Petitioners allege that the particulate matters (PM) – complex mixtures of

dust, dirt, smoke, and liquid droplets, varying in sizes and compositions
THIRD DIVISION emitted into the air from various engine combustions – have caused
detrimental effects on health, productivity, infrastructure and the overall
HILARION M. HENARES, JR., VICTOR C. G.R. No. 158290 quality of life. Petitioners particularly cite the effects of certain fuel
AGUSTIN, ALFREDO L. HENARES, emissions from engine combustion when these react to other pollutants.
DANIEL L. HENARES, ENRIQUE BELO Present: For instance, petitioners aver, with hydrocarbons, oxide of nitrogen (NOx)
HENARES, and CRISTINA BELO creates smog; with sulfur dioxide, it creates acid rain; and with ammonia,
HENARES, QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, moisture and other compounds, it reacts to form nitric acid and harmful
Petitioners, CARPIO, nitrates. Fuel emissions also cause retardation and leaf bleaching in plants.
CARPIO MORALES, According to petitioner, another emission, carbon monoxide (CO), when
TINGA, and not completely burned but emitted into the atmosphere and then inhaled
- versus - VELASCO, JR., JJ. can disrupt the necessary oxygen in blood. With prolonged exposure, CO
affects the nervous system and can be lethal to people with weak hearts.

