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Jian Liu*1)
The design flood criteria suitable for Southeast Asian nations are recommended
after reviewing the design criteria and guideline of China, Japan, UK, USA and
ICOLD. The project’s scale, the downstream hazard potential and dam type
should be considered when the design floods are determined. PMF as a design
flood is a suitable adoption for an embankment dam, but it is excessively
conservative for a concrete dam. As case studies, the selection of design floods
for the Kelai 2 Hydropower Project in Indonesia and the Namkok Hydropower
Project in Myanmar are discussed.
Introduction
The design floods for the dams and spillways in the Southeast Asian nations are determined
on the basis of the design standards of the countries outside the region, because they do not
have their own design criteria. In most cases, the design standards and guidelines of Australia,
Canada, China, EU, Japan, Russia, USA and International Commission on Large Dams
(ICOLD) are used without any modification, though the climate conditions in the monsoon
regions are different from the countries whose criteria are used. Japan uses the maximum
value between 200-year frequency flood and maximum experienced flood as the design flood
for concrete dams and 1.2 times the relevant value for the concrete dams for embankment
dams. All the other counties and organization mentioned early use the probable maximum
flood (PMF) as the design floods for embankment dams. The design flood criteria of China,
Japan and Russia for concrete dams are lower than the standards of the English-speaking
nations that also use PMF as a design flood for concrete dams. Japan uses the lowest probable
flood as a design flood in the world, but the dam failures in Japan due to low design floods
have not occurred until the present, and this means the low design flood would not absolutely
increase the dam failure rate. Although there are a lot of arguments on PMF as a design flood
regardless of dam type, for the embankment dam, PMF would be a better choice in
consideration of the structure’s weakness and high failure rate. However, the selection of PMF
as the design flood for the concrete dams seems to be too conservative, taking the free board
effects and high safety factors of concrete dams. The overall failure rate is considered as
around 1% and the annual failure risk for any dam is about 0.00001 on average. They have
been reducing with appearance and improvement of new investigation techniques, the wide
dissemination of knowledge on risks and increase of hydrological records. Actually, the dam
failures mainly occurred before 1970, and most of them were small embankment dams built
in 1920-40s, when the hydrological data were limited and there was a lack of geological
knowledge. The failed concrete dams account for 3% of all damaged dams and almost no
concrete dams failed due to overtopping after 1970s (ICOLD, 1974; Lecornu, 1996).
In practice, different country’s consultants often select different design floods for the same
project due to a lack of the unified standards. In most of the cases, PMF is chosen as a design
flood because dam professionals do not want to be associated with dam failures which cause
death and property damage. This often results in unnecessary huge spillways and an increase
of project costs and duration. In order to find a suitable design flood criteria for the Southeast
Asian nations, most of which do not have their own dam design criteria, the design flood
standards of Great Britain, China, Japan, USA and ICOLD are reviewed and the selection of
design floods for the Kelai 2 Hydropower Project in Indonesia and the Namkok Hydropower
Project in Myanmar are discussed as case studies.
China
China has 86000 dams with a total storage capacity of 560 billion m3, and 90% of them are
embankment dams. The large dams are up to 24136 in 1999, accounting for about 50% of the
large dams in the world (Pan & He, 2000). The large dam failure rate is estimated at 0.1% and
almost all are embankment dam due to piping, overtopping, design and operation mistakes
and bad construction quality, but the damage is very serious. The most catastrophic dam
failures occurred at the Banqiao dam and Shimantan dam in the Huai River basin on August 9,
1975 in the Zhumadian Prefecture of Henan province in central China and the recent collapse
is the Gouhou dam in August 1993 in Gonghe County of Hainan Tibet Autonomous
Prefecture, Qinghai province in Northwest China. In August 1975, a typhoon passed through
the whole of the region south of the Yellow River, and this led to a set of storms, which
dropped 1005mm of water in 24hr in the Huai River basin. After the storms, the 118m
Banqiao Dam on the Ru River and the Shimantan dam on the Hong River collapsed due to
overtopping as did other 60 small dams in the Huai River basin. Eleven million people were
severely affected. The death toll estimates for these failures varied widely. Approximately
26000 deaths occurred from drowning in the immediate aftermath of the dam collapses. There
were as many as 230000 deaths if those who died of consequent health epidemics and famine
