The Socratic Paradox

Author(s): R. E. Allen
Source: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Apr. - Jun., 1960), pp. 256-265
Published by: University of Pennsylvania Press
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 THE SOCRATIC PARADOX

BY R. E. ALLEN

Most peoplethinkthatknowledge has neitherstrengthnor authority

nor
powerof command;thatthougha manmayhave it,it can be overpowered
-by anger,by pleasureand pain, sometimes by love, oftenby fear-as
thoughit weresomepoorslave,to be draggedaboutat willby thepassions.
Is thatyourview,Protagoras?Or wouldyounotratheragreethatknowl-
edgeis a thingofbeautyand power,invincible; thatoncea manknowsgood
fromevil,nothing on earthcan compelhimto act againstthatknowledge-
Wisdombeingsufficient to his aid?
Protagoras352b-c
Therehas beenremarkable unanimity amongscholarsas to whatSoc-
ratesmeantby sayingthatVirtueis Knowledge, thatapEr' is OrtaTTT)L. In
essence,thedoctrine
attributedto himis this: abstract,judgmental knowl-
edgeofvalue,similarto theknowledge thatgoldis yellow,thatfireburns,
thatthe squareoftwo is four,necessitates
certainkindsof action:knowl-
edge of the essentialnature of virtue,of its definition,entails virtuousbe-
havior.
ThisviewofSocrates'meaning has beenheldbymanycritics, andit owns
thedistinguished supportofAristotle.'But iftakenbaldly,it is untenable,
and moreover, patentlyso. It may be thatfora purespirit,to knowthe
goodis to do it; buthumanbeingsare something less thanpurespirits. A
commonexperience ofthemorallife,and onewhichhas exercised European
ethicalinquirysinceits inception,
is thatof the selfdividedin conflictof
motives.We lovewhatwe hate,longforwhatwe fear,urgently seekwhat
we wouldmostavoid. We do thosethingswe oughtnotto do, and do them
in some sense knowingly.The man does not existwhoseprinciples, at
sometime,have notbeencorrupted by his passions;no one buta creature
withoutemotionscould denythis,and Socrateswas bothpassionateand
wise.
The traditional is unbelievable.What,then,did Socrates
interpretation
mean?
Epistemologistshavecommonly understood ' knowledge ' to meanknowl-
edge of factsand theirrelation,knowingthatsomething is true. But in
ordinary discourse
thereis anothersenseoftheword,thesensein whichwe
knowhowto playtennis,orbake cakes,or crackjokes. This associationof
knowledge withabilityis primitive.Both ' can ' and ' know' are derived
fromthesameroot,2an associationwhichsurvivesin the Germankonnen,
and in archaicEnglishusage. GertrudetheQueen,describing thedrowning
of Ophelia,relateshow,fora littlewhile,the air in her'garments buoyed
herup:
1 Cf. E.N. 1145b23ff. For a clearmodernexpression,see RichardRobinson,
Plato'sEarlierDialectic(Oxford,1953),14.
2 OE.D., s.v. 'can' and 'know'; phonetically,
comparethe Scots'ken,' which
retainstheancientassociation ofabilityand knowledge.
256
 THE SOCRATIC PARADOX 257

Whichtimeshe chantedsnatchesofold tunes;