LAND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING Promulgated:
AND REGULATORY BOARD and
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION October 23, 2006
AND COMMUNICATIONS,
Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamus
commanding respondents Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory
Board (LTFRB) and the Department of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC) to require public utility vehicles (PUVs) to use compressed natural
gas (CNG) as alternative fuel.
Citing statistics from the Metro Manila Transportation and Traffic
Situation Study of 1996, the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of
the National Capital Region, a study of the Asian Development Bank, the
Manila Observatory and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) on the high growth and low turnover in vehicle
ownership in the Philippines, including diesel-powered vehicles, two-stroke
engine powered motorcycles and their concomitant emission of air
pollutants, petitioners attempt to present a compelling case for judicial
action against the bane of air pollution and related environmental hazards.
Petitioners add that although much of the new power generated in the
country will use natural gas while a number of oil and coal-fired fuel
stations are being phased-out, still with the projected doubling of power
generation over the next 10 years, and with the continuing high demand
for motor vehicles, the energy and transport sectors are likely to remain
the major sources of harmful emissions. Petitioners refer us to the study of
the Philippine Environment Monitor 2002, stating that in four of the
country’s major cities, Metro Manila, Davao, Cebu and Baguio, the
exposure to PM10, a finer PM which can penetrate deep into the lungs
causing serious health problems, is estimated at over US$430 million. The
study also reports that the emissions of PMs have caused the following:
· Over 2,000 people die prematurely. This loss is valued at
about US$140 million.
· Over 9,000 people suffer from chronic bronchitis, which is
valued at about US$120 million.
· Nearly 51 million cases of respiratory symptom days in Metro
Manila (averaging twice a year in Davao and Cebu, and five to six times in
Metro Manila and Baguio), costs about US$170 million. This is a 70 percent
increase, over a decade, when compared with the findings of a similar
study done in 1992 for Metro Manila, which reported 33 million cases.
Petitioners likewise cite the University of the Philippines’ studies in 1990-
91 and 1994 showing that vehicular emissions in Metro Manila have
resulted to the prevalence of chronic obstructive pulmonary diseases
(COPD); that pulmonary tuberculosis is highest among jeepney drivers;
and there is a 4.8 to 27.5 percent prevalence of respiratory symptoms
among school children and 15.8 to 40.6 percent among child vendors. The
studies also revealed that the children in Metro Manila showed more
compromised pulmonary function than their rural counterparts. Petitioners
infer that these are mostly due to the emissions of PUVs.
To counter the aforementioned detrimental effects of emissions from PUVs,
petitioners propose the use of CNG. According to petitioners, CNG is a
natural gas comprised mostly of methane which although containing small
amounts of propane and butane, is colorless and odorless and considered
the cleanest fossil fuel because it produces much less pollutants than coal
and petroleum; produces up to 90 percent less CO compared to gasoline
and diesel fuel; reduces NOx emissions by 50 percent and cuts
hydrocarbon emissions by half; emits 60 percent less PMs; and releases
virtually no sulfur dioxide. Although, according to petitioners, the only
drawback of CNG is that it produces more methane, one of the gases
blamed for global warming.
Asserting their right to clean air, petitioners contend that the bases for
their petition for a writ of mandamus to order the LTFRB to require PUVs to
use CNG as an alternative fuel, lie in Section 16, Article II of the 1987
Constitution, our ruling in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., and Section 4 of Republic
Act No. 8749 otherwise known as the “Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999.”
Meantime, following a subsequent motion, the Court granted
petitioners’ motion to implead the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC) as additional respondent.
In his Comment for respondents LTFRB and DOTC, the Solicitor General,
cites Section 3, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and explains that the
writ of mandamus is not the correct remedy since the writ may be issued
only to command a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do an act that
is required to be done, when he or it unlawfully neglects the performance
of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, there being
no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Further citing existing jurisprudence, the Solicitor General explains that in
contrast to a discretionary act, a ministerial act, which a mandamus is, is
one in which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a
prescribed manner, in obedience to a mandate of legal authority, without
regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or
impropriety of an act done.
The Solicitor General also notes that nothing in Rep. Act No. 8749 that
petitioners invoke, prohibits the use of gasoline and diesel by owners of
motor vehicles. Sadly too, according to the Solicitor General, Rep. Act No.
8749 does not even mention the existence of CNG as alternative fuel and
avers that unless this law is amended to provide CNG as alternative fuel for
PUVs, the respondents cannot propose that PUVs use CNG as alternative
fuel.
The Solicitor General also adds that it is the DENR that is tasked to
implement Rep. Act No. 8749 and not the LTFRB nor the DOTC. Moreover,
he says, it is the Department of Energy (DOE), under Section 26 of Rep.
Act No. 8749, that is required to set the specifications for all types of fuel
and fuel-related products to improve fuel compositions for improved
efficiency and reduced emissions. He adds that under Section 21 of the
cited Republic Act, the DOTC is limited to implementing the emission
standards for motor vehicles, and the herein respondents cannot alter,
change or modify the emission standards. The Solicitor General opines
that the Court should declare the instant petition for mandamus without
merit.
Petitioners, in their Reply, insist that the respondents possess the
administrative and regulatory powers to implement measures in
accordance with the policies and principles mandated by Rep. Act No.
8749, specifically Section 2 and Section 21. Petitioners state that under
these laws and with all the available information provided by the DOE on
the benefits of CNG, respondents cannot ignore the existence of CNG, and
their failure to recognize CNG and compel its use by PUVs as alternative
fuel while air pollution brought about by the emissions of gasoline and
diesel endanger the environment and the people, is tantamount to neglect
in the performance of a duty which the law enjoins.
Lastly, petitioners aver that other than the writ applied for, they have no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Petitioners insist that the writ in fact should be issued pursuant to the very
same Section 3, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court that the Solicitor
General invokes.
In their Memorandum, petitioners phrase the issues before us as follows:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS HAVE THE
PERSONALITY TO BRING THE PRESENT ACTION
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE PRESENT ACTION IS SUPPORTED BY
LAW
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT IS THE AGENCY
RESPONSIBLE TO IMPLEMENT THE SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE OF
REQUIRING PUBLIC UTILITY VEHICLES TO USE COMPRESSED NATURAL GAS
(CNG)
IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT CAN BE COMPELLED TO
REQUIRE PUBLIC UTILITY VEHICLES TO USE COMPRESSED NATURAL GAS
THROUGH A WRIT OF MANDAMUS
Briefly put, the issues are two-fold. First, Do petitioners have legal
personality to bring this petition before us? Second, Should mandamus
issue against respondents to compel PUVs to use CNG as alternative fuel?
According to petitioners, Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution is the
policy statement that bestows on the people the right to breathe clean air in
a healthy environment. This policy is enunciated in Oposa. The
implementation of this policy is articulated in Rep. Act No. 8749. These,
according to petitioners, are the bases for their standing to file the instant
petition. They aver that when there is an omission by the government to
safeguard a right, in this case their right to clean air, then, the citizens can
resort to and exhaust all remedies to challenge this omission by the
government. This, they say, is embodied in Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 8749.
Petitioners insist that since it is the LTFRB and the DOTC that are the
government agencies clothed with power to regulate and control motor
vehicles, particularly PUVs, and with the same agencies’ awareness and
knowledge that the PUVs emit dangerous levels of air pollutants, then, the
responsibility to see that these are curbed falls under respondents’
functions and a writ of mandamus should issue against them.
The Solicitor General, for his part, reiterates his position that the
respondent government agencies, the DOTC and the LTFRB, are not in a
position to compel the PUVs to use CNG as alternative fuel. The Solicitor
General explains that the function of the DOTC is limited to implementing
the emission standards set forth in Rep. Act No. 8749 and the said law only
goes as far as setting the maximum limit for the emission of vehicles, but
it does not recognize CNG as alternative engine fuel. The Solicitor General
avers that the petition should be addressed to Congress for it to come up
with a policy that would compel the use of CNG as alternative fuel.
Patently, this Court is being asked to resolve issues that are not only
procedural. Petitioners challenge this Court to decide if what petitioners
propose could be done through a less circuitous, speedy and unchartered
course in an issue that Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. in his ponencia in
the Oposa case, describes as “inter-generational responsibility” and “inter-
generational justice.”
Now, as to petitioners’ standing. There is no dispute that petitioners
have standing to bring their case before this Court. Even respondents do
not question their standing. This petition focuses on one fundamental legal
right of petitioners, their right to clean air. Moreover, as held previously, a
party’s standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which may,
in the exercise of the Court’s discretion, be set aside in view of the
importance of the issue raised. We brush aside this issue of technicality
under the principle of the transcendental importance to the public,
especially so if these cases demand that they be settled promptly.
Undeniably, the right to clean air not only is an issue of paramount
importance to petitioners for it concerns the air they breathe, but it is also
impressed with public interest. The consequences of the counter-
productive and retrogressive effects of a neglected environment due to
emissions of motor vehicles immeasurably affect the well-being of
petitioners. On these considerations, the legal standing of the petitioners
deserves recognition.
Our next concern is whether the writ of mandamus is the proper
remedy, and if the writ could issue against respondents.
Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, mandamus lies under
any of the following cases: (1) against any tribunal which unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty; (2) in case any corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust, or station; and (3) in case any tribunal, corporation, board or
person unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right
or office to which such other is legally entitled; and there is no other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
In University of San Agustin, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we said,
…It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the
performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its main
objective. It does not lie to require anyone to fulfill contractual obligations
or to compel a course of conduct, nor to control or review the exercise of
discretion. On the part of the petitioner, it is essential to the issuance of a
writ of mandamus that he should have a clear legal right to the thing
demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to
perform the act required. It never issues in doubtful cases. While it may
not be necessary that the duty be absolutely expressed, it must however,
be clear. The writ will not issue to compel an official to do anything which
is not his duty to do or which is his duty not to do, or give to the applicant
anything to which he is not entitled by law. The writ neither confers
powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power
already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed. (Emphasis
supplied.)
In this petition the legal right which is sought to be recognized and
enforced hinges on a constitutional and a statutory policy already
articulated in operational terms, e.g. in Rep. Act No. 8749, the Philippine
Clean Air Act of 1999. Paragraph (a), Section 21 of the Act specifically
provides that when PUVs are concerned, the responsibility of implementing
the policy falls on respondent DOTC. It provides as follows:
SEC 21. Pollution from Motor Vehicles. - a) The DOTC shall implement the
emission standards for motor vehicles set pursuant to and as provided in
this Act. To further improve the emission standards, the Department
[DENR] shall review, revise and publish the standards every two (2) years,
or as the need arises. It shall consider the maximum limits for all major
pollutants to ensure substantial improvement in air quality for the health,
safety and welfare of the general public.
Paragraph (b) states:
b) The Department [DENR] in collaboration with the DOTC, DTI and LGUs,
shall develop an action plan for the control and management of air
pollution from motor vehicles consistent with the Integrated Air Quality
Framework . . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
There is no dispute that under the Clean Air Act it is the DENR that is
tasked to set the emission standards for fuel use and the task of
developing an action plan. As far as motor vehicles are concerned, it
devolves upon the DOTC and the line agency whose mandate is to oversee
that motor vehicles prepare an action plan and implement the emission
standards for motor vehicles, namely the LTFRB.
In Oposa we said, the right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries
with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. We
also said, it is clearly the duty of the responsible government agencies to
advance the said right.
Petitioners invoke the provisions of the Constitution and the Clean Air Act
in their prayer for issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the
respondents to require PUVs to use CNG as an alternative fuel. Although
both are general mandates that do not specifically enjoin the use of any
kind of fuel, particularly the use of CNG, there is an executive order
implementing a program on the use of CNG by public vehicles. Executive
Order No. 290, entitled Implementing the Natural Gas Vehicle Program for
Public Transport (NGVPPT), took effect on February 24, 2004. The program
recognized, among others, natural gas as a clean burning alternative fuel
for vehicle which has the potential to produce substantially lower
pollutants; and the Malampaya Gas-to-Power Project as representing the
beginning of the natural gas industry of the Philippines. Paragraph 1.2,
Section 1 of E.O. No. 290 cites as one of its objectives, the use of CNG as a
clean alternative fuel for transport. Furthermore, one of the components of
the program is the development of CNG refueling stations and all related
facilities in strategic locations in the country to serve the needs of CNG-
powered PUVs. Section 3 of E.O. No. 290, consistent with E.O. No. 66,
series of 2002, designated the DOE as the lead agency (a) in developing
the natural gas industry of the country with the DENR, through the EMB
and (b) in formulating emission standards for CNG. Most significantly, par.
4.5, Section 4 tasks the DOTC, working with the DOE, to develop an
implementation plan for “a gradual shift to CNG fuel utilization in PUVs and
promote NGVs [natural gas vehicles] in Metro Manila and Luzon through
the issuance of directives/orders providing preferential franchises in
present day major routes and exclusive franchises to NGVs in newly
opened routes…” A thorough reading of the executive order assures us
that implementation for a cleaner environment is being addressed. To a
certain extent, the instant petition had been mooted by the issuance of
E.O. No. 290.
 Regrettably, however, the plain, speedy and adequate remedy herein
sought by petitioners, i.e., a writ of mandamus commanding the
respondents to require PUVs to use CNG, is unavailing. Mandamus is
available only to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a
duty. Here, there is no law that mandates the respondents LTFRB and the
DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG. At most the LTFRB has
been tasked by E.O. No. 290 in par. 4.5 (ii), Section 4 “to grant preferential
and exclusive Certificates of Public Convenience (CPC) or franchises to
operators of NGVs based on the results of the DOTC surveys.”
resort to drastic measures to reduce air pollutants emitted by motor vehicles,
we must admit in particular that petitioners are unable to pinpoint the law
that imposes an indubitable legal duty on respondents that will justify a grant
of the writ of mandamus compelling the use of CNG for public utility vehicles.
It appears to us that more properly, the legislature should provide first the
specific statutory remedy to the complex environmental problems bared by
herein petitioners before any judicial recourse by mandamus is taken.
WHEREFORE, the petition for the issuance of a writ of mandamus is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Further, mandamus will not generally lie from one branch of government to SO ORDERED.
a coordinate branch, for the obvious reason that neither is inferior to the
other. The need for future changes in both legislation and its
implementation cannot be preempted by orders from this Court, especially
when what is prayed for is procedurally infirm. Besides, comity with and LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
courtesy to a coequal branch dictate that we give sufficient time and leeway Associate Justice
for the coequal branches to address by themselves the environmental
problems raised in this petition.
WE CONCUR:
In the same manner that we have associated the fundamental right to a
balanced and healthful ecology with the twin concepts of “inter-generational
responsibility” and “inter-generational justice” in Oposa, where we upheld the
right of future Filipinos to prevent the destruction of the rainforests, so do we
recognize, in this petition, the right of petitioners and the future generation to ANTONIO T. CARPIO
clean air. In Oposa we said that if the right to a balanced and healthful Associate Justice
ecology is now explicitly found in the Constitution even if the right is CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES DANTE O. TINGA
“assumed to exist from the inception of humankind,… it is because of the Associate Justice Associate Justice
well-founded fear of its framers [of the Constitution] that unless the rights to PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state Associate Justice
policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing
importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the
first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when
all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to ATTESTATION
come. . .”
I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been
It is the firm belief of this Court that in this case, it is timely to reaffirm the reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
premium we have placed on the protection of the environment in the opinion of the Court’s Division.
landmark case of Oposa. Yet, as serious as the statistics are on air pollution,
with the present fuels deemed toxic as they are to the environment, as fatal
as these pollutants are to the health of the citizens, and urgently requiring
 LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING SEC. 4. Recognition of Rights. – Pursuant to the above-declared
Associate Justice principles, the following rights of citizens are hereby sought to be
Chairperson recognized and the State shall seek to guarantee their enjoyment:
a) The right to breathe clean air;
b) The right to utilize and enjoy all natural resources according
CERTIFICATION to the principle of sustainable development;
c) The right to participate in the formulation, planning,
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the implementation and monitoring of environmental policies and programs
Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the and in the decision-making process;
above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was d) The right to participate in the decision-making process
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division. concerning development policies, plans and programs, projects or
activities that may have adverse impact on the environment and public
health;
e) The right to be informed of the nature and extent of the
potential hazard of any activity, undertaking or project and to be served
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN timely notice of any significant rise in the level of pollution and the
Chief Justice accidental or deliberate release into the atmosphere of harmful or
hazardous substances;
f) The right of access to public records which a citizen may
need to exercise his or her rights effectively under this Act;
Rollo, p. 4. g) The right to bring action in court or quasi-judicial bodies to
Id. at 6. enjoin all activities in violation of environmental laws and regulations, to
Id. compel the rehabilitation and cleanup of affected area, and to seek the
Id. imposition of penal sanctions against violators of environmental laws; and
Id. at 7. h) The right to bring action in court for compensation of
Id. at 5, 7-8. personal damages resulting from the adverse environmental and public
Id. at 9. health impact of a project or activity.
Id. at 10. Rollo, p. 64.
Id. at 9-10. SEC. 26. Fuels and Additives.- Pursuant to the Air Quality Framework to
Id. at 11, citing Alternative Fuels: A Key to Reducing Air Pollution. The be established under Section 7 of this Act, the Department of Energy
Environmental Education and Information Division Environmental (DOE), co-chaired by the Department of Environment and Natural
Management Bureau-DENR. Resources (DENR), in consultation with the Bureau of Product Standards
Id. at 11-12, citing Bacallan, J.J. Alternative Fuels for Vehicles. Business (BPS) of the DTI, the DOST, the representatives of the fuel and automotive
and Environment. First Quarter 2003. Volume 8, No. 1, page 12. industries, academe and the consumers shall set the specifications for all
Section 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people types of fuel and fuel-related products, to improve fuel composition for
to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and increased efficiency and reduced emissions: . . .
harmony of nature. SEC. 21. Pollution from Motor Vehicles. - a) The DOTC shall implement
G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993, 224 SCRA 792. the emission standards for motor vehicles set pursuant to and as provided
in this Act. To further improve the emission standards, the Department
[DENR] shall review, revise and publish the standards every two (2) years,
or as the need arises. It shall consider the maximum limits for all major
pollutants to ensure substantial improvement in air quality for the health,
safety and welfare of the general public.
. . .
SEC. 2. Declaration of Principles. - . . .
...
Finally, the State recognizes that a clean and healthy
environment is for the good of all and should therefore be the concern of
all.
SEC. 21. Pollution from Motor Vehicles. - a) The DOTC shall implement
the emission standards for motor vehicles set pursuant to and as provided
in this Act….
Rollo, pp. 93-94.
Supra note 12.
Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., supra note 13.
Supra note 14.
Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., supra note 13.
G.R. No. 100588, March 7, 1994, 230 SCRA 761, 771-772.
Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., supra note 13 at 805, 808.
Dwikarna v. Domingo, G.R. No. 153454, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 748, 754.

Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., supra note 13 at 803.

Id. at 805.
 Alejandro, Rodolfo, and Romeo. Rodolfo and Romeo are the respondents in
this petition. Upon the death of Felicidad in 1949, Nicomedes married
Maria Rosario de Castro (Maria Rosario) on 14 October 1964. The couple
did not have any children. During the marriage of Nicomedes and Maria
THIRD DIVISION Rosario, they acquired certain properties including those hereinbelow
described:

CAROLINA B. VILLENA, G.R. No. 167620 A parcel of land (Lot 3 of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-180944, being
Petitioner, a portion of Lot 3-A-2-B (LRC) Psd-140722, LRC Record No. 19405), situated
Present: in Poblacion, Municipality of Alcala, Province of Pangasinan, Island of
Luzon. Bounded on the NE., points 1 to 2 by Lot 2 of the subdivision plan,
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., and points 3 to 4 by property of the Heirs of Luis Soriano; on the SE.,
Chairperson, points 4 to 5 by property of the Heirs of Luis Soriano, and points 5 to 6 by
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, property of Andres Dumpao; on the SW, points 6 to 7 Lot 3-B (LRC) Psd-
CALLEJO, SR., 54161; and on the NW., points 7 to 1 by Burgos street, 15.00 M. wide, and
CHICO-NAZARIO, and points 2 to 3 by Lot 2 of the subdivision plan. Containing an AREA OF ONE
NACHURA, JJ. THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED NINETY TWO (1,492) Square Meters, more or
less. Its technical description appears on TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
ROMEO Z. RUPISAN and RODOLFO Promulgated: No. 101871 – Register of Deeds for Pangasinan. Its assessed value is
Z. RUPISAN, P9,600.00 as per Tax Dec. No. 6599 of Alcala.
Respondents. April 4, 2007
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x (a) A parcel of residential land (Lot 1, Plan Psu-79891), situated in
Poblacion, Alaminos, Pangasinan, containing an area of two hundred
ninety-two (292) square meters and covered by TCT No. 1037 of the
DECISION Register of Deeds of Pangasinan, issued to the names of Nicomedes and
Ma. Rosario.

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 79405 dated 10 November 2004 granting the petition of
the herein respondents Romeo and Rodolfo Rupisan and the Resolution
dated 1 April 2005 denying the Motion for Reconsideration filed by herein
petitioner Carolina B. Villena.
(b) A parcel of land (Lot 3, Plan Psu-79891) situated in Poblacion,
Alaminos, Pangasinan, containing an area of sixteen (16) square meters
and covered by TCT No. 1037 of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan.
As to the above properties, Nicomedes and Maria Rosario
apparently executed an Agreement on Separation of Conjugal Properties
which reads:

The factual antecedents are: I. MAIN MOTIVE OF THE AGREEMENT. Because of the absence of
descendant, WE the undersigned spouses have adopted this AGREEMENT,
The late Nicomedes T. Rupisan was first married to Felicidad in order to provide a Guidance and to prevent any possible
Zamora. Their union bore five children namely: Consuelo, Erlinda, misunderstanding and litigation between the surviving Spouse and the
Heirs and successors of the predeceased Spouse. WE HOPE that the
Courts of Justice will give legal value to these Agreements.
xxxx
V. The parcel of land in No. 2 SECTION A, including the House of strong
materials built thereon and all Furnitures to be found therein, will belong
exclusively to the Husband.
VI. The parcels of lands (Lot No. 1 and Lot No. 3) in SECTION B,
including the House of strong materials built thereon and all Furnitures to
be found therein, will belong exclusively to the Wife.
On 22 June 1981, Maria Rosario caused the annotation and
registration of the said agreement on Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
1037.
On 20 March 1984, Nicomedes died intestate. On 18 May 1984,
Maria Rosario executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication adjudicating to
herself alone the subject properties covered by TCT No. 1037. Maria
Rosario then caused the cancellation of TCT No. 1037 and a new one, TCT
No. 8177, issued in her name. Similarly, she caused the cancellation of
tax declaration covering the subject properties.
On 24 April 1992, Maria Rosario died at the age of 83 years old
allegedly leaving behind a holographic will dated 3 October 1989 wherein
she devised the properties under TCT No. 8177 to her niece, petitioner
Carolina Villena. Petitioner immediately took possession of the properties.
Respondents Romeo and Rodolfo Rupisan, sons by the first marriage
of Nicomedes, filed Civil Case No. A-2106 for Partition, Annulment of
title/documents and/or Recovery of possession/ownership and damages.
On the other hand, petitioner filed Special Proceedings No. A-1278 for the
probate of the will of Maria Rosario in her capacity as devisee of the
deceased, Maria Rosario. Both cases were filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Alaminos, City Pangasinan, Branch 54. The cases were
consolidated on 18 November 1999.
On 25 September 2002, a Decision on the consolidated cases, was
rendered, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered
as follows:
1. Allowing and granting the probate of the Holographic Will of Maria
Rosario Braganza De Castro Rupisan (Spl. Proc. Case No. A-1278) and a
certificate of its allowance to be attached to the Holographic Will is
accordingly hereby issued, attested by the seal of this Court, pursuant to
and in consideration with Section 13, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court and
which must be duly recorded with the Office of the Clerk of Court, as well
as in the Office of the Registry of Deeds, Alaminos, Pangasinan;
2. Dismissing the Complaint in Civil Case No. A-2106 for utter lack of
merit, and
3. Ordering plaintiffs in Civil Case No. A-2106 to jointly and solidarily
pay defendant moral damages in the sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (P200,000.00); the reduced sum of exemplary damages in the
amount of SEVENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P70,000.00), including attorney’s
fees and costs of litigation in the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00).
Respondents, through counsel Atty. Jose Antonio M. Guillermo (Atty.
Guillermo), filed a Notice of Appeal dated 5 October 2002.
On 22 November 2002 the RTC issued an Order denying
respondent’s appeal in Civil Case No. A-2106 due to late payment of
appellate docket fees but allowed the appeal in Special Proceeding No.A-
1278, subject to certain conditions. The RTC held:
To emphasize the point, if it is true indeed that the plaintiff
received through counsel on October 2, 2002, the Decision of this
Honorable Court, then he has (sic) up to October 17, 2002 within which to
perfect the appeal in Civil Case No. 2106 which is the timely filing of the
Notice of Appeal, together with the payment to the Clerk of Court of the
full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees.
 xxxx
However, with respect to Special Proceeding Case No. 1278,
considering that Rule 141 Sec. 3 of the Revised Rules of Court provides
that: “where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a
notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty days from notice of
judgment or final order” and in which case therefore, with respect to
Special Proceeding Case No. A-1278, the Notice of Appeal is deemed
perfected except for the approval of the Record on Appeal.
WHEREFORE, Civil Case No. A-2106, not having been perfected
within the time provided for by law in accordance with Rule 41, Sec. 4 of
the Revised Rules of Court, the said appeal is DENIED for lack of merit.
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated
22 November 2002 insofar as it dismissed their appeal in Civil Case No. A-
2106. Acting on this motion, the trial court in an Order dated 16 July 2003
dismissed both appeals including that in Special Proceedings No. A-1278.
The Court ruled that inasmuch as respondents’ counsel of record, Atty.
Guillermo, already filed his Withdrawal of Appearance on 4 October 2002,
the Notice of Appeal filed on 5 October 2002, signed by said counsel, was
invalid and no longer bound his clients, respondents therein. The RTC
ratiocinated:
During the January 20, 2003 hearing which are for purposes of
approval of the record on appeal and to determine whether such record on
appeal filed by the oppositor in Special Proceeding Case No. A-1278 is in
order and whether or not the other matters treated in the Opposition to
the Motion for Approval of the Record on Appeal filed by petitioner are
impressed with merit, the following facts surfaced, to wit:
1. That on October 4, 2002, as shown by the date of the pleading
entitled “Withdrawal of Appearance” filed by Atty. Jose Antonio M.
Guillermo and which contained the conformity of no less than the
oppositor himself, Romeo Rupisan, the said counsel, Jose Antonio M.
Guillermo, stated as follows: “the undersigned attorney upon the request
and conformity of plaintiff/oppositor respectfully withdraws his appearance
as counsel for plaintiffs/oppositor in the above-entitled cases” and prayed
that his Withdrawal of Appearance be noted by this Court;
2. The aforesaid pleading was received and docketed in this court on
November 12, 2002;
3. However, notwithstanding the aforesaid withdrawal, the aforesaid
counsel, Atty. Jose M. Guillermo, submitted and filed with this Court,
without the conformity of oppositor, Romeo Rupisan, a “Notice of Appeal”
dated October 5, 2002 in the above-consolidated cases and which was
received by this Court on October 9, 2002;
4. In the meantime, on November 8, 2002, this Court is in receipt of a
“Motion for Approval of Record on Appeal” filed by Seguion Reyna
Montecillo and Ongsiako, which motion is dated October 29, 2002;
5. Subsequently on November 11, 2002 (the same date of receipt by
this court of Atty. Guillermo’s Withdrawal of Appearance), this Court
received the “notice of Appearance” dated November 5, 2002 of Seguion
Reyna Montecillo and Ongsiako, as counsel for the plaintiffs/oppositor in
the above-captioned cases;
6. Thereafter, on November 12, 2002, Atty. Jose M. Guillermo, filed
with this court an “Opposition” dated November 12, 2002, to
defendant/petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss Appeal, alleging among others as
follows: (a) that he is still the counsel of record for plaintiffs/oppositor in
the above-captioned cases inasmuch as his Withdrawal of Appearance has
not yet been acted upon by this court and considering that to his own
knowledge, no new counsel has yet entered its appearance for
plaintiffs/oppositor in the above-captioned cases; (b) That a record on
appeal is not required in the instant case.
xxxx
Verily, this Court has not acted on Atty. Guillermo’s Withdrawal of
Appearance dated October 4, 2002 and received by this court on
November 12, 2002 considering that same is not a motion and he prayed
that his Withdrawal of Appearance be just noted by the court while the
Notice of Appeal dated November 5, 2002 was received by this Court on
October 9, 2002. Thus, it appears that with reference to date, the
Withdrawal of Appearance came ahead before the Notice of Appeal.
However, with respect to the filing, the Notice of Appeal was filed ahead
than the Withdrawal of Appearance.
Rupisan alleged on his Notice of Appeal that he received a copy of
the Decision rendered by this Court dated September 25, 2002 on October
2, 2002 which means therefore that he has (sic) until October 17, 2002
within which to file his appeal. Although his Notice of Appeal dated
October 5, 2002 and was received by this Court on October 9, 2002, the
appeal/docket fee was paid late as payment was made only on October
23, 2002.
Anent Special Proceedings Case No. A-1278, the RTC disallowed the
appeal thereon on the ground that respondents did not comply with the
requirements provided by law. It said that aside from the fact that the
documents involved were not arranged in chronological order the same
also did not contained any data that will show the court that the appeal
was perfected on time. It added that neither the Compliance dated
February 11, 2003 filed by respondents contained any data showing that
the appeal was perfected on time. The trial court said that these
requirements are mandatory and non-compliance therewith is fatal to the
appeal.
The RTC declared that since no Notice of Appeal has effectively been
filed even up to the present, its decision dated 25 September 2002, has
become final and executory.
The dispositive portion of the Order dated 16 July 2003 reads:
WHEREFORE, for reasons above-stated, including those stated in
the Order of this court dated November 22, 2002, which are not in conflict
with the above, plaintiff/oppositor’s appeal is denied. Accordingly, the
decision of this Court dated September 25, 2002, has now become final
and executory.
Respondents hastily filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of
Appeals which was given due course. A Decision was rendered on 10
November 2004, the dispositive portion of which provides:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is
GRANTED. The assailed resolutions of the respondent court denying the
notice of appeal filed by petitioners for late payment of docket fees are
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The respondent trial court is directed
to give due course to petitioners’ notice of appeal.
The Court of Appeals applied a liberal interpretation of the rules. It
found the delay excusable as respondents demonstrated their willingness
to pay the docket fees as manifested in their immediate compliance with
the said requirement.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied in a
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 1 April 2005. Hence, this Petition.
The following issues are for our resolution:
1. DID THE COURT OF APPEALS VALIDLY ACQUIRE
JURISDICTION OVER RESPONDENTS’ PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IN CA-G.R.
SP No. 79405 NOTWITHSTANDING RESPONDENTS FAILURE TO FILE A PRIOR
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AS AGAINST THE JULY 16, 2003 ORDER OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT A QUO.
2. CAN A LAWYER WHO WAS PRIORLY DISMISSED BY HIS
CLIENT STILL INTERVENE IN THE CASE BY FILING A NOTICE OF APPEAL
WITHOUT THE CONFORMITY OF HIS FORMER CLIENT? STATED
DIFFERENTLY, IS THERE A VALID NOTICE OF APPEAL IN THE INSTANT CASE.
3. EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE NOTICE OF APPEAL
WAS VALIDLY FILED, WERE RESPONDENTS IN THE PRESENT PETITION ABLE
TO PERFECT THEIR APPEAL ON TIME AS CONTEMPLATED BY LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE.
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS IS GUILTY OF
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN PLACING THE SELF-SERVING AND GRATUITIOUS
EXPLANATION OF RESPONDENTS AS REGARDS THEIR DELAY IN THE
PAYMENT OF DOCKET FEES, WITHIN THE REALM OF THE EXCEPTIONAL
CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFYING THE LATE PAYMENT OF APPELLATE COURT
DOCKET AND OTHER LAWFUL FEES.

