The Colonial Division of Space: The Significance of the Swaziland Land Partition

Author(s): Jonathan Crush

Source: The International Journal of African Historical Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1 (1980), pp. 71-
86
Published by: Boston University African Studies Center
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THE COLONIAL DIVISION OF SPACE:
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SWAZILAND
LAND PARTITION

Jonathan Crush

The question of land alienationin the settler state has recently

experiencedsomethingof a resurgenceof interestamongstudentsof
the African past. While some are content with the orthodoxyof
conventionalhistorical analytical frameworks,others seek new
insightswithinpolitical economy paradigms.1The latterapproach
and its attendantconceptualformulationshas not, as yet, diffused
sufficientlyto shed new lighton the Swazilandcase.2
Notwithstandingthe universalityof land alienationin the settler
state, the mechanismsof alienationowe much to the particular
historicalcircumstancesprevailingwithineach state. A monopoly
on complexityof mechanismhas over the years been repeatedly
claimedforthe Swazilandsituation,not withoutsomejustification.3

'More conventional perspectives are exemplified by A. J. Christopher, "Colonial Land

Policy inNatal,"AnnalsAssociation of American Geographers, 61,3 (1971), 560-575; and
B. Pachai, "Land Policies in Malawi: An Examination of the Colonial Legacy," Journal of
Africa History, 14 (1973), 681-698. Challenges to conventional wisdom are issued in
H. Slater, "The Changing Pattern of Economic Relations in Rural Natal, 1838-1914,"
I.C.S. Seminar Series, Vol. 3 (London, 1972), 38-52; E. Friedland, "The Political Economy
of Colonialism in South Africa and Mogambique," Journal of Southern African Affairs, 2
(1977), 61-76; and R. Palmer and N. Parsons, eds., The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central
and Southern Africa (Berkeley, 1977).
2Works on Swaziland which clearly reveal some of the ideological shortcomings of
orthodoxy include P. Scott, "Land Policy and the Native Population in Swaziland,"
Geographical Journal, 17 (1951); G. W. Whittington and J. B. M. Daniel, "Problems of
Land Tenure and Ownership in Swaziland," in G. W. Whittington and M. F. Thomas, eds.,
Environment and Land Use in Africa (London 1969), 447-461; and A. C. G. Best,
"Development of Commercial Agriculture in Swaziland, 1946-63," Papers of the Michigan
Academy of Science, Arts and Letters, 52 (1967), 269-287. A recent rejoinderis R. Palmer
and N. Parsons, "Dualism Theory and Swaziland's Economic History," in Palmer and
Parsons, Roots of Rural Poverty, 16-20.
3Most recently in J. S. M. Matsebula, History of Swaziland (Cape Town, 1976). A
suitable point for regional comparison is D. Lincoln, "The Genesis of Kwazulu," (M.A.
thesis, Wilfrid Laurier University, 1977).
The International Journal of African Historical Studies, 13, 1 (1980) 71
72 JONATHAN CRUSH

Resolution of a tangled morass of spatially and functionally con-

flicting land rights held by white settlers certainly called for a high
degree of dexterity on the part of the British colonial state. Swazi
protestwas skillfullymanipulatedand minimized,and, in the final
analysis, colonial officials appearedwell satisfied that they had
resolvedan intractableproblemin ajust manner,leavinga definitive
landpartitionas a testimonyto theirresolutenessandimpartiality.4
Prizing the lid off colonial state ideology reveals a somewhat
differentpicture.5Underlyinga guise of claimedprotectionismof
the Swazi lay fundamentalcommitmentsto the restructuring of the
indigenous mode of to
production, confirming white settlers and
Britishcapital in majoritycontrolover land and resources,and to
promotingthe provision of labor power for capitalist enterprise
throughtaxationandthe sanctioningof tenancyrelations.6Nowhere
is this ideologicalgloss exposedmoreeffectivelythanin the imple-
mentationof the Swazilandlandpartitionbetween 1907 and 1910.
This paper constitutes a contributionto a discussion of the
significanceof the land partitionin Swaziland.It is arguedthat an
examinationof the backgroundto the partitionandthe explicitand
implicitprinciplesdeployedin its implementationhighlightthe fact
that the superficialgeometryof the partitionis historicallystruc-
turedby a set of criteriadeeply empatheticto the notionsof white
settlerandmetropolitancapitalcontrolover Swazi land and labor.

