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Disaster
Disaster mythology: mythology
looting in New Orleans
Mark Constable
Chiswick, Australia 519
Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the many reports of looting during the response
operation in New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and assess these reports against
literature which suggests that looting during natural disasters is a myth.
Design/methodology/approach – Media reports of looting from the days following Hurricane
Katrina’s landfall in New Orleans are compared with previously published evidence of disaster
mythology. Questions are raised regarding the legitimacy of these reports and the role of such reports
is assessed along with the role that media agencies play in disaster planning and response.
Findings – Media reports of looting in New Orleans appear to be mainly repeated second-hand accounts.
It is likely that there was in fact no looting in the traditional sense. The paper suggests what really
happened in terms of theft and poses potential reasons as to the cause thereof. A clear definition of looting
is suggested for emergency managers to use in order to separate acts of survival from pure criminal acts.
Originality/value – The paper highlights the dangers for emergency managers in believing
common disaster myths. It is a timely reminder of the existence disaster mythology against a recent
disaster in a developed country.
Keywords Natural disasters, Myths, Emergency measures, United States of America
Paper type Viewpoint

Introduction
A typical Atlantic hurricane season features on average approximately ten “named”
storms. Of these, six will become hurricanes. 2004 saw previous meteorological records
smashed when Hurricanes Charley, Frances, Ivan and Jeanne shattered vast areas of
Florida, the Carolinas, and Alabama, killing more than 100 people (Rigg, 2006, p. 10). In
August 2005, 12 months later, Hurricane Katrina, a Category 5 hurricane over the Gulf
of Mexico, proceeded north, becoming a slow moving Category 3 storm as it passed
over New Orleans and the surrounding areas. Over 1,400 people were killed during the
storm or during the subsequent flooding which covered over 80 per cent of New
Orleans. At the time of writing, up to one million people have been left displaced and
the damage bill is estimated somewhere in the vicinity of US $100 billion (St Onge and
Epstein, 2006). A total of 90,000 square miles of coastland along the Gulf of Mexico,
covering an area the size of Great Britain, suffered major infrastructure damage, if not
total devastation (Rigg, 2006, p. 10).
In the days following the landfall of Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana reports flooded
all media formats of the looting that was occurring in areas of New Orleans. Yet one
needs to go no further than the works of Drabek (1996), Dynes (1994) and Quarantelli
(1980) to see long since published evidence, based on research and observations, that
mass scale looting falls squarely within the realms of disaster mythology. So what Disaster Prevention and Management
Vol. 17 No. 4, 2008
happened in New Orleans? Was this the exception that proves the rule or was this pp. 519-525
media hype? What influence did disaster mythology have on decision makers in New q Emerald Group Publishing Limited
0965-3562
Orleans in August 2005? DOI 10.1108/09653560810901764
DPM Any emergency response presents us with opportunities to learn from mistakes
17,4 made and it is worthwhile for emergency managers from around the world to consider
the lessons to be learned from the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.
As with any disaster, there were many successes and failures in the response to
Hurricane Katrina. It seems timely to remind emergency managers of the existence of
“disaster mythology”. In the case of New Orleans, we have a clear reminder of the myth
520 of looting following natural disasters. Emergency managers need to stay aware of the
potential for media “beat ups” during emergencies and must have an understanding of
how disaster mythology may effect the decision making process. A thorough
understanding of disaster mythology will help guard against making ill-informed
decisions both before disasters strike and during times of crisis.