5. WHAT IS THE LEGAL STANDING OR HOW SHOULD THE
MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF THE RECORD ON APPEAL TOGETHER WITH THE
RECORD ON APPEAL FILED BY SIGUION REYNA MONTECILLO AND
ONGSIAKO BE TREATED IN THE ABSENCE OF A VALID SUBSTITUTION OF
COUNSEL?
Petitioner faults respondents for not filing a Motion for
Reconsideration on the assailed RTC order of 16 July 2003. Petitioner’s
theory is that a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals may be
availed of only after having earlier filed a motion for reconsideration
before the trial court.
We disagree.
The filing of a Motion for Reconsideration before resort to certiorari
will lie is intended to afford the public respondent an opportunity to correct
any actual or fancied error attributed to it by way of re-examination of the
legal and factual aspects of the case.
Respondents actually filed a Motion for Reconsideration. It must be
noted that the 16 July 2003 Order of the trial court is in itself an order
resolving the motion for reconsideration dismissing the respondents’
Notice of Appeal in Civil Case No. A-2106.
In any event, the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration before
availing of the remedy of certiorari is not always sine qua non. The rules
admit of certain exceptions. The instant case is one of those. In this
case, a motion for reconsideration would be useless in the light of the
declaration of the RTC that the Order of 16 July 2003 is final and executory.
We now proceed to resolve the second and fifth issues. Taken
together, the question to be resolved is: what is the effect of the
withdrawal of Atty. Guillermo as respondents’ counsel of record on the
Notice of Appeal which he had filed for both Civil Case No. A-2106 and
Special Proceedings No. A-1278.
The Rule regarding change of counsel is provided under Rule 138,
Section 26 thereat. It states:
SEC. 26. Change of attorneys. – An attorney may retire at any time
from any action or special proceeding, by the written consent of his client
filed in court. He may also retire at any time from an action or special
proceeding, without the consent of his client, should the court, on notice to
the client and attorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought to be
allowed to retire. In case of substitution, the name of the attorney newly
employed shall be entered on the docket of the court in place of the
former one, and written notice of the change shall be given to the adverse
party.
Admittedly, Atty. Guillermo filed a Notice of Withdrawal on 4 October
2002. The withdrawal notwithstanding, the trial court in its Order dated 22
November 2002 initially allowed the appeal of the respondents in Special
Proceedings No. A-1278, although it rejected the appeal in Civil Case No.
A-2106. Be that as it may, we are inclined to allow the Notice of Appeal for
both cases inspite of the obvious procedural lapse. When non-compliance
with the Rules of Court is not intended for delay or does not prejudice the
adverse party, the dismissal of an appeal on a mere technicality may be
stayed and the court may, in its sound discretion, exercise its equity
jurisdiction. This lack of intention to delay is shown by the fact that the
Notice of Appeal was filed on 5 October 2002, or only a difference of one
day from the filing by Atty. Guillermo of his Notice of Withdrawal. The
emerging trend in our jurisprudence is to afford every party-litigant the
amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause free
from the constraints of technicalities. While it is desirable that the Rules of
Court be faithfully and even meticulously observed, courts should not be
so strict about procedural lapses that do not really impair the
administration of justice especially when such strict compliance was
apparently relaxed by the trial court itself when it initially gave due course
to the Notice of Appeal. If the rules are intended to insure the orderly
conduct of litigation it is because of the higher objective they seek which is
the protection of the substantive rights of the parties. Under the
circumstances we find that the notice of appeal signed by Atty. Guillermo
should be considered valid.
 The next issue relates to docket fees, and the effect of the belated
payment by the respondents. The records show that on 2 October 2002,
the respondents received a copy of the decision. They had up to 17
October 2002 to file a Notice of Appeal and to pay the appropriate docket
fees. It is not disputed that said docket fees were paid only 23 October
2002, or six days after the lapse of the period within which to pay the said
docket fees. The reason advanced by respondents for the delayed
payment is poverty and ignorance of legal procedures.
Rule 41, Section 4, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, states:
SEC. 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. – Within the
period for taking an appeal, the appellant shall pay to the clerk of court
which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from, the full amount
of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Proof of payment of
said fees shall be transmitted to the appellate court together with the
original record or the record on appeal.
xxxx
SEC. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. – A party’s appeal by
notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to him upon the filing of the
notice of appeal in due time.
A party’s appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected as to
him with respect to the subject matter thereof upon the approval of the
record on appeal filed in due time.
In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the
case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the
expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.
In appeals by record on appeal, the court loses jurisdiction only
over the subject matter thereof upon the approval of the records on appeal
filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other
parties.
In either case, prior to the transmittal of the original record or the
record on appeal, the court may issue orders for the protection and
preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter
litigated by the appeal, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent
litigants, order execution pending appeal in accordance with Section 2 of
Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the appeal.
The failure of the appellant to pay the docket fees is a ground for
the dismissal of the appeal under Section 1(c), Rule 50 of the same rule
which states:
SECTION 1. x x x.
(c) Failure of the appellant to pay the docket and other lawful
fees as provided in section 5 of Rule 40 and section 4 of Rule 41.
From the foregoing, it can be gleaned that the payment of docket
fees within the prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of an
appeal. This is so because a court acquires jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the action only upon the payment of the correct amount of
docket fees regardless of the actual date of filing of the case in court.
In the case of Gegare v. Court of Appeals, this Court upheld the
appellate court’s dismissal of an appeal for failure of petitioner to pay the
docket fees within the reglementary period despite a notice from the Court
of Appeals informing him that such fees had to be paid within 15 days
from receipt of such notice. Denying petitioner’s plea for judicial leniency,
we held that –
Also without merit, in our view, is petitioner’s plea for a liberal
treatment by the said court, rather than a strict adherence to the technical
rules, in order to promote substantial justice. For it has consistently held
that payment in full of docket fees within the prescribed period is
mandatory. As this Court has firmly declared in Rodillas v. Commission on
Elections [245 SCRA 702 (1995)], such payment is an essential
requirement before the court could acquire jurisdiction over a case:
The payment of the full amount of the docket fee is an
indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal (Dorego v. Perez, 22
SCRA 8 [1968]; Bello v. Fernandez, 4 SCRA 135 [1962]). In both original
and appellate cases, the court acquires jurisdiction over the case only
upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees as held in Acda v. Minister
of Labor, 119 SCRA 306 (1982). The requirement of an appeal fee is by no
means a mere technicality of law or procedure. It is an essential
requirement without which the decision appealed from would become final
and executory as if no appeal was filed at all. The right to appeal is merely
a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner prescribed
by, and in accordance with, the provision of the law.”
In Lazaro v. Court of Appeals, decided 6 April 2000, the private
respondents therein failed to pay the docket fees within the reglementary
period. They paid the fees only after the Court of Appeals had dismissed
the appeal, that is, six months after the filing of the Notice of Appeal. The
Court of Appeals reinstated the appeal “in the interest of substantial
justice” without other justification. This Court, through then Chief Justice
Artemio V. Panganiban, though not persuaded, recognized that there are
exceptions to the stringent requirements of the law on payment of the
docket fees. thus:
We must stress that the bare invocation of “the interest of
substantial justice” is not a magic wand that will automatically compel this
Court to suspend procedural rules. “Procedural rules are not to be
belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have
resulted in prejudice to a party’s substantive rights. Like all rules, they are
required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons
when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not
commensurate with the degree of this thoughtlessness in not complying
with the procedure prescribed.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Sure enough, the foregoing jurisprudence truly blazed the trails for a
liberal application of the strict interpretation of the law.
In Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Mangubat, the
payment of the docket fees was delayed by six days, but the late payment
was accepted because the party showed willingness to abide by the Rules
by immediately paying those fees. The Court also took note of the
importance of the issues in this case involving as it does the entitlement or
not of the respondents to properties involved.
Of similar import is the ruling of the court in the case of Ginete v.
Court of Appeals where we held that aside from matters of life, liberty,
honor or property which would warrant the suspension of the rules of the
most mandatory character and an examination and review by the
appellate court of the lower court’s findings of fact, the other elements
that should be considered are the following: (1) the existence of special or
compelling circumstances; (2) the merits of the case; (3) a cause not
entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the
suspension of the rules; (4) a lack of any showing that the review sought is
merely frivolous and dilatory, and (5) the other party will not be unjustly
prejudiced thereby.
Yambao v. Court of Appeals saw us again relaxing the Rules when
we declared therein that “the appellate court may extend the time for the
payment of the docket fees if appellant is able to show that there is a
justifiable reason for the failure to pay the correct amount of docket fees
within the prescribed period, like fraud, accident, mistake, excusable
negligence, or a similar supervening casualty, without fault on the part of
the appellant.
In Go v. Tong, reiterated in Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor, it was
held that while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional
requirement, even its nonpayment at the time of filing does not
automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as long as the fee is paid
within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period; more so when
the party involved demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules
prescribing such payment.
In Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation, the Court stated
that failure to pay the appellate docket fee does not automatically result in
the dismissal of an appeal, dismissal being discretionary on the part of the
appellate court. And in determining whether or not to dismiss an appeal
on such ground, courts have always been guided by the peculiar legal and
equitable circumstances attendant to each case.
In Camposagrado v. Camposagrado, the case involved a deficiency
in the payment of docket fees in the amount of Five Pesos (P5.00). This
Court called for the liberal interpretation of the rules and gave due course
to the appeal. In brief, the Court said that the failure to pay the appellate
docket fee does not automatically result in the dismissal of the appeal,
dismissal being discretionary on the part of the appellate court. A party’s
failure to pay the appellate docket fee within the reglementary period
confers only a discretionary and not a mandatory power to dismiss the
proposed appeal. Such discretionary power should be used in the exercise
of the court’s sound judgment in accordance with the tenets of justice and
fair play with great deal of circumspection, considering all attendant
circumstances and must be exercised wisely and ever prudently, never
capriciously, with a view to substantial justice.
In the subsequent case of Far Corporation v. Magdaluyo, this Court,
while reiterating that the payment of docket and other legal fees within
the prescribed period is both mandatory and jurisdictional, in the same
vein, recognized that the existence of persuasive and weighty reasons call
for a relaxation of the rules.
In La Salette College v. Pilotin, notwithstanding the mandatory
nature of the requirement of payment of appellate docket fees, we also
recognized that its strict application is qualified by the following: first,
failure to pay those fees within the reglementary period allows only
discretionary, not automatic, dismissal; second, such power should be
used by the court in conjunction with its exercise of sound discretion in
accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, as well as with a great
deal of circumspection in consideration of all attendant circumstances.
In all, what emerges from all of the above is that the rules of
procedure in the matter of paying the docket fees must be followed.
However, there are exceptions to the stringent requirement as to call for a
relaxation of the application of the rules, such as: (1) most persuasive and
weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not
commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure;
(3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a
reasonable time from the time of the default; (4) the existence of special
or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not
entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the
suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is
merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly
prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence
without appellant’s fault; (10) peculiar legal and equitable circumstances
attendant to each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair
play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound
discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant circumstances.
Concomitant to a liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure should be
an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to adequately explain
his failure to abide by the rules. Anyone seeking exemption from the
application of the Rule has the burden of proving that exceptionally
meritorious instances exist which warrant such departure.
In the case at bar, respondents were delayed in the payment of
docket fees for six (6) days only. The reason advanced by them was
because of poverty. Evidently, in the cases where the Supreme Court
disallowed the late payment of docket fees, the tardiness was for a
significant period of time. Guided by the foregoing jurisprudential
pronouncements, it will be extremely harsh for the Court to take a
lackadaisical attitude towards the cause of the respondents. We are
convinced of the fastidiousness of the Court of Appeals’ decision.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for
lack of merit. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 10
November 2004 and Resolution dated 1 April 2005 are AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the
Chairperson Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
Rollo, pp. 69-80. Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr.
with Associate Justices Eubulo G. Verzola and Noel G. Tijam concurring.
Id. at 11.
CA rollo, Vol. II, p. 612.
Id. at 665.
Rollo, p. 142.
CA rollo, Vol. II, p. 665.
Rollo, p. 142.
CA rollo, Vol. II, p. 632.
ATTESTATION Id. at 640.
Id. at 635.
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in Id. at 625.
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of Id. at 786; Only Romeo and Rodolfo Rupisan filed the Complaint in
the Court’s Division. view of the Deed of Renunciation of Real Rights executed by their other
siblings, Consuelo Z. Rupisan, Erlinda R. Lirag and Alejandro Z. Rupisan
(Id. at 797).
Id. at 793; Section 1. Who may petition for the allowance of will.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO – Any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other person
Associate Justice interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death of the testator,
Chairperson, Third Division petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the
same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed. (Rule 76, Rules of
Court.)
Rollo, pp. 94-95.
CA rollo, Vol. II, p. 621.
CERTIFICATION The RTC held:
In Civil Case No. 2106, what was submitted before this
Honorable Court was only a Notice of Appeal, however, it was only on
October 23, 2002, that an appeal fee of Forty Eight Pesos (P48.00) covered
by O.R. No. 15919947 and the amount of Four Hundred Fifty Two Pesos
(P452.00) covered by O.R. No. 1591854 and another amount of Twenty
Pesos (P20.00) covered by O.R. No. 15918522 which were paid to the Clerk
of Court, in the manner therefore that the payment of appeal fees
prescribed under Rule 41 Sec. 4 of the Revised Rules of Court was after the
expiry of the fifteen days period to perfect the appeal.
The RTC Order on this point reads:
However, with respect to the appeal filed by the Oppositor in
Special Proceeding Case No. A-1278, the appeal is considered seasonably
filed upon the timely filing of the Record of Appeal, inclusive of the
required appeal fees, but in accordance with Sec. 7 of Rule 41 of the
Revised Rules of Court, let the records on appeal be submitted for
consideration by the Honorable Court for purposes of its approval.
Let there be a hearing on Special Proceeding Case No.
A-1278 for the purpose of determining whether or not there are incidents
to be included in the record of appeal or there are amendments thereto
which the Court orders therefore the parties to appear on December 18,
2002 at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon for purposes of approval of the
record of appeal submitted by the Oppositor in Special Proc. Case No.
1278.
CA rollo, Vol. I, pp. 51-52.
Rollo, pp. 99-101.
Sec. 6, Rule 41, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rollo, p. 101.
Id. at 79.
Id. at 78.
CA rollo, Vol. II, p. 104.
Rollo, pp. 257-259. The new counsel of respondents, Siguion
Reyna Montecillo & Ongsiako, filed its entry of appearance on 5 November
2002 (Rollo, p. 296).
Sevillana v. I.T. (International) Corporation, G.R. No. 99047, 16
April 2001, 356 SCRA 451, 462.
Chas Realty and Development Corporation v. Talavera, 445 Phil.
43, 53 (2003).
The recognized exceptions where the special civil action
for certiorari will lie even without filing a motion for reconsideration
includes: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo
has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari
proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or
are the same as those raised and passed upon by the lower court; (c)
where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and
any further delay would prejudice the interests of the government or of the
petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where,
under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;
(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme
urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of
arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is
improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for
lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings was ex parte or in which
the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised
is one purely of law or public interest is involved. (Sevillana v. I.T.
[International] Corp., supra note 26 at 462.)
Rule 41, Section 9, of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court states that:
Sec. 9. – Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. – A
party’s appeal by notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to him
upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due time.
A party’s appeal by record on appeal is deemed
perfected as to him with respect to the subject matter thereof upon
the approval of the record on appeal filed in due time.
In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses
jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals
filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other
parties.
In appeals by record on appeal, the court loses
jurisdiction only over the subject matter thereof upon the approval of
the records on appeal filed in due time and the expiration of the time
to appeal of the other parties.
In either case, prior to the transmittal of the original
record or the record on appeal, the court may issue orders for the
protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not
involve any matter litigated by the appeal, approve compromises, permit
appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal in
accordance with Section 2 of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the
appeal.
Parañaque Kings Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil.
1184, 1194 (1997).
Cojuangco v. Court of Appeals, 369 Phil. 41, 52.
Rinconanda Telephone Co., Inc. v. Buenviaje, G.R. Nos. 49241-42,
27 April 1990, 184 SCRA 701, 706.
 358 Phil. 228 (1998).
386 Phil. 412 (2000).
Id. at 417.
Mactan International Airport v. Mangubat, 371 Phil. 393 (1999);
Ginete v. Court of Appeals, 357 Phil. 36 (1998); Yambao v. Court of
Appeals, 399 Phil. 712 (2000).
Id.
Supra note 36.
Supra note 36.
G.R. No. 151942, 27 November 2003, 416 SCRA 557, 567.
G.R. No. 140954, 12 April 2005, 455 SCRA 460, 475.
Go v. Tong, supra note 40 at 567; Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v.
Melicor, supra note 41 at 475.
G.R. No. 156278, 29 March 2004, 426 SCRA 414, 420.
G.R. No. 143195, 13 September 2005, 469 SCRA 602, 608.
Id.
G.R. No. 148739, 19 November 2004, 443 SCRA 218.
463 Phil. 785 (2003).
Enriquez v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 139303, 25 August 2005, 468 SCRA
77, 86.
See cases of La Salette College v. Pilotin, supra note 47 at 387-
388; Lazaro v. Court of Appeals, supra note 34; Barangay 24 of Legazpi
City v. Imperial, 393 Phil. 357 (2,000); Enriquez v. Enriquez, id; Far
Corporation v. Magdaluyo, supra note 46; Tamayo v. Tamayo, Jr., G.R. No.
148482, 12 August 2005, 466 SCRA 618.

