Offshore Safety

MASTER HSE & Q - M7 - Industrial Safety
MASTER HSE&Q - M7 Industrial Safety
HSE in OFFSHORE
Oil&Gas and
Petrochemical Projects
INTRODUCTION
5 FEBRUARY 2009
TABLE OF CONTENT
MODULE 0 - INTRODUCTION
- General concepts
- Safety in Design (Offshore)
MODULE 1 - DROPPED OBJECT STUDY

MODULE 2 - MARINE HAZARD ANALYSIS (SHIP
IMPACT / COLLISION STUDY)
MODULE 3 - ESCAPE, EVACUATION AND RESCUE
ANALYSIS (EERA)
MODULE 4 - TEMPORARY REFUGE (T.R.) INTEGRITY
MODULE 5 (EXTRA) - HAZARDOUS AREA
CLASSIFICATION (HAC)
1
Oil&Gas, Chemical, Petrochemical

Onshore and Offshore Plants:
Hazardous?
Hazards
Fire
2
Hazards
Explosion
Hazards
Dispersion of Toxic Substances
3
Hazards
Where does the hazard originate?
Hazards
Example of Check List for identification of Hazards
4
Hazards
In broad terms, we can identify two types of Hazards:

- Occupational Hazards (impact on the health of the worker/s)
- “Major”
Major” Hazards (possible impact on population, environment,
asset)
Major Hazards
Hazardous Substances
NFPA Diamond
5
European Symbols (Dir 67/548)
Hazard Scenarios
Release of Hazardous substance can cause:

Flammable material
- Jet Fire
- Pool Fire
- BLEVE
- UVCE/CVE
Toxic Material
- Toxic Dispersion
But also: Release of Energy/Pressure
- Physical explosion
6
Hazard Scenarios
How an accident scenario is generated?

generated?
(Example Event Tree)
Tree)
How are hazards controlled?
Risk Control Legislation
7
Incidents that define Process Safety
WHEN WHERE WHAT FATALITIES REGULATIONS

• 1966 Feyzin, France LPG Bleve 18 First LPG prescriptive regulations
• 1974 Flixborough, UK Cyclohexane 28 EU Seveso I Directive1982
• 1976 Seveso, Italy Dioxin 1 US Chemical Emergency Preparedness
• 1979 Bantry Bay, Ireland Crude ship 50 Program 1985
• 1982 Ocean Ranger, Canada Platform 84 US Emergency Planning and Community
• 1984 Mexico LPG Bleve 600+ Right-to-Know Act 1986
US Chemical Accident Prevention Program
• 1984 Bhopal, India Methyl isocyanate 20000+
1986
• 1986 Challenger Space shuttle 7 US Chemical Safety Audit Program 1986
• 1986 Chernobyl, USSR Nuclear powerplant 100+ EU Seveso I Directive update 1987
• 1986 Sandoz, Bale, Switzerland Warehouse 0
US Clean Air Act Amendments 1990
• 1987 Texas City, USA HF 0
• 1987 Grangemouth, UK HCK HP/LP interface 1 UK HSE Offshore Installations (Safety
• 1988 Piper Alpha Platform 167 Case) Regulations 1992
• 1988 Norco, USA Propane FCCU 7 US OSHA 1910-119 Process Safety
• 1989 Pasadena TX, USA Ethylene/isobutane 23 Management 1992
• 1992 La Mède, France Gasoline/LPG FCCU 6 US EPA Risk Management Program1996
• 1994 Milford Haven, UK FCCU feedstock 0 EU Seveso II Directive 1996
• 1998 Longford, Australia LPG, brittle fracture 2
• 2001 Toulouse, France Ammonium Nitrate 30 UK Control of Major Accident Hazard
Regulations 1999
• 2001 Petrobras Platform 11
• 2003 Columbia Space shuttle 7 EU Seveso II update 2002 (SEVESO III)
• 2004 Skikda, Algeria LNG 27 UK HSE Offshore Installations (Safety Case)
• 2005 Texas City, US Gasoline ISOM 15 Regulations 2005
• 2005 Buncefield, UK Gasoline 0 API RPs on occupied buildings and vents
• 2005 Bombay High, India Platform 13
OSHA Refinery National Emphasis Program
How is Plant Safety ensured in a Project?

HSE Management
8
Safety in Design - HSE
“GOOD” DESIGN
LOW RISKS
(FOR POPULATION, HIGH PRODUCTIVITY
OPERATORS, ENVIRONMENT)
Î PROBLEMS:
Î How can we demonstrate ‘safety’ of design? 2
Î How “good”? (i.e. up to which point the system shall be

optimized?)

Integrated HSE
Management
SAFETY
To assess the level of safety
wrt exposed people
ENVIRONMENT
MACHINERY
To assess the level of safety CERTIFICATION (EU)
towards environment
To identify and certify the
machinery systems
F&G DETECTION according to the provisions
RELIABILITY of the EU Directive
Optimisation of Localisation of detectors
To assess the level
of productivity of plant
PRESSURE EQUIPMENT
CERTIFICATION AUDITS/REVIEW
(PED, EU)
To verify, in all phases of production process,
To certify safety of pressure equipment
the correct implementation of Rules,
HAZARDOUS AREAS Standards and SE requirements
CLASSIFICATION
Control of explosion risk SIL

To assess the level of reliability
required to Safety Loops
9
HSE MANAGEMENT FLOW CHART
CONTRACT & LAW

REQUIREMENTS
CONTRACTOR’S APPLICABLE
HSE POLICY CODES & STANDARDS
PROJECT GENERAL
HSE PLAN
HSE PLAN FOR HSE PLAN FOR

ENGINEERING & PROCUREMENT WORKS AT SITE
CONTRACTOR’S
HSE AUDIT
PLANS WORK ENV. HSE STUDY HSE WORKING
STUDY PROCEDURE PROCEDURE
HSE STUDY HSE DESIGN JOB HAZARD HSE STUDY HSE WORKING
HSE DESIGN
PROCEDURE
HSE STUDY CRITERIA
HSE DESIGN ANASLYSIS PROCEDURE PROCEDURE
REVIEW ETC. HSE STUDY HSE WORKING
HSE STUDY
PROCEDURE HSE DESIGN
CRITERIA PROCEDURE (STUDIES) PROCEDURE PROCEDURE
PROCEDURE CRITERIA CONTRACTOR’S
DESIGN
WORKS
HSE
CONTRACTOR’S
AUDIT
HSE
INPUT TO DESIGN
CONTRACTOR’S SITE HSE MANUAL