The Backgroundto Partition

Swazilandwas isolatedfromthe mainstreamof white migrationin

southernAfrica, and Swazi contact with whites was generally
sporadicbefore 1850.7Thereafter,rapidpenetrationof the country

4Forstudiesof the Swazipoliticalresponseto Britishcontrolandaspectsof the colonial

modeof defusingSwaziprotest,see B. Nyeko, "Prenationalist Resistanceto ColonialRule:
Swazilandon the Eve of the Impositionof BritishAdministration,"
TransafricanJournalof
History,5 (1976), 66-84; F. J. Mashasha,"TheRoadto Colonialism:Concessionsandthe
Collapseof SwaziIndependence,1875-1926," (Ph.D. thesis,Universityof Oxford,1977);
andC. P. You6,"ImperialLandPolicy in Swazilandandthe SwaziResponse,"Journalof
Imperialand CommonwealthStudies,7 (1978), 56-70.
5Thishas beenachievedveryeffectivelyin the Kenyancase by E. A. Brett,Colonialism
and Underdevelopment in East Africa (London, 1974); C. Leys, Underdevelopment in
Kenya(Berkeley,1975);andG. Wasserman,PoliticsofDecolonization(Cambridge,1976).
6The nature of the indigenousmode of productionis reconstructedwithin a class
frameworkin A. Kruger,"The Myth of AfricanClasslessness,"African Perspective,4
(1976); and P. Bonner,"Classes, the Mode of Productionand the State in Pre-colonial
Swaziland,"I.C.S. SeminarSeries,Vol. 8 (London,1977), 31-41.
7Butsee P. Bonner,"Factions and Fissions: Transvaal/SwaziPolitics in the Mid-
NineteenthCentury,"Journalof AfricanHistory, 19 (1978), 219-238.
 THE COLONIALDIVISIONOF SPACE 73

was a function of the utilitariandesires of Boer pastoralists from the

neighboringTransvaal and the profit-seeking drive of British mining
prospectors, traders and farmers. This two-pronged immigration
thrust was perceived by contemporary observers in the following
manner:
For a good many years Swazilandhas been the favouritegrazing
groundfor the Boers. In wintera numberof them with theirflocks
move to the lower countryand have been allowedto squatthereby
the SwazieKing. Some of themhave obtainedgrazinglicenses from
the King.Grantingof licenseshas goneon foreightyearsbutonly in
the last fourhavethe Boers come in any number.8
and later,
The news that gold was foundfiredmen'simaginationwith the idea
that Swazilandwas a veritableEldorado.The findingof a few small
reefs and some alluvial tin sufficed to send adventurersinto the
countryin swarms and there was a constant stream of potential
concessionairesgoingto andreturningfromthe Royal Kraal.9
By 1980 there were 500 permanent and over 1000 temporary white
residents of the country. As the above excerpts suggest, both sought
Swazi acquiesence in their exploitation through the medium of
concessions. Between 1885 and 1889, over 400 concessions were
obtained from the Swazi king, Mbandzeni; of these, 245 conferred
some form of agriculturalright.10Figure 1, which was constructed
from concession-grant dates, is a surrogate for white mobility. The
predominance of grants to the Boers in the winter months, May to
August, is consistent with the Boer pattern of temporary residence
and contrasts sharply with the more even distribution of permanent
resident acquisition. Most agricultural concessions contained ex-
plicit, though invariably conflicting, spatial clauses.
During the 1890s the Boers continued with their transhumance
while the British faction established links with British investors to
provide capital backing for their projected mining and agricultural
undertakings. Twenty companies were floated in Britain before
1894 on the basis of acquired concessions.1 Nevertheless broader

8"SpecialReporton Swaziland,"TheNatal Witness,11 May 1887.

9C.C. Watts,Dawn in Swaziland(Witherly,1922).
concessionrightsobtainedincludedmining,trading,revenuecollectionanda host
'?Other
of speculativemanufacturingand importationmonopolies.The excesses of the Swaziland
concessionseraaredocumentedby contemporary reports,includingF. de Winton,Reporton
Swaziland (Cmd. 6200, 1890); and J. Rubie, Swaziland Concessions Report (Pretoria,
1903).
"Corporateactivity in Swazilandduringthis period in examinedin J. S. Crush,
74 JONATHAN CRUSH

0
ui
z
m
cr
tl:

z
g
{3
o
UX

w
m
.5

:~::~~r;?i?:::ir rr
1
FM
:>s
?3r.:.:B
:
A M::~JiJ A ON

MONTHS

Fig. 1: Monthly Distribution of Concession Grants, 1884-1890

political and economic uncertainties and the annexation of Swazi-

land in 1894 by the South African Republic under Kruger, in the
interests of British capital in central Africa, precluded any sub-
stantial inflow of foreign capital before 1900.
A situation of untrammelled complexity confronted the British
colonial state at the outset of colonial rule in Swaziland in 1903-
the spatial legacy of capitalist and settler penetration of the previous
twenty-five years.'2 As Coryndon later wrote in 1909:
Practicallythe wholecountrywas coveredthreeor evenfourdeepby
concessionsof all sizes, for differentperiodsandfor greatlydiffering
time periods. In but few cases were even the boundariesdefined,
manyof the areashadbeen subdividedandseldomwerethe bound-
ariesof superimposedareascoterminous.13

"Monopoly Control and the Imperial Response: The Case of the Swaziland Corporation
Ltd.," African Economic History (Fall, 1969).
'2Charged with the resolution of the perceived problem by the Colonial Office and by
virtue of colonial appointments were High Commissioners Milner (1903-1905) and
Selborne (1905-1910) and Resident Commissioners Moony (1903-1907) and Coryndon
(1907-1914). Coryndon was later heavily involved in the Rhodesian land question; see
R Palmer, Land and Racial Domination in Rhodesia (Berkeley, 1977).
"Swaziland, Annual Colonial Report, 1907-8, (Cmd. 448-5, 1909), 13.
 THE COLONIALDIVISIONOF SPACE 75
Coryndonwas undoubtedlyexaggeratingthe extentof the confusion
for effect, but there was certainly more than a germ of truth in his
statement. The permanent settlers particularly wanted a settlement
of conflicting rights to facilitate the influx of metropolitan capital.14
As disillusionment set in about the mining potential of the country,
there was an increasing awareness of the environmentalpotential for
settler-estate production and large-scale agricultural plantation
production. 5Integral to the realization of profits was the perceived
necessity for a coastal rail link, the introduction of a white settler
class, the creation of a cheap labor force, and unfettered and secure
private ownership of land.16
As a direct response, and despite virulent Swazi opposition, the
British colonial state commissioned a general survey to delineate
spatial rights and produce a single network of basal (or prior-
granted) land concessions to resolve the overlap confusion.17 After a
period of considerable vacillation, from 1904 to 1907, colonial
officials determined that partition was the most satisfactory means
of creating Swazi labor reserves and of according settlers direct
control over land and Swazi labor. Partition was also openly
recognized as being a concrete means to effect basic changes in the
indigenous mode of agriculturalproduction:
By limitingthe area availablefor native agriculture,land will be
improvedby the necessity for close grazing and less primitive
methodsof cultivation;... the presentpracticeof shiftingagriculture
andimpoverishingthe soil will then cease,18
and as a means to provide reserves along the lines of the South
African model, pending any future transfer of Swaziland to South

14In 1904 therewere890 permanentsettlersin the country.By 1910 thisfigurehadrisen

to 1100. The companieswith majorlanded interestsin Swazilandwere the Henderson
ConsolidatedCorporationandthe SwazilandCorporationLtd.
"5Thischangein awarenessis exemplifiedin severalcontemporarypublicationsincluding
Swaziland Corporation,Swaziland and the Swaziland Corporation(London, 1903);
SwazilandChamberof Mines, Commerceand Industry,Swaziland, Californiaof South
Africa(Mbabane,1906);andA. Miller,"Swaziland:Its AgriculturalandPastoralFuture,"
TransvaalAgriculturalJournal,4 (1906).
16See R. T. Coryndon,"Swaziland,"Journal of the African Society, 14 (1914),
250-265; A. Miller,TheSouthEast Coastof AfricaandIts Development(London,1920);
andA. C. G. Best,TheSwazilandRailway:A StudyinPolitico-EconomicGeography(East
Lansing,Mich., 1965).
"See SwazilandConcessionsCommission,Reportof Detailed Decisions Relative to
Boundaries,Registrationof Servitudes,Periodsof Servitudeand Periodsof Employment
(Pretoria,1908).
"8Swaziland ConcessionsCommissionto Selbome, 7 July 1905, SwazilandNational
Archives(S.N.A.) J 190/05.
76 JONATHAN CRUSH