EN BANC
HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS G.R. No. 163980
ASSOCIATION, INC. and NESTORIO
F. APOLINARIO, in his personal
capacity and as President of Holy
Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc.,
Petitioners,
- versus -
SECRETARY MICHAEL DEFENSOR,
in his capacity as Chairman of the
Housing and Urban Development
Coordinating Council (HUDCC),
ATTY. EDGARDO PAMINTUAN,
in his capacity as General Manager of
the National Housing Authority (NHA),
MR. PERCIVAL CHAVEZ, in his
capacity as Chairman of the Presidential
Commission for the Urban Poor (PCUP),
MAYOR FELICIANO BELMONTE, in
his capacity as Mayor of Quezon City,
SECRETARY ELISEA GOZUN, in her
capacity as Secretary of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) and SECRETARY FLORENTE
SORIQUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary
of the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH) as ex-officio members
of the NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
CENTER ADMINISTRATION
COMMITTEE,
Respondents.
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Present: The instant petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, seeks to prevent respondents
PANGANIBAN, C.J., from enforcing the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of Republic
PUNO, Act No. 9207, otherwise known as the “National Government Center (NGC)
QUISUMBING, Housing and Land Utilization Act of 2003.”
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, Petitioner Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. (Association) is a
CARPIO, homeowners association from the West Side of the NGC. It is represented
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, by its president, Nestorio F. Apolinario, Jr., who is a co-petitioner in his own
CORONA, personal capacity and on behalf of the association.
CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR., Named respondents are the ex-officio members of the National
AZCUNA, Government Center Administration Committee (Committee). At the filing of
TINGA, the instant petition, the Committee was composed of Secretary Michael
CHICO-NAZARIO, Defensor, Chairman of the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating
GARCIA, and Council (HUDCC), Atty. Edgardo Pamintuan, General Manager of the
VELASCO, JR., JJ. National Housing Authority (NHA), Mr. Percival Chavez, Chairman of the
Presidential Commission for Urban Poor (PCUP), Mayor Feliciano Belmonte
of Quezon City, Secretary Elisea Gozun of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR), and Secretary Florante Soriquez of the
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH).
Promulgated:
Prior to the passage of R.A. No. 9207, a number of presidential
issuances authorized the creation and development of what is now known
as the National Government Center (NGC).
August 3, 2006
On March 5, 1972, former President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation
No. 1826, reserving a parcel of land in Constitution Hills, Quezon City,
covering a little over 440 hectares as a national government site to be
known as the NGC.
On August 11, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation
No. 137, excluding 150 of the 440 hectares of the reserved site from the
coverage of Proclamation No. 1826 and authorizing instead the disposition
of the excluded portion by direct sale to the bona fide residents therein.
In view of the rapid increase in population density in the portion excluded
by Proclamation No. 137 from the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826,
former President Fidel Ramos issued Proclamation No. 248 on September
7, 1993, authorizing the vertical development of the excluded portion to
maximize the number of families who can effectively become beneficiaries
of the government’s socialized housing program.
On May 14, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A.
No. 9207. Among the salient provisions of the law are the following:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared the policy of the State
to secure the land tenure of the urban poor. Toward this end, lands located
in the NGC, Quezon City shall be utilized for housing, socioeconomic, civic,
educational, religious and other purposes.
SEC. 3. Disposition of Certain Portions of the National Government Center
Site to Bona Fide Residents. – Proclamation No. 1826, Series of 1979, is
hereby amended by excluding from the coverage thereof, 184 hectares on
the west side and 238 hectares on the east side of Commonwealth
Avenue, and declaring the same open for disposition to bona fide residents
therein: Provided, That the determination of the bona fide residents on the
west side shall be based on the census survey conducted in 1994 and the
determination of the bona fide residents on the east side shall be based on
the census survey conducted in 1994 and occupancy verification survey
conducted in 2000: Provided, further, That all existing legal agreements,
programs and plans signed, drawn up or implemented and actions taken,
consistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby adopted.
SEC. 4. Disposition of Certain Portions of the National Government Center
Site for Local Government or Community Facilities, Socioeconomic,
Charitable, Educational and Religious Purposes. – Certain portions of land
within the aforesaid area for local government or community facilities,
socioeconomic, charitable, educational and religious institutions are
hereby reserved for disposition for such purposes: Provided, That only
those institutions already operating and with existing facilities or
structures, or those occupying the land may avail of the disposition
program established under the provisions this Act; Provided, further, That
in ascertaining the specific areas that may be disposed of in favor of these
institutions, the existing site allocation shall be used as basis therefore:
Provided, finally. That in determining the reasonable lot allocation of such
institutions without specific lot allocations, the land area that may be
allocated to them shall be based on the area actually used by said
institutions at the time of effectivity of this Act. (Emphasis supplied.)
In accordance with Section 5 of R.A. No. 9207, the Committee formulated
the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9207 on June 29,
2004. Petitioners subsequently filed the instant petition, raising the
following issues:
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 3.1 (A.4), 3.1 (B.2), 3.2 (A.1) AND 3.2 (C.1) OF
THE RULES AND REGULATIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9207, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS “NATIONAL GOVERNMENT CENTER (NGC) HOUSING AND LAND
UTILIZATION ACT OF 2003” SHOULD BE DECLARED NULL AND VOID FOR
BEING INCONSISTENT WITH THE LAW IT SEEKS TO IMPLEMENT.
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 3.1 (A.4), 3.1 (B.2), 3.2 (A.1) AND 3.2 (C.1) OF
THE RULES AND REGULATIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9207, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS “NATIONAL GOVERNMENT CENTER (NGC) HOUSING AND LAND
UTILIZATION ACT OF 2003” SHOULD BE DECLARED NULL AND VOID FOR
BEING ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS AND WHIMSICAL.
First, the procedural matters.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that petitioner Association
cannot question the implementation of Section 3.1 (b.2) and Section 3.2
(c.1) since it does not claim any right over the NGC East Side. Section 3.1
(b.2) provides for the maximum lot area that may be awarded to a
resident-beneficiary of the NGC East Side, while Section 3.2 (c.1) imposes
a lot price escalation penalty to a qualified beneficiary who fails to execute
a contract to sell within the prescribed period. Also, the OSG contends that
since petitioner association is not the duly recognized people’s
organization in the NGC and since petitioners not qualify as beneficiaries,
they cannot question the manner of disposition of lots in the NGC.
“Legal standing” or locus standi has been defined as a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged…. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party
alleges “such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.”
Petitioner association has the legal standing to institute the instant
petition, whether or not it is the duly recognized association of
homeowners in the NGC. There is no dispute that the individual members
of petitioner association are residents of the NGC. As such they are
covered and stand to be either benefited or injured by the enforcement of
the IRR, particularly as regards the selection process of beneficiaries and
lot allocation to qualified beneficiaries. Thus, petitioner association may
assail those provisions in the IRR which it believes to be unfavorable to the
rights of its members. Contrary to the OSG’s allegation that the failure of
petitioner association and its members to qualify as beneficiaries
effectively bars them from questioning the provisions of the IRR, such
circumstance precisely operates to confer on them the legal personality to
assail the IRR. Certainly, petitioner and its members have sustained direct
injury arising from the enforcement of the IRR in that they have been
disqualified and eliminated from the selection process. While it is true that
petitioners claim rights over the NGC West Side only and thus cannot be
affected by the implementation of Section 3.1 (b.2), which refers to the
NGC East Side, the rest of the assailed provisions of the IRR, namely,
Sections 3.1 (a.4), 3.2 (a.1) and 3.2 (c.1), govern the disposition of lots in
the West Side itself or all the lots in the NGC.
We cannot, therefore, agree with the OSG on the issue of locus standi. The
petition does not merit dismissal on that ground.
There are, however, other procedural impediments to the granting of the
instant petition. The OSG claims that the instant petition for prohibition is
an improper remedy because the writ of prohibition does not lie against
the exercise of a quasi-legislative function. Since in issuing the questioned
IRR of R.A. No. 9207, the Committee was not exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial function, which is the scope of a petition for
prohibition under Section 2, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
the instant prohibition should be dismissed outright, the OSG contends.
For their part, respondent Mayor of Quezon City and respondent NHA
contend that petitioners violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts in
filing the instant petition with this Court and not with the Court of Appeals,
which has concurrent jurisdiction over a petition for prohibition.
The cited breaches are mortal. The petition deserves to be spurned as a
consequence.
Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers
and quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative
or rule-making power is the power to make rules and regulations which
results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting
statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers.
In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued
by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative
remedies before going to court. This principle, however, applies only
where the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed
pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act
pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power.
The assailed IRR was issued pursuant to the quasi-legislative power of the
Committee expressly authorized by R.A. No. 9207. The petition rests
mainly on the theory that the assailed IRR issued by the Committee is
invalid on the ground that it is not germane to the object and purpose of
the statute it seeks to implement. Where what is assailed is the validity or
constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative
agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular
courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same.

