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STUDII DE FILOSOFIE MORALA, 7 August 2015, 24,23 Doc Final
STUDII DE FILOSOFIE MORALA, 7 August 2015, 24,23 Doc Final
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ
Marcus Aurelius, Gânduri către sine însuşi, Cartea a IX-a, ediţie bilingvă,
Bucureşti, Humanitas, p.263.
,,Orice ar face sau ar spune cineva, eu trebuie să fiu bun, ca şi cum aurul,
smaraldul sau purpura ar spune tot timpul: Orice ar face sau ar spune cineva, eu
trebuie să fiu smarald şi să-mi păstrez culoarea.”
,,Fericirea este un daimon bun sau o viaţă dusă conform daimonului bun....”
Marcus Aurelius, Gânduri către sine însuşi, Cartea a VII-a, ediţie bilingvă,
Bucureşti, Humanitas, p. 209.
”He that is unjust, is also impious. For the nature of the universe, having made all
reasonable creatures one for another, to the end that they should do one another good;
more or less according to the several persons and occasions but in no way hurt one
another: it is manifest that he doth transgress against this her will, is guilty of impiety
towards the most ancient and venerable of all the deities...She is also called Truth and is
the first cause of all truths.”
”Whatsoever any man either doth or saith, thou must be good, as if either gold, or
the emerald, or purple, should ever be saying to themselves: Whatsoever any man
either doth or saith, I must still be an emerald, and I must keep my colour”.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ
STUDII
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FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
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FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 5
Nici o parte din acest volum nu poate fi copiată fără acordul scris al
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Cuprins
CUVÂNT ÎNAINTE..............................................................................................7
FORWARD.............................................................................................................9
CUVÂNT ÎNAINTE
FORWARD
INTRODUCERE:
NEVOIA DE ETICĂ
1
Vladimir Jankelevitch, Curs de filosofie morală, Iaşi, Polirom, 2011, p.45.
2
J.J.Rousseau, Emil ou de l‘éducation, Paris, Edition Lutetia, Tome Premier,
Nelson Editeurs.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 15
10
Frederick Copleston, Istoria filosofiei, vol. I. Grecia şi Roma, Bucureşti, Ed.
2008, p.195.
11
Aristotel, Etica nicomahică, Bucureşti, Ed. Ştiinţifică şi Enciclopedică, 1998, p.7.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 19
aceasta dacă vom pătrunde resorturile adânci ale fiinţei umane, dacă
vom conştientiza imperfecţiunea naturii noastre. De altfel, postulatul
metafizic al imperfecţiunii lumii porneşte de la faptul că noi mai
degrabă judecăm realul în funcţie de ceea ce nu este şi de ceea ce am
dori să fie decât să-l înţelegem aşa cum este. Astfel, Etica lui
Spinoza15 ne îndeamnă să ne transformăm judecata în înţelegere şi
condamnarea în bucurie. L-am adus în discuţie pe Spinoza pentru că
etica sa are, în opinia noastră, o fundamentare deopotrivă metafizică
şi epistemologică. Filosoful olandez s-a străduit să nu ia în derâdere
acţiunile omeneşti, să nu le deplângă, nici să le deteste, ci să ajungă la
o adevărată cunoaştere a lor. Este vorba de a ne considera acţiunile nu
imperfecţiuni sau vicii, ci „ca nişte proprietăţi ale naturii umane,
moduri de a fi ale acesteia, ce-i aparţin, aşa cum căldura şi frigul,
furtuna, tunetul şi toţi meteorii aparţin naturii aerului.16
Cumva, Spinoza ne sugerează că etica se dovedeşte utilă încetând
să mai condamne la modul abstract afecţiunile dăunătoare şi
încercând să convertească pasiunile în acţiuni, necesitatea în libertate,
tristeţea în bucurie, neputinţa în forţă. În acest sens, putem sublinia că
spinozismul nu înseamnă ascetism. A filosofa nu înseamnă să mori
când vrei, ci să perseverezi în a fi. Orice gândire morală, indiferent
că e hedonistă sau instantaneistă, utilitaristă, trebuie să admită
postulatul următor: conştiinţa care este în noi vrea să conştientizeze.
Putem spune, fără echivoc, că salvarea noastră este tocmai
trezirea la conştiinţă.
Ideea publicării acestor studii, atât în limba română, cât şi în
limba engleză a apărut din nevoia realizării unei comunicări ideatice
extinse, reclamată de universalitatea moralei. Se ştie că orice societate
cunoaşte un asamblu de reguli de conduită şi de valori, peste tot se
constată opoziţia dintre bine şi rău. În mod fundamental, morala este
rodul unei experienţe generale.
Adevărul este că epoca noastră nu e martoră atât a deprecierii
tuturor valorilor, cât a unei relansări a interogaţiei morale legate de
reculul influenţei politicului şi al marilor sisteme ale sensului. Pe
măsură ce puterea tehnicii şi a pieţei creşte, domeniul etic este
15
Spinoza, Etica, Bucureşti, Ed. Ştiinţifică şi Enciclopedică, 1981.
16
Ibidem.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 21
17
Gilles Lipovetsky, Fericirea paradoxală, Eseu asupra societăţii de consum, Iaşi,
Ed. Polirom 2006, p.314.
22
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
the being depends on what he does. His deeds become part of his life,
freedom changes man and helps him become what he wanted to be.
Man is master of his choices. Morality begins with this choice –
everyone will decide what they will be. Every man, even corrupted
by sin, keeps a sacred moral spark inside himself. This principle of
moral consciousness preservation is to be found with many authors.18
Socrates used to believe in the infallibility of his familiar “demon"
who was instructing him in times when he found himself in difficulty.
This demon is somehow a personification of consciousness.
“Savoyard Vicar" (Rousseau) is a long apostrophe of consciousness
that is constantly watching the human being19.
Through a beautiful picture, Kant distinguishes the starry sky
above our heads and the moral law within us as order of necessity
and freedom. The specific of human nature is to be able, being free,
to contradict its nature. Doing your duty already means no longer
being as you are, fighting against what is in us represents the mark of
naturality, inclinations or desires. It is precisely this duplicity of man
to be both sensitive and sensible that makes him capable of
morality.
We have gathered in this work studies in moral philosophy that
stem from certain themes of reflection, from specific experiences and
realities lived and shared with a view to opening the way to self-
knowledge and raising the awareness of the impetuous need for
ethics in a world deprived of authentic moral landmarks, where
imposture and mediocrity, vanity and deception reign, where the
confusion between good and evil alter the entire system of values.
The study of moral philosophy, of philosophy in general,
inevitably urges the pursuit of perfection, of the Absolute. In this
respect, the arguments presented by Andrei Pleşu in the work Minima
Moralia are relevant: “the ethical rule cannot have another legitimate
criterion but for the absolute”. From this perspective, Ethics is
defined by Pleşu “as a heroic attempt to recompose the absolute out
18
Vladimir Jankelevitch, Course in Moral Philosophy, Iassy, Polirom Publishing
House, 2011, p.45,
19
J.J. Rousseau, Emil ou de l‘éducation, Paris, Edition Lutetia, Tome Premier,
Nelson Editeurs.
24
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
of the fragments of his silence, to find the law in whose name one can
live with dignity the occultation of the true law. Ethics is the
discipline born from the removal of absolute, it is a way to manage
this removal.” 20
The need for philosophy must be understood as an imperative
of self-knowledge, a sine qua non condition of self-achievement.
Philosophy itself has emerged in the European cultural area as a
knowledge activity, but also as a way of life. So, there can be no
ignoring of ethical metaphysics. In fact, all levels of philosophical
reflection intermingle, between the theoretical and practical
philosophy there is a close connection. The practical philosophy
studies the first principles of action and is divided into moral
philosophy and the philosophy of law21 The world Ethics is often
used.
The term ‘ethics’ comes from the Greek ethos that means
character or habit. The term ‘morality’ comes from Latin: mores,
<<morals>> and especially from moralis, from Cicero, who
translated the Greek term ethikos <<concerning morals>>,
<<moral>>.
Although in common language “ethical" and “moral" are used
interchangeably, as absolute synonyms, in theory the difference
between them is quite important: ethics or moral philosophy is a
theoretical interpretation of the ethos and of the moral phenomenon.
Ethics strives to answer some questions such as “do we have to be
moral?” “how to be moral?" and tries to give some universally
valuable answers.
Therefore, ethics can be considered a science of human
behavior, of morals, a set of concrete rules or prescriptions or a
theory on morality.
Thus, we can assert that ethics has an academic connotation,
whereas morality is the circumstantial aspect of ethics, a particular
20
Andrei Pleşu, Minima Moralia, Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House, 2005,
p.14.
Giorgio Del Vecchio, Lessons of Legal Philosophy, Bucharest, Europa Nova
21
life. When the soul is in a proper state, then man is happy. A truly
virtuous man is a really a good and happy man.
It is necessary to emphasize in the context of our analysis that
ethics, for the Greeks, had only the function to distinguish the true
good from the false one, that is to accept what is not really useful and
to reject the mirage produced by imagination – the search for what is
pleasurable is not morally reprehensible, but it's not wise to act
without knowing what is most useful to desire.
Ethics requires a real knowledge of things, the highest degree of
this knowledge leading to wisdom, that is to full happiness. Morality
expresses a judgment of things that makes us condemn the distance
between the ideal and the real.29
Although the moral ideal is actually contradicted by selfishness or
by people’s desire to live, it does not entitle us enough to cast doubt
on its value. Of course, it's difficult not to lose faith in virtue, that
may never have existed on earth ...This “radical innate evil in human
nature”30 Kant speaks about would cause us to be even more
pessimistic. However, even if there had never been a truly virtuous
action, that is selfless, morality continues to the same extent to
impose its persuasion power, to ask man to overdo himself, to go
beyond the pathological temptation of pleasures and interests related
to his nature.
Indeed, the fact that, properly speaking, virtue is inexistent, does
not change anything morally. “You must, so you can” means that it is
enough that virtue be possible for us to be forced to be virtuous.
Conversely, it is enough to be forced to be virtuous, to make virtue
possible. Precisely because evil is a temptation, we have to do good.
Morality is possible because we have to do good and it is necessary
for us because we actually do harm.
Happiness would ask us, undoubtedly, for a firmer hope, a
stronger belief in the reality of virtue. Little does the idea that this is
possible offer us consolation, even if we know that intentions are
29
Christine Le Bihan, The Great Problems of Ethics, Iassy, The European Institute,
1999, p.7.
30
Imm. Kant, Grounding of Metaphysics of Morals, Bucharest, Humanitas
Publishing House, 2007.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 29
important, not the actual deeds. Why then it is not sufficient for us
what should be?
Although, more often than not, through our acts and decisions we
do not place ourselves in the rational area, implicitly in the moral one,
because it is easier to commit evil than good, morality tends to invade
our entire existence – it has the same vocation as religion.
“The moral point of view is the best way to relate to human
existence. In every human problem there is a moral estimation.
Therefore everything is ethics, including psychology and
sociology"31. That is why the need for ethics is a categorical
imperative. We will understand that if we penetrate the deep insights
of human beings, if we are aware of the imperfection of our nature.
Moreover, the metaphysical postulate of the world imperfection stems
from the fact that we judge reality in terms of what it is not and what
we would like it to be, rather than understand it as it is. Thus,
Spinoza's Ethics32 urges us to transform our judgment into
understanding and our convicting into joy. I have brought Spinoza
into discussion because his ethics has, in our opinion, both a
metaphysical and epistemological grounding. The Dutch philosopher
strived not to mock at the human actions, not to mourn or detest them,
but to achieve real knowledge of them. Therefore, our actions should
not be looked upon as imperfections or flaws but “like properties of
human nature, its ways of being that belong to it, as heat and cold,
storm, thunder and all meteors belong to the nature of air.33
Somehow, Spinoza suggests that ethics proves to be useful
ceasing to condemn abstractly the harmful conditions and trying to
convert passions into actions, necessity into freedom, sadness into
joy, helplessness into force. In this regard, we can emphasize that
spinozism does not mean asceticism. Philosophizing does not mean
dying when you want, but persevering in existing. Any moral
thinking, whether hedonistic or instantaneist, utilitarian, must admit
the following postulate: that the consciousness within us wants to
31
Vladimir Jankelevich, cited works, p.45.
32
Spinoza, Ethics, Bucharest, The Scientific and Encyclopaedic Publishing House,
1981.
33
Ibidem.
30
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
34
Gilles Lipovetsky, Paradoxical Happiness: Essay on the Hyper-Consumption
Society, Iassy, Polirom Publishing House, 2006, p.314.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 31
Azi, noul spaţiu este al fluxurilor. Este o nouă realitate foarte subtilă,
lichidă, incontrolabilă, teritorial.
Noua putere extrateritorială şi mutantă urmăreşte să dea lovitura de
graţie şi ultimei limite rămase: diferenţa dintre adevăr şi fals.
Pierre Bourdieu ne alertează privind pericolul constant în sociologie:
suntem invadaţi de informaţie şi se confundă adevărul şi falsul, se
acţionează cu simulacre, iar ,,idolii publici” se transformă în categorii,
precum anunţa Baudrillard. Haosul este produsul noii clase difuze a
economiei financiare care se serveşte de haos, fiind o clasă care se
invizibilizează, fără a lăsa urme. Este ceea ce s-a numit ,,geopolitica haosului”.
Toate acestea duc la o nouă modalitate de inegalitate socială, facilă şi
subtilă, care are o nouă componentă de putere, ca inegalitate. Noua clasă
scapă controlului, pentru că nu există control, normă, limită, încât nici
măcar statul nu poate face nimic în această privinţă.
Drama omului contemporan este una a conştiinţei. Trăind
în ,,uitarea fiinţei” omul zilelor noastre este alienat şi pierdut,
desacralizat, lipsit de repere, confuz şi dezorientat. Lumea contemporană
este lipsită de raţionalitate, de înţelepciune, de iubire; este o lume în
care ,,Dumnezeu a murit”, iar omul este singur şi incapabil să înţeleagă
ceea ce Raymond James Ray, filosof contemporan american
avertiza: ,,Secretele sunt în noi toţi… Puteţi avea tot ce vă doriţi doar prin
cunoaştere interioară şi doar din interior vă vine schimbarea. Astfel vă
puteţi schimba toată viaţa, aceasta este cheia către tot ce v-aţi dorit.”
Când omul are simţământul că a pierdut cheia existenţei sale, când nu
mai ştie care este semnificaţia vieţii, e vorba întru totul de o problemă de
non-raportare la divinitate, la absolut, cu alte cuvinte o problemă de
filosofie, deoarece aceasta răspunde la întrebarea fundamentală: care este
sensul existenţei?
Criza actuală este indiscutabil una a conştiinţei de sine, astfel, o criză
morală, spirituală fără precedent în istorie. În această situaţie limită,
salvarea nu vine de la economie, ci de la ,,trezirea la conştiinţă”; Cum?
Prin educaţie. Aceasta ne diferenţiază ca popoare, ca indivizi.35 În
singurătatea momentului critic omul apelează la ceea ce nu pierde el
niciodată: la el însuşi.
35
J.S. Mill, Despre libertate, Bucureşti, Ed. Humanitas, 2001.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 33
36
N. Berdiaev, Filosofia inegalităţii, Bucureşti, Andromeda Company, 2005.
34
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
37
G. Lipovetsky, Fericirea paradoxală: Eseu asupra societăţii de hiperconsum, Iaşi, Ed.
Polirom, 2007.
38
Sylvie Mesure, Alain Renaut, La guerre des dieux. Essai sur la querelle des valeurs,
Paris, Grasset, 1996, p.139.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 35
39
C.I. Gulian, Hegel sau filosofia crizei, Bucureşti, Ed. Academiei, 1970.
36
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
40
Hegel, Fenomenologia spiritului, Bucureşti, Ed. Academiei, 1965.
41
K. Jaspers, La situation spirituelle de notre temps, Paris, Louvain, 1952, p.19.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 37
42
A. Camus, Essais, Paris, Gallimard, 1965, p.1424.
38
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
43
G.W. Leibniz, Eseuri de teodicee, Iaşi, Ed. Polirom, 1997.
42
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
Bibliografie
44
J.S. Mill, On Freedom, Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House, 2001.
46
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
granted so much importance nor has it ever been elevated to the status of
ultimate goal. Spiritual life fell under the rule of material life.
Although mankind has faced such convulsions before, current crisis
exceeds the size and interference of all previous displays. Terror of needs
and deprivations has never reached such alarming scale. Man has never
felt so much pressure from all sides, nor has he ever felt so helpless in the
lurch.
The oppression of economism is result of economy losing any sacred
support. During nineteenth century and twentieth century, human life
suffered terrible constraints. In the twenty-first century, people are
suffocated and obsessed with the material dimension of life. Population
and needs growth has chained man of the economy. Machine penetration
in human life has revolutionized world history, shaking the foundations
of existence. Moreover, contemporary human life is taking place in the
digital world. Computer has become indispensable to the people. The
rhythm of life has changed. Human life comes visibly out of the natural.
Mankind faces disintegration and de-harmonization. What is the need to
impose economy over the human life?
Need is display of the non-cosmic status of the world. 45 Overcoming
the need requires the offensive of cosmic harmony and transcending the
material state of the world as a cosmic stiffness. Material world, as
physical life connected to the physical body of the universe, means a state
of shortcomings, prejudices and bad habits. It is certain that social heaven
and welfare, total freedom and evil and suffering removal are not possible
in the physical world; they can not be accomplished in the empire of
materialism.
According to contemporary mentality, social heaven should be
maximum of consumption and minimum of production. The ideal of
consumerism is a radically philistine ideal. It implies no creative
requirements.
“Consumer society”46: the expression first occurred in the 1920s,
having become popular between 1950 and 1970, and its success remains
intact even today, as proved by how often we encounter it in everyday
N. Berdiaev, The Philosophy of Inequality, Bucharest, Andromeda Company, 2005.
45
47
Sylvie Mesure, Alain Renaut, La guerre des dieux. Essai sur la querelle des valeurs,
Paris, Grasset, 1996, p.139.
48
C.I. Gulian, Hegel or the Philosophy of Crisis, Bucharest, Academy’s Publishing
House, 1970.
48
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
49
Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, Bucharest, Academy’s Publishing House, 1965.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 49
50
K. Jaspers, La situation spirituelle de notre temps, Paris, Louvain, 1952, p.19.
50
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
51
A. Camus, Essais, Paris, Gallimard, 1965, p.142.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 51
References
52
G.W. Leibniz, Essays on Theodicity, Iassy, Polirom Publshing House, 1997.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 55
proces din care emerg atât efectele pozitive cât şi cele negative, pe care le
resimţim cu toţii, fie că suntem pro sau contra globalizării.
,,Globalizarea” un termen foarte utilizat în ultima vreme dar şi foarte
diferit înţeles de către cei care îl utilizează: unii văd în globalizare o
uniformizare totală alţii, dimpotrivă, o diversificare de proporţii bazată pe
respectarea unor principii comune. Un lucru este cert: în faza actuală de
dezvoltare este de neconceput ca anumite părţi ale lumii să acţioneze fără a
ţine seama de celelalte. Nu cred că este necesar să nuanțez acest lucru pentru
că el este unanim acceptat - astăzi, orice eveniment petrecut în lume, fie şi în
cel mai îndepărtat colţ al ei, afectează viaţa fiecăruia dintre noi.
Ţinând seama de această realitate devine evident că globalizarea este
un proces în desfăşurare, inevitabil şi ireversibil.
Dorind să dea o definiţie de lucru conceptului, Malcom Waters
consideră că ,,probabil cea mai bună abordare a unei asemenea definiţii ar
trebuie să încerce să specifice unde s-ar putea termina procesul de
globalizare, cum ar arăta o lume complet globalizată53. Iar imaginaţia
autorului, partizan al globalizării, nu se lasă mult aşteptată: ,,Într-o lume
globalizată vor exista o societate singură şi o singură cultură care ocupă
planeta. Această societate şi cultură nu vor fi probabil armonios integrate,
deşi ar fi convenabil să fie. Mai degrabă vor tinde probabil spre niveluri
înalte de diferenţiere, multicentricitate şi haos.54” În satul global nu va
exista un guvern organizator central, şi nici un set îngust de preferinţe şi
prescripţii culturale. În măsura în care cultura va fi unificată, continuă
autorul, ea va fi extrem de abstractă, exprimând toleranţa pentru
diversitate şi opţiunea individuală. Important este că teritorialitatea va
dispare ca principiu organizator pentru viaţa socială şi culturală, ea va fi o
societate fără margini şi fără graniţe spaţiale.
După descrierea acestei viziuni mai degrabă utopice, câteva întrebări
îşi aşteaptă răspuns: dacă tendinţa de globalizare a societăţii şi a culturii ar
putea duce, printre altele, la haos, cum ar mai putea fi stăvilit acesta? Cum
poate fi compatibilizat caracterul extrem de abstract al culturii cu
53
Malcom Waters, Globalization, London and New York, Routledge, Ist. Ed. 1995, II.
Ed. 1996, p.2;
54
Ibidem, p.3.
58
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
55
Athanase Joja, Logos architekton, Cluj, Ed. Dacia, 1971, p. 109.
62
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
56
Petre Andrei, Opere sociologice I, Bucureşti, Ed. Academiei, 1973, p.296.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 63
57
Maurice W. Strong, New Challenges, în vol. Ethics and Spiritual Values. Promoting
Environmentally Sustainable Development, Washington DC, Eds. Ismail Serageldin,
Richard Barett, ESD Proceedings Series No.12, 1996, pp.1 şi 2.
68
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
58
James d. Wolfensohn, New Partnerships, în op.cit., p.1.
59
Michael M. Cernea, Prefaţa în vol. Putting people first. Sociological variables in rural
development. Ed. Michael M. Cernea, 2nd Edition, New York, London Published for World
Bank, Oxford University, 1991, p.XIV.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 69
60
Ethics and Spiritual Values, p.12 -13.
61
Ibidem, p.17.
70
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
62
Ibidem, p.25-26.
63
Norman Myers, Ethics and Values. A Global Perspective. Proceedings of an
Associated Event of the Fifth Annual World Bank Conference on Environmentally and
Socially Sustainable Development, Washington DC Eds. Ismail Serageldin, and Joan
Martin-Brown, 1998, p.25.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 71
Bibliografie
64
Imm. Kant, Opere, Spre Pacea eternă. Un proiect filosofic, Bucureşti, Ed. All, 2008,
p.73-74.
65
G. Pohoaţă, Imm. Kant sau despre proiectul păcii internaţionale, Rev. Cogito, , vol. II, no.2,
Bucureşti, Ed.Prouniversitaria , 2010, p.88.
66
James Roseanu, A Study of World Politics, vol. II: Globalization and Governance,
Routledge, 2006 şi J. Rosenau, People Count! Networked Individuals in global Politics,
Paradigm Puh, 2007.
72
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
David H., McGrew, A., David, G., and Jonathan, P., (2004),
Transformări globale. Politică, economie şi cultură, Iaşi, Polirom.
Edkins, J., (1999), Poststructuralism and International Relations: Bringing
the Political Back In, Boulder, Lynne Rienner.
James. R., (2006), A Study of World Politics, vol. II: Globalization and
Governance, Routledge, and James, R., (2007), People Count! Networked
Individuals in global Politics, Paradigm Puh.
Joja, A., (1971), Logos architekton, Cluj, Dacia Publishing House.
Kant, Imm., (2008), Opere, Spre Pacea eternă. Un proiect filosofic,
Bucharest, Ed. All.
Norman, R., (1996), New Challenges, in Ethics and Spiritual Values.
Promoting Environmentally Sustainable Development, Washington DC, Eds.
Ismail Serageldin, Richard Barett, ESD Proceedings Series No.12 .
Patrick, H., (2009), The Ashgate Research Companion to Ethics and
International Relations, Ashgate Publishing Limited, Farnham.
Pohoaţă, G., (2010), Immanuel Kant sau despre proiectul păcii
internaţionale, Rev. Cogito vol.II, nr.2, Bucureşti, Ed. Prouniversitaria.
Strong, M.W., (1996), New Challenges, in Ethics and Spiritual Values.
Promoting Environmentally Sustainable Development, Washington DC,Eds.
Ismail Serageldin, Richard Barett, ESD Proceedings Series No.12.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 73
Our aim is to analyse the relation between culture and morality within
globalization, starting from the premise that this is the major dilemma of this
process from which both the positive and the negative effects that we all feel
- regardless of whether we are supporters or opponents of globalization -
emerge.
“Globalization” is a term that has been used very frequently lately, at
the same time being understood very differently by those who use it:
some see it as a total levelling, while others understand it as a major
diversification based on some common principles. The sure thing is that
in the current development stage it is unthinkable that some parts of the
world would act without considering the others. I do not believe that it is
necessary for me to go into details in this respect, since this is already a
commonly-accepted fact: today, any event that occurs in the world, even
its remotest corner, affects the life of each of us.
Taking into account this reality, it becomes obvious that globalization
is an ongoing process, an unavoidable and irreversible one.
Wishing to give a working definition to this concept, Malcom Waters
considers that probably the best approach of such a definition should try
to specify where the globalization process could end, how a completely
globalized world would look like”67. And the imagination of the author, a
supporter of globalization, is not long in coming: “In a globalized world
there will be a single society and a single culture that inhabits the planet.
This society and this culture will probably not be harmoniously
integrated, although it would be convenient that they should be. Rather
they will probably tend towards high levels of differentiation, multi-
centricity and chaos”68. In the global state there will be neither a central
organizing government nor a narrow set of preferences and cultural
prescriptions. “Should this culture be unified, it would be extremely
abstract, expressing tolerance of diversity and individual option. The
important thing is that territoriality will disappear as an organizing
principle for the social and cultural life, there will be a society with no
limits and no spatial borders.
67
Malcom Waters, Globalization, London and New York, Routledge, Ist. Ed. 1995, II.
Ed. 1996, p.2;
68
Ibidem, p. 3.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 75
human and the moral progress, will continue to exist and even to be
revitalized, reconsidered and placed once again on the position where
history has raised them.
Autonomous spiritual domains, culture and morality have met in
history and have influenced each other mutually. We understand the
relation between them as having a unitary deep nature, justified by their
role in society, which is to serve it by resorting to their specific means.
Having its roots in the human and social ontics the dialectic unity of
the two areas of the human spirit lies, first of all, in reasoning and in
work. The inter-conditionality of the two areas does not identify them and
does not annihilate the differences between them. The characterization of
culture, in its creative and value transforming dynamic, is understood as
being the stimulus that determines the evolution of ethics itself, through
the new meanings of its values, which transforms the human being into a
value creating moral agent. Morality, including moral values, is a
component of culture which, through its characteristic perspective,
contributed to the social solidarity and cohesion, even if to a minimum
extent at the beginning, instituting a social set of elementary moral norms
without which the existence and the development of society would be
difficult to conceive.
The moral norms and rules have a correspondent in reasoning and in
the order that characterizes it. Analyzing the essence of the ethical norm in
Logos architekton, Athanase Joja shows that it “is part of the human nature,
because the ethic norm is the emanation, the transposition of the logical
norms. Thus, the ethic norm is not an unexplainable attachment, but a
manifestation of the human essence. Quoting E. Goblot, he goes on by
underlying the fact that << The work of reason consists of two related logical
systems: the system of Truth, science, and the system of the Just,
morality>>”. Belonging to the intellect, an expression of the harmony of the
universe, and as works of reason, truth, just, science and morality explain,
according to the author, why “the moral norm appears as related to the very
essence of man, therefore as ineradicable”69.
