N G SHEETS
I2730' 3625-IV NE 3J25JV 12752'30'
Prepared under t h e direction of t h e Chief of Engineers by t h e Army M a p Service ( A M ) , U . S . A r m y , W a s h i n g t o n , D . C . , 1944. Mosaic controlled by average fit to 1:25,000 m a p . Aerial photographs flown by U.S.A.A.F. a n d U.S.N. Sorties: S e p t e m b e r 1944, 14 P L / M R 7 6 " TV; October 1944, WASP 2 3 1 , 232 1 2 " . FRANK 125(B) 6"V,
1000 1000
500
1000 1000
625-1 NW 5
NW7
mm
3625-111 NE
500
LHZHS
O N E T H O U S A N D Y A R D W O R L D P O L Y C O N I C G R I D . B A N D 11 I N . Z O N E " C
T H E LAST T H R E E DIGITS O F T H E G R I D N U M B E R S A R E O M I T T E D
3625-111 JUW
3625-IU
POLYCONIC
PROJECTION
numerical
values.
Reliability of grid uncertain due to local minor disagreement between photo map and topographic map.
Q3IJI3
mm
NOTE:
OFFICERS USINS THIS HAP WILL MARK HEREON CORRECTIONS AND ADDITIONS WHICH COME
pivot point *P" on the south edge the value of the angle NORTH and MAGNETIC
NORTH, as plotted on
HEIGHTS IN METERS
RYUKYU-RETTO 1:25,000
s-io- r p
r
For use by War and Navy Department Agencies only Not for sale or distribution
ITOMAN NE
5
1079
1 0
io8o
SHEET 3625-111 NE
10
1 I I I 1 I 1 i l l I l I I I l I J-L
12737'30"
io69
77
42'30"
10
78
81
^
Hi;
"*
)7'30"
p2605' 12745'
10
lOggoOOyds. [ CONVERSION GRAPH NOT at t h e scale of t h e m a p . Meters Feet 3,000
lOgl
1 0
82
75
Scale 1:25,000
R e p r o d u c e d by 3 0 t h E n g r . B a s e T o p . B n . U S A F P O A N o
1461-4
May
1945
A.M.S. L891
First Edition ( A M S POA 1 1), 1944. l) ( R e v i s i o n of First Edition A M S
c~ 10,000
_E 9,000
1000 1000
I | _ [
500
2000
Meters SORTIE
COVERAGE
DIAGRAM
INDEX
TO
BOUNDARIES
INDEX
TO A D J O I N I N G
SHEETS
3 P R 5 M 6 3 IV FEB 4S
1000
2000
Yards
r~~ 1 /
b 1 c
'
m e t h o d s , by r e f e r e n c e t o J a p a n e s e H y d r o g r a p h i c C h a r t 2 2 2 , 1935. H y d r o g r a p h y c o m p i l e d by H y d r o g r a p h i e O f f i c e , U . S. All p l a c e n a m e s a r e t r a n s c r i b e d a c c o r d i n g t o T O GIVE G R I D A N D T A R G F T A R E A R E F E R E N C E S O N T H I S S H E E T FIGURES. IGNORE the SMALLER figures printed around the margin of the map. These are for finding the full coordinates. USE ONLY THE LARGER FIGURES PRINTED IN THE MARGIN OR ON THE R e v i s e d by t h e 3 0 t h Engr. Base T o p . Bn. U S A F P O A April utilizing stereophotogrammetric f r o m aerial photography dated methods (Multiplex) POINT U D O REFERENCE FOR S T A N D A R D M I L I T A R Y G R I D 1945, FACE OF THE MAP. Viz. 3157OOO ONE THOUSAND YARD WORLD POLYCONIC GRID BAND MlN.ZONE " C "
THE LAST THREE DIGITS OF THE GRID NUMBERS ARE OMITTED
NOTE: OFFICERS USING THIS M TO THEIR ATTENTION AND MAIL L I MARK HEREON CORRECTIONS AND ADDITIONS WHICH COME - T TO T H F CHIEF OF ENGINEERS. W A S H I N G T O N . D. C. POLYCONIC PROJECTION
#*
CONTOUR INTERVAL 10 METERS
Navy, 1 9 4 4 .
i
fs r c. chartered town APPROXIMATE MEAN D E C L I N A T I O N 1 9 4 4 FOR CENTER OF SHEET NO A N N U A L MAGNETIC CHANGE Use diagram only to obtain north numerical line, edge connect values. the I n t e n s i f i e d f r o m p h o t o s o f 12 ' focal l e n g t h or l o n g e r .
y ^^
**"' i
fx
\ >
!f.