As oneincapableofherowndistress,
Or likea creaturenativeand indued
Untothatelement.
Chaucer'sFranklin,
Similarly, a simpleman,confesses,
I ne can no termesofastrologye.
Bacon'sfamousdictum' Knowledgeis Power' musthaveseemedto his con-
temporariesialmosta commonplace.Etymologically, to say thata manhas
knowledgeis to suggestthat he knowshowto act; 3 and this same con-
nectionis foundin Greek. 'E7TrTaraatwiththeinfinitiveis identicalinmean-
ingand grammatical formwiththeEnglish'knowhowto ' andtheinfinitive
withkonnenorsavoir. The nounF7TL'YT?)bL?) may havethesamemeaning,4 and
thisis significant.
It has usuallybeensupposedthatSocrateswas a radicalintellectualist
in moralpsychology; butthe connection ofknowledgewithabilityand his
explicit (and repeated) association of knowledgewith art, TExv-?,5
suggests
a different
view. It suggests thatSocratesmeantby 'Virtueis Knowledge'
thatthosemenare virtuouswhopossessthe art of intelligent living,who
knowhowto be virtuous, or possessmoralability. If he didmeanthis,the
majorobjectionto thetraditional interpretationis avoided,forto speakof
a man'sknowledge, in thisconcrete sense,as overcome by passionor desire
is to speak nonsense.Whena man acts againsthis betterjudgment, he
demonstrates that,whatever hisprofessions,he doesnotreallyknowhowto
live correctly.The pleasuresand fears,passionsand desiresofmortallife
are a materialelement, patientto theknowing soul. Virtueusesthemas a
potteruses his clay; and themanwhocannotworkclay is no potter. The
knowledge whichis virtueis not merelyan abstractor theoretical under-
standingof value,but the capacityor practicalabilityto exhibitunder-
3Knowledgeis also associatedwithstanceor posture. In English,we under-
standor standundera thing. The Germanstandsthroughit (ver-stehen).The
Greekstandsto or at or by it (&L'-o.raaOat, assuming thatthisis properly derived
fromthesta- rootfoundin 'stand' and 'stehen'). In each case,the rootmeta-
phorseemsto be thatof takingup a physicalposturetowarda thing,of putting
one'sselfin a positionto act. I am indebtedto Prof.N. J. DeWittforthisremark.
4Mr. JohnGould (Plato's Ethics [Cambridge,1955], 15) summarizes Prof.
BrunoSnell'ssurveyof pre-Platonic uses of brorT'4L'q as follows:"'ETrt(ralia and
trYTL/77, like(rocta and unlikeytyvKEotv and ovvetvaL, haveas theirprimary mean-
ing 'efficiency in practice,'practicalintelligence; sometimes denotinga restricted
technique(abilityin somespecialfield),sometimes a generallyintelligent
approach
to living.... 'E=ar'TV- doesnotimplycontemplation ofan object,butunderstand-
ing,in thesenseofabilityto act."
5 Cf. Ion 537d,538aff.,Charm.165d,Euthyph.14c,Rep. I 342c,335a,Euthyd.
289c,Prot.345a. Thislistis by no meansexhaustive.
258 R. E. ALLEN