Africa.19Intense lobbying and reactive clamour by individual and

corporate settler interests presaged a state decision to partition one
third of the land surface for reserves and retain the remaining two
thirds for settlers and the crown. This was to be effected by
subtracting one third of the area of each defined concession, and
adding as much crown land as was necessary to make the area of
reserves up to one third of the country.20The Swazi were accorded
little say in the policy making of the state: "Their history has never
taught them the futility of resistance to the unyielding decrees of a
consistent administration."'21
Five alternative partition schemes were advocated and rejected
by the state between 1905 and 1907.22 The partition itself was
eventually implemented by a single commissioner, George Grey,
between January and December 1908.23 Thirty-two reserves were
demarcated after an intensive field survey:
Armed with districtmaps,,cut up into sheets suitable for use on
horseback,he coveredwithouthastethe whole areaof the countryin
a close examinationof the characterof the soil anddensityof native
population.Therewerefew largevalleysuponwhichhis eyes hadnot
rested,and few dominantmountainsfromthe tops of which he had
not searched out the native kraals, the cultivated land and the
concessionboundaries.The examinationcausedhim to markon his
maps almostevery kraalin the country,and his acquaintancewith
everycomerwas so close thatit no doubtenabledhimto arrangean
acceptable solution.24
Figure 2 portrays these reserves with Grey's own nomenclature.
This apparently haphazard patchwork, which persists with only
minor modifications to the present, has little obvious order.25It is
therefore expedient at this stage to identify the set of procedural

'9Eventual transfer was summarily assumed although no date was ever set; Selbore to
Elgin, n.d., Lagden Papers, Rhodes House Library, Oxford (RH.L.) Mss Afr S 209. See
A. R. Booth, "Lord Selbome and the British Protectorates," Journal of African History, 10
(1969), 133-148; and a rejoinder, R. Hyam, "African Interests and the South Africa Act,
1908-10," Historical Journal, 13 (1970), 85-105.
20HighCommissioner's Proclamation No. 28 of 1907, Article 4.
21Coryndonto Selbome, 6 May 1907, S.N.A. 45/07/640.
22For a discussion of these various schemes, see J. S. Crush, "The Spatial Impress of
Capital and the Colonial State in Swaziland, 1903-14," (M.A. thesis, Wilfrid Laurier
University, 1978), ch. 5.
23The partition commissioner, Grey, spent sixteen years in the employ of capital in
central Africa before this, his only colonial commission. He is credited with the discovery of
the Katanga copper mines in W. V. Brelsford, Generation of Men (Salisbury, 1965). The
partition was effected by Grey in continuous consultation with both Selbore and Coryndon.
24R.T. Coryndon, SomeAccount ofGeorge Grey and His Workin Africa (London, 1914).
25Persistence in the postcolonial period is described most recently in G. Maasdorp,
"Modernization in Swaziland," in C. G. Knight and J. L. Newman, eds., Contemporary
 THE COLONIAL DIVISION OF SPACE 77

o 10o 20omiles
0 10 20 3' kms
Fig. 2: Demarcated Swazi Reserves, 1908
criteriaon which the partitionwas based. We can then assess to
what extent the partitionattemptedto lay the groundworkfor the
integrationof the countryinto capitalistmodes of production.
ProceduralCriteria
The partitioncriteriaused by Grey were a mixtureof principleand
praxis and were sufficientlyflexible to allow modificationas the
partitionproceeded.26 The initialquestionwhichpreoccupiedGrey
was how to provideexplicitandindisputableboundarylines around

Africa: Geography and Change (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1976), 408-422. The reasons are
suggested within a political economy paradigmin I. Winter, "The Post Colonial State and the
Forces and Relations of Production,"Review ofAfrican PoliticalEconomy, 9 (1978), 27-43.
26This account is based on a number of sources, both official and private, but see
particularly partition instructions to Grey, 18 November 1907, CO 417/441, Enclosure 1.
78 JONATHANCRUSH

