Rule 133, Sec.

1: preponderance of evidence
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 169711 February 8, 2010
HEIRS OF SARAH MARIE PALMA BURGOS, Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and JOHNNY CO y YU, Respondents.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the legal standing of the offended parties in a criminal case to seek, in their personal capacities and without the
Solicitor General’s intervention, reversal of the trial court’s order granting bail to the accused on the ground of absence of strong
evidence of guilt.
The Facts and the Case
On January 7, 1992 a number of assailants attacked the household of Sarah Marie Palma Burgos while all were asleep, killing
Sarah and her uncle Erasmo Palma (Erasmo). Another uncle, Victor Palma (Victor), and a friend, Benigno Oquendo (Oquendo),
survived the attack. The theory of the police was that a land transaction gone sour between Sarah’s live-in partner, David So
(David), and respondent Johnny Co (Co) motivated the assault.
Four months after the incident, the police arrested Cresencio Aman (Aman) and Romeo Martin (Martin) who executed confessions,
allegedly admitting their part in the attack. They pointed to two others who helped them, namely, Artemio "Pong" Bergonia and
Danilo Say, and to respondent Co who allegedly masterminded the whole thing. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch
51, tried the case against Aman and Martin in Criminal Cases 92-104918-21. The three others remained at large. After trial, the RTC
acquitted them both.
After 10 years or on September 5, 2002 respondent Co surrendered to the National Bureau of Investigation. The prosecution
charged him with two counts of murder for the deaths of Sarah1 and Erasmo2 and two counts of frustrated murder committed
against Oquendo3 and Victor.4 Upon arraignment, Co pleaded not guilty to the charges.
On September 25, 2002 respondent Co filed a petition for admission to bail.5 After hearing or on April 14, 2004, the RTC6 granted
bail on the ground that the evidence of guilt of respondent Co was not strong. The RTC summarized the prosecution’s evidence as
follows:
1. Aman and Martin’s extrajudicial confessions that pointed to Co as the one who hired them to kill David and his family.
2. David’s testimony as alleged witness to the killing of Sarah. Aman supposedly told David later when they met that it
was Co who ordered the massacre.
3. Police officer Leopoldo Vasquez, assistant leader of the police team that investigated the case, said that his team
conducted two operations to take Co into custody. The first was in a restaurant where they waited for him. But Co got
suspicious and when he saw the police, he immediately left the restaurant, got into his car, and sped away. The police
also tried to arrest Co at his residence but the police did not find him there. Co also offered to settle the case.
The RTC had a low estimate, however, of the above evidence. First, the extrajudicial confessions of Aman and Martin, apart from
having been irregularly executed, merely proved their participation in the killing. Neither, however, claimed conspiracy with
respondent Co. Further, the prosecution did not present Aman or Martin during the bail hearing, reportedly because Aman was
already dead and Martin could not be located. To admit their sworn statements in evidence would deprive Co of his constitutional
right to cross-examine them.
Second, David’s narrations were, to the RTC, contradictory, uncorroborated, and self-serving, thus lacking in evidentiary weight.
Third, police officer Vasquez’s story was likewise uncorroborated. Besides, while flight is often indicative of guilt, it requires a
clear showing of the identity of the offender and his evasion of arrest. Here, said the RTC, the prosecution failed to establish Co’s
identity as the assailant and his reason for fleeing from the police.
Fourth, the prosecution failed to prove that the offer of settlement came from Co.
Petitioner heirs of Sarah moved for reconsideration7 but the RTC, now presided over by another judge,8 denied the same in its
Order of May 18, 2005.9 This prompted the victim’s heirs to file a special civil action of certiorari with prayer for a temporary
restraining order or preliminary injunction10 before the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 90028.
The CA dismissed the petition,11 however, for having been filed without involving the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in
violation of jurisprudence12 and the law, specifically, Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code which
states that:
Sec. 35. Powers and Functions.—The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its
agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceedings, investigation or matter requiring the
services of lawyers. When authorized by the President or head of the office concerned, it shall also represent government-owned
or controlled corporations. The Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as such, shall
discharge duties requiring the services of lawyers. It shall have the following specific powers and functions:
xxxx
(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the
Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special
proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party.
Petitioner heirs of Sarah moved for reconsideration13 but the CA denied it for lack of merit in its Resolution of September 16,
2005,14 hence, the heirs’ recourse to this Court.
The Issue
The case raises one issue: whether or not the CA correctly dismissed the special civil action of certiorari, which questioned the
RTC’s grant of bail to respondent Co, for having been filed in the name of the offended parties and without the OSG’s intervention.
The Court’s Ruling
Generally, a criminal case has two aspects, the civil and the criminal. The civil aspect is borne of the principle that every person
criminally liable is also civilly liable.15
The civil action, in which the offended party is the plaintiff and the accused is the defendant,16 is deemed instituted with the
criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action or reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.17
The law allows the merger of the criminal and the civil actions to avoid multiplicity of suits.18 Thus, when the state succeeds in
prosecuting the offense, the offended party benefits from such result and is able to collect the damages awarded to him.
But, when the trial court acquits the accused19 or dismisses the case20 on the ground of lack of evidence to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt, the civil action is not automatically extinguished since liability under such an action can be
determined based on mere preponderance of evidence. The offended party may peel off from the terminated criminal action and
appeal from the implied dismissal of his claim for civil liability.21
The purpose of a criminal action, in its purest sense, is to determine the penal liability of the accused for having outraged the state
with his crime and, if he be found guilty, to punish him for it. In this sense, the parties to the action are the People of the
Philippines and the accused.22 The offended party is regarded merely as a witness for the state.23 Also in this wise, only the state,
through its appellate counsel, the OSG,24 has the sole right and authority to institute proceedings before the CA or the Supreme
Court.251avvphi1
As a general rule, the mandate or authority to represent the state lies only in the OSG. Thus—
It is patent that the intent of the lawmaker was to give the designated official, the Solicitor General, in this case, the unequivocal
mandate to appear for the government in legal proceedings. Spread out in the laws creating the office is the discernible intent
which may be gathered from the term "shall" x x x.
xxxx
The Court is firmly convinced that considering the spirit and the letter of the law, there can be no other logical interpretation of
Sec. 35 of the Administrative Code than that it is, indeed, mandatory upon the OSG to "represent the Government of the
Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter
requiring the services of a lawyer.26
For the above reason, actions essentially involving the interest of the state, if not initiated by the Solicitor General, are, as a
rule,27 summarily dismissed.28
Here, the question of granting bail to the accused is but an aspect of the criminal action, preventing him from eluding punishment
in the event of conviction. The grant of bail or its denial has no impact on the civil liability of the accused that depends on
conviction by final judgment. Here, respondent Co has already been arraigned. Trial and judgment, with award for civil liability
when warranted, could proceed even in his absence.
In Narciso v. Sta. Romana-Cruz,29 this Court allowed the offended party to challenge before it the trial court’s order granting bail.
But in that case, the trial court gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting bail without conducting
any hearing at all. Thus, to disallow the appeal on the basis of lack of intervention of the OSG would "leave the private complainant
without any recourse to rectify the public injustice."30 It is not the case here. The trial court took time to hear the parade of
witnesses that the prosecution presented before reaching the conclusion that the evidence of guilt of respondent Co was not
strong.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. SP 90028 dated June 29, 2005
and its Resolution dated September 16, 2005.
SO ORDERED.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 170790 October 23, 2009
ANGELITO COLMENARES, Petitioner,
vs.
HAND TRACTOR PARTS AND AGRO-INDUSTRIAL CORP., Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Petitioner Angelito Colmenares assails the Decision1 dated July 27, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 57877
and its Resolution2 dated November 15, 2005, denying his motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals had affirmed the
judgment of the trial court which ordered petitioner to pay a sum of money to respondent Hand Tractor Parts and Agro-
Industrial Corporation.
The facts, culled from the records, are briefly as follows:
Respondent is a domestic corporation3 engaged in selling tractor and agro-industrial parts. Petitioner is one of its
customers.4
On June 15, 1988, petitioner bought on credit paddle wheels from respondent.5 The paddle wheels were delivered on June
18 and 29, 1988.6 On November 9, 1988, respondent issued to petitioner a charge invoice7 for P80,200, the price of the
paddle wheels and their accessories. Petitioner paid P25,000 on November 16, 1988, P10,000 on May 18, 1991 and P3,000
on April 17, 19938 or a total of P38,000.
In a letter9 dated September 18, 1995, respondent’s counsel demanded that petitioner pay P156,266 for his unpaid account,
including interest computed at 3% per month.10 In response, petitioner wrote:
xxxx
While I do not deny the fact that I have purchased some tractor parts from your client on credit, my records of my account
with your client do not show that I am indebted to your client in the amount of P156,266.00.
May I ask therefore from your client a period of 45 days from today, to check my records, compare them with the records of
your client and settle my actual accountability with your client within said period.11
On November 28, 1995, respondent sued petitioner for a sum of money.12 Respondent claimed that despite demand,
petitioner failed to pay.
For his defense, petitioner testified that he did not purchase the paddle wheels and accessories stated in the November 9,
1988 charge invoice.13
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 44, found petitioner liable to respondent. It ruled that petitioner’s
denial of his obligation was insufficient against the invoices, delivery receipts, and official receipts showing his partial
payments. Petitioner was ordered to pay respondent P166,466 plus 3% interest per month from June 1996 and 25% of the
net amount due as attorney’s fees and cost of collection.14
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.15 It found respondent’s testimonial and documentary
evidence sufficient to support the trial court’s decision. The Court of Appeals ruled:
Exhibit "A" [charge invoice] … will show that, on June 18, 1988, [petitioner] purchased from [respondent] several farm
implements.
Other than his bare denial, [petitioner] failed to present other convincing testimonial and documentary evidence to rebut
[respondent’s] evidence.
Exhibits "B" and "C" [delivery receipts] … will show that the farm implements … were delivered to [petitioner] through his
representative.
It is easy for the [petitioner] to deny outright receiving such items and likewise deny to have authorized persons to receive
said items. However, again, [petitioner] failed to present witnesses and other documentary evidence to support his allegation.
As to the rest of the evidence adduced by the [respondent], we find the [trial court] to have correctly weighed and appreciated
the same when it held:
"The [petitioner’s] mere denial of his obligation would not suffice against the invoices and delivery receipts, especially the
official receipts issued by the [respondent]. It would be absurd for the [respondent] to fabricate official receipts just to solicit a
phony obligation. As agreed upon by the [petitioner] himself, he was a customer of the [respondent] before the controversial
sale was made. Thus, the general manager of the [respondent] cannot mistake him for anyone of their other clients,
considering their transactions were done in personal.xxx"16
After his motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner filed the instant petition which raised the following issues:
I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE TO MEET THE QUANTUM OF PROOF
IN CIVIL CASES WHICH IS "PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE."