standingin action.6 If thisis true,the SocraticParadoxis farless para-

doxical.
If one wereto offera parameterforthe traditionalinterpretation of
'Virtueis Knowledge'it wouldbe, 'to knowwhatvirtueis, is to be virtu-
ous.' As we haveseen,thisis falseto thecomplexity of humannatureand
itsself-division.A betterparameter is,'to knowhowto be virtuousis to be
virtuous,'sincevirtueis notmerelya matterof factualknowledge, but of
practicalability.
This conclusionis not whollyoriginal. Mr. JohnGould,in a recent
book,Plato's Ethics,has defendedit withadmirablevigorand lucidity.
But he goesonto erectuponit an interpretation whichis morequestionable,
onewhich,in theremaining pagesofthispaper,I proposeto criticize.
Mr. Gould'sinterpretation is essentiallyRylean:soundpracticedoesnot
requiresoundtheory, or anytheory.'Knowinghow' needhaveno admix-
tureof 'knowingthat.' The knowledge whichSocratesvaluedis notjudg-
mentalor abstract:it is intelligentability,and thatonly. " For Socrates
and Plato,to achieveaperq'is notto arriveat a valid ethicaltheory,
butto
attainvalidmoralbehavior" (op. cit.,p. 13).
It followsthatthetraditional viewmisunderstood theproblemSocrates
set himselfto solve. His was nottheproblemofthejudge or critic,faced
withthetask of defining an objectivecriterionof moralbehavior. It was
rathertheproblemofthemoralagent,facedwiththe exigencies of action.
The moralaim is in somesensea 'given' (p. ix); the problemof ethicsis
notto discoverone'saim,butto attainit.
Thereseemsno questionin theseearlydialoguesoflookingforan objective
formoralbehavior:the assumption
justification appearsto be thatmoral
behavior . . . justifiesitself,and the problem is how to achieve it . ...
There is nothingso far to suggestthat 6rtor4u is in any way to be under-
stood as . . . contemplationof moral truth . . . . It representsrather a
moralassurance,perhapswithoutobjectivejustification,
but sufficient
to
makeactionfollow(pp. 20-21).
Mr. Gouldconcludesfromthisthat Socrateswas a moralsubjectivist,
though(I wouldlike to add) in a peculiarsense. A modernsubjectivist
woulddenythatmoralstatements can be trueor false,or morethan im-
perativesor expressionsof feelingand attitude.But forMr. Gould'sSoc-
rates,thetruthofmoraljudgments is notdenied,simplybecausetheques-
tionof theirtruthdoesnot arise. Moral knowledge, whichis ability,can
no morein the ordinary sensebe truethanabilityto play tennisor dance
jigs can be true. Socrateswas, in thisview,a subjectivistbecausehe was
not an objectivist.But he was not an objectivist,if Mr. Gouldis correct,
in just the sensethatthe numbersevenis notpurple;it is notpurplebe-
6Strictly,the abilityto be virtuousis not virtue,any morethanthe abilityto
play tennisis playingtennis. Socratesassumesthatwheremoralabilityexistsit
willbe actualizeddue to the ftotA.qoats or ' truewish' of menforthe good. Mr.
Gould'sdiscussion of this (op. cit.,ch. iii) is excellent,
and the readerinterested
in
pursuingthismatterfurther is advisedto consultit.
 THE SOCRATIC PARADOX 259

cause it is not any color at all, not because it is red. The traditionalin-
terpretation,in forcingSocrates to take a stand in the dispute over moral
objectivity,has made him answer a question which he did not, and under
the circumstancescould not, ask. For on Mr. Gould's view, 4E`rLTo7FL?1 con-
sists solely in behavior,not in judgments:
Does 'Plato suggestthat brto-7- ' is to be thoughtof as evincedin action,as
a mannerof acting,or as a priorstate of mind upon which action follows?
Is 'knowing' a manner of behaving or of thinking? . . . I believe that
Plato would answer, however little in our terms: a manner of behaving
(p. 30).
Mr. Gould's Socrates,then,so far as morals at least are concerned,is, like
ProfessorRyle, a logical behaviorist,a man who believes that, "when we
describepeople as exercisingqualities of mind,we are not referring
to occult
episodes of which theirovert acts and utterancesare effects;we are refer-
ringto those overtacts and utterancesthemselves."7
There is muchin Mr. Gould's interpretation that is suggestiveand pene-
trating,and it supplies a welcome corrective. But in its implicationsit is
very nearly as one-sided as the view it is designed to replace. In what
followsI shall argue that it misrepresents the nature of Socratic dialectic,
that it neglectsSocrates' genuinebelief in the relevance of moral theoryto
moral practice,and that it misunderstandshis estimateof the innerlife of
the moral agent. The upshotof this discussionwill be that both Mr. Gould
and the traditionalview are rightin what they affirm, wrongonly in what
they deny; that the proper parameter for 'Virtue is Knowledge' is, 'to
know how to be virtuous,and to know what virtue is, is to be virtuous.'
No prioritywill be assigned to 'knowing how' or 'knowing that'; both
are parts of the same process,and in Socrates' thought,mutuallyimplicated
-indeed, perhapshardlydistinguished.

A. SOCRATIC DIALECTIC
The traditionalinterpretation viewed the questions 'What is Justice?'
and 'What is 'Courage?' as questionsfortheory,demandingan answer,not
directlyan action. Neverthelessthey had directpractical bearing,forif a
man is to behave morallyhe mustknowwhat moral behavioris, and if he is
to know when he succeeds,or when he fails,he must know what it is he is
aimingat.8 Reflectionon moral principleis not accidental to morality,but
7 GilbertRyle,ConceptofMind (New York,1949),25.
8 Prof.Ryleand Mr. Gouldwouldhereobjectthatpractical abilityneednotin-
volveany abstractor judgmental knowledge at all. A traditionalist
wouldreply
thatthismay wellbe true,but thatin the specialcase of morality, at least,it is
irrelevant:formoralactions,to use Kant's language,are actionsdonenotonlyas
dutyrequires, butalso becausedutyrequires.If thedeonticexpression seemsinap-
propriatefora Greek,the same pointmaybe put in anotherway: actionunder-
takenwithout reflection
on and knowledge
ofmoralprinciple is,no matterhowwell
it succeedsin attaininga commendable end,itselfno moremoralthanthat of a
bruteanimal's. We do not praisespidersforspinning webs,or dogsforburying
bones,thoughwe mayadmiretheskillwithwhichtheydo it.
260 R. E. ALLEN

of its essence. Dialectic, Socrates' technique of question-and-answerin

search of definitions,aimed at moral improvement;it did so by aiming at
truth.
Mr. Gould disagrees,since in his view Socrateswas not in any way con-
cernedwithmoraltheory. The virtuousman,he maintains,in face of moral
decision,possesses an inward convictionor assurance very like that of a
master-weaverat his loom. The goal of dialectic is to producethat assur-
ance,9 and its instrumentis ad hominemargument. Addressingitselfto a
particularindividual in a particularsituation,dialectic produces a convic-
tion peculiarlyand personallyhis own. There is no questionhere of moral
rules or universalprinciples,thoughit is no accident that dialectic should
use as its methodthe search for definitions. Socrates' ethics was not de-
scriptive,but normative,and its definitionsare disguisedrecommendations,
' persuasive definitions,'definitionswhich redirectattitudes by redefining
terms.
This view seems tenable only because Mr. Gould assumes (and does not
argue) that definitionsare incapable of being true or false. But this is a
miodern,or at least post-Aristotelian, thesis, and Aristotlehimselfshowed
instructivehesitationon the issue. As forPlato, thereis no evidencethat
he ever viewed definitionas merelynominalor stipulative,as he would have
had to if he had accepted this view. Socrates and Thrasymachus,to take
only one example, are not in the Republic quarrelingover the meaningof
the word 'justice,' but over Justice,over the nature of somethingwhich
exists. Definition,for Plato, is real definition;it articulatesthe structure
of reality,and is as capable of truthor falsityas any othertype of state-
ment. If this were not true,the method of hypothesisin the middle dia-
logues, and the method of collection and division in the later, would be
unintelligible;and in the absence of strongevidenceto the contrary,which
Mr. Gould has not produced,we must also suppose it true of the early
period. The dialogues,fromfirstto last, assume that definitionis the goal
ofinquiry,notitsinitium,and that to achieve definition is to achieve knowl-
edge of reality.
This view of definitionis importantfor a correctunderstandingof the
'particularity' of Socratic argument. Dialectic involvesno proof,and little
deduction; as Mr. Gould rightlyremarks,it is a direct appeal to the man
himself. But thoughthe process of argumentis particular,adapted to the
individual addressed,the product is not. The goal of moral inquiry,for
Socrates, is self-knowledge, knowledgeof one's own human nature and its
needs. But dialectic is universal,in this'sense: it seeks to define,not my
justice, or yours,but Justice;and this impliesthat,howevermuch one man
may differfromanother,thereis a point in whichall men are one. In self-
knowledge,'particularity,'we touch the universal. This is worthelaborat-
ing. All men possess self-knowledge, howeverdimly,and it is forthis rea-
9 Mr. Gould appearsto believethat onlythosewho have moralabilitycan
possessthisconviction, conviction,
so that dialectic,in producing producesmoral
abilityas well. But in whatwayis theconviction whichmarksthewiseman sub-
fromthatwhichso oftenmarksthefool?
jectivelydifferent
 THE SOCRATIC PARADOX 261