reservesto mitigateblack-whitefriction,black trespass on white

property,and the expense of fencing all reserves.As a solution,
Grey attemptedin the main to use rivers and streams as clear
demarcationlines. He commented,"Whereverpossible I have
adoptedwell definedwatersheds,watercoursesor riversas bound-
ariesof nativeareas;suchboundarieswill be easily recognisedand
understoodby natives."27Rightsto water along a riverwere to be
sharedequally.An analysisof boundarylines revealsthatof a total
lengthof 1690 miles, 36 percentwas perennialriver.The remaining
64 percentwas madeup of concessionboundariesandwatersheds.
By the inclusionof land alreadybeingused by the Swazi within
thereserves,it was assumedby thestatethatpartitionwouldproduce
a situationin which morethan one thirdof "fertileland"wouldbe
in the reserves. Grey afterwardsmade the auspiciousclaim that
"fiftypercentof the most fertileportionsof Swazilandare in native
area."28Both settlerand Swazi laterclaimedthatthe otherhad the
betterof the division.An analysisbased on Murdoch'sland capa-
bility surveyreveals the following.29 Approximately79 percentof
the total area of the reserveswas comprisedof soil types ranging
frompoorto untillable.Of the remaining21 percent,6 percentwas
on slopesof greaterthan14?;leavinga mere15 percenton whichthe
soil and slopes mighthave been suitedfor cropproduction.On the
otherhand,69 percentof all goodsoil on slopesof less than 14?was
expropriatedfromthe Swazi for settlers.Grey's claim has proved
difficultto substantiateandif anything,the Swazi claimis the more
justified.
In the field Grey attemptedto elicit informationfrom Swazi
chiefsaboutthe landthey consideredmostdesirablefor agriculture,
for inclusion in the reserves, as an appeasementexercise. The
responseto Grey was uniformlynegative:"GenerallyI was given
little or no informationby the chiefs I visited. Usually they ex-
plainedthat withoutthe Chief Regent'sordersthey were unableto
point out the land they most required."30 Despite a numberof
attemptsby the state to obtainthis authorization
forthe chiefsfrom
the Regent, the conspiracyof silence persisted.31Grey was con-
sequentlyforced to make his own evaluationof land the Swazi

27HighCommissioner's Notice No. 119 of 1908, Grey'sOfficialReport,Section6.

28Greyto Selbore, 31 December1908, S.N.A. D 09/2 andCO 417/469/7.
29G.Murdoch,Soils and Land Capabilityin Swaziland(Mbabane,1972).
30Greyto Selbore, 3 May 1908, S.N.A. D 09/2.
"Coryndon'sunsuccessfulattemptsto gettheregentto orderthe chiefsto cooperatewith
Grey arerecordedin CO 417/456/86.
 THE COLONIAL DIVISION OF SPACE 79

considered desirable, since the overall design of the state was not to
be thwarted by such protest. Hence the network contains no overt
expression of land desirability by the Swazi.
The partition is also related to Grey's perception of Swaziland's
four environmental provinces (the Highveld, Middleveld, Lowveld,
and Lebombo) which have been identified on numerous occasions in
secondary texts.32As a result,
The Middleveldis the most thickly inhabiteddistrict and has a
greatercapacityfor carryinga largenativepopulationthananyother
portion of Swaziland... While the natives appreciatethe fertile
middleveld,the concessionairesvalue morethanany otherarea,the
highveldgrassfor wintergrazing.33
The Middleveld was consequently the favored zone for reserve
demarcation;44 percent of the total area demarcated as reserve was
located in the Middleveld, and only 23 percent, 28 percent and 5
percent was in the Highveld, Lowveld and Lebombo respectively.
The Middleveld was not the exclusive preserve of the Swazi,
however, since settler interests were generally paramount and the
potential of this zone for settler-estate production was coming to
light: "In the middleveld I have succeeded in keeping out of native
area two large stretches in which a considerable farmingpopulation
might find settlement."34In the final analysis, settlers were left with
70 percent of the Highveld, 51 percent of the Middleveld, 66 percent
of the Lowveld and 73 percent of the Lebombo region.
Any land already under settler occupation and cultivation in
1908 was automatically precluded from the reserves. An examina-
tion of Grey's field notes reveals such comments as:
Thebestlandandmuchgoodgrazingis leftto thewhiteowner;... the
white owner should be well satisfied with his portions;the more
accessibleare left to him. .. .the portionleft to the concessionaire
containssomeof the finestcountryin Swaziland,is well-wateredand
containsgood agriculturalland.35
Land being thus "beneficially occupied" was automatically ex-
empted from the so-called "primitive agricultural technique" of
the Swazi.

32Forexample in H. J. De Blij, "The Concept of the Physiographic Province Applied to

Swaziland," Journal for Geography, 1 (1960), 7-20; and Murdoch, Soils and Land
Capability.
3Grey to Selborne,31 December1908, S.N.A. D 09/2 andCO 417/469/7.
34Ibid.
3ExtractsfromGrey'sfieldnotes,locatedin S.N.A. D 09/2.
80 JONATHAN CRUSH

The basic networkof definedconcessionsundoubtedlyexercised

a pre-existentset of spatial constraintson the possibilityfor pro-
ducing consolidatedor symmetricalreserves. Grey exercised a
prerogativenot to deduct a rigid one-thirdportion of every con-
cession and this represents, in part, an attempt to circumvent
networkconstraints.The deductedportions,togetherwiththe small
quantityof crownlandbeingused, were arrangedto formcompact
blocks whereverthese constraintspermitted."I have attemptedto
makethe nativeareasas largeas possibleandat the sametimeto cut
off exactly a thirdof all land concessions."36The 32 reserveswere
consolidatedfromthe portionsof 181 concessions, thoughwith a
considerablesize range(2,900 to 259,000 acres)anda meansize of
45,700 acres.
The statedrationalefor the consolidationof reservesis of some
significanceto the argumenthere. Consolidationwas designedto
minimizeprospectiveracialfriction,to preserveaggregatedblocks
of landfor unencumberedcapitalistproduction,to sustaina market
valuefor settlerproperty,andto providethe Swaziwith a degreeof
maneuverabilityin the short term, despite the longer-termdesir-
ability of puttingan end to shiftingcultivation.37 Thus on the one
handtherewas a concernto reinforceandpreservethe institutionof
privateproperty,andon the otherto ensurethatthe mass of Swazi
would not feel any immediatepsychologicaldeprivationor con-
strictionof rights.The mystificationimplicitin the latterpointdraws
attention,in fact, to an overridingconcernof the state to minimize
Swazi reactive response to the partition.As Selbome noted, "I
wanted to runno risk of any disturbancein respect of this partition."38
Partition itself was from the first perceived by .the state as a
potentially disruptive, though necessary, act which might engender
violent protest from the indigenous population. The desire of the
state to minimize the possibilities of social and political unrest
amongthe Swazi, and to fulfil its role as a politically repressive force,
was heightened by the proximate Natal uprisings of 1906-1908.39
At an early stage it was determinedthat in pursuitof this goal, a
partition should incorporate two basic principles. First, that there

36Greyto Selbome,18 February1908, S.N.A. D09/2. Inthefinalpartitiononethirdwas

deductedfrom62 concessions,less thanone thirdfrom68 concessions,andmorethanone
thirdfrom51 concessions.
37Thesepointsareallmadein Selbore to Grey, 18 November1907, S.N.A. 45/07/2129
and CO 417/441/Enclosure 1. See also Selbore to Elgin, 29 October 1906, CO
879/955/61.
38Selborememorandum, 3 February1908, CO 417/456/71.
39Foran excellentstudyof the Natal uprisings,see S. Marks,ReluctantRebellion:The
1906-8 Disturbancesin Natal (Oxford,1970).
 THE COLONIALDIVISIONOF SPACE 81
should be no forced movement of Swazis to the reserves, and
second, that the potential distance to be travelled for those who did
wish to move should be minimized.40 Consequently, the access-
ibility of reserves to all Swazi was a further element in the con-
solidation of blocks by Grey. In the final partition, no point in the
country was left furtherthan ten miles from a reserve.
The security motive was also worked out in a complementary
direction. Grey was directed by Selbome to minimize the potential
disturbance of existing homesteads,4' in order to ensure that most
Swazi would not experience a sudden change of residence or of
social and economic status in relation to the settler class. Hence, the
most densely populated zones of the country were an obvious
priority for demarcation within the reserves. In general, Grey
incorporated as many Swazi as possible within the reserves; for this
purpose detailed population distribution maps were drawn.42
Grey's comment on these maps highlights the difficulty experienced
in effecting this principle, "It will be seen how unevenly distributed
the population is and how unavoidable it is that a large proportionof
it must be left on those parts not laid out in native areas."43 Of the
6,787 Swazi homesteads identified by Grey, only 3,914 (58
percent) were within the reserves. This left 42 percent of the Swazi
population in residence on expropriated land and in an immediate
subordinate social and economic position vis-a-vis the settler
class.44 For the state, the awareness of this uncomfortably high
proportion was tempered by the forceful arguments that it was
necessary to leave Swazis on settler land as a labor force for
capitalist enterprise. This was clearly spelled out on a number of
occasions-for example, by Selbome in 1908: "I want many of the
Swazi to stay on the farmer'sland and work for them the way they do
in the Transvaal."545 Colonial officials had always assumed that the
great majority of alienated Swazi would choose to remain on settler
estates and enter into tribute or labor contracts with settlers:
The chiefobjectof the reservesis not to compelall nativesto go into
these areas.As a rulenativesmakelittleuse of reserves.The native

40Selbometo Elgin,29 October1906, CO 879/955/61.

