Research Foundation of SUNY

The Future of Global Polarization

Author(s): Samir Amin
Source: Review (Fernand Braudel Center), Vol. 17, No. 3 (Summer, 1994), pp. 337-347
Published by: Research Foundation of SUNY for and on behalf of the Fernand Braudel Center
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The Futureof GlobalPolarization*

Samir Amin
sinceAntiquity bysocialinequal-
has been characterized
ity.But it is only in the modern era that polarizationhas
become the immanentby-product of the entire
of the integration
planetintothe capitalistsystem.
Moderncapitalistpolarizationhas appearedin successiveforms
duringthe evolutionof the capitalistmode of production:
• The mercantilist form(1500-1800) beforetheindustrialrev-
olution,as fashionedby the hegemonyof merchantcapital
in the dominantAtlanticcenters,and the creationof the
peripheralzones (the Americas)in functionof theirtotal
compliance with the logic of accumulationof merchant
capital;and
• The so-calledclassicalmodel,whichgrewout of the indus-
trialrevolutionand henceforthdefinedthe basic formsof
capitalism,whereastheperipheries- progressivelyaddingall
of Asia (except forJapan) and Africato Latin America-
remained rural, non-industrialized. Because of this their
participation in the worlddivisionof labor was via agricul-
tureand mineralproduction.This importantcharacteristic
of polarizationwas accompaniedbya second equallyimpor-
tant one: the crystallization of core industrialsystemsas
nationalautocentricsystemswhichparalleledthe construc-
tionof the nationalbourgeoisstates.Taken together,these
two characteristics account for the dominantlines of the
ideologyofnationalliberationwhichwas theresponseto the

'
Translatedby BeatriceWallerstein.

XVII,3, SUMMER1994, 337-47

REVIEW, 337
338 SamirAmin

challengeof polarization:thegoal ofindustrialization as syn-

for
onym liberatingprogress and a means of "catchingup";
the goal of the construction of nation-states inspiredby the
modelsof thosein thecore. Modernization ideologywas de-
finedin termsof these two goals. The world-system from
afterthe industrialrevolution(after1800) until afterthe
Second World War was markedby this classical formof
polarization.
• The postwarperiod(1945-1990) was one of theprogressive
erosionof the above twocharacteristics. It was a period of
the industrialization of the peripheries- unequal to be sure,
but it was the dominantfactorin Asia and LatinAmerica-
whichthenationalliberationmovementdid itsbestto accel-
eratewithinperipheralstateshavingrecentlyregainedtheir
politicalautonomy.This period was simultaneously one of
the progressivedismantling of autocentricnationalproduc-
tion systemsand their recompositionas constitutiveele-
mentsof an integratedworldproductionsystem.This dou-
ble erosionwas the new manifestation of the deepeningof
globalization.
• The accumulationof these transformations resultedin the
collapse of the equilibriacharacteristic of the postwarworld-
system. It is not leadingby itselfto a new world orderchar-
acterizedby new formsof polarization, but to "globaldisor-
der." The chaos whichconfrontsus today comes froma
triplefailureof the system:it has not developednew forms
of politicaland social organizationgoingbeyondthenation-
state-a new requirementof the globalizedsystemof pro-
duction;it has not developed economic and politicalrela-
tionshipscapable of reconcilingthe rise of industrialization
in the newly-competitive peripheralzones of Asia and Latin
Americawiththe pursuitof globalgrowth;it has not devel-
oped a rapportotherthanan exclusionary one withtheAfri-
can periphery, whichis notengagedin competitive industri-
alization.This chaos is visiblein all regionsof theworldand
in all facetsof thepolitical,social,and ideologicalcrisis.It is
at theoriginof thedifficulties in theconstruction of Europe
and its inabilityto pursue marketintegrationand parallel
integrative politicalstructures. It is the cause of the convul-
FUTURE OF GLOBAL POLARIZATION 339