son that ironywas so markeda featureof Socrates' character. His was the
humorof the man who knowsthat his opponentin argumentis wrong,and
also knows that, despite his protestations,the opponentknows it too. In
Socratic ironywe findone root of Plato's theoryof Recollection,the theory
that the truthof all thingsis always in the soul. This much is clear: argu-
ment,on such a theory,must always at bottombe ad hominem,forits pur-
pose is not to lead on to novelty,but to clear away obscuritiesfromsome-
thingwhichhas always been thereto be seen.10
Mr. Gould is able to ignorethe analytic and judgmental characterof
dialectic only by treatingthe moral aim as a 'given.' But this seems ec-
centric. In the latterpart of the Vth century,forceof events and ferment
of ideas had subjected the moral code of Greece to doubtfulscrutiny;mo-
rality-any moralitybeyond the appeal to force and naked passion-de-
manded justificationand defense. The debate of Socrates and Thrasy-
machus over the nature of Justice is a debate over the moral aim, over
what is worthlivingfor. It is not a debate over means to an end already
agreedupon. The moral aim, forSocrates,is clear: it is spiritualperfection,
virtue,a state of the individual soul whichis identicalwith self-knowledge
and self-mastery. This conclusion,and its corollaries,so far frombeing a
' given,'was forgedin the face of hot dispute,and of the most intenseand
painful self-questioning and self-doubt.
Mr. Gould, then,errsin rejectingthe traditionalview of the role of dia-
lectic; he errsno less in what he puts in its place. In his view, the aim of
dialectic is to produce con'victionor assurance, thoughnot the conviction
or assurance that certainpropositionsare true. But even if it be granted
that a convictionof this kind exists,it has littleto do with Plato, who dis-
tinguishesknowledgefrombeliefand definesit by its ability to 'render an
account' and by its fieldof objects. Those objects are Forms,Forms which
pertainto moral no less than mathematicalinquiry. Mr. Gould avers that,
"a troublesomeidea whichwe mustabandon is the suppositionthat &UrC7q,
in Plato's writings,bases its claim to acknowledgedsupremacyin the sphere
of ethics (and human behavior generally) on being in touch with objective
truthsor objectivevalues " (p. 11). But surely,to abandon the objectivity
ofbrtTWT' is to abandon Platonism. Whateverelse it may be, the theoryof
Forms is a theoryof ideals, ideals whichserve as the main aim of moral as-
pirationand lend to moral activityits very meaning. The essence of Pla-
tonism is its firmand unswervingaffirmation of the objectivityof those
ideals, their independenceof human beliefsand attitudesand the world of
temporalfact; and the relevanceof them,and of knowledgeof them,to the
course of human life. This conclusionis as true,in a different way, of the
10Mr. Gould,rightly, connectsthe ad hominem characterof dialecticwiththe
factthatPlato wrotedialogues, nottreatises.But thedialogueformdoesnotimply
thatPlato thoughtthatphilosophical truthlackssystem, stillless thatthereis no
truthto be known;it impliesthattruth,ifit is to be recovered, mustbe recovered
out of one'sself. For thisprocess,questioningis vital,and therefore not doctrine
but dialogue,thedramaticinterplay ofmindwithmindin conversation, is perhaps
thebestsubstitute forconversationitself.
262 R. E. ALLEN

early dialogues as of the middle. The Socratic positionwas indeliblyob-

jective, thoughnot in Plato's sense. It did not assert the existenceof spe-
cificallymoral objects; but it did assume that thereis a truthin morals no
less than in mathematics,a truthvitally relevantto the livingof a human
life.11
B. MORAL THEORY AND MORAL PRACTICE
Dialectic is the primemethodof moral exhortationforSocrates. If, as
I have argued, it attemptedto obtain moral improvementby exhibiting
moral truth,then the relevanceof moral theoryto moral practice is estab-
lished. But that relevance could have been established on independent
grounds,since it is implicitin the notionof rTXV1.
Mr. Gould regardsrEXv-1 merelyas 'practical aptitude'; but spidershave
a practical aptitude forweb-spinning,thoughnot the art of spinningwebs.
A bettercommenltary on the word'smeaningis the firstchapterofthe Meta-
physics,whereArt or Wisdom is straightforwardly viewed as practical sci-
ence, concernedwiththe concreteapplication of universalprinciples. Aris-
totle'streatmentof rEXv-7 merelyechoesthat ofPlato in the Gorgias (500e if.,
cf. 503e), a dialogue not later than the early middleperiod. There the de-
finingcharacter of Art, as distinctfrommere 'knack' and 'experience'
(rpt3,8q and E'pratpta) is that it inquiresinto the nature of its object and the
cause of its behavior,and is able to renderan account. The notionof intel-
ligentpracticedivorcedfromt-heory is Rylean; it is not Platonic.'2
Socrates' missionas an ethical teacherwas, in effect,to raise men from
the level of moral E,u7rapi1a to the level of moral rEXv-.Every man, in a root,
minimalsense,knowshow to live or he would not be alive; but his abilityis
susceptibleof degree,and the key to successfullivingis reflection.So long
as men live by customand habit, followinga life of conventionwhichthey
do not understandand thereforecannot justify,they live blindly. And
those who live blindly cannot live well. These are the men who, to use
Plato's word, have mere c4tretpia. Their skill in living may be likened to
that of the unreflective cook, who can bake a cake-sometimes an excellent
cake-but cannot give a recipe. It is characteristicof this kind of knowl-
11In supportofthisconclusion: it is reasonableto supposethatPlatoviewedthe
theoryof Formsas merelyan extension or consequence of Socrates'moralphilos-
ophy,the philosophy of Plato'sown earlydialogues.If, as Mr. Gouldmaintains,
theearlydialoguesput forward a typeof moralsubjectivism, thenthereis a revo-
lutionin doctrinebetweenthe earlyand middleperiod,a revolution whichPlato,
strangely enough, allowsto occurquitewithoutcomment.
12 'ETrt-rL , in the earlydialogues, may meaneitherabilityor factualknowl-
edge. The brothersin the Euthydemus, forexample,claimto knoweverything
(294aff.,cf.278a,wherebri7Trapiatequals the abstracturvv6cvat); theyhave factual
knowledge of suchthingsas thenumberof starsin thesky,and grainsof sand on
the seashore;and theyknowhowto do everything-to dance,to vaultswords,to
cobbleand sew-fortheirknowledge is universal.This discussion exhibitsan am-
biguityin commonusuageof whichSocrateswas probablyunaware:the dual as-
pectsofknowledge wereheldin solution, in histhought,
unified, and thischemistry
madenaturalhiseasyassociation ofknowledge and art.
 THE SOCRATIC PARADOX 263

edge that it is inarticulate;thoughone can perform,one cannot renderan

accountof how one performs.But the genuineartistknowsbothwhat to do
and what to say.13 He can renderan account of his workbecause thereare
in it formalconditionsabout whichhe can judge truly. There is an essen-
tial structureimplicitin the goal he seeks to realize,in the materialhe works
with,in the instruments and techniqueshe uses. An essentialfeatureof art,
as distinctfromknack, is the possessionof abstract knowledge,knowledge
of facts and their relation. The artist combinesthis knowledgewith con-
crete capacity in action,and these two sides of grasp and capacity are dis-
tinct. A person who can bake a good cake may be unable to provide a
recipe,and as everybridesupposedlyknows,a personwitha recipemay not
be able to bake a good cake. But thoughgrasp and capacity are distinct,
they are complementary.Knowingwhat one is doing and knowinghow to
do it are parts of the same process.
The Platonic view of art, then, is best explicated as a formof applied
science, like engineeringor, to use a favoriteGreek example, medicine.
Moral skill, if it is to be more than 'knack' and 'experience,' demands
moral science.
There is no question here of saying,'first learn moral theory,and then
go and be moral.' Socrates' respondentswere already engagedin the moral
life,since men by nature search fortheirown souls' good; that search is of
the essence,not an accident,of human existence. A man cannot put him-
self outsidethe moral context,beyondgood and evil, forthe claim of moral-
ity,on Socraticprinciples,is the claim of humannature on itself. Thus the
appeal of moral theoryis not to a mind divorcedfromaction (or passion);
thereis no such mind,and if therewere,moral principleswould be meaning-
less to it, since they would not issue fromlife. Everyone begins with a
grasp of those principles; if they did not, Socratic dialectic would have
nothingit could say to them. But their grasp is dim and uncertain,and
thereforeerring,and it was this flawthat dialectic aimed to correct. For
Socrates, moral theory and moral behavior were distinguishableelements
of a single activity,an activitywhich everyman, willy nilly,is committed
to pursue.
C. THE INNER LIFE

My finalobjectionto Mr. Gould's interpretation

is that it providesno just
estimateof the place of moral inwardnessin Socrates' thought. ErtOTLt0J,
he holds,is purelya mannerof behaving. But only the body behaves, and
thereforethis view is not Platonic. Plato would have understood,as log-
ical behavioristslike Mr. Gould and ProfessorRyle cannot,those followers
of the HyperboreanApollo, whose divine giftsenabled themto leave their
bodies periodicallyand to journey over the whole world to survey it. In
howeverpeculiar a way, these shamans anticipatedin theirown experience
Plato's theorythat the soul is immortaland able to exist 'alone by itself,'
apart fromand priorto the body. This is a metaphysicaldoctrine;but it is
13Alcib.II 140e,Lach. 190c,Prot.314b,Meno86b.
264 R. E. ALLEN