41Selbome to Grey, 18 November 1907, S.N.A. 45/07/2129 and CO 417/441/
Enclosure1.
42Thesemaps,drawnat a scaleof 1":1 mile,hadproveduntraceableatthetimeof writing.
43Grey to Selborne, 13 February 1908, S.N.A. D 09/2.
44The Swaziwere allowedfive yearsin whichto voluntarilymove to the reserves.After
1914 settlersandlandownerswerepermittedto evict themor to levy a standardized tax or
labortribute.Contemporary accountsdetailno mass exodusof Swazi fromalienatedland
eitherbeforeor after1914.
45Selbomememorandum, 3 February1908, CO 417/456/71.
82 JONATHAN CRUSH

lE[ SwaziAreas
* Chief's Homestead *

A Royal Household /
o Royal Cattle Post

o 10 2omiles
0 o1 20 3kms
Fig. 3: Distribution of Reserves Around Indigenous Structure Elements

chooses his master and looks up to him for help, advice and
protection.46
There is evidence to suggest, however, that landowners resident
outside Swaziland used their holdings to channel alienated Swazi
labor to their estates in the eastern Transvaal. "The whole interest
of the Boers of the Eastern Transvaal lies in the direction of
Swaziland since all of them want to... increase their supply of
Swazi labour."47This scenario, while an unavoidable byproduct of
partition, was not particularly desired by the state.
Colonial officials were invariably conscious of the strong hier-
archical social structure of the Swazi and the concentration of
S.N.A. 45/07/1464.
46Selbomememorandum,
47Selbore to Maydon, 3 April 1906, Bodleian Library, MS Selbore, Box 170.
 THE COLONIAL DIVISION OF SPACE 83

politicalpower in the upperechelons of the hierarchy.48 Appease-

mentof the Swazi rulerswas thus a basic tenet of colonialpolicy in
the partition.This conformedto the securitydriveof the state andis
builtinto the partitionin an intriguingmanner.At one stage it was
arguedthat such an appeasementcould be achieved by granting
large "farms" to the chiefs, but this quickly gave way to the
presuppositionthat if neitherroyals nor regionalchiefs were re-
quiredto move theirresidentiallocations, Swazi protestwould be
considerablymuted-a correctassumption,as it transpired.
Greywas furtherinstructedto ensurethateveryroyalhomestead,
chiefly homestead,royal cattle post, and royal burialgroundwas
included within the reserves.49Identification of these elements on
the groundloomslargein Grey'sfieldnotes.The successwithwhich
thiscriterionwas fulfilledis illustratedin Figure3, whichshowshow
closely the distributionof elements of the Swazi social structure
was correlatedwith the demarcationof reserves.Of 124 chiefs, for
instance, only one was left outside the reserves, and all royal
households,cattleposts, and burialgroundswere incorporated.In
one instance,a royalburialgroundwas too remoteto be includedin
a reserve without cutting out "thousandsof morgenof valuable
ground,"so a small enclave was declaredaroundthe grave. The
arrangementof the partitionaroundelements of the traditional
politicaland sacerdotalstructureby the colonialstate was a primi-
tive formof cooptationwith a strongspatialdimension.
The partitionwas also arrangedaroundan incipient colonial
infrastructure,again to settler advantage.In the early period of
Britishcolonialrule,boththe transportation networkandthe urban
system were at a rudimentarystage of development.Nevertheless
the prospectof an integratedinfrastructure didexercisean influence
on the spatial array of the partition(Figure 4). Potential urban
centers-at this stageno morethansmall settlersettlements-were
all clearlysurroundedby landundersettlercontrolto affordsettlers
a competitiveadvantagein productionforurbanmarkets.However,
the reserveswere all proximateenoughto ensurethe ready avail-
abilityof anurbanlaborforceforanyfuturecommerceandindustry.
The small numberof mines being workedin 1908 were clearly
includedwithinsettlerland.No positiverelationshipwas proposed
by the state between the existing primitiveroad networkand the
partition,but there was a definite correlationwith a prospective
48See B. Marwick, The Swazi (Cambridge, 1949); H. Kuper, An African Aristocracy
(Oxford, 1961).
49Selbome to Grey, 18 November 1907, CO 417/441/Enclosure 1.
84 JONATHAN CRUSH