HAZOP PLOT PLAN AUDIT
HSE
QRA ESD AUDIT PRE-STARTUP
EIA REVIEW
GAS DET. PROCEDURE
SIL STUDY FIRE PROT.
CONSTRUCTION
DOCS TO
ETC.
REVIEW
ETC. PROJECT
(STUDIES) (REVIEWS) MOC
PROCEDURE PRE-STARTUP
REV IEW HSE REVIEW
FEED BACK
COMMISSIONING &
INPUT TO ENGINEERING & STARTUP
DESIGN PROCUREMENT APPROVED
HSE REVIEW
CHANGES OF CHANGES PROPOSED CHANGES
Safety in Design - Offshore
OFFSHORE PLANTS
10
Specific Hazards in offshore environment?
• Hazardous substances (as onshore);
• External events:
9 collisions (ship, helicopter..),
9 extreme weather;
• Worsening factors:
9 equipment congestion;
9 process/safety/living areas on same structure in close
proximity;
9 repair/escape and rescue is difficult;
9 mitigation is difficult.
11
Safety in Design – Offshore – Example of HSE Plan
ACTIVITY
1 PROJECT HSE MANAGEMENT
1.1 HSE/Risk Assessment Plan
2 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
2.1 HAZID Review
2.2 HAZOP Review - Process Systems
2.3 HAZOP Review - Utility Systems
2.4 HAZOP Review - Vendor Package
2.5 SIL (Safety Integrity Level) Analysis
3. FORMAL SAFETY ASSESSMENTS
3.1 Hazard Register
3.2 Hazardous Inventory Report
3.3 Fire Protection Analysis
3.4 Fire Risk Analysis
3.5 Fire Resistance Analysis
3.6 Explosion Risk Analysis
3.7 Explosion Resistance Analysis
3.8 Escape, Evacuation and Rescue (EER) Study
3.9 Emergency Systems Survivability Analysis (ESSA)
3.10 Ship Collision Risk Analysis
3.11 Occupational Risk Assessment
3.12 Temporary Refuge Impairments Assessment (TRIA)
3.13 Quantified Risk Assessment (QRA)
3.14 Smoke and Gas Dispersion Study
3.15 Exhaust Gas Dispersion Study
3.16 Dropped Object Study
4. PERFORMANCE STANDARDS
4.1 Safety Critical Element (SCE) List
4.2 Performance Standards for SCEs
4.3 RAM for Safety Critical Elements
5. SAFETY CASE
5.1 Design Safety Case
5.2 Operational Safety Case
12
6. DESIGN CRITERIA & PHILOSOPHIES
6.1 HSE/Safety/Loss Prevention Philosophy
6.2 Fire and Gas Detection Philosophy
6.3 Project Environmental Criteria
6.4 Noise/Vibration Criteria
7. DESIGN SAFETY ACTIVITIES
7.1 Flare Radiation and Dispersion Study
7.2 Vent Dispersion and Radiation Study
7.3 Fire and Gas Detection Layout
7.4 Hazardous Area Classification Report & Layout
7.5 Escape Way Layouts
7.6 Safety and Lifesaving Equipment Layouts
7.7 Fire-fighting Equipment Layouts
7.8 Safety Sign Layouts
8. RELIABILITY, AVAILABILITY AND MAINTAINABILITY STUDIES
8.1 HIPPS Reliability Study
8.2 Failure, Modes & Effects Analysis (FMEA)
8.3 Reliability, Availability and Maintainability (RAM) Study
9. HUMAN FACTORS & MATERIAL HANDLING
9.1 Human Factors Philosophy
9.2 Human Factors / 3D Model Review
9.3 Human Factors Verification
9.4 Material Handling Philosophy
9.5 Material Handling Review
13
10. ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVITIES
10.1 Environmental Impact Study
10.2 Emissions List
10.3 Noise Study
10.4 Field Abandonment Report
11. VERIFICATION DOCUMENTS
11.1 Hazardous Area Class. Compliance Review
11.2 API RP 14J Compliance Review
Some References
1. Skelton B., “Process Safety Analysis - An Introduction”, IChemE, UK.
2. F.P. Lees, “Loss Prevention in the Process Industries”, Butterworth-

Heinnemann.
3. "Guidelines for Quantitative Risk Assessment“, CPR 18E Purple Book,

1999, TNO The Netherlands.
4. AIChE Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS), 1992, "Guidelines for
Hazard Evaluation Procedures", USA, 2nd edition.
5. ISO “Petroleum and natural gas industries – Offshore production

installations – Guidelines on tools and techniques for hazard
identification and risk assessment”
6. Vinnem, J. E., “Offshore Risk Assessment . Principles, modelling and

Applications of QRA studies” – Springer, 2007
7. ….. and many others
14
Headquarters:
Via San Nazaro, 19 - 16145 Genova – Italy
National Offices:
Via Martiri di Cefalonia, 2 - 20097 San Donato
Milanese
Largo C. Salinari, 18/19 - 00142 Roma
Via S. Pasquale a Chiaia, 62B - 80121 Napoli
SS 7 km 7,3 c/o Cetma - 72100 Brindisi
Via S. Maria dell’Arco, 19 - 98121 Messina
URL: www.dappolonia.it
15
HSE in OFFSHORE
Oil&Gas and
Module 1
Dropped Object Study

