Neural Networks-Based Sensor Validation

for the Flight Control System of a B777 Research Model

Giampiero Campa*, Mario Luca Fravolini+, Marcello Napolitano**, Brad Seanor***
+ Department of Electronic and Information Engineering Perugia University, 06100 Perugia, Italy.
* Department of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering, West Virginia University, Morgantown, WV 26506/6106.

Abstract
In fact, sensor failures, if left undetected and
This paper shows the results of the analysis of a scheme for uncompensated, can lead to closed-loop instability and,
Sensor Failure, Detection, