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Introduction:
Terrorism brings with it a wide range of issues for the international community to
consider. These issues are shaping government policies worldwide. The terrorist’s attacks against
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11 2001 and the subsequent terror
attacks in different parts of the world have ignited wide concern. Saudi Arabia has suffered a
series of terrorist’s attacks in recent decades of different types and magnitudes. Responding to
the most recent attack of May 12, 2003, which was well organized and synchronized, the Saudi
Government mobilized its resources to combat this threat for security of the country and to
participate in cooperative efforts with the world community. Significant efforts have been made
in this regard. These include economic, educational, and media efforts to halt and eradicate
terrorism in all possible ways. Direct domestic security operations are primarily focused on the
dismantling of existing terrorist cells. Assisting these efforts will lead to a desirable end state that
is beneficial not only for the security of Saudi Arabia but for the security of the whole world.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the efforts that have been put into effect to fight
terrorism by Saudi Arabia, and to recommend actions to assist and improve these efforts.
Abstract:
The September 11, 2001 attacks fueled criticisms within the United States of
alleged Saudi involvement in terrorism or of Saudi laxity in acting against terrorist
groups. Of particular concern have been reports that funds may be flowing from
Saudi Arabia and other Middle East countries to terrorist groups, largely under the
guise of charitable contributions. Critics of Saudi policies have cited a number of
reports that the Saudi government has permitted or encouraged fund raising in Saudi
Arabia by charitable Islamic groups and foundations linked to Osama bin Laden’s Al
Qaeda organization or like-minded entities.
The final report released by the bipartisan National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission) indicates that the
Commission “found no evidence that the Saudi government as an institution or senior
Saudi officials individually funded [Al Qaeda].” The report also states, however, that
Saudi Arabia “was a place where Al Qaeda raised money directly from individuals
and through charities,” and indicates that “charities with significant Saudi
government sponsorship” may have diverted funding to Al Qaeda.
In numerous official statements and position papers, Saudi leaders have said
they are committed to cooperating with the United States in fighting terrorist
financing, pointing out that Saudi Arabia itself is a victim of terrorism and shares the
U.S. interest in combating it. Saudi leaders acknowledge providing financial support
for Islamic and Palestinian causes, but maintain that no Saudi support goes to any
terrorist organizations, such as the Hamas organization. The U.S. State Department
in its most recent annual report on international terrorism states that Hamas receives
some funds from individuals in the Persian Gulf states but does not specifically
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mention Saudi Arabia.
Since the September 11 attacks, Saudi Arabia has issued numerous decrees and
created new institutions designed to tighten controls over the flow of funds in or
through the kingdom, with particular emphasis on increasing the effectiveness of
governmental supervision over charitable donations and collections. A rash of
terrorist attacks on residential and office compounds in Saudi Arabia in 2003-2004
appears to have given added impetus to the Saudi leadership in expanding counterterrorist
efforts. Since mid-2003, the Saudi government has: set up a joint task force
with the United States to investigate terrorist financing in Saudi Arabia; shuttered
charitable organizations suspected of terrorist ties; passed anti-money laundering
legislation; banned cash collections at mosques; centralized control over charitable
collections; closed unlicensed money exchanges; and scrutinized clerics involved in
charitable collections. H.R. 10, introduced on September 24, 2004, would require
the President to submit to designated congressional committees a strategy for
U.S. Saudi collaboration, with special reference to combating terrorist financing.
The attacks of September 11, 2001 fueled criticism within the United States of
alleged Saudi involvement in terrorism or of Saudi laxity in acting against terrorist
groups. One area of particular concern is the suspicion that public or private funds
may be flowing from Saudi Arabia and other Middle East countries to finance
international terrorist activity.
Reliable figures on the amount of money originating in or passing through Saudi
Arabia and ending up in terrorist hands generally are difficult to obtain, for several
reasons. First, the relatively small amounts of money required for terrorist acts can
easily pass unnoticed. Second, the structure of the Saudi financial system makes
financial transfers difficult to trace. Personal income records are not kept for tax
purposes in Saudi Arabia and many citizens prefer cash transactions. Third, Muslim
charitable contributions (zakat) are a religious obligation, constituting one of the five
“pillars of Islam.” Contributions are often given anonymously, and donated funds
may be diverted from otherwise legitimate charities. Moreover, Saudi funding of
international Islamic charities is reportedly derived from both public and private
sources which in some cases appear to overlap, further complicating efforts to
estimate the amounts involved and to identify the sources and end recipients of these
donations.
This paper reviews allegations of Saudi involvement in terrorist financing
together with Saudi rebuttals, discusses the question of Saudi support for religious
charities and schools (madrasas) abroad, discusses recent steps taken by Saudi
Arabia to counter terrorist financing (many in conjunction with the United States),
and suggests some implications of recent Saudi actions for the war on terrorism.
General Allegations
The 9/11 Commission, The final report released by the bipartisan National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States indicates that the
Commission “found no evidence that the Saudi government as an institution or senior
Saudi officials individually funded [Al Qaeda].” The report also states, however, that
Saudi Arabia “was a place where Al Qaeda raised money directly from individuals
and through charities,” and indicates that “charities with significant Saudi
government sponsorship,” such as the Al Haramain Islamic Foundation, may have
diverted funding to Al Qaeda.
Specifically, the report describes bin Laden’s use of “the Golden Chain,” an
informal financial network of prominent Saudi and Gulf individuals originally
established to support the anti-Soviet Afghan resistance movement in the 1980s.
U.S. officials state that this network collected funds and funneled it to Arab fighters
in Afghanistan, and later to Al Qaeda, using charities and other non-governmental
organizations. According to the Commission’s report, Saudi individuals and other
financiers associated with the Golden Chain enabled bin Laden and Al Qaeda to
replace lost financial assets and establish a base in Afghanistan following their abrupt
departure from Sudan in 1996. These activities were facilitated in part, the report
argues, by the “extreme religious views” that exist within Saudi Arabia and the fact
that “until recently” Saudi charities were “subject to very limited oversight.”
Although the report highlights a series of unsuccessful U.S. government efforts
to gain access to a senior Al Qaeda financial operative who had been detained by
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Saudi Arabia in 1997, the report credits the Saudi government with assisting U.S.
officials in interviewing members of the bin Laden family in 1999 and 2000. The
report argues that these meetings were integral to U.S. efforts to understand the role
of bin Laden’s personal wealth in the financing of Al Qaeda. As a result of this
assistance, U.S. officials learned that Saudi government actions in the early 1990s
had in effect divested bin Laden of his share of the bin Laden family fortune, leading
Al Qaeda to rely thereafter on a “a core group of financial facilitators” based in the
Persian Gulf “and particularly in Saudi Arabia” for funding. The report also credits
Saudi government actions following the May 2003 bombings in Riyadh which
“apparently reduced the funds available to Al Qaeda perhaps drastically.”