5 February 2009
Module 1 - TABLE OF CONTENT
DROPPED OBJECT STUDY

1. The concept of Dropped Object Analysis,
2. The Best Practices,
3. The methodologies,
4. Examples of results.
1
Dropped Object (DO) analysis is aimed at the evaluation

of the risk associated to a load falling onto sensitive
objects.
DO analysis is mainly applied to offshore platforms to

assess the risk from dropped crane/monorails loads onto
equipment (on the platform decks) and onto pipelines
(subsea,
subsea, risers, onboard). A result of the study is the
identification of protections required to mitigate the risk.
Methodology
The Dropped Object Analysis is done to assess the risk of damage to
process areas, subsea pipelines and safety critical elements due to
falling objects.
The approach for the Dropped Object Analysis is typically as follows:
- Review crane facilities and operations associated with the facilities;

- Identify the main hazards associated with the cranes and their operations and
define the expected scenarios associated with these hazards;
- Undertake frequency analysis and assess the associated impact energy and
subsequently determine the expected risk associated with the hazards
identified;
- Discuss the risk associated with dropped objects and subsequently identify
engineering and operational safeguards that are in place to either control or
mitigate them;
- Determine if protection is required for the topside equipment, subsea
pipelines and structures.
2
Dropped Object (DO) is essentially a very specialized

"Risk Analysis" where:
Likelihood of the Event is given by the expected

Frequency of the Dropped Load,
Consequence of the Event is given by the expected

damage to equipment following the Impact with the
dropped object.
Frequency is typically evaluated by applying

international standardized methods (e.g. DNV-
DNV-RP-
RP-F107)
and engineering considerations.
Consequence is evaluated by assessing the type of

damage to the pipeline (again by the application of DNV-
DNV-
RP-
RP- F107 methodology or similar).
3
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
Dropped Object Study - INPUT DATA
• Platform configuration (operational, drilling, work-over)

• Platform crane(s) location, characteristics and lifts/year
• Barge crane (if any) location, characteristics and lifts/year
• Assisting barge dimension and location
• Platform and jacket layouts and sections
• Topsides configuration and process data
• Bathymetry
• Sealine data (route, mechanical data, transported fluid
composition and operational data)
4
ASSUMPTIONS (1/3)
• Loads divided in load classes as applied in DNV Recommended

Practices.
• Dropped object frequency as in DNV RP:
9 2.2x10-5 drops/lift, for loads less than 20 tons
9 3.0x10-5 drops/lift, for loads greater than 20 tons
• Lift frequencies given by load classes.

• Definition of Initial drop points.
• Definition Receptor points on the seabed.
• The objects excursions on the seabed are normal distributed
with angular deviations (gliding angle).
• Jacket is considered as a solid obstacle due to the low
probability of objects passing through the legs .
• The presence of a barge on the boat landing side is considered
as an obstacle for the objects to drop into the sea .
ASSUMPTIONS (2/3)
5

Dropped Object Study for Sealines-
Sealines- ASSUMPTIONS (3/3)
6
FREQUENCY (1/6)
• For each drop point vertical projection onto the sea bed,
a normal distribution of the load is given, as follows:
−x 2
1
p( x ) = ⋅ e 2⋅ δ
2
2⋅π⋅δ
• The probability that a sinking object will hit the seabed
within a distance r from the vertical line through the
drop point is : r
P( x ≤ r ) = ∫ p( x ) ⋅ dx
−r
• The probability of impacting on the seabed within two

circles around the drop point with inner radius rj-1 and
outer radius rj is:
P(rj −1 < x ≤ rj ) = P( x ≤ rj ) − P( x ≤ rj −1 )
• This probability may be expressed per m2 by dividing the
value on the actual circle area:
P(rj −1 < x ≤ rj )
P (rj −1 < x ≤ rj ) =
A j −1, j
FREQUENCY (2/6)
•The breadth of each ring is taken

at a constant value interval.
7
FREQUENCY (3/6)
• For the considered load class LC, the frequency FLC, with which
the associated dropped objects hits the sea bottom, can be
evaluated as (drop/year/m2):
FLC = fd ⋅ fl ⋅ ∑∑ (p di ⋅ pij )
fd dropped object frequency (drop/lift); i j
fl lift frequency (lift/year);
pdi probability that the object drops on the vertical of the dropped point i;
pij probability per m2 that the object drops into the j-th annular ring with “i” as
centre point.
• Pdi is considered the same for each dropped point detected.

• The frequency FLC is evaluated on the sea bottom for a discrete
number of points (receptor points equally spaced and sealine
simulating points).
FREQUENCY (4/6)
8
FREQUENCY (5/6)
For the considered load class LC, the frequency FLC, with
which the associated dropped objects hits the deck, can be
evaluated as (drop/year/m2):
fd ⋅ fl
FLC =
ALC
where:
fd=dropped object frequency (drop/lift);
fl=lift frequency (lift/year);
ALC=area (m2) of the footprint of the crane trajectory over the
deck, during the movement of objects belongs to load class LC.
FREQUENCY (6/6) - example on a 10" condensate line
9
CONSEQUENCE (1)
• Kinetic energy for each drop points and for each load
class LC is evaluated with the formula of objects
dropping in air (first) and into water (after) and
compared with the kinetic energy capable to produce a
sealine OR topside Equipment damage.
• Kinetic energy that could damage pipeline is evaluated

according to DNV-RP-F107 :
1 1 3
⎛ 2 ⋅π ⎞ 2 ⎛ D ⎞2 ⎛ δ ⎞2
E D = 16 ⋅ ⎜ ⎟ ⋅ m p ⋅ ⎜ ⎟ ⋅ D⎜ ⎟
⎝ 9 ⎠ ⎝ t ⎠ ⎝D⎠
and damage criteria is expressed by DNV as:
CONSEQUENCE (2)
Each level shall be compared with the applicable Risk

Management Standard criteria!
SEE EXAMPLE OF ACTUAL CALCULATION FOR DO

KINETIC ENERGY
10
EXAMPLES
Dropped Objects:
EXAMPLES
2.5E-006
2.3E-006
Platform North Jacket 2.1E-006
1.9E-006
Deck +19.500
1.7E-006
1.5E-006
1.3E-006
1.1E-006
9E-007
7E-007
Impact Frequency: 5E-007
3E-007
SCALE 1E-007
0m 5m 10m 15m 20m
11
EXAMPLES
3E-006
2.8E-006
2.6E-006
Platform North
2.4E-006
2.2E-006
2E-006
jacket
1.8E-006
deck +24.000 1.6E-006

1.4E-006
1.2E-006
1E-006
4'' gas lift sealine 8E-007
12'' separation gas sealine
6E-007
6'' oil sealine
4E-007
SCALE
2E-007
0m 5m 10m 15m 20m
EXAMPLES
2.3E-006
2.1E-006
1.9E-006
Deck +3.400 1.7E-006
1.5E-006
1.3E-006
Sealine
1.1E-006
9E-007
7E-007
5E-007
3E-007
1E-007
SCALE
0m 5m 10m 15m 20m
12
EXAMPLES
EXAMPLES
13
HSE in OFFSHORE
Oil&Gas and
Module 2
Marine Hazard Analysis

(Ship Impact / Collision Study)
5 February 2009
Marine Hazard Analysis

1. The concept of Marine Hazard,
2. The main methodological approach,
3. The calculations and Results,
4. Examples.
1
Ship Impact / Collision Study
MARINE HAZARD
……
SHIPS IMPACT
Are those Hazards related to
Marine and Vessel Operations
These Hazards have high

potential consequences
SHIP COLLISION
HEAVY LIFTS/D.O.
Methodology - Ship impact study

The Analysis is performed in the following steps:
1. Identify the risks associated to the facilities due to

marine activities e.g. ship collision with the platforms,
fishing vessels and other traffic hazards to pipelines
and supporting vessels;
2. Quantify the expected frequency of occurrence of
these events;
3. Assess the expected consequences, on the basis of
the applicable severity classification given in the
Project Risk Criteria.
2
Typical Input Data

Input data needed for the Marine Hazard Analysis are:
1. Platform and field layouts;

2. Data on the commercial marine traffic in the area;
3. Data on the fishing traffic in the area;
4. Operational Data and Frequencies of the Plant;
5. Typical Meteo-
Meteo-marine data (wind intensity and
direction, marine currents, ect.).
ect.).
METHODOLOGY FOR FREQUENCY ASSESSMENT

The expected frequency of occurrence of collision events
are calculated starting from the available maritime traffic
data.
The models used in the analysis consider the real intensity
of the ship traffic in the area, the time of exposure to the
hazard of collision and the real interaction between vessels
and installation.
Two cases are typically considered:
•vessel impact with fixed obstacles (vessel/platform);

•vessel impact with moving obstacles (vessel/vessel).
3
Impact of moving vessel with Fixed Obstacles

The following scenarios are typically considered to
evaluate the expected frequency of collision between with
a fixed object such as the platform (or a moored vessel
such as a FPSO) and a moving vessel:
• impact of powered passing vessels;

• impact of drifting vessels;
• impact of dedicated/supporting vessels.
The model is based on a geometric approach and on two

premises:
a) ships normally travel in predictable "lanes";
b) vessels normally keeps an effective monitoring of the
movements (also visual) which shall avoid collision with an
obstacle unless there is an emergency situation. However
it is not totally excluded that a certain fraction of vessels
could fail to keep an effective monitoring.
There will be reasonable navigation uncertainties as well

as the effect of wind and waves on the vessels: these will
possibly cause vessels to stray from the lanes centerline.
Vessels traveling on a lane will be normally more likely to
be near the centre line but a distribution of vessel traffic
across the lane must be defined.
4
Collision Frequency for Powered Passing Vessels

The collision probability between powered passing vessels
(commercial vessels, fishing boats, pleasure crafts) along a shipping
shipping
lane and a fixed obstacle is evaluated considering standard navigation
navigation
conditions and a standard level of instrumental assistance. With
With these
assumptions, the frequency of collision with the Platform/moored
vessel for each ship class is:
Ni×f × P1i × P2i × P3i
Fpi = ΣNi×
where:
Fpi = annual collision frequency for a class "i" powered vessel (event/year);
(event/year);
Ni = total vessel traffic in the shipping lane for a class i vessel
vessel (vessel movement/year);
f = fraction of vessels in direct collision route with the obstacle;
obstacle;
P1i = Planning failure factor: Probability that a vessel fails to
to plan its approaching route
adequately so as to avoid an obstacle;
P2i = Watchkeeping failure factor: Probability that in the vessel it is not kept an
adequate monitoring of the movements (so to recover in time a bad bad maneuvering);
P3i = Obstacle initiated recovery factor: Probability that external
external monitoring (e.g. from
the "obstacle" point of view) fails to take some action to recover
recover the failures and/or
prevent a collision.
5
Collision Frequency for Drifting Vessels

The frequency of collision between drifting vessels (passing vessels
vessels or
fishing boats or pleasure crafts) and a fixed obstacle is evaluated
evaluated
using the following formula:
D
Fdi = ∑ Fdij = ∑ N ij ⋅ Pwj ⋅ Pfi ⋅ i
j j Lj
where:
j = is the considered "block" or "section" of the shipping lane;
I = is the vessel class;
Fdi = annual collision frequency for a class i drifting vessel (event/year);
(event/year);
Fdij = annual collision frequency with an obstacle for a class i drifting
drifting vessel whose
initial location is block j (event/year);
Nij = number of class i vessels per year in block j (vessel/year);
Pwj = probability that wind from block j is directed towards the obstacle;
obstacle;
Pfi = failure probability for vessels of class i causing vessel to drift - (events/vessel);
Di = collision diameter of a class i vessel;
Lj = is the length of block j.
Collision Frequency for Dedicated/Supporting Vessels

Dedicated and supporting vessels could be considered both powered
powered
passing and drifting vessels. Therefore the collision frequency of
these vessels against an obstacle is given by the sum of the collision
collision
frequency of drifting vessels plus the collision frequency of powered
powered
passing vessels.
Fc = (Fc1+Fc2) × Pred
Fc1 = N × Pr × Pc/r × Pna
Pc/r = α/2π 1/π×
/2π = 1/π arcsin[(D1+D2)/2L]
Fc2 = N × Pf × Pc/f × Pna
D1 + D 2
L= +H
2
6
Fc = (Fc1+Fc2) × Pred;
Pred; Fc1 = N × Pr × Pc/r × Pna
Pc/r = α/2π 1/π×
/2π = 1/π arcsin[(D1+D2)/2L];
Fc2 = N × Pf × Pc/f × Pna
D1 + D 2
L= +H
2
Fc = annual collision frequency with a fixed obstacle for dedicated and powered passing vessels (event/year);
Fc1 = annual collision frequency with a fixed obstacle for powered passing vessels (event/year);
Fc2 = annual collision frequency with a fixed obstacle for drifting vessels (event/year);
Pred = reduction factor for approaching vessels supported by assistance vessels;
N = number of vessels per year (vessel/year);
Pr = probability of uncontrolled navigation inside Minimum Safety Operational Distance MSOD;
Pc/r = probability that the route leads to collision with the fixed obstacle conditioned to the entrance inside the
MSOD zone, it is calculated using geometrical models;
Pna = probability of failure of safety procedures to avoid impact;
α = is the collision angle;
D1,2 = equivalent diameters (obstacle/vessel) meters;
H = is the net distance between the vessel and the fixed obstacle (m);
L = is the average distance between vessel and the obstacle (m);
Pf = is the failure probability for vessels with the potential to cause vessel to drift (events/vessel);
Pc/f = probability that the route leads to collision with the fixed obstacle conditioned to propulsion loss.
7
Impact of moving vessel with Moving Obstacles

(vessel/vessel)
The carrier approach routes are subdivided into two or
more parts. It is then assumed that the ship movements
along each route fraction are developed with a simplified
profile with the vessel axis constant within each portion of
the route. For each selected position, the same
methodology reported for fixed obstacles shall be applied
considering, as reduction factor, the fraction of time spent
in a year by the vessel to cover the relevant route fraction.
METHODOLOGY FOR CALCULATION OF EXPECTED

IMPACT ENERGY
The effect of a potential collision between a ship and a
Platform, or between ships has been analyzed in the
literature with structural simulations of impacts under the
most serious conditions, namely for perpendicular impacts
(most severe impact).
From previous studies, the "limit" for serious damages can

be identified for different conditions, vessels and
structures, in terms of Maximum Impact Energy (MJ).
8
The expected impact energies, as a function of the tonnage

of the striking vessel and for different speed of impact, can
be calculated (e.g. with the following formula):
1 M Tot ⋅1000 ⋅ (v ⋅ 0.514 )

2
E= ⋅
2 1000000
E = expected impact energy (MJ);

MTot = vessel total mass (tons);
v = vessel speed (knots).
The calculated impact energies can be compared for each

ship class with the "limit" available from literature or from
project-
project-specific data.

1 M Tot ⋅1000 ⋅ (v ⋅ 0.514 )
2
E= ⋅
2 1000000
E = expected impact energy (MJ);
MTot = vessel total mass (tons);
v = vessel speed (knots).
Suezmax Tanker
Typical DWT: 150,000 Tons

Typical Service speed: 15 knots
Expected Impact Energy is…

is…
Approximately: 5,000 MJ
9
Energy
Event (MegaJoule)
Mt. St. Helens Eruption Of 1980 1.90E+12
"Little Boy" Nuclear Bomb 6.28E+07
Typical Lightning Bolt 5000
Chemical Energy In 1 Gallon Of Gasoline 132
Electrical Energy In 1 AA Battery 0.001
Hidraulic Hammer (per stroke) 0.004
1 Ton of TNT 4185
Earthquake Ritcher Scale 3.0 2000
Suezmax impact 150,000 DWT - 15 knots 5000
Example of calculated Impact Energy for Vessels

in Function of Tonnage and Speed
Total Energy (MJ)(a)

Ship Mass(b)
Class (tons) 1.7 kn 2.9 kn 5 kn 6.5 kn 10 kn 15 kn 20 kn
1 1,000 0 1 3 5 13 30 53
2 3,000 1 3 10 16 40 89 159
3 14,500 6 16 49 79 192 432 768
4 80,000 31 89 270 436 1,057 2,384 4,235
5 140,000 54 155 473 762 1,849 4,172 7,412
(a) the impact energies expected to have the potential to cause a loss of integrity for
perpendicular collision are highlighted.
(b) Total Mass is calculated as ship dwt plus ship weight.
10
References:
• Technica,
Technica, 1987, Report, "RABL - Risk Assessment of Buoyancy
Loss, Project PP4, Assessment of Module Collision
Frequencies", London, U.K.
• Pitblado,
Pitblado, 2004, “Consequences of LNG Marine Incidents”
Incidents”, CCPS
Conference, June 2004.
• SikteC,
SikteC, 1987, Report, “Zeepipe Riser Platform, Ship Collision
Study”
Study”, Trondheim, Norway
11
HSE in OFFSHORE
Oil&Gas and
Module 3
Escape, Evacuation and Rescue

Analysis (EERA)
5 February 2009
Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Analysis

1. Why EERA,
2. The main methodological approach,
3. The Analysis and Results,
4. Examples.
1
EERA
WHY EERA ?
To ensure that offshore installations be as safe

as reasonably practicable (ALARP) for personnel
in the event of a situation which requires
abandonment of the installation.
EERA
The overall objective of the EERA is to assess

the potential for impairment of the Plant Escape,
Evacuation and Rescue (EER) arrangements and
associated goals and objectives.
EERA is performed on the basis of the results

arising from QRA and, together with the
Emergency Systems Survivability Assessment
(ESSA), assesses in detail the potential for key
safety related arrangements to be impaired by
the major accident hazards, hence potentially
resulting in escalation of an event.
2
EERA
DEFINITIONS
Escape = Movement of personnel from their location at

the time of the alarm to a Temporary Safe Refuge (TSR).
Evacuation = Movement from the TSR to a lifeboat or

other safety craft, and its launch and movement to a safe
distance from the installation.
Rescue = Transfer of personnel from safety craft, water,

or platform to a safe haven.
EERA
EERA focuses on assessing the vulnerability of

emergency response related arrangements (e.g.
escape routes, muster points etc)
Steps:
- Identification of scenarios (MAE, Major Accidental Events)
- Identification of the systems/equipment required for E, E & R
- Definition of performance criteria for E,E & R systems
- Analysis of the mechanisms that can impair the E, E & R systems/

functions
3
EERA
EERA
IDENTIFICATION OF MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARDS
Essentially the MAEs are:
Hydrocarbon jet fires and pool fires;

Explosions and flash fires;
Gas (flammable / toxic) and Smoke dispersion;
Non-hydrocarbon fires (e.g. Electrical);
Dropped objects;
Helicopter crash onto facility (helideck);
Ship or boat collision;
4
EERA
EERA
5
EERA
IMPAIRMENT CRITERIA
EERA
IMPAIRMENT CRITERIA (CONTINUATION)
6
EERA
Major Incident
Overview of EER Process 1.0

Alarm
2.0
Access
3.0
Muster
4.0
Egress
5.0 6.0
Evacuation Escape
7.0
Rescue
PATH 1
PATH 2
Place of Safety
PATH 3
PATH 4
EERA
IMPAIRMENT CRITERIA (CONTINUATION)

Top Level Hierarchical Task Analysis
0.0
EER PROCESS
1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0

ALARM ACCESS MUSTER EGRESS EVACUATION ESCAPE RESCUE
4.1
2.1 3.1 5.1 6.1 7.1
1.1 Choose
Choose Register at Evacuate Via Escape Approach
Detect Alarm Egress
Access Route Muster Point Bridge Link by Sea survivors
Route
2.2 3.2 4.2 5.2 6.2 7.2

1.2
Move Along Communicate with Move Along Evacuate by Escape directly Help Survivors
Interpret alarm
Access Route “Cellule de Crise” Egress Route helicopter into sea to Board
1.3 3.3 5.3

Act Receive Evacuate by
accordingly Instructions Sea
7
EERA (Evacuation, Escape and Rescue) Analysis
The study is typically performed in the following steps:

- The Evacuation, Escape and Rescue (EER) arrangements and facilities are
described (considering both existing CPP and new facilities);
- The loss of integrity criteria for the EER arrangements is defined, in
accordance to Client Criteria (and EERA ToR).
- Identification of MAEs that could

potentially affect the EER devices
(derived from QRA);
- Assessment of escape means
availability during MAE occurrence.
The EERA Report demonstrates

that the impairment of the key EER
arrangements is within Client
criteria.
Typical EERA Results (top events)
Flame
EER Top Overpress Heat Flash Flamma Overall EER Goal
Impingem
Arrangement Events ure Radiation Fire ble Gas Impaired
ent
1 N P P P P N
Escape 4 N P P P P N
routes 5 N P P P P N
9 N P P P P N
1 N P P P P N
Emergency 4 N N P N N N
Gates 5 N N P P P N
9 N P P P P N
example of EERA results
8
References:
• A methodology for hazard identification on EER Assessments –
OTH 95 466 – RM Consultants – Health and Safety Executive
• SOLAS International Maritime Organization (IMO). Consolidated
text of the IMO international convention for the Safety Of Life At
Sea (SOLAS) 2004 and subsequent amendments
• ISO 13702:1999 Petroleum and Natural Gas Industries – Control
and Mitigation of Fires and Explosions on Offshore Production
Installations – Requirements and Guidelines
9
HSE in OFFSHORE
Oil&Gas and
Module 4
Temporary Refuge (T.R.) Integrity
5 February 2009
Temporary Refuge Integrity

1. Definition of T.R.
2. The main issues.
1
T.R.
T.R.
T. R. - TEMPORARY REFUGE
Temporary Refuge (TR): (Also: Temporary Safe

Refuge - TSR):
One or more locations where personnel are

adequately protected from explosion, fire, heat,
smoke, toxic gas, or fumes while an emergency
incident is brought under control or the decision
is made to abandon the facility.
T.R.
T.R.
The TR needs:
• to be accessible,
• to provide physical protection for personnel
from the immediate effects of the emergency
incident,
• to maintain its structural integrity,
• to allow communication with people outside
involved in controlling the incident or
organising rescue services, and
• to provide egress to the means of evacuation.
2
T.R.
T.R.
This applies offshore to temporary refuges and

in general to any facilities that need to operate during
an emergency. In the context of MAE, four main types
of failure need to be considered:
• Loss of structural support (collapse of jacket or

supporting structure; loss of buoyancy or stability
of floating unit; collapse of walls or roof or floor;
etc)
• Loss of availability of means of evacuation
T.R.
T.R.
• Deterioration of conditions at temporary refuge

locations ingress of smoke, fumes, gas, or heat;
lack of oxygen; toxic fumes generated internally;
effects of internal fire; etc) to the point where this
may be expected to lead to loss of life or other
serious harm to the workforce
• Loss of command functions (communications;

power; control systems; lighting; etc) which will
effect the information available for decision-
making, and the capacity to mitigate or fight the
incident and/or organise safe evacuation if
appropriate
3
T.R.
T.R.
T.R.
T.R.
There are two main Risk drivers to TR impairment

• Risk of Gas Explosion
the overpressure could damage platform
protection systems, damage escape routes and
ultimately damage the integrity of the T.R.
• Risk of smoke and Gas ingress