Since the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the
assailed IRR issued by the Committee in the exercise of its quasi-
legislative power, the judicial course to assail its validity must follow the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court, Court of
Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue
writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus
and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted
freedom of choice of court forum.

True, this Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the
petition filed directly with it if compelling reasons, or the nature and
importance of the issues raised, so warrant. A direct invocation of the
Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only
when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition.

In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor, the Court said that it will not
entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained
in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances,
such as cases of national interest and of serious implications, justify the
availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the
exercise of its primary jurisdiction. A perusal, however, of the petition for
prohibition shows no compelling, special or important reasons to warrant
the Court’s taking cognizance of the petition in the first instance. Petitioner
also failed to state any reason that precludes the lower courts from
passing upon the validity of the questioned IRR. Moreover, as provided in
Section 5, Article VIII of the
Constitution, the Court’s power to evaluate the validity of an implementing
rule or regulation is generally appellate in nature. Thus, following the Now, we turn to the substantive aspects of the petition. The outcome,
doctrine of hierarchy of courts, the instant petition should have been however, is just as dismal for petitioners.
initially filed with the Regional Trial Court.
Petitioners assail the following provisions of the IRR:
A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an IRR
issued in the exercise of a quasi-legislative function. Prohibition is an
extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer
or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial Section 3. Disposition of Certain portions of the NGC Site to the bonafide
functions, ordering said entity or person to desist from further proceedings residents
when said proceedings are without or in excess of said entity’s or person’s
jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there 3.1. Period for Qualification of Beneficiaries
is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial xxxx
functions, but not against legislative or quasi-legislative functions.
Generally, the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court (a.4) Processing and evaluation of qualifications shall be based on
within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of the Code of Policies and subject to the condition that a beneficiary is
justice in orderly channels. Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief qualified to acquire only one (1) lot with a minimum of 36 sq. m. and
against usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in maximum of 54 sq. m. and subject further to the availability of lots.
the exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its cognizance
the inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or xxxx
where there is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law
by which such relief can be obtained. Where the principal relief sought is (b.2) Applications for qualification as beneficiary shall be processed and
to invalidate an IRR, petitioners’ remedy is an ordinary action for its evaluated based on the Code of Policies including the minimum and
nullification, an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the maximum lot allocation of 35 sq. m. and 60 sq. m.
Regional Trial Court. In any case, petitioners’ allegation that “respondents
are performing or threatening to perform functions without or in excess of xxxx
their jurisdiction” may appropriately be enjoined by the trial court through
a writ of injunction or a temporary restraining order. 3.2. Execution of the Contract to Sell

In a number of petitions, the Court adequately resolved them on other (a) Westside
grounds without adjudicating on the constitutionality issue when there
were no compelling reasons to pass upon the same. In like manner, the (a.1) All qualified beneficiaries shall execute Contract to Sell (CTS) within
instant petition may be dismissed based on the foregoing procedural sixty (60) days from the effectivity of the IRR in order to avail of the lot at
grounds. Yet, the Court will not shirk from its duty to rule on the merits of P700.00 per sq. m.
this petition to facilitate the speedy resolution of this case. In proper
cases, procedural rules may be relaxed or suspended in the interest of xxxx
substantial justice. And the power of the Court to except a particular case
from its rules whenever the purposes of justice require it cannot be (c) for both eastside and westside
questioned.
(c.1) Qualified beneficiaries who failed to execute CTS on the deadline set
in item a.1 above in case of westside and in case of eastside six (6)
months after approval of the subdivision plan shall be subjected to lot
price escalation.
The rate shall be based on the formula to be set by the National Housing
Authority factoring therein the affordability criteria. The new rate shall be
approved by the NGC-Administration Committee (NGC-AC).
Petitioners’ interpretation is also not supported by the policy of R.A. No.
9207 and the prior proclamations establishing the NGC. The government’s
policy to set aside public property aims to benefit not only the urban poor
but also the local government and various government institutions
devoted to socioeconomic, charitable, educational and

Petitioners contend that the aforequoted provisions of the IRR are

constitutionally infirm as they are not germane to and/or are in conflict
with the object and purpose of the law sought to be implemented.