Scrutiny of Riggs Bank; The Riggs National Bank, which for two decades
had been the chief banker for the Royal Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in
Washington, has come under scrutiny from U.S. Treasury and law enforcement
officials and has been fined $25 million “for numerous violations of the Bank
Secrecy Act.” In 2003, Riggs began filing “suspicious activity reports” (SARs) of
unusual or unexplained transactions involving the Saudi Embassy’s bank accounts.
Saudi accounts at Riggs were closed in early March 2004 at the bank’s initiative,
according to some sources, but Saudi sources say it was a Saudi decision to end the
Relationship. On May 13, 2004, federal regulators fined Riggs $25 million for
failing to actively monitor financial transfers through Saudi Arabian and other bank
accounts. The FBI is currently investigating the activities of the former chief
federal bank examiner for Riggs from 1998 to 2002, the period in which alleged
money laundering violations occurred. In 2002, the official left the Treasury
Department to become a vice president at Riggs.
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Allegations of Support for Iraqi Insurgents; In October 2004, an
unidentified Defense Department official told the press those private Saudi individuals
and charities were channeling funds to insurgent groups in Iraq. Saudi officials
vigorously denied the claims and appealed for U.S. officials to provide concrete
information in support of the charges so that Saudi authorities could investigate and
prosecute any individuals or entities that may have been involved. In December
2004, press reports cited intelligence gathered following U.S. military operations,
including the November 2004 assault on Fallujah, which indicated that “a handful of
senior Iraqi Baathists operating in Syria are collecting money from private sources
in Saudi Arabia and Europe” and are channeling it to insurgent groups.
Saudi Arabia has contributed $1 billion in loans and credits to reconstruction
efforts in Iraq and U.S. officials have engaged Saudi authorities regarding
forgiveness of Iraqi debt. The Saudi government administers official aid programs
in Iraq under the supervision of the Saudi Committee for the Relief of the Iraqi
People and the Saudi Red Crescent Society. Prince Nayef bin Abd Al Aziz, the
Saudi Minister of Interior directs the Committee’s operations. The Committee held
a fundraising telethon in April 2003, which reportedly raised $11.5 million for relief
efforts in Iraq. In May 2003, the Saudi government established an official
government bank account, Unified Account Number 111, to consolidate public and
private donations in support of the Iraqi people. Saudi press reports describing the
operations of the Committee and the Red Crescent Society indicate that numerous
shipments of food aid and medical supplies have been delivered across Iraq since
April 2003, including shipments to the former-insurgent stronghold of Fallujah
during the summer of 2004.
Kamal Orry, the owner and chairman of the Jeddah-based International Bunkering Company which owns
the hijacked ship told Asharq Al-Awsat in a telephone interview that "the hijackers – who are Somali
pirates – have demanded a ransom of $20 million in return for the release of the ship and its crew." Orry
also confirmed that he was not involved in the negotiations and that the insurance company that covers
Al-Nisr Al-Saudi's insurance was conducting the negotiations with the pirates; however he refused to
disclose the name of this insurance company or the details of the insurance agreement to Asharq Al-
Awsat.
Orry also told Asharq Al-Awsat that "the negotiations are being conducted by a representative of the
pirates who contacted them [the insurance company] via a satellite telephone where he was informed that
the ship is insured and negotiations are being carried out with the insurance company."
Orry also informed Asharq Al-Awsat that "the ship has a 14-man crew; 13 Sri Lankans and the ship's
captain who is Greek." He added "they contacted their families yesterday and they are in good health."
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He also revealed that this ship is brand new and was heading to Jeddah from Japan when it was hijacked.
Orry said "the ship is new and modern and was not carrying any oil at the time of the hijack." The ship
was destined to operate as part of the International Bunkering Company operations in the Gulf of Jeddah
where it would refuel other ships at sea.
News agencies quoted Andrew Mwangura of the East African Seafarers' Assistance Programme as
confirming that said that the Saudi-owned 5,136 tonne al-Nisr al-Saudi ship which was seized on Monday
is currently moored off the Somali coast.
In 2008, the Saudi Arabian oil tanker the Sirius Star was hijacked by Somali pirates in the Indian Ocean,
and it was also later moored off the Somali coast, near the port of Harardhere, a Somali pirate stronghold.
Israel retrieved a document of the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) which
detailed the allocation of $280,000 to 14 Hamas charities. IIRO and other suspected global Saudi
charities are not NGOs, since their boards of directors are headed by Saudi cabinet members.
Prince Salman, a full brother of King Fahd, controls IIRO distributions "with an iron hand,” is
according to former CIA operative Robert Baer. Mahmoud Abbas, in fact, complained, in a
handwritten December 2000 letter to Salman, about Saudi funding of Hamas. Defense Minister
Prince Sultan has been cited as a major IIRO contributor.
It was hoped, after the May 12 triple bombing attack in Riyadh, that Saudi Arabia might
halt its support for terrorism. Internally, the Saudi security forces moved against al-Qaeda cells
all over the kingdom. But externally, the Saudis were still engaged in terrorist financing,
underwriting 60-70 percent of the Hamas budget, in violation of their "roadmap" commitments
to President Bush.
Additionally, the Saudis back the civilian infrastructure of Hamas with extremist
textbooks glorifying jihad and martyrdom that are used by schools and Islamic societies
throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Ideological infiltration of Palestinian society by the
Saudis in this way is reminiscent of their involvement in the madrassa system of Pakistan during
the 1980s, which gave birth to the Taliban and other pro bin-Laden groups.
For decades, terrorism had been associated with states like Libya, Syria, or Iran. Saudi
Arabia had been a pro-Western force during the Cold War and had hosted large coalition armies
during the 1991 Gulf War. Saudi Arabia had not been colonized during its history, like other
Middle Eastern states that had endured a legacy of European imperialism. This background only
sharpened the questions of many after the attacks: What was the precise source of the hatred that
drove these men to take their own lives in an act of mass murder? The Saudis were initially in a
state of denial about their connection to September 11; Interior Minister Prince Naif even tried to
pin the blame for the attacks on Israel, saying it was impossible that Saudi youth could have been
involved.
Yet over time it became clearer how Saudi Arabia could have provided the ideological
backdrop that spawned al-Qaeda's attack on the United States. In a series of articles appearing in
the Egyptian weekly, Ruz al-Yousef (the Newsweek of Egypt), Wael al-Abrashi, the magazine's
deputy editor, attempted to grapple with this issue. He drew a direct link between the rise of
much of contemporary terrorism and Saudi Arabia's main Islamic creed, Wahhabism, and the
financial involvement of Saudi Arabia's large charitable organizations:
Wahhabism leads, as we have seen, to the birth of extremist, closed, and fanatical
streams, that accuse others of heresy, abolish them, and destroy them. The extremist religious
groups have moved from the stage of Takfir [condemning other Muslims as unbelievers] to the
stage of "annihilation and destruction," in accordance with the strategy of Al-Qa'ida - which
Saudi authorities must admit is a local Saudi organization that drew other organizations into it,
and not the other way around. All the organizations emerged from under the robe of Wahhabism.
I can state with certainly that after a very careful reading of all the documents and texts of
the official investigations linked to all acts of terror that have taken place in Egypt, from the
assassination of the late president Anwar Sadat in October 1981, up to the Luxor massacre in
1997, Saudi Arabia was the main station through which most of the Egyptian extremists passed,
and emerged bearing with them terrorist thought regarding Takfir - thought that they drew from
the sheikhs of Wahhabism. They also bore with them funds they received from the Saudi
charities.
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Thus, while some Western commentators have sought to explain the roots of al-Qaeda's
fury at the U.S. by focusing on the history of American policy in the Middle East or other
external factors, a growing number of Middle Eastern analysts have concentrated instead on
internal Saudi factors, including recent militant trends among Saudi Arabia's Wahhabi clerics
and the role of large Saudi global charities in terrorist financing. This requires a careful look at
how Saudi Arabia contributed to the ideological roots of some of the new wave of international
terrorism as well as how the kingdom emerged as a critical factor in providing the resources
needed by many terrorist groups.
• What are their motives and how do they get their support?
The answers to these questions have changed significantly over the last 25 years. There
are dramatically fewer international terrorist incidents than in the mid-eighties. Many of the
groups that targeted America's interests, friends, and allies have disappeared. The Soviet bloc,
which once provided support to terrorist groups, no longer exists. Countries that once excused
terrorism now condemn it. This changed international attitude has led to 12 United Nations
conventions targeting terrorist activity and, more importantly, growing, practical international
cooperation.
Now, a growing percentage of terrorist attacks are designed to kill as many people as
possible. In the 1990s a terrorist incident was almost 20 percent more likely to result in death or
injury than an incident two decades ago. The World Trade Center bombing in New York killed
six and wounded about 1,000, but the terrorists' goal was to topple the twin towers, killing tens
of thousands of people. The thwarted attacks against New York City's infrastructure in 1993
which included plans to bomb the Lincoln and Holland tunnels-- also were intended to cause
mass casualties. In 1995, Philippine authorities uncovered a terrorist plot to bring down 11 U.S.
airliners in Asia. The circumstances surrounding the millennium border arrests of foreign
nationals suggest that the suspects planned to target a large group assembled for a New Year's
celebration. Overseas attacks against the United States in recent years have followed the same
trend. The bombs that destroyed the military barracks in Saudi Arabia and two U.S. Embassies in
Africa inflicted 6,059 casualties. Those arrested in Jordan in late December had also planned
attacks designed to kill large numbers.
However, if most of the world's countries are firmer in opposing terrorism, some still
support terrorists or use terrorism as an element of state policy. Iran is the clearest case. The
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Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Ministry of intelligence and Security carry out terrorist
activities and give direction and support to other terrorists. The regimes of Syria, Sudan, and
Afghanistan provide funding, refuge, training bases, and weapons to terrorists. Libya continues
to provide support to some Palestinian terrorist groups and to harass expatriate dissidents, and
North Korea may still provide weapons to terrorists. Cuba provides safe haven to a number of
terrorists. Other states allow terrorist groups to operate on their soil or provide support which,
while failing short of state sponsorship, nonetheless gives terrorists important assistance.
The trend toward higher casualties reflects, in part, the changing motivation of today's
terrorists. Religiously motivated terrorist groups, such as Osama bin Ladin's group, al-Qaida,
which is believed to have bombed the U.S. Embassies in Africa, represent a growing trend
toward hatred of the United States. Other terrorist groups are driven by visions of a post-
apocalyptic future or by ethnic hatred. Such groups may lack a concrete political goal other than
to punish their enemies by killing as many of them as possible, seemingly without concern about
alienating sympathizers. Increasingly, attacks are less likely to be followed by claims of
responsibility or lists of political demands.
The shift in terrorist motives has contributed to a change in the way some international
terrorist groups are structured. Because groups based on ideological or religious motives may
lack a specific political or nationalistic agenda, they have less need for a hierarchical structure.
Instead, they can rely on loose affiliations with like-minded groups from a variety of countries to
support their common cause against the United States.
Not all terrorists are the same, but the groups most dangerous to the United States share
some characteristics not seen 10 or 20 years ago:
• Their funding and logistical networks cross borders, are less dependent on state sponsors,
and are harder to disrupt with economic sanctions.
• They make use of widely available technologies to communicate quickly and securely.
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This changing nature of the terrorist threat raises the stakes in getting American counterterrorist
policies and practices right.
Jonathan Pollard tried to warn both the US and Israel of what was going on and got
"nailed to the cross" for treason. Turns out he wasn't the one selling out US Intelligence, the real
culprits were a pair of WASP's nailed in the 1990's, not a Jew. But the fact he was a Jew was a
ready excuse to silence a fair inquiry. Threatening Americans has become a worthy goal for
Ashcroft and Bush.
Saudi Arabia is still the largest sponsor and supporter of Islamic terrorism in the world.
Spreading the Wahhabi Cult across the Muslim world (including many Muslims in America) and
teaching hate and intolerance, even of non-Wahhabi Muslims. The hate being taught in schools
and mosques must be ended. The American "crack whore" addiction to cheap oil must end or we
will continue to sell-out everything we stand for just to get the next fix. $3 a gallon for gas is
cheaper then the next September 11.
Now Saudi Arabia itself may be the target of its own terrorists, as they seemed to have
lost control. And the US seems to be planning to use terrorists against Iran. This is stupid
because that will also go out of control.
Quoting Henry Kissinger, "The Saudis are pro-American, they have to operate in a difficult
region, and ultimately we can manage them." Guess the homicide bombings in Saudi Arabia and
the inside help the terrorists got from Saudi officials has proven his point wrong. Unless
President Bush stops covering up for Saudi Arabia and using terrorists to bolster American
policy, the War on Terrorism is a sick joke.
Today all of the western countries are looking to the Arab countries as they are terrorist
countries due to the incident that occurred in the past. Arab countries try to proof that they are
innocent from such acts because Islam as a religion calls for stopping this behavior against
humanity. Islam respects human rights and tries to spread peace and harmony.
What is terrorism? In the past years we have all experienced or heard about some
sort of attack that has made a huge impact on us. A few years ago, 9/11 caught us by surprise and
had an overwhelming effect on us. This time powerful figures were targeted such as the World
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Trade Center which symbolizes America's influential economy, the Pentagon, which represents
America's military power, and if it were not for the courageous passengers on United Airlines
Flight 93 the White House would have been another target. There have been other attacks such
as these, some of which have also taken place on an airplane like the Egypt Air Flight 648 that
was heading to Cairo from Athens on November 23.
It is very difficult to resolve the international problem of terrorism for several major
reasons. Terrorists usually don't claim responsibility for their actions until the fuse is lit; it's not a
case of Jack the Ripper sending an ear to the cops and warning them who his next victim will be.
Terrorists usually do claim responsibility for their actions after the media is aware that something
happened, this gains recognition for their cause, which is often the reason they resort to terrorism
in the first place. These groups are often underground and individuals rarely step forward, how
can you arrest an entire group that you can't touch?
Terrorism following the dramatic events of September 11, 2001, the issue of terrorism
has become a permanent actor in the daily amphitheater of international politics. Every American
should realize what terrorism entails, especially after 9/11. Whether or not we understand the
proper meaning of terrorism, it has become a large, terrifying part of our society today. To
clarify things, the scientific definition of terrorism is "the use of intimidation, coercion, threats,
and violent attacks to achieve the objectives of an individual or of a group"
Compare and contrast the international terrorism of the early 21st century with the
international terrorism of the 1970s and 1980s.”International terrorism of the 1970s and 1980s
compared to that of the terrorism we face in the beginning of the new millennium has changed or
rather evolved in a number of aspects and in particular with regards to; mass media, a shift in
ideology from political to fanatical religious, the objectives becoming increasingly unrealistic
and “apocalyptic”, a change in the methods of exercising violence and the scale of violent with
particular reference to the number of victims targeted. This is a direct result of the shifting
political, social and economic climate of the world, globalization, and the rapid progression of
technologies.
While these developments may seem far beyond the horizon of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, a careful examination of some of the worst suicide bombings by the Hamas organization
against the State of Israel also leads to Saudi Arabia. As of September 2003, Saudi clerics were
featured prominently on Hamas websites as providing the religious justification for suicide
bombings. Of 16 religious leaders cited by Hamas, Saudis are the largest national group backing
these attacks. The formal Saudi position on suicide bombings, in fact, has been mixed. To his
credit, the current Saudi Grand Mufti, Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin Abdullah Al al-Sheikh, has
condemned these acts. Yet at the same time, Saudi Arabia's Minister for Islamic Affairs, Sheikh
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Saleh Al al-Sheikh, has condoned them: "The suicide bombings are permitted...the victims are
considered to have died a martyr's death."
The Hamas-Saudi connection should not come as a surprise. Hamas emerged in 1987
from the Gaza branch of Muslim Brotherhood which, as noted earlier, had become a key Saudi
ally in previous decades. When Hamas spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmed Yasin was let out of an
Israeli prison in 1998, he went to Saudi Arabia for medical treatment and Crown Prince Abdullah
made a high-profile visit to his hospital bedside. As late as early 2002, Abdullah was hosting
Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradhawi, the spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood. Bin Laden had
made the fate of Sheikh Yasin an issue for his al-Qaeda followers as well. In his 1996
"Declaration of War," he listed Sheikh Yasin's release from prison as one of his demands or
grievances.
Saudi support for suicide bombings has wider repercussions. Other militant Islamic
movements cite Saudi Wahhabi clerics to justify their activities - from the Chechen groups
battling the Russians to Iraqi mujahidin fighting the U.S. in western Iraq. Coincidentally, the
ubiquitous IIRO was lauded by the Saudi press for its support activities in the Sunni districts of
post-Saddam Iraq, as well. Its presence was usually indicative in other regions of Saudi
identification with local militant causes. In order to evaluate the significance of these religious
rulings, it is necessary to focus on the stature of these various Saudi clerical figures that jihadi
movements worldwide were citing.
For example, just after the September 11 attacks, it is true that many Saudi government
officials condemned them. But there were other voices as well. Shortly thereafter a Saudi book
appeared on the Internet justifying the murder of thousands of Americans, entitled The
Foundations of the Legality of the Destruction That Befell America. The Introduction to the book
was written by a prominent Saudi religious leader, Sheikh Hamud bin Uqla al-Shuaibi. He wrote
on November 16, 2001, that he hoped Allah would bring further destruction upon the United
States. Al-Shuaibi's name appears in a book entitled the Great Book of Fatwas, found in a
Taliban office in Kabul. Sheikh al-Shuaibi appears on the Hamas website, noted earlier, as a
religious source for suicide attacks. Attacks on U.S. soldiers in western Iraq by a Wahhabi group
called al-Jama'a al-Salafiya were dedicated to his name and to the names of other Saudi clerics.
Al-Shuaibi's ideas, in short, had global reach.
The question that must be asked is whether a religious leader of this sort is a peripheral
figure on the fringes of society or whether he reflects more mainstream thinking. In fact, al-
Shuaibi had very strong credentials. Born in 1925 in the Wahhabi stronghold of Buraida, he was
a student of King Faisal's Grand Mufti, Sheikh Muhammad ibn Ibrahim Al al-Sheikh. Al-
Shuaibi's roster of students read like a "Who's Who" of Saudi Arabia, including the current
Grand Mufti and the former Minister of Islamic Affairs and Muslim World League secretary-
general, Abdullah al-Turki. When al-Shuaibi died in 2002, many central Saudi figures attended
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his funeral. In short, he was mainstream. His militant ideas about justifying the September 11
attacks were echoed by Sheikh Abdullah bin Abdul Rahman Jibrin, who actually was a member
of the Directorate of Religious Research, Islamic Legal Rulings, and Islamic Propagation and
Guidance - an official branch of the Saudi government.
In 2003, the religious opinions of Saudi militant clerics were turning up in Hamas
educational institutions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. For example, the Hamas-oriented
"Koran and Sunna Society-Palestine," that had been established in 1996 in Kalkilya, had
branches in Bethlehem, Salfit, Abu Dis, Jenin, and the Tulkarm area. It distributed Saudi texts
praising suicide attacks against "the infidels" and condemning those who dodge their obligations
to join "the jihad." The pro-Hamas "Dar al-Arqam Model School" in Gaza, that was established
with Saudi aid, used texts that cited Sheikh Sulaiman bin Nasser al-Ulwan, a pro-al-Qaeda Saudi
cleric, whose name is mentioned in a bin Laden video clip from December 2001. Both the
"Koran and Sunna Society-Palestine" and the "Dar al-Arqam Model School" were supported by
the Saudi-based World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), and were part of the "civilian"
infrastructure of Hamas. Militant Saudi texts extolling martyrdom were infiltrated into schools
throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip, creating a whole generation of students that absorbed
their extremist messages. The export of this jihadi ideology to the Palestinians was reminiscent
of the Saudi support for madrasses in western Pakistan during the 1980s, which gave birth to the
Taliban and other pro-bin Laden groups.
As already demonstrated, Saudi Arabia erected a number of large global charities in the
1960s and 1970s whose original purpose may have been to spread Wahhabi Islam, but which
became penetrated by prominent individuals from al-Qaeda's global jihadi network. The three
most prominent of these charities were the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO; an
offshoot of the Muslim World League), the World Assembly of Muslim Youth, and the
Charitable Foundations of al-Haramain. All three are suspected by various global intelligence
organizations of terrorist funding. From the CIA's interrogation of an al-Qaeda operative, it was
learned that al-Haramain, for example, was used as a conduit for funding al-Qaeda in Southeast
Asia. Furthermore, Russia's Federal Security Service charged that al-Haramain was wiring funds
to Chechen militants in 1999.