Smoke and Gas could impair the systems that
maintain the quality of environment inside the
T.R.
4
T.R.
T.R.
The TR impairments
• Failure of firewalls, allowing entry of fire, smoke,
flammable vapours, toxic fumes or flood water
• Fire inside the TR (modelled as a separate event)
• Explosion
• Deterioration of internal conditions due to
external fire, smoke, gases or flooding
• Structural, foundation or buoyancy failure
• Loss of command support and communications
systems (this should be covered by a separate
emergency systems survivability assessment)
• Escape from the TR is prevented at all exits due
to a deterioration of external conditions
T.R.
T.R.
The TR impairments
A risk-
risk-based approach shall be set out in the Temporary
Refuge Impairment Analysis (TRIA) in which the
impairment criteria shall be assessed for hazards
identified by all credible Major Accident Events (MAEs
(MAEs))
discussed in the following;
• Fire and Explosion Analysis (FERA);
• Toxic Gas Dispersion Analysis;
• Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Analysis (EERA);
• Smoke and Gas Ingress Analysis (SGIA);
• Emergency Systems Survivability Analysis (ESSA);
• Impact analysis (Dropped object, Boat impact and
Missile impact);
• Environmental analysis (Seismic and Extreme
weather conditions).
• helicopter crash
5
References:
• A methodology for hazard identification on EER Assessments –
OTH 95 466 – RM Consultants – Health and Safety Executive
• ISO 13702:1999 Petroleum and Natural Gas Industries – Control
and Mitigation of Fires and Explosions on Offshore Production
Installations – Requirements and Guidelines
• ISO15544:2000 Petroleum and natural gas industries-
industries-Offshore
production installation-
installation-Requirements and guidelines for
emergency response
6
MASTER PROGETTAZIONE IMPIANTI

OIL&GAS
HSE in Oil&Gas and

Module 5 (Extra)
Hazardous Area Classification

5 February 2009
Safety Engineering
A life without adventure is likely to be

unsatisfying, but a life in which adventure is
allowed to take whatever form it will, is likely to
be short.
— Bertrand Russell
In the latest years, design and operating procedures to eliminate or control process
hazards have evolved and been incorporated into codes and standards. The
sequence and series of control tools and techniques normally applied in a modern
Process Project is referred to as "Safety Engineering".
One of the most widely used and important (for its influence in the design)
technique is the Hazardous Area Classification (HAC).
1

1. The concept of Hazardous Area. Purpose of the classification,
2. The main standards for HAC: API, European Standards,
3. The methods for the definition of the extension of classified area,
4. Workshop.
Hazardous Area Classification (HAC) is a method of

analysing and classifying the environment where
explosive gas atmospheres may occur to allow the
proper selection of electrical apparatus to be installed in
that environment.
There are several kind of methods to determine the

hazardous area according to different national regulation.
Among all:
• API 500 / 505
• IEC 60079-
60079-10
2
These recommended practices are applicable to many

type of Plant (e.g. Chemical Plant, Refinery, Oil&Gas
Plant, Offshore Installations, etc), with exception for
mines (none is applicable), explosives plant (IEC is not
applicable), hospitals and houses (IEC is not applicable).
References:
• API Recommended Practice 505, “Recommended Practice for
Classification of Locations for Electrical Installations at
Petroleum Facilities Classified as Class I, Zone 0, Zone 1, and
Zone 2”
2”, First Edition, November 1997.
• IEC EN 60079-
60079-10. Electrical Apparatus for Explosive Gas
Atmospheres - Part 10 - Classification of Hazardous Areas. -
Fourth Ed. 2002 - 6.
3
Explosive Gas Atmosphere:

Atmosphere: A mixture with air, under
atmospheric conditions, of a flammable material in the
form of gas or vapour in which, after ignition, the
combustion spreads throughout the unconsumed mixture.
mixture.
Hazardous Area:
Area: A three-
three-dimensional space in which an
explosive gas atmosphere is present,
present, or may be expected
to be present, in quantities such as to require special
precautions for the construction, installation and use of
apparatuses.
Non-
Non-hazardous Area:
Area: A three-
three-dimensional space in which
an explosive gas atmosphere is not expected to be
present,
present, in quantities such as to require special
precautions for the construction, installation and use of
apparatuses.
example
Grades of Release:
Release:
Continuous (C): A release which is continuous or is
expected to occur for long periods, or that
occurs frequently and for short periods.
Primary (P): A release which can be expected to occur
periodically or occasionally during normal
operation.
Secondary (S): A release which is not expected to occur
during normal operation and if it does
occur, it is likely to do so only
infrequently and for short periods.
Normal Operation:
Operation:
The situation when the equipment is operating within its
design parameters.
4
Zones:
Zones: Hazardous areas are classified into zones on the
basis of the frequency of the occurrence and duration of
an explosive gas atmosphere, as follows:
• Zone 0:0: An area in which an explosive gas atmosphere
is present continuously or for long periods.
is likely to occur in normal operation.
is not likely to occur in normal operation and, if it does
occur, it is likely to do so only infrequently and will
exist for a short period only.
Type of Ventilation:
Ventilation:
Natural (N): This is a type of ventilation, which is
accomplished by the movement of air
caused by the wind and/or by temperature
gradients.
Artificial (A): The air movement required for ventilation is
provided by artificial means, for example
fans or extractors.
5
Availability of Ventilation:
Ventilation:
Good (G): Ventilation is present virtually continuously.
Fair (F): Ventilation is expected to be present during
normal operation. Discontinuities are
permitted, provided they occur infrequently
and for short periods.
Poor (P): Ventilation which does not meet the standard
of fair or good and whose discontinuities are
however not expected to occur for long
periods.
Degree of Ventilation [1]:

High ventilation (VH): Can reduce concentration at the source of
release virtually instantaneously, resulting in a
concentration below the lower explosive limit
(LEL).
Medium ventilation (VM): Can control the concentration, resulting in a
stable situation in which the concentration
beyond the zone boundary is below the LEL
whilst release is in progress and where the
explosive atmosphere does not unduly persist
after the release has stopped.
Low ventilation (VL): Cannot control the concentration whilst the
release is in progress and/or cannot prevent
undue persistence of a flammable atmosphere
after the release has stopped.
6
Fluid Category:
Category:
Fluid Category A:
A: A flammable liquid that, on release,
would vaporize rapidly and substantially.
This category includes: .
a) Any liquefied petroleum gas or lighter flammable liquid.
b) Any flammable liquid at a temperature sufficient to
produce, on release, more than about 40% vol vaporization
with no heat input other than from the surroundings.
Fluid Category B:
B: A flammable liquid, not in Category A,
but at a temperature sufficient for the
boiling to occur on release.
C: A flammable liquid, not in Category A
Fluid Category C:
or B, but which can, on release, be at a
temperature above its flashpoint, or form a
flammable mist or spray.
7
Temperature Classes:
Classes: According to the auto-
auto-ignition
temperature, for every flammable fluid is associated a
Temperature Class
Hazardous Area Classification – API 505
The procedure to classify the plant is as follow:

• Identify the hazardous materials;
• Identify for each material, its chemical-
chemical-physical
properties, such as LFL, UFL, Flash Point, Auto-
Auto-ignition
Temperature;
• Identify the Emission Sources and their probability of
occurrence;
• Evaluate the availability of ventilation;
• Apply the typical examples present on the standard to
each emission source identified according to the
ventilation and the plant layout.
8
Hazardous Area Classification – API 505 – Example
Example: Launching Trap of an Offshore Platform
INPUT
Max air temperature: 38°C
Relative Humidity: 77%
Environment: Open structure, naturally ventilated
Material: Natural Gas (99,47% mol CH4)
Chemical-Phisical Properties:
Boiling point: -162°C Density gas/air: 0,694
LEL: 5,3 Ignition Temperature: >500°C
Group: IIA Temperature Class: T1
Vapour Pressure: N/A (gas) Flash Point: N/A (gas)
OUTPUT
Launching Trap – Example

Op. Zone 1 Zone 2 Hazardous Zone
No Example Location Material
Temp °C Extension Extension ref. to examples
Natural
4 10.6.6.2.1 Main Deck 34 1,5 m 3,0 m Fig. 49
Gas
9
Hazardous Area Classification – IEC 60079-

60079-10
The procedure to classify the plant is as follow:
• Identify the hazardous materials;
• Identify for each material, its chemical-
chemical-physical properties,
such as LFL, UFL, Flash Point, Auto-
Auto-ignition Temperature;
• Identify the Emission Sources and their probability of
occurrence, evaluating the type of release (Continuous,
Primary, Secondary);
• Evaluate the availability of ventilation;
• Evaluate the hole dimension according to the standard;
• Apply the all the equations given in the standard in order to
evaluate the Flow rate of emission (Qg(Qg),
), the Hazardous
Volume (Vz
(Vz)) and the Hazardous Distances (dz (dz))
The IEC standards provide also the rules for classifying the areas
areas
with flammable powder and dust substances.
10

60079-10
Hazardous Volume
Minimum ventilation flow
Gas emission flow rate
Two-phase emission flow rate
Cryogenic emission flow rate
Liquid emission flow rate
Hazardous distance (high velocity of emission)
Hazardous distance (low velocity of emission)

Explosive Volume
Average concentration

60079-10 – Example
Example: Pressure Safety Valve

Material Natural Gas P atm 101325 Pa
Flash Point <0°C T external 313 K
Cp/Cv 1.31 Environment OPEN
MW 17.77 kg/kmol Air density 1.127 kg/m3
4.43 %vol GOOD,
LEL Ventilation (type,
(0.0327kg/m3) NATURAL,
availability, degree)
Autoignition MEDIUM
482°C
Temperature Efficiency of
1
Group IIA Ventilation
Temperature Wind Speed 0.5 m/s

T1
Class K = 0.35
Safety Coefficient
Kdz = 0.35
Operating Pressure 25.013*E05 Pa
Operating Temperature 293 K
Max. Initial Gas
50%
Concentration
11

60079-10 – Example
Primary Grade Emission
with , (sonic release)
a = a1 = dz ~ 1 m

60079-10 – Example
12

60079-10 – Example
Secondary Grade Emission

with , (sonic release)
with K0=1
a = a2 = dz ~ 10 m

60079-10 – Example
Vex Group,
Results ai Qg kg/s Vz m3
m3 Temp. Class
1° Grade 1m 2.27*E-3 0.506 0.177 IIA, T1
2° Grade 10 m 0.416 440 264 IIA, T1
13

60079-10 – Exercise
EMISSION FROM FLANGES

(Secondary Grade Emission)

INPUT DATA
Material Natural Gas P atm 101325 Pa
Flash Point <0°C T external 313 K

Cp/Cv 1.31 Environment OPEN (Kz=1)
MW 17.77 kg/kmol Air density 1.127 kg/m3
4.43 %vol GOOD,
LEL Ventilation (type,
(0.0327kg/m3) NATURAL,
availability, degree)
Autoignition MEDIUM
482°C
Temperature Efficiency of
1
Group IIA Ventilation
Temperature Wind Speed 0.5 m/s

T1
Class K = 0.35
Safety Coefficient
Kdz = 0.35
K , Kdz 0.6
Operating Pressure 25.013*E05 Pa
C (leak coefficient) 0.8
Operating Temperature 293 K
A (leak area) 25 mm2 Max. Initial Gas
50%
Concentration
14

Results:
a = 0.2 m

15

16

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MASTER HSE & Q - M7 - Industrial Safety

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In broad terms, we can identify two types of Hazards:

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WHEN WHERE WHAT FATALITIES REGULATIONS

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CONTRACT & LAW

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• Hazardous substances (as onshore);

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1 PROJECT HSE MANAGEMENT

1.1 HSE/Risk Assessment Plan

2.1 HAZID Review

2.2 HAZOP Review - Process Systems

2.3 HAZOP Review - Utility Systems

2.4 HAZOP Review - Vendor Package

2.5 SIL (Safety Integrity Level) Analysis

3. FORMAL SAFETY ASSESSMENTS

3.1 Hazard Register

3.2 Hazardous Inventory Report

3.3 Fire Protection Analysis

3.4 Fire Risk Analysis

3.5 Fire Resistance Analysis

3.6 Explosion Risk Analysis

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3.8 Escape, Evacuation and Rescue (EER) Study

3.9 Emergency Systems Survivability Analysis (ESSA)

3.10 Ship Collision Risk Analysis

3.11 Occupational Risk Assessment