Disaster mythology in New Orleans

Beliefs held towards “disaster mythology” by the public and emergency managers
alike have been the subject of much research over the last few decades. Particular
myths including those of mass panic, mass looting, imposed martial law, mass
evacuations, “disaster shock”, and general antisocial behaviour (such as criminal
activities) have been proven to be exactly that – myths (Drabek, 1996, p. 1). Yet
surveys and research have shown that a high percentage of the general public and
indeed of many officials engaged in emergency and disaster management believe such
myths to be true. Without a doubt emergency planners with little experience will often
base their plans on such “conventional wisdom” as mythology rather than knowledge
of actual events and associated behaviours (Dynes, 1994, p. 141). Why are these myths
held to be true by so many and in what way did they effect the planning and response
operation to Hurricane Katrina?
Drabek (1996, p. 1) has suggested that people learn these falsehoods of disaster
behaviour from their peers and generally have such beliefs confirmed by the media, who
he found did report accurately on specific facts but also reinforced typical disaster
mythology. Stallings (1990, p. 80) cites Short, stating that news organisations are one of
the most significant actors involved in the social construction of risk. Quarantelli studied
36 disaster films, finding that they “either perpetuate the wrong ideas according to
scientific studies or present empirically incorrect facts” (Drabek, 1996, p. 3).
The media will amplify the impact of the event to suit their own interests: the bigger
the destruction, the bigger the news (van den Eynde and Veno, 1999, p. 70). The media
plays an important role in defining the situation, highlighting the difference between
what is really going on and what is brought to bear on the decision-makers, emergency
workers, the people in the stricken areas and the public (Rosenthal, 1998, p. 157).
Conducting an internet search for news articles regarding looting in News Orleans,
reveals many results; however, many links are third-party commentaries and many
news organisations repeat information originally reported by different agencies.
MSNBC (2005), Fox News (Goldblatt et al., 2006), ABC News (2005), and the Sydney
Morning Herald (2005) web sites each quoted verbatim a passage originally reported
by the Associated Press on 1 September 2005 (Nossiter, 2006) as did no less than 400
other news web sites in early September 2005. With the same basic story repeated so
many times around the world, it is no wonder that a belief in disaster mythology such
as looting becomes so ingrained in the minds of emergency managers and the
community.
 Interviews in 1980 with 55 emergency management officials regarding disaster Disaster
mythology found that 76 per cent believed in the myth of looting; 85 per cent believed mythology
that martial law would need to be imposed following a disaster; and 54 per cent
believed that there would be an increase in the rate of crime (Drabek, 1996, p. 1). If the
emergency management officials and politicians involved in the response to Katrina
had similar beliefs, then these research findings would certainly suggest a reason for
their actions in response to the hurricane. But what is the cost to life? It is probable that 521
this is immeasurable, but with 1500 police pulled away from rescue operations on the
31 August and ordered to concentrate on the “looting problem” (Associated Press,
2005), who knows how many lives may have been lost in New Orleans? And what is
the social cost of such actions within an already devastated community? Is it possible,
with a well developed belief in looting, that emergency managers and the unaffected
public may come to despise those disenfranchised by a natural disaster because of a
fear of looting masses?
So was New Orleans an exception to the findings of so much research or are the
stories of such wide spread looting just a media beat up? Certainly following the impact
of Hurricane Katrina there were hundreds of media reports of looting and crime
occurring in New Orleans. How many of the reports were true is something that we will
not know until research and surveys are conducted of those within the city who were
present at the events reported by the world’s media.
We must, however, consider two very important issues: first, media agencies do
sensationalise their reports, and second, we need to examine what is meant by
“looting”.
In selecting events to report (and not to report), interviewing certain experts who
interpret these events, and in distributing news products, news organisations play a
large role in creating a fundamental element of public discourse (Stallings, 1990,
p. 80). Private media agencies need to sell papers or gain television ratings. How do
they do this? By providing the public with exciting stories which are amazing to
read or exciting to see. When was the last time you read or saw a story about a
disaster response where everything was going smoothly and nothing went wrong?
The public at large watch, listen, and read about the likely causes of an unsettling
event and hope to be reassured about the absence of future harm (Stallings, 1990,
p. 81). Hewitt (1998, p. 87) describes the exploitation of tragic images and the
heartrending words by officials and media for the promotion of their own
organisations as “disaster pornography,” and he suggests that it must be fought
against by listening to the oral testimony of disaster victims in order to gain a true
social understanding of the situation in question. Rosenthal (1998, p. 157) continues
this theme by suggesting that from outright sensationalism to self-imposed
censorship, the “mediazation” of disasters underscores the subjective mode of such
information.
Drabek (1996, p. 3) refers to the sensationalised captions next to pictures in the book
The Complete Story of the Galveston Horror highlighting examples such as: “Vandals
robbing the dead”; “Shooting vandals at work on the dead bodies in Galveston after the
disaster”; “Survivors insane over the loss of homes and dear ones”; “Survivors, nearly
starved, ransacking a grocery store for food.” Further examples can be seen in media
reports of New Orleans with headlines such as “Widespread looting” (Mattingly et al.,
2005), “Witnesses: New Orleans cops among looters” (Griffin and Phillips, 2005) and
DPM “Chaotic conditions in New Orleans “(CBS, 2005). The use of emotive language in
17,4 media reports sways the opinions of the reader or viewer and limits ones ability to