The earliest documented links between one of these charities and terrorists was found in
Bosnia. It is a handwritten account on IIRO stationery from the late 1980's of a meeting attended
by the secretary-general of the Muslim World League and bin Laden representatives, indicating
the IIRO's readiness to have its offices used in support of militant actions. As already noted,
IIRO has been suspected of terrorist funding in the Philippines, Russia, East Africa, Bosnia, and
India. Al-Qaeda operatives became accustomed to Saudi Arabia being their source of support, in
general. In an intercepted telephone conversation, a senior al-Qaeda operative told a subordinate:
"Don't ever worry about money, because Saudi Arabia's money is your money. As recently as
mid-August 2003, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage admitted in Australia that
"some money from Saudi private charities had gone toward funding militants in Iraq.
But the strongest documented cases that demonstrate the ties between Saudi Arabia's
global charities and international terrorism are related to Hamas. These ties were allegedly
already in place in the mid-1990s when a Hamas funding group received instructions to write
letters of thanks to executives of IIRO and WAMY for funds it had received. In 1994, President
Clinton made a brief stop-over in Saudi Arabia during which he complained about Saudi funding
of Hamas. These charges about Saudi Arabia bankrolling Hamas have become even more
vociferous in recent years.
The Saudis have been equally vociferous in their denials. Crown Prince Abdullah's
foreign policy advisor, Adel al-Jubeir, asserted on CNN's "Crossfire" on August 16, 2002: "We
do not allow funding to go from Saudi Arabia to Hamas." More recently, Foreign Minister Prince
Saud al-Faisal told the Saudi daily Arab News on June 23, 2003, that since the establishment of
the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, the Saudi Kingdom only
sends funding through the PLO. He denied that the Saudis finance Hamas.
Yet during Israel's Operation Defensive Shield last year, a whole array of documents was
uncovered which show these repeated Saudi denials to be completely baseless. One of the
strongest pieces of evidence came from a handwritten letter written in Arabic by the former
Palestinian prime minister, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), on December 30, 2000, to Prince
Salman, governor of Riyadh and a full brother of King Fahd. Abbas complained that Saudi
donations in the Gaza Strip are going to an organization called al-Jamiya al-Islamiya (the
Islamic Society) which, Abbas explained, "belongs to Hamas." He wanted the funds for Fatah.
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Al-Jamiya al-Islamiya was not just a Hamas front, supporting positive social programs
and secretly diverting funds to military activity. Even its showcase "humanitarian" activities
were reprehensible. For example, at a kindergarten graduation involving some of its 1,600
Palestinian pre-schoolers, children wore uniforms and carried mock rifles. Others re-enacted the
lynching of Israelis or other terrorist attacks. A five-year-old girl dipped her hands in what was
supposed to be Israeli blood and then lifted them for the cameras. Al-Jamiya al-Islamiya posted
the photographs on its website. Thus, the Saudis were not only funding the current generation of
terrorism but also the next generation as well.
There were other documents linking Saudi institutions to terrorist financing. An actual
IIRO document was found that detailed how $280,000 was to be allocated to 14 Hamas front
groups. Former CIA operative Robert Baer has contended that the very same Prince Salman, who
received Mahmoud Abbas's letter of complaint, controlled IIRO distributions "with an iron
hand." There was further evidence tying the Saudis to Hamas. Checks made out to well-known
Hamas fronts from the corporate account of al-Rajhi Banking and Investment at Chase
Manhattan Bank were also uncovered. Al-Rajhi Banking and Investment was one of the largest
Saudi banking networks which serviced the Saudi charities. Its head, Sulaiman al-Rajhi, headed
the family that established the SAAR (the acronym for his name) foundation in Herndon,
Virginia, which was raided last year by U.S. federal agents because of suspected terrorist links.
The Saudis were clearly uncomfortable with the Israeli discoveries. Adel al-Jubeir tried
to question the authenticity of the documents. Alternatively, he attempted to misrepresent their
content. Thus, on the BBC interview program "Hardtalk" with Tim Sebastian on August 15,
2003, al-Jubeir argued that Mahmoud Abbas's letter to Prince Salman, noted above, contained no
reference to Hamas, but only to undefined Islamic groups. Yet, in fact, Abbas
made explicit reference to Hamas as a recipient of Saudi aid, in his own handwriting.
There were other conduits for terrorist funding that were disclosed. Spreadsheets from the
Saudi Committee for Aid to the al-Quds Intifada were found that detailed the movement of
moneys to the families of suicide bombers. Saudi spokesmen tried to distance themselves from
this activity by arguing that they helped these families through "international aid organizations."
Yet it became clear from the spreadsheets that these contributions were given through a
specifically Saudi organization, headed by the Saudi Minister of the Interior, Prince Naif. Indeed,
at the top right-hand corner of the spreadsheets found in the West Bank, the name "Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia" stands out. In the words of Secretary of State Colin Powell, this kind of support
"incentivized" the suicide terrorist attacks.
The Hamas case demonstrated the mode of operation of Saudi charities in support of
terrorism. It was significant, as well, for those investigating other cases of global terrorism,
including al-Qaeda, since very often these groups shared the same funding mechanisms. IIRO
and BMI, a New Jersey-based Islamic investment bank, were involved in Hamas funding and are
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suspected to have financed the 1998 bombing of the U.S. embassies in East Africa. As a case-
study, Hamas's funding is particularly useful to examine, since it is the best-documented case of
how the Saudis used their charities to back militant activities.
Most of the documents discovered in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were dated from the
year 2000. Saudi diplomats argued that after September 11, 2001, they had turned over a new
leaf. For example, in December 2002, the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Washington
released a nine-page report detailing the steps they had taken to keep better track of what the
charities were doing. The Saudi report stated that since September 11, 2001, "charitable groups
have been closely monitored and additional audits have been performed to assure that there are
no links to suspected groups." Was this indeed the new Saudi policy, it made sense, since
President Bush had clearly stated that in the war on terrorism, states were "either with us or with
the terrorists?"
Yet just weeks before the newest Saudi assurances were provided on terrorist financing at
a news conference in Washington, one of the top leaders of Hamas, Khaled Mashal, had been
invited to Riyadh for a WAMY conference. So while in Washington the press corps was told that
there were no longer any ties between the Saudi charities and "suspected groups," in Riyadh, one
of the three main Saudi charities was hosting the leader of one of the "suspected groups," Hamas,
which had been labeled by the U.S. government as an international terrorist organization.
According to a captured Hamas document that detailed Khaled Mashal's visit to Saudi Arabia; he
actually had been invited by Crown Prince Abdullah himself. While Hamas had refused at the
time to stop its suicide attacks, nonetheless, Saudi officials reassured Mashal of continuing
support.
These discrepancies between Saudi declarations and realities on the ground have been
found elsewhere. In a June 12, 2003, news conference in Washington, Adel al-Jubeir announced
that al-Haramain "would be shutting down all of its foreign offices. Yet on July 5, 2003, Jane
Perlez reported in the New York Times from Jakarta, Indonesia, that al-Haramain put its large
headquarters in a Jakarta suburb up for rent and simply "moved to a smaller house down the
block.” In another case, the al-Haramain office in Ashland, Oregon, was still up and running in
September 2003, though its lawyer argued it did not receive funds from its main office in
Riyadh.
A new context for the issue of Saudi funding of terrorist groups was created when
President Bush issued the "Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-
Palestinian Conflict" on April 30, 2003. Besides requiring difficult measures by Israelis and
Palestinians alike, the first phase of the new Bush administration plan specifically called on Arab
states to "cut off public and private funding and all other forms of support for groups supporting
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and engaging in violence and terror." In short, Saudi Arabia had to come under the roadmap, as
well. Meeting the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, and Bahrain at Sharm el-Sheikh on
June 3, 2003, President Bush announced that they had committed themselves to use all means to
cut off assistance to any terror group.
It might have been expected that Saudi Arabia would adhere to this firm U.S. policy and
not defy President Bush. After all, Crown Prince Abdullah had made a commitment to President
Bush at Sharm el-Sheikh. Moreover, on May 12, 2003, Saudi Arabia itself was struck by a triple
suicide bombing that led to 35 fatalities, including 9 Americans. Having denied that there was an
al-Qaeda presence in the Saudi kingdom, the Saudi government began uncovering al-Qaeda cells
and munitions in Riyadh, Mecca, Medina, Jiddah, and in the northern al-Jawf area. After
providing the ideological and financial basis for the growth of al-Qaeda and its sister
organizations, including Hamas, the Saudis found that the fire they had ignited was coming back
to burn them as well.
Unfortunately, while the Saudis appear to be taking their own domestic threat seriously,
there is no indication that they have scaled back terrorism financing abroad. For example, on
June 26, 2003, David Aufhauser, the General Counsel to the Treasury Department, appeared
before the Senate Judiciary Committee and still described Saudi Arabia as "the epicenter" of
terrorist financing. That was more than a month after the Riyadh bombings. More than two
months after the bombing, on July 31, 2003, John Pistole, the Acting FBI Director for
Counterterrorism, was asked about Saudi efforts to stop terrorist financing. Pistole, who praised
the level of Saudi cooperation with the FBI on investigating the Riyadh bombings as
"unprecedented," could only say with respect to Saudi moves against terrorist financing, "the
jury's still out."
This has been borne out by the Israeli experience with Hamas. The Israeli national
assessment is that Saudi Arabia today funds more than 50 percent of the needs of Hamas, and the
Saudi percentage in the total foreign aid to Hamas is actually growing. U.S. law enforcement
officials agree. Some Israeli estimates of the Saudi portion of the Hamas budget have been put at
60-70 percent. Saudi Arabia continues to aid the families of suicide bombers. It helps dual-use
charities and charities that funnel funds directly to military activities against Israel. Indeed, in
August 2003, the Hamas spiritual leader, Sheikh Ahmed Yasin, thanked IIRO and WAMY for
their assistance during a public address in the Gaza Strip.
On June 29, 2003, Hamas agreed to a temporary truce with Israel called a hudna, but at
the same time vigorously sought to rebuild its operational infrastructure, including an effort to
increase the quantity and quality of Qassam rockets launched against Israelis towns. Muslim
writers have argued in the past that a hudna is to be maintained until the balance of power
improves for the Muslim side. Funding Hamas clearly jeopardized efforts to reach a full-scale
cease-fire between Israel and the Palestinians and increased the likelihood that Hamas would
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escalate its militant actions. By August 28, 2003, Hamas was able to launch one of its new
extended-range Qassam rockets, developed during the hudna, a distance of nearly six miles,
striking the outskirts of Ashkelon. The hudna had already collapsed.
There was one exception to these disturbing trends. On August 18, 2003, the Saudi
government adopted its first money-laundering law, which, in theory, could be used to block
terrorist financing. The law contained steep fines and long jail terms for violators. But it was too
early to determine whether the law would be enforced or would just remain on the books. In the
past, Saudi counter-terrorist initiatives proved to be mostly empty rhetoric. U.S. Treasury
Secretary John W. Snow praise the Saudi decision to clamp down on terrorist financing during a
visit to Jiddah on September 17, 2003, yet there was little evidence to indicate that this was any
more than an attempt to acknowledge Saudi intentions in the absence of any tangible results.
Very simply, past Saudi commitments to take effective measures against terrorist
financing or incitement to violence have been half-hearted, at best. At a June 12, 2003, news
conference, Adel al-Jubeir announced with great fanfare that Saudi Arabia had fired several
hundred clerics and suspended more than a thousand for preaching intolerance. Yet within
weeks, the Saudi deputy minister for Islamic affairs flatly denied that the move against the
clerics had anything to do with curbing extremism. Whatever the reason why the clerics were
disciplined, the Saudi governmental message to the mosques has not been sufficiently clear: U.S.
Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Robert Jordan noted: "We have noticed lately in influential
mosques the imam has condemned terrorism and preached in favor of tolerance, then closed the
sermon with 'O God, please destroy the Jews, the infidels, and all who support them.'" In short,
all dimensions of the supposed Saudi war on terrorism look incomplete.
The Saudis have faced domestic terrorism before. It is instructive to recall that in 1995,
Saudi Arabia's National Guard headquarters was struck by pro-bin Laden forces. Yet, domestic
threats in the mid-1990s did not cause the Saudis to halt their assistance to jihadi groups abroad,
like Hamas or the Taliban. Riyadh appears able to draw a distinction between acts of domestic
subversion and international terrorist activities, which are seen as part of the global jihad. Saudi
spokesmen frequently ask how they could support an organization that intended to harm them.
Yet that it is the essence of the "Faustian bargain" (to borrow an expression from former CIA
director James Woolsey) that they apparently struck in the 1990s: al-Qaeda could strike globally
and the Saudis would pay them to leave the royal family alone.
This analysis was intended to disclose the critical role of Saudi Arabia in providing
ideological and financial support for the new terrorism. While most of the evidence presented
here comes from the specific case of Hamas, the modus operandi adopted in the Hamas case is
probably applicable to other parts of the global terrorist network as well. This is especially true
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of the critical role of Saudi Arabia's global charities in sustaining many similar militant
organizations from Indonesia to central Russia. While Saudi spokesmen have provided repeated
assurances that they have cleaned up these activities, their denials with respect to terrorist
funding do not stand up against the documented evidence that has accumulated in the last two
years.
The Saudi government faces hard dilemmas. It has recently taken disciplinary action
against some of its most extreme religious leaders. But traditionally, the Saudis need the
backing of their clerics to legitimize their regime; that is the heart of the Saudi-Wahhabi
covenant that dates back to the eighteenth century. Yet the Saudis also need the ultimate
protective shield provided by the United States. In order to sustain this, they have spent huge
sums of money for public relations firms and influence-brokers. But the time has come to tell the
Saudis that they have to make a choice. After September 11, there has to be zero tolerance for
terrorist funding and other forms of terrorist support.
The stakes involved are not just a question of public relations or Arab-Israel point-
scoring in Washington. The West needs to come to an understanding with the Islamic world
based on mutual respect and tolerance. The radicalization of the Middle East being promoted by
the Saudis undermines that goal and threatens to substitute instead a vision of perpetual militancy
and conflict. For that reason, what is at stake is nothing less than the security of the United States
and its allies, as well as the question of whether the Middle East moves in the direction of hope
and peace or relapses into a state of continuing strife.
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Officially Sanctioned Relief Efforts
Saudi Committees; Within Saudi Arabia, two official charitable committees
have solicited and delivered aid to Palestinian institutions, individuals, and causes
since the onset of the second Palestinian intifada in October 2000: the Saudi Popular
Committee for Assisting the Palestinian Mujahideen and the Saudi Committee for
the Support of the Al Quds Intifada. According to Saudi press reports, Prince Salman
bin Abd Al Aziz, the governor of Riyadh Province, established the Popular
Committee and has directed its operations. The Popular Committee’s periodic
public reports indicate that it provided approximately $8.8 million to the PLO from
October 2000 to April 2003.
The Saudi Committee for the Support of the Al Quds Intifada has served as the
main conduit for Saudi financial and material aid to the Palestinian territories since
its establishment under Royal Decree 8636 on October 16, 2000. Prince Nayef has
directed the Committee’s operations since its establishment. A December 31, 2003
report issued by the Saudi Embassy in Washington stated that the costs of the Al
Quds Intifada Committee’s 31 relief programs amounted to 524,265,283 Saudi riyals
(SR) [$139,804,075], in addition to the costs of then-current projects, which
amounted to a further 203,699,433 SR [$54,302,249]. The report also stated that
“the value of the services provided by the Committee to the Palestinian people”
through December 2003 was equal to an additional 727,964,716 SR
[$194,123,924].
The Al Quds Intifada Committee’s periodic public reports describe millions of
riyals in monetary aid that its programs have provided to the Palestinian people in the
form of financial transfers to the Palestinian Authority (PA), donations to charitable
organizations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and by means of direct assistance to
over 35,000 needy Palestinian individuals. In addition to financial assistance, the Al
Quds Intifada Committee also has provided food, blankets, medicine, ambulances,
and other aid in kind through programs aimed at supporting health care, education,
and the provision of basic social services in the Palestinian territories that have been
disrupted during the current uprising. The Committee has also constructed hundreds
of homes for Palestinians that have been left homeless due to the ongoing violence.
Palestinian officials have reportedly praised the Committee’s support for the
Palestinian people.
In June 2004, the Saudi government announced that the future activities of all
Saudi charitable committees and organizations that send aid abroad (including “the
Palestinian committees”) will be monitored and directed by the Saudi
Nongovernmental National Commission for Relief and Charity Work Abroad. As
of December 2004 it was unclear if this National Commission was operational or if
either of the two Committees described above continued to operate.
Unified Accounts; Saudi press reports indicate that the Al Quds Intifada
Committee consolidated the proceeds of its fund-raising efforts along with public and
private donations in support of Palestinian causes in national, government-sponsored
unified accounts established in a number of Saudi banks. “Unified Account
Number 98" and “Unified Account Number 90" are referred to in Saudi press reports
describing the Al Quds Intifada Committee’s activities, although it is unclear if both
accounts existed simultaneously, if they are synonymous, if one superseded the other,
or if either still exists. According to Saudi press reports, Saudi citizens were
encouraged to make donations to these accounts at their local banks.
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Allegations of Support for Palestinian Terrorists
Allegations of Support for the Families of Suicide Attackers; In May
2002, Israeli officials released a report that alleged that the Saudi Committee for the
Support of the Al Quds Intifada had “transferred large sums of money to families of
Palestinians who died in violent events, including notorious terrorists.” The report
argued that this alleged financial support encouraged Palestinian terrorism by easing the potential
burden on the families of attackers. Saudi officials called the allegations “baseless and false,”
and stated “unequivocally that Saudi Arabia does not provide financial support to suicide
bombers or their families.” Saudi officials also questioned the claim that Palestinian suicide
attacks were financially rather than politically motivated. Statements made by Committee figures
in response to specific claims that the Al Quds Intifada Committee provided support to the
families of suicide bombers or otherwise supported terrorism have been less consistent. Saudi
government spokesman Adel Al Jubeir has discussed the possibility that money from the
Committee may have gone to the families of suicide bombers, but has categorically ruled out the
existence of any quid pro quo arrangement or reward system similar to that sponsored by former
Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.
Support to Hamas; Since the early 1990s, there have been unsubstantiated
reports of Saudi public and private assistance to the fundamentalist Islamic Resistance
Movement (Hamas), which the U.S. government has designated as a foreign terrorist
organization. The Saudi government has not officially described Hamas as a terrorist
organization.
In its annual report on terrorism for the year 2001 (Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2001),
the State Department noted that Hamas receives funding from “private benefactors in Saudi
Arabia and other moderate Arab states.” The 2002 and most recent 2003 editions of the report do
not mention Saudi Arabia as a specific source of funding for Hamas. Other reports have
estimated varying amounts of aid to Hamas from private donations. According to one report,
individuals in Saudi Arabia have contributed approximately $5 million to Hamas each year, or
approximately half of its annual operating budget. Saudi spokesman Adel Al Jubeir rejoins that
“no Saudi government money goes to Hamas, directly or indirectly.” Al Jubeir has been quoted
as saying that he considers it “very likely” that “some Saudi individuals” have provided financial
support to Hamas. Recently, reports citing unidentified U.S. and Israeli intelligence officials
have indicated that Saudi funding for Hamas has been curtailed and replaced by other regional
sponsors. In June 2004 testimony before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, former
Treasury Department General Counsel David Aufhauser quoted “informed intelligence sources”
as saying that “for whatever reason, the money going to Hamas from Saudi Arabia has
substantially dried up.” Aufhauser indicated that Saudi financial support “has been supplemented
by money from Iran and Syria flowing through even more dangerous rejectionist groups in the
West Bank.”
Similarly, a report in the June 23, 2004 edition of the Israeli daily Maariv quoted an
unidentified Israeli military official as saying that “for the first time in years the Saudis have
begun to reduce the flow of funds to Hamas and to the Gaza Strip.” This unidentified source
attributes this change largely to U.S. pressure on Saudi Arabia to stem the flow of funding to
Hamas and other terrorist organizations.
Charitable giving (zakat) is a religious obligation for Muslims, constituting one of the
five “pillars of Islam.” Many wealthy Saudis contribute approximately 2.5 percent of their
annual income to charitable causes and relief organizations that fund religious education
programs, orphanages, hospitals, and other development projects both within Saudi Arabia and
around the world. One expert estimates Saudi charitable donations, in general, to be about $3
billion to $4 billion annually, of which 10-20% is disseminated abroad. Saudi official’s estimate
that $100 million in charitable donations are directed abroad each year. It is unclear how much
money is channeled from Saudi Arabian donations towards charitable endeavors in the United
States, but some estimates suggest that $100 million has been donated over the last decade. To
what extent these donations have stemmed from the Saudi government or from private
individuals is unknown.