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON "BURDEN OF PROOF" IN CIVIL CASES.

III.
 WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON "AWARD OF DAMAGES."17

Essentially, the issues are: (1) Was respondent able to prove by a preponderance of evidence its claim for a sum of money
against petitioner? (2) Was the award of interest and attorney’s fees proper?
Petitioner contests the finding that he was respondent’s customer even before the sale of the paddle wheels. He says that
respondent’s lone witness even testified that the first and last transaction between him (witness) and petitioner was on June
29, 1988. He adds that the Court of Appeals also made a presumptuous finding that on June 18, 1988 he purchased from
respondent several farm implements and the same were delivered to him. Petitioner claims that he or his duly authorized
representative never signed the exhibits cited for this finding. The delivery receipts are also anomalous or questionable
because they are consecutively numbered although the deliveries had a gap of 11 days. Moreover, the statement of account
and the demand letter cannot prove his account. Not all statements of account are truthful statements and not all demand
letters contain valid demands. In addition, the official receipts may be good proof of payment but they are not good proof of
the existence of his account. While the transaction was in June 1988, the official receipts show that the first payment was
made five months after the purchase, the second payment was made two years and six months after the first payment, the
third payment was made one year and 11 months after the second payment, and respondent sued him seven years after he
obtained credit. Petitioner concludes that respondent failed to prove its affirmative assertions and there is no evidence to
prove the existence of his account with respondent. Consequently, he avers, the decision of the Court of Appeals is not
supported by sufficient evidence. For it to conclude that "it would be absurd for the [respondent] to fabricate official receipts
just to solicit a phony obligation" is error because said documents, according to petitioner, are plainly and simply self-serving,
fabricated pieces of evidence with no probative value.18
Respondent counters that petitioner has raised factual issues, and that petitioner assails its evidence but has failed to
present his own countervailing evidence other than mere denial.19
On the first issue, we find for the respondent.
Indeed, it is obvious that petitioner’s submissions involve factual issues that call for review of all evidence presented before
the trial court. Whether petitioner was respondent’s customer before the subject transaction, whether petitioner purchased
the paddle wheels, whether his unpaid account exists, whether the documents presented as evidence are questionable,
anomalous or fabricated, are all questions of fact.
It is settled that questions of fact cannot be the subject of a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The rule
finds more stringent application where the Court of Appeals upholds the findings of fact of the trial court. In such instance, as
in this case, this Court is generally bound to adopt the facts as determined by the lower courts.20 This Court has held also
that when supported by substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the
parties and are not reviewable by this Court.21 Needless to stress, under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the
petition shall raise only questions of law.22 The reason is that this Court is not a trier of facts, and is not to review and
calibrate the evidence on record.23
Here, we find no exception to the general rule. The trial court and the Court of Appeals are one in finding that petitioner
bought paddle wheels from respondent, that the same were delivered to petitioner through his representative, and that
petitioner failed to fully pay the price as he made partial payments only. This finding is amply supported by the evidence on
record. Raul Chua, respondent’s general manager, testified on petitioner’s credit purchase. Respondent also presented the
delivery receipts, charge invoice, official receipts of partial payment, and petitioner’s reply to the demand letter.
Regarding petitioner’s denial of his obligation, we find him less than candid in his submissions. He conveniently ignores his
admission captured by the transcripts and the evidence he himself wrote. First, he contests the finding that he was
respondent’s customer before the subject transaction. But he has testified that he used to purchase farm implements from
respondent in cash or credit.24 Thus, we see nothing wrong in the conclusion of the trial court and the Court of Appeals
which was based on his testimony. Second, petitioner assails the finding that the paddle wheels were delivered to him
through his representative. We note that Raul Chua identified petitioner’s secretary as the one who received the
deliveries.25 Petitioner, on the other hand, denied knowing the person who received the deliveries and having said person in
his employ.26 Interestingly, petitioner’s counsel, Atty. Cris Dionela, manifested after petitioner’s testimony that he will present
petitioner’s secretary during the next hearing.27 Since petitioner denied knowing the person who received the deliveries, the
reason should be clear why we do not find on record the testimony of his secretary. This time, however, petitioner laments
that "the persons who only the respondent claimed to be [petitioner’s] employees" were never presented in court to be
identified and confronted by him.28 Third, that there is no evidence of petitioner’s account with respondent is belied by
petitioner himself when he replied to the demand letter and said that he will check his records and settle his actual
accountability within 45 days.
Relatedly, petitioner’s unpaid account was duly proven by the charge invoice for his credit purchase worthP80,200 and
official receipts for his partial payment of P38,000 only. Petitioner, in his belabored challenge to respondent’s evidence, has
not informed the Court what other evidence could possibly prove his unpaid account. Perhaps he could think of no other
because any evidence other than proof of credit and proof of partial payment would only be superfluous in proving his unpaid
account. And his reply to the demand letter only confirms what he has to settle.
Thus, we are in agreement that respondent was able to prove by preponderant evidence, which means evidence which is of
greater weight or is more convincing than that which is in opposition to it,29 that petitioner ought to pay his unpaid account.
On the matter of damages, petitioner contends that the award of 3% interest per month is baseless because the legal rate is
12% per annum. The charge invoice also states 12% interest per annum on overdue accounts. The award of attorney’s fees
and cost of collection is also baseless in view of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate.
Respondent counters that attorney’s fees may be awarded when a party is compelled to litigate.
On this issue, petitioner is partly correct. The interest payable for an overdue account as stated in the charge invoice is only
12% per annum,30 not 3% per month. The handwritten modification to 36% was not explained by respondent. In its
comment,31 respondent did not even dispute petitioner’s assertion and limited its argument on the propriety of attorney’s
fees.
Accordingly, as of November 28, 2008, 13 years after respondent’s judicial demand, petitioner’s unpaid account amounts
to P108,032, computed as follows:
Unpaid Account = Unpaid Price + Interest
 Unpaid Account = (80,200 – 38,000) + [(80,200-38,000)x .12 x 13]
Unpaid Account = 42,200 + 65,832
Unpaid Account = P108,032
Additional interest can be computed after November 28, 2008.
Finally, we agree with the lower courts on the award of attorney’s fees. Article 220832 of the Civil Code provides that in the
absence of stipulation, attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered. In this case,
however, the charge invoice provides that "25% of the amount due is further charged for attorney’s fees and cost of collection
in case of suit." Thus, we agree that respondent is also entitled to 25% ofP108,032 or P27,008 as attorney’s fees.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated July 27, 2005 and Resolution dated
November 15, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 57877 are hereby MODIFIED. Petitioner isORDERED to pay
respondent (a) P108,032 plus additional interest after November 28, 2008, and (b) P27,008 as attorney’s fees.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 178907 July 4, 2008

FLORA N. FLORES, represented by her Attorneys-In-Fact, JOSE NAVARRO and ERLINDA NAVARRO, petitioner,
vs.SPOUSES LUCAS and ZENAIDA QUITALIG, respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

This petition under Rule 45 arose from a complaint for forcible entry and damages filed by Flora N. Flores against spouses Lucas and
Zenaida Quitalig before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) in Bauang, La Union and which was docketed as Civil Case No. 1013.

The property subject of the case is an untitled lot with an area of 200 sq.m. located in Taberna, Bauang, La Union Cadastre and lies
between Lot No. 4834, owned by the spouses Quitalig, and Lot No. 4835, owned by Flores. In her complaint, Flores alleged that in 2004,
the spouses Quitalig, in the belief that the subject lot is part of their Lot No. 4834, entered, occupied, and constructed a fence around the
subject lot. Both parties claimed ownership and prior possession of the said property.

The complaint was, however, dismissed by the MTC in its April 6, 2005 Decision.1 According to the MTC, the spouses Quitalig were able to
prove their prior possession and ownership of the subject lot through documentary and testamentary evidence. On the other hand, Flores
was not able to prove her claim of ownership since her title to the subject lot is tainted with irregularity. The court found that Flores derived
title to the subject lot through a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Macario Navarro in 1995 who, as it turned out, died on April 22, 1986.

Unperturbed by the unfavorable MTC decision, Flores appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 33 in Bauang, La Union, the
appeal docketed as Civil Case No. 1600-BG. In its September 6, 2005 Decision,2 the RTC found for Flores and accordingly set aside that
of the MTC. The RTC held that Flores was able to prove that she and her predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject
lot since 1950, through tax declarations under the names of her predecessors-in-interest. In stark contrast thereto, the RTC doubted the
spouses Quitalig's claim of prior possession, because their documentary evidence to prove their prior possession over the subject property
being dated 2004, at the earliest, was apparently prepared after the complaint was filed. The RTC also held that the issue on Flores'
ownership cannot be properly appreciated in a case for forcible entry and should, therefore, be resolved in a separate action for the
annulment of the adverted deed of sale.

Aggrieved, the spouses Quitalig filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals (CA), which, on January 31, 2007, rendered a
Decision3 ruling in favor of the spouses Quitalig. The CA ruled that Flores failed to sufficiently show that the subject lot is within the
boundaries of her claimed property, Lot No. 4835. This failure, according to the CA, precluded it from properly determining whether or not
there was forcible entry. Accordingly, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC and dismissed Flores' complaint for forcible entry.

Flores accordingly moved for the reconsideration of the CA's decision but the same was denied in the CA's July 26, 2007 Resolution.

Flores now comes before this Court setting forth this issue, summarized as follows: Whether the CA erred in holding that petitioner failed to
present adequate proof to establish the identity of the subject lot and, thus, also failed to show that the subject lot is within the metes and
bounds of her land, thereby precluding the CA from determining the issue of forcible entry.

Flores maintains that she, her attorneys-in-fact, and her predecessors-in-interest have been in peaceful possession of the subject property
since 1950 until the possession was interrupted by the spouses Quitalig in 2004 when they abruptly entered the property and fenced its
perimeter.

The spouses Quitalig, on the other hand, claim that the subject property belongs to them as it is part of the lot they had purchased from
Cresencio and Jose Madayag in 1982 and had been in their possession ever since.

The petition has merit.

An action for forcible entry is summary in nature. It is designed to recover physical possession through prompt proceedings that are
restrictive in nature, scope, and time limits.4 In such action, the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior possession of the land or building
and that he was deprived thereof by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth.5

Owing to the summary nature of forcible entry cases, courts should expeditiously resolve the issue of possession, eschewing, as a rule, the
issue of ownership since such cases proceed independently of any claim of ownership and the plaintiff needs merely to prove prior
possession de facto and the undue deprivation thereof.6 Here, the MTC clearly erred when it delved into the issue of ownership and
focused on Flores' seemingly flawed title over the property. The MTC failed to appreciate that, in spite of this flaw in Flores' title to the
subject property, there is preponderance of evidence to reasonably conclude that Flores and her predecessors-in-interest were in actual
possession of the subject property until 2004 when respondents, through stealth or strategy, entered and claimed it as part of their land. It
is clear though that the spouses Quitalig almost succeeded in muddling the core issue by inserting the collateral issue of ownership.