sions in all the peripheriesof easternEurope, of the old

semi-industrializedThird World, of the new marginalized
"FourthWorld."Farfromsustaining theprogressionofglob-
alization,the currentchaos reveals itsextremevulnerability.
• The predominanceof thischaos should not keep us from
thinking aboutalternativescenariosfora "newworldorder"
even if thereare manydifferent possiblefuture"worldor-
ders." What I am tryingto do here is to call attentionto
questionswhichhavebeen glossedoverbythetriumphalism
of inevitableglobalizationat the same timethatits precari-
ousnessis beingrevealed.
The reader willno doubt have discoveredthatthisanalysisof
worldcapitalismis not centeredon the questionof hegemonies.I
do not subscribeto the successivehegemoniesschool of historiog-
raphy.The conceptof hegemonyis oftensterileand not scientific
because it has been so looselydefined.It does not seem to me that
it should be the centerof the debate. I have, on the contrary, ar-
gued thathegemony is farfrom the rule but rather the exception,
the rule being conflictamong partnerswhichputs an end to the
hegemony.The hegemonyof theUnitedStates,seeminglyin effect
today,perhapsbydefault,is as fragileand precariousas theglobal-
izationof the structures throughwhichit operates.In myopinion
the debate should startwithan in-depthdiscussionof whatis new
in the world-system producedby the erosionof the previousone.
In myopinionthereare twonew elements:
• The erosion of the autocentricnation-state and the subse-
quentdisappearance of thelink between the arena of repro-
duction and accumulation and that of politicaland social
controlwhichup to now had been definedpreciselyby the
frontiersof thisautocentricnation-state.
• The erosionof the antinomy:industrialized center/non-in-
dustrializedperipheralregions,and the emergenceof new
dimensionsof polarization.
A country'spositionin theworldpyramidis definedbyitscapa-
cityto competein the worldmarket.Recognizingthistruismdoes
not in anywayimplysharingthe bourgeoiseconomist'sviewthat
thispositionis achievedas the resultof "rational"measures,said
540 SamirAmin

rationality beingmeasuredby the standardof the so-called"objec-

tivelawsof themarket."On thecontrary, I thinkthatthiscompeti-
tivityis a complexproductof manyeconomic,political,and social
factors.In thisunequal fightthe centersuse whatI call their"five
monopolies." These monopolies challenge the totalityof social
theory.Theyare:
• Technologicalmonopoly:It requireshuge expenditures that
a
only large and wealthy statecan Without
envisage. thesup-
port of the state,somethingliberaldiscoursedoesn't men-
tion,mostimportantly formilitary spending,mostof these
monopolies would not last.
• Financial control of world-widefinancialmarkets:These
monopolieshave an unprecedentedefficacythanksto the
liberalizationof rulesgoverningtheirestablishment. Not so
long ago the greaterpart of a nation'ssavingscould circu-
late onlywithinthearena,largelynational,of financialinsti-
tutions.Today thesesavingsare handledcentrally byinstitu-
tions whose operationsare worldwide.We are talkingof
financecapital,capital's most globalizedcomponent.The
logic of this globalizationof financecould be called into
question by a simple politicaldecision to delink,even if
limitedto the domain of financialtransfers. Moreoverthe
rules governingthe freemovementof financecapitalhave
brokendown.This systemhad been based on thefreefloat-
ing of currencieson the market(accordingto the theory
thatmoneyis a merchandiselikeanyother)withthe dollar
servingde factoas a universalcurrency. The moneyas mer-
chandisetheoryis unscientific and thepositionof thedollar
is onlyfautede mieux.A nationalcurrencycannotfulfillthe
functionsof an international currencyunlessthereis a sur-
of
plus exports in the "international currency"country,thus
underwriting structuraladjustmentin the othercountries.
This was thecase of GreatBritainin thelate-nineteenth cen-
tury. This is not the case of the United Statestoday,which
financesits deficitby imposedborrowings.Nor is thisthe
case forthe competitorsof the UnitedStates:Japan's sur-
plus (thatof Germanyhavingdisappearedafterunification)
is not sufficient to meet the financialneeds occasionedby
FUTURE OF GLOBAL POLARIZATION 341