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Charity Oversight
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“galvanized Riyadh into launching a sustained crackdown against Al Qa’ida’s presence in the
Kingdom and spurred an unprecedented level of cooperation with the United States.”
Joint Task Force; Shortly after the May 2003 attacks in Riyadh, a joint U.S.- Saudi
intelligence task force was set up to help identify the perpetrators. This set the stage for a more
permanent bilateral group with a broader mission. During the first week in August 2003, a
delegation of senior U.S. counter-terrorism officials from the National Security Council, the
State Department, the Treasury Department, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation met with
Saudi leaders reportedly to urge them to do more to cut off the funneling of money to terrorists
through Saudi businesses and organizations. U.S. officials traveled to Riyadh later that month to
set up a joint task force to investigate terrorist financing in Saudi Arabia. Subsequently, agents
from U.S. organizations including the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Internal Revenue
Service joined Saudi officials to set up a center that will focus on bank accounts, computer
records, and other financial data.
The U.S.-Saudi task force apparently has two components: one focused mainly on
intelligence and the other on financing. The intelligence side shares intelligence information
related to threats to the United States, especially general criminal terrorism leads. The financing
side shares information related to terrorist funding, including sharing financial leads, requests for
bank records, information on accounts, and so on. The overall task force is composed of small
groups of FBI agents, FBI employees, analysts, IRS agents and intelligence agents. Among other
capabilities, it is apparently able to receive real time information on potential leads in the United
States and then request Saudi assistance to pursue them in Saudi Arabia. According to press
articles, this is the first time that U.S. law enforcement officials have been stationed in Saudi
Arabia to pursue intelligence and financing issues. Many observers see this joint effort as a test
of how responsive Saudi Arabia may prove to be in dealing with the issue of terrorism and
blocking the flow of money from its citizens to terrorist organizations.
Other Recent Measures; Press reports, the State Department’s Patterns of Global
Terrorism: 2003, and statements by knowledgeable observers including a former Department of
the Treasury official have listed various recent measures taken by Saudi Arabia to put a stop to
terrorist financing. Most of these measures have been designed to improve oversight of
charitable collections, and include: A law adopted in August 2003 making money laundering and
terrorist financing criminal offenses. A ban on cash collections at mosques and on transfers
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abroad of charitable funds collected in Saudi Arabia, except with Foreign Ministry approval and
subject to stringent reporting requirements.
A requirement for charitable organizations to have single disbursement bank accounts
and an approved official with signatory authority to facilitate tighter controls over such accounts.
Closure of unlicensed money exchange houses and closer supervision of informal money transfer
houses used to send funds abroad, known as hawalas.
New rules governing the insurance sector and capital markets, and establishment of a
financial intelligence unit (the SAFCU) to collect and share information on suspicious financial
transactions.
Vetting of religious clerics and supervision of money given to them by their
congregations. The government suspended more than 1,000 clerics in 2003 and 900 clerics so far
in 2004 supposedly “on the grounds of negligence.”
Announcement in early December 2003 of a rewards program, ranging from $270,000 to
$1.87 million, for information leading to the arrest of suspects or disruption of terrorist attacks.
Announcement in late November 2004 that Saudi Arabia will participate in the newly
established Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF).
Membership in the regional body commits Saudi Arabia to implementing the internationally
recognized anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing standards designed by FATF.
There have also been specific developments in bilateral U.S.-Saudi cooperation in
criminal investigations and procedures:
In September 2003, the FBI and the Internal Revenue ServiceCriminal Investigative
Division began a program of terrorism financing training for the Saudi government and has had
sessions in Riyadh and Washington, D.C. A third session was scheduled for Riyadh in May
2004.
According to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, the Saudis have killed several known
operatives, financial facilitators, and financiers for Al Qaeda, including Yousif Salih Fahad Al
Ayeeri (a.k.a. “Swift Sword”) and Khaled Ali Al Hajj, reportedly key financial facilitators
for Al Qaeda in the Persian Gulf region.
The Khobar Towers Bombing. The bombing of a U.S. Air Force billeting facility
in June 1996 has never been resolved. The reluctance of Saudi investigative officials to share
evidence with their U.S. counterparts was a long-standing source of friction between the two
governments; both issued their own separate indictments. Although the Saudi Hezbollah group
and the Iranian government are suspected of involvement, recent reports indicate that Al Qaeda
may also have played a role in the attack. Some observers believe that more and better U.S.
access to Saudi files on this case might reveal money trails that could shed further light on the
intricacies of terrorist funding and collaboration.
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Dilatory Action. U.S. officials have complained in the past that Saudi officials have
been slow to take action against organizations and entities implicate in terrorist financing.
According to a monograph released by the 9/11 Commission, “the Saudi government turned a
blind eye to the financing of al Qaeda” before September 11, 2001, and “the Saudis did not begin
to crack down hard on Al Qaeda financing in the Kingdom until after the May 2003 Al Qaeda
attacks in Riyadh.” The report recognized the “significantly higher levels of cooperation” that
U.S. officials have received from their Saudi counterparts since May 2003. Securing timely
cooperation remains an important component of U.S. efforts to curb the flow of funds to terrorist
groups.
Accountability. U.S. officials have also said that the Saudi Government should give
more emphasis to personal responsibility in reporting and act against those who tolerate or
promote financing of terrorist activity. According to the 9/11Commission Monograph on
Terrorist Financing, “the Saudis have failed to impose criminal punishment on any high-profile
donor.” The 2004 FATF review found that Saudi Arabia has initiated five criminal cases
involving terrorist financing activities, with one successful conviction. Several prominent Saudi
individuals suspected by U.S. authorities of involvement in terrorist financing have not been
charged or prosecuted in the United States, Saudi Arabia, or other jurisdictions. These
individuals are believed to be in Saudi Arabia.
Palestinian Funding. Saudi leaders have said that Saudi government contributions to
Palestinian causes go exclusively to the Palestinian Authority and not to Hamas. The State
Department notes that Hamas receives funds from benefactors in various locations including the
Persian Gulf, although it does not specifically mention Saudi Arabia. The possibility remains that
private donor in Saudi Arabia may circumvent Saudi regulatory controls.
International Efforts. The FATF review notes that Saudi Arabia has not ratified the
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, adopted by the U.N.
General Assembly in December 1999. The FATF report urges Saudi Arabia to do so “as soon as
possible.”
Conclusion
It seems clear that growing challenges to internal security and an increase in terrorist
incidents in Saudi Arabia have impelled the Saudi leadership to devote heightened attention to
countering sources of financing terrorism. This has been particularly true since mid-2003, when
terrorists began mounting a series of attacks on residential and office compounds, apparently in
an effort to target the Saudi government as well as the western presence in Saudi Arabia. Both
U.S. officials and independent observers have welcomed the mechanisms that Saudi authorities
have put in place with the aim of stemming the flow of funds destined for terrorist groups.
They point out, however, that the effectiveness of these measures will be tested by the degree to
which Saudi authorities succeed in implementing the various institutions and regulations that
have been established in recent years.
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