The CA, too, erred when it held that Flores failed to particularly identify the location of the subject property, which thereby precluded it from
determining whether or not the spouses Quitalig indeed dispossessed her of the subject property. It is clear from the records before us that
the lot in question is between Lot No. 4834, owned by the spouses Quitalig, and Lot No. 4835, owned by Flores and her predecessors-in-
interest. It is also clear that Flores, through her attorneys-in-fact, was in physical possession of the subject lot before the spouses Quitalig
entered and fenced it in 2004. The CA could have easily and should have determined from the other evidence presented who between the
parties exercised prior possession over the subject property since what is important in this type of cases is determining who is entitled to
the physical possession of the property.7 Indeed, any of the parties who can prove prior possession de facto may recover such possession
even from the owner himself.8 In any case, the RTC correctly ruled that the issue of ownership can be properly resolved in another
proceeding and in a more appropriate forum.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the CA's January 31, 2007 Decision and its July 26, 2007 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 91823 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The RTC's September 6, 2005 Decision in Civil Case No. 1600-BG is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Quisumbing,Chairperson Carpio-Morales, Tinga, Brion., JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 167884 January 20, 2009
ENRICO S. EULOGIO, Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES CLEMENTE APELES1 and LUZ APELES, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Petitioner Enrico S. Eulogio (Enrico) filed this instant Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court assailing the Decision2 dated 20 December 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76933 which reversed the
Decision3 dated 8 October 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 215, in Civil Case No. Q-99-
36834. The RTC directed respondents, spouses Clemente and Luz Apeles (spouses Apeles) to execute a Deed of Sale over
a piece of real property in favor of Enrico after the latter’s payment of full consideration therefor.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the present case are as follows:
The real property in question consists of a house and lot situated at No. 87 Timog Avenue, Quezon City (subject property).
The lot has an area of 360.60 square meters, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 253990 issued by the Registry of
Deeds of Quezon City in the names of the spouses Apeles.4
In 1979, the spouses Apeles leased the subject property to Arturo Eulogio (Arturo), Enrico’s father. Upon Arturo’s death, his
son Enrico succeeded as lessor of the subject property. Enrico used the subject property as his residence and place of
business. Enrico was engaged in the business of buying and selling imported cars.5
On 6 January 1987, the spouses Apeles and Enrico allegedly entered into a Contract of Lease6 with Option to Purchase
involving the subject property. According to the said lease contract, Luz Apeles was authorized to enter into the same as the
attorney-in-fact of her husband, Clemente, pursuant to a Special Power of Attorney executed by the latter in favor of the
former on 24 January 1979. The contract purportedly afforded Enrico, before the expiration of the three-year lease period,
the option to purchase the subject property for a price not exceedingP1.5 Million. The pertinent provisions of the Contract of
Lease are reproduced below:
3. That this Contract shall be effective commencing from January 26, 1987 and shall remain valid and binding for
THREE (3) YEARS from the said date. The LESSOR hereby gives the LESSEE under this Contract of Lease the
right and option to buy the subject house and lot within the said 3-year lease period.
4. That the purchase price or total consideration of the house and lot subject of this Contract of Lease shall, should
the LESSEE exercise his option to buy it on or before the expiration of the 3-year lease period, be fixed or agreed
upon by the LESSOR and the LESSEE, Provided, that the said purchase price, as it is hereby agreed, shall not be
more than ONE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P1,500,000.00) and, provided further, that the
monthly rentals paid by the LESSEE to the LESSOR during the 3-year lease period shall form part of or be
deducted from the purchase price or total consideration as may hereafter be mutually fixed or agreed upon by the
LESSOR and the LESSEE.
5. That if the LESSEE shall give oral or written notice to the LESSOR on or before the expiry date of the 3-year
lease period stipulated herein of his desire to exercise his option to buy or purchase the house and lot herein
leased, the LESSOR upon receipt of the purchase price/total consideration as fixed or agreed upon less the total
amount of monthly rentals paid the LESSEE during the 3-year lease period shall execute the appropriate Deed to
SELL, TRANSFER and CONVEY the house and lot subject of this Contract in favor of the LESSEE, his heirs,
successors and assigns, together with all the fixtures and accessories therein, free from all liens and encumbrances.
Before the expiration of the three-year lease period provided in the lease contract, Enrico exercised his option to purchase
the subject property by communicating verbally and in writing to Luz his willingness to pay the agreed purchase price, but the
spouses Apeles supposedly ignored Enrico’s manifestation. This prompted Enrico to seek recourse from the barangay for the
enforcement of his right to purchase the subject property, but despite several notices, the spouses Apeles failed to appear
before the barangay for settlement proceedings. Hence, thebarangay issued to Enrico a Certificate to File Action.7
In a letter dated 26 January 1997 to Enrico, the spouses Apeles demanded that he pay his rental arrears from January 1991
to December 1996 and he vacate the subject property since it would be needed by the spouses Apeles themselves.
Without heeding the demand of the spouses Apeles, Enrico instituted on 23 February 1999 a Complaint for Specific
Performance with Damages against the spouses Apeles before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-99-36834. Enrico’s
cause of action is founded on paragraph 5 of the Contract of Lease with Option to Purchase vesting him with the right to
acquire ownership of the subject property after paying the agreed amount of consideration.
Following the pre-trial conference, trial on the merits ensued before the RTC.
Enrico himself testified as the sole witness for his side. He narrated that he and Luz entered into the Contract of Lease with
Option to Purchase on 26 January 1987, with Luz signing the said Contract at Enrico’s office in Timog Avenue, Quezon City.
The Contract was notarized on the same day as evidenced by the Certification on the Notary Public’s Report issued by the
Clerk of Court of the RTC of Manila.8
On the other hand, the spouses Apeles denied that Luz signed the Contract of Lease with Option to Purchase, and posited
that Luz’s signature thereon was a forgery. To buttress their contention, the spouses Apeles offered as evidence Luz’s
Philippine Passport which showed that on 26 January 1987, the date when Luz allegedly signed the said Contract, she was
in the United States of America. The spouses Apeles likewise presented several official documents bearing her genuine
signatures to reveal their remarkable discrepancy from the signature appearing in the disputed lease contract. The spouses
Apeles maintained that they did not intend to sell the subject property.9
After the spouses Apeles established by documentary evidence that Luz was not in the country at the time the Contract of
Lease with Option to Purchase was executed, Enrico, in rebuttal, retracted his prior declaration that the said Contract was
signed by Luz on 26 January 1996. Instead, Enrico averred that Luz signed the Contract after she arrived in the Philippines
on 30 May 1987. Enrico further related that after Luz signed the lease contract, she took it with her for notarization, and by
the time the document was returned to him, it was already notarized.10
On 8 October 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision in Civil Case No. Q-99-36834 in favor of Enrico. Since none of the parties
presented a handwriting expert, the RTC relied on its own examination of the specimen signatures submitted to resolve the
issue of forgery. The RTC found striking similarity between Luz’s genuine signatures in the documents presented by the
spouses Apeles themselves and her purportedly forged signature in the Contract of Lease with Option to Purchase. Absent
any finding of forgery, the RTC bound the parties to the clear and unequivocal stipulations they made in the lease contract.
Accordingly, the RTC ordered the spouses Apeles to execute a Deed of Sale in favor of Enrico upon the latter’s payment of
the agreed amount of consideration. Thefallo of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds [Enrico’s] complaint to be substantiated by preponderance of evidence and accordingly
orders –
(1) [The spouses Apeles] to comply with the provisions of the Contract of Lease with Option to Purchase; and upon
payment of total consideration as stipulated in the said CONTRACT for [the spouses Apeles] to execute a Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of [Enrico], over the parcel of land and the improvements existing thereon located at No. 87
Timog Avenue, Quezon City.
(2) [The spouses Apeles] to pay [Enrico] moral and exemplary damages in the respective amounts ofP100,000.00
and P50,000.00.
(3) [The spouses Apeles] to pay attorney’s fees of P50,000.00 and costs of the suit.11
The spouses Apeles challenged the adverse RTC Decision before the Court of Appeals and urged the appellate court to
nullify the assailed Contract of Lease with Option to Purchase since Luz’s signature thereon was clearly a forgery. The
spouses Apeles argued that it was physically impossible for Luz to sign the said Contract on 26 January 1987 since she was
not in the Philippines on that date and returned five months thereafter. The spouses Apeles called attention to Enrico’s
inconsistent declarations as to material details involving the execution of the lease contract, thereby casting doubt on
Enrico’s credibility, as well as on the presumed regularity of the contract as a notarized document.
On 20 December 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 76933 granting the appeal of the
spouses Apeles and overturning the judgment of the RTC. In arriving at its assailed decision, the appellate court noted that
the Notary Public did not observe utmost care in certifying the due execution of the Contract of Lease with Option to
Purchase. The Court of Appeals chose not to accord the disputed Contract full faith and credence. The Court of Appeals
held, thus:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the appealed decision dated October 8, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 215 in Civil Case No. Q-99-36834 for specific performance with damages is hereby REVERSED and
a new is one entered dismissing [Enrico’s] complaint.12
Enrico’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution13 dated 25 April 2005.
Enrico is presently before this Court seeking the reversal of the unfavorable judgment of the Court of Appeals, assigning the
following errors thereto:
I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED (sic) REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT BRUSHED ASIDE THE
RULING OF THE COURT A QUO UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY OF THE CONTRACT OF LEASE WITH
OPTION TO PURCHASE AND IN LIEU THEREOF RULED THAT THE SAID CONTRACT OF LEASE WAS A
FORGERY AND THUS, NULL AND VOID.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED (sic) REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN CONTRARY TO THE
FINDINGS OF THE COURT A QUO IT RULED THAT THE DEFENSE OF FORGERY WAS SUBSTANTIALLY
AND CONVINCINGLY PROVEN BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE.