are included. Because China did not establish its criteria, the two dams were all built in 1950s
according to the former Soviet Union criteria without any modification and the check design
flood was designated as a 1000-year flood for the Banqiao dam, which was estimated at 530
mm rainfall over a three day period, and 500-year flood for the Shimantan dam, which was
estimated at 480 mm rainfall over a three day period. The Banqiao Dam was originally
designed to pass about 1742 m3/s through its sluice gates and a spillway. The storage capacity
was set at 492 million m3 with 375 million m3 of the capacity reserved for flood storage. The
Shimantan Dam had a capacity of 94.4 million m3 with 70.4 million m3 for flood storage. It
can be found that the rainfalls used for calculating the check design floods of the two dams,
which were determined on the basis of the maximum daily rainfall of 320mm are much less
than the precipitation of 1005mm recorded in 24 hours in August 1975 (Dai, 1998). After the
catastrophe, a survey of historical floods has been emphasized, and PMF or 10000-year flood
has been using the check design flood for large embankment dams, and sometimes used for
concrete dams until 1990. Since 1975, no dam has failed by overtopping because the
discharge capacities of all dam were checked and the new discharging structures for the dams
with small releasing capacities were designed and constructed according to the revised
Chinese criteria in which PMF was first used. The 71m high Gouhou concrete-faced rockfill
dam (CFRD) was built in 1989 and collapsed by piping due to bad construction quality and
design mistakes on August 27, 1993. The dam failure, which is the first CFRD breach in the
world, caused 242 people dead, 330 injured, 2,932 houses collapsed and 90 ha. farmland
inundated. The property loss is up to US$22.7 million. The dam failure investigation indicated
that the water level at the reservoir at the collapse (El. 3277.25) was 3.75m lower than the
dam crest (El.3281) and the flood was smaller than the design flood with 500-year return
period and much smaller than the check design flood with 10000-year return period (Li et al.,
1999). This dam failure resulted in that the CFRD guideline was heightened into the design
code and the construction specification on CFRD was developed.
The Chinese design flood criteria were developed in 1964, and first revised in 1978 after the
catastrophe of the Banqiao and Shimantan dam failures and secondarily revised in 1990. The
design floods for dams and other relevant structures are determined by the project rank,
structure class and dam type. The water conservancy and hydropower projects in China are
classified into five different ranks in accordance with their scales, benefits and importance in
national economy. The criteria for classifying project functions as specified in Chinese design
codes are listed in Table 1 (CEC, 2000). The various hydraulic structures of a project are
further divided into five classes based on the rank of the project in which they work and their
roles and importance in the project (Table 2). For example, the dam of a 1 GW hydropower
project that is classified as Rank 1 will be designated as a Class 1 structure, while a bridge on
an access road for the same project will be designated as a Class 3 structure, and the
cofferdams for river diversion will be set as a Class 4 structure.
Table 5 Design flood and Check design flood criteria for powerhouse and non-damming structures
Class 1 2 3 4 5
Design flood 100 50 30 20 10 Return
Check design flood 1,000 500 200 100 50 period
Japan
In Japan, the inflow design floods for dams are stipulated in the Structural Standards for River
Protective Facilities (Cabinet Order), which was drawn up on the basis of River Law.
According to the standards, when the dam is constructed or reconstructed, the inflow design
floods for a concrete dam must be taken on the largest value among the following three
discharges: (1) 200-year flood at the damsite; (2) maximum experienced flood discharge at
the damsite and (3) maximum flood discharge that can be expected at the damsite based on
the maximum experienced flood discharge in the basins with similar hydrological conditions
or climate. For an embankment dam, the design flood should be specified to be 1.2 times of
the relevant values for a concrete dam (JICE, 2000). The return period of the design flood for
an embankment dam is actually equivalent to 1000 years or more.
United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, dam safety is entrusted to individual members of a statutory panel of
engineers determined by the government to be qualified to design and inspect impoundments.
The panel engineer is personally responsible for the safety of the dam he is hired to supervise,
and no mandatory standards are imposed by the government. The design floods are generally
determined by the guidelines published by the Institution of Civil Engineers, London in 1978.
Depending on the categorization (e.g. Categories A, B, C and D), the relevant design floods
are selected from PMF, 0.5PMF, 0.3PMF, 0.2PMF and/or the flood with a recurrence interval
of 10000, 1000, 150 years respectively (Table 8).
USA
In most cases, the design floods in USA are PMF. In case of adoption of an inflow design
flood less than PMF, the owner, agency, or organization in charge of construction of the
project would be responsible for a dam break. Therefore, most engineers do not want any
level of risk. The US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) recommended that the design floods
should be adopted by the height of a dam and storage impounded and, also, by hazard
potentials in the downstream areas in the event of a failure of the dam. The US Bureau of
Reclamation (USBR) uses the inflow design flood, which is PMF in most instances, as the
design flood. The design flood criteria of USACE and USBR are shown in Tables 9 and 10
(Committee on Safety Criteria for Dams, 1985).
Table 8 Reservoir flood and wave standards by dam category, United Kingdom (ICE, 1978)
Category Initial reservoir Dam design flood inflow Concurrent wind speed and
condition General standard Minimum standard if minimum wave surcharge
rare overtopping is allowance
tolerable
A Spilling PMF 0.5PMF or 10000-yr Winter: maximum hourly wind
Long-term flood (take larger) once in 10yr
average daily Summer: average annual
inflow maximum hourly wind
B Just full (i.e. 0.5PMF or 0.3PMF or 1000-yr Wave surcharge allowance not
no spill) 10000-yr flood flood (take larger) less than 0.6m
(take larger)
C Just full (i.e. 0.3PMF or 0.2PMF or 150-yr Average annual maximum
no spill) 1000-yr flood flood (take larger) hourly wind
(take larger) Wave surcharge allowance not
less than 0.4m
D Spilling 0.2PMF or 150-yr Not applicable Average annual maximum
Long-term flood hourly wind
average daily Wave surcharge allowance not
inflow less than 0.3m
Notes: 1) Category A= reservoirs where a breach will endanger lives in a community; Category B= reservoirs
where a breach (i) may endanger lives not in a community (ii) will results in extensive damage; Category C=
reservoirs where a breach will pose negligible risk to life and cause limited damage; and Category D= special
cases where no loss of life can be foreseen as a results of a breach and very limited additional flood damage
will be caused. 2) For the reservoirs with Categories B and C, alternative standards of the dam design flood
inflow, if economic study is warranted, are the flood with probability that minimizes spillway plus damage
costs, inflow not to be less than minimum standard but may exceed general standard. 3) Where reservoir control
procedure requires and discharge capacities permit, operation at or below specified levels defined throughout
the year that may be adopted providing they are specified in the certificates or reports for the dam. Where a
proportion of PMF is specified, it is intended that the PMF hydrograph should be computed and then all
ordinates be multiplied by 0.5, 0.3, or 0.2 as indicated.
ICOLD
As a general rule, ICOLD recommends that design floods shall be PMF (Table 11) and the
capacity of gated spillways shall be sufficient to discharge the full design flood without taking
into account the dampening effect resulting from flood routing through the reservoir. But for
the ungated spillway of a flood control dam, the retention effects may be considered when
calculating the design outflow flood (ICOLD, 1984; ICOLD, 1992).
Case study
Conclusions
The design flood criteria and guidelines of China, Japan, UK, USA and ICOLD are reviewed
and almost all counties and organizations except Japan have similar design flood criteria for
embankment dams. The criteria for concrete dams are different and the criteria of Japan and
China are generally are not so stringent as compared with those of UK, USA and ICOLD in
which the dam type is not taken as a classification factor. In spite of the failure rate of
concrete dams being much less than that of embankment dams, the criteria of China and Japan
in which the dams are classified into concrete and embankment dams seem to be more
reasonable. From a safety point of view, PMF as a design flood is a suitable adoption for an
embankment dam, but it is excessively conservative for a concrete dam. From a conservative
point of view, the US criteria and ICOLD guidelines for embankment dams would be suitable
for determination of the design floods in the Southeast Asian Nations. For concrete dams, the
Chinese and UK standards would be better from an economic, hydrological, geographical and
technical point of view. The Chinese criteria are especially recommended in consideration of
Southeast Asia and South China having similar meteorological and geological conditions.
The selection of design floods for the Kelai 2 Hydropower Project in Indonesia and the
Namkok Hydropower Project in Myanmar are discussed, and PMF was adopted as the design
floods for the two projects. For the Namkok project, PMF is too conservative and should be
reevaluated during the detail design phase. However, it is a suitable choice for the Kelai 2
project, though the value of PMF should be checked after the measured peak discharges are
available.
Acknowledgements
The author is grateful to Professor Ellis of Sonoda Women’s University for reviewing this
paper.
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