~'T \>^~Z
OKINAWA-KEN SHIMAJIRI-GUN a. TOMIGUSKlf-MURA b. KANEGUSUKU-MURA KOCHINDA'-MURA d. OZATO-MHRA e. TAMAGUSUKU-MURA f. TAKAMINEMURA g. h. i. j. k. KIYAN-MU.RA MABUNI-lflURA MAKABE-MURA GUSHICHAN-MttRA ITOMAN MACHI
Feb. 1 9 4 5 .
LEGEND
Prefectural Road Road,2-4 meters wide.. Track and Trail Road in built-up areas Railroad 3'6"gauge-steam Railroad 3 ' 6 " gauge-electric Railroad 2 ' 6 " narrow gauge HORSE-DRAWN Railroad 2 ' 6 " narrow Soundings Fathom line Limiting danger line gauge-.horse-drawn i l I I I ELECTRIFIED I I I I I I I
East Take West edge of square in which point lies, and read the figure printed opposite this line on North or South margin or on the line itself on the face of the map. Estimate tenths Eastwards East STANDARD MILITARY GRID REFERENCE
North Take South edge of square in which point lies, and read the figure printed opposite this line on East or West margin or on the line itself on the face of the map. Estimate tenths Northwards North 773572 DESIGNATOR 7757 ^ _ _ Q [ 7757"$
GLOSSARY
dake (-take) mountain county castle cape prefecture DATUM machi mura saki ( - z a k i , - m i s a k i ) shima ( - j i m a j sho APPROXIMATE with WATER the value of the angle between plotted GRID on NORTH the and MAGNETIC scale NORTH,as edge gun g u s u k u (-jo) kaku (-saki,-hana) ken _ township cape island reef tiled f r o m m a p o r liable photos. To determine pivot HYDROGRAPHIC LEVEL O F LOWEST LOW point magnetic
572
FOR T A R G E T - A R E A
Take NUMBER of the 1000 yard square in which the point lies. Mud or tidal flats Rice field Take LETTER of the 200 yard square in which the point lies. TARGET AREA DESIGNATOR (Locales within 200-yard square)
of ( h e map
i 1 _
degree
at the north
of the map.
Orchard
For use,by War and Navy Deparfment Agencies only Not for sale or distribution
10
ITOMAN N E
FIRST
EDITION
-A MS
SHEET 3625-111 NE
1069
10
70
71
I I
3157000yds. [\|
12737'30"
lOggOOOyds.^
2605' 1 0 g 2 12745'
A.M.S. L091
First Edition (AMS 1), 1944; revisecHAMS 2), 1944.
Reproduced by 30th Engr. Base Top. Bn. USAFPOA No. 1461 May 1945
Prepared under the direction of the Chief of Engineers by the Army Map Service (AM), U.S.Army, Washington, D.C., 1944. Mosaic controlled by average fit to 1: 25,000 map. Aerial photographs flown by U.S.A.A.F. and U.S.N. Sorties: September 1944, 14PL/MR7 12"Ry, 14PL/MR7 6"TV, 11PL/MR7 6"TV; October* 1944, WASP 231 12";CV6 129 6"V
7
3625-IV SE
3625-1
1000 1 hH 1000
1000 1000
C sw
3625-1 NW
3625 I NW
% g
3625 111^ / NF ^
Reliability of grid uncertain due to local minor disagreement between photo map and topographic map.
m ow
1M 2l$*> VJ3
NO A N N U A L M A G N E T I C
3625-111 SE
POL.YCONIC
NOTE:
PROJECTION
OFFICERS USING THIS MAP WILL MARK HErtEON CORRECTIONS AND ADDITIONS WHICH COME
HEIGHTS IN METERS
Use diagram only fo obtain numerical values. To determine magnetic north line, connect the pivot point *P" on the south edge of the map with the value of the angle between CR!D NORTH and MAGNETIC NORTH, as plotted on the degree scale at the north edge of the map.
OVERLAY SHOWING^ AQEA SECURED ST i MAR tflV (REIN) PHASE HE SOUTHERN OKINAWA
Map $f: Mukyu-I^fetfo,
Scale: 1/25,000
< &
SHEET i OF 2
^ J
* > Jf>
CMAPTEQ X COMMENTS..
QCCOMMfNIDATION S SPECIAL ACTION QEPORT NANSEI SMOTO
<<*?