make informed decisions on the contents of the reports.
What is looting and did it really occur in New Orleans? The word “looting” conjures
images of masses of people throwing bricks through the windows of store fronts and
ransacking these stores of everything of value. According to the The Concise Oxford
522 Dictionary, 2005 to loot is to: “steal goods from, especially during a war or riot.” Did
stealing occur? Certainly, people were witnessed removing items they presumably did
not pay for from stores of which they likely gained unlawful access to; but what was
taken? According to most reports stolen items generally amounted to foodstuffs,
pharmaceutical goods and clothing items (Goldblatt et al., 2006; Mattingly et al., 2005),
things that would generally be considered necessary for an individual’s survival.
In order to understand what occurred in New Orleans we need to assess the social
context in which it occurred. People, for the most part, were not stealing items from
stores for their own personal gain or profit (such as colour televisions) but were taking
items, equipment and food essential for their survival. And why were they doing this?
Most likely because the response from the government was too slow and/or inadequate
for the communities personal needs at that time. The goods taken, particularly in the
case of food taken from abandoned stores, would have likely rotted if it was not taken
and consumed and would have therefore added to the overall health risk.
In Maslow’s “Hierarchy of Needs”, a human’s physiological needs take the highest
priority forming the base of all human requirements. These base needs are chiefly: the
need to breathe; the need for water; the need to eat; the need to dispose of bodily wastes;
the need for sleep; the need to regulate body temperature; and the need for protection.
When any of these needs are not met an individual will de-prioritise all other desires
and capacities. Physiological needs can control thoughts and behaviours, can cause
people to feel sickness, pain and discomfort (Huitt, 2004). These so-called “looters”
most likely found themselves with little or no possessions, no shelter and no food or
clean water and so their basic survival instinct to seek shelter and sustenance took
over.
Did people steal? In the strict sense of the law, most likely, yes. However we, the
unaffected, need to reflect on when an individual’s right to survive under horrific
circumstances out weighs laws imposed in times of social normality. It is unlikely that
anyone would think badly of a soldier, stuck behind enemy lines during a war, for
stealing food from the local population in order to survive. So why would anyone think
differently of any of the residents of New Orleans following the devastation of
Hurricane Katrina?
Defining an emergency is a complex social process, requiring information about the
status of the present compared with the circumstance of the past and drawing
conclusions about the consequences of those discrepancies (Dynes, 1994, p. 146). This
is the challenge and the problem for all emergency managers and social commentators
to address before rushing to judgement on the “looting” in New Orleans.
In criticising the military model of response, Dynes (1994, p. 147) highlights several
organisational directions, assumptions and consequences. He emphasises the
assumptions made by response agencies that victims are passive and cannot “help”
themselves and that any spontaneous and “unplanned” behaviour [by non agency
staff] is evaluated as being dysfunctional, misdirected and harmful. When considering
these assumptions and the concept that a reliance on “conventional wisdom” [instead Disaster
of knowledge] which will treat any nonconforming experience as irrelevant (Dynes, mythology
1994, p. 141) against the actions of hungry and homeless victims of Katrina, it is
possible to see what drove the decisions of emergency management staff to redirect
police away from rescue efforts and towards law enforcement activities.
In order to ensure that emergency managers do not act on conventional wisdom
alone we need to set clearly defined parameters of what constitutes “looting”. Most 523
importantly any classification of looting should consider the malicious intent of the
individual or groups actions. One possible characterisation may be to define looting as:
An act of robbery, taking advantage of disastrous circumstances, that is performed purely for
self-gain and is conducted with criminal intent.
It is vital that we realise that certain actions, which would be considered “illegal”
during normal circumstances, when aimed at ensuring the survival of oneself and
others during catastrophic circumstances should be considered, at the time, as no more
wrong than an ambulance running a red light whilst en route to an car accident! It is
also important that emergency managers and the media alike differentiate between
acts of survival and acts of civil unrest or malicious crime.
None of this is to say that crime did not occur in the wake of Katrina, nor that crime
does not occur during any number of emergency situations. There were several
reported robberies, assaults, rapes, shootings and car-jackings (BBC News, 2005;
Goldblatt et al., 2006) during the response operation. However, statistically, these types
of events are likely to have occurred during a non-emergency situation, with New
Orleans having a crime rate roughly double the national average for the USA
(CityRating, 2002).
It must be remembered that, emergencies do not suddenly create Jekylls out of
Hydes (Dynes, 1994, p. 150). With this disaster mythology in mind, it is of interest to
consider whether official reactions to looting was based on solid evidence or were they
simply a reaction to sensationalised media reporting and hearsay? It is likely that the
official response to “looting” in New Orleans was based on the widespread belief that
antisocial behaviour is extremely common and threatens the re-establishment of
“normality” (Dynes, 1994, p. 147). Or was it something more? Was the claim of mass
looting a deliberate action on the part of the New Orleans Government to ensure the US
Federal Government, a government known to be “tough on crime”, would activate the
National Guard in response and thus New Orleans would receive an enormous boost to
its struggling response and recovery manpower, albeit under false pretences? If this
was the case, and we may never know for sure, what damage may have been done to
the attitudes of future emergency managers and their responses to natural disasters
around the world?