thestructural adjustments of theothers.Underthesecondi-

tions, financial farfrombeinga "natural"pro-
globalization,
cess, is an extremelyfragileone. In the shortrun it leads
onlyto permanentinstability, and not to the stability
neces-
saryfor the efficient operationof the processes of adjust-
ment.
• Monopoliesof access to the planet'snaturalresources:The
dangers of the recklessexploitationof these resourcesis
nowplanet-wide. Capitalism,based on short-term rationality,
cannotovercomethe dangersposed by thisrecklessbehav-
ior, and it thereforereinforcesthe monopoliesof already
developed countries.Their concern is simplynot to let
othersbe equallyirresponsible.
• Media and communication monopolies:They not onlylead
to uniformity of culturebut also open up new means of
politicalmanipulation. The expansionof themodernmedia
marketis alreadyone of the majorcomponentsof the ero-
sion of democraticpracticesin theWestitself.
• Finally,monopoliesofweaponsofmassdestruction: Held in
checkby the postwarbipolarity, thismonopolyis again the
sole domain of the UnitedStates,as in 1945. If "prolifera-
tion" is a riskin thatit mayget out of controlit is stillthe
only way of fightingthis unacceptablemonopolyin the
absence of democraticinternational control.

These fivemonopoliestakenas a whole definethe framework

withinwhichthelaw of globalizedvalue operates.The law of value
is thecondensedexpressionofall theseconditions,and scarcelythe
expressionof an objective"pure" economicrationality. All of these
processes,theirconditioning,annulstheimpactof industrialization
in the peripheries,devaluestheirproductivework,and overvalues
the supposed value added to the activitiesof the new monopolies
fromwhichthe centersprofit.What resultsis a new hierarchyin
the distributionof income on a worldscale, more unequal than
everbefore,subordinating theindustriesof theperipheries,reduc-
ing them to subcontracting.This is the newfoundationof polariza-
tion,presagingitsfutureforms.
In contrastto the dominantideologicaldiscourse,I maintain
that"globalizationvia themarket"is a reactionary Utopia.We must
342 SamirAmin

counteritbydevelopingan alternative humanistic projectofglobal-

izationconsistentwitha socialistperspective.Impliedin therealiza-
tionofsuch a projectis theconstruction ofa globalpoliticalsystem
whichis not in the serviceof a globalmarketbut whichdefinesits
parameters, just as the nation-state representedthe so-
historically
cial framework of the nationalmarketand not its fieldof deploy-
ment.A globalpoliticalsystemwouldthushave majorresponsibili-
tiesin each of the followingfourdomains:
• The organizationof global disarmamentat appropriate
levels,liberatinghumanityfromthe menace of nuclearand
otherholocausts.
• The organizationof access to the planet'sresourcesin an
equitable mannerso thattherewould be less and less in-
equality.There should be a global decision-making process
witha valuation{tarification)
ofresourceswhichwouldmake
waste reductionobligatoryand would distributethe value
and incomefromtheseresources.Thiswouldalso be thebe-
ginningof a globalizedfiscalsystem.
• Negotiationof open, flexibleeconomicrelationships among
the world'smajor regionswhichare unequallydeveloped.
This would progressively reduce the centers'technological
and financialmonopolies.This meansof coursetheliquida-
tionof the institutionspresentlyrunningthe global market
(the socalled World Bank, the IMF, GATT, etc.) and the
creationof othersystemsformanagingtheglobaleconomy.
• Startingnegotiation forthecorrectmanagementoftheglob-
al/nationaldialecticin theareas of communication, culture,
and politicalpolicy.This impliesthe creationof politicalin-
stitutionswhichwould representsocial interestsoperating
on a global scale, the beginningof a "world parliament"
goingbeyondinterstate mechanismsthatexistnow.
It is more thanevidentthatcurrenttrendsare not goingin the
directiondescribedabove and thatthehumanistobjectivesare not
thosebeingfoughtabout today.I am notsurprised.I wouldin fact
be surprisedwere it otherwise.The erosion of the old systemof
globalizationis not able to prepareitsown successionand can lead
onlyto chaos. Dominantforcesare developingtheiractivities in the
framework of theseconstraints, tryingto maneuver forshort-term
FUTURE OF GLOBAL POLARIZATION 343