The osmosis between culture and the moral values is explained by
the characteristic of morality of not being an independent “in itself”, but
69
Athanasie, J., Logos Architekton, Cluj, Dacia Publishing House, 1971, p. 109.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 79
of interacting with all the facets of the human existence, of being present
in the intricate weaving of the individual and of the social life.
The cultural creation, with its well-known manifestations – science,
technology, art, literature, philosophy, religion etc. has permanently
served the human, has emphasized the values that represented the height
reached by the ideals of each era, has built attitudes in front of the world
and of life, where the moral values constituted the bond between the
forms of expression. In other words, morality, through its values, has
never been absent and cannot be absent from any of the forms of culture.
It works from the inside, in a more or less transparent way, instituting the
convergence towards welfare, beauty and truth, convergence that will
contribute to the human construction of man, to the expansion of his
limits and to the improvement of his powers. The universe of culture is
deeply impregnated by moral meanings that are co-substantial. Present in
the culture, the moral dimension contributes to defining culture,
participates to its permanent enrichment, just as the culture brings
arguments for a highly moral structuring of the human personality. The
Kantian inspiration – it is known that with Kant the supreme value was
the human personality, man being an aim not a means – is taken a step
forward. The Romanian axiologist Petre Andrei proposes the “culture-
creating personality” as a moral ideal and an absolute value. Petre Andrei
asks himself if morality creates culture or presupposes it; he further
continues: “Culture is at the same time a condition and an effect of
morality. It is a sine qua non condition, because it is a state in which the
moral conviction influence, in which the moral law can be
accomplished… Culture is a continuous creation and transformation of
values whose general synthesis is the superior spiritual culture of
humanity”.70
Beyond the relativity of the values, accounted for in the consideration
of cultural diversity, morality as theory, as ethics and as practice –
understood as human attitudes, feelings, behaviour and characteristics –
has built around some common values that offered an inner unity to
social constructs. Thus, it is hard to conceive a society without the
70
Petre, A., Sociological Works I, Bucharest, Academy’s Publishing House, 1973, p.
296.
80
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
71
Maurice, Strong, W., New Challenges, in Ethics and Spiritual Values. Promoting
Environmentally Sustainable Development, Washington DC ,Eds. Ismail Serageldin, Richard
Barett, ESD Proceedings Series No.12 ,1996, pp.1 and 2.
86
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
expect from the other I expect from myself – and the fundamental human
values which would be hard to deny by any rational being”. The stringency
of the problem asks for action in this direction. “We must somehow create a
movement and a new conscience at mass scale. The place where we must act
is represented by the schools, by our system of education”76. The redefinition
of the concept of learning means, for example, that a constructor of a dam
should also know the consequences that it has over the environment, over
people, over forests and over wildlife.
The change that is required now is that the human attention should
not center on mobilizing the resources of the Earth to sustain the human
cause, but on mobilizing the human resources to sustain the cause of the
Earth, thus satisfying the needs of the people. Such a perception and
understanding are considered to be “one of the biggest moral challenges
since we came out of caves”, “a moral challenge that is itself very
challenging”.77
The ethic approach investigates new dimensions of the international
justice, such as the relation between poverty, inequality and global
distributive justice, the political exclusion of the refugees and the quasi-
absence of these approaches from the ethics of the international relations,
the relations between the human rights, human needs, human
development and human security, the justice problems relating to the
environment. In their national and international dimensions, the topic of
the multinational corporations and of their global responsibilities and the
problems correlated with nationalism, national self-determination and
Secession.
Globalization made world states face global problems of various
natures, some of them having a local “epicenter” and urging to action
governments, state institutions and not only, mass media, national civil
societies, the world civil society that is emerging through networking,
national and transnational NGOs and even individuals.
76
Ashok, K., New Challenges, in Ethics and Spiritual Values. Promoting Environmentally
Sustainable Development, Washington DC, Eds. Ismail Serageldin, Richard Barett, ESD
Proceedings Series No.12, 1996, p.25-26.
77
Norman, M., Ethics and Values. A Global Perspective. Proceedings of an Associated
Event of the Fifth Annual World Bank Conference on Environmentally and Socially Sustainable
Development, Washington DC, Eds. Ismail Serageldin, and Joan Martin-Brown, 1998, p.25.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 89
References
85
N. Hartmann, Ethik, Berlin, W. de Gruyter, 1935, p.13-14.
94
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
86
Al. Boboc, Cultură modernă şi ,,tradiţie de cultură”, Cluj-Napoca, Ed. Grinta, p.170.
87
N. Hartamnn, op.cit., p.12-13.
88
Berdiaev, N., Sensul creaţiei, Bucureşti, Humanitas, 1992, p.263-267.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 95
89
G.W.F. Hegel, Enciclopedia ştiinţelor filosofice I, Bucureşti, Ed. Academiei, 1962,
p.36.
J.S. Mill, Despre libertate, Bucureşti, Humanitas, 1995.
90
E. Husserl, Die Krisis des europaischen Menschentum und die Philosophie/ Criza
91
Căci în această situaţie este vorba de ceva mai mult decât de o chestiune
de cunoaştere. Conştiinţa are în genere în ea determinarea momentului
cunoaşterii; ,,în acelaşi timp, pentru conştiinţă, acest altul nu este doar
pentru ea, ci şi în afara acestei relaţii, adică în sine: momentul adevărului.
Deci, în ceea ce conştiinţa declară în interiorul ei că fiind în sinele, adică
adevărul, avem criteriul, pe care ea însăși îl stabileşte pentru a măsura
prin ea cunoaşterea sa.”93
Surprinzând relaţia dintre cunoaştere şi adevăr, în textul de mai sus,
Hegel releva ,,experienţa totală pe care omul o dobândește în lume”,
<<experienţa de adevăr>>, de fapt <<adevărul>> în pluralitatea acestei
experienţe; de aceea procedeul hermeneutic îşi propune ,,să discearnă,
oriunde s-ar întâlni, experienţa de adevăr…Căci în ştiinţele spiritului se
întâlnesc modalități de experienţă altele decât cele ale experienţei
ştiinţifice, anume experienţa filosofiei, artei, experienţa istoriei însăși”94.
Demersul hermeneutic e menit să releve o particularitate a
cunoaşterii la nivelul unor astfel de forme de <<experienţa de
adevăr>>: ,,ceea ce se transformă reţine atenţia mai mult decât ce
rămâne”; ,,perspectivele oferite de experienţa transformării istorice se află
permanent în pericolul de a fi contorsionări vane, întrucât nesocotesc
prezenţa ascunsă a ceea ce se perpetuează. Trăim, se pare, într-o continuă
stare de surescitare a conştiinţei noastre istorice”. Am putea spune că în
locul conştiinţei istorice trece tot mai mult înclinaţia spre fragmentar şi
marginal, departe de ceea ce în modernitatea culturii europene centra
universul valorilor: <<fundamentele raţionale>>. Situaţia nouă în care ne
aflăm implică dificultăți care barează calea situării în adevăr.
Cumva în sensul a ceea ce Nietzsche descria cândva drept ,,o
convingere pe care nu a avut-o nicio epocă anume că noi nu avem
adevărul”95 au apărut şi persistă fenomene de îngrijorare, frământări ce
denotă căutare şi derută totodată. De unde ,,convingerea” unora că au
fost traşi pe sfoară, că li s-a ,,confiscat” ceva şi, în reacţie, culpabilizarea
(uneori în bloc) a celorlalţi. Ca indivizi ,,trăim din senzaţie în senzaţie.
93
G.W.F. Hegel, Fenomenologia spiritului, Bucureşti, Ed. Academiei, 1965, p.55.
94
H.G. Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzuge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik
4, Aufl., Tubingen, J.C.B. Mohr, 1985, p.XXVIII.
95
Fr. Nietzsche, Die Unschuld des Werdens. Der Nachlab, I, Leipzig, 1931, p.225.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 97
96
N. Hartmann, op.cit., p.14.
97
K. Jaspers, Texte filosofice, Bucureşti, Ed. Politică, 1984, p.82.
98
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
98
Ibidem, p.13.
99
Imm. Kant, Critica raţiunii pure, Bucureşti, Ed. Ştiinţifică, 1969, p.612.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 99
Bibliografie
101
N., Hartmann, Ethik, Berlin, W.de Gruyter, 1935, p.13-14.
104
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
lack of measure and weight in evaluation; weak concern for identity and
authenticity, ideal and permanence of history; situations lacking the
consciousness of value in the human behaviour (individual and
collective).102
But the most significant phenomenon is the one called “passing near
something”: “Countless people meet other people. Few are those who
really “see” in terms of value… Isn’t it the climax of the absurd as each
knows the desire of the other and still they pass farther without seeing
that a human being remains alone in the hidden pain of their solitude?” 103
The individualistic alienation and disunion represent the foundation
of any “policy”, of any “social community” of our age. We are too social
because we are too isolated and alienated. The hegemony of “the social”
over the contemporary consciousness bears something crushing like a
nightmare. This exterior “social” hides and consumes all genuine,
ultimate realities. All genuine, ultimate values are replaced by the fake
and exterior value of the “social”. The “social” nature of the conscience,
which dominates at present, hides the creative secret of the communion, it
denies and rejects the cosmic nature of the human being and of the
society, detaches itself from the organic roots of the communion. The
human being isolated in what is exclusively human and in exclusively
human relationships, cannot comprehend the secrets of the communion.
The man of the positively-sociological conscience does not know
themselves and their kin, does not comprehend the world and their
connections to the world.104 The recognition of the interior man in their
unrepeatable individuality and unrepeatable qualitative nature, in the
uniqueness of their vocation and place in the world involves the
metaphysical recognition of the interior order of the world, of its
hierarchic organism. Such authentic hierarchism and metaphysical
aristocratism have always been the origin of any greatness in the world, of any
enrichment of the human life’s qualities and values, of any movement in the
world.
102
Al. Boboc, Modern Culture and “Tradition of Culture”, Cluj-Napoca, Grinta
Publishing House, 2008, p.170.
103
N., Hartmann, cited works, p.12-13.
104
Berdiaev, N., The Sense of Creation, Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House, 1992,
p. 263-267.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 105
105
G.W.F., Hegel, Encyclopedia of Philosophic Sciences I, Bucharest, Academy’s
Publishing House, 1962, p. 36.
106
J.S., Mill, On Freedom, Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House, 1995, p. 78.
107
E., Husserl, Die Krisis des europaischen Menschentum und die Philosophie, (The Crisis
of the European Humanity and the Philosophy) Paideia Publishing House, 2003, p. 68.
108
G.W., Leibniz, Essays on Theodicity, Iassy, Polirom Publishing House, 1997. (The
Leibniz sense of this phrase is ontological, not moral).
106
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
109
G.W.F., Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, Bucharest, Academy’s Publishing
House, 1965, p.55.
110
H.G., Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzuge einer philosophischen
Hermeneutik 4, Aufl., Tubingen, J.C.B. Mohr, 1985, p.XXVIII.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 107
facing involves difficulties which hinder the path of the positioning in the
truth.
Somehow, according to what Nietzsche once described as “a belief
that any age has not had, respectively that we do not hold the truth” 111
there have appeared and persist phenomena of concern, convulsions
denoting search and confusion at the same time. Wherefrom the “belief”
of some that they have been deceived, that something has been “taken”
and, as consequence, the blame (sometimes overall blame) put on the
others. As individuals “we live from feeling to feeling. The power of
penetration flattens; the sense of value wears out in our pursuit of the
sensational”112.
From such a perspective, “the query on the future’s humanism comes
from our concerns for ourselves, for the contemporary man. Different
descriptions of the modern man made for half a century now let us see
something downright frightening. Man breaks his bridges to the past.
Living in the pure instant, he delivers himself to the existent situation and
chance. True, he still lives in the wings of the past. But they are no longer
the scene of his life, but a background of ruins. He looks upon them as
mere fiction. Man seems to submit to nothingness. He scrutinizes the
nothingness filled with despair or a destructive enthusiasm. Nietzsche's
words: “God is dead" are heard more strongly”.113
No matter how we characterize today’s people, they remain diverse
and cannot be subsumed to a single type. Large masses of people are still
in a state of drowsiness.
Human conscience is dispersed and shuttered, changing
kaleidoscopically, remaining the same just as messy diversity. Inside this
dispersion, there are possible vigorous forms of a simplified conscience,
which, in alliance with political power, can enjoy a time of consideration,
but without being able to impose a model of spiritual human existence.
The future human existence will be shaped by this form of fundamental
knowledge, which is acquired from the forces of solitude under a free
spiritual communication. The certainty of the authentic being is achieved
111
Fr., Nietzsche, Die Unschuld des Werdens. Der Nachlab, I, Leipzig, 1931, p.225.
112
N., Hartmann, cited works, p.14.
113
K., Jaspers, Philosophical Texts, Bucharest, the Political Publishing House, 1984, p.82.
108
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
116
Şt. Costea, Globalization – the end of the diversity in the evolution of the contemporary
societies? in vol. Humanism and Education, the Publishing House of Suceava University,
2002, p.24.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 111
“madding” world (the present) and the horizon (the future), given the
conscience of the area’s inexhaustibility, the participation possibilities and
the limits of any contribution in the area of human knowledge.
Our world suffers from moral inertia, influenced by at least three major
crises: the drama of the atheistic humanism, the challenging of universality
and immutability of moral norms and the separation of science from
metaphysics.
This world needs the dialogue between philosophers, theologians
and scientists, a dialogue that would make each what was meant to be:
science – science, religion-religion and philosophy – philosophy.
Globalization, the new scientific discoveries, the neutrality of science,
the danger of agnosticism and relativism are just some of the reasons
claiming the need for such dialogue. But the communication of truth must
take into account the fundamental requirements of each human being. In
this respect, we advocate for new ways to communicate the truth and the
emergency to restore the dialogue between philosophy, theology and
science. Thus, the phrase of Leibniz about this world, “the best of all
possible worlds”, formulated by the German thinker, from an ontological
perspective, could also have a moral support. But, without authentic
communication and truth, there is no morality.
References
K. Jaspers, Cine este Kierkegaard? în vol. Kierkegaard vivant, Colloque organisé par
117
ceilalţi şi care descoperă în teribila lor suferinţă acea realitate din care
ceilalţi vor avea de câştigat. >>(…). Sunt, spune el, << un om care ar putea
deveni necesar
într-o criză , un cobai pentru viaţă >>. << Ca un brad singuratic, retras
egoist in sine şi întors către înalturi, mă înalţ fără să arunc umbră şi doar
porumbelul sălbatic îşi face cuibul în ramurile mele.(…)118
Exigenţa sa cea mai mare, valabilă atunci, astăzi şi oricând, era
loaialitatea. N-a luptat nici pentru creştinism, nici pentru vreo altă cauză
determinată. Nu a ţinut parte nici unei realizări de pe lume. A rămas fără
profesie, necăsătorit. (…)119
trăieşte. Iar Howard and Edna Hong vin în sprijinul afirmaţiei făcute mai
sus: “There are similarities between Kierkegaard and Socrates at several
essential points. Both made their appearance in an age of disintegration,
which impelled them to seek the true point of departure for human
existence. Both concentrated on self-knowledge and introspection rather
than on the external, physical world. Both were very interested in
conversing with their fellow men in order to gain insight into the deepest
motives for men's actions. Kierkegaard also tried to realize in his own
thinking what he says of Socrates-that he knew how to think "one thought
all the way through" (VI A 15). He also believed that Socrates in particular
could teach him something about the art of communication, an art
Kierkegaard subsequently developed to perfection. And just as he called
Socrates "the only world-historical philosopher of life" who ever lived, so
for a later age Kierkegaard became the thinker who concentrated most of
all on the life-problems of man. These similarities justify calling
Kierkegaard Christianity's Socrates, for just as Socrates tried to make men
aware of the highest truth in paganism, Kierkegaard tried to make men
aware of Christianity”124.
Ne imaginăm că dacă, Socrate şi Kierkegaard ar veni astăzi printre noi,
ar fi huliţi plini de indignare, consideraţi smintiţi plini de ridicol,
individualişti şi îngâmfați, duşmani ai omenirii etc. Ar veni poate să ne
dovedească încă o dată cum lumea politică liberă înăbușe adevărul, ucigând
renumele prin calomnie.
Astfel, într-o lume lipsită de raţionalitate şi înţelepciune cu siguranţă
că cei doi nu s-ar regăsi. Însă influenţa lor este enormă asupra posterității,
fapt dovedit şi de asemenea izbitoare dintre cei doi filosofi.
Se știe că, Socrate rămâne pentru Kierkegaard o paradigmă mai ales în
ceea ce priveşte ironia, dar nu numai. În Fărâme filosofice, Kierkegaard îl
prezintă pe Socrate într-o altă lumină, de data aceasta al Învăţătorului de
Adevăr.
Adevărul ne este dat – după Socrate – este înnăscut; tot ceea ce ne
rămâne este să-l descoperim şi să îl facem cunoscut. „Socrate chibzuieşte
asupra dificultăţii conform căreia orice învăţare şi căutare nu este decât
124
Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers, translated by Howard and Edna Hong, Indiana
University Press, 1967.
118
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
125
Kierkegaard, Fărâme filosofice, Timişoara, Ed. Amacord, 1999, p.30.
126
În Theaitetos (150b), Socrate afirmă că cea mai frumoasă lucrare a moaşelor constă
în cernerea adevărului de neadevăr. „Moşitul pe care îl practic eu, se îngrijeşte cam de
aceleaşi lucruri; se deosebește, însă, prin aceea că moşeşte bărbaţi nu femei, şi că
cercetează roadele sufleteşti, nu trupeşti ale acestora (150c)”. Iar Kierkegaard avea să
afirme, mult mai târziu, că „Socrate a fost şi a rămas un mamoş; pentru că îşi dăduse
seama că era cea mai înaltă relaţie pe care o poate adopta cineva faţă de vreun om”.
(Fărâme, 31)
127
”In the Socratic view each individual is his own center, and the entire world
centers in him, because his self-knowledge is knowledge of God”. (Philosophical
Fragments, Princeton University Press, 1974, 14)
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 119
128
Kierkegaard, op.cit., 54-55.
129
Samlede Værker, XIV, 366-368; in Svenson, op. cit., 38.
120
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
130
D. Swenson, Something about Kierkegaard, Minneapolis, 1956, 113, apud. Cătălina
Dobre, op.cit.
131
“This Socratic daimon has always been a crux philologorum (a cross for the
philologist), a difficulty that nevertheless has had an effect more tempting than
forbidding and, because of its mysterious magic, even fascinating”. (CI, 157)
132
Diogenes Laertios, Despre vieţile şi doctrinele filosofilor, III. 48, Iaşi, Polirom, 1997,
138.
133
Socrate o numea aşa deoarece susţinea că a învăţat de la mama sa „arta
moşitului” care-i ajută la naşterea adevărului. Mai târziu Platon va numi această metodă
„dialectică”.
134
”He has nothing by which a later age can judge him; indeed even if I were to
imagine myself his contemporary, he would still always be difficult to comprehend”.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 121
lui Socrate asupra contemporanilor săi fapt pentru care îl invoca într-un mod
emoţionant:
„Socrate, Socrate, Socrate! Da, de trei ori trebuie invocat numele tău şi
nu ar fi prea mult de-ar fi şi de zece ori, în caz că ar ajuta la ceva. Se spune
că lumea are nevoie de o republică şi se mai spune că avem nevoie de o
nouă ordine socială şi de o nouă religie; însă nimeni nu se gândeşte la
faptul că evident de un Socrate are nevoie această lume buimăcită”135.
De asemenea, merită să aducem în discuţie în acest context lucrarea sa
intitulată Post-scriptum136, în care Kierkegaard compară rolul jucat de către
Socrate pe lângă elevii săi cu cel al lui Cristos pe lângă discipolii săi. Ca
dascăl, susţine Kierkegaard, Socrate a fost pentru elevii săi ocazia descoperirii
adevărului, în timp ce Cristos a fost Dumnezeul care constituie însăși esenţa
acestei descoperiri. Diferenţa dintre Socrate şi Cristos rezidă, după
Kierkegaard, în aceea că, Cristos nu doar propovăduiește adevărul, ci este
adevărul.
Trebuie să subliniem mai întâi că, prin această comparaţie,
Kierkegaard nu are deloc intenţia să-l coboare pe Socrate, pentru care
nutrea cea mai vie admiraţie şi despre care a ştiut să vorbească admirabil.
Socrate este maestrul care vrea nu să-şi instruiască elevii, ci să le arate
metoda care le va permite să găsească singuri adevărul. Măreția sa constă
în aceea că-şi ajută elevii, prin întrebările puse, să caute adevărul şi să-l
descopere în ei înşişi- un adevăr care sălășluiește deja dinainte, dar pe
care nu ştiu să-l descifreze şi care rămânea independent de viaţa lor.
Socrate îi aduce în situaţia de a descoperi acest adevăr lăuntric; el este
incitaţia la această descoperire. Şi din clipa în care elevii sunt capabili să
găsească singuri ceea ce este adevărat, el se retrage- e tocmai ce a practicat
efectiv maestrul. În această rezidă măreție a sa: el nu transmite o doctrină,
nu domină spiritual elevului, ci lucrează cu el pentru a-l face capabil să se
dispenseze de maestro. Kierkegaard a arătat în ce constă esenţa cea mai
profundă a pedagogiei.
(Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, CI, Princeton University Press, 1989, 12).
135
Kierkegaard, Boala de moarte, Bucureşti, Humanitas, 1999, p.171.
136
Kierkegaard, Postscriptum neştiinţific conclusiv la Fărâme filosofice, Timişoara, Ed.
Amacord, 1999.
122
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
137
Din volumul Kierkegaard vivant, op.cit., p.111.
138
Jacqueline Russ, Istoria filosofiei, vol. III, Bucureşti, Ed. Univers enciclopedic, 2000,
p.236.
124
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
Bibliografie
catalina.doc
Jaspers, K., Cine este Kierkegaard? (1966) în vol. Kierkegaard vivant,
Colloque organisé par l’Unesco à Paris, 1964, Paris.
Kierkegaard, S., (2002), Frică şi cutremur, Bucureşti, Ed. Humanitas.
Kierkegaard, S., (1999), Boala de moarte, Bucureşti, Ed. Humanitas.
Kierkegaard, S., (1999), Postscriptum neştiinţific conclusiv la Fărâme
filosofice, Timişoara, Ed. Amacord.
Laertios, Diogene, (1997), Despre vieţile şi doctrinele filosofilor, III. 48,
Iaşi, Ed. Polirom.
Popa, Grigorie, (1998), Existenţă şi adevăr la Soren Kierkegaard, Cluj-
Napoca, Ed. Dacia.
Russ, Jacqueline, (2000), Istoria filosofiei, vol. III, Bucureşti, Ed. Univers
enciclopedic.
141
K. Jaspers, Who is Kierkegaard? in the volume Kierkegaard vivant, Colloque
organisé par l’Unesco à Paris, du 21 au 23 avril 1964, Paris, 1966, pp.82-93.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 127
egoistically shut off, pointing to the skies and casting no shadow, and
only the turtle-dove builds its nest in my branches”. (…)142
His greatest exigency, which was true then, still is today and will be
forever, was loyalty. He fought neither for Christianity nor for any other
definite cause. He did not take the side of any achievement in the world.
He remained without a profession, unmarried. (…)143
142
Ibidem.
143
Ibidem.
144
Ibidem, p.110.
128
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
introspection rather than on the external, physical world. Both were very
interested in conversing with their fellow men in order to gain insight
into the deepest motives for men's actions. Kierkegaard also tried to
realize in his own thinking what he says of Socrates-that he knew how to
think “one thought all the way through” (VI A 15). He also believed that
Socrates in particular could teach him something about the art of
communication, an art Kierkegaard subsequently developed to
perfection. And just as he called Socrates “the only world-historical
philosopher of life” who ever lived, so for a later age Kierkegaard became
the thinker who concentrated most of all on the life-problems of man.
These similarities justify calling Kierkegaard Christianity's Socrates, for
just as Socrates tried to make men aware of the highest truth in paganism,
Kierkegaard tried to make men aware of Christianity”148.
We imagine that, if Socrates and Kierkegaard came among us today,
insults full of indignation would be hurled at them, they would be
considered insane and ridiculous, individualistic and conceited, enemies
of mankind, etc. Maybe they would come to prove us once again how the
free political world suppresses the truth, killing good reputation by
means of libel.
Thus, in a world deprived of rationalism and wisdom it certain that
the two of them wouldn’t find their place. But their influence on later
generations is enormous, and this fact is also proved by the striking
resemblance between the two philosophers.
It is common knowledge that Socrates remains for Kierkegaard a
paradigm especially as far as irony is concerned, and not only. In
Philosophical Fragments, Kierkegaard shows Socrates in a different light,
but this time he looks upon him as the Truth Teacher. The truth is given
to us - according to Socrates – it is inborn; all we have to do is discover it
and bring it to light. “Socrates ponders on the difficulty according to
which learning and seeking is all remembrance, as the ignorant has only
to remember in order to realize what he already knew. Therefore, the
truth is not fetched from outside, it is inside him, an idea (...) which
148
Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers, translated by Howard and Edna Hong, Indiana
University Press, 1967.
130
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
149
Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, Timişoara, Amacord Publishing House,
1999, p.30.
150
In Theaitetos (150b), Socrates asserts that the accoucheur’s most beautiful work
consists in separating the truth from the untruth. “The accouchement I practise deals,
more or less, with the same things; it differentiates, however, by the fact that it assists
men, not women, and that it searches the fruit of their minds, not their bodies (150c)”.
And Kierkegaard asserted, much later, that “Socrates has always been an accoucheur
because he had realized that it was the highest relationship one can adopt towards a
human being (Crumbles, 31/Fragments, 31).
151
”In the Socratic view each individual is his own center, and the entire world
centers in him, because his self-knowledge is knowledge of God”. (Philosophical
Fragments, Princeton University Press, 1974, 14).
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 131
152
Kierkegaard, cited works, p. 54-55.
153
Samlede Værker, XIV, 366-368; in Swenson, cited works, 38.
132
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
154
D. Swenson, Something about Kierkegaard, Minneapolis, 1956, 113, apud. Cătălina
Dobre, cited works.
155
“This Socratic daimon has always been a crux philologorum (a cross for the
philologist), a difficulty that nevertheless has had an effect more tempting than
forbidding and, because of its mysterious magic, even fascinating”. (CI, 157).
156
Diogenes Laertios, On the Lives and Doctrines of Philosophers, III. 48, Iassy, Polirom,
1997, 138.
157
Socrates named it like this because he said he had learned from his mother “the art of
accouchement” which helped give birth to the truth. Later, he will call this method
“dialectic”.
158
”He has nothing by which a later age can judge him; indeed even if I were to
imagine myself his contemporary, he would still always be difficult to comprehend”.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 133
(Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, CI, Princeton University Press, 1989, 12).
159
Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death, Bucharest, Humanitas, 1999, p.171.
160
Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments,
Timişoara, Amacord Publishing House, 1999.
134
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
161
From the volume Kierkegaard vivant, cited works, p.111.
136
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
162
Jacqueline Russ, The History of Philosophy, 3rd volume, Bucharest, Encyclopedic
Universe Publishing House, 2000, p.236.
163
Popa, Grigorie, Essence and Truth in Soren Kierkegaard’s Work, doctoral thesis, with a
forward by Achim Micu, Cluj, Dacia Publishing House, 1998, p. 269.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 137
from fear: “I looked into the eyes of terror, says Kierkegaard, and I was
not afraid”164.
References
164
S. Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House,
2002.
138
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
2008, p. 11.
140
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
166
Diogenes, Laertios, Despre vieţile şi doctrinele filosofilor, Bucureşti, Ed. Academiei
Române, 1963.
167
K. Jaspers, Les grands philosophes, Paris, Ed. Plon, 1963.
168
Platon, Dialoguri, traduceri de Cezar Papacostea, revizuite de Constantin Noica,
Bucureşti, Ed. pentru Literatură Universală, 1968.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 141
169
F. Copleston, Istoria Filosofiei I. Grecia şi Roma, Bucureşti, Ed. All, 2008.
142
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
170
În democraţia ateniană sycofanţii erau ,,denunţătorii”; această denumire li se
trage de la sycon=smochină, fiindcă la început denunţurile se făceau împotriva
contrabandiştilor de smochine. Ei primeau o anumită răsplată; dar, dacă denunţurile nu
întruneau la judecată măcar o cincime din numărul votanţilor, denunţătorul era
pedepsit.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 143
171
Platon, Phaidon, Bucureşti, Ed. Humanitas, 1994.
146
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
a rămas singur, singur în ţara sa, în epoca sa, în armonie cu norocul care
atârna pe umerii eroilor cu adevărat liberi. De aceea condamnarea lui
Socrate are o importanţă covârşitoare. În momentul când pleca, nesupus şi
supus în acelaşi timp, de la tribunal spre moarte, el săvârșea spontan, voit
şi responsabil, un act unic în istorie: a ridicat şi a ţinut singur deasupra
instituţiilor temporare, deasupra chiar a lui însuşi, destinul spiritului.
Socrate a fost, fără nici o îndoială, un martir al raţiunii, respectiv, al
filosofiei172. În acest sens, considerăm că pledoaria sa din proces are un tâlc
filosofic deosebit de profund, cu valoare permanentă. Substanţa filosofică a
aparerii a fost tălmăcită în chip diferit de-a lungul veacurilor de exegeţii
textului platonician.
Aici ne mărginim să amintim doar unul singur, pe acela sugerat de
subtilul gânditor român Constantin Noica: ,,Sub raport filosofic îndărătul
pledoariei sta o tema unică: destinul omului Socrate este omul în general,
fără nicio cunoaştere şi iscusinţă deosebită, la început. Fiecărui om o voce
lăuntrica, dacă nu chiar oracolul din Delphi, ca aici, îi spune: porţi în tine
înţelepciunea de om. Cei mai mulţi oameni, fireşte, nu răspund chemării
acesteia. Câţiva se încred ei, nu-i înţeleg gravele răspunderi şi sfârșesc
prin a o dezminţi. Socrate nu se încrede în ea, căuta s-o dezmintă prin
confruntarea cu oamenii, şi o confirma. Acest adevăr îl spune Platon,
poate, când arata că viaţa unui om adevărat, a lui Socrate, n-a fost decât
ecoul ironiei unui zeu.”
Eveniment judiciar epocal, de neistovita actualitate, în miezul său,
procesul lui Socrate ,,somează” din generaţie în generaţie conștiința
justiţiară a umanității să răspundă la câteva întrebări fundamentale. A
fost Socrate cu adevărat vinovat,- cel puţin potrivit legii penale ateniene
din acea vreme? În desfășurarea dezbaterilor s-au respectat rânduielile de
procedura penală statornicite în Atica? Au existat, dacă nu temeiuri
juridice, măcar circumstanţe istorice care au impus osândirea
inculpatului? Coloratura precumpănitor politică a infracţiunii de asebia
imputată lui Socrate n-a imprimat oare procesului o orientare aparte, de
natură să facă inadecvate criteriile juridice de apreciere a validității
condamnării, dacă nu chiar să ,,legitimize” această condamnare?
172
K. Jaspers, Oamenii de însemnătate crucială, Bucureşti, Ed. Paideia, 1996.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 147
173
D. Cosma, Socrate, Bruno, Galilei în faţa justiţiei, Bucureşti, Ed. Sport-Turism,
1982.
148
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
174
În vremea confruntării filosofului atenian cu justiţia cetăţii, judecarea asebiei era
de competenţa tribunalului heliaştilor (numit şi Heliaia). Un tribunal de un fel deosebit,
ale cărui şedinţe de judecată semănau mai degrabă cu lucrările unei întruniri politice
decât cu dezbaterile unui organ jurisdicţional. Sistemul judiciar al Atenei, complex şi
totuşi suplu, cuprindea o multitudine de instanţe. Cea mai venerabilă dintre ele era
areopagul, care însă, încă din vremea lui Pericle şi odată cu degringolada politică a
aristocrație, îşi pierduseră întinsele prerogative ce îi făcuseră faima. Alături şi mai presus
de el, ca sferă de atribuţii, se impusese tribunalul heliaştilor, adevărată instanță de drept
comun care judeca deopotrivă pricini civile şi pricini penale. Numele şi-l trăgea de la
Heliaia, locul din agora unde îşi ţinea şedinţele de judecată.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 149
175
Aristotel, Metafizica, Bucureşti, Ed. Iri, 1996.
150
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
176
Anton Dumitriu , Cartea întâlnirilor admirabile, Bucureşti, Ed. Eminescu, 1981.
152
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
Bibliografie
1
G. Pohoaţǎ, The Philosophical and Legal Thinking in Texts, Bucharest, Pro
Universitaria Publishing House, 2008, p. 11.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 155
Socrates carried out its entire activity in the city and under the rule of
its laws. Not even for one moment did he think to retire in solitude,
somewhere in an illusory desert where he could improve himself
independently from his fellow-citizens.
What he has in view is the human community called Polis, the Greek
city, its people, whose welfare and improvement he constantly watched.
He obeyed the laws even when the city was unjust to him.
The image we have of Socrates is that of an elderly man. We do not
know anything about his youth. He was born around 470 BC and was
brought up in the powerful, rich and thriving Athens after the Persian wars.
He was almost forty years old when the fatality of the Peloponnesian war
began (431). Only starting with this period did he become a well-known
public person. The oldest document about him that was handed down to us
is Aristophanes' comedy the Clouds (423), in which he is ridiculed. The image
that Aristophanes portrayed of Socrates should not embarrass us. Socrates
was a student of the ancient philosophers, and was influenced by
Anaxagoras’ teachings, as he admitted himself. As far as the “sophist”
nuance assigned to his character in the Clouds is concerned, we must
remember that Socrates, just like the sophists, focused on the subject, on man
as such. It was a familiar public figure, well-known for his dialectic activity,
and to some people he seemed, undoubtedly, “rationalist", destructively
critical and with anti-rationalist tendencies.
The biographical data and the moral portrait that Diogenes Laertius
makes him are relevant 2. We do not insist here on these aspects. We bring
forward only those elements which enable us to have a clearer insight of
this extremely controversial trial, which has not always been presented in
the light of truth and historical objectivity.
We have to point out that Socrate’s interest was predominantly
ethical. Aristotle said quite clear that Socrates “was dealing only with
ethical issues".3 And he also said that “Socrates dealt with the study of
ethical virtues and was the first who attempted to give universal
2
Laertius Diogenes, On the Lives and Doctrines of Philosophers, Bucharest, The
Romanian Academy Publishing House, 1963.
3
Jaspers Karl, Les grands philosophes, Paris, Plon Publishing House, 1963.
156
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
4
Plato, Dialogues, translated by Cezar Papacostea, revised by Constantin Noica,
Bucharest, The Publishing House for Universal Literature, 1968.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 157
This ethical intellectualism 5 did not make Socrates very agreeable for
democracy, as it was practised in Athens.
This inexhaustible activity to enlighten the Athenians with the light of
virtue, which Socrates used to preach in a somewhat aggressive way, the
biting irony he used to treat his opponents with, could not fail to cause
adverse reactions. Indeed, there were three men Anytus, Meletus and
Lycon about whom Voltaire would say that history has retained their
names only due to the severity of the their crime: they officially accused the
Athenian sage of the following crimes: not recognizing the gods the city
used to worship; the introduction of other divinities; corruption of the
youth. The punishment required was death. We will point out that neither
the prosecution nor the defense seems well grounded legally. The
prosecution does not have a logical sequence, it is visibly childish and in
bad faith; the defense is naive and most of the time not to the point. It gives
the feeling of an artificial debate, a staged trial, of course with political
implications, and of a defendant who does not know how to defend
himself against some accusations which are completely groundless. So
what is so great in this debate that overwhelms you, though its
denouement leads to a disgusting murder?
This problem of the end of Socrates’ life, of the last act of a life
dedicated to the city is more complex than it seems at first glance. In order
to outline it, we have to take a closer look at the three platonic letters which
refers to Socrates’ trial, sentence and death. His trial and sentence are a
judicial parody, as shown in the Apologies of Plato and Xenophon. They are
wrongly entitled Apologies (defenses) because Socrates does not defend
himself, he accuses. Why Socrates was obliged to accept an unjust sentence,
both legally and morally, it is explained to us by Plato in the dialogue
entitled Crito or “on the citizen’s duties", and he also makes obvious for us
Socrates’ divine greatness and serenity in front of death in the dialogue
Phaedo or “on the soul".
We will point out here only what seemed essential to us in the trial
against Socrates.
F. Copleston, The History of Philosophy I. Greece and Rome, Bucharest, All Publishing
5
House, 2008.
158
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
6
In the Athenian democracy, the sycophants were the ”denouncers”; this
denomination comes from sycon=fig, because in the beginning the denouncements were
made against the fig smuggler. They received a certain reward; but, if the
denouncements did not meet at the judgement at least a fifth of the number of voters, the
denouncer was punished.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 159
a ”rightous man" is beyond any evil , it can no longer touch him, nothing can
happen to constitute an evil for him, he has defeated life, because only if you
are a prisoner of life and its temptations you can be hurt by it. This attitude
emerges even more clearly from the dialogue Crito, where Socrates' disciple
bearing that name comes to prison and proposes him to flee away, since
everything had been prepared. But Socrates refuses. What are his arguments
to accept the execution of an unjust sentence and remain in prison awaiting
it? Let's see the most important ones: at his age (around 70 years old) he
should not feel sorry for dying; he did not care what the majority of people
would say, who, knowing that the sentence was unjust, would think that he
should run away, because their opinion was not competent; it is wrong to
disobey the law, when a whole life you have preached obedience to law
”you must not answer injustice with another injustice”; his runaway will
strengthen the conviction that the judges had condemned him rightously;
the life he would lead in another country will invalidate everything he said
about justice and virtue.
He accepted the trial only from the desire to obey the law and to keep
intact the objectivity of its authority. Until the last moment, he wanted to
accomplish what was right and, thus, by his last deed, to make complete
not only his life, but also his spirit.
Thirty days passed from the sentence pronunciation to its execution
during which, certainly, Socrates could have saved himself. Should this be
a reason why some have written that it was a judicial suicide and not a
judicial assassination?! As a rule, the sentence is carried out without any
delay. But this time the Delphic god intervened in favor of his protege.
For just a day after the conclusion of the lawsuit, a ship dedicated to
Apollo set out for the island of Delos. It was the annual celebration of the
help offered to Theseus by god in his confrontation with the Cretan
Minotaur. And the law said that for a month, the time it took the ship to
reach Delos and to return, any execution was prohibited. Therefore,
Socrates remained in prison for thirty days awaiting death, visited by
friends, disciples of Xanthippe (his wife) and by his sons. The disciples
had prepared all this time an escape plan, and had even attracted the
prison guard to their side, but everything was in vain due to Socrates’
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 161
7
Platon, Phaedo, Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House, 1994.
162
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
8
K. Jaspers, Les grands philosophes, Paris, Plon Publishing House, 1963.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 163
9
D. Cosma, Socrates, Bruno, Galilei in front of Justice, Bucharest, Sport-Tourism
Publishing House, 1982.
10
In the times of the The Athenian philosopher’s confrontation with the state
justice, the judgement of asebia was carried out by the Heliasts’ court of law (also called
Heliaia). A special kind of court whose sessions were similar to the proceedings of a
political meeting rather than to the debates of a judicial body. The judicial system of
Athens, complex and yet flexible, comprised a plurality of instances. The most venerable
164
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
judgment has an obvious political character, the judges cannot ignore the
laws - good or bad - existing in the state where the trial is taking place, on
the ground that raison d'état is above those laws. This, at least, in a state of
law, as the Athenian state claimed to be by the voice of its most
authorized political men. ”...A salutary fear stops us to infringe the laws
of the republic - Pericles said in a memorable speech about the Athenian
democracy - we always listen to the governors and to the laws and, of
these, to those who support the defense of the oppressed and which,
although uncoded, draw everyone’s contempt upon the one who
infringes them."
The proclamation of an over-legality of politics in front of the law
courts proves to be, under these circumstances, incompatible with the
conception of the rule of law, dominant in Athens and perfectly embodied
by Socrates’ self-sacrifice. We no longer elaborate on the fact that the
acceptance of such thesis would open widely the way to arbitrary in
justice, when justice is called precisely to defend the judicial order and the
fundamental rights of the citizens. Rejecting therefore the thesis on the
over-legality of politics, we believe that in order to pronounce a rightful
judgment on Socrates’ condemnation, a legal examination of the trial, in
the light of the laws which were in force at that time in Athens, is an
absolute imperative.
In front of the court, the philosopher, unwittingly, found himself in a
precarious procedural position, circumstances that contributed to the tragic
denouement of the trial. Insufficiently evolved, the Attic criminal law did
not know the principle - fundamental in the current criminal legislation –
of the legality of incriminations and punishments, crystallized in the Latin
adage nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege. In the absence of this
shield against arbitrary, the defendant was being left disarmed in front of
some of abusive judges, bribed or just ignorant, and so any resolution was
made possible.
of them was the Areopagus which, however, ever since the time of Pericles and along
with the political mess of the aristocracy had lost the extensive prerogatives which had
made its fame. In conjunction with and above it, as a sphere of attributions, the law court
of the Heliasts had imposed itself, a true common law court that used to judge both civil
and criminal cases. Its name stemmed from Heliaia, the place of agora where the legal
sessions were being held.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 165
The legal and factual conditions of the trial proceedings were some of
the most ingrate ones for Socrates. Profane in matters of justice, the wise
Athenian found himself in the position of defending himself mainly
against an offense of opinion, equally serious and hard to define by the
criminal law in Attica.11 Among the main merits of the thinker, Aristotle
recognized that of having demonstrated the value of general definitions
in the work of knowing the world, and convinced himself once more -
and this time out of his own experience – of the risks of applying an
undefined concept. The difficulties of defending himself, stemming from
the inexistence of a clear notion of the asebia were increased by the
maintenance of the alleged facts. Of course, the philosopher did not find it
easy to defend himself against the accusation of disbelief in the city’s
gods, which were created by the popular fantasy or by the poets endowed
with a rich imagination like Homer and Hesiod, when the rightful belief
could hardly be told from heresy, in the absence – specific to the religion
of the old Greeks - of some “saint books” and some dogmas. Finally, the
“loaded” political atmosphere" in which the trial took place, as well as the
unconcealed hostility of most of the Heliasts, manipulated by the accusers
or tributary to some anti-Socratic prejudices, did not ease the defence of
the accused either. Forgetting that he was in the position of a defendant,
not that of an accusor or moral mentor of the city, he spoke as if he did
not find himself before a law court, with a special argumentation and
mood. The Heliasts were, as we have already pointed out, most of them,
ordinary people easily to be influenced and almost unskilled at legal
issues. A defendant could not expect from them the competence, balance
and impartiality of some professional judges. On the other hand, due to
its huge number of members, the Heliasts’ law court had rather the
psychology of an amorphous and easy to manipulate mass by means of
some unscrupulous agitators, than that of a balanced panel of judges,
made of a lower number of magistrates, more immune than the common
citizens to the emotional states of mind deliberately caused. What is more,
when entering the courtroom, the professional judges are not completely
neutral either, they cannot totally forget their ideas and beliefs, they also
have likes and dislikes, prejudiced and resentments. If the litigants have
11
Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bucharest, Iri Publishing House, 1996.
166
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
to take into account the professional judges’ mood, the more Socrates
should have done it, being tried by a court having the psychology of an
emotional and versatile crowd. Even the spiritual attitude to which the
defendant raised his judicial debates – paradoxically – turned against
him. Ordinary people, unaccustomed to philosophical speculations, the
Heliasts could not follow, in all their twists and turns, the demonstrations
of the subtle logician who was being accused. For them, the arguments of
this redoubtable dialectician were simple sophisms. The fact that Socrates
had the misfortune to encounter some judges incapable to dominate their
momentary passions and resentments proves the disparty between the
two ballots occurred within a few hours only. Indeed, in the first ballot,
281 judges voted the defendant guilty, 251 estimating his innocence. But
when the the second ballot took place, meant to establish the penalty, 361
Heliasts voted for the death penalty, that is 80 more than had first
pronounced themselves in favour of his culpability. In other words, in a
very short while, 80 judges who, initially, had considered the philosopher
innocent, changed their mind completely, considering that he deserved
the capital punishment. It is not hard to imagine the amazement with
which the inborn logician who was Socrates encountered this
inconstancy.
It was even said, by some of the researchers who challenged the
philosopher’s guilt, that under the circumstances of those times, his
sentence was an imperative of raison d’etat, an act of defending the city.
“The judges of the sage from Athens realized that the universalism of his
conception on Truth and Ideas could not come to terms with the
conception of the Greek city, with the particularist character based on a
narrow local patriotism - said the eminent historian of ancient
philosophy, who was Aram Frenkian, in his micro-essay Why Socrates was
sentenced to death. The victory of the Socratic universalism meant the
collapse of the city, in its ancient, Hellenian meaning. That is why this
universalism seemed to them even more dangerous than the Sophists’
nihilism and relativism. This is why Socrates was sentenced to death and
the Athenian judges were right, from their point of view, when they gave
the fatal verdict". It is doubtful that at the moment of the philosopher’s
trial the Heliasts thought of the problem so subtlety. Their decision to
condemn the culprit to death did not stem from their hostility toward the
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 167
12
Dumitriu Anton, The Book of Wonderful Meetings, Bucharest, Eminescu Publishing
House, 1981.
168
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
References
1
Augustin, Confesiuni, Bucureşti, Ed. Humanitas, 1992, p.343.
2
Augustin, De Civitate Dei, Bucureşti, Ed. Ştiinţifică, 1998.
174
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
terrena) ,,cetăţii lui Dumnezeu” (Civitas Dei). Cetatea terestră este cetatea
celor lipsiţi de Dumnezeu, celor lipsiţi de morală. Ea coexistă cu cetatea lui
Dumnezeu. Aceasta din urmă se dezvoltă, după Augustin, în etape din
prima. De Civitate Dei este o apologie a creştinismului tratată pe planul
istoriei. Istoria umană este pentru Augustin o luptă între cele două
împărăţii, terestră şi divină. Augustin se ocupă de toată istoria umană de la
Adam, Israeliţi, Greci, Romani. Istoria se împarte pentru el in trei părţi
mari:- înainte de lege - în lege - în epoca graţiei. Perspectiva asupra istoriei
dă o mare amploare operei augustiniene. Ordinea divină se realizează în
istorie, răscumpără istoria. Dumnezeu are totodată putere asupra istoriei.
Acest lucru are pentru Augustin o însemnătate deosebită, căci el nu este
preocupat, ca filosofii greci, cu precădere de lumea naturii; pe el îl
interesează înainte de toate lumea istoriei, ceea ce este în consonanţă cu
faptul că gândirea lui Augustin este orientată în genere către om. Dar omul
este văzut acum nu ca o fiinţă raţională anistorică, ci ca om istoric. Pornind
de la această idee, Augustin proiectează o interpretare cuprinzătoare a
istoriei, prin care se dovedeşte a fi primul mare teolog şi filosof al istoriei
din Occident. Istoria omenirii este pentru el teatrul unei lupte înfricoşătoare
între împărăţia lui Dumnezeu şi împărăţia lumii şi a diavolului; epocile
istoriei reprezintă stadiile acestei lupte. Chiar şi aici privirea lui Augustin
se îndreaptă dincolo de planul omenesc, către domeniul divin. Istoria nu
începe abia cu omul, ci o dată cu căderea îngerului rău. Ea îşi are centrul în
venirea lui Hristos şi se sfârşeşte cu Judecata de Apoi, cu condamnarea
celor răi şi cu instaurarea deplină a împărăţiei lui Dumnezeu. În toate
acestea însă - în viziunea lui Augustin nu poate fi altfel-nu fapta omului, ci
voinţa lui Dumnezeu este cea care hotărăşte în cele din urmă evenimentele
decisive. Augustin oferă astfel, o explicaţie religioasă cursului istoriei
omeneşti, explicaţie ce a avut o mare înrâurire asupra luptelor din evul
mediu, lupte care au dus la supremaţia necondiţionată a Bisericii catolice, a
Papalităţii asupra statului politic. Teoria izbăvirii predestinate prin Biserică
împrumuta acesteia o putere ,,lumească” formidabilă; regele Henric al IV-
lea îngenunchea înaintea papei Gregoriu al VII-lea.
Omenirea, bună la început, a alunecat în păcat din Adam şi a devenit
lumea păcatului, lumea păgână ce nu poate să nu păcătuiască. Iisus,
Logosul s-a încarnat pe Pământ, trimis de Dumnezeu, pentru a mântui pe
păcătoşi; cu el începe cea din urmă epoca istorică, epoca credincioşilor ce
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 175
la toate bătăliile care s-au purtat, la tot sângele care s-a vărsat, pentru ca
aproape toate naţiunile Italiei, cu ajutorul cărora Imperiul Roman a dobândit
o putere covârşitoare, să fie subjugate ca şi cum ar fi sălbatici barbari.”
(DCDXIX)11. Roma a fost condusă de dorinţa de răzbunare şi de cruzime, iar
acestea au triumfat în numele păcii. Imperiul a devenit nedrept, un fel de
bandă criminală la scară mult mai mare. Într-un pasaj devenit celebru.,
Augustin spune povestea replicii pe care un pirat i-a dat-o lui Alexandru cel
Mare, care-l capturase, atunci când acesta din urmă l-a întrebat care este
motivul pentru care jefuieşte pe mare, piratul a răspuns cu o obrăznicie
evidentă, ,,Acelaşi ca şi al tău, atunci când jefuieşti pământul! Dar pentru că
eu fac asta cu un vas micuţ, oamenii spun că sunt pirat; pentru că tu ai o flotă
puternică, se spune că eşti împărat”, Augustin sugerează chiar că romanii ar
fi trebuit să înalţe un monument acestor străini, ,,celorlalţi” pe care să-l
boteze ,,Aliena”, pentru că s-au folosit atât de mult de ei, spunând că toate
războaiele pe care le-au purtat au fost războaie de apărare; romanii aveau
nevoie să invoce un duşman străin implacabil, pentru a-şi justifica cuceririle.
Pentru Roma pacea nu era decât un alt nume pentru dominium. Dacă ororile
războiului sunt, în parte, pedepse pentru păcatele oamenilor, atunci oamenii
care aplică această pedeapsă sunt cei care păcătuiesc cel mai grav. Cu toate
astea, Augustin insistă asupra faptului că războiul este ales în mod liber şi
stabileşte că cei care participă la el sunt pe deplin responsabili pentru
acţiunile lor.
Dacă te gândeşti la ororile războaielor pornite din motive rele şi
scopuri nedemne, vei dori ca numărul războaielor să fie cât mai mic, şi ca
acele să fie drepte, chiar dacă regreţi faptul că ele trebuie purtate: aşa
spune Augustin. Există şi războaie de apărare, în adevăratul sens al
cuvântului.. Conducătorul înţelept şi comunitatea lui vor pune mâna pe
arme numai împotriva propriei voinţe, cu repulsie, şovăială şi remuşcări.
Datorită argumentului său pentru războaiele limitate şi drepte, Augustin
este adesea considerat părintele teoriei războiului drept. (Alţii, desigur, îl
consideră un înaintaş al realismului politic. Nu există niciun motiv ca el
să nu poată fi şi una şi alta, în funcţie de ce anume se înţelege prin realism
şi, respectiv, război drept). Augustin este conştient de ceea ce teoreticienii
11
Pasajele cele mai importante în care Augustin abordează tema războiului sunt
cele din DCDXIX. Dar aceasta contestare a păcii romane străbate toată Partea I, Cărţile I-
XV.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 179
12
Rudiger, B., Augustine’s Philosophy of History, în Mathews,1999, pp. 354-360, apud.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 181
civitate Dei” este prima încercare de Filosofia istoriei din punct de vedere
creştin. Sf. Augustin întrevede în istorie îndeplinirea planurilor
Providenţei divine. Astfel el arată, spre exemplu, că prădarea Romei de
către barbari a fost un semn al judecăţii divine. Apariţia şi dispariţia
marilor imperii de-a lungul istoriei demonstrează că este imposibil de
construit ceva durabil în absenţa raportării la Dumnezeu.
Istoria rezultă din dinamica acestor două voinţe, umană şi divină.
Intervenţia lui Dumnezeu în istorie îşi are apogeul în venirea lui Mesia.
Întruparea lui Hristos instaurează o eră nouă, cea a creştinilor
pelerini. Pelerini pentru viaţă, pelerini pentru istorie, creştinii sunt mereu
în căutarea apropierii de Dumnezeu.
Societăţile necreştine, nerecunoscând jertfa lui Hristos, stau pentru
totdeauna sub semnul timpului, aparţinând exclusiv cetăţii terestre.
Biserica este descrisă de Augustin ca civitas peregrine, înţelegând prin
aceasta o comunitate în exil, care sălăşluieşte în mijlocul cetăţii terestre
fără a se confunda cu ea. E o comunitate care se raportează la un sens
eshatologic al timpului, fiind mereu atentă la Cetatea lui Dumnezeu şi la
sfârşitul istoriei.16 Biserica îşi urmează cursul exilului său, între
persecuţiile lumii şi mângâierile lui Dumnezeu. Astfel înţeleasă, istoria
capătă sens ca loc ce permite acumularea datelor necesare unei evoluţii
ontologice a naturii umane înseşi. Prin şansa care îi este oferită în istorie,
omul poate recupera ceea ce a pierdut Adam prin mândrie.
Se poate aprecia că, cheia hermeneutică a viziunii augustiniene asupra
istoriei o constituie tensiunea permanentă şi amestecul continuu în care se
află cele două cetăţi; principiul de coerenţă este Hristos.17 Ceea ce interesează
perspectiva creştină asupra istoriei este trecerea timpului în ansamblul său.
Dumnezeu este acelaşi permanent, doar lumea se schimbă pe drumul sau
spre mântuire. Civitas terrena este pentru Augustin,,cetatea omenească, prea
omenească în care omul, uitându-şi vocaţia eternităţii, se închide în
finitudinea sa şi îşi fixează drept scop ceea ce nu ar trebui să fie decât un
16
Dougherty, J., The Sacred City and the City of God, Augustinian Studies, no. 10,
1979.
Tat, A., De vera de falsa religione. Religie, filosofie şi politică în De Civitate Dei de Sf.
17
18
Marrou, H., Teologia istoriei, Iaşi, Institutul European,1995, p.43.
19
Parain, B., Histoire de la philosophie 1, Paris, Editions Gallimard,1979, p. 1222.
184
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
20
Gilson, E., Introduction à l’Étude de Saint Augustin, Paris, Vrin,1987, p. 200.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 185
Bibliografie
21
Un pasaj nou şi interesant despre această literatură secundară, aproape
interminabilă, despre Augustin găsim la. Burt, D.X., (1999), Friendship and Society: An
Introduction to Augustine’s Practical Philosophy (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans).
186
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
The tendency towards eternity is the soul of time and the very engine
of love conferring the being’s dynamism. Yet, a badly directed love might
fail its chance. The real virtue is actually the charity that makes us love
what must be loved: God and our peers. And this fact extends to politics.
In his “Citadel of God”22, written after the conquest of Rome by the Goths
(in 410), Augustine opposes the mortal character of the civilizations
founded on “hegemonic passion” the eternity of the ultimate, internal,
spiritual goals. How could the mankind hide this ‘kingdom” which is not
its, which is transcendent to experience and history, and, yet, capable to
inspire it in its necessary reconstructions? The God’s citadel, open to the
people’s universality, to those who admit God and live on His law
opposes to the citadel of the Earth, whose principle is the exclusive love of
the self. Far from censuring the social and political field as such,
Augustine stigmatizes only the will perverted inside the terrestrial
citadel, ready to worship State as a goal in itself, creating a closed area
doomed to despair inside the human’s space, unless a parallel, invisible
citadel of spirit existed, tightly linked to the human structures, watching
over the power inherent totalitarian temptations. Christ, the embodied
Verb, is the centre of this history which he recalls towards alpha - His
principle - and leads it towards omega - its fulfillment-, thus giving the
human being an absolute value. By breaking with the antique thinking,
Augustine states that History has a sense transcending the empirical
tragic – the excess of evil that manifests in it -, a sense lying in the citadel
of Man joining the founding values of the Being, as a judgement standard.
Good at its beginning, the mankind had fallen into sin since Adam
and became a world of sin, a heathen world that could only be sinful.
Jesus Christ, the Logos, came to the Earth as a man, sent by God to save
the sinners; with Him, the Christian epoch started, the last one, to wait for
190
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
the world’s near ending and for the Lord to come, to meet the eternal
happiness. In brief, after Augustine, the single goal of the history of
humanity was to create the “Divine Citadel” on the Earth.
On the other hand, God’s Citadel, during its pilgrimage through this
world, might found peace, thus reuniting “citizens of all nations, and
creating a community of strangers speaking all the languages.” It – civitas
Dei – could do that not only by putting off the Earthly differences, but
also by keeping some of them “as long as God is still worshipped”.
192
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
DCDXIX. But the contestation of the Roman peace is obvious all through Part I, Books I-
XV.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 193
to these aims, and they won ob behalf of peace. The Empire became unjust, a
sort of criminal band at its highest level. In a passage that became famous,
Augustine related the story of a pirate who gave an obviously insolent
answer to Alexander the Great who had captured him, when the latter asked
him the reason for his plundering on the sea: “the same like you, as you also
plunder the Earth! While I do that in a little ship, and the people call me
pirate, you do the same with a big fleet, and they call you emperor”.
Augustine suggested that the Romans should have erected a monument to
those strangers, to “the others”, and name it “Aliena”, for having used them
so much, saying that had been defending themselves during all the wars; the
Romans needed to figure a foreign enemy to justify their conquests. To
Rome, peace was but another name for dominium. If the war atrocities are
partly punishments for the people’s sins, then the people who give way to
these punishments are those who sin at utmost. Though, Augustine stressed
that war was chosen deliberately, and the participants were entirely
responsible for their actions.
When thinking of the atrocities generated by mean, shameful reasons
one will wish a reduced number of wars, and consider the fairness in
wars, even if they must be unleashed, that is what Augustine stated.
There are wars of defense, in the real sense of the word. A mature leader
and his community will start fighting only against their will, with
loathing, hesitation, remorse. Due to his pros to the limited and right
wars, Augustine is often considered the father of the fair war theory
(others consider him the forerunner of the political realism. He can
obviously be either one or another, depending on what realism and fair
war mean). Augustine was aware of what the modern theory of the
international relationships call “security dilemma”. People will never ever
have such a “safe state as to never be afraid that they might be subdued
by their enemies; in fact, the instability of the human relationships is so
high, that no nation ever reached that level of safety as to allow the
eliminate any menace to life. That place would be the realm of peace and
safety, it is eternal and held in store for the eternal beings, it is a motherly
land, it is the free Jerusalem” (DCD XVII, 13, pp.743–744).
There is nothing else to do than to keep on living, haunted by
anguish and worries. But one should not give up in front of these feelings,
194
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
at least never without real grounds. When driven by fear and anxiety, the
result is always the war and the outrageous destruction, social and civil
conflicts altogether. Each war will generate another one, through the
mimesis of destruction. Each war will generate discontent and resentment
which, in their turn, require a great wish to revenge. On the other hand,
the wise leader would start some necessary wars, either to cease violence
or the unjustified attack, or to save innocent people from death. The
reason should be his love for his peers and his wish to bring peace at last.
This is an ultimate justification, that of the minimal evil, but war will
never be a normative good with Augustine, it will only be a tragic
necessity. One should notice that the simple self salvation will never
justify violence; it is better to be the victim of injustice than to commit it
yourself. But sociability imposes people in general, and leaders – those
bearing the whole responsibility for the people’s welfare – in particular, to
love the peer. Thus, our inner sociability together with the norms to not
prejudicing others and giving a handful help whenever possible, define
the two war justifiable matters.
Disciples of various sects and those who still used to believe in gods, the
opponents to the true Christian faith would impose the settlement and the
clearing of Christian truth to all the Christian scholars. And that is also
true in the case of Augustine. Starting from the declared aim of
demonstrating which the real faith was, Augustine looked deeply in the
history of Rome, showing that its decay was mostly connected to the
ignorance with regard to the real God, than to the old gods’ anger. So,
what Augustine was particularly interested in regarded less the
development of events, and more the understanding of the reasons,
principles on which basis they took place in one or another way.” In
Augustine’s conception, the history of mankind was subordinated to the
larger context of the end of the world, in which history represents the
temporary putting off of the divine justice.32
Paying more attention to principles and considering the events as
simple pretexts, one may say that Augustine was among of the first in the
category that opened the way to the philosophy of history. “Being more
metaphysics by its application to history than a search of history, and thus
rather a speculative reconstruction (in the primary sense of evaluating
actions only as long as they reflect complexity) than a restoration in a
historical succession, it is subordinated to criteria of judgment which are
metaphysics in pure concept”.33
The idea of history as a place of meeting for Man and the divine
providence was common to other Christian writers, too. For instance,
Saint Ambrosius and Saint Jeronimus stated that pax romana had been
conceived by God Himself to convert the world. Yet, there are others who
state the existence of a permanent tension between the world (the state)
and the Church, among which Hipopolitus, Bishop Ciprianus and
Tertulian. Yet, Augustine rejected the both outlooks. In his opinion, the
Roman state had a secular character. “The state itself is neither religious
nor unreligious”.34
32
Rudiger B., Augustine’s Philosophy of History, in Mathews, 1999, pp.354-360, apud.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
33
Vlăduţescu, G., (1998), in ’Introductory Study’ to Aurelius Augustine, On the City of
God, 1st vol., Bucharest, the Scientific Publishing House,1998.
34
Lavere, J.G., The Political Realism of Saint Augustine, Augustinian Studies, no. 11,
1980.
196
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
None of the two citadels is identical to the church or the State. Their
identification becomes valid only by reference to an inner principle.
“Civitas terrenea” is led by vanitas, Civitas Dei by veritas”35. Augustine did
not reject the role of the State, treating it as an integrant part of the history
of mankind. The Earthly State had a praiseworthy aim, as it kept the
peace among the people, but it had to do that in a permanent
subordination towards the church; it can justify itself only relatively, as it
is an instrument of the church, which is the State, for the latter to meet its
goals, and thus to repress heresy). To the end, the Earthly State will
disappear, to be replaced by the kingdom of God. This dark and
catastrophic conception with regard to human matters is partly explained
by the political experiences in Saint Augustine’s time, who saw the
empire invaded by the barbarians, and through his personal events
during his life. In general, Saint Augustine made the Christian doctrine in
all its rigid aspects, predestination, the eternal damnation of Men in their
majority etc. The Political philosophy of Augustine represents the
triumph of austerity; in this conception that tends to depreciate the State,
the supernatural aspirations are glorified to the prejudice of human
values. Also, “De civitas Dei” is the first step in the philosophy of history
from the Christian point of view. Saint Augustine saw in history the
achievement of the divine plans of Providence. He showed, for example,
that the barbarian’s devastation of Rome was a sign of the divine
judgment. The appearance and disappearance of the great empires along
history demonstrated that it was impossible to build something
sustainable outside the presence of God.
The history is the result of the action of the human and the divine
wills, and God’s intervention in history had its climax when Christ came
to the Earth. Christ’s embodiment started a new era, the Christian
pilgrims. Pilgrims to life and to history, the Christians will always be
searching to approach God.
The non-Christian communities, not admitting Christ’s sacrifice, will
always be a subject of time, belonging exclusively to the terrestrial citadel.
The church is described by Augustine as a civitas peregrine, and by that he
35
Adamuţ, A., The Philosophy of Saint Augustine, Iassy, Polirom Publishing House,
2001, p. 172.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 197
36
Dougherty, J., The Sacred City and the City of God, Augustinian Studies, no. 10,
1970.
37
Tat, A., De vera de falsa religione. Religion, Philosophy and Politics in De Civitas Dei by
St. Augustine, apud. Mihai, M., Symposion Journal, no. 2, Iassy, 2005, p.504.
38
Marrou, H., Theology of History, Iassy, the European Institute, 1995, p. 43.
198
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
the appeal to the secular arm of the State to repress heresies. What was
called “the political Augustinianism”, the doctrine founded by Augustine
based on his own interpretation of the Gospel, would be resumed in the
17-th century, to justify both the fight of the Catholic Church against
Protestantism, considered a heresy, and the conversion by force.
To stick to the essentials, the relation between the Church and the
State should have respected the mutual independence of the spirit and the
temporality, that was what the Fathers of the Church thought.
Augustine did not stick at that extreme opposition, he tried to
harmonize the two citadels on the Earth. Whether the aims may be
opposed, yet they do not refer less to peace, a common condition, useful
to everybody. Even the malefactors would need a certain harmony among
them, to succeed in their criminal activities. In a totally different way, the
Christian would look for peace too, in his love for his peer.
Cohabitation is, thus, possible between the two citadels on the Earth.
The Christian should submit to the prince, the leader, as the warrant of
the agreement in the Stat. In his turn, the good prince should better look
after the pilgrimage conditions in the divine citadel and to enforce the
Christian faith; only in this case a citadel may be really and fully called
“republic”. This political model will inspire the idea of a State
subordinated to his prince - a medieval idea of monarchy -, he himself a
subject to Church, and a temporal extension of the latter.
The Citadel of God – the collocation that Augustine used to describe
the Christians who make the community of reconciliation and fraternity
foreshadowing the celestial kingdom – would have never been possible
(….) had the saints’ lives been carried on inside a society”. (DCDXIX. 6, p.
860). All the people, with no exception, are citizens of the terrestrial
kingdom- the Man’s citadel – and even under this menial condition there
still is a “natural resemblance” that connects us. These “connections of
peace” are not sufficient enough as to prevent wars, conflicts, cruelty and
human misery of all kinds. A certain unity in diversity will lead us
towards harmony. The pluralism and diversity coming out from unity –
as God is Unique – these were essential in Augustine’s philosophy. That
was his way to gather the human uniqueness and individuality with
sociability and pluralism.
The friendship need is the fundamental stone of what one calls
Augustine’s “practical philosophy”: history, ethics and his social and
200
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
References
41
A new and interesting excerpt about this secondary literature, almost
interminable, about Augustine may be found in Donald X. Burt, Friendship and Society:
An Introduction to Augustine’s Practical Philosophy (Grand rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans,
1999).
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 201
1. A-ţi face datoria înseamnă a te supune unei legi ce-ţi impune să-l
respecţi pe celălalt, oricine ar fi el şi în orice situaţie s-ar afla.
Conştiinţa datoriei este aceea a unui trebuie, adică a unei exigenţe a
cărei valoare constă în faptul că nu este produsul unui sentiment. Astfel,
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 203
Invariabilitatea în mediu).
Ameliorarea sau perfecţionarea de sine reprezintă, după Confucius,
punctul de plecare şi calea absolut indispensabilă pentru a ajunge la
ameliorarea sau perfecţionarea celorlalţi. Cu cât o persoană ocupă un rang
mai înalt în societate, cu atât datoriile faţă de sine însuşi sunt mai mari.
Perfecţiunea pură, în afara oricărui amestec, este legea cerului; perfecţiunea
care constă în efortul perseverent de a urma legea cerului - ceea ce, de
fapt, în confucianism înseamnă a te conforma esenţei umane-nu poate fi
decât o morală incompletă şi inoperantă. Dar, pentru ca omul să-şi poată
conforma conduita sa legii morale, trebuie mai întâi să o cunoască: ,,Or,
spune Confucius, nu există în lume decât oameni întru totul perfecţi, care
pot să-şi cunoască pe deplin propria lor natură, legea finită lor şi datoriile
care decurg, ei pot cunoaşte prin însuşi acest fapt natura celorlalţi oameni,
legea finită lor, şi să le arate datoriile pe care trebuie să le observe pentru a
se îndeplini mandatul cerului…” (Tchung-Iung sau Invariabilitatea în
mediu).
Dar există trepte diferite ale perfecţiunii. Treapta cea mai înaltă
depăşeşte într-un fel condiţiile naturii umane, reflectând de fapt nu ceea
ce este realmente perfectibil, ci o esenţă ascunsă şi imuabilă a naturii
umane. Despre cei care au atins această treaptă - ne spune Confucius - ei
pot prevedea viitorul, destinul popoarelor, ascensiunea şi decăderea
acestora, manifestându-se prin aceste daruri superioare ale spiritului ca
nişte inteligente imateriale, cvasi-divine.
În centrul învăţăturii lui Confucius stă credinţa într-o ordine
superioară la care omul poate contribui prin perfecţionarea propriei sale
conduite. De aici importanţa acordată ceremonialului şi respectării
riturilor religioase, datorii care reprezintă în confucianism calea supremă
de colaborare a omului cu legile naturii. În esenţa lor, legile morale şi
legile naturii se integrează aceluiaşi sistem normativ: există o singură
ordine în lume care îmbrăţişează într-o unitate armonioasă normele
conduitei morale şi acelea care guvernează evoluţia cosmosului,
succesiunea anotimpurilor, ca şi alternanţa zilelor şi nopţilor.
Recunoaşterea identităţii de esenţă şi a interdependenţei acestor legi
reprezintă condiţia indispensabilă a vieţii morale, calea care duce spre
ideal, odată cu norma de bază a responsabilităţii: atunci când oamenii nu-
208
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
şi îndeplinesc îndatoririle lor morale, atunci când tatăl nu mai este un bun
tată, atunci când soţul nu mai este un bun soţ, atunci când conducătorul
nu mai este un bun conducător, sau supusul un bun supus, politeţea,
inteligenţa şi fidelitatea faţă de datorie sunt neglijate, ordinea socială
cedează locul unei stări de anarhie şi însăşi natura e afectată în mersul ei,
Cosmosul ameninţat să se transforme într-un veritabil haos.
Pentru Imm. Kant perfecţiunea, care este totuna cu sfinţenia, nu este
hărăzită nici unei fiinţe raţionale aici pe pământ. De ea ne putem apropia
numai printr-un progres, care, fiindcă nu-şi poate atinge scopul în această
lume, trebuie să admitem că se prelungeşte şi în lumea cealaltă, prin
dăinuirea personalităţii noastre în acea lume, adică trebuie să admitem
nemurirea sufletului ca pe o ,,speranţă consolatoare”. Aşa, cum se poate
observa, după Kant morala nu are nevoie să recurgă la ideea unei fiinţe
supreme, pentru a lua cunoştinţă de datoriile pe care le are omul, nu are
nevoie nici de alte mobiluri decât de legea morală pentru a le împlini.
Morala îşi este, ca morală, suficientă ei însăşi.
Kant susţine că moralitatea se bazează în întregime pe raţiune.
Raţiunea ne dă cerinţele morale, cărora trebuie să li se conformeze toate
acţiunile noastre. Filosoful german susţine că toate normele morale sunt
individualizări ale unei singure norme morale generale, pe care a numit-o
Imperativul categoric. Cele mai importante forme în care se manifestă
Imperativul categoric sunt Legea Universală-acţionează în aşa fel încât
maxima voinţei tale să fie în acord cu legea universală,- şi Scopul în sine -
acţionează în aşa fel încât să tratezi întotdeauna umanitatea, atât în
persoana ta, cât şi a celorlalţi, ca scop în sine şi niciodată numai ca mijloc.
Ideea de bază, în prima formulare, este aceea că moralitatea cere ca
tuturor oamenilor să li se aplice aceleaşi standarde. Trebuie să ne gândim
întotdeauna dacă am putea dori în mod consecvent ca altcineva să facă
ceea ce noi suntem pe cale să facem. Ideea de bază în cea de-a doua
formulare este aceea că moralitatea cere să tratam oamenii, inclusiv pe noi
înşine, ca având valoare în sine şi nu doar relativ la satisfacerea dorinţelor
noastre. Raţionalitatea ne cere să tratam lucrurile asemănătoare în mod
asemănător.
Umanismul kantian este o replică strălucită la doctrina confucianistă
concentrată în maxime precum: A te purta cu ceilalţi aşa cum ai vrea ca ei
să se poarte cu tine; Regula vieţii este reciprocitatea (Ta-hio X, 3); (Menz-
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 209
Bibliografie
These are arguments entitling that the Kantian ethics based on the
concept of duty is not unique in the history of philosophy, and
furthermore, that the Kantian vision started with the Chinese
philosopher’s texts. The Kantian text witnesses the similitudes, and the
modern manner of approach:
“Duty! What a great and sublime word, you do not have anything
agreeable in yourself, anything to include insinuation, but claims for
obedience, that do not threat with anything, that might raise a natural
aversion of the soul, and might frighten it to activate the will, you only
settle a law which penetrates the soul, and yet gains veneration (though
not always obedience), despite the will, in front of which all vocations die,
yet secretely acting against it; have you a worthy descent or where could
we find the place of your noble source which proudly rejects any relations
to vocations, the place from which the indispensable condition that only
the people themselves could share should come up, like from its own
origin?” (C.R.P).
Duty is our obligation to motivate our exclusive deeds through the
moral law. The moral law will require holly obedience to be totally
adequate with the moral law. But the Man, as a rational being, who
belongs to worlds of sensitivity and intelligibility is only capable of
virtue, of accomplishing the moral law out of respect, between the
requirements of the moral law and what the Man can do, postulates the
immortality of the soul, which opens the perspective of reconciliation,
through an infinite program of the will perfect adequacy to the moral law.
The aim of this moral rule is self improvement, this is the Man’s law,
but above it there is perfection, and this is the law of the Sky, and the real
principle of all the other laws.
By this, Confucius reaches the sublim idea that morality is superior to
nature, and that it is the first principle of universe. The sky and the earth
are, undoubtedly, great; yet, the man found imperfection even in them.
That is why the wise man, thinking that the rule of the moral conduct is
even greater, said that the world could not contain it (XXV, 1).
So, what is the cause of universe?
“The active power of the sky and the earth” answered Confucius,
may be expressed in one single word: perfection. Perfection is the
216
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
beginning and the end of all beings; without it, the world could not exist”
(XIII, 1). These are the general principles of Confucius’s morals.
The greatest individual virtues that Conficius recommended were:
the power of the soul, moderation – which means to keep constant on the
middle course - justice, and above all, kindness. Confucius was searching
for perfection and the means to reach it in the field of the exterior
conduct, of the “phenomenon”, and from here there came the importance
of the etiquette. In fact, Confucius’s philosophy is a pragmatic formalism.
Confucius suggested a moral doctrine made of applicable precepts to
the individual’s everyday life in society. Without metaphysical
speculations, with no mystical concerns, but with a few hints towards
divinity, a simple and practical ethics, fidelity to traditions and to
ancestral rites, honesty and a spirit of justice, love to the dear ones and
family devotion, respect to hierarchy, sense of duty, virtue... The virtuous
attitude, in Confucius’s morals, leads to wisdom. So, Confucius’s
philosophy had a pragmatic finality; starting from the premises that the
individual is an ever perfectible being will require the duty of perfection.
All individuals, from the strongest to the most humble one, should strive
to touch the ideal perfection.
fervent efforts to observe the law of the sky – which with Confucius
means to comply with the human nature - is just an incomplete and
inoperant morals. But, in order that the individual conform his conduct to
the moral law, he should know it first. „In the world, says Confucius,
there are people who are entirely perfect, who could know their inner
nature, their finite law and duties coming from it, they could understand,
through this, the nature of the other people, their finite law, and could
show them the duties they must observe to meet the demands of the
sky”......... (Tchung- Iung or the Environment Invariability).
There are different steps to improve. The highest one is over the
human condition, reflecting the hidden and immutable human nature
substance, not what might be really improved. Those who reached that
step, says Confucius, could foresee the future, the peoples’ destiny, their
rise and fall, behaving- due to these high skills of the spirit - like the
immaterial intelligence, they are the quasi-divine individuals.
In the middle of Confucius’s lecture there stays the faith in a superior
order in which the Man could contribute through the improvement of his
own conduct. The outcome is the importance of ceremonies and religious
rites, duties which represent the supreme way of the individual’s
collaboration to the laws of nature. Essentially, the moral laws and the laws
of nature are parts of the same normative system; there is a single order in
the world, embracing the sequence of the seasons and the alternation of the
day with the night, all these inside the harmonious norms of the moral
conduct and of those reigning over the evolution of universe.
child!” “The great man”, answered the philosopher, “must consider all
the people living inside the four great lines as his own brothers!”
(Lun- yu, I, XII, 22, I, 6, I, X, 14, V, 25, XII, 5).
others” (Analecte, 18, 6). The theme of the human solidarity invoked is
spectacular.
For Immanuel Kant, the humanism in each individual was sacred.
“Act to treat humanism, in yourself and in others, like a goal, not like a
mean.” So, respect is the only true universal feeling, being a pragmatic
love, which does not owe anything to the sensitiveness of its generator,
and which is meant to everybody, beyond any sentimental resemblances.
By means of a beautiful idea, Kant depicted the sky above and the
moral law as the order of necessity and liberty. The characteristic of the
human free nature is to contradict nature. To do one’s duty does not
mean to be as you used to be, to fight against the signs of nature (our
intentions or desires). This Man’s duplicity to be both sensitive and
intelligible makes him capable of morality. The German philosopher
firmly rejected the theological interference in morality, considering it
etheronomic and against morality. His ethics is based on reasoning, and it
is a priori universally valid for every thinking individual.
The whole world is founded on the moral law, and Kant stated his
high esteem for two things: a sky full of stars above and a moral law
inside consciousness. For Confucius’s disciples, the “kingdom in the sky
above” is the representation of the moral law. It becomes active in a static
universe, and from the perespective of the perfectly balanced world, it is
hard to perceive the possibility or the reason of any deeper changes in the
order of things, to lead to the essential progress in the history of society,
and to the living conditions of the “common mortals”.
Despite all criticisim, of which some very well grounded works with
regard to his thinking, the Kantian conception on morals represents a
major step in the general philosophical thinking.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 221
References
1
G.W. Leibniz, Eseuri de teodicee – Asupra bunătății lui Dumnezeu, a libertății omului şi
a originii răului, traducere de Diana Moraraşu şi Ingrid Ilinca, Iaşi, Polirom, 1997.
2
G. Pohoaţă, Dimitrie Cantemir şi G.W. Leibniz- enciclopedişti cu vocaţie europeană,
Rev.Cogito, vol. II, nr.4/2010, Bucureşti, Prouniversitaria,p 13-21.
3
Ibidem.
4
G. Pohoaţă, Dimitrie Cantemir- teacher of Romanians in Romanian Educational Models
in Philosophy, Lambert Academic Publishing, 2012, p.43.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 223
5
Precizăm că termenul de ortologie a fost creat în filosofia românească de către
Camil Petrescu, fiind înţeles dintr-o perspectivă fenomenologică. A se vedea Camil
Petrescu, Doctrina substanţei, Bucureşti, Ed. Ştiinţifică şi Enciclopedică, 1998, vol. I, cap.
Ortologia I şi II, pp.310-357.
6
D. Cantemir, D. Cantemir, Divanul sau Gâlceava Înțeleptului cu Lumea, sau Giudeţul
sufletului cu trupul, ediţie îngrijita şi studiu introductiv de Virgil Cândea, Bucureşti, Ed.
Pentru Literatură, 1969, p. 110.s.n.…
7
D. Cantemir, Ibidem.
224
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
8
Ibidem, p.228.
9
Istoria filosofiei româneşti, vol. I, ed. II, Bucureşti, Ed. Academiei, 1985, p.168.
10
D. Cantemir, Ibidem.
11
V. Cândea, Studiu introductiv la Divanul, p.47-48, şi Comentarii, nr.43.
12
N. Gogoneaţa, Scrisoarea lui Dimitrie Cantemir către Golovkin, în Revista de filosofie,
tomul 17/1 1970, Bucureşti, Academia Română.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 225
13
D. Cantemir, Loca Obscura, mss.lat.76 al Academiei Române, f.104, apud. Petru
Vaida, în Umanismul lui Cantemir şi problema conştiinţei morale, Revista de filosofie,
nr.5/1971, Bucureşti, Academia Română.
14
Ioan XIV, 15, 21; XV,20, apud. Dimitrie Cantemir în Loca Obscura, traducere şi
comentariu de Pr. Prof. Teodor Bodogae, Extras din revista <<Biserica Ortodoxă Română>>, anul
XCI, nr. 9-10/1973, p.1064.
15
Ioan II, 4, Ibidem.
16
Iacob II, 26. Ibidem.
226
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
unde atrage atenţia lui Procopovici17 ca pentru << prima învățătură pentru
prunci>> trebuie plecat << ad inferiori gradu ad superiorem>>; întâi
<<lapte>>, pe urmă <<hrana vârtoasă>>. Dacă nu se procedează aşa,
mintea <<fragedă a copiilor>> nu ajunge nici să asimileze, nici să rodească
pentru viaţă. Altfel, cu noţiuni neclare ori cu insinuări obosim şi mintea
adulţilor, nu numai a copiilor, iar decât să facem greşeli de acest fel, mai
bine să fim fericiţi învățând din pățania altuia.
În legătură cu <<Legea lui Dumnezeu>>, pe care trebuie să o cunoască
pruncii, potrivit catehismului lui Procopovici, Cantemir observa că
<<legea>> nu-I numai cea din Vechiul Testament- care de altfel e
nedeplină- ci trebuie adăugat aici şi <<legea nouă>>, ca şi tot ceea ce ne-a
lăsat Biserica prin Apostoli şi urmaşii lor.18
Combătând de la început afirmaţia lui Procopovici că nu putem fi decât
răi odată ce aşa ne-am născut, Cantemir întreabă: atunci de ce a zis Hristos:
veniţi la mine toţi? Sau cum se face că unii sunt predestinaţi spre bine, alţii
spre rău? Să facem pe Dumnezeu nedrept, autor al răului? (f.1-5)
Dacă tânărul legiuitor a plecat supărat de la Mântuitorul, deşi păzise
legea din tinerețile lui (Matei XIX,20-22), atunci desigur- subliniază
Cantemir- <<legea e imperfectă>>, iar dacă << şi credinţa şi lumina firească
a minţii spun acelaşi lucru, atunci după o axiomă a filosofilor antici, ceea
ce doi spun aşa, cu atât mai vârtos aşa trebuie să fie (f.33), (argumentare
pe care o foloseşte şi în Sacrosanctae scientiae…>>, p.30.19 Expresii ca <<
lumen naturale et libera volendi facultas>>(p.4), << ratiocinandi
facultas>>(p.4) ca şi <<jus gentium>> (p.178), sunt noţiuni pe care Cantemir
le utilizează atunci când susţinea adevărul hotărârilor sinodale despre
originea divină a Bisericii, credibilitatea minunilor, a realismului
suprafiresc trăit prin tainele bisericii etc.
Cantemir, gânditor cu vocaţia universalității era conştient de rolul pe
care şi-l asumase filosofia în epoca sa în Europa, şi anume de a gândi
religia, de a ţine un discurs raţional despre Absolut în tradiţie creştină.
17
Omul prin care a încercat Petru cel Mare reformele sale pedagogice şi bisericeşti,
un învățat trecut prin şcoli catolice din Polonia şi Italia, dar împrietenit şi cu teologi
calvini şi luterani din Elveţia şi Germania.
18
Dimitrie Cantemir, Loca obscura, p.13-71.
19
Teodor Bodogae, Dimitrie Cantemir, pedagog şi teolog ortodox în Traducere şi
comentariu la Loca obscura, op.cit.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 227
26
Introdusă de Al. Duţu, apud. Petru Vaida în ,,Raportul dintre Raţiune şi
Credinţă” op.cit., p. 191.
27
Dimitrie Cantemir, Istoria ieroglifică, ediţia Stela Toma—N. Stoicescu, p.183-184.
28
Ibidem, p.243-246.
29
v. lucrarea lui Pico della Mirandola ,,De dignitate hominis”
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 229
Bibliografie
35
B. Tatakis, Histoire de la philosophie byzantine, Paris, 1950, p.108.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 231
232
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
36
G.W. Leibniz, Essays of the Theodicy – On the Goodness of God, Freedom of Man and
the Origin of Evil, Iassyi, Polirom, 1997; translation by Diana Moraraşu and Ingrid Ilinca.
37
G. Pohoaţă, Dimitrie Cantemir and G.W. Leibniz - Encyclopedists with European
Vocation, Cogito Journal, vol.II, no.4/2010, Bucharest, Prouniversitaria Publishing House
p.13-21.
38
Ibidem.
39
G. Pohoaţă, Dimitrie Cantemir - Teacher of Romanians in Romanian Educational
Models in Philosophy, Lambert Academic Publishing, 2012, p.43.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 233
40
We notice that the term orthology was created in the Romanian philosophy by
Camil Petrescu and it is understood from a phenomenological perspective. See Camil
Petrescu, Doctrine of Substance, Bucharest, Scientific and Encyclopedic Publishing House,
1998, 1st vol. chapter OrtHology I and II, pp.310-357.
41
D. Cantemir, The Divan or The Wise Man’s Parley with the World, or The Judgement of
the Soul with the Body, edition and introductory study by Virgil Cândea, Bucharest, the
Publishing House for Literature, 1969, p.110. s.n.
42
D. Cantemir, Ibidem.
234
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
works in faith, but working, he forges his own personality because “God
does not offer His gifts to the lazy and negligent ones, but to those who
are diligent and hardworking”.43 The righteous man – through grace and
ethical aspiration and Christian charity, but also through the “soundness”
of his mind, through ethical values created here, in life, “aspires to offer to
this world a piece of heaven”; the order and unity of the dogma do not
oppose the social order as one supports the other. “Sedulity, dignity of
the human being resides in the rational part while laziness resides in the
material, physical part”44. Starting from those precepts, Cantemir human
being placed as a human ideal, at the historical border of the spiritual
elevation promised by the dogma, sets out the dawns of a new humanist
and illuminist rationality. We discover here the greatness and uniqueness
of Cantemir’s thinking, who understands that reason is the “universe
given to the man”, through which the man is privileged to accede to Truth
if it is used according to Christian values. The right employment of
reason imposes the light of faith. “Thus, reason can be righteous and
good.”45
The above mentioned rationalist tendency is sketched in Divanul, the
first work of Cantemir, although the literary form of the book does not
allow a systemic approach of the relation between reason and faith. Both
the World and the Scholar who represents the Christian position, bring
rational arguments, but the entire dispute between the Scholar and the
World is carried out in the court of reason, of “righteousness”. 46 Cantemir
resorted to reason and logics to argue on an ethical system. The rationalist
tendency in ethics, the conception according to which morality arises from reason
and the good consists of following reason (the “righteousness”, as Cantemir says
in his Romanian writings) is present in his entire work, starting with Divanul,
continuing with Istoria ieroglifica and ending with his works of maturity,
Loca obscura and Scrisoare catre Golovkin.47 In his work Loca obscura,
published shortly before Scrisoare, Cantemir underlined, somehow
43
Ibidem, p.228.
44
The History of Romanian Philosophy, 1st vol., 2nd edition, Bucharest, Academy’s
Publishing House, 1985, p.168.
45
D. Cantemir, Ibidem.
46
V. Cândea, Introductory study to The Divan, p.47-48 and Comments, no. 43.
47
N. Gogoneaţă, Dimitrie Cantemir’s Letter to Golovkin, in the Journal of Philosophy,
tome 17/1 1970, Bucharest, the Romanian Academy Publishing House.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 235
distancing himself from the Orthodox dogma, the “good nature” of man.
The good nature of man remained untouched even after the original sin,
Cantemir wrote, and especially “the light which is called natural and the
free will remain unharmed”.48 Cantemir wrote “lumen quod vocant
naturale”, the light which is (usually) called natural, an obvious reference
to a recognized terminology, namely that of the Western scholastics.
Pointing out, within the Christian morals, and breaking its borders here
and there, the autonomy and freedom of man appears as a constant of
Cantemir’s thinking. The argument used in this respect is found in Loca
Obscura: “Moreover, if the man weren’t free, he could not be educated”.
Starting from this point, Cantemir concludes that “all men are
naturally good and well-conceived, but starting with their youth, according
to the moral law, any man can bend to evil and do evil, therefore, since
their youth, men must be guided towards Christian and good habits, to
listen to those who call them, to trust in those said and to respect
commandments49, as it well known that the one who knows God, but does
not respect his commands, is a liar50, because faith without deeds is dead.51.
According to those underlined above, we can draw two major
characteristics of the Philosopher Prince, or rather two passions of his
writing. The first is his faith in the power of human reason, the use, as
much as possible, of the power of syllogism, definitions, of the logic
apparatus he enjoined to build his sentences with. And the second is his
concern as an enlightened teacher, who – considering the eternal values of
traditions – suggests and intertwines appropriate perspectives and means
for an efficient education.
Speaking of Cantemir’s teaching principles, we can notice the
wonderful description of the “ways and methods” of the progressive and
concentric education of the young, a theme which is resumed as a
48
D. Cantemir, Loca Obscura, mss.lat.76 of the Romanian Academy, f.104, apud.
Petru Vaida, in Cantemir’s Humanism and the Problem of Moral Consciousness, the Journal of
Philosophy no. 5/1971, Bucharest, the Romanian Academy Publishing House.
49
John XIV, 15, 21; XV, 20, apud. Dimitrie Cantemir in Loca Obscura, translation and
comments by Prof. Teodor Bodogae, Excerpt of the Magazine <<The Romanian Orthodox
Church>>, year XCI, nr. 9-10/1973, p.1064.
50
John II, 4, Ibidem.
51
Jacob II, 26. Ibidem.
236
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
52
The man with the help of whom Peter the Great tried his educational and
religious reforms, a scholar educated in the catholic schools of Poland and Italy, but who
had friends among Calvin and Lutheran theologians from Switzerland and Germany.
53
Dimitrie Cantemir, Loca Obscura, p.13-71.
54
Teodor Bodogae, Dimitrie Cantemir, Teacher and Othodox Theologian in his
Translation and Comments to Loca Obscura, cited works.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 237
55
Dimitrie Cantemir, Sacrosanctae, mss.lat. 76 of the Library of the Romanian
Academy, f.297, translation by Locusteanu, p.287-288.
56
Theodicy, cited works. The term of theodicy is a neologism created by Leibniz, in
1696, from the Greek words theos (god) and dike (reparation, reason, justice,
righteousness); work published in Amsterdam in 1710, in French.
57
F. Billicsich, Das Problem des Ubels in der Philosophie des Abendlandes, Band 2,
Vienna, 1952, p.111.
58
A. Brunswig, Leibniz, Vienna & Leipzig, 1925, p.53.
59
F. Uberweg, Grundrif der Geschichte der Philosophie, III, Die Philosophie der Neuezeit
his zum Ende des 18. Jahrhunderis, Berlin, 1924, p.333.
60
Petru Vaida, Dimitrie Cantemir, Life and Work in the History of Romanian Philosophy,
1 vol., 2nd edition, Publishing House the Romanian Academy Publishing House, 1985,
st
p.236.
238
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
from theology. The first attitude, met especially in Divanul, Logica and
Loca obscura, is related with the one of the medieval scholastics (reason in
the service of faith); in the Eastern context, it continues the traditions of
the rationalist branch of the Byzantine theology, as opposed to its
mystical line, obviously irrationalist (Grigore de Nyssa, Maximum the
Confessor, the Hesychast), which had dominated the Byzantine religious
literature received in our country. The name of the “Orthodox
rationalism”61 (of Orthodox religious rationalism) indicates quite
accurately the essence of such attitude, undertaken by other
representatives of the Romanian humanism and which does not reach the
rationalist criticism of dogmas. The second attitude, a more prolific, one is
embodied in the scientific work of Cantemir and can be related to the
philosophy of the Renaissance (the theory of the “double truth”).
Cantemir, however, rejects in his Sacrosanctae, the theory of the “double
truth”, which had to substantiate the separation of philosophy from
theology. The concept of “scared science” or of “theology-physics” from
Sacrosanctae gives rise to intricate problems. The name of “theology-
physics” or “theology – ethics”, assigned to the parts of the system
designed by Cantermir, shows the intention to merge philosophy and
science with theology.
Building a sort of bridge over Sacrosanctae, which reasserts its
somehow isolated nature in the work’s context, the optimistic and
rationalist conception from Divanul, reappears in Istoria ieroglifica62. The
entire philosophical excursus from Chapter 1063 is presented as a small
treaty, De Dignitate hominis, similar to those written by the Renaissance
humanists64. The status of the human being is not thought in theological
categories; the dignity of man does not reside, as in Sacrosanctae, in the
singular, unique relation with the religious transcendence, in the
transcendent vocation. Resuming the criticism of the naturalist finalism
from Van Helmont and several topics of the Orthodox thinking, Cantemir
61
Introduced by Al. Duţu, apud. Petru Vaida in The Relationship between Reason and
Faith, cited works, p. 191.
62
Dimitrie Cantemir, The Hieroglyphic History,Bucharest, Edition Stela Toma - N.
Stoicescu, 1973, p.183-184.
63
Ibidem, p.243-246.
64
See the work of Pico della Mirandola ’De dignitate hominis’.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 239
References
Billicsich, F., (1952), Das Problem des Ubels in der Philosophie des
Abendlandes, Band 2, Vienna.
Bodogae, Teodor, (1971), Dimitrie Cantemir, teacher and Orthodox
Theologian in his ‘Translation and Comments’ to Loca obscura, in the
Journal of Philosophy no. 5/, the Romanian Academy Printing House.
Cantemir, Dimitrie, (1901), The Chronicle of the Durability of Romanians-
Moldavians-Wallachians Tocilescu Printing House, C. Göbl Institute for
Graphic Arts.
Cantemir, Dimitrie, (1969), The Divan or The Wise Man’s Parley with the
World or The Judgement of the Soul with the Body, edition and introductory
study by Virgil Cândea, Bucharest, the Publishing House for Literature.
Cantemir, Dimitrie, (1973), The Hieroglyphic History, edition Stela Toma -
N. Stoicescu.
Gogoneaţă, N., (1970), Dimitrie Cantemir’s Letter to Golovkin, in the
Journal of Philosophy, tome 17/1, Bucharest, the Romanian Academy.
69
The contemporary sources show that the works John of Damascus (the 8 th
Century) were the basis of the study of theology in the Greek schools from Cantemir’s
age.
70
B. Tatakis, Histoire de la philosophie byzantine, Paris, 1950, p.108.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 241
Emil Cioran a fost apreciat ca fiind „cel mai mare nihilist al Occidentului
de la Nietzsche încoace”71.
Nihilist şi existenţialist, Cioran se ocupă de concepte precum
moartea, angoasa, absurdul, infinitul, neantul, haosul, agonia,
sinuciderea, nebunia. Exprimarea literară, dar mai ales ideile susţinute,
fac din Emil Cioran reprezentant tipic al orientărilor deconstructive ale
secolului al XX-lea în linia antiistorismului, antireprezentaţionismului şi
nonraţionalismului specifice şcolilor continentale din Germania, Italia,
Franţa.
Dintre români cea mai explicită poziţie postmodernă de tip nihilist
deconstructiv o are Emil Cioran72.
74
Idem, Tratat de descompunere, Bucureşti, Ed. Humanitas, 1992.
244
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
75
Idem, E., Despre Dumnezeu, antologie, selecţia textelor de Aurel Cioran, Bucureşti,
Ed. Humanitas, 1997, p.99.
76
Ibidem, p. 243.
77
Blaise Pascal, Pensées, Les Provinciales, Paris, Bookking International, 1995, p.9-10.
78
Emil Cioran, Despre Dumnezeu, p. 191.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 245
79
Idem, Lacrimi şi sfinţi, Bucureşti, Ed. Humanitas, p.110.
80
Idem, Mărturisiri şi anateme, p. 53.
81
Idem, Despre Dumnezeu, op.cit., p.30.
82
Idem, Ispita de a exista, Bucureşti, 2002, Ed. Humanitas, p.15.
83
Idem, Demiurgul cel rău, Bucureşti, 1996, Ed. Humanitas, p.168.
84
Convorbiri cu Cioran, Bucureşti, Ed. Humanitas, 1996, p.195.
85
Ibidem, p.196.
246
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
86
Emil Cioran, Despre Dumnezeu, p.232.
87
Ibidem, p.232.
88
Ibidem, p.98.
89
Ibidem, p.104.
90
Pohoaţă, G., Fr. Nietzsche and Emil Cioran – Notes on the Contemporary Nihilism, Vol.
International Conference on Philosophy, Minsk, 2011, p.50.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 247
91
Convorbiri cu Cioran, Bucureşti, Ed. Humanitas, 1996, p.193;
92
Ibidem, 194.
93
Ibidem, p.270.
94
Cioran, Lacrimi şi sfinţi, p.17.
95
Idem, Amurgul gândurilor, Bucureşti, Ed. Humanitas, 1996, p.164.
96
Idem, ,,Despre Dumnezeu”, Bucureşti, Ed. Humanitas, 1997, p.67.
97
Idem, Silogismele amărăciunii, Bucureşti, Ed. Humanitas, 1992, p.61.
98
Ibidem, p.80.
99
Idem, Amurgul gândurilor, p.168.
248
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
100
Idem, Silogismele amărăciunii, p.37.
101
Idem, Despre neajunsul de a te fi născut, Bucureşti, Ed. Humanitas, 1995, p.200.
102
Chira, V., Dominantele gândirii cioraniene, Sibiu, Ed. Univ. Lucian Blaga, 2006, p.
61.
103
Cioran, E., Amurgul gândurilor, p.143.
104
Idem, Lacrimi şi sfinţi, p. 89.
105
Idem, Amurgul gândurilor, p. 144.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 249
106
Idem, Cartea amăgirilor, p.97.
107
Idem, Amurgul gândurilor, p. 114.
108
Idem, Exerciţii de admiraţie, op.cit., p.20.
250
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
Bibliografie
109
Idem, Caiete, vol. I, Bucureşti, Ed. Humanitas, 2005, p.274.
110
Idem, Caiete, vol. III, Bucureşti, Ed. Humanitas, 2005, p. 190.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 251
Emil Cioran was considered as “the biggest nihilist of the Occident since
Nietzsche.”111
Nihilist and existentialist, Cioran is concerned about concepts like
death, anguish, absurd, infinite, nothingness, chaos, agony, suicide and
madness. The literary formulation, and most of all, the supported ideas,
makes Emil Cioran a typical representative of deconstruction orientations
of the 20th century in the area of anti-history, anti-representations and
non-rationalism that are typical to continental schools from Germany,
Italy and France.
Among Romanians, the most explicit post-modern position of a
nihilist deconstructivism type is the one of Emil Cioran112.
111
Gabriel Liiceanu, The Apocalypse after Cioran, Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing
House, 1992.
112
Angela Botez, A Century of Romanian Philosophy, Bucharest, the Romanian
Academy Publishing House 2005, p.320-331.
113
Emil Cioran, Exercises of Admiration, Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House,
1993, p. 201-206.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 253
114
Idem, A Short History of Decay, Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House, 1992.
254
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
Cioran with God. “The only thing that lasts is what has been designed of
solitude, facing God, even if you are a believer or not.”115
That is why I consider irrelevant the research of belief or disbelief of
Cioran in God. It is well known that this problem does not concern
philosophy. Nevertheless, there were faithful philosophers that never
wrote a book Despre Dumezeu (About God).
What matters the most in philosophy, and it is something that we can see in
Emil Cioran, is the interrogative intensity that makes impossible the answer, any
answer: “I don’t know how people can trust God, even if I think daily about
him.”116
Here is where the problem of the distinction between believer and
philosopher appears, between God and the idea of God, made once by
Pascal117, in order to difference Iov’s and Abraham’s God from the one of
philosophers and scientists. In the same manner, Cioran tries to clarify:
“The philosopher thinks about Divinity, the believer about God. One
thinks about the essence, the other one about the person. The divinity is
the abstract and impersonal stance of God. Faith being a close
transcendent, finds vitality in the routine of essences. Philosophy is only
an existential allusion, just the way that divinity is an indirect aspect of
God.”118
Cioran was aware that human meant is to think about God. More than
that, all thinkers surround him but the question is how many think inside
him?
Human immanency in divine transcendence is the only way of saving
the thinking process. The individual cannot become a metaphysic centre
without the illusion of divine substantiality.
God was defined, throughout history, as the Absolute or
metamorphosed as a human part. Under this contradiction we can find
philosophical ideas of the essayist Emil Cioran.
There is an impossibility of finding the truth that torments and that –
because of the impossibility before which the thinker finds himself,
converts into negativism. This negativism is determined by the
115
Idem, E., On God, p.99.
116
Ibidem, p. 243.
117
Blaise Pascal, Pensées, Les Provinciales, Paris, Bookking International, 1995, p.9-10.
118
Emil Cioran, On God, p. 191.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 255
“demonic” side of human that fights with ration: “It is curious how
exhausting is this idea of God. It’s presence inside the conscience is a
continuous tiredness, a hidden and exhausting fever, a destructive
principle”119.
After a self-testimony (in an interview of Gabriel Liiceanu), Emil
Cioran “shifts all the time between the need of belief and the impossibility
of believing”. He somehow has the pride of a loser: “It seems easier to
believe yourself God than to believe in God.”120 The fight of Cioran with
life, with the idea of God was a real spiritual war. “No one is able to know
if he is a believer or not”. “Religious is the one that can do without faith
but not without God.”121 The domain of faith has several unsuspected
shade because the sceptic Cioran, the one that doubts God and his own
faith finally reaches (in the virtue of scepticism principle) to doubt his
own unfaith as well. His rebellion is considered “a faith that I embrace
without believing in it.”122 This is how Cioran is not sure of the
“disinterest towards salvation.” “If I would be sure […], I would be by far
the happiest person alive.”123
119
Idem, Tears and Saints, Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House, 2008, p.110.
120
Idem, Confessions and Anathemas, p. 53.
121
Idem, On God, cited works, p.30.
122
Idem, The Temptation to Exist, Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House, 2002,
p.15.
Idem, The New Gods (The Evil Demiurge), Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing
123
125
Ibidem, p. 196.
126
Emil Cioran, On God, p. 232.
127
Ibidem, p. 232.
128
Ibidem, p. 98.
129
Ibidem, p. 104.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 257
130
Pohoaţă, G., Fr. Nietzsche and Emil Cioran – Notes on the Contemporary Nihilism,
Vol. International Conference on Philosophy, Minsk, 2011, p. 50.
131
Conversations with Cioran, Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House, 1996, p. 193.
132
Ibidem, 194.
133
Ibidem, p.270.
134
Cioran, Tears and Saints, p.17.
135
Idem, Le crépuscule des pensées, Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House, 1996,
p.164.
136
Idem, On God, antology, selection of texts by Aurel Cioran, Bucharest, Humanitas,
Publishing House, 1997, p.67.
258
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
References
149
Idem, Cahiers, vol. I, Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House, 2005, p. 274.
150
Idem, Cahiers, vol. III, Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House, 2005, p. 190.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 261
154
Cioran, Emil, Convorbiri cu Cioran, Bucureşti, Ed. Humanitas, 1993, p.201.
155
Augustin, Confesiuni, Bucureşti, Ed. Humanitas, 2002.
156
Cioran, E., op.cit., p. 203.
264
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
157
Nietzsche, Fr., Voinţă de putere, Bucureşti, Ed. Aion, 1999, p.55.
158
Nietzsche, Fr., Ştiinţa voiasǎ, Bucureşti, Ed. Humanitas, 2006, p. 85.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 265
159
Nietzsche, Fr., op.cit., p. 86.
160
Nietzsche, Fr., op.cit., p. 88.
161
Cioran, Emil, Despre Dumnezeu, Bucureşti, Ed. Humanitas, 1997, p. 99.
162
Cioran, Emil, Convorbiri cu Cioran, Bucureşti, Ed. Humanitas, 1996, p. 193.
266
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
163
Cioran, E., ibidem, op.cit., 1996.
164
Cioran, E., Despre Dumnezeu, Bucureşti, Humanitas, p.104.
165
Cioran, E., Ibidem, op.cit., 1997.
166
Cioran, E., Pe culmile disperǎrii, Bucureşti, Ed. Humanitas, 1998, p.103.
Nota: Pe culmile disperarii este considerată de autorul însuşi cea mai filosofică carte
a sa.
167
Nietzsche, Fr., Voinţa de putere, op.cit., p.47.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 267
3. Ceea ce contează cel mai mult pentru cei doi gânditori nu este atât
conştiinţa transcendenţei, ci posibilitatea de a accede la ea, prin suferinţă.
Poate de aici şi asemănarea întru nihilism. Sub domnia nihilismului,
filosofia are ca mobil sentimente negre: o ,,nemulţumire”, o angoasă, o
nelinişte de a trăi- un obscur sentiment de vinovăţie. Valorizarea
sentimentelor negative şi a pasiunilor triste reprezintă cumva, mistificarea
pe care nihilismul își întemeiază puterea.
Considerăm că nota comună a nihilismului împărtăşit de cei doi
gânditori este conferită de suferința. Această formă de spiritualitate este
cea mai acceptabilă pentru o omenire bântuită de ruina sa mai mult sau
mai puţin iminentă.
Dar ceea ce-i superiorizează pe autorii analizaţi este, mai ales, o pură
suferinţă metafizică generată de incapacitatea credinţei în divinitate.
Conştiinţa contradicţiei dintre a ştii şi a simţi capătă dimensiuni
dramatice. Dar consolarea vine cumva din afirmaţia lui Emil Cioran: ,,Un
om care nu a trăit drama conștiinței este un naiv” sau din mărturisirea
aceluiaşi autor: ,,Dacă ar mai fi trebuit să scriu o carte s-ar fi intitulat:
CONŞTIINŢA CA FATALITATE.
Bibliografie
168
Cioran, E., Convorbiri cu Cioran, op.cit., p.110.
268
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
169
Ionescu, Nae, Lectures on Philosophy of Religion, Cluj, Ed. Apostrof, 1993, p.116.
170
Cioran, Emil, The Trouble with Being Born, Bucharest, Ed. Humanitas, 1998, p.76.
171
Liiceanu, Gabriel, The Apocalypse after Cioran, Bucharest, Humanitas, 1995, p.57.
270
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
175
Nietzsche, Fr., Will to Power, Bucharest, Aion Publishing House 1999, p. 55.
176
Nietzsche, Fr., Gay Science, Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House, 2006, p. 85.
272
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
177
Nietzsche, Fr., cited works, p.86.
178
Nietzsche, Fr., cited works, p.88.
179
Cioran, Emil, On God, Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House, 1997, p.99.
180
Cioran, Emil, Conversations with Cioran, Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House,
1996, p.193.
181
Cioran, E., ibidem, cited works, 1996.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 273
interlocutor for us, God. Not by chance Cioran writes a book entitle “On
God.182”
Romanian thinker reaches to God’s conscience thanks to several
illumination moments which led him to the supreme happiness cognition
mystics speak about. To this path he confesses:
“Besides this happiness to which we are not called but only
exceptionally and only on short term, nothing holds a true experience; we
live in the kingdom of shadows. No matter what, you never come back
the same, either from paradise or inferno.183”
Mystic is the main concern which rises from the written works of
Romanian thinker: “Tears and Saints”, “On the deficient of being born”,
“On God”.
Mystic for Cioran means an exceptional experience. Somehow, it
identifies with ecstasy. It is an extreme experience which he had lived
several times (four times, as he, himself, confesses), maybe, to convert to
faith. Though, Cioran had not the same opinion. Therefore he stated: “…
you could live such experiences with or without faith”.184
It can be stated that Emil Cioran was no mystic though to a certain
point. Mystical void leads to Nothing, though to a Nothing which, in the
same time, is everything or the Being. “Nothing in mystic is what starts
after God or, more precisely, after divinity.”185 Herefrom the relation:
nihilism-mysticism.
In “Tears or Saints”, Cioran with thought of Nietzsche quotes: “You
searched for the heaviest burden and then you found yourself”, and later
in “Colloquy with Cioran” he concludes: “I know, ultimately, only two
cardinal issues: how to handle life and how to handle yourself. There are
no greater difficulties.”186 The origin of Emil Cioran attitude must be
182
Cioran, E., On God, Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House, p.104.
183
Cioran, E., Ibidem, cited works, 1997.
184
Cioran, E., On the Heights of Despair, Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House,
1998, p.103.
Note: On the Heights of Despair is considered by the author himself his most
philosophical work.
185
Nietzsche, Fr., Will to Power, cited works, p.47.
186
Cioran, E., Conversation with Cioran, cited works, p.110.
274
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
3. The most important for the two thinkers is not the consciousness of
its transcendence, though the possibility of acceding to it, by suffering.
From this point the resemblance with nihilism. Under the reign of
nihilism, the philosophy has as a purpose dark feelings: “a discontent”,
angst, a restlessness of living – an obscure feeling of guilt. Valuation of
negative feelings and sad passions represents somehow the mystification
on which nihilism develops its strength.
We consider the common note of nihilism shared by the two thinkers
as delivered by suffering. This form of spirituality is most acceptable for
mankind haunted by ruin more or less imminent.
Though, what makes the analyzed authors superior is, especially, o
pure metaphysical suffering generated by the incapacity of faith in
divinity. The conscience of contradiction between knowing and feeling
takes dramatic dimensions. The consolation comes, somehow, from Emil
Cioran’s statement: “A man who has not lived the drama of conscience is
a naïve” or by the confession of the same author: “If I Had had to write
another book, it would have been entitled: CONSCIENCE AS
FATALITY.”
References
187
G.W.F. Hegel, Prelegeri de filosofie a religiei, Bucureşti, Humanitas, 1995, p.18.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 277
ceea ce e Dumnezeu şi a ceea ce decurge din natura lui, iar această natură
trebuie să se manifeste şi să se dezvolte.” Astfel, filosofia se distinge ca
demers cognitiv deoarece conţine în ea un elan către un alt tip de
existenţă, temeritatea de a accede la taina ultimă. Este „Ştiinţa despre
Absolut”.188
Pentru o înţelegere corectă a distincţiei dintre filosofie şi religie,
apreciem ca fiind de referinţă textul lui N. Berdiaev care precizează:
„Filosofia nu este, asemenea religiei, revelaţie a lui Dumnezeu, ea este
revelaţie a omului, dar a omului părtaş la Logos, la Omul Absolut, la
Omul total, iar nu fiinţa individuală închisă. Filosofia este revelaţia
înţelepciunii în omul însuşi, prin efortul său creator.” 189
Cumva filosofia porneşte de la om înspre Dumnezeu, în timp ce în
religie drumul este invers.
Filosofia este o activitate a conştiinţei, iar Dumnezeu se lasă auzit
numai în liniştea vocii conştiinţei. „Nu există sistem filosofic complet
încheiat care să nu ajungă, mai curând sau mai târziu, la un punct limită,
care este Dumnezeu – fie că acest Dumnezeu este materie, fie că este
universul, ca la panteişti, fie că este o Idee supremă de bine, ca la
platonicieni etc., dar toate ajung la un punct limită, izvor al întregii vieţi şi
al întregii realităţi şi, în acelaşi timp, fundare a întregii realităţi“. 190 Pe
urmele lui Hegel, marele profesor român de filosofie, Nae Ionescu susţine
că filosofia are ca obiect transcendenţa 191, iar deosebirile dintre filosofie şi
religie „nu vin de la obiect, ci probabil din altă parte: întâi, de la rolul pe
care obiectul îl joacă în preocuparea filosofică sau religioasă şi, în al doilea
rând, de la felul cum se ajunge la acest obiect pe o cale sau pe cealaltă… e
calea religioasă, ajungerea la Dumnezeu se face prin identificare, iar
dovedirea existenţei lui Dumnezeu se face pe calea trăirii, pe câtă vreme
în filosofie, punctual acesta limită, Dumnezeu este rezultatul unui întreg
şir de cercetări ale raţiunii noastre”.192
Se poate înţelege astfel că filosofia ajunge la Dumnezeu prin
posibilităţile omului de cunoaştere, calea filosofică înspre divinitate fiind
188
Ibidem, p.17.
189
Nic. Berdiaev, Sensul creaţiei, Bucureşti, Humanitas, 1992, p. 99-115.
190
Nae Ionescu, Prelegeri de filosofia religiei, Cluj, Biblioteca Apostrof, 1993, p.116.
191
Idem, Tratat despre metafizică, Bucureşti, Ed. Roza Vânturilor, 1999.
192
Idem, Prelegeri de filosofia religiei, p.117.
278
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
195
S. Kierkegaard, Frică şi cutremur, Bucureşti, Humanitas, 2002.
280
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
Nu moartea este mântuire, aceasta poartă cu totul alt nume şi este legată de
o cu totul altă condiţie. Moartea ţine întru totul de aparenţă, de empiric, de
sfera multiplicităţii şi a schimbării; ea nu atinge deloc realitatea
transcendentă şi adevărată. Ceea ce moare în noi este numai individuaţia;
sâmburele esenţei noastre, voinţa, care este voinţa de viaţă, rămâne complet
neatins şi atâta timp cât nu face decât să se afirme pe sine va şti să găsească
întotdeauna căile spre viaţă.196
Un exemplu relevant îl constituie de asemenea gândirea lui Friderich
Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844-1900)197 care este un alt reper filosofic în privinţa
problemei soteriologice. Diferit de credinţă sau de practică, este acum indicat
un principiu nou, cel al „voinţei de putere”, conceput ca „eterna întoarcere a
aceluiaşi”. Acesta comportă negarea valorilor tradiţionale şi edificarea unor
valori noi. Morala veche este de fapt morala sclavilor, animaţi de spiritul
răzbunării pentru acele valori pe care nu le posedă. Creştinismul este
responsabil că a făcut posibilă o morală a supunerii. Nietzsche poate astfel să
nege valorile fericirii şi ale mântuirii, întrucât sunt expresie ale unei vieţi de
renunţare şi de supunere. Apare pe aceste baze nihilismul, care se exprimă
în aforismul „Dumnezeu a murit”. Această afirmaţie nu conţine o negaţie a
divinităţii, ea exprimă mai curând o critică la adaptările credinţei la spiritul
mundan şi ecleziastic, denunţând-o de incapacitatea de a realiza cu ridicarea
măştii o adevărată mântuire. Aceasta se obţine de fapt acceptând viaţa
pentru ceea ce este, adică drept bucurie şi suferinţă, durere şi pasiune.
Mântuirea constă atunci în acceptarea acestei condiţii de viaţă excepţională.
Numai supra-omul poate accepta şi suporta întregul şi crudul adevăr al
vieţii şi al lumii, recunoscând că la urma urmei există o veşnică repetare a
întâmplărilor cosmice.
Noul secol – al XX-lea – se deschide cu strigătul „morţii lui
Dumnezeu”, în care se exprimă conştiinţa crizei a tot ceea ce secolul al
XIX-lea considera ca definitiv. În timp ce în Italia filosofiile
neoidealismului, cu Benedetto Croce (1866-1952) şi Giovanni Gentile
(1875-1944), reacţionează la scientism şi la pozitivism, în altă parte
speculaţia străbate alte căi: cea a contemplaţiei şi a reflecţiei asupra
temelor existenţei. Fenomenologia inaugurată de Edmund Husserl (1859-
196
Ah. Schopenhauer, Scrieri despre filosofie şi religie, Bucureşti, Humanitas, 1995,
p.28.
197
Fr. Nietzsche, Voinţa de putere, Bucureşti, Ed. Aion, 1997.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 281
Humanitas, 2011.
199
M. Heidegger, Fiinţă şi timp, Bucureşti, Humanitas, 2003.
200
K. Jaspers, Texte filosofice, Bucureşti, Ed. Politică, 1988.
201
Nae Ionescu, op.cit.
282
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
205
Andrei Pleşu, Prefaţa la Sensul creaţiei, op.cit., p.12.
284
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
206
Augustin, în Iohannis Evangelium tractatus, XXIX, 6, apud. Diane Collinson, Mic
dicţionar al filosofiei occidentale, Bucureşti, Nemira, 1987, p. 39.
207
Ibidem, p. 40.
208
Leibniz, Eseuri de teodicee, Iaşi, Polirom, 1997, p. 45-89.
209
K. Jaspers, Conceptul de credinţă filosofică, în Texte filosofice, Bucureşti, Ed.
Politică, 1988, p. 112.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 285
210
Spinoza, Etica, Bucureşti, Ed. Ştiinţifică şi Enciclopedică, 1981.
211
G. Liiceanu „Declaraţie de iubire”, Bucureşti, Humanitas, 2001.
212
Spinoza, op.cit., p. 277.
286
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
Bibliografie
213
A. Camus, Mitul lui Sisif, în colecţia Opere XXI, Bucureşti, Ed. Rao, 2011.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 287
214
G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Bucharest, Humanitas, 1995,
p.18.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 289
215
Ibidem, p.17.
216
N. Berdiaev, The Meaning of the Creative Act, Bucharest, Humanitas, 1992, p.99-
115.
217
Nae Ionescu, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Cluj, Apostrof Library, 1993,
p.116.
218
Idem, A Treatise on Metaphysics, Bucharest, Roza Vânturilor Publishing House,
1999.
290
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
219
Idem, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, p.117.
220
Augustin, Confessions, Bucharest, Humanitas, 2002.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 291
221
N. Berdiaev, Freedom and the Spirit. An Essay on Christian Philosophy, Bucharest,
Paideia, 1996, p. 26.
222
S. Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, Bucharest, Humanitas, 2002.
292
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
God ", which expresses the awareness of the crisis of everything that the
19th century considered as definitive. While in Italy the philosophies of
neo-idealism, with Benedetto Croce (1866-1952) and Giovanni Gentile
(1875-1944), react to scientism and positivism, elsewhere the speculation
takes other ways: that of contemplation and reflection on the themes of
existence. Phenomenology, inaugurated by Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), is
the return to pure theoreticity, claiming a diverse use of reason, apart from
that of world domination tool. Reason, in phenomenology, is necessary to
get to know the real human being that presents itself to the world of life
(Lebenswelt). It's that reason which confers an ultimate tendency toward the
monadologic unity of the ego and upper communities, such as family and
society. Salvation is seen in this context as the reconstruction of pure
theoreticity. "The heroism of reason" (Heroismus der Vernunft) or
‘barbarianism’: this is the motto of one of Husserl’ last works, Krisis, where
salvation is seen in opposition with the objective danger threatening
Europe.225
The setorological intention in terms of truth (i.e. always philosophical
ones), is the focus of Martin Heidegger’s speculation (1889-1976)226. While
in the first works, as in Sein und Zeit, this intention appears as the
necessity to make man belong to banality and to the decay of inauthentic
life, in a second moment the salvation theme appears among those
problems with which the historical world in its destiny of decadence is
analyzed. That is why it was said that the expression of Heidegger’s
thought is becoming more and more attentive to the soteriological and
religious moment. Perhaps the most important position of this line of
thinking is that of K. Jaspers 227, who, in his works glorified the life of faith
as the only possibility of salvation. In fact, faith identifies itself with the
very condition of existence. Unable to take the leap into transcendence, it
is revealed, however, by figures or limit situations, like pain, sin and
death. Salvation is, therefore, in Jaspers’ opinion, a condition that arises
from the total abandonment or "shipwreck" of existence. In the Romanian
225
Ed. Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology,
Bucharest, Humanitas, 2011.
226
M. Heidegger, Being and Time, Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House, 2003.
227
K. Jaspers, Philosophical Texts, Bucharest, The Political Publishing House, 1988.
294
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
230
N. Berdiaev, The Meaning of the Creative Act, cited works, Humanitas Publishing
House, 1992.
231
Ibidem, p.70.
232
Andrei Pleşu, Forward to the The Meaning of the Creative Act, cited works, p.12.
296
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
The wise man, on the contrary, as we consider him as such, has his
soul troubled hardly at all, but, being in a kind of eternal need of self-
awareness, of God and things, never ceases to exist and always enjoys the
true peace of mind. If the way we have shown that leads to it seems very
difficult, it can still be found, and, of course, a thing that we meet so rarely
must be hard. If salvation were within easy reach and could be attained
without much trouble, how would it possibly be ignored by almost
everyone?
The wise man, on the contrary, as we consider him as such, has his
soul troubled hardly at all, but, being in a kind of eternal need of self-
awareness, of God and things, never ceases to exist and always enjoys the
true peace of mind. If the way we have shown that leads to it seems very
difficult, it can still be found, and, of course, a thing that we meet so rarely
must be hard. If salvation were within easy reach and could be attained
without much trouble, how would it possibly be ignored by almost
everyone?
239
Spinoza, cited works, p. 277.
240
A. Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus, Works XXI, Bucharest, Rao, 2011.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 299
References
241
S. Freud, Introducere în psihanaliză, Bucureşti, Ed. Trei, 2010.
242
G.W. Leibniz, Eseuri de teodicee, Iaşi, Polirom, 1997.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 303
243
E. Cioran, Revelaţiile durerii, Cluj, Ed. Echinox, 1990, p.90-91.
244
Ibidem, p.91.
304
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
245
N. Berdiaev, Spirit şi libertate, Bucureşti, Paideia, 1996, p.198.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 305
aceasta face parte din lucrarea divină în lume. Dar triumful definitiv
asupra răului nu va putea fi câştigat prin puterile naturale ale omului ce
rămân despărțite de Dumnezeu. Cumva, lumea precreştină s-a îndreptat spre
mântuirea arătată de creştinism, ca operă a iubirii, a salvării prin sacrificiul
infinitei iubiri divine.
Creştinismul este religia Mântuirii şi în consecinţă implică existenţa
răului, existenţa suferinţelor. Dacă suferinţa este consecinţa răului ea este
şi calea care trebuie să ne elibereze. Pentru conştiinţa creștină, suferinţa
nu este neapărat un rău; există o suferinţă divină, chiar al lui Dumnezeu-
Însuşi, cea a Fiului. Toată creaţia suspină şi plânge, așteaptă eliberarea.
Nu este răspunzătoare religia iubirii de faptul că domneşte ura în lumea
noastră naturală. Ca să respingem creştinismul e imposibil să cităm
existenţa suferinţelor incalculabile şi a relelor vieţii. Creştinismul este
religia libertății şi de aceea nu poate admite extirparea răului şi a
suferinţei prin violenţă şi constrângere. El dă suferinţei un sens,
eliberează din rău. Dar eliberarea prin ea însăși implică participarea
libertății omeneşti.246 Trimiterea la religia creştină este iminentă în
contextul analizei noastre, pentru că, înainte de toate, creștinismul ne
învață a fi neîndurători privind răul care este în noi. Dar nimicindu-l
trebuie să fim indulgenţi faţă de aproapele nostru. Răul nu poate fi
depășit decât lăuntric şi spiritual. Biruinţa obişnuită asupra lui este
legată de misterul mântuirii; nu poate avea loc decât în Hristos şi prin
Hristos. El este reperul suferinţei maxime suportate din iubire. Astfel,
prin exemplul său putem înţelege cum iubirea învinge moartea.
Misterul infinitei iubiri şi al noii libertăți nu putea fi descoperit decât prin
Hristos. De aceea apariţia Lui marchează un nou eon în destinul lumii.
Nu numai natura umană, ci tot universul, întreaga viaţă cosmică a fost
transfigurată după venirea lui Hristos. Nu poţi îndrăzni să analizezi
suferinţa, ca realitate ontologică şi transcederea ei, fără a nu avea în faţă
apogeul suferinţei întruchipate de Iisus, simbolul iubirii universale.
Consider că Experienţa trăită de Iisus este o dovadă a unei duble
implicații între iubire şi suferinţă: iubirea absolută generează suferinţa
absolută, iar aceasta din urmă poate fi depășită numai prin iubire.
Mântuirea este în mod cert singura teodicee posibilă, justificarea lui
246
Ibidem, p. 211.
306
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
256
Fr. Nietzsche, Ştiinţa voioasă, Bucureşti, Humanitas, 1994.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 309
Bibliografie
257
Cioran, Revelaţiile durerii, p.94.
310
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
behavior. Whereas during the physical suffering the human being gets in
touch with its biological self, during the moral one he becomes aware of
everyday nothingness and of the exterior evil, reaching the level of the
social ego or superego level as Freud258 used to call it, during the
metaphysical suffering man realizes his limit and lives with the thought
of death. Arriving here, on the stage of the spiritual self, man reaches self-
consciousness. In other words, there are several forms of suffering
corresponding to the different degrees of consciousness. Man manages
to overcome the evil (the physical, moral or metaphysical one) to the
extent in which he becomes capable of overcoming his limited point of
view. When he comes across the evil, he must be able to ascend to divine
law, for which the evil is only an indispensable element.
We do not live in “the best of all possible worlds "as Leibniz 259 said.
Moreover, the famous Leibnizian formula brought into derision by
Voltaire does not have any ethical connotations, the German philosopher
making here an extremely valuable ontological judgment which
differentiates between divine perfection and human imperfection. Hence,
from here derives Leibniz's answer to the problem of evil: evil comes from
imperfection, from the limitations and obscurities which determine the
existence of any created being. There is undoubtedly a connection
between the existence of evil and suffering. The evil generates
suffering, and its understanding can turn the evil into good. Evil is the
counterpart of good. Evil would be deprived of meaning in the absence of
good. Somehow, even though the evil is undesirable, it is necessary.
Without it, there would be neither excellence nor value. The search for
value, for excellence in the world would be impossible. The evil is a cause
of good, an idea shared by Leibniz in Theodicy; Good comes from God,
the evil from the status of creature.
Any serious conception of life involves the vision and admission of
evil and, implicitly, of suffering. Not seeing them, ignoring them, make
man irresponsible and superficial, somehow bars the depth of life for him.
Denying the evil, cancelling suffering means losing the freedom of the
spirit, throwing away the burden of freedom. Today’s world is under the
258
S. Freud, Introduction to Psychoanalysis, Bucharest, Trei Publishing House, 2010.
259
G.W. Leibniz, Essays on Theodicy, Iassy, Polirom Publishing House, 1997.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 313
260
E. Cioran, Pain Revelations, Cluj, Echinox Publishing House, 1990, p.90-91.
261
Ibidem, p. 91.
314
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
262
N. Berdiaev, Freedom and the Spirit, Bucharest, Paideia, 1996, p. 198.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 315
The indisputable and empirical evidence is the Greek culture. The higher
spiritual nature of man lived in Plato. The thirst for God and divine life
man felt manifested in him. The human nature preserves its
independence, it is part of the divine work in the world. But the final
triumph over evil cannot be gained through man's natural powers which
remain separated from God. Somehow, the pre-Christian world turned
towards the salvation shown by Christianity, as a work of love, of salvation
through the sacrifice of infinite divine love.
Christianity is the religion of Salvation and, consequently, it implies
the existence of evil, of sufferings. If suffering is the consequence of evil, it
is also the path we need to set us free. For the Christian consciousness,
suffering is not necessarily an evil; there is a divine suffering, even of
God-Himself, that of the Son. The whole creation sighs and cries, waiting
to be released. The religion of love is not responsible for the fact that
hatred reigns in our natural world. To reject Christianity is impossible to
quote the existence of incalculable sufferings and evils of life. Christianity
is the religion of freedom and, therefore, cannot allow the removal of evil
and suffering through violence and coercion. It gives suffering a sense,
releases it from evil. But the release itself involves the participation of
human freedom263. The reference to the Christian religion is imminent in
the context of our analysis, because, above all, Christianity teaches us to
be ruthless to the evil which is inside us. But by destroying it, we must be
indulgent toward our fellow man. Evil can be overcome only in an inner
and spiritual way. Common victory is linked to the mystery of salvation;
it can take place only in Christ and through Christ. He is the benchmark
of maximum suffering borne from love. Thus, through his example we
can understand how love conquers death. The mystery of infinite love
and new freedom could be found only through Christ. Therefore, His
appearance marks a new eon in the world’s destiny. Not only the human
nature, but also the entire universe, the whole cosmic life was
transfigured by the coming of Christ. One cannot dare to analyze
suffering, as ontological reality and its transcendence, without having
in front of the eyes the pinnacle of suffering embodied by Jesus, the
symbol of universal love.
263
Ibidem, p.211.
316
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
267
E. Cioran, cited works, p.22.
268
Ibidem, Tears and Saints, Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House, 2008.
269
Ibidem, The Book of Delusions, Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House, 1991.
270
Ibidem, Confessions and Anathemas, Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House,
2012.
271
Ibidem, The Fall in Time, Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House, 1994.
318
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
272
Ibidem, The Trouble with Being Born, Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House,
2008.
273
Fr. Nietzsche, The Gay Science, Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House, 1994.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 319
References
274
E. Cioran, Pain Revelations, Cluj, Echinox Publishing House, 1990, p.94.
275
Bh. Spinoza, The Ethics, The Scientific and Encyclopedic Publishing House,
Bucharest, 1981.
320
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
Berdiaev, N., (1996), Freedom and the Spirit, Bucharest, Paideia Publishing
House.
Cioran, E., (2008), Tears and Saints, Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing
House.
Cioran, E., (1991), The Book of Delusions, Bucharest, Humnitas Publishing
House.
Cioran, E., (2012), Confessions and Anathemas, Bucharest, Humanitas
Publishing House.
Cioran, E., (1994), The Fall in Time, Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing
House.
Cioran, E., (2008), The Trouble with Being Born, Bucharest, Humanitas
Publishing House.
Cioran, E., (1990), Pain Revelations, Cluj, Echinox Publishing House.
Cioran, E., (1992), The Trouble of Existing, Bucharest, Dionysos
Publsihing House.
Freud, S., (2010), Introduction to Psychoanalysis, Bucharest, Trei
Publishing House.
Leibniz, G.W., (1997), Essays on Theodicy, Iaşi, Polirom Publishing
House.
Nietzsche, Fr., (1994), The Gay Science, Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing
House.
Schopenhauer, A., (2012), The World as Will and Representation,
Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House.
Spinoza, Bh., (1981), The Ethics, Bucharest, The Scientific and
Encyclopedic Publishing House.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 321
280
Ibidem.
281
The Oxford English Dictionary, apud. Ibidem.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 323
282
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, op.cit.
283
Al. Surdu, Despre Existenţă, Fiinţă şi Realitate din perspectiva filosofiei sistematice
categoriale, în Studii de istorie a filosofiei romanești, vol. X, Bucureşti, Ed. Academiei
Române, 2014, p.14.
324
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
284
Platon, Dialoguri trad. De Cezar Papacostea, Bucureşti, Ed. Trei, 1998.
285
M.Heidegger, Scrisoare despre umanism, trad. de Thomas Kleininger and Gabriel
Liiceanu, Bucureşti, Ed. Univers, 1982, p.321-383.
286
N.Berdiaev, Spirit şi libertate, Bucureşti, Paideia, 1996, p.222.
287
Ibidem, p.223.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 325
288
Ibidem, p. 227.
289
A. Frossard, Întrebări despre Dumnezeu, Bucureşti, Ed. Humanitas, 1992, p.131.
326
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
291
Vladimir Jankelevitch, op.cit., trad. de Laurentiu Zvicas, Prefața de Valeriu
Gherghel.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 327
este ușoară, nici imposibilă, pur şi simplu foarte grea. Astfel, Ricoeur
susține că, iubirea este capabilă să lase în urmă orice, chiar şi ce este de
neiertat; iertarea ori se referă şi la cele de neiertat, ori nu există. El
enumera păcatele în patru categorii: criminale, politice, morale şi
metafizice; recunoaște, că a fi păcătos înseamnă că omul poate fi pedepsit,
dar refuză disprețul faţă de autor; incapabilitatea de-a se adresa cu
respect către autor este imperfecțiunea iubirii. Chiar dacă iertarea nu
poate fi instituționalizată, această cultură a respectului definește politica şi
relația dintre popoare-considera Ricoeur.
Întrebarea vehementă a lui J.: oare nu s-a cerut iertare? Indică faptul,
că iertarea este mult mai ușoară acolo, unde autorii şi-au recunoscut
propriile păcate. Ricoeur este interesat tocmai de această dinamică a
reciprocității. Ricoeur redă o relație între cadou şi iertare. Ambele se
referă la o relație asimetrică. Este de acord cu J. în faptul că maximul etic
este dragostea faţă de dușman care nu așteaptă răsplată. Iisus elimină regulă
reciprocității în Predica de pe munte. În realitate, iertarea depășește un interval
între sus şi jos, între prea înaltul spiritului de iertare şi prăpastia culpabilităţii.
Această disimetrie este elementul constitutiv al ecuației iertării. Ea ne însoțește
ca o enigmă pe care n-am încetat niciodată s-o cercetăm.294
În acest sens, iertarea ca problemă a filosofiei morale este explorată
excepțional şi de către Griswold care îşi deschide lucrarea consacrată
acestei problematici295 cu o discuție istorică despre iertare punând în
antinomie viziunea anticilor şi cea a modernilor. Contrar credinței
tradiționale aprobată de gânditori precum Hannah Arendt, că iertarea
este exclusiv iudeo-creștină ca fiind opusă ideii păgâne, Griswold susține
că iertarea şi noțiunile legate de aceasta sunt într-adevăr prezente în
gândirea grecească şi cea romană. Totuși filosofii clasici-precum şi filosofii
moderni influențați de către aceștia, mai ales Nietzsche-nu considerau
iertarea o virtute autentică. Griswold oferă patru motive pentru care
trebuie să pornim de la doctrinele clasice despre perfecționism şi
demnitatea umană: 1. persoanele virtuoase ar fi prin definiție perfecte din
punct de vedere moral şi nu ar avea nevoie de iertarea celorlalți. În plus,
ei ar fi probabil neiertători cu ceilalți, în măsura în care (2) ei nu ar avea
niciun interes de a prelua în mod înțelegător defectele morale ale
294
Ibidem, p.584.
295
Charles L. Griswold, op.cit., pp. 242.
330
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
296
Platon, Apologia lui Socrate, Opere, Dialoguri, trad. de Cezar Papacostea, Bucureşti,
Ed. Trei, 1988, p.9-41.
297
Charles L. Griswold, op.cit., p.47.
298
Ibidem, p.115.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 331
299
Ibidem, p.140
300
Wendell O’Bien, How not to Forgive, 2012.
301
Ileana Vulpescu, Arta conversaţiei, Bucureşti, Ed. Tempus, 2010.
332
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
302
Pr. Constantin Coman, Dreptatea lui Dumnezeu şi dreptatea oamenilor, Bucureşti,
Ed. Bizantina, 2010.
303
Ibidem.
304
P. Ricoeur, Memoria, istoria, uitarea, Timișoara, Ed. Amarcord, 2001, p.579.
305
Hannah Arendt ,,Condition de l’homme moderne”, p.266, apud. P. Ricoeur, op.cit.,
589.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 333
spun că numai dacă oamenii schimbă iertarea, vor putea spera să fie
iertați de Dumnezeu: puterea de a ierta este o putere umană 306. Astfel,
Arendt argumentează: ,,Numai dezlegându-se reciproc de ceea ce au
făcut pot rămâne oamenii agenți liberi”307. Fapt confirmat, pe de o parte,
de opoziția între iertare şi răzbunare, cele două moduri umane de a
reacționa la jignire, iar pe de altă parte de paralelismul dintre iertare şi
pedeapsă, ambele întrerupând un şir nesfârșit de rele. Asupra acestui
punct H. Arendt are o oarecare ezitare: ,,Deci e un fapt foarte semnificativ,
un element structural al domeniului lucrărilor umane, ca oamenii să fie
incapabili de a ierta ceea ce nu pot pedepsi şi să fie incapabili de a pedepsi
ceea ce se dovedește de neiertat. Aceasta e adevărata marcă a jignirilor
numite de la Kant încoace<<radical rele>> şi despre care știm atât de
puțin, chiar noi, cei care am fost supuși uneia din rarele lor explozii în
public. Tot ce știm este că nu putem nici pedepsi, nici ierta aceste jigniri şi
că, în consecință, ele transcend domeniul lucrărilor umane şi potențiala
putere umană pe care ambele o distrug radical pretutindeni unde își fac
apariția. Deci, atunci când actul însuși ne deposedează de orice putere, nu
ne rămâne decât să repetăm, împreuna cu Iisus: <<Ar fi mai bine pentru el
să I se atârne la gât o piatră de moară şi să fie aruncat în mare…>> 308.
Hannah, susține Paul Ricoeur309, realizează faptul că raportul iertării cu
dragostea o ţine departe de politică. Dovada prin absurd o constituie
eșecul uneori monstruos al tuturor tentativelor de a instituționaliză
iertarea. Filosoful francez evoca ,,caricatura iertării care este amnistia”,
forma instituțională a uitării.310 Apelând la texte din Nietzsche 311 Paul
Ricoeur analizând simetria dintre iertare şi făgăduință, aduce în atenție
306
În Matei, 18,35, se spune: ,,Tot așa va face şi Tatăl meu ceresc, dacă fiecare dintre
voi nu iartă din toata inima pe fratele său”. Şi: ,,Dacă iertați oamenilor greşelile lor, şi
Tatăl vostru ceresc vă va ierta greșelile voastre. Dar dacă nu iertați oamenilor greșelile
lor, nici Tatăl vostru nu vă va ierta greșelile voastre” (6,14-15) Luca, 17,3-4: ,,Dacă fratele
tău păcătuiește împotriva ta de șapte ori pe zi şi de șapte ori pe zi se întoarce spre tine şi
zice: << Îmi pare rău>>-să-l ierți”.
307
Hannah Arendt, op.cit., p. 270.
308
Hannah Arendt, op.cit., p.271, apud. Paul Ricoeur, op.cit., p.590.
309
Paul Ricoeur, op.cit., p.591.
310
Ibidem.
311
Fr. Nietzsche, Opere, vol. 2, Știința voiasă, Genealogia moralei, Amurgul idolilor,
București, Humanitas, 1994, p.287-446.
334
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
315
Vladimir Jankelevitch, op.cit., p.11.
316
Artistotel, Etica Nicomahică, Bucureşti Ed. Stiinţifică şi Enciclopedică, 1988.
336
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
317
G.W. Leibniz, Adevărurile prime în Opere filosofice, I, trad. Constantin Floru,
Bucureşti, Ed. Stiinţifică, 1972.
318
Georges Friedmann, Leibniz et Spinoza (1946), apud. Vladimir Jankelevitch,
Iertarea, Iași, Ed. Polirom, 1998, p.88.
319
Imm. Kant, Religia în limitele simplei rațiuni, trad. de Gabriel Parvu, Bucureşti, Ed.
Humanitas, 2004.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 337
Limitele iertării
Pentru o anumită categorie de oameni umiliți sau ofensați, a acorda
iertare ofensatorului sau persecutorului lor este extrem de greu: a ierta
este un efort ce trebuie întruna reînceput; aceasta încercare este, în unele
cazuri, la limita puterilor noastre. Iertarea, în sensul strict al termenului,
este efectiv un caz limită. Omul vremelnic, făptura finită, nu este croit nici
pentru suferința veșnică, nici pentru ranchiuna nepieritoare: căci pentru o
asemenea veșnicie inimaginabilă ar fi mai degrabă, pentru noi,
insuportabila disperare. Iertarea nu ne cere să ne sacrificăm întreaga ființă
proprie şi nici să luăm locul păcătosului: iertarea nu cere atât de mult; ea
ne cere doar, când este vorba de o insultă, să renunţăm la arțag, la
agresiunea pătimașă şi la ispita răzbunării; iar când este vorba de un
păcat, la pedepse, la răsplata cu aceeași monedă şi la exigenţele cele mai
legitime ale justiției. Iertarea este, în definitiv, nu atât radical disperată,
cât dezinteresată.320 Fără îndoială însă că o mașină de iertat, un
distribuitor automat de graţie şi indulgenţe nu au decât o vagă legătură
cu adevărata iertare. Dimpotrivă, darul dezinteresului absolut este mai
degrabă o limită ideală şi un orizont inaccesibil, de care ne apropiem
asimptotic fără să-l atingem de fapt niciodată. Sau, altfel spus: harul
iertării şi al iubirii dezinteresate ne este dăruit în clipă şi ca apariție care
dispare de îndată- adică îl găsim şi îl pierdem în același moment. De
fiecare dată când iertarea se află în slujba unui scop, chiar şi a unui scop
nobil şi spiritual (răscumpărare sau mântuire, reconciliere, izbăvire), de
fiecare dată când tinde să restabilească o stare de normalitate (socială,
națională, politică, psihologică) printr-un travaliu de doliu, printr-o
anume terapie sau ecologie a memoriei, de fiecare dată ,,iertarea” nu este
pură şi nici conceptul său. Iertarea nu este, nu ar trebui să fie nici
normală, nici normative şi nici normalizatoare. Ea ar trebui să rămână
excepțională şi extraordinară, gata să treacă proba imposibilului: ca şi
cum ar întrerupe cursul obișnuit al temporalității istorice.321
Bibliografie
320
Ibidem, p.89.
321
J. Derrida, op.cit., p.93.
338
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
322
Vladimir Jankelevitch, Forgiveness, Iassy, Polirom Publishing House, 1998.
323
Jacques Derrida, Faith and Knowledge. Century and Forgiveness, Paralela 45
Publishing House, 2003.
324
Paul Ricoeur, Memory, History, Oblivion, Timişoara, Amarcord Publishing House,
2001, p.553-606.
325
Charles L. Griswold, Forgiveness: A Philosophical Exploration, Cambridge
University Press, 2007; Forgiveness: A Philosophical Exploration is a masterful treatment of
a central issue in moral philosophy. Well-written, penetrating, and rich in details, this
book discusses a number of related topics including interpersonal forgiveness, political
apology, pardon, and civic reconciliation. It not only provides a broad historical survey
of the views on forgiveness of many important philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle,
Seneca, Epicurus, Butler, Hume, Smith, Nietzsche, and Arendt, but also offers insightful
analyses of related concepts including trust, narrative, sympathy and empathy, truth-
telling, and moral luck. At the end of the day, even if one does not fully agree with all of
Griswold's main theses -- many of which, as we shall see, are quite controversial -- there
is still an extraordinary amount to be learned from this impressive account.
340
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
326
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Plato Stanford, edu/entries/forgiveness, First
published Thu May 6, 2010; substantive revision Tue Dec 23, 2014.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 341
327
Ibidem.
328
The Oxford English Dictionary, apud. Ibidem.
329
Paul Ricoeur, Memory, History, Oblivion, Timişoara, Amarcord Publishing House,
2001.
342
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
330
Al. Surdu, On Existence, Being and Reality from the Perspective of Categorical
Systematic Philosophy, in Studies on the History of Romanian Philosophy, vol. X, Bucharest,
the Romanian Academy Publishing House, 2014, p.14.
331
Platon, Dialogues, translated by Cezar Papacostea, Bucharest, Trei Publishing
House, 1998.
332
M. Heidegger, Letter about Humanism, translated by Thomas Kleininger and
Gabriel Liiceanu, Bucharest, the Universe Publishing House, 1982, p.321-383.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 343
the evil, man is often contaminated by it, without realizing the power evil
has on him. Man who fights evil often finds himself caught in its traps,
which will keep him captive forever333. What man thinks to be the fight
against evil, for himself becomes the good itself. “The state is called to
limit the manifestations of evil in the world, but the means it uses easily
change into the evil itself, even morality has the ability to degenerate into
its opposite, destroying the creative life of the spirit. The law, the customs,
the ecclesiastical law can deform life. The obsession of evil and the need
to fight against it, through coercion and violence, enslave the man to the
sin and prevent him from freeing himself. The true spiritual hygiene does
not consist in absorbing evil from world, but in focusing on the good, on
the divine world, on the vision of light.” 334 The antinomy of evil can only
be clarified through spiritual experience, which Dostoevsky understood
in a remarkable way. The experience of evil, the disclosure of its
nothingness, may lead us to the apogee of goodness. By living the evil, we
can get full knowledge of truth and goodness. In fact, man, peoples and
all mankind follow this path, experiencing the evil and thus getting to
know the power of goodness, of the elevation of truth. Man learns the
nothingness of evil and the greatness of goodness, neither through a
formal law nor through prohibition, but through the experience lived on
the path of life. Besides, the experimental spiritual path is the only way to
knowledge. The Man and the world are undergoing a voluntary attempt
through free knowledge and head freely to God, to His Kingdom.
Above of all, Christianity teaches us to be ruthless as to the evil which
is inside us. But destroying it, we must be indulgent towards our peer, in
other words we need to forgive. Firstly, I have to realize the strength and
beauty of goodness inside me and not to impose on the others what I
couldn’t achieve, hard as I might have tried myself 335. The evil can be
overcome only innerly and spiritually. The victory obtained over it is
linked to the mystery of Salvation; it can be gained only through Christ
and through Christ. We defeat the evil only in communion with Christ,
333
N. Berdiaev, Freedom and the Spirit, Bucharest, Paideia Publishing House, 1996,
p.222.
334
Ibidem, p.223.
335
Ibidem, p. 227.
344
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
participating in his Work, taking upon us His Cross. Jesus is the symbol
of love, and love is the first principle of all that was and will ever be 336.
In order to remove the evil we must build our lives on love, not on
vanity and selfishness. Through love man keeps his link with God whom
he begs for leniency and forgiveness for his sins. God's forgiveness occurs
only on the background of eliminating the evil from ourselves (purifying)
and forgiving those who have caused us evil. At this level, forgiveness
can be a way of salvation, by changing the evil into goodness.
338
Vladimir Jankelevitch, cited works, translated by Laurentiu Zvicas, Forward by
Valeriu Gherghel.
346
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
339
Derrida, Jacques, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, translated by Mark Dooley
and Michel Hughes, New York: Routledge, 2001.
340
P. Ricoeur, cited works, 553-606.
348
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
the maximum ethic is the love of the enemy which does not expect any reward. Jesus
eliminated the rule of reciprocity in the Sermon on the Mount. In reality, forgiveness
exceeds an interval between the top and bottom, between the High spirit of
forgiveness and the gap of culpability. This dissymmetry is the constitutive element
of the equation of forgiveness. It accompanies us as a mystery that we have never
stopped researching.341
In this respect, forgiveness as a problem of moral philosophy is also
exceptionally explored by Griswold who starts his work dedicated to this
issue342 with a historical discussion about forgiveness putting in antinomy
the vision of the ancients and that of the moderns. Contrary to the
traditional belief approved by thinkers such as Hannah Arendt, that
forgiveness is exclusively Judeo-Christian as opposed to the pagan idea,
Griswold argues that forgiveness and the notions related to it are indeed
present in the Romanian and Greek thinking. However, classical as well
as modern philosophers influenced by them, especially Nietzsche, did not
look upon forgiveness as an authentic virtue. Griswold offers four reasons
why we must start from the classical doctrines about perfectionism and
human dignity: 1. virtuous people would be by definition morally perfect
and would not need the others’ forgiveness. In addition, they would
probably be unforgiving to others, to the extent that (2) they would have
no interest in overtaking in a sympathetic way the moral flaws of
individuals lacking moral virtue; 3) they would consider themselves
immune to the moral injuries of those lacking moral virtue and, last but
not least, 4) due to a hierarchical system of values, they would not accept
that those lacking virtue might claim mutual moral compensation or have
an equal moral position, contrary to our modern ideal of human dignity.
The author uses as an argument the case of Socrates who said in his
Defence343: “Neither Meletus nor Anytus can harm me in any way; he
could not harm me, for I do not think it is permitted that a better man be
harmed by a worse" idea that was later developed by more thinkers. The
main idea underlying Griswold's analysis is his claim that “forgiveness
comes with certain conditions or rules" 344. More specifically, forgiveness
341
Ibidem, p.584.
342
Charles L. Griswold, cited works, p.242.
343
Plato, The Apology of Socrates, Works, Dialogues, cited works, p.9-41.
344
Charles L. Griswold, cited works, p.47.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 349
345
Ibidem. p.115.
346
Ibidem.p.140.
350
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
not do to others what I would not like to be done to me, and I will do what I wish.
True forgiveness also implies a negative judgement in the sense that
someone has wronged you. A person who rarely, if ever, had no
resentment or did not judge, then he rarely or never meets the necessary
conditions for forgiveness.347
Forgiveness does not have to be a mere formality, accomplished to
emanate a sense of moral superiority, but it requires a certain attitude of
understanding and tolerance in relation to the subject of forgiveness.
We can speak about a moral and psychological benefit of forgiveness
when any matter which is the subject of this relationship (supply and
demand of forgiveness) is clarified through adequate communication in
terms of honesty, fairness and respect from everyone involved. This level
of interpersonal relationships is difficult to achieve, especially today,
when in the world there is too much pride and forgiveness is seen as a
manifestation of weakness and less as an evidence of kindness and love.
strength to forgive without being asked, it is even better. Only in this way
we can reconcile ourselves, inside of us, with the other. And not only do I
reconcile with the other within me, eliminating the tension accumulated
in my soul, in my mind - maybe rightfully due to abuses, or errors, or
injustices that we received from others - but my path is open to the other,
it is cleansed of obstacles. I, with my soul and mind, I go leisurely
towards the other, to meet him, which is very important. The attitude of
forgiveness that comes unilaterally determines, according to the
testimony of the Gospel of Christ the Saviour, the other to cast off the
weapons of war. Forgiveness is the only and most effective way of
reconciliation.349 Man through his essence is forgiveness. 350 The human
being’s strength to continue fighting is amazing, making him keep his
soul unaltered, even when the circumstances make such action almost
impossible. Where does the power to forgive come from?
In this respect, we bring into discussion philosophical concerns of
reference for our analysis. If Paul Ricoeur argues that forgiveness is a
“heavenly gift” and “love of enemies is the absolute measure of the gift 351,
the position we share, as far as the position adopted by Hannah Arendt is
concerned, there is a significant distance leaving us to understand somehow
that forgiveness does not come from any other faculty, possibly higher, but it
is one of the virtualities of human action. 352 Regarding this aspect, Hannah
Arendt uses the Gospel exegesis extremely favourable to his interpretation.
These texts say that only if people change forgiveness, they can hope to be
forgiven by God: the power to forgive is a human power353. Thus, Arendt
349
Pr. Constantin Coman, God’s Justice and People’s Justice, Bucharest, Bizantina
Printing House, 2010.
350
Ibidem.
351
P. Ricoeur, Memory, History, Oblivion, Amarcord Publishing House, Timişoara, 2001,
p. 579.
352
Hannah Arendt, Condition de l’homme moderne, p. 266, apud. P. Ricoeur, cited works, p.
589.
353
In Mathew, 18,35, it is said: "My heavenly Father will also do the same to you, if each
of you does not forgive his brother from your heart.” And: "For if you forgive men their
trespasses, your heavenly Father will also forgive you. "But if you do not forgive men their
trespasses, neither will your Father... (6,14-15); Luca, 17,3-4: “And if your brother sins
against you seven times a day, and returns to you seven times, saying: << I am sorry >> you
must forgive him”.
352
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
argues: “Only freeing each other from what they did, can people remain free
agents."354 A fact confirmed, on the one hand, by the opposition between
forgiveness and revenge, the two human ways to react to insult and, on the
other hand, by the parallelism between forgiveness and punishment, both
interrupting an endless series of evil facts. On this point, H. Arendt has some
hesitations: “So, it is a very significant fact, a structural element of the field of
human works, the fact that people are incapable of forgiving what they
cannot punish and are unable to punish what proves unforgivable. This is
the true mark of insults since Kant called them “radical evil” and about
which we know so little, even we, the ones who have been subjected to one
of their rare explosions in public. All we know is that we can neither punish
nor forgive these offenses and that, consequently, they transcend the human
work and the human potential power which both destroy radically
wherever they make their appearance. So, when we the act itself deprives us
of any power, all we can do is repeat together with Jesus: << It would be
better for him if a millstone were hung around his neck and he were cast into
the sea ... >>355. Hannah, argues Paul Ricoeur356, is aware of the fact that the
relationship of forgiveness with love keeps it away from politics. Proof of the
absurd is the failure, sometimes monstrous, of all attempts to institutionalize
forgiveness. The French philosopher conjured up “the caricature of
forgiveness which is amnesty", the institutional form of oblivion 357.
Appealing to Nietzsche’s texts358, Paul Ricoeur, analyzing the symmetry
between forgiveness and promise, brings to attention the Nietzschean
approach on the relationship between memory and oblivion, that we
consider useful in our analysis. Oblivion is not considered a mere inertia, but
an “active positive braking capacity in the strictest sense of the word"…”the
benefit of active oblivion consisting in the fact that it is a sort of concierge, a
sort of preserver of spiritual order, of tranquility and etiquette" 359. It is
against such oblivion that the memory works, not any memory, not the
memory which is a preserver of the past, a reminder of the past events, of
354
Hannah Arendt, cited works, p. 270.
355
Hannah Arendt, cited works, p. 270, p.271, apud. Paul Ricoeur, cited works, p.590.
356
Paul Ricoeur, cited works, p.591.
357
Ibidem.
358
Fr. Nietzsche, Works, 2nd vol., The Gay Science, On the Genealogy of Morality,
Twilight of the Idols, Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House, 1994, p.287-446.
359
Ibidem.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 353
the revolute past, but the memory that confers men the power to keep their
promises, to maintain themselves: ontological memory, we would say, a
memory that, regulating the future after having engaged the past, makes
man be “predictable, well-ordered, necessary"- and thus able “to be
responsible for his future” 360. Paul Ricoeur's conception of memory and
oblivion is a reference point for the current issue, but the French author’s
arguments are valued in terms of historical hermeneutics. 361 The most
irreducible reason of the dissymmetry between oblivion and memory as to
forgiveness lies in the ineffable nature of the polarity that divides against
itself the underground empire of oblivion: the polarity between oblivion by
deleting and reserve oblivion. If the French author concludes that there
cannot be happy oblivion, as we can dream of a happy memory, we believe
that the two are complementary, not in antinomic relationship. It is true that
oblivion is not a law of memory, meaning that we forget what we do not
want to forget and keep in our memory’s reservoir information that harms
our soul.
Thus, the paradigm we propose is based on the premise that the
education of memory is in our power. Therefore, man can take possession of
his retrieval capacity. Only by loathing the evil, keeping in the intellect, in
the memory, the noble aspects, repudiating rancor, resentments or guilt,
only such an intellect can be enlightened by the divine grace. It is certain
that forgiveness is the prerogative of an inner freedom conferred by
achieving a state of peace of mind. This can be accomplished through self-
knowledge, through reason and will, which acting jointly regulates the
ontological memory.
Therefore, we propose a new paradigm of forgiveness: I WANT TO
FORGET IN ORDER TO BE ABLE FORGIVE. This has as backing pillar the
next argument: the gift of forgiveness can be received only based on a
happy memory or happy oblivion. The happy memory is when the
memory’s reservoir is full of noble ideas, pure thoughts and happy
oblivion occurs when you remove from the memory those issues that
cause suffering. One can forget only by detesting the evil. This is where
free will acts. If man uses properly the free will, he can then avoid the error,
360
Giles Deleuze, Nietzsche et la Philosophie, Paris, PUF, coll. ,,Quadrige”, 1962, 1998,
apud. Paul Ricoeur, cited works, p. 591.
361
Paul Ricoeur, cited works, p. 607.
354
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
the sin, the evil. The climax of forgiveness is only God. The power to
forgive comes only from God. It is a trans-human feeling. The lesson of
forgiveness cannot be learned or acquired through knowledge, it can occur somehow
through self-knowledge, through the psychoanalysis of the self. And self-knowledge is
not a passive reflection, it is a fight that requires a synergistic action of intelligence,
faith and will. “Forgiveness is a decision of the will, as victory over
temptation: it remains however, like any decision, an initial and sudden,
spontaneous event"362. At human level, in general, there is no total
forgiveness for man is ambivalent: the combination of subjective/objective,
sacred/profane, rational/irrational, entropy/negentropy etc. This is the
greatest difficulty that philosophical conceptions have faced in explaining
man. Forgiveness is an Absolute or, in other words, the man capable of
genuine forgiveness lives in Truth, being connected to a noumenal world of
perfect order. The man who knows himself measures against the Absolute
and can experience forgiveness through contemplation, the highest activity
of the soul to which man can accede by nous “the most elevated part of man,
the human being itself”363. What we speak about is disinterested forgiveness
similar to disinterested love. We can meet it in the case of elevated spirits,
who know that inner freedom results from renunciation. We consider it a
proof of moral superiority when a man exposed to some unfair assaults
which are hard to bear by a rational being, finds the strength to answer to
any exterior enticement with an interior virtue.
This attitude does not diminish mistake, fault, or injustice of the one
who committed it, but through pardon the wronged one remains with the
soul equally indifferent regardless of the vicissitudes. It is essential for the
man who has been subject to an ordeal to acquire spiritual progress,
otherwise the great principle of the Leibnizian metaphysics, which in
ontological formulation expresses the following idea: “nothing exists
without a reason or sufficient reason"364, would be cancelled. Wanting the
limited monad to accommodate as well as possible in terms of general
harmony, Leibniz would accept to say: << To understand means to forgive >>.
362
Vladimir Jankelevitch, cited works, p.11.
363
Artistotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, Bucharest, the Scientific and Encyclopedic
Printing House, 1988, p.17.
364
G.W.Leibniz, Philosophical Works, I, translated by Constantin Floru, Bucharest, the
Scientific Publishing House, 1972, p.42.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 355
As Leibniz admits the necessary evil, and as this evil is a lesser evil, the sin is
rather minimized than nihilized; or, if the negativity of evil is a smaller
positivity, forgiveness risks, in turn, to be nothing but a smaller grudge.
Someone’s sin fits into the overall design of the universe, being, forever, an
ingredient thereof; since the elements of the universal economy are linked,
the singular mistake must be understood, like all other things, as part of a
series. Leibniz does not say that sin is inexistent, but that sin does not
discord with the overall picture; harmony of the universe is saved, but the
sinner is left adrift.365 Less concerned with the beauty of the fresco, Spinoza
proves much more humane to the individual. Comprehension involves not
only communication with humanity, but also an inner transformation of the
subject who understands; to understand means to make friends not only
with people, but also with yourself; lucid knowledge is always the great
sedative that drives away suffering. Thus, a philosophical attitude in front of
existence requires a high level of understanding, awareness, which in
metaphysical plane suspends any negative inclination of man. It is only at
this level that we can speak about forgiveness as a proof of pure, absolute
love, to which only the one who is really capable of authentic philosophy can
accede. It is not by chance that Imm. Kant, one of the greatest humanistic
philosophers, addresses man the request to use their native disposition
towards goodness in order to be able to hope that ”what is in not their power
will be completed by a cooperation from above".366
365
Georges Friedmann, Leibniz et Spinoza (1946), apud. Vladimir Jankelevitch,
Forgiveness, Iaşi, Polirom Publishing House, 1998, p.88.
366
Imm. Kant, Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason, Bucharest, translated by
Gabriel Pârvu, Humanitas Publishing House, 2004.
356
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
Limits of Forgiveness
For a certain class of people, humiliated or offended, to pardon the
offender or their perpetrator is extremely difficult: forgiving is an effort that
must be continuously resumed; this trial is, in some cases, at the limit of
our powers. Forgiveness, in the strict sense of the term, is actually a limit
case. The temporal man, the finite creature, is not cut either for eternal
suffering, or for immortal rancor: as such an unimaginable eternity would
rather mean for us unbearable despair. Forgiveness does not require us to
sacrifice our own being and nor to take the place of the sinner; forgiveness
does not demand that much from us; it only requires, when it comes to an
insult, to give up arguing, passionate aggression and revenge temptation;
and when it comes to sin, it requires punishment, an eye for an eye,
requital within the most legitimate exigencies of justice. Forgiveness is,
after all, more disinterested than so desperately radical367. Undoubtedly, a
forgiving machine, a vending machine for grace and indulgences are only
vaguely linked with true forgiveness. On the contrary, the gift of absolute
disinterest is rather an ideal limit and inaccessible horizon we are
approaching asymptotically without ever actually touching it. Or, in other
words: the grace of forgiveness and selfless love is given to us for a
moment and as an appearance which vanishes immediately, that is we find
it and lose it at the same time. Whenever forgiveness is in the service of a
goal, even a noble and spiritual one (redemption or salvation,
reconciliation,), each time when it tends to re-establish a state of normality
(social, national, political, psychological) through a labor of mourning,
through a certain therapy or ecology of memory, every time “forgiveness"
is not pure and neither is its concept. Forgiveness is not, it should not be
either normal or normative, or normalizing. It should remain exceptional
and extraordinary, ready to pass the test of impossible: as if it disrupted the
normal course of historical temporality.368
367
Ibidem, p.89.
368
J. Derrida, cited works, p.93.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 357
References
Ideea textului s-a ivit din conștiința degradării naturii umane, astăzi,
într-o lume din ce în ce mai instabilă, măcinată de conflicte uneori
ireconciliabile, dominată de exacerbarea răului, lipsită de raționalitate şi
credință autentică. Totul este un simulacru, asistăm la un amestec
indezirabil al adevărului cu minciuna, al valorilor cu nonvalorile;
cunoașterea noastră a devenit confuză; nediferențierea clară între bine şi
rău, între esențial şi neesențial ne îndepărtează de o anumită înțelegere a
sensului vieții, irosind astfel timpul oferit în această lume. Studiul nostru
este o invitaţie la cunoaștere de sine, imperativ necesar, deoarece cauza
diminuării forței morale a omului o găsim în incapacitatea autentică de
autocunoaștere, de reevaluare şi stăpânire de sine. Izvorul bunătății se
află în noi, trebuie doar să vrem să ajungem la el şi să-l păstram curat.
369
Constantin Noica, Mathesis sau bucuriile simple, București, Humanitas, 1992, p.84.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 361
Paradoxurile bunătății
A scrie despre bunătate astăzi, într-o lume care nu pare să fie ,,cea
mai bună dintre toate lumile posibile” 370 este o încercare care pare lipsită
de sens la prima vedere şi totuși atât de necesară, pentru că nu există un
timp mai potrivit pentru a scrie despre ceea ce ne lipsește din ce în ce mai
mult.. Trăim într-o stare de ,,precaritate ontologică”371: comunicăm in mod
direct din ce în ce mai puțin, suferim de un solipsism dăunător, ne
credem cei mai buni, dar în realitate ne sfâșiem între noi, ne amăgim că
suntem virtuoși, aleși, dar în realitate suntem individualiști şi egoiști,
lacomi, lași şi încărcați de invidie şi ranchiună, ,,orbiți” de orgoliu;
bunătatea este considerată, astăzi, ca fiind apanajul omului slab şi lipsit de
pragmatism, naiv şi idealist, de multe ori, din nefericire, este percepută
chiar ca o dovadă de prostie. Astfel, omul bun riscă să nu se poată adapta
la o realitate de tip hobbsean ilustrată prin sintagma celebră: ,,belum
omnium contra omnes”372; înțelegerea greșită a bunătății conduce
inevitabil la eludarea ei. Aducem în atenție, în sprijinul acestor idei, un
text pe care îl considerăm edificator pentru problema analizată: „Degeaba
le-am avea pe toate: inteligenţa, cultura, istețimea, supracultura,
doctoratele, supradoctoratele dacă suntem răi, haini, mojici şi vulgari, proşti
şi nerozi, doi bani nu facem, se duc pe apa sâmbetei şi inteligenţa şi
erudiția şi supradoctoratele şi toate congresele internaționale la care luăm
parte şi toate bursele pentru studii pe care le câștigam prin concursuri
severe. Nimic nu poate înlocui şi suplini niţică bunatate sufletească,
nițică bunăvoință, toleranţă, înțelegere. Bunătatea sufletească nu-i o
virtute subtilă şi rafinată, e un atribut de bază al ființei omenești şi
totodată un atribut al culturii."373 Cei care sunt „bădărani”, „răi la suflet”,
370
Leibniz, Eseuri de teodicee. Asupra bunătăţii lui Dumnezeu, a libertăţii omului şi a
originii răului, Cartea întâi, traducere de Diana Morăraşu şi Ingrid Ilinca, Iaşi, Polirom,
1997, p.93.
371
C. Noica, Devenirea întru fiinţă. Încercare asupra filosofiei tradiţionale. Tratat de
ontologie, Bucureşti, Humanitas, 1998, p.291.
372
Th. Hobbes, Leviathan, Paris, Sirey, 1971, trad.rom. : Leviathan, XIII, Bucureşti, Ed.
Ştiinţifică, 1957.
373
N. Steinhardt, Despre bunătatea sufletească în Primejdia mărturisirii, Cluj-Napoca,
Ed. Dacia, 1998, p. 41.
362
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
379
Al. Paleologu, Bunul simţ ca paradox, https: //books,google.ro, books?
isbn=9734620568, 2011.
380
M. Heidegger, Scrisoare despre umanism în Originea operei de artă, București, Ed.
Univers, 1982, p.148.
381
Platon, Republica, în Opere, vol. V, Bucureşti, Ed. Ştiinţifică şi Enciclopedică, 1986,
p.81-411.
382
A. Plesu, Minima moralia, Bucureşti, Humanitas, 2002, p.47.
366
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
386
Gabriela Pohoaţă, Confucius and Kant or the Ethics of Duty, Cogito. Multidisciplinary
Research Journal, vol. II nr. 1/2010, Bucureşti, Pro Universitaria, p.50-57.
387
Nicolae Sacaliş-Calata, Filosofia şi pedagogia culturii. De la Homer la Platon şi
Zamolxe, Bucureşti, Pro Universitaria, 2012, p.20.
368
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
ceea ce face natura din om, ci ceea ce el însuși face din sine” 388. Că virtutea
poate fi dobândită (că nu e înnăscută), reiese din noțiunea ei, fără a fi
nevoie să ne raportăm la cunoștințe antropologice din experiență. Căci
facultatea morală a omului, nu ar fi virtute, dacă nu ar triumfa prin
puterea principiului în lupta cu atât de puternicule inclinări contrare. Ea
este produsul rațiunii practice pure, întrucât aceasta în conștiința
superiorității sale, din libertate câștigă predominanţa asupra inclinărilor.
Am putea pune semnul egal între modestie-bunătate şi personalitatea
morală a omului. Ţinând seama de această dublă dimensionare a sa,
modestia este o valoare morală a personalităţii care ţine de atitudinea ei
faţă de alţii şi faţă de sine în virtutea căreia omul se apreciază corect, la
valoarea reală a activităţii şi conduitei, nu-şi atribuie niciun merit şi niciun
drept în plus, nu ignoră voinţa şi trebuinţele altora. Aici, apare legătura
intrinsecă între modestie şi bunătate, care poate să conducă la înţelegerea
că niciun om nu trebuie subestimat, pentru că fiecare om, aşa cum spunea
Socrate, ,,se naşte cu înţelepciunea de om”. Este necesar în acest context al
analizei noastre să reamintim că pentru vechii greci idealul educațional
era kalokatheia: un om frumos (kalos) şi bun (agathos), Pentru Platon, natura
omului nu se realizează prin dezlănțuirea forței şi a pasiunilor, ci printr-o
viaţă trăită rațional conform Dreptăţi şi Binelui care poate conduce la
fericire. Oamenii care trăiesc numai după dorințele nestăvilite ale
corpului sunt nu numai ignoranți şi răi, dar, în aceeași măsură, nefericiți.
Viaţa fericită este viaţa sufletului care cunoaște binele, frumuseţea şi
bunătatea, fiecare facultate a sufletului îndeplinindu-şi rolul propriu
într-o structură ierarhică care asigură supremaţia raţiunii. Invers,
dominarea sufletului de către pasiuni conduce la insatisfacţie, la repetarea
neîncetată a dorinţelor imposibil de potolit şi, în consecinţă, la nefericire.
Deşi cei mai mulţi oameni nu doresc această nefericire, deoarece ,,nimeni
nu-şi vrea propriul rău”, tragedia constă în aceea că ei refuză eliberarea
spirituală, terapia prin filosofie a sufletului, terapie care ar putea să-i
vindece de relele şi suferinţele lor. Omul îşi realizează esenţa de ,,animal
raţional nu într-o viaţă de plăceri în care triumfă pasiunile sale, ci într-
Bogdan, C. Narly, Antologie filosofică, Filosofi străini, Bucureşti, Ed. Casa Şcoalelor, 1943,
p.457.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 369
389
Aristotel, Etica Nicomahică, Bucureşti, Ed. Ştiinţifică şi Enciclopedică, 1988, p.28.
390
Vladimir Soloviov, Îndreptăţirea binelui, Bucureşti, Humanitas, 1988, p.137.
391
Ah. Schopenhauer, Lumea ca voinţă şi reprezentare, apud. Ion Petrovici ,,Etica
renunţării” în Schopenhauer, Monografie istorico-filosofică, Eurosong & Book, 1997, p.125.
370
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
392
Aristotel, op.cit., 30.
393
Aristotel, Politica, Bucureşti, Ed. Iri, 2001, p.37.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 371
394
J.J. Rousseau, Du contract social, GF Flamarion, présentation, notes, bibliographie et
chronologie par Bruno Biernardi,Paris, GF Flamarion, 2001.
395
Platon, Apologia lui Socrate, în Dialoguri, Bucureşti, Ed. Iri, 1998, 9-41.
372
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
396
Imm. Kant, Critica raţiunii practice, Bucureşti, Ed. Iri, 1999, p.21.
397
Ibidem, p.22.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 373
398
Ibidem, p.25.
399
Leibniz, op.cit., p.228.
374
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
400
Ibidem, p.27.
401
Ibidem, p.266.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 375
Bibliografie
402
Constantin Noica, Mathesis or the Simple Joys, Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing
House, 1992, p.84.
378
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
we are not worth a damn, then all these - intelligence and erudition and
super-doctorates go down the drain, just like all the international
congresses we take part in and all scholarships that we win by means of
severe competitions. Nothing can replace and provide for a bit of
kindness, a bit of goodwill, tolerance and understanding. The kindness
of the soul is not a subtle and refined virtue, it is a basic attribute of the
human being and also an attribute of culture”.407 Those who are “rude”,
“wicked” regardless of the knowledge they possess, their academic
position or intellectual level, are not to be excused if they possess an inner
malice. Kindness is not only a “mere obsolete and sentimental virtue”.
Without kindness, Steinhardt had called the intellectuals “information
memorizers”. The mere reproduction of knowledge at intellectual level
does not do much, it is only an attitude of pride and it is finally deprived
of any quality. In a profoundly individualistic and moral polluted world
as the one we live in today, kindness is repudiated and derided, although
we need it. What justifies the current human moral behavior? Why is it
so hard to be kind?! What is really kindness? How to express it?! What
is the faculty of the soul meant to lead us to kindness?
Kindness encompasses a range of acts and habits that can be most
easily described as thoughtful manners and heartfelt courtesy. Such
etiquette not only applies to our relationships with other people but also
to things, animals, plants and the Earth. Kindness may be simple like
saying “please,” “thank you,” “excuse me,” or “I’m sorry.”It may be
offering a helping hand, patiently waiting your turn, returning a phone
call or favor, or even cheerfully responding with a smile. Kindness is also
characterized by being generous with your time, money, resources and a
willingness to help. “Kindness,” as the Greek philosopher Sophocles said,
“gives birth to kindness.” It is, as American writer Mark Twain notes,
“The language which the deaf can hear and the blind can see.”
The present condition of the world seems to contradict the notion that
the virtue of kindness offers people a sanctuary for peace, safety, comfort
and hope. Over two-dozen major armed conflicts consistently take place
in the world; over 1.5 billion people live on less than one dollar a day; 2.5
408
C. Forrest McDowell, The Virtue of Kindness, on
www.onesanctuary.com/peace/peacevirtues/ virtueofkindness.pd, Excerpted from
forthcoming book, Peace of Heart, Peace of Mind, 2007.
409
(Bible, Luke 6:31)
410
K. Jaspers, Crucial People from the History of Mankind: Socrates, Buddha, Confucius,
Jesus, Bucharest, Paideia Publishing House, 1996.
411
Mary Midgley, Kindness and Philosophy, article online,
thinkBuddha.org:WillBuckingham@DMU, 2008.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 381
consequence, they like to talk about virtue and vice, good and evil,
responsibility and obligation. These are big and impressive sounding
things. But the amount of ink spent writing about kindness is, as far as I
can see, rather slight. That is not to say that philosophers have entirely
ignored the subject, of course. Aristotle, for example, tackles the subject in
his Rhetoric, where he writes that “Kindness – under the influence of
which a man is said to “be kind” – may be defined as helpfulness towards
some one in need, not in return for anything, nor for the advantage of the
helper himself, but for that of the person helped” – perhaps a rather more
minimal definition than I myself might favour. However, it would be
possible to scour the indexes of a substantial library shelf full of books on
ethics, and not come across the word “kindness” mentioned even once.
And yet, when it comes to our everyday lives, kindness is something that
we seem to care about a great deal. Indeed, for many of us, I suspect,
kindness is a more fundamental aspect of ethical reflection than the ideas
of duty, rights, consequence and so on. Still, we meet in the specialized
literature a relatively recent work, in fact a singular work dedicated to
kindness, which demonstrates the actuality of researching this theme.
Thus, our analysis could not omit Kindness and the Good Society:
Connections of the by William S. Hamrick412 which “is steeped in the
language and concerns of Merleau-Ponty, Marcel, Ricoeur, Levinas,
Dufrenne, and Werner Marx, but is by no means confined to an exposition
—or even an integration—of the theories of others. Instead, the author
offers, first, an original phenomenological description of the phenomenon
of kindness, supported not only by examples drawn from his own
experience and from current social events, but by examples drawn from
the arts, notably literature. Next, he complements the descriptive move
with a hermeneutics of suspicion designed to reveal how hidden
interpretive frameworks covertly shape the ways in which we experience
and recognize kindness. Yet he does not merely invoke such suspicion in
order to “destabilize” descriptions, undermining their findings by
revealing their limits; rather, he assigns the hermeneutic move a positive
role, employing it in service of a critique of the social world itself. The
412
William S. Hamrick, Kindness and the Good Society: Connections of the Heart, SUNY
Press Publishing House, 2002, pag. 253.
382
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
413
R. Descartes, Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason and Seeking
the Truth in Sciences, transl. by Daniela Revenţa Frumuşanu and Alexandru Boboc, notes,
commentary and bibliography by Al. Boboc, Bucharest, Academiei Publishing House,
1990, p.113.
414
Ibidem, p. 114.
415
Elena Buzatu, On Good Sense, www.universulromanesc.com, 2014; Prof. at "Butte
College" Faculty. Oroville / California / USA
384
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
416
Al. Paleologu, Good Sense as Paradox, https: //books,google.ro/ books?
isbn=9734620568, 2011.
417
M. Heidegger, Letter on Humanism in the Origin of the Art Work, Bucharest, The
Universe Publishing House, 1982, p.148.
418
Platon, The Republic, in Works 5th vol., Bucharest, The Scientific and Encyclopaedic
Publsihing House, 1986, p.81-411.
419
A. Plesu, Minima Moralia, Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House, 2002, p.47.
386
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
as a corollary of our duty, we must accept the belief in the perfectibility of the
genre. And, indeed, it would be meaningless to feel bound by a duty unless we
believe in the effectiveness of accomplishing it, even remotely. 420 If human
reason had not evolved during the centuries which followed Kant, his
reflections could still be assigned to the transcendental idealism of his
thinking. Indeed, man has evolved intellectually, but the ultimate purpose
of reason is to establish a good will in itself 421, in Kantian language, we could
say that a theoretical, pure reason is fulfilled through a practical reason,
which is good will. The Kantinian argument is - good will, not happiness is
the only intrinsic good. From what can be thought anywhere in the world, and
even beyond it, there is nothing that can be considered good without restriction,
except for a good will. Intelligence, wit, judgment power or no matter how
the talents of the spirit may be called, or courage, determination,
perseverance in making decisions, as traits of the temperament, are
undoubtedly good and desirable in many respects; but they may also
become extremely bad and harmful when the will, which must use these
gifts of nature and whose specific constitution is therefore called
character, is not good. The same is true regarding the fate’s conducive
gifts (Glucksgaben). Power, wealth, honours, health itself and the whole
welfare and contentment for the situation in which we find ourselves,
known as happiness, give rise to boldness and, through it, more often
than not to vanity, where there is not a good will to correct their influence
on the soul and, along with it, to regulate the whole principle of action
and to adjust it universally according to its scope (allgemein-
zweckmassing mache); needless to mention that an impartial rational
spectator can never be satisfied seeing the continuous prosperity of a
being who bears none of the ornaments of pure and good will, so it seems
that good will is a prerequisite for the very dignity of being happy.422.
We appreciate the good will in the Kantian meaning as being a
developed form of good sense fulfilled through knowledge, education
and self-education. The morally significant documents which make proof of
420
Giorgio DelVecchio, Lessons of Legal Philosophy, Bucharest, Europa Nova
Publishing House, 1995, p.116-117.
421
Imm. Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, Bucharest, Humanitas Publihing House, 2006,
p.31.
422
Ibidem, p.29.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 387
unconditioned human goodness are out of duty, which means the obligation to
perform our actions in accordance with the moral law. They stem from an
independent will, unconditioned sentimentally, which gives itselfs laws, is self-
determining. Of course, in the world we live moral perfection cannot be
conceivable, because we have interests, inclinations, temptations, cravings hard
to stave off; but doing one’s your duty towards oneself and towards the others is a
form of perfection. To be good, to love, to work for the others’ happiness
and for one’s own improvement are actions stemming from duty with a
high moral content. If we were able to obey the moral law or the categorical
Kantinian imperative, then we would all be saints; I would no longer need law,
state, as all our actions would be moral. In reality, our world is dominated by
what might be called antropical entropy, where the one who does his duty is out
of tune, being marginalized or even humiliated. It is hard to talk about the
Kantian moral in a world where the individualis are deprived of an interior will,
lacking authentic landmarks and being unable of self-knowledge.423 Man keeps
being an open being. We love and hate, we are selfless and selfish, good or bad,
without being able, more often than not, to explain and control our own behavior,
and much less the collective behaviors. And as time passes and we become more
aware of ourselves we realize the unfathomable depths and the darkness of the
human soul.424
reason. It does not matter here what nature makes out of man, but what
he makes out of himself”425. The fact that virtue can be acquired (it's not
innate), can be inferred from its notion, without having to relate to
anthropological knowledge from experience. As human moral faculty
would not be virtue, unless it triumphed through the power of principle
in fighting the strong contrary inclinations. It is the product of pure
practical reason, as the latter, being aware of its superiority, due to its
freedom, gains ground predominantly over the inclinations. 426 Moral
theories which, like those of Plato, Aristotle and Aquinas, give a central
place to the virtues, tend to assume that as traits of character the virtues
are mutually compatible so that it is possible for one and the same person
to possess them all. This assumption—let us call it the compatibility thesis
—does not deny the existence of painful moral dilemmas: it allows that
the virtues may conflict in particular situations when considerations
associated with different virtues favour incompatible courses of action,
but holds that these conflicts occur only at the level of individual actions.
Thus while it may not always be possible to do both what would be just
and what would be kind or to act both loyally and honestly, it is possible
to be both a kind and a just person and to have both the virtue of loyalty
and the virtue of honesty 427. ‘Virtue and Character’ A.D.M. Walker claims
that kindness and justice are incompatible in certain important ways and
that a person can be kind or just without possessing the other virtue.
Walker argues that virtues must lead to ‘effective and intelligent action’
and that a virtue ceases to exist if ‘it leads to violation of the minimal
requirements of any other virtue’. On this view kindness and justice
function independently to produce effective action. Kindness requires a
direct caring for the individual in particular circumstances, while justice
involves a commitment to impartiality that abstracts from an individual's
situation. Walker argues that, as long as the minimal requirements of
other virtues are met, one can be kind without weighing considerations of
425
Imm. Kant, Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, apud. N. Bagdasar, Virgil
Bogdan, C. Narly, Philosophical Antology, Foreign Philosophers, Bucharest, Casa
Şcoalelor Publihing House, 1943, p.457.
426
Idem, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, ibidem. p. 457.
427
A.D.M. Walker, Virtue and Character – Research Gate. Available from:
http://www.researchgate.net/publication/231933987
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 389
justice. He cites with approval kind behaviour which human beings learn
as young children. Such behaviour may be a deeply engrained personality
trait, and the individual passing through different situations in life may
have no need to consider questions of justice. ‘He will merely need to be
able to recognize and respond to certain types of considerations as
overriding the values promoted by kindness’he trait of modesty has
received significant philosophical attention in recent years 428. This is due,
in part, to Julia Driver's claim that modesty is able to act as a counter-
example to intellectualist accounts of the nature of virtue. ‘Modesty as
kindness’ states that the trait of modesty ought to be considered as
intimately connected with the more fundamental virtue of kindness. I set
out the account, explain its benefits and defend it against possible
objections. I then ask whether or not the intense focus on the trait of
modesty has actually furthered our understanding of the nature of virtue
more generally, and suggest that alternative approaches ought to be
considered429. Julia Driver argues that modesty essentially involves
ignorance (underestimation) of one's self-worth. Intuitively, modesty is a
virtue. So this would count against traditional accounts of virtue (as
involving moral perception or an internal orientation towards the good),
and in favour of her instrumental account. But there are reasons to doubt
whether modesty essentially involves ignorance after all. 430 We could
equate modesty with human kindness and man’s moral personality.
Given this dual dimnesion, modesty is a moral value of personality that
belongs to one’s attitude towards the others and towards oneself by virtue
of which man assesses himself properly, to the actual value of his work
and conduct, without ascribing to himself any further merit or right,
without ignoring the will and needs of others. Here, there is the intrinsic
link between modesty and kindness, which can lead to the understanding
that no man should be underestimated, because each man, as Socrates
said, “was born with the wisdom of man". It is necessary in this context of
our analysis to recall that for the ancient Greeks the educational ideal was
428
Daniel Putman, The Compatibility of Justice and Kindness, Philosophy 65(254):516-
517(1990).
429
Alan T. Wilson, Modesty as Kindness, Ratio 28(2), 2014.
430
Julia Driver, Are There Virtues of Ignorance,
http://www.philosophyetc.net/2009/09/are-there-virtues-of-ignorance.html
390
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
kalokatheia: a handsome (kalos) and good (agathos) man. For Plato, human
nature is not accomplished by the unleashing of force and passions, but
by a life lived rationally according to Justice and Good that can lead to
happiness. People who live only according to the unbridled desires of
their body are not only ignorant and bad, but, equally, unhappy. The
happy life is the life of the soul which has become acquainted with
good, beauty and kindness, every faculty of the soul fulfilling their role
in a hierarchical structure that ensures the supremacy of reason.
Conversely, the soul domination by passions leads to dissatisfaction, to
the incessant repetition of desires impossible to appease and therefore to
unhappiness. Although most people do not want this unhappiness
because nobody wants “his own evil”, the tragedy is that they refuse their
spiritual liberation, the therapy through the philosophy of soul, a therapy
that could heal his ills and sufferings. Man realizes his essence of a
“rational animal not in a life of pleasure in which his passions triumph,
but in an activity of the soul consistent with virtue. 431. In his eudemic
Ethics, Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of virtuous people – the “good
man” (agathos), who acts virtuously in order to acquire naturally good
things, such as wealth and dignity, and the “noble and good man”
(kaloskagathos), who accomplishes the virtuous actions for their own sake,
because they are noble. Being moral towards other people stems from and
helps increase the personal value or have a good character. Having a
good character means acquiring virtues. Being virtuous means behaving
properly. For example, shame, inclinations for pity or compassion, in contrast
with insolence, selfishness, cruelty and malice are positive character traits or
virtues that provide a rule of altruistic behavior, guided by justice and charity.
Such a behavior leads to the moral good of a true solidarity with others, with all
living beings.432 When there is a moral action, mercy is always its
generating feeling. Moral life means solidarity, and it is based on the
feeling of pity. “A boundless compassion that unites us to all the living
things, here it is the strongest and safest guarantor of morality. 433 The
previous arguments converge on the idea that human goodness is a
431
Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, Bucharest, Scientific and Encyclopedic
Publishing House, 1988, p.28.
432
Vladimir Soloviov, Justification of Goodness, Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing
House, 1988, p.137.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 391
433
Ah. Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representaion, apud. Ion Petrovici Ethics
of Renonciation in Schopenhauer, Historical and Philosophical Monography, Eurosong & Book,
1997, p.125.
434
Aristotle, cited works, 30.
392
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
435
Aristotle, Politics, Bucharest, Iri Publishing House, 2001, p.37.
436
J.J. Rousseau, Du contract social, GF Flamarion, présentation, notes, bibliographie et
chronologie par Bruno Biernardi, Paris GF Flamarion, 2001.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 393
The evil man is never happy because his soul cannot enjoy inner
peace even in the midst of his riches. Therefore, happiness on earth
consists in our own work onto ourselves and on our peers to make us
all better. The evil man is never happy because his soul cannot enjoy
inner peace even in the midst of his riches. Therefore, happiness on
earth consists in our own work onto ourselves and on our peers to make
us all better. Before Kant, the representatives of the eudaemonistic-
emipiriste concepts had asserted that the purpose of life was the
promotion of personal well-being (happiness) in a general prosperity,
without specifying where the first ends and where the second begins, and
the rationalist representatives of the concepts who had supported
perfection as the purpose of life lay emphasis on personal perfection,
without considering its social aspect. Kant reconciles the theses of this
opposite points of views, reducing them to their true value, by stating the
following moral command “Set as goal of your actions your own
perfection and foreign happiness.” 437 Your own perfection and not the
others’ perfection, for others, if they do not possess it, cannot be
inoculated with a good conscience, as it the personal work of each of us.
Foreign happiness and not personal happiness because we tend
instinctively to personal happiness and we do not need anyone's
instigation and competition. Kant admits that people tend to happiness
by virtue of their nature of finite and rational beings, the pursuit of
happiness thus being a necessary endeavor of their nature. But perfection,
which is the same as holiness, is not destined for any rational human
beings here on earth. It can be approached only through progress, which,
because it cannot achieve its purpose in this world, must be admitted to
extend itself in the other world, by the continuance of our personality in
that world, that is we must admit the immortality of the soul, not as a
certainty, for the immortality of the soul is not subject to knowledge that
can be demonstrated theoretically, but as a “comforting” hope. 438 Thus,
only by postulating the immortality of the soul through hope that we will
continue to exist as a moral personality after death, morality becomes
437
Imm. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, Bucharest, Iri Publishing House,
Bucharest, 1999, p.21.
438
Ibidem, p.22.
394
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
reality. For our moral conscience, virtue on this superior moral stage is
not only worthy of happiness, but makes even part of it, opening prospects
for the sovereign Good, a notion that has always played an important role
in ancient ethics, for the Epicureans, and which we continuously
approach, but we will not never reach, comforting ourselves just with the
hope that we will still manage.
But since we are not sure that the sovereign Good could be
accomplished even in an eternal life, for it is beyond human powers to
achieve it, we must admit a moral world order, where the change in
nature is subject to a superior order, whose ultimate purpose is to lead to
unity between the sensible world and the intelligible one , to unify, as
Kant also stated “the empire of nature with the empire of mores” and to
achieve a perfect agreement between virtue (morality) and happiness or,
as the Greeks said, the moral Good. But such unification is conceivable
only by postulating the existence of a moral omnipotent and absolute
being, of God. And thus the faith in God's existence is, in Kant’s view,
according to the faith in the sovereign Good.
439
Leibniz, cited works, p.228.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 395
fail to remind in our analysis maybe the most beautiful ideas that have
ever been written about divine kindmess. “Love is that affection that
makes us enjoy the perfections of what we love, and nothing is perfect
and more charming than God. In order to love Him it is enough to think
of his perfections and this not hard work, as we find these ideas inside
ourselves. Perfections of God are those of our souls, but he possesses a
boundless ocean from which we received only mere drops – there is
inside us some power, knowledge, kindness but all of these, as a whole,
are inside God. Order, proportion, harmony delight us, painting and
music prove it. God is sheer order, He always keeps the fair
proportions, produces universal harmony – the entire beauty is an
outpouring of His rays ...440
Good nature, appropriate education, meeting with pious and
virtuous persons can greatly contribute to put souls in this beautiful
posture .... we need to combine light and ardor, it it is necessary that
intellectual perfections lead to improving those of the will. We always learn at
school that as truth is the object of truth, goodness is the object of the will
and as the intellect can never assert than what is shown under the
desguise/appearance of truth, the will never like but what seems good to
it. The will contains a natural determination for good in general. There is
in us enough willpower, only that we are unaware of it. We are the
masters of our homes, in the sense that we have free will, but not like God
who is the Master of the world. The kindness of the infinitely perfect
Being is infinite and it would not be infinite if we could conceive a greater
kindnes than His. But when we say that only kindness led God to create
this universe, we must add that KINDNESS led Him antecedently to
create and produce any possible goodness, but WISDOM is the one that
made the selection and was the reason why he chose the greatest
goodness consistently and, finally, it was POWER that gave him the means
of carrying out the great plan which he made up. As God is good,
goodness itself created the man good and righteous, but also changeable,
being able to by his free will. It is precisely this duplicity of man to be
both sensitive and intelligible that makes him capable of morality.
Besides, morale starts with this choice - each will decide what he will be.
440
Ibidem, p.27.
396
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ
Thus, we understand so that we can achieve good will but not in the nick
of time or through a simple act of will. We have yet to remark that
troubles and sorrows that accompany the victory over the passions turns
into pleasure for some, due to the satisfaction thay find in the intense
feeling of the force of their spirit and of the divine grace. This happy state
can be reached, and this is one of the principal means the soul can use to
strengthen its dominion.441
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441
Ibidem, p.266.
GABRIELA POHOAŢĂ 397
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398
FILOSOFIE MORALĂ