Conclusion
Hurricane Katrina took more lives in the USA than nearly any storm in living memory
and it caused more damage in terms of cost than any other storm in US recorded
history. History and research have shown us that those who have the least control over
life events (such as the poor and the powerless) are the most likely to be negatively
affected in an emergency situation or disaster (van den Eynde and Veno, 1999, p. 172)
and it seems that the situation in New Orleans is no different. Particular failures in the
DPM response operation led certain residents of New Orleans to take their survival into their
17,4 own hands by sourcing supplies of food, water and clothing by breaking into shops.
The fiction author Quinnell (1981, p. 31) wrote:
Hunger and necessity are poor teachers of morality. A society that cannot provide the basics
of life does not get its laws obeyed.

524 There is a lesson in this quote in terms of the necessity of any government to ensure
that the basic needs of a community are always met and that provisions are in place in
case of disaster to ensure the continuation of the supply of basic needs.
A failure to recognise media reports of looting as disaster mythology may have cost
the lives of hundreds of people and certainly limited the speed of aid delivery to those
in the most need following the hurricane. Actions taken to aid in ones survival should
not be labelled as looting. The actions of individuals during times of significant social
disturbance should be examined within the context of the surrounding events. Those
involved in emergency management should consider the definition of looting in a
natural disaster and should design responses based on social welfare, not violence.

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Corresponding author
Mark Constable can be contacted at: markconstable@optusnet.com.au

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