gainand therebyaggravating thechaos.Theirattemptto legitimate

theirchoicesby the stale ideologyof the "self-regulating" market,
by affirming that "there is no alternative," or by pure and simple
cynicism, is not the solutionbut is part of the problem.The peo-
ple's spontaneousresponsesto thedegradationare not necessarily
more helpful.In a timeof disarray,illusorysolutions,such as fun-
damentalismor chauvinism, can be verypolitically mobilizing.It is
up to the left-thatis its historicmission-to formulate,in theory
and in practice,a humanisticresponseto the challenge.In its ab-
sence and untilit is formulated, regressiveand criminalscenarios
willbe the mostlikelyorderof the day.
The difficulties confronting the European projecttodayare a
good illustration of theimpasseof "globalizationbymarketmecha-
nisms."In the firstblushof enthusiasmoverthe European project
no one foresawthese difficulties. Yet theywere perfectly predict-
able by people who neverbelievedthatthe CommonMarketby it-
selfcould createEurope. We said thata projectas ambitiousas this
one could not be accomplishedwithouta leftcapable of makingit
sociallyand culturallyprogressive.If not, it would remainfragile
and the least serious accidentwould be fatal.It was necessary,
therefore, fortheEuropeanleftsto makesure thateach stepof the
integration of the marketswas accompaniedby a double seriesof
measures-on theone hand insuringthatprofitsgo to theworkers,
therebyreinforcing theirsocial powerand theirunity;and on the
other,beginningtheconstruction of a politicalsystemwhichsuper-
sedes thenation-state and whichis theonlyunitthatcan effectively
manage an enlargedmarket.This did not happen. The European
project,in the hands of the right,was reducedto mercantilist pro-
portions,and the leftsooner or later offeredits supportwithout
imposinganyof itsconditions.The resultis whatwe see beforeus:
theeconomicdownturnhas put theEuropeanpartnersin an adver-
sarialposition.They can onlyimaginesolutionsto theirproblems
(notablyunemployment)that are at the expense of others,and
don'tevenhave effective toolsfordoingthat.Theyare increasingly
temptedby involutivepullbacks.Even the sincereeffortsto avoid
such actionon the part of Frenchand Germanpoliticianson the
rightand on thelefthave resultedonlyin incantation.
"Little"Europe (the EC) is experiencingproblemsat the same
timethat"big" Europe is givinga new meaningto the challenge.
544 SamirAmin

This is an opportunity fortheleftto rethinkthe Europeanproject

as a whole and to begin the construction of a confédéralpolitical
and economicbig Europe, thatis anchoredon theleftby a recon-
structedand unitedEuropeanlabor force.Europeanpolicymakers
havemissedthisopportunity, and,on thecontrary, havebackedthe
forcesof therightwhichwerein a hurryto profitfromthecollapse
of the Sovietempireby substituting a wildcapitalism.It is obvious
thatthe "Latin-Americanization" of easternEurope can onlyweak-
en the chancesof successfora Europeanprojectanchoredon the
left,and thatit can onlyaccentuatethe disequilibrium among the
Europe of the EG to the benefitof the onlypartnerable to profit
fromthisevolution:unitedGermany.
The crisisof theEuropeanprojectis one of themajorchalleng-
es confronting theconstruction of thenewglobalization.But these
involutivemanifestations, theseinadequateand tragicresponsesto
the challengeof the construction of a renewedglobal system,are
not foundexclusively in Europe. Theyare seen throughout thefor-
merThirdWorld,especiallyin regionsmarginalized by the collapse
of the old world order (Sub-SaharanAfricaand the Arab-Islamic
areas), and also in the new ThirdWorldof the East (as in the for-
merU.S.S.R. and theformerYugoslavia),wherewe see autodestruc-
tiveinvolutionsratherthanresponsesequal to the challenge.
Giventhisbackground,thereare a fewscenarioswhichare pro-
posed as realistic.I willexamineseveralof themand showthatthey
do not replyto the exigenciesof the construction of an acceptable
and stableworldorder,and thereforedo not providean exitfrom
chaos.
The European questionis at the centerof theorizingabout the
futureof globalization.Withthebreakdownof the Europeanproj-
ect and thethreatof disintegration, forcesfaithfulto theEuropean
idea could believe it usefuland possibleto regroupto their"sec-
ond best" position,thatis, a GermanEurope. There is reason to
believe that in this scenario the Britishship would sail close to
Americanshores,keepingitsdistancefromcontinental Europe.We
havealreadystarteddownthispathand some haveevenlegitimated
thischoice by givingpriority to the "neutralmanagementof mon-
ey" (a technocratic concept based on ignoranceof the political
of
meaning moneymanagement), and conferring it(whereelse?) to
theBundesbank!I do notbelievethatthiscaricatureof theoriginal
FUTURE OF GLOBAL POLARIZATION 345

