Introduction

When WWII ended in 1945, Nazi concentration camps had killed approximately six-million

Jews. In 2010, an earthquake hit the Caribbean country of Haiti with a magnitude that

resulted in approximately 230,000 deaths and 300,000 injured.1 Surely, if there is a God, he is

either a tyrant who causes terrible suffering, or is powerless to do anything about it. David

Hume famously phrased the problem of evil as such: ‘Is he willing to prevent evil, but not

able? Then he is impotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he both able

and willing? Whence then is evil?’2

The problem of evil has caused a historical tension that scholars have predominantly tried to

solve in a theoretical manner. However, there have been a significant number who refuse to

accept any such theoretical or philosophical ‘solution’ to the problem of evil. Alongside such

scholars who address the problem by means of an open theodicy3 question, this author will

address the protest of the problem of evil from a Christian perspective that acknowledges the

reality of evil as a critical apologetic response.

Paradigms From Which the Question is Asked

Hall points out that ‘no human question is ever asked (and no answer given!) in a historical

vacuum; it is asked in a specific time and place by specific persons.’4 For an apologetic

response to the question of the problem of evil, it is necessary to first consider who our

audience is so that we might gain the context in which to respond.

1 Rodgers, 'Haiti'.

2 Hume, Dialogues, 66.

3Since philosopher, Gottfried Leibniz, any such attempt to reconcile the problem of evil has been
referred to as theodicy.

4 Hall, Suffering, 24.

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There are two main groups that might helpfully be identified for this purpose – those for

whom the question is raised through some experience of suffering and those who are

principally hypothetically or philosophically invested into the question.

For the purposes of this essay, whilst endeavouring to explore the theodicies that are

theoretically focused, we shall concentrate on directing an apologetic response appropriate to

those who are actually suffering – for this is where the problem of evil questions are hardest

to answer but most real.

Defining ‘God’

Since the enlightenment, when the canonical form of the theodicy-problem was birthed,5 one

of the major problems has been deciding who the God on trial is. This essay is a Christian

response and thus will refer to the Judeo-Christian God.

The Christian God is not some divinity known as ‘the God of the philosophers’,6 rather he is

the God revealed in Jesus Christ. Almost all contemporary discussions of the problem of evil

have assumed ‘an understanding of “God” overwhelmingly constrained by the principles of

seventeenth and eighteenth century philosophical theism’7 and the result of this was that

‘Christian theologians, when confronted by modern atheism had at their disposal only a god

who lacked any characteristics of a Trinitarian God that can save.’8

Christian doctrine affirms that God cannot be spoken of outside of Christ and Kenneth Surin

points out that to do so would result in God becoming a mere hypothesis or some possible

5 Surin, Theology, 3.

6 Surin, Theology, 3.

7 Surin, Theology, 4.

8 Hauerwas, Silences, 40.

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entity.9 Christians affirm that only through faith in Christ can one truly see who God is by

having their vision cleansed. 10 It follows that the process of seeking to answer the question of

‘whence is evil?’ for an atheist will be founded on an a priori understanding of the god in

question as an unspecified philosophical deity, one which inevitably gives rise to distrust in

both or either their power and goodness.

Hauerwas is right in arguing that when Christians assume that the problem of evil is

intelligible to anyone they ‘turn the Christian faith into a system of beliefs that can be ...

known without ... conversion.’11 However, engaging with those outside of Christian faith,

whose ‘God’ of the problem of evil is certainly not the God revealed in Jesus, is still a

worthwhile endeavour, providing we make clear from the outset that the ‘God’ in question

is, for the Christian (or at least should be), not the ‘God’ of the atheist.

One significant development in this area has been expounded by, among others, Jürgen

Moltmann. Moltmann addresses the issue of impassibility and posits the idea of the

‘suffering god’ who – through a trinitarian model that attributes divinity to Jesus – suffers

through Jesus. This idea will be expanded later.

Theoretical Theodicies

There have been a number of attempts to solve the problem of evil in recent history, some

more popular than others. Although it is not the main intention of this essay to critique such

theodicies, a brief overview and assessment of two in particular will be necessary. These are

Alvin Plantinga’s free will defence and John Hick’s soul-making theodicy.

9 Surin, Theology, 5.

10 Surin, Theology, 11.

11 Hauerwas, Silences, 48.

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Free Will Defence

Plantinga’s free will defence is a contemporary version of the Augustinian answer to the

problem of evil that aims to show the logical possibility of maintaining God’s omnipotence

and omni-benevolence in the presence of evil. It attempts this by proving that evil exists

because of the actions of free, rational and fallible creatures. 12 Plantinga’s basic argument is

that because God loves and desires to be loved, ‘to make us capable of … [loving him], God

had to give us the freedom to choose, because love … is meaningful only when it is neither

automatic nor coerced’ but the giving of such free will allowed for the possibility of evil

through ‘defiance of both God and one’s own best interest.’13

Hauerwas correctly identifies that the general ‘problem with all free-will defences … is that

they “explain” too much.’14 Indeed, there are a number of key issues in the free will defence

that rob it of the infallibility some have ascribed to it.

Firstly, one must question how plausible it is to dispose of a question with the magnitude

that the problem of evil contains, in such a minimalist fashion. 15 Secondly, he points to the

‘question of the acceptability of the free will defender’s tacit assumption that human evil can

be “balanced” or “outweighed” by human good.’16 Also, it is questionable to assume that a

world with free will is worth the cost of evil; one might reasonably prefer the idea of a world

without evil at the cost of their free will. Furthermore, the free will defence will always be

constrained to end up arriving at a sub-Christian ‘God’.17

12 Surin, Theology, 71.

13 Plantinga, Evil, 81.

14 Hauerwas, Silences, 78.

15 Surin, Theology, 74.

16 Surin, Theology, 75.

17 Surin, Theology, 76.

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The ‘Soul-Making’ Theodicy

Hick’s ‘soul-making’ theodicy 18 is the contemporary Irenaean answer to the problem of evil

which ‘sees evil as an integral feature of an environment in which souls are shaped by a God

who desires all creatures to grow into a … perfect relationship with him.’19 Only in a world

with ‘real difficulties, dangers and suffering’ can we develop ‘courage and intelligence, and

compassion and self-sacrifice.’20 Also present is the idea that in an afterlife the pains of

suffering will be recompensed.21

One of the major criticisms of this theodicy, which Hick is aware of, is that ‘the degree and

variety of suffering that exists anywhere is too great to justify whatever ultimate joy there is

at the end of history.’ 22 It is questionable to say that every occurrence of evil, particularly

natural disasters, always bring good. It may be that good does come from evil on occasion

but that cannot sufficiently explain or justify it.23

Critique

The approaches of figures like Plantinga and Hick have inherited the ‘enlightenment

penchant for reducing complex, concrete problems to clean and neat abstractions.’24 Hick’s

positing of an eschatological resolution of the plight of those who are afflicted ‘will carry

18 Hick, Evil, 297.

19 Surin, Theology, 92.

20 Astley, World, 60.

21 Hick, Evil, 297.

22 Surin, Theology, 95.

23 Hauerwas, Silences, 78.

24 Billings, 'Lived'.
5
very little conviction for the ‘moral’ atheist’ 25 such as Dostoevsky’s character, Ivan

Karamazov, who cannot comprehend how any afterlife can balance the scales of suffering.26

Stackhouse believes that the theoretical answers can, at best, show some plausible ways to

begin to make the problem of evil less difficult 27 but the protest of Ivan Karamazov

demonstrates quite the opposite, that they actually compound the problem.

Ivan Karamazov is the very epitome of what Moltmann refers to as the ‘protest’ atheist.28

Ivan says ‘it is not God that I don’t accept,’29 and thus his protest is not the classical atheist’s

denial of the existence of God but that simply that the more you affirm the goodness and the

power of this God the more deep seated the problem of evil becomes. Ivan questions

whether it is possible for the sufferer to ever speak of God’s benevolence. With this in mind,

the job is therefore to attempt to reconnect the ideas of a good God to the actual situation in

which the sufferer finds themselves.

Pragmatically, we might also question what good would it bring to ‘solve’ the problem of

evil. For surely if we were to explain away the reason for why evil exists then it would cease

to be a problem and we would simply forget about it and its sufferers reducing the dialogue

of suffering to a monologue. Forgetting not only seems unnatural but emotionally and

physically harmful. On the contrary ‘not only did Israel think it legitimate to complain but

she also developed an entire genre for lament,’30 and thus Brueggemann is right in asserting

25 Surin, Theology, 96.

26 Dostoyevsky, Brothers, 287.

27 Stackhouse, Trusted, 102.

28 Moltmann, Crucified, 227.

29 Dostoyevsky, Brothers, 287.

30 Hauerwas, Silences, 79.

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‘that a church that goes on singing “happy songs” in the face of raw reality is doing

something very different from what the Bible itself does’31 and is thus sub-Christian.

Therefore, we depart from the theoretical ‘solutions’ to the problem of evil with our question

unresolved from the Christian worldview. Asides from the general unresolved issues, no

theoretical ‘solution’ so far can answer the question of the problem of evil and remain true to

the Christian God revealed in Jesus.

The Suffering God

In his memoir ‘Night’, Elie Wiesel, a holocaust survivor, accounts the experience of seeing

Nazis hang three Jews, one of whom is an eight year-old boy. The two adults die very

quickly on the gallows but the young boy struggles for over half an hour. In sight of this

atrocity, a by-stander questions ‘where is God now?’ to which Wiesel recalls a voice inside

responding ‘Where is He? Here He is - He is hanging here on this gallows.’ 32

According to Jürgen Moltmann ‘any other answer would be blasphemy’33 because ‘to speak

here of a God who could not suffer would make God a demon.’34 Instead, Moltmann

‘jettisons the “axiom of apatheia”, which affirms the intrinsic unchangeableness of … God’35

and rather asserts, through a trinitarian understanding of the cross of Christ, that God is the

suffering-God in Jesus Christ and the one who utters the cry of dereliction.

31 Brueggemann, Psalms, 51.

32 Wiesel, Night, 77.

33 Moltmann, Crucified, 274.

34 Moltmann, Crucified, 274.

35 Surin, Theology, 125.

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Moltmann’s first principle of dealing with the problem of evil, is to see God as a fellow-

sufferer of those who suffer. 36 For, the ‘God who sits enthroned in heaven in a glory that no

one can share’37 that Moltmann describes could never have the special empathy which the

suffering-God could have. Therefore, although, as Moltmann believes, there may be no

theoretical ‘solution’ to the problem of evil, 38 Christians have a God that has experienced the

reality of evil.

Further to Moltmann’s focus on the suffering of the triune God, he looks to the ‘hope in the

eschatological victory of divine love over all evil.’39 If recompense for suffering were to

happen in an afterlife then there would be no need to act now to alleviate the effects of evil.

We could in good conscience do nothing knowing that God will compensate them for their

suffering. However, it should be noted that it is in Hick’s eschatology that afterlife is a

recompense for the sufferers affliction, whereas for Moltmann, it is simply a victory over evil

whereby eradication is the solution.40 Although we may agree with Sartre that ‘Evil cannot

be redeemed,’41 this is still a very helpful distinction as it gives the sufferer and particularly

the onlooker a reason to act now and not just patiently cope.

Practical Theodicy

If we remain open to the possibility that the Christian God is omni-benevolent and

omnipotent even in light of the realities of evil in the world, but insist that theoretical

36Moltmann develops co-suffering into a panentheistic eschatology where God takes up the whole
history of suffering into himself, which should be criticised in its implication of an eternally suffering
God.

37 Moltmann, Crucified, 226.

38 Moltmann, Crucified, 224.

39 Migliore, Faith, 133.

40Moltmann develops an eschatological universalism where by all will be saved at the end that this
author would not agree with.

41 Sartre, Literature, 162.

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theodicies can never ‘solve’ the problem, then what left is there for the Christian to say

regarding the statement in question?

The problem of evil is not about rectifying our suffering with some general notion of God’s

nature as all-powerful and good; rather, it is about what we mean by God’s goodness itself,

which for Christians must be construed in terms of God as the Creator who has called into

existence a people called Israel so that the world might know that God has not abandoned us.42

The Christian worldview insists that evil (regardless of how it came to be) is the reality of a

fallen creation. In recent years, seen in a more anthropologically holistic approach to mission

work, Christians are increasingly accepting their purpose as the people of God to be not only

spiritual but physical as well. As Jesus healed the sick, blessed the poor and spent time with

social outcasts as well as teaching people of spiritual truth so Christians also have a

responsibility to physically respond to evil in the world.

Although Hauerwas is right in his critique of what he calls ‘Anthropodicy’43 – which is the

notion that we think we can ‘solve’ the problem of evil through our own efforts – part of the

Christian response to the problem of evil must surely be demonstration instead of words. For

he then goes on to say that ‘God as the Creator ... has called into existence a people called

Israel so that the world might know that God has not abandoned us.’ 44 It is important to

make the distinction that Christians are therefore called not to solve the problem of evil by

their actions but to combat the effects of the problem of evil in order to demonstrate the love

of God and air a voice that says, “this is not how things are supposed to be”. In this manner

one begins an effective practical theodicy that answers the question of the problem of evil by

saying, “let me show you.”

42 Hauerwas, Silences, 78-79.

43 Hauerwas, Silences, 59.

44 Hauerwas, Silences, 78-79.

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We might call this response to evil ‘protest’, an idea discussed by John Roth as ‘protest

theodicy.’45 Against Hick’s ‘soul-making theodicy’ idea of eschatological recompense that

teaches the sufferer and the onlooker to patiently wait for the compensation due in the

afterlife, it is impatient protest, which attempts to combat the effects of suffering here and

now, that should be part of the appropriate Christian response to the problem of evil

question.

Historically speaking Christians have never had a theoretical ‘solution’ to the problem of

evil, only ever a community of believers to absorb the effects of evil, thus demonstrating

God’s love and goodness working through them. It is in the honesty of leaving the question

of the problem of evil open, keeping the dialogue with sufferers alive, not claiming to be able

to explain away why they are experiencing suffering that an apologetic response can best be

formed. An honest and genuinely Christian response to the problem of evil may be formed

by demonstrating God’s goodness through the worldwide community of Christians and by

pointing to his power that has been demonstrated throughout history, not least in his

voluntary suffering in Jesus Christ.

Conclusion

The assertion of the Problem of Evil which questions God’s goodness and power in light of

the reality of evil has plagued thinkers in a historically unique way since the birth of the

enlightenment.

In particular, the protest in question is constrained by an a priori understanding of a

hypothetical ‘God’ defined by seventeenth and eighteenth century philosophical theism.

Only through looking at Jesus Christ can we have our vision cleansed to truly understand

who the God of the Christian faith is.

45 Migliore, Faith, 128.

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Furthermore, who is protesting and why is of great significance. The needs and agenda of the

protester that has experienced evil or suffering in some manner will be unique from other

protests and thus requires an approach that maintains evil as categorical and provides hope

as opposed to mere speculation.

Recent attempts to solve the problem of evil by figures such as Plantinga and Hick have

attempted to develop the theodicies of Augustine and Irenaen that defend God’s omni-

benevolence and his omnipotence. These theodicies, which fall into the theoretical category,

while helping to satisfy the philosophical speculator, have a number of unsolvable issues

both pragmatic and theoretical. Even if the philosophical problems are satisfied and offer a

‘solution’ to the problem of evil, these theodicies offer a ‘God’ no longer responsible for evil

and thus fail to offer any hope to the sufferer.

A practical theodicy will satisfy such ‘protest’ atheists by means of an answer that gives full

scope to the evilness of evil. The appropriate apologetic response to such a protest will not be

found in a ‘solution’, rather through an open theodicy question. Moltmann’s idea of the

suffering God and eschatological victory maintain the open theodicy question and yet offer

here and now comfort to the sufferer. Hauerwas keeps the problem of evil question open and

points to the Christian community’s responsibility to absorb the effects of evil as the only

historical answer to the problem of evil. For the suffering protester, evil remains a ‘problem’

but one in which the Christian faith can provide a means to address through identifying with

the suffering God who can empathise and has promised an end (not a justification) and a

means of absorbing some of the effects through his community.

Through Jesus Christ, the God of the Christian faith has revealed himself to be neither a

tyrant nor powerless. Christians can offer theoretical demonstrations of how this is possible

through the post-enlightenment philosophical theodicies but must fully engage with the

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limitations and dangers of such approaches. In doing so, an open theodicy question that

keeps evil as an unsolved problem, alongside an identification with the suffering God and a

protest against evil and against God, will be a highly effective critical apologetic tool for

engaging with the sufferer fully.

Word count: 2972

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