Simply, Enrico faults the Court of Appeals for disturbing the factual findings of the RTC in disregard of the legal aphorism that
the factual findings of the trial court should be accorded great weight and respect on appeal.
We do not agree.
Enrico’s insistence on the infallibility of the findings of the RTC seriously impairs the discretion of the appellate tribunal to
make independent determination of the merits of the case appealed before it. Certainly, the Court of Appeals cannot swallow
hook, line, and sinker the factual conclusions of the trial court without crippling the very office of review. Although we have
indeed held that the factual findings of the trial courts are to be accorded great weight and respect, they are not absolutely
conclusive upon the appellate court.14
The reliance of appellate tribunals on the factual findings of the trial court is based on the postulate that the latter had
firsthand opportunity to hear the witnesses and to observe their conduct and demeanor during the proceedings. However,
when such findings are not anchored on their credibility and their testimonies, but on the assessment of documents that are
available to appellate magistrates and subject to their scrutiny, reliance on the trial court finds no application.15
Moreover, appeal by writ of error to the Court of Appeals under Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court, the parties may raise
both questions of fact and/or of law. In fact, it is imperative for the Court of Appeals to review the findings of fact made by the
trial court. The Court of Appeals even has the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any
and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction.16
Enrico assiduously prays before this Court to sustain the validity of the Contract of Lease with Option to Purchase. Enrico
asserts that the said Contract was voluntarily entered into and signed by Luz who had it notarized herself. The spouses
Apeles should be obliged to respect the terms of the agreement, and not be allowed to renege on their commitment
thereunder and frustrate the sanctity of contracts.
Again, we are not persuaded. We agree with the Court of Appeals that in ruling out forgery, the RTC heavily relied on the
testimony proffered by Enrico during the trial, ignoring blatant contradictions that destroy his credibility and the veracity of his
claims. On direct examination, Enrico testified that Luz signed the Contract of Lease with Option to Purchase on 26 January
1987 in his presence,17 but he recanted his testimony on the matter after the spouses Apeles established by clear and
convincing evidence that Luz was not in the Philippines on that date.18 In rebuttal, Enrico made a complete turnabout and
claimed that Luz signed the Contract in question on 30 May 1987 after her arrival in the country.19 The inconsistencies in
Enrico’s version of events have seriously impaired the probative value of his testimony and cast serious doubt on his
credibility. His contradictory statements on important details simply eroded the integrity of his testimony.
While it is true that a notarized document carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution,
and has in its favor the presumption of regularity, this presumption, however, is not absolute. It may be rebutted by clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary.20 Enrico himself admitted that Luz took the document and had it notarized without his
presence. Such fact alone overcomes the presumption of regularity since a notary public is enjoined not to notarize a
document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared
before the said notary public to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein.
Although there is no direct evidence to prove forgery, preponderance of evidence inarguably favors the spouses Apeles. In
civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. Preponderance of
evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be
synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence." Preponderance of
evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the
court as worthier of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.21 In the case at bar, the spouses Apeles were able
to overcome the burden of proof and prove by preponderant evidence in disputing the authenticity and due execution of the
Contract of Lease with Option to Purchase. In contrast, Enrico seemed to rely only on his own self-serving declarations,
without asserting any proof of corroborating testimony or circumstantial evidence to buttress his claim.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that we agree with Enrico that Luz voluntarily entered into the Contract of Lease
with Option to Purchase and personally affixed her signature to the said document, the provision on the option to purchase
the subject property incorporated in said Contract still remains unenforceable.
There is no dispute that what Enrico sought to enforce in Civil Case No. Q-99-36834 was his purported right to acquire
ownership of the subject property in the exercise of his option to purchase the same under the Contract of Lease with Option
to Purchase. He ultimately wants to compel the spouses Apeles to already execute the Deed of Sale over the subject
property in his favor.
An option is a contract by which the owner of the property agrees with another person that the latter shall have the right to
buy the former’s property at a fixed price within a certain time. It is a condition offered or contract by which the owner
stipulates with another that the latter shall have the right to buy the property at a fixed price within a certain time, or under, or
in compliance with certain terms and conditions; or which gives to the owner of the property the right to sell or demand a
sale.22 An option is not of itself a purchase, but merely secures the privilege to buy. It is not a sale of property but a sale of
the right to purchase. It is simply a contract by which the owner of the property agrees with another person that he shall have
the right to buy his property at a fixed price within a certain time. He does not sell his land; he does not then agree to sell it;
but he does sell something, i.e., the right or privilege to buy at the election or option of the other party. Its distinguishing
characteristic is that it imposes no binding obligation on the person holding the option, aside from the consideration for the
offer.23
It is also sometimes called an "unaccepted offer" and is sanctioned by Article 1479 of the Civil Code:
Art. 1479. A promise to buy and sell a determinate thing for a price certain is reciprocally demandable.
An accepted unilateral promise to buy or to sell a determinate thing for a price certain is binding upon the promissor if the
promise is supported by a consideration distinct from the price.
The second paragraph of Article 1479 provides for the definition and consequent rights and obligations under an option
contract. For an option contract to be valid and enforceable against the promissor, there must be a separate and distinct
consideration that supports it.24
In the landmark case of Southwestern Sugar and Molasses Company v. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co.,25 we declared that for
an option contract to bind the promissor, it must be supported by consideration:
There is no question that under Article 1479 of the new Civil Code "an option to sell," or "a promise to buy or to sell," as used
in said article, to be valid must be "supported by a consideration distinct from the price." This is clearly inferred from the
context of said article that a unilateral promise to buy or to sell, even if accepted, is only binding if supported by a
consideration. In other words, "an accepted unilateral promise" can only have a binding effect if supported by a
consideration, which means that the option can still be withdrawn, even if accepted, if the same is not supported by
any consideration. Here it is not disputed that the option is without consideration. It can therefore be withdrawn
notwithstanding the acceptance made of it by appellee. (Emphasis supplied.)
The doctrine requiring the payment of consideration in an option contract enunciated in Southwestern Sugar is resonated in
subsequent cases and remains controlling to this day. Without consideration that is separate and distinct from the purchase
price, an option contract cannot be enforced; that holds true even if the unilateral promise is already accepted by the
optionee.
The consideration is "the why of the contracts, the essential reason which moves the contracting parties to enter into the
contract." This definition illustrates that the consideration contemplated to support an option contract need not be monetary.
Actual cash need not be exchanged for the option. However, by the very nature of an option contract, as defined in Article
1479, the same is an onerous contract for which the consideration must be something of value, although its kind may vary.26
We have painstakingly examined the Contract of Lease with Option to Purchase, as well as the pleadings submitted by the
parties, and their testimonies in open court, for any direct evidence or evidence aliunde to prove the existence of
consideration for the option contract, but we have found none. The only consideration agreed upon by the parties in the said
Contract is the supposed purchase price for the subject property in the amount not exceeding P1.5 Million, which could not
be deemed to be the same consideration for the option contract since the law and jurisprudence explicitly dictate that for the
option contract to be valid, it must be supported by a consideration separate and distinct from the price.
In Bible Baptist Church v. Court of Appeals,27 we stressed that an option contract needs to be supported by a separate
consideration. The consideration need not be monetary but could consist of other things or undertakings. However, if the
consideration is not monetary, these must be things or undertakings of value, in view of the onerous nature of the option
contract. Furthermore, when a consideration for an option contract is not monetary, said consideration must be clearly
specified as such in the option contract or clause.