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Bfc&MSmED
Comment: Before the OKINAWA Operation, the Division received r e l i e f maps from four d i f f e r e n t sources, FMF, P a c i f i c , Camp Radford, CINCPAC-CINCPOA, and I I I Phib Corps. All maps were of d i f f e r e n t types of composition and varied g r e a t l y i n s c a l e and d e t a i l . Now that Marine Divisions are operating as an i n t e g r a l part of Corps, i t i s b e l i e v e d that the Division R e l i e f Mapping Section should be disbanded and absorbed into the Corps u n i t . This system would lead to l e s s duplication and have the advantage of economy of personnel. Recommendation: That the D i v i s i o n R e l i e f Mapping Units be disbanded and absorbed by Corps. CAPTURED EQUIPMENT Comment: No JICPOA Captured Equipment Team was furnished t h i s D i v i s i o n for the OKINAWA Operation. Tenth Army's Captured Equipment Teams were composed of enemy materiel e x p e r t s , but included no personnel for p h y s i c a l l y guarding and handling captured m a t e r i e l . I t i s emphasized that regiments cannot d e t a i l personnel to stay behind and guard t h i s m a t e r i e l . Such a system, e s p e c i a l l y i n a f a s t moving s i t u a t i o n , would s e r i o u s l y impair t h e i r combat e f f i c i e n c y . Recommendation: That higher headquarters provide teams to guard and c o l l e c t captured enemy m a t e r i e l . CENSORSHIP Comment: Large numbers of Marines were evacuated to Army h o s p i t a l s during the OKINAWA Operation. Army censors at these h o s p i t a l s refused to handle t h e i r mail* s i n c e i t bore F l e e t Post Office* rather than APO return addresses. Consequently, the mail of these men was delayed u n n e c e s s a r i l y .
GECWIED
^3
KKMSIFIED
Recommendation:
That censors in Army hospitals be authorized to censor
and stamp mail of Marine patients, without any change in the
latters1 return address being necessary.
LANGUAGE PERSONNEL
Comment:
During the operation I t was found that considerable enemy information of immediate t a c t i c a l value to battalions was l o s t because there was no one at battalion headquarters with any knowledge of the Jaoaneae Language. Re commendation: That the number of enlisted Japanese Interpreters i n a d i v i s i o n be increased from twelve (12) to eighteen ( 1 8 ) . (a) NISEI INTERPRETERS Comment: Nisei interpreters and translators have been found invaluable by t h i s Division, and other d i v i s i o n s , i n e a r l i e r campaigns. None were a v a i l a t l e on OKINAWA, Recommendation: That a team of s i x (6) Nisei be attached to the Division for each campaigi.
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE Comment: In order to carry on p s y c h o l o g i c a l warfare, there i s a
d e f i n i t e need in a d i v i s i o n for a "sound Jeep". I t i s understood that the Second Marine Division developed and tested such a device, and found i t very successful. Recommendation: That one (1) "sound Jeep" be furnished to each Marine Division*
V?Y .
AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS Comment: Aerial photographic coverage on the OKINAWA Campaign, was, by and l a r g e , very s a t i s f a c t o r y . However, several v e r t i c a l s o r t i e s were too cloudy to be of value. Recommendation: That v e r t i c a l coverage be flown at as low a l e v e l as may be p r a c t i c a b l e , thus eliminating most cloud cover. Comment: Oblique and v e r t i c a l coverage of the zones of action of adjacent u n i t s would be very helpful f o r o r i e n t i n g personnel, for a r t i l l e r y counter-battery f i r e , and for other purposes. A l l that should be necessary to achieve t h i s extra d i s t r i b u t i o n i s the preparation of additional prints of boundary a r e a s . Bulges and pockets i n the l i n e are.almost always c r i t i c a l p o i n t s , and should not be neglected. Recommendation: That a d d i t i o n a l p r i n t s of boundary areas be prepared, so that each u n i t may be given coverage of key terrain f e a t u r e s to i t s flanks as well as to i t s front. Comment: Sonne s t r i p s would have been of great value i n determining water depths o f f beaches ( i n Phase I ) and also for a s c e r t a i n i n g beach d e f e n s e s . Similarly, dicing runs would have been very helpful for preparing beach oblique mosaics. Recommendation: That Sonne s t r i p s and d i c i n g runs be made of a l l beach areas i n advance of" future landings. Comment: Large scale gridded mosaics were of great value during
the campaign, especially in the early weeks, when maps were
very inaccurate and unsatisfactory. Lithographed mosaics
are not satisfactory.
DECLASSIFIED
Recommendation:
That gridded mosaics, scales between 1:5,000 and
1:10,000, of any future operating areas be furnished the
Division as early as is practicable.
Comment:
In fast-moving s i t u a t i o n s , photography sometimes lags far behind. In such circumstances, prints reaching front l i n e units are frequently of areas two thousand yards and more to the rear. Recommendation: Tha*t in fast-moving s i t u a t i o n s , aerial oho to graphs as requested by the Division must be furnished in time to be of value to assault u n i t s .