First. According to petitioners, the limitation on the areas to be awarded to

qualified beneficiaries under Sec. 3.1 (a.4) and (b.2) of the IRR is not in
harmony with the provisions of R.A. No. 9207, which mandates that the lot
allocation to qualified beneficiaries shall be based on the area actually
used or occupied by bona fide residents without limitation to area. The
argument is utterly baseless.

The beneficiaries of lot allocations in the NGC may be classified into two
groups, namely, the urban poor or the bona fide residents within the NGC
site and certain government institutions including the local government.
Section 3, R.A. No. 9207 mandates the allocation of additional property
within the NGC for disposition to its bona fide residents and the manner by
which this area may be distributed to qualified beneficiaries. Section 4,
R.A. No. 9207, on the other hand, governs the lot disposition to
government institutions. While it is true that Section 4 of R.A. No. 9207 has
a proviso mandating that the lot allocation shall be based on the land area
actually used or occupied at the time of the law’s effectivity, this proviso
applies only to institutional beneficiaries consisting of the local
government, socioeconomic, charitable, educational and religious
institutions which do not have specific lot allocations, and not to the bona
fide residents of NGC. There is no proviso which even hints that a bona
fide resident of the NGC is likewise entitled to the lot area actually
occupied by him.

religious purposes. Thus, although Proclamation No. 137 authorized the
sale of lots to bona fide residents in the NGC, only a third of the entire area
of the NGC was declared open for disposition subject to the condition that
those portions being used or earmarked for public or quasi-public purposes
would be excluded from the housing program for NGC residents. The same
policy of rational and optimal land use can be read in Proclamation No. 248
issued by then President Ramos. Although the proclamation recognized the
rapid increase in the population density in the NGC, it did not allocate
additional property within the NGC for urban poor housing but instead
authorized the vertical development of the same 150 hectares identified
previously by Proclamation No. 137 since the distribution of individual lots
would not adequately provide for the housing needs of all the bona fide
residents in the NGC.
In addition, as provided in Section 4 of R.A. No. 9207, the institutional
beneficiaries shall be allocated the areas actually occupied by them;
hence, the portions intended for the institutional beneficiaries is fixed and
cannot be allocated for other non-institutional beneficiaries. Thus, the
areas not intended for institutional beneficiaries would have to be
equitably distributed among the bona fide residents of the NGC. In order to
accommodate all qualified residents, a limitation on the area to be
awarded to each beneficiary must be fixed as a necessary consequence.
Second. Petitioners note that while Sec. 3.2 (a.1) of the IRR fixes the
selling rate of a lot at P700.00 per sq. m., R.A. No. 9207 does not provide
for the price. They add Sec. 3.2 (c.1) penalizes a beneficiary who fails to
execute a contract to sell within six (6) months from the approval of the
subdivision plan by imposing a price escalation, while there is no such
penalty imposed by R.A. No. 9207. Thus, they conclude that the assailed
provisions conflict with R.A. No. 9207 and should be nullified. The
argument deserves scant consideration.
Where a rule or regulation has a provision not expressly stated or
contained in the statute being implemented, that provision does not
necessarily contradict the statute. A legislative rule is in the nature of
subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation by
providing the details thereof. All that is required is that the regulation
should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the
regulation be not in contradiction to but in conformity with the standards
prescribed by the law.
In Section 5 of R.A. No. 9207, the Committee is granted the power to
administer, formulate guidelines and policies, and implement the
disposition of the areas covered by the law. Implicit in this authority and
the statute’s objective of urban poor housing is the power of the
Committee to formulate the manner by which the reserved property may
be allocated to the beneficiaries. Under this broad power, the Committee
is mandated to fill in the details such as the qualifications of beneficiaries,
the selling price of the lots, the terms and conditions governing the sale
and other key particulars necessary to implement the objective of the law.
These details are purposely omitted from the statute and their
determination is left to the discretion of the Committee because the latter
possesses special knowledge and technical expertise over these matters.
The Committee’s authority to fix the selling price of the lots may be
likened to the rate-fixing power of administrative agencies. In case of a
delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is
required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is
that the rate be reasonable and just. However, it has been held that even
in the absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this
standard may be implied. In this regard, petitioners do not even claim that
the selling price of the lots is unreasonable.
The provision on the price escalation clause as a penalty imposed to a
beneficiary who fails to execute a contract to sell within the prescribed
period is also within the Committee’s authority to formulate guidelines and
policies to implement R.A. No. 9207. The Committee has the power to lay
down the terms and conditions governing the disposition of said lots,
provided that these are reasonable and just. There is nothing
objectionable about prescribing a period within which the parties must
execute the contract to sell. This condition can ordinarily be found in a
contract to sell and is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order, or public policy.
Third. Petitioners also suggest that the adoption of the assailed IRR suffers
from a procedural flaw. According to them the IRR was adopted and
concurred in by several representatives of people’s organizations contrary
to the express mandate of R.A. No. 9207 that only two representatives
 from duly recognized peoples’ organizations must compose the NGCAC
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
which promulgated the assailed IRR. It is worth noting that petitioner
Associate Justice Associate Justice
association is not a duly recognized people’s organization.

In subordinate legislation, as long as the passage of the rule or regulation

had the benefit of a hearing, the procedural due process requirement is
deemed complied with. That there is observance of more than the
minimum requirements of due process in the adoption of the questioned ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
IRR is not a ground to invalidate the same. Associate Justice Associate Justice

In sum, the petition lacks merit and suffers from procedural deficiencies.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for prohibition is DISMISSED. Costs

against petitioners. RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice
SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice Associate Justice Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO CANCIO C. GARCIA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice

REYNATO S. PUNO LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

Associate Justice Associate Justice CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby

certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court. Smart Communications, Inc. v. National Telecommunications Commission,
456 Phil. 145, 155 (2003).

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN. Id. at 157.

Chief Justice
Id. at 158.

Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor, G.R. No. 140954, April 12, 2005, 455
SCRA 460, 470.

Fortich v. Corona, 352 Phil. 461, 480 (1998).

Rollo, p. 6. Id. at 481.

Id. at 7. Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor, supra.

Id. Id. at 471.

SEC. 5. National Government Center Administration Committee. – There is CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 5 states: The Supreme Court shall have the
hereby created a National Government Center Administration Committee following powers:
to administer, formulate guidelines and policies, and implement the land
disposition of the areas covered by this Act. xxx xxx

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the

Rollo, p. 12. law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower
courts in:
Id. at 80.
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of
Id. at 82. any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential
decrees, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004, 421 question. x x x
SCRA 656, 665, citing IBP v. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000,
338 SCRA 81. RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, Sec. 2.

Rollo, p. 81. David v. Rivera, G.R. Nos. 139913 & 140159, January 16, 2004, 420 SCRA
90, 100.
Id. at 51.
Id.
Id. at 66.
Development Bank of the Phils. v. Commission on Audit, 424 Phil. 411
(2002); Planters Products, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 375 Phil. 615 (1999);
Spouses Mirasol v. Court of Appeals, 403 Phil. 761 (2001).

Philippine National Bank v. Sanao Marketing Corporation, G.R. No. 153951,

July 29, 2005.

Republic Act No. 9207 (2003), Sec. 2, provides: Declaration of Policy. – It

is hereby declared the policy of the State to secure the land tenure of the
urban poor. Toward this end, lands located in the NGC, Quezon City shall
be utilized for housing, socioeconomic, civic, educational, religious and
other purposes.

Commissioner on Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 987,

1006-1007 (1996), citing Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders,
Inc. v. Department of Finance Secretary, 238 SCRA 63.

Sigre v. Court of Appeals, 435 Phil. 711, 719 (2002).

Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation v. Alcuaz, G.R. No. 84818,

December 18, 1989, 180 SCRA 218, 225-226.