In the present case, it is indubitable that no consideration was given by Enrico to the spouses Apeles for the option contract.
The absence of monetary or any material consideration keeps this Court from enforcing the rights of the parties under said
option contract.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 20 December 2004 and
Resolution dated 25 April 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76933 are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 183198 November 25, 2009
LUZ PALANCA TAN, Petitioner, vs.JAM TRANSIT, INC., Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of the Decision2 dated
June 2, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 89046 and the reinstatement of the Decision3 dated December
20, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 27, Santa Cruz, Laguna in Civil Case No. SC-3838.
The antecedents are as follows—
In her Complaint, petitioner Luz Palanca Tan (Tan) alleged that she was the owner of a passenger-type jitney with plate
number DKF-168. On March 14, 1997, at around 5:00 a.m., the said jitney figured in an accident at an intersection along
Maharlika Highway, Barangay Bangyas, Calauan, Laguna, as it collided with a JAM Transit passenger bus bound for Manila,
bearing plate number DVG-557 and body number 8030. The bus was driven by Eddie Dimayuga (Dimayuga).
At the time of the collision, Tan’s jitney was loaded with quail eggs and duck eggs (balot and salted eggs). It was driven by
Alexander M. Ramirez (Ramirez). Tan alleged that Dimayuga was reckless, negligent, imprudent, and not observing traffic
rules and regulations, causing the bus to collide with the jitney which was then, with care and proper light direction signals,
about to negotiate a left turn towards the feeder or barangay road of Barangay Bangyas, Calauan, Laguna going to the
Poblacion. The jitney turned turtle along the shoulder of the road and the cargo of eggs was destroyed. Ramirez and his
helper were injured and hospitalized, incurring expenses for medical treatment at the Pagamutang Pangmasa in Bay,
Laguna. Tan prayed for damages in the amount ofP400,000.00 for the damaged jitney, P142,210.00 for the destroyed
shipment, P20,000.00 for moral damages, attorney’s fees of P20,000.00 plus P1,000.00 per court appearance of counsel,
and other reliefs warranted under the premises.
In its Answer with Counterclaim, respondent JAM Transit, Inc. (JAM) admitted ownership of the subject passenger bus and
that Dimayuga was under its employ. However, it denied the allegations in the Complaint, and claimed that the accident
occurred due to the gross negligence of
Ramirez. As counterclaim, JAM sought payment of P100,000.00 for the damages sustained by the bus,P100,000.00 for loss
of income, and P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees plus P3,000.00 per court appearance of counsel.
After pretrial, trial on the merits ensued.
Tan proffered testimonial evidence, summarized by the RTC, and quoted by the CA, as follows:
LUZ PALANCA TAN, 47 years old, married, a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna and a businesswoman, testified to the facts
stated in the complaint that: She is engaged in the business of nets and ropes, and egg dealership based [in] Santa Cruz,
Laguna. She supplies her products to her customers [in] San Pablo and Lucena. On March 14, 1997, while at home, she was
informed by her husband that one of their jeepneys, which was loaded with eggs, was bumped by a JAM Transit bus when
the latter overtook the jeepney. The vehicle was driven by one Alexander Ramirez, who has one "Monching" as a companion.
As a result of the accident, she incurred damages in the amount of P650,000.00 based on the following
computation: P400,000.00 as actual damage sustained by the jeepney, from an estimate (Exhibit "D") furnished by Plantilla
Motors; P142,000.00 for the lost value of the egg shipment, based on a certification issued by the Calauan Police Station;
and P15,000.00, for the hospitalization and treatment of the driver and his companion. The jeepney is duly registered as
evidenced by its registration receipt (Exhibit "G"). On cross examination, she testified that Ramirez, the jeepney driver when
the accident occurred, was under her employ since 1993 and is still working for her.
On redirect, the plaintiff testified that prior to March 13, 1997, the day the accident happened, Ramirez has not met any
vehicular accident and that it was only in the aforestated date when he figured in one. On re-cross, she testified that she has
no knowledge of Ramirez’ prior experience as a driver. She did not ask Ramirez for his NBI or police clearance prior to her
hiring the said driver. On additional redirect, the plaintiff testified that she is satisfied with the performance of Ramirez as a
driver as he is kind.
ALEXANDER RAMIREZ, 35 years old, married, resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, and a driver testified that: He knows the
plaintiff Luz Palanca Tan because she is his manager. He worked for her as a driver sometime in 1993. He sometimes drove
a jeepney or a truck.
On March 13, 1997, at around 4:00 o’clock in the morning, he reported for work at his employer’s warehouse located [in]
Pagsawitan, Sta. Cruz. He got the passenger jeep loaded with salted eggs, "balot" and quail eggs for delivery to Lucena City
upon instruction of Tan. In going to Lucena City, he chose to drive on the Maharlika Road at San Isidro, Brgy. Bangyas,
Calauan, Laguna because it is better than the road along Brgy. Dayap of the same municipality. However, while at the
Maharlika Road, he met an accident at around 5:00 a.m. The jitney turned turtle.
PO3 DANIEL C. ESCARES, 37 years old, married, resident of Calauan, Laguna, and a member of PNP-Calauan, Laguna,
testified that: He was on police duty as of March 14, 1997. On that day, he issued a certification (Exhibit "B") pertaining to a
vehicular accident which occurred earlier. He came to know of the accident as relayed to their office by a concerned citizen.
He proceeded to the place of the accident, which was at Maharlika Highway, in an intersection at Brgy. Bangyas, Calauan,
Laguna for an investigation. Upon reaching the place, as a rule followed by police officers, he inquired from some of the
residents about the incident. As relayed to him, the jeepney with Plate No. 168 was going towards the direction of San Isidro,
followed by another jeepney, a truck and then by a JAM Transit bus. The bus overtook the jeepney it was following then side
swept the jeepney (which figured in the accident) dragging it along ("nakaladkad") towards the sampaguita gardens. [NOTE:
The testimony of the witness regarding the information gathered was ordered by the Court to be deleted.] Then, he went
personally to the place where the incident happened.
He stated it was cloudy that day. He described the highway where the incident happened as having a double straight yellow
line which prohibits overtaking on both sides of the road. The said place is near the intersection of Maharlika Highway and
the barangay road leading to Brgy. San Isidro.
On cross examination, he stated he cannot remember if he was with other police officers during the investigation of the
incident but he can recall having interviewed a certain Mercy Ponteiros and one Rodel, who are both residents of the place.
On redirect, he stated that the witness Mercy Ponteiros is still residing at Brgy. Bangyas[.]
On additional direct examination, he stated that the accident site is still fresh in his mind and he drew a sketch (Exhibit "F" to
"F-7") of the said place. He identified in the sketch the direction of the highway which leads to Manila and to Sta. Cruz,
Laguna. The road, per his approximation, was about 10 meters wide, with the shoulder about 5 meters except that it was
diminished to about 2 meters on account of some encroachment. The highway has a painted crosswalk. It also has a yellow
line without any cut which means no vehicle could overtake from both sides of the road. He showed in the sketch the spot
where the jitney and the bus were at the time of the incident. Shown the photographs (Exhibits "E" to "E-6"), he stated that
they are truly reflective of the scene of the incident, the damages in both the jeepney and the bus, as of March 13, 1997.
On cross, he stated that what he saw was the situation after the incident. He came to learn of the accident at around 5:10 in
the morning from a report received by their office, as relayed by a concerned citizen. He remembers that SPO4 Rogelio
Medina, now retired, as one of his companions at the accident site. The site is about a kilometer away from their police
station. He can recall the scene of the incident because of the photographs. The persons he investigated were the jitney
driver, his "pahinante" (helper) and some people in the vicinity. He could not remember the names of those persons but they
were listed in the police blotter.
RODRIGO CONDINO, 38 years old, married, resident of Victoria, Laguna and a mechanic, testified that: He is a mechanic of
Plantilla Motors at Bubucal, Sta. Cruz, Laguna. He knows the plaintiff Luz Tan as he and his chief (mechanic) repaired the
jeepney owned by the latter after it figured in an accident on March 13, 1997. He came to know of the accident when the said
vehicle was brought to their motor shop. They made an estimate (Exhibit "D") of the damage sustained by the said vehicle,
which amounted to P450,000.00.4
Tan also formally offered as exhibits the following documents:
Exhibit "A" - Articles of Incorporation of JAM Transit, Inc.;
Exhibit "B" - Certification issued by the Calauan Municipal Police Station regarding the vehicular accident;
Exhibit "C" - PNP-Calauan Police Report regarding the jitney shipment;
Exhibit "D" - Estimate of damages sustained by the jitney, from A. Plantilla Motors Repair Shop;
Exhibit "E" - Six (6) photographs depicting the site of the vehicular accident;
Exhibit "F" - Four (4) pages of receipts representing hospital and medical expenses paid by the plaintiff for injuries
sustained by her driver and helper in the accident;
Exhibit "G" - Certificate of Registration of plaintiff’s jitney;
Exhibit "H" - Driver’s license of Eddie Dimayuga, defendant’s bus driver;