COMMUNICATIONS Comment:
G-2 l i a i s o n teams attached to infantry regiments were unable to operate properly many times during the campaign because of Inadequate radio communications. When operating over a large land mass in a fast-moving situation the SCR 610 i s not powerful enough to assure continuous radio contact between G-2 and i t s l i a i s o n teams. This w i l l be especially true in a l l future operations. I t i s believed that this s i t u a t i o n could be remedied by using SCR 608 radios for the d i v i s i o n i n t e l l i g e n c e net. Recommendation: That the Division G-2 Section be furnished three (3)
Jeeps equipped with SCR 508 radios, so that one may be
assigned to each l i a i e o n team operating with an infantry regiment. G-3 SECTION Comment:
Close coordination between the naval and marine staffs is
necessary to work out the loading details, Boat Allocation
Plan, Boat Assignment Tables, Debarkation and Approval
Schedules, Landing Diagram, etc. Such coordination was
found very difficult to obtain during the planning phase
.*&:*Mmtlfl* for the OKINAWA Operation, since the naval s t a f f remained ashore only three days, a f t e r which time they returned to t h e i r s h i p s . The ships then were continually under way from one place to another i n the RUSSELL ISLANDS; i t was impossible for marine s t a f f o f f i c e r s to maintain l i a i s o n with the naval s t a f f , A great deal of confusion, delay and misunderstanding r e s u l t e d . Recommendation: That necessary transport squadron and transport d i v i s i o n o f f i c e r s a r r i v e at D i v i s i o n Headquarters at l e a s t four weeks prior to the embarkation date and remain u n t i l d e t a i l s of l o a d i n g and s h i p - t o - s h o r e plans are completed. Comment: In the GUADALCANAL rehearsals for the OKINAWA Operation, LSTs which were to % oarry elements of assault b a t t a l i o n s arrived too l a t e to take part i n the e x e r c i s e s . Exercises were executed with Incomplete boat groups. The ship-to-shore movement as planned was never rehearsed with a l l a s s a u l t elements p a r t i c i p a t i n g . R e commendation: That the rehearsals do not commence u n t i l a l l LSTs carrying a s s a u l t b a t t a l i o n s are loaded and ready to p a r t i c i p a t e . Comment:
During both the rehearsal phase and the assault landing
It was found that many wave guide officers were unable to
execute their assigned mission without confusion, because
they had not been orooerly briefed beforehand, or had
* suddenly been given a different assignment. In the landing
on OKINAWA some waves were as much as fifteen minutes l^ate
in hitting the beach. This could have caused serious
consequences had the landing been heavily opposed.
Recommendation:
That wave guide officers be assigned early, maintained
on the same assignment, and be given a thorough briefing.
Comment:
In the actual landing the Seventh Infantry Division
landed on PURPLE and ORANGE Beaches which were adjacent to the
- 9
^tlFIED
\ KWiPB
i$%*U
BLUE and Y L O Beaches on which the First Marine Division EL W landed. The control v e s s e l s for PURPLE and O A G Beaches RNE flew exactly the same identifying flags as did the BLUE and Y L O control vessels* As a result several Army waves landed EL W on Marine Beaches and vice-versa. The cross t r a f f i c through the boat lanes also materially hampered the waves which were trying to land at the correct beaches. Recommendation: That wave guide o f f i c e r s be properly briefed on the numbers of their control v e s s e l s to prevent confusion by identical control f l a g s , and/or that adjacent beaches not be given similar oolor designation. Comment:
Often advances were delayed waiting for engineers to remove
mine fields. Engineers were busily employed elsewhere on
construction, maintenance and demolition projects. Thus
both essential engineering work and tactical advances were
impeded by infantry^ inability to breach mine fields. In
future operations it is anticipated that the enemy will make
more extensive use of all types of mines.
Recommendation:
That infantry units be thoroughly trained in mine detection
and removal* Training programs must provide ample instruction
and time for practice in this subject;
Comment:
Throughout the campaign the enemy defended reverse slopes of a l l favorable terrain features in his defensive l i n e s * Recommendation: Reverse slopes must be thoroughly "processed" by heavy air and naval gunfire strikes before the Infantry arrives in the v i c i n i t y of such slopes. Fire should be l i f t e d only when i t endangers the assaulting infantry. Comment: Tank-infantry t a c t i c s as executed proved to be sound and extremely profitable i n reducing enemy T>osltions. Successes attained resulted from constant mutual oro tectio n o f tanks ai ual oro tectio n o f tank
- 10 - I " "
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infantry. Japanese close assault tank hunters were totally unsuccessful In their attempts to destroy our tanks. Re commendation: A minimum of infantry (usually a f i r e team per tank) should protect the tanks at maximum range, sometimes as great as 300 yards:' tanks invariably draw heavy a r t i l l e r y and mortar fire which destroys personnel advancing in close proximity of the tank. Training of the tank-infantry teams should begin early in the training phase and must be given top emphasis. Infantrymen must be given opportunities to ride in tanks, to be picked up and discharged through escape hatches, and to be thoroughly grounded in a l l phases of tank-infantry coordination. Continued stress must be laid upon proteotlng tanks from enemy tank hunters. Comment: Flame-thrower tanks were extensively used by a l l units for cleaning out caves and pillboxes. Recommendation: I t i s recommended that one company of flame-thrower tanks be added to the Tank Battalion. (See Tank Annex). Comment: On two occasions night attacks resulted in the capture of strongly-held enemy positions which had resisted our continued daylight assaults. The enemy had. during daylight, supported his positions by heavy fire from inaccessible dominating terrain features which lay outside this Division's zone of action. Our night attacks, which came as a surprise to the Japanese, enabled us to attain the objective against practically no opposition. R e commendation: During the training period more emphasis should be placed on night operations. Units must be schooled not only i n limited objective attacks but also in the seizure of major p o s i t i o n s .
DEBtnlSonED
Comment:
During Phase I and II of this operation Periodic Reports
submitted by the various Divisional Staff Sections did
not cover the same period and were not submitted to higher
headquarters at the same time. It was oarticularly difficult
for the regiments and battalions who were forced to make
several messenger runs from the front lines at all hours to
deliver various reports, which could have been delivered in
one trip if the required times for submission had been
uniform. Furthermore, the Periodic Reports submitted by the
Division Staff Sections were to some extent overlapping,
and it was difficult to make the Information in one report
agree with the same information in another report submitted
by another Staff Section, when that report was made to cover
a different period. For example the G--1 report covered the
period from 0001 to 2400 and the G-3 report the period from
1600 to 1600. Cases occurred where the G-3 report gave an
account of a comparatively quiet day and at the same time
included a list of heavy casualties bases on information
obtained from the 0-1 whose information was for a different
period altogether.
Recommendation:
That Periodic Reports of all sections cover the same period
and be submitted to higher headquarters at the same time.
Comment:
With the change from Jungle warfare to combat over more
open and varied terrain, the opportunity exists for massing
machine guns and mortars as a battalion base of fire.
Recommendation:
That a board of experienced infantry officers be appointed
to consider the advisability of reforming the battalion
weapons company. The board to revelw this oroblem in light
of the tactical employment, training and supply and to consider
the effect of recoiless weapons on this organization.
This will be the subject of further study and recommendations
by this headquarters.
Comment:
Extensive paJ&Djling was conducted with the aid of scout War Dogs.' Afl units using these dogs commented favorably on t h e i r a b i l i t y to a l e r t to the presence of enemy hidden In brush and caves. Messenge*%<Jpgp V e r I M e iL - 12
DJTT1
V k W U #'
i n f r e q u e n t l y ; the employment of these s p e d ! a l l y - t r a i n e d doge does not appear to be further warranted. Recommendation: That the War Dog Platoon be increased to f i f t y dogs, a l l scout d o g s . Comment: The 4 . 5 i n c h barrage rocket was used with good r e s u l t s . However, the l i m i t e d range (1,200 yards) of t h i s weapon o f t e n made "it d i f f i c u l t to get the launchers close enough for f i r e m i s s i o n s . The present 4x4 cargo truck n e g o t i a t e s rough t e r r a i n with great d i f f i c u l t y and affords no protection for crew members. Organic transportation of the Rocket Detachment i s inadequate. Recommendation: That the range of the rocket be increased, to about 2,500 yards. P r o j e c t i l e s should be s p i n - s t a b i l i z e d for g r e a t e r accuracy. That e i t h e r a h a l f - t r a c k or f u l l - t r a c k e d v e h i c l e be adopted for mounting launchers and two 6x6 cargo trucks be added to each f i r i n g s e c t i o n . Comment: One^Army company of 4.2 inch mortars was attached to
t h i s D i v i s i o n during the b a t t l e for Southern OKINAWA.
These weapons furnished accurate high angle d e s t r u c t i v e , n e u t r a l i z a t i o n f i r e s , and smoke cover. The 4.2e engaged t a r g e t s which could be reduced by neither a r t i l l e r y nor 81mm mortar8. Recommendation: That one company of 4 . 2 inch mortars be made organic i n the Marine D i v i s i o n . That t h i s company be patterned a f t e r the Army o r g a n i z a t i o n ; and be equipped with s u i t a b l e transportation and communication equipment to insure rapid movement of the company and quick completion of assigned f i r e missions. Comment:
* *
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G-4 SECTION Embarkation and debarkation 1. Ships 1 TQM1s should be present as early as p o s s i b l e prior to embarkation date to f a c i l i t a t e planning. 2* Accurate ships' c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s must be furnished early so l a s t minute changes i n loading -olans can be avoided. 3. An LST representative authorized to make de c i s i o n s for the LST F l o t i l l a Commander should be present during the planning phase. 4. More emphasis should be placed on the Stowage Plan and P r o f i l e Plan. The Cargo and Loading Analysis and the Consolidated Vehicle Table should be eliminated. 5. Due to limited space a v a i l a b l e only twenty days 1 r a t i o n s and fuel should be embarked on assault shirking. 6. I t was not & und p r a c t i c a l to get boat cargo t i c k e t s from s h i p , to control boat, to reef transfer, to Shore Party Commander, to dump. However, they were found u s e f u l at the control b o a t s . The landing craft carried t i c k e t from ship to control boat and then stood by u n t i l that type cargo was needed ashore. 7. Understowing of LST'a: This type of loading requires a great amount of work for the small tonnage loaded. Stowing g a s o l i n e burning v e h i c l e s over dunnaged high e x p l o s i v e s may not have a high s a f e t y f a c t o r . However, because the LST area i s always much nearer the beaches than the transport area; and because LST's can be unloaded by amphibian v e h i c l e s over beaches or r e e f s that LCVP's or LCMfB cannot apT>roach, i t i s a t a c t i c a l n e c e s s i t y that not l e s s than two u n i t s of f i r e be loaded on LST's. If a s u f f i c i e n t number o f LST's were assigned t o a d i v i s i o n so that four could be used as supply s h i p s , understowing would not be necessary. This would approach an i d e a l s o l u t i o n . For a d i v i s i o n reinforced with three Amphibian Tractor B a t t a l i o n s , two D K Companies, and one Naval UW Construction B a t t a l i o n , t h i r t y LST's would be required. - 15
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and by use of "Cargo Tickets" the type of supplies needed by troops ashore was given p r i o r i t y . This plan was successfully exe cuted. 2. Causeways were of l i t t l e value in unloading a s s a u l t supplies over r e e f s . t A d i r e c t radio channel between the Shore Party Commander and the Reef Beachmaster should be established. There should also be a d i r e c t radio channel between the Reef Beachmaster and the Marine T M aboard the Transport Q Squadron Flag Ship. 4 . Liaison Officers from the pontoon barg detach ments and from the LST Group should maintain close con t a c t between t h e i r commands and the Shore Party Commander. 5. Barge propulsion u n i t s should be tested for operating efficiency enroute to the target area. 6. Beach l i g h t i n g equipment should be provided i n beach dumps to f a c i l i t a t e night unloading. 7. Dump signs for r a t i o n s , fuel, ammunition, water and miscellaneous supolles should be oainted with a luminous p a i n t . 8 . New oioneer equipment was not provided in s u f f i c i e n t time before leaving the staging aea to service i t f u l l y . I f the equipment had been provided e a r l i e r , the operators could have been more fully trained and damage to t h e equipment could have been avoided. 9. Spare p a r t s aid tools were not received i n s u f f i c i e n t quantity to r e p a i r vehicles ard equipment used on the PALAU Operation and to provide a sufficient stock for r e p a i r on t h i s operation. 10. More expendable supplies, cable, welding sup p l i e s , and metal stock should be provided for the repair of equipment. In the p a s t , supply of these items has been inadequate for maintenance and r e p a i r of equipment. Materiel Recommendations 1. CT-9 Trackson cranes should be powered by a d i e s e l operated engine instead of a gasoline one. Less
:
'f.' V !>
-17
S~6f