Ls AREAS
SWAZI
O TOWNS

"-+.t-1--PLANNEDRAIL
ROUTE

0 10 2omiles
10 '20 i kms
Fig. 4: Reserves and the Colonial Infrastructure

railwayline. Grey assumedthatthe futurerailwaywouldbe of little

relevanceto the Swazi, and he thereforemaximizedwhite settler
accessibilityto the proposedline of rail.50 As he notedin 1908, "My
plan of partitionplaces no native area in the middleor lowveldon
the whole route of the proposedrailway."95In the long run, this
factordid not turnout to be of criticalimportance,as the proposed
railwayschemewas soon abandoned.
Grey's final exercise after partitionwas to estimate carrying
capacityfiguresfor the reservesin orderto determinehow greatan
increasein Swazipopulationthe total amountof reservelandcould
bear. Based on a numberof theoreticalassumptionsconcerning
"?Greyto Selbore, 31 December 1908, S.N.A. D09/2 and CO 417/469/7.
"Ibid.
 THE COLONIAL DIVISION OF SPACE 85
Swazi land requirements,he estimated that the reserves could
accommodatean increaseof 52 percentof the total population.It
was assumed, albeit implicitly,that new land would have to be
addedto the reserveswheneverthis figurewas finallyreached.In
the 1940s environmental deteriorationinthe reservesandthe failure
of the state to spontaneouslygenerateany large-scaleexportcrop
productionamongthe Swazi led to the instigationof the firstrural
developmentprogramand to the increasingof reserve size by the
state.52

Conclusion

The spatial patternof landholdinggeneratedin Swazilandby the

1908 partitionwas a functionof a policy which presupposedthe
expediency of cultural, social, and economic dominationof the
Swazi by a white settlerclass. Examinationof the historicalback-
dropto the partitionrevealshow the spatialarrayis structuredby a
set of proceduralcriteriaimplementedby the colonial State which
closely accordswith the interestsof promotingcapitalistforms of
agriculturalproduction,and with the integrationof the Swazi into
such modes. As one colonial official poignantlyobserved, "The
Europeandesiresto expropriatethe best groundforhimself,to stop
indiscriminatecultivationand to displace any nativesnot required
for his own purpose."953The colonial state-through Selbome,
Coryndonand Grey-- complementedthese desires at virtuallyall
points.
The patentinequityof alienatingtwo thirdsof the landsurfaceto
the crown and less than six hundredsettlers while providingthe
Swaziwiththe remairingone thirdis explicablebothin termsof the
desireto expropriateiandfor directwhite settlementand capitalist
production,and secondarily, as being a concrete means to re-
structurethe self-sufficientindigenousagriculturalbase in orderto
acquire control over Swazi labor power while simultaneously
providingthe Swazi with enoughland to reproducethe short-term
means of subsistence.This paper has identifiedhow the physical
arrangement of spaceembodiesaninterlinkedset of criteriadesigned
to facilitateexploitationof both land and labor. The desire of the

52See D. M. Doveton, The Human Geography of Swaziland (London, 1937); and

A. Hughes,Land Tenure,Land Rights and Land Communitieson Swazi Nation Land
(Durban,1972).
"Lagdenmemorandum, 8 September1906, CO 291/107/Enclosure4.
86 JONATHAN CRUSH

state for the consolidationof reservesis seen to be a functionof an

intention to create an optimal pattern for minimizingreactive
political response from the Swazi, and hence to ensure the con-
ditions for the furtherpenetrationof white settlementand metro-
politan capital. The manipulationof the indigenouspolitical and
sacerdotal structureby the colonial state to promote political
stability, and the linking of the land pattern with the incipient
colonialinfrastructure werefurtherinducementsto capitalismin the
settlerstate.
It shouldbe notedthatthe policy makingof the colonialstatewas
both a functionof anda mediumforthe ongoingprocessof external
social and economic domination of the country. Many of the
decisionswerebasedon prospectivedevelopmentsundercapitalism
whicheventuallyfailedto materializeas SouthAfricandomination
in the regional social formationincreased.But in the year 1908
when spatialpatternswere inerasablyimprintedon the landscape,
the ideologicalbase of colonial state policy was aptly exposedin a
lamentby Greyhimself:"I havebeenthe instrumentthathas locked
up muchbeautifulandfertilecountryfromwhichthe Europeanis to
be foreverexcluded."54This is surelyan appositepostscripton the
social and economicrationalefor the Swazilandlandpartition.

54Greyto Selbore, 31 December 1908, S.N.A. D09/2 and CO 417/469/7.