Europeanprojectcan be trulystable,forneitherRussianor France

willacceptthe erosionof theirpositionswhichis impliedby it.
To makemattersworse,thepreferential positionof the United
Statesis not challengedunder the scenarioof Germany'sgoingit
alone or of a GermanEurope. Nor is it clear thatthereis anything
in thisprojectthatcould challengethe UnitedStatesin anyof the
areas of the fivemonopoliesdiscussedabove. A GermanEurope
would remainwithinthe U.S. orbit.
There is a second scenario-forlack of an alternative- a second
editionof "U.S. hegemony."There are manyvariations.The most
likelyone is a sharingof theburdenassociatedwithneo-imperialist
regionalization, hitchingLatinAmericato theU.S. wagonand Afri-
ca to the German-European one (withcrumbsforFrance),but not
the Gulfoil regionand the "commonmarketof the Middle East,"
whichwould remainthe domain of the United States. The U.S.
presenceis feltbythemilitary occupationoftheGulfand indirectly
by its alliance withIsrael, and, one can say,by the symmetry of
leavingsouthernAsia toJapaneseexpansion.But thereis no equal-
ity implied in this divisionamong the three centers discussed
above: the UnitedStatesretainsitsprivilegedposition.Here too I
do not believe thatneo-imperialist optionsof thistypeguarantee
the stabilityof the system;they willbe disputedhere and thereby
revoltsin LatinAmerica,Asia, and Africa.
We should thereforefocus our attentionon Asia, whichhas
been largelyoutsidethe Euro-American conflict.It has oftenbeen
observed that the nations of East Asia-fromJapan to People's
Republicof China, to Korea, as well as to a lesser degree certain
countriesof SoutheastAsia (Singapore,Thailand,and Malaysia),
and even India-have not been affectedby the crisis and have
registeredsuccessesin termsofgrowthand efficiency (measuredby
competitivity on the world market). One can not quicklyjump
ahead and say thatAsia willbe the locus of the nexthegemony.
Asia, in this globalizingconcept, contains more than half the
world's population! This population is divided among distinct
states.In the place of a vague concept of hegemonyone could
substitute one ofan Asia becomingtheprincipalregionofcapitalist
accumulation.It remainsto describein detailhow thisis occurring,
thearticulation amongthedifferent nations,and betweenthemand
the restof the world.There are variantsof the model. The easiest
346 SamirAmin

to imagine-the dominationof Japanese imperialismin the re-

gion-is, in my opinion,the least plausible. Admirersof Japan's
recentsuccess too oftenunderestimate It is
Japan's vulnerability.
because of thisvulnerability thatJapanremainstied to the United
States.It is notseriouslyprobablethatChina,or evenKorea,would
accept being subordinatedto Japan. Under these conditionsthe
maintenanceof an inter-Asian equilibriumwoulddepend on forces
externalto the regionand here again onlythe UnitedStatesis a
candidatefor this role, whichwould prolongits primacyon the
worldscene.
Nonethelessit is highlyprobable that the positionsof these
Asiancountriesin theworld-system willbe reinforced.How willthe
United States react to this?All strategiesof allianceswill,in my
opinion,revolvearoundthisquestion.It goes almostwithoutsaying
thatthe developmentof China threatensall global equilibria,and
thatis whythe United States will feel threatenedby its develop-
ment.In myopiniontheUnitedStatesand Chinawillbe themajor
antagonistsin futureconflict.WhatwillEurope's attitudebe? It is
hard to telltoday.
Currentdevelopments suggestdifferent possiblescenarios,none
ofwhichquestionthecause of "North^South" The com-
polarization.
mandinglogic of the capitalist the
systemperpetuates center/periph-
erypolarization. Its modesof operationare everrenewedand willin
thefuturebe foundedon thefivemonopoliesexplainedabove.
One could saythatthereis nothingnewin thisviewbecause po-
larizationis almostpartof thenaturalorderof things.I do notcon-
clude on this note preciselybecause somethingis different now
fromwhathas existedoverthelastfivecenturies.Peoples peripher-
alizedbycapitalistworldexpansion,who seemed fora long timeto
accept theirfate,have overthe past 50 yearsnot been acceptingit
anylongerand willacceptitless and less in thefuture.The positive
aspect of the universalization whichcapitalisminaugurated-and
whichcannottranscenditspresenttruncatedversion-is the worm
in the fruit.The Russian and Chinese revolutionsbegan the at-
temptto transform thesystemon thebasis of therevoltsofperiph-
eral peoples-and thiswillbe continuedin new versions.The final
explanationforthe instability of the "world-systems" in progressis
foundhere.Of coursetheconflicts thatwilloccupytheforefront of
the stage in the futurewill,as always,not all be of equal impor-
tance. I would intuitively give the determining role to futurecon-
FUTURE OF GLOBAL POLARIZATION 347

flictsopposingthepeoples of Asia and thedominantsystems.This

does notmean thatotherswillnotparticipatein thegeneralizedre-
voltagainstpolarization, just as it does not mean thattransforma-
tionsand progresswillnot emanatefromthe verycentersof the
system.This does notexcludefailures,dramaticones,whenpeople
resolutelyrefusea universalist perspective.A humanisticresponse
to thechallengeofglobalizationinauguratedbycapitalistexpansion
maybe idealisticbut it is not Utopian.On the contrary,it is the
onlyrealisticprojectpossible.Let us beginto developit and power-
fulsocial forceswillrallyto it fromall regionsof theworld.
This is the wayto renewthe perspectiveof global socialism.In
preparation, ideologicaland politicalforcesmustregroupin orderto
be capable of combatingthefivemonopolieswhichreproducecapi-
talism.This combatwillcreateconditionsfor"mutualadjustment."
In thisstrugglewe have to reconsiderfundamental questionson the
ideological cultural front: the universal/particular dialectic,the
relationship between politicaldemocracy and social progress,the
dialecticof so-calledeconomic efficiency (and the ways it is ex-
the
pressed: "market") and values of equalityand fraternity,and the
definition of a globalsocialistobjectivein thelight of all the above.
On the politicalfrontwe have to developworldorganizational
formswhichare moreauthentically democraticso as to be capable
of reshapingeconomic relationson the basis of less and less in-
equality.In thisperspectiveI givea highpriority to reorganization
of the global systemon the basis of large regionswhichwould
group scatteredpartsof the peripheries.This would be the place
forthe constitution of LatinAmerican,Arab,African,and South-
east Asianregions,alongsideChina and India (the onlycontinental
countrieson our planet). This objectiveshould receive priority
treatment in thenewagenda of the"Non-Aligned Movement."The
regionalgroupingsdo not exclude otherones such as Europe or
theformerU.S.S.R. The reasonforthisexigencyis simple:itis only
on thisscale thatone can effectively combatthefivemonopoliesof
our analysis.The construction in turnof a trulyglobal economic
and financialsystembecomes possibleon thisbasis.
Of course the transformation of the worldalwaysbeginswith
strugglesat itsbase. Withoutthebeginningof changesin ideologi-
cal, political,and social systemson thelevelof theirnationalbases,
anydiscussionabout globalizationand polarizationremainsa dead
letter.