Matthew Mo

The University of Chicago

April 25, 2011
mom@uchicago.edu
Power, Identity, Resistance—Section 18

Nietzsche & Foucault—The Systems of Power, Knowledge, and Power/Knowledge

Prompt: For Nietzsche and Foucault, which came first—power or knowledge?

For Nietzsche and Foucault, neither power nor knowledge came first; instead, power and

knowledge are separate but mutually dependent forces that build upon each other to create the

hierarchy and social norms that exist in modern society. Nietzsche and Foucault both believe that

having knowledge about a subject gives one power over him/her, and those in power often exert

their power by documenting or “knowing” the individual. Therefore, the tools we use to “know”

anything are seen as an exercise of power, yet at the same time, knowledge is also a means to

acquire power. In order to show that power and knowledge are separate but dependent on each

other, it is important to first establish that the acquisition of power, rather than truth, is the

fundamental basis of human activity; we then must analyze the reciprocal relationship between

power and knowledge. Finally, we will examine how power and knowledge work together as a

coordinated system to illustrate the struggle between social categories for Nietzsche, and the

creation of a homogeneous social body for Foucault.

For Nietzsche, the instinctual desire for power is the prime factor that motivates all the

activities of life: “A living thing desires above all to vent its strength – life as such is will to

power” (Beyond Good and Evil, §13). The will as the desire for power is the principle of reality.

Intellect, reason, and knowledge are all instruments of the will to attain power. Nietzsche

observes that everything in the world has a tendency to try to overcome others, to gain

superiority over everyone else, to vanquish or rule the whole world of beings. Nietzsche has a
problem with the will-to-truth as the basic instinct of all beings because he believes it to be

derived from the more fundamental will-to-power. The will-to-truth, Nietzsche argues, is our

attempt to understand the world by imposing our structures and explanations onto nature as

“truths”, which can be broken down to our instinctual need to manifest power over nature; to

immerse ourselves in the belief that we can understand the world. Similarly, Foucault explains

the acquisition of power as fundamental to human nature through the lens of punishment and

penality: “the body now serves as an instrument or intermediary: if one intervenes upon it to

imprison it, or to make it work, it is in order to deprive the individual of a liberty that is regarded

both as a right and as property” (Foucault, 11). The action of punishment, therefore, agrees with

the Nietzsche’s observation that everything in the world is a struggle for domination and

supremacy. Therefore, the will-to-power, Nietzsche and Foucault both assert, is universally

inherent in all human beings.

Nietzsche uses the genealogical method as his method of analysis of the origin of our

moral prejudices. From that, Nietzsche examines how humans have arrived at their assessment of

good/bad and good/evil by differentiating between those who use the terms good/bad and those

who use the terms good/evil; the former he defines as “master morality”, while the latter he

defines as “slave morality”. “Whereas all noble morality grows out of a triumphant saying ‘yes’

to itself, slave morality says ‘no’ on principle to everything that is ‘outside’, ‘other’, non-self’:

and this ‘no’ is its creative deed” (Nietzsche, 20). The “blond beast”, the term Nietzsche uses to

refer to the nobility, are so proud of their culture, roots and abilities that they “avidly prowl

round for spoil and victory; this hidden centre needs release from time to time” (Nietzsche, 23).

Nietzsche highlights the nobility’s will-to-power in the form of domination over lesser cultures

and races. The master morality, he argues, is life-affirming and prideful; this leads to their initial
development of the idea of “good”; that they themselves are high and noble, which translates to

an idea of “good” morality; anyone who is not part of this noble culture is considered “bad”.

On the other hand, slave morality develops from the powerless; powerlessness, for

Nietzsche, leads to hatred. Through subordination and subjection to the “noble races”, the

oppressed begin to develop a feeling of bitterness and hostility defined by Nietzsche as

ressentiment. Therefore, those who have power are seen by the powerless not only as bad, but

evil. It is important to note that the slave morality of good/evil is a reaction to oppression;

therefore the oppressed tended to villainize their oppressors. This leads to their initial

development of their idea of “evil”; this negative mindset is consequently life-denying rather

than life-affirming.

Genealogical and philological evidence supports Nietzsche’s argument that the “strong”

and “noble” invented the idea of “good” through self-celebration and acknowledgement: “the

judgment ‘good’ does not emanate from those to whom goodness is shown! Instead it has been

‘the good’ themselves, meaning the noble, the mighty, the high-place and the high-minded, who

saw and judged themselves and their actions as good” (Nietzsche, 11). From their fundamental

will-to-power came the domination of other races, and consequently “they first claimed the right

to create values and give these values names: usefulness was none of their concern!” (Nietzsche,

11). On this basis, the creation of categories (good/bad) is derived from the will-to-power; in

addition, the categories we use to “know” anything are seen as an exercise of power. This shows

the reciprocal relationship between power and knowledge; power can be used to create

knowledge, but at the same time, the knowledge that is created is used to reinforce one’s power.