hen be encountered in g e t t i n g CT-9 Trackson Cranes ashore and o p e r a t i n g . The front suspension o f the CT-9 Crane should be strengthened. At p r e s e n t , the front suspension i s weak, and i n a s s a u l t o p e r a t i o n s the crane must be moved frequently over rough t e r r a i n r e s u l t i n g i n many breakdowns. 2 . The crane mounted on the TD-14 Tractor did not orove s a t i s f a c t o r y during the OKINAWA Operation. The boom on the crane i s too s h o r t , the speed of the crane i s too slow, and the crane i s poorly c o n s t r u c t e d . 3 . The Trackson Crane was not s a t i s f a c t o r y for d i r e c t unloading of small boats on the b e a c h e s . More cranes with l o n g boom and of f i v e (5) ton capacity should be made a v a i l a b l e , as most of t h e s e cranes were o p e r a t i n g on barges at the t r a n s f e r l i n e . 4 . I t i s recommended t h a t , during extended oper a t i o n s , a d d i t i o n a l spare p a r t s f o r ordnance equipment be i n c l u d e d i n resuoply shipments. Shortages e x i s t e d i n the f o l l o w i n g items during o p e r a t i o n s i n Southern OKINAWA: a. Spare p a r t s for ^4A2 Tank D i e s e l e n g i n e s . b . Soare p a r t s for the Continental engine i n the M7 Motor Carriage. c S o l e n o i d s for .30 Cal. machine guns mounted i n tanks. d. P i s t o l , spare p a r t s . e. Spare p a r t s for LVT(3)'s. f. Shotgun spare p a r t s . g # Additional b a r r e l s for . 3 0 Cal. machine guns, M1917A1. 5 . I t i s recommended that the g r e a t e s t p o s s i b l e care be e x e r c i s e d i n planning resupply shipments to p r o v i d e a s u f f i c i e n t allowance of spare p a r t s f o r motor t r a n s p o r t , a l l types of t r a c t o r s , and e n g i n e e r i n g e q u i p ment. Equipment u r g e n t l y needed for combat o p e r a t i o n s was deadlined for l a c k of spare p a r t s . 6 . I t i s recommended that the primer g a s o l i n e l i n e running through the b a t t e r y w e l l i n the motor c a r r i a g e i n the M-7 105mm Howitzer, S . P . , be removed as dangerous f i r e s have s t a r t e d from b a t t e r y sparks when t h i s g a s o l i n e l i n e has been ruptured during removal and i n s t a l l a t i o n of the b a t t e r y *
IFiEO
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7. The M7B1 105mm Howitzer, S . P . , was found to be more s a t i s f a c t o r y than the M-7. The Ford motor in the M7B1 has more power and can be maintained more e a s i l y . Organization 1. I t I s recommended that, i n future operations, Service Regiments support Divisions by transporting s u p p l i e s to D i v i s i o n dumps. During the OKINAWA Operation, i t was necessary for the Division to transport Class II and IV items from the 7th Service Regiment's dumps. In l a r g e o p e r a t i o n s , where i t becomes necessarv to d i s o l a c e dumps forward several times, i t i s not p o s s i b l e for Div i s i o n s to transport supplies from the supply agency's dumps and at the same time keep D i v i s i o n dumps well for ward. The D i v i s i o n ' s transportation and personnel r e sources are not capable of performing t h i s double duty. 2. I t i s recommended that the Tank Maintenance Platoon be made part of the Tank B a t t a l i o n and removed from the Ordnance Company, and that the Tank B a t t a l i o n be made r e s p o n s i b l e for the maintenance of the M-7 105mm Howitzer, S . P . , i n the D i v i s i o n . 3. I t i s recommended that each Infantry regiment be furnished two (2) TD-9 Tractors, dozer equipped, to be used for i n i t i a l road, t r a i l , dump clearance, construc t i o n , e t c . Experience on t h i s operation, Involving ex t e n s i v e movement over a f a i r l y : l a r g e lard mass and poor roads,- i n d i c a t e s a need i n the infantry regiment for some organic earth moving equipment. Transportation 1. I t i s recommended that the truck, 1-ton, 4x4, cargo, I n t e r n a t i o n a l , be discarded as a combat v e h i c l e and r e l e g a t e d to rear area use; and that the truck 3 / 4 ton, Dodge, Weaoons Carrier, or the truck, l f - t o n , 6x6, Dodge, replace i t . 2. I t i s recommended that each infantry regiment be equipped with f i v e (5) M Prime Movers with t r a i l e r s 5 to be used for transporting ammunition and supplies over r o u t e s impassable to wheeled v e h i c l e s , and to supplement regular motor transportation. - 19
roy
Preparation of d a l l y r e p o r t s . b . OPERATION OF SERVICES: (1) Bakery (2) Laundry (3) Chemical (4) Graves R e g i s t r a t i o n (5) Salvage (6) Ordnance Repair
c. OPERATION OF DIVISION DUMPS: (1) Class I , Rations and Water. (2) Class I I and IV, General Supply, Clothing, Equipment, F o r t i f i c a t i o n Material, HouseKeeping Gear, and Chemical Gear. (3) Class I I I , Fuel O i l , Greases, and Gasoline. (4) Class V, Ammunition. It is absolutely essential that any organization of the
Service Battalion, Division Quartermaster, should embrace
these activities regardless of how the responsibility is
subdivided, whether Quartermaster or Service Command.
This discussion is mainly concerned with the activities
listed in 2c above - operation of Division Dumps. Here
is where the present organization is Particularly weak
and is not corrected in the new Table of Organisation for
the Service Battalion of a Division.
The setting- U P of division dumps is essential as supply
regiments and army supply units will not deal with indiv
idual units of a division, nor can they break issues
down into small components for distribution tj subordlnat
units. This must be accomplished in the division dumps.
To take care of tnis function and provide for displace
ment, when it is usually necessary to continue the oper
ation of an old dump simultaneously with the establish
ment of a new one, requires:
a. Sufficient Officers.
b. Enlisted personnel, clerical, labor and
security.
c. Equipment.
d. Transportation.