intimatelyconnectedwith Plato's moral theory. Just as the soul is inde-

pendentof the body, so is the self independentof bodily behavior. Plato
does not definemoralityby referenceto action or (scarcely less external)
dispositionto action. The moral ideal is an internalorder of soul, from
whichrightaction follows. It has oftenbeen remarkedthat forPlato, there
is no such thingas just action; thereare only actions done by just men. To
identifyvirtuewitha mannerof behavingis to mistakeconsequentforcause.
And virtueis knowledge.14
More precisely,virtueis self-knowledge, and it is self-knowledge which
providesthe measure of Socratic inwardness. In the First Alcibiades15 it
is argued that to know what we ourselvesare (Tt 7TOT' iofv avToc) we must
know the Self Itself (avTo TavTo, 129b 1), plainly a universalin which indi-
vidual selves are groundedand fromwhichthey derive theirnature. This
view is not explicitin any otherearly dialogue; but dialectic,with its uni-
versalityof definition, presupposesit, and so does Socrates' ethics,whichas-
sumesthat men in seekingtheirown self-perfection seek a universal,an ideal
harmonyin whichstruggleand contentionare reconciled. In self-knowledge,
then,a merelyrelativegood is transcended,and the individualis seen to be
groundedin somethingdeeperthan himself. The First Alcibiades morethan
hints that the ideal is no mere essential structure,but an existent,God.
The self,in findingitself,findsconsiderablymore,and in so doing it passes
beyond ethics,forwhichthe good is merelypossible,to religion,wherethe
possible is actual. This is why friendship, a type of self-knowledgegained
by gazing into the eye of anothersoul, is also a formof communionwith
and knowledgeof the divine.16
14 It maybe objected thatMr. Gouldfindsin theconviction or assuranceofthe
virtuous mana kindof'subjectivetruth,'a la Kierkegaard, and quoteswithappro-
val Kierkegaard's famousquestion,'What is truthbut to live foran idea?' This
mightseemto introduce theinteriority
thatSocraticethicsdemands, butit doesnot,
and cannotconsistently.Socratescould not well have been both a Rylean,for
whomknowledge ofourselvesand otherswouldbe exhausted in theirbehavior,and
a Kierkegaardian, forwhomany knowledge of behaviorcouldonlybe 'possibility
knowledge,' irrelevant to the subjectivetruthwhichis Faith. I therefore assume
that,forMr. Gould,'assurance' means'assured behavior,'and that the above
criticismstands.
It is perhapsworthwhile hereto hazarda remarkon thetendency, whichis be-
comingevermorepopular,to introduce Kierkegaardian themesintotheinterpreta-
tionof Socrates. Socrateswas no voluntarist;thereis no hintanywhere in the
dialogues, orin Greekliterature generally,thatlivingforan idea,passionforit,com-
mitment to it, couldeverserveto makeit true. Socrateswas awarethatit is pos-
sibleto be intensely and passionately
wrong, and I suggestthathe wouldhavefound
Kierkegaard's notionof truthquiteunintelligible. He was not,therefore, a proto-
existentialist,anymorethanhe was a proto-logical behaviorist.
15 The genuineness of thisdialoguehas been disputed,thoughnot,I think,on
compelling grounds.SinceMr. Gouldcitesthe dialogueforsupport,I assumehe
agrees. But see A. E. Taylor,Plato (New York,1950),522ff.
16 Alcibiad. I 132cff.
 THE SOCRATIC PARADOX 265

Plato's continualcomparison of the mindto the eye,of intelligence to

sight,is mostsignificant: it is fruitof the assumption that the primary
function ofbothlies in directand immediate apprehension.But theobject
ofself-knowledge, in so faras it maybe called' object,'is notmerelyseen:
it is possessed.The unityofthesoul'svisionis inextricably associatedwith
a unityof life. The ethicalideal is one ofwholeness, in whichthevarious
and oftencontending elements in ournatureunitein theserviceof a single
commonend. The ideal is notunlikethatofKant's Holy Will,thewill of
a personality so perfectly unitedthatno illicitinclination can everariseto
disturbit. Ideally,theselforsoulhas in it no compartments, no unitfacul-
ties,no fissures to divideintention frombelief. Knowledgeof the moral
ideal,self-knowledge, impliesa unityof personality in the serviceof that
ideal. To knowthegoodis thento do it; formoralincapacityis themark
of a soul in conflict,
aTacus, and oftheignorance whichcTa'TcrYentails.
It followsfromthisthatthe parameter, 'to knowhowto be virtuous,
and to knowwhat virtueis, is to be virtuous,'providesonly a surface
meaningforthe dictumthat Virtueis Knowledge. Virtueimpliesboth
graspand capacity;but bothare rootedin a formof intuition so funda-
mentalthat it toucheseverycornerof the self,an intuition whichentails
the completeintegration of the personality.It followsthatthereis a di-
mensionof meaningin the Socraticparadoxwhichmustremaindark and
difficultto understand; forthe paradoxissuesfroma depthof experience
whichfewhave attained,and no one,notevenPlato in his descriptions of
BeautyItselfand the Good,has adequatelycharacterized.Socratesper-
haps knewas well as any manthe fullextentofhis paradox,knewthatit
was obscureand mustremainso. But thisdid notindicatetheuselessness
of conceptualexplication.Intuition, he appearsto 'havefelt,mustcontin-
ually be associatedwithanalysis,and bothwithlife; and in the unionof
theseelements, all wouldbe enriched.
University of Minnesota.