Therefore, according to Nietzsche, knowledge cannot exist without power; and power cannot

continue to exist without knowledge.

 Similarly, Foucault also uses the genealogical method to trace the development of

punishment by examining the different forms of it in the past ages, from public execution (the

“scaffold”) to corrective punishment (the “gentle way”) and finally, to the birth of the prison. He

notices that both the “scaffold” and the “gentle way” required an audience in order to fulfill their

respective functions in society; the audience gained knowledge through an exposed and public

display of power. While the “scaffold” required an audience in order to reinforce the power of

the sovereign and instill fear in the population, the “gentle way” required an audience in order to

show its dual function: not only does it correct the criminal through the practice of good habits, it

also economized punishment so that society benefits through its utility; “it is this inversion of

visibility in the functioning of the disciplines that was to assure the exercise of power even in its

lowest manifestations” (Foucault, 189). Public execution was primarily used as a celebration of

surplus power when the monarch was offended or insulted by a citizen’s actions; societal

knowledge of this power translated to fear and terror. Corrective punishment got rid of this

surplus power, and instead, through the economization of punishment and its exposed nature,

societal knowledge of this power generated widespread approval and reinforcement. These two

forms of punishment illustrate a causal relationship between power and knowledge; while both

are required, they work at different stages in order to create the desired effect, which was

discipline through the subjection to power (public execution) and discipline through requalifying

individuals as “good” subjects of the state (corrective punishment). The prison, in comparison,

incorporates both power and knowledge at the same stage, causing power and knowledge to be

mutually dependent to create the desired effect—that of self-induced discipline.

The afore-mentioned forms of punishment are different from the prison in the sense that

the prison does not require an audience; rather, the prison is private and hidden from society. The
disappearance of an audience however, gives rise to surveillance. In surveillance, rather than

requiring society to witness one’s ramifications of committing a crime to produce a substantial

effect, one only needs to give the criminal a sense that he/she is being watched. Foucault

exemplifies this assertion with Bentham’s concept of the Panopticon: “he is seen, but he does not

see; he is the object of information, never a subject in communication” (Foucault, 200). Through

the Panopticon, Foucault effectively establishes the function of power and knowledge together as

a system to control and discipline the criminal—since inmates never know whether they are

being observed, they must act as if they are always objects of observation. As a result, control is

achieved more by the internal monitoring of those controlled than by heavy physical

constraints—he/she is instilled with “a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures

the automatic functioning of power” (Foucault, 102). Foucault argues that the increase in

surveillance through the ages has allowed external authority to train individuals to control

themselves; by making people aware that they are being watched, there is power and control over

the surveyed population. On Foucault’s account, the relation of power and knowledge are tightly

knit together; he believes that the two ideas exist quite independently, but also that the goals of

power and the goals of knowledge cannot be separated—in knowing, we control; and in

controlling, we know: “power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power

relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does

not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations” (Foucault, 27).

Nietzsche and Foucault both further their arguments by exploring the deeper connection

between power and knowledge in a social context. Nietzsche propounds the theory that life is

perpetuated as a constant struggle between social categories through different means of the

acquisition of power and knowledge; he uses the Jews as an example of slave morality; that it
was the Jews who brought about this reversal of the life-affirming mindset of master morality;

they asserted, through hatred of their oppressors, that “only those who suffer are good, only the

poor, the powerless, the lowly are good…whereas you rich, the noble and powerful, you are

eternally wicked” (Nietzsche, 17). Nietzsche argues that Christianity became the “heir” to this

revaluation, and therefore “the slaves’ revolt in morality begins with the Jews” and ends with

Christian morals, a long-term “victory” for the slave morality (Nietzsche, 18). We see here that

“slaves”, or the powerless, gained power by imposing their system of categories on society.

Therefore, the imposition of categories is part of an acquisition of power. The slaves’ radical

reaction to master morality is a prime example of how power and knowledge are used together in

the contest for social hegemony and control.

Foucault expands his argument to the system of power and knowledge by linking the two

together to create the concept of power/knowledge, where “knowledge follows the advances of

power, discovering new objects of knowledge over all the surfaces on which power is exercised”

(Foucault, 204). Knowledge, linked to power, not only assumes the authority of the truth, but

also has the power to make itself true. All knowledge, once applied in the real world, has effects,

and in that sense becomes the truth. Control of the truth, therefore, stems from a systematic

application of power and knowledge, or power/knowledge, to create, control, and induce

discipline. Therefore, those in control can formulate categories, averages, and norms that are in

turn the foundation for the development of power/knowledge. Discourse, information, and

knowledge is created and perpetuated by those who have the power and means of

communication; i.e., those who are in control decide who we are by deciding what we discuss

and what we know. The examination of students in school and/or patients in a hospital is a

method of control that combines hierarchical observation with normalizing judgment. It is a

prime example of what Foucault calls power/knowledge, since it combines into a unified whole

“the deployment of force and the establishment of truth”; it both elicits the truth about those who

undergo the examination by telling us what they know or what is the state of their health and

controls their behavior by forcing them to study or directing them to a course of treatment

(Foucault, 184). The examination turns the individual into a “case”—in both senses of the term:

as a scientific example and as an object of care; where caring is always also an opportunity for

control.

Foucault also introduces the concept of delinquency as a product of the carceral system to

show (through a different perspective) the effect of power/knowledge in society. These

criminals, who commit petty crimes and lead a disorganized life, are sent to prison and come out

as delinquents who offer uses to society and specifically the ruling class. Delinquency, as a form

of illegality, becomes a means by which to categorize on behalf of the prison system. For some

reason, the prison system invests in certain practices to create a mechanism of delinquent

production. Foucault gives three reasons for this: first, by defining and controlling a criminal

element, a more supervisable, manipulable group diffuses the possibility for more disruptive

illegalities; power/knowledge here serves as a means of criminal control (Foucault, 278).

Second, delinquency can be used as a form of domestic colonialism, i.e. reaping the profits of

prostitution and other illegalities (Foucault, 279). Third, the surveillance and documentation of

organized crime and parts of society is made possible through the use of delinquents as “thugs”

or political informants (Foucault, 280). This collaborative nature between the delinquent and the

police is very similar to that of power and knowledge—the police, who have the power, have no

means of exercising it without a certain grasp of knowledge that is needed; the delinquent helps

the police to attain this knowledge by receiving a subtle amount of power from the police to gain
information for them; “this delinquency, with its specificity, is a result of the system; but it also

becomes a part and an instrument of it…(police—prison—delinquency) support one another and

form a circuit that is never interrupted” (Foucault, 292). Ultimately, through categorization and

the manipulation of criminals, Foucault exemplifies the social functions brought out by power

and knowledge.

Foucault offers another example for the function of power/knowledge as a means of

homogenizing society and normalizing outliers. The 13-year old boy, who lives the life of

vagabondage, is tried and sentenced to two year in a reformatory (Foucault, 291). This 13-year

old boy, Foucault argues, is sentenced to a reformatory simply because he does not comply with

the social norms of the bourgeoisie. The judge speaks to the boy as if there was something wrong

with him; the judge does not accept his answers, and instead, attempts to correct and normalize

him by sentencing him to a reformatory. This parallels Nietzsche’s idea of master morality—the

master, being the bourgeoisie, is the ruling class and therefore asserts that they are good; the

imposition of their lifestyle as the social norm relates to this idea of a life-affirming morality.

The 13-year old boy, by disobeying this social norm imposed by the bourgeoisie, is declared to

be “bad” because he does not conform. The judge therefore exerted bourgeois power by

“treating” and “disciplining” him. The power of the judge only existed because the bourgeoisie

controlled the domains of knowledge by establishing their lifestyle as the social norm and as the

right way to live: “in short, one should have a master, be caught up and situated in a hierarchy;

one exists only when fixed in definite relations of domination” (Foucault, 291). Through the

analysis of a delinquent case, Foucault attributes the function of power/knowledge in society as

part of a wider system of discipline and social homogeneity to class conflict and the rise of the

bourgeoisie.
 Both Nietzsche and Foucault analyze systems of power and the genealogy of power

relations and come to the same conclusions that neither power nor knowledge was prioritized,

but that both are inextricably linked in the development of society. Both power and knowledge

are observed to have explicit results on individuals and groups of people; but power and

knowledge can also serve to give rise to struggles between social categories as well as complex

social functions; namely, power and knowledge develop simultaneously and reinforce each other

to create an environment for social strife (Nietzsche) and a system of social control and

homogenization (Foucault).

Works Cited

Foucault, Michel, and Alan Sheridan. Discipline & Punish. New York: Vintage Books, Random
House Inc., 1995. Print.

Nietzsche, Friedrich, and Carol Diethe. On the Genealogy of Morality. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2007. Print.