Tne above should be sufficient to be able to split three
wavs with overall supervision in order to operate in the
initial phases of"a landing.
i '* H IT
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57*
for t h i s duty. I t has been necessary to use Ordnance Company trucks and Ordnance Comoany s p e c i a l i z e d personnel for t h i s task*. For t h i s purpose there I s urgently required: One (1) Ammunition Company with a munitions o f f i c e r In charge and a s s i s t ants, or at l e a s t a munitions platoon attached to Ordnance or 3ut>oly Comp any, with 2-^-ton trucks, cargo; also one b u l l dozer. In order that transoortation, equipment, and personnel may be out to maximum use In operating the above l i s t e d dumr>s and s u p o l i e s , there should be attached to the Service B a t t a l i o n , operating under d i r e c t supervision of the D i v i s i o n Quartermaster:. 1 Quartermaster Truck Company of 3 Platoons of 16 trucks each. 1 Service Platoon of approximately 100 men, for handling Class I , I I , I I I and IV s u p o l i e s . Bull dozer and crane operators. Motor v e h i c l e maintenance personnel. Equipment: 48 2^-toh trucks, cargo.
3 Bull dozers, TD-14 or l a r g e r .
4 Tractor cranes,
10 J - t o n trucks, with t r a i l e r s . The above transportation and equipment should be organ i c a l l y assigned and d e f i n i t e l y should not be pooled with any other o r g a n i z a t i o n , as experience has shown that deoending upon another u n i t for equipment and transport a t i o n i s not p r a c t i c a b l e . All too often such equipment and transportation i s not a v a i l a b l e when needed, which prevents planning and adequate s e r v i c e . Bull dozers are i n constant need for preparation of dump s i t e s , fuel o i l trenches, and ammunition revetments. The Division Quartermaster's department has a d e f i n i t e mission to oerform and should be given the means and Dersonnel with which to do i t . The need for re-organization along the above l i n e s i s urgent i f future operations contemplate movement over d i s t a n c e s exceeding three (3) miles from the beach,
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DECUWMIII
DE#*0
Miscellaneous 1 . 75mm Tank ammunition should be s t e n c i l e d with a white "TH or "TANK" on ends of c l o v e r l e a f s to d i s t i n g u i s h i t from other types of 75mm ammunition.
2 Period covered and time due on a l l adminis t r a t i v e , supoly ordnance and ammunition r e p o r t s should be standardized. 3 . I t i s recommended t h a t five-man and twenty-man s t o v e s , Coleman, gasoline burning, be furnished i n f a n t r y regiments. 4 . The "10 i n 1M r a t i o n s a r e e x c e l l e n t f i e l d r a t i o n s and a r e highly recommended for future u s e . 5.' Extra coffee, f r u i t s and f r u i t Juices g r e a t l y improve morale and combat efficiency of a l l troops and p r o v i s i o n should be made to resupply these items during extended o p e r a t i o n s . 6 # The new type " C r a t i o n shows a vast improvement over t h e old type and i s recommended for i s s u e on future operations. 7. I t i s considered p r a c t i c a b l e , i n planning future o p e r a t i o n s , to include with the V O squadron four add M i t i o n a l OY planes rigged for casualty evacuation or i n some other way provide from higher echelon planes f o r casualty evacuation. 8. I t i s recommended t h a t information concerning standard packaging of supplies and t h e f e a s i b i l i t y of dropping c e r t a i n types of supplies by parachute be d i s s eminated to a l l u n i t 8 who might use a i r d r b p s . -9. I t i s recommended t h a t each i n f a n t r y regiment be equipped with some type of tracked, armored t r a n s p o r t a t i o n such as a tank e s p e c i a l l y equipped t o evacuate "casualties and t r a n s p o r t supplies and munitions i n a b a t t l e zone. In p r a c t i c a l l y everv advance of an i n f a n t r y u n i t j d u r l n g t h i s operation an area remained which had t o be cleared of sniper f i r e . The existance of t h i s type of r e s i s t a n c e was often discovered only when an attempt was made t o move supplies forward or to evacuate c a s u a l t i e s . We, therefore^, suffered add! Ltional losses^iA a ^ i f A
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COMBINED ARMS RESEARCH LIBRARY
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KS
COMBINED ARMS I
supposedly secured area. To avoid t h i s type of J.ass, tanks were used on many occasions to carry woundea from the immediate combat area and return with v i t a l s u p p l i e s . 1 0 . I t i s recommended that each infantry regiment be equipped with 300 Army Ply-wood Pack Carriers. A l i m i t e d number of these carriers were used by one r e g i ment during the OKINAWA campaign and found to be highly practical. 1 1 . The present issue poncho should be replaced by the Army type which i s l i g h t e r , more durable, has a draw s t r i n g to c l o s e the neck opening, and corner grommets f o r ' r i g g i n g , as a s h e l t e r .
ku