Exhibit "I" - Sketch of the site where the vehicular accident occurred.5
On the other hand, JAM offered the following testimonial evidence –
EDGARDO DIMAYUGA, 49 years old, married, resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna and bus driver of JAM Transit Inc., testified
that: He has been a passenger bus driver since 1983. He was previously employed with the Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus
Company (BLTB). He was employed with JAM Transit since 1992. He has a professional driver’s license, D-12-78-
008462562.
On March 14, 1997, he reported for work. He met an accident while driving a bus. The other vehicle involved, a jitney,
belongs to Luz Palanca Tan and driven by Alexander Ramirez. The accident happened along the intersection of Maharlika
Highway, Brgy. Bangyas at around 5:00 o’clock in the morning. He was driving the bus with a speed of 40 km/h when
suddenly, a vehicle overtook the bus from the right side going to Calauan. He was not able to evade the vehicle as there was
no way for him to do so. The front portion of the bus and the mirror were destroyed.
On cross examination, he stated that his route as of March 14, 1997 was Sta. Cruz-Lawton. He cannot recall the bus
conductor who was on Bangyas, Calauan. He stated he was not able to evade the jitney as there was no way for him to
avoid the situation, causing the jitney to be dragged to the side. Nothing else happened after the bus hit the jeepney. He and
other persons took the driver from the jeepney and brought him to a hospital.
On redirect, he stated that bus conductors change duties every two or three days.6
JAM did not offer any documentary counter-evidence.
Applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the RTC found the JAM passenger bus driver at fault as he was then violating a
traffic regulation when the collision took place. Thus, the RTC ruled in favor of Tan and disposed as follows—
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered against the defendants who are hereby adjudged to pay the plaintiff jointly and
solidarily, the following:
1. actual damages of P142,210.00 for the lost and damaged cargoes; P400,000.00 for the destroyed
jitney;P1,327.00 medical expenses of the jitney driver and his companion, for a total amount of [P543,537.00];
2. P10,000.00 as moral damages;
3. P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees[;]
4. Costs of suit[.]
SO ORDERED.7
Aggrieved, JAM appealed to the CA. The CA granted the appeal and dismissed the complaint on the ground that there was
nothing on record that supported the RTC’s finding that the JAM passenger bus was overtaking Tan’s jitney. The CA noted
that Ramirez only testified that, on March 14, 1997, he met an accident at around 5:00 a.m., while transporting eggs along
Maharlika Road in San Isidro, Barangay Bangyas, Calauan, Laguna, causing the jitney he was driving to turn turtle. The CA
also observed that the Certification (Exhibit "B") made no mention that the JAM passenger bus was overspeeding or that it
was overtaking the jitney; and, thus, there was no evidence as to who between Ramirez and Dimayuga was negligent in
connection with the vehicular accident. The CA held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can only be invoked when direct
evidence is nonexistent or not accessible. It further said that Tan had access to direct evidence as to the precise cause of the
mishap, such that the circumstances of the vehicular accident or the specific act constituting the supposed negligence of
Dimayuga could have been testified to by Ramirez or by the latter’s companion. The CA concluded that res ipsa loquitur
could not apply in this case because the doctrine does not dispense with the requirement of establishing proof of negligence.
Hence, this petition, with petitioner positing that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable given the circumstances of the
case.
Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase that literally means "the thing or the transaction speaks for itself." It is a maxim for the rule
that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a
presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff’s prima facie case, and present a question of fact for defendant to meet
with an explanation. Where the thing that caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the
defendant or his servants; and the accident, in the ordinary course of things, would not happen if those who had
management or control used proper care, it affords reasonable evidence -- in the absence of a sufficient, reasonable and
logical explanation by defendant -- that the accident arose from or was caused by the defendant’s want of care. This rule is
grounded on the superior logic of ordinary human experience, and it is on the basis of such experience or common
knowledge that negligence may be deduced from the mere occurrence of the accident itself. Hence, the rule is applied in
conjunction with the doctrine of common knowledge.8
However, res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law and does not constitute an independent or separate ground for
liability. Instead, it is considered as merely evidentiary, a mode of proof, or a mere procedural convenience, since it furnishes
a substitute for, and relieves a plaintiff of, the burden of producing a specific proof of negligence. In other words, mere
invocation and application of the doctrine do not dispense with the requirement of proof of negligence. It is simply a step in
the process of such proof, permitting plaintiff to present, along with the proof of the accident, enough of the attending
circumstances to invoke the doctrine, creating an inference or presumption of negligence, and thereby placing on defendant
the burden of going forward with the proof.9 Still, before resort to the doctrine may be allowed, the following requisites must
be satisfactorily shown:
1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence;
2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants; and
3. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated.10
Was petitioner able to establish the above requisites? We answer in the affirmative. We do not subscribe to the finding of the
CA that petitioner had direct access to the evidence surrounding the accident, but since she failed to present it, the doctrine
would not operate to apply. While Ramirez took the witness stand, he was only able to testify that he drove along Maharlika
Highway in San Isidro, Barangay Bangyas, Calauan, Laguna, Tan’s passenger jitney loaded with salted eggs, balot and quail
eggs for delivery at around 5:00 a.m. when he met an accident, causing the vehicle to turn turtle. Obviously, Ramirez had no
vivid recollection of how the passenger jitney was actually hit by the JAM passenger bus. Further, for some unknown
reasons, the other possible eyewitnesses to the mishap were not available to testify. With the dearth of testimonial or direct
evidence, should petitioner now be left without remedy? The answer is NO.
We cannot agree with the CA when it said that how the incident happened could not be established, neither from the
photographs offered in evidence in favor of petitioner, nor from the Certification11 that quoted an excerpt from the records on
the Police Blotter of the Calauan Municipal Police Station. The CA, likewise, discounted the probative value of the Police
Blotter because, although prepared in the regular performance of official duty, it was not conclusive proof of the truth of its
entries, since police blotters are usually incomplete and inaccurate; and sometimes based on partial suggestion, inaccurate
reporting and hearsay.12
It is worth noting, however, that photographs are in the nature of physical evidence13 -- a mute but eloquent manifestation of
truth ranking high in the hierarchy of trustworthy evidence.14 When duly verified and shown by extrinsic evidence to be
faithful representations of the subject as of the time in question, they are, in the discretion of the trial court, admissible in
evidence as aids in arriving at an understanding of the evidence, the situation or condition of objects or premises, or the
circumstances of an accident.15
The photographs16 proffered by petitioner indeed depicted the relative positions of her jitney and of the JAM passenger bus
immediately after the accident took place. An examination of the photographs would readily show that the highway where the
accident occurred was marked by two yellow continuous parallel lines at the center, separating the right lane from the left.
Based on evidence, the JAM passenger bus was moving along the highway towards Manila, and the jitney was going along
the same route, until it was about to turn left to the barangay road towards the Poblacion. After the incident, the photographs
would show that both vehicles were found on the opposite lane of the highway. The front right portion of the bus was shown
to have collided with or hit the left portion of the jitney with such an impact, causing the latter to turn turtle with extensive
damage, injuring its driver and his companion, and completely destroying its cargo.17
Although the person who took the pictures was not able to testify because he predeceased the trial, Senior Police Officer II
Daniel Escares (Escares) was recalled to the witness stand to authenticate the said pictures. He testified that the pictures
were faithful representations of the circumstances immediately after the accident.18 Escares also made an appropriately
labeled sketch19 of the situation after the collision, and testified as to the physical circumstances thereof, including the width
of the road and the road shoulder, especially the double yellow lines at the center of the highway.20
As regards police blotters, it should be remembered that although they are of little probative value, they are nevertheless
admitted and considered in the absence of competent evidence to refute the facts stated therein. Entries in police records
made by a police officer in the performance of a duty especially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated, and their probative value may be either substantiated or nullified by other competent evidence.21 In this case, the
Certification,22 whose entries were adopted from the police blotter of the Calauan Municipal Police Station, the
sketch23 prepared by Escares, and the photographs, taken together would prove that the jitney and the bus were going
along the same way; that the jitney was about to negotiate the intersection going to the left towards the feeder road in the
direction of the Poblacion; and that the bus hit the left-turning jitney causing the smaller vehicle to turn turtle.
Indeed, no two motor vehicles traversing the same lane of a highway with double yellow center lines will collide as a matter of
course, both ending up on the opposite lane, unless someone is negligent. Dimayuga was driving the JAM passenger bus
which, from the evidence adduced, appears to have precipitated the collision with petitioner’s jitney. Driving the bus gave
Dimayuga exclusive management and control over it. Despite the claim of JAM to the contrary, no contributory negligence
could be attributed to Ramirez relative to the incident on the basis of the available evidence. Inevitably, the requisites being
present, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies.
We, thus, quote with concurrence the findings of the RTC—
As both parties are asserting claim for the damages each has respectively sustained from the subject collision, the
negligence of either driver of the bus or of the jitney must be shown, and the burden to prove the negligence, by
preponderance of evidence, lies upon both who are alleging the other’s negligence. Preponderance of evidence is "evidence
as a whole which is superior to that of the defendant {or the other}" [Pacific Banking Employees Organization vs. CA, 286
SCRA 495].
To prove negligence of the bus driver, plaintiff relies heavily upon the testimony of PO3 DANIEL C. ESCARES, who identified
the police report of the incident [Exhibit "B"] as well as the sketch of the site [Exhibit "I"] and the pictures taken as reflective of
the scene of the incident [Exhibits "E" with sub-markings], invoking [in plaintiff’s memorandum] the application of the doctrine
of "res ipsa loquitor."
From the said exhibits, the plaintiff postulates that her jitney then being driven by Alexander Ramirez, as well as the bus
driven by defendant Dimayuga were heading the same direction towards Manila, but when the jitney was about to negotiate
the left side road intersection towards the feeder/Barangay road of Brgy. Bangyas, Calauan, Laguna, it was bumped by the
oncoming/overtaking bus driven by Dimayuga, that caused the jitney to turn turtle at the road shoulder causing damages on
the jitney, the cargoes and injuries to the jitney driver and his companion. It was allegedly improper for the bus to overtake as
the road bears a double yellow line at the middle which prohibits overtaking.
On the other hand, the bus driver who is the lone witness/evidence for the defendant testified he was driving at the Maharlika
Highway at 40 km/hr when the jitney "overtook" from the right and that there was no way for him to evade the latter so it was
dragged to the side [TSN, May 18, 2006, p. 13]. In its memorandum, defendants postulate that it was the jitney driver who
was negligent as it overtook the bus from the right which is not proper. Plaintiff allegedly could not claim damages for its
failure to prove the bus driver’s negligence, and it was the jitney’s own negligence that is the proximate cause of his injury.
No direct evidence was presented with respect to the exact road position of the bus and the jitney at the time of the collision
such that the same can only be inferred from the pictures of the colliding vehicles taken immediately after the incident
[Exhibits "E"].
At this juncture, it was established from exhibits "E-5" and "E-6" that the jitney’s left side portion was directly hit by the front-
right portion of the bus. This is consistent with the plaintiff’s theory that the jitney was then negotiating the left portion of the
road when it was hit by the oncoming bus causing the jitney to have a 90-degree turn around. The bus and the jitney were
almost perpendicular to each other when the collision took place, with the bus directly hitting the jitney head on.
The statement of the bus driver that the jitney "overtook" from the right only presumes that at the point of collision, the bus
was at the left lane of the road overtaking the vehicle/s at the right. This scenario, in fact, was affirmed by the police report of
the incident [Exhibit "B"]. It is not quite logical that the jitney, in allegedly overtaking the bus from the right came from the right
shoulder of the road, a rough road merely 5 meters in width [Exhibit "F"] and even diminished by two (2) meters because of
the encroachment at the sides [TSN, 11-6-02]. No evidence was shown that the jitney came from the right shoulder. The
jitney then loaded with eggs for delivery, was about to negotiate the left lane towards the feeder/barangay road intersection,
and it would be illogical in such a situation that the jitney driver would take the right shoulder. The foregoing suggest the fact
that the bus overtook the passing vehicles at the right lane and in the course thereof, the jitney in front that was about to
negotiate the left lane, was hit.24
Verily, although there was no direct evidence that the JAM passenger bus was overtaking the vehicles running along the right
lane of the highway from the left lane, the available evidence readily points to such fact. There were two continuous yellow
lines at the center of the highway, which meant that no vehicle in the said area should overtake another on either side of the
road. The "double yellow center lines" regulation, which this Court takes judicial notice of as an internationally recognized
pavement regulation, was precisely intended to avoid accidents along highways, such as what happened in this case. This
prohibition finds support in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4136 (Land Transportation and Traffic Code), Section
41(e).25 Furthermore, it is observed that the area of collision was an intersection. Section 41(c)26 of R.A. No. 4136, likewise,
prohibits overtaking or passing any other vehicle proceeding in the same direction at any intersection of highways, among
others. Thus, by overtaking on the left lane, Dimayuga was not only violating the "double yellow center lines" regulation, but
also the prohibition on overtaking at highway intersections. Consequently, negligence can be attributed only to him, which
negligence was the proximate cause of the injury sustained by petitioner. This prima facie finding of negligence was not
sufficiently rebutted or contradicted by Dimayuga. Therefore, a finding that he is liable for damages to petitioner is
warranted.1avvphi1
The liability of Dimayuga is solidary with JAM, pursuant to Article 2176, in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, which provides—
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-
delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those
of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
xxxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
Whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption juris tantum
that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the section (culpa in eligiendo) or supervision (culpa in
vigilando) of its employees.27 To avoid liability for a quasi-delict committed by its employee, an employer must overcome the
presumption, by presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of his employee.28
In this case, aside from the testimony of Dimayuga, JAM did not present any other evidence, whether documentary or
testimonial, in its favor. Inevitably, the presumption of its negligence as Dimayuga’s employer stands and it is, thus, solidarily
liable for the damages sustained by petitioner.
As regards the award for actual damages, we, however, concur with respondent that the award of P400,000.00 for the
damage to the jitney is not warranted, considering that the evidence submitted to support this claim was merely an estimate
made by A. Plantilla Motors. The same reason holds true with respect to the amount of damages for the destroyed cargo of
eggs, considering that the document submitted by petitioner to support the claim ofP142,210.00 was merely a
Certification,29 as the information found thereon was supplied by petitioner herself per the number of pieces of the different
eggs and the corresponding price per piece.
To warrant an award of actual or compensatory damages for repair to damage sustained, the best evidence should be the
receipts or other documentary proofs of the actual amount expended.30 However, considering that it was duly proven that
the jitney was damaged and had to be repaired, as it was repaired, and that the cargo of eggs was indeed destroyed, but the
actual amounts expended or lost were not proven, we deem it appropriate to award P250,000.00 by way of temperate
damages. Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered when pecuniary loss has been
suffered but its amount cannot be proved with certainty.31 We, however, sustain the trial court’s award of P1,327.00 as
regards the medical expenses incurred by petitioner, the same being duly supported by receipts.32
The award of P10,000.00 as moral damages, P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees, and the costs of suit are sustained, the same
being in order and authorized by law. Although the basis for the award of attorney’s fees was not indicated in the trial court’s
Decision, we deem it justified as petitioner was compelled to litigate before the courts and incur expenses in order to
vindicate her rights under the premises.33
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 2, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
89046 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated December 20, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Sta.
Cruz, Laguna in Civil Case No. SC-3838 is REINSTATED with the MODIFICATION that the award of actual damages is
reduced to P1,327.00, and, in lieu of actual damages with respect to the damage or loss sustained with respect to the
passenger jitney and the cargo of eggs, the amount of P250,000.00 is awarded by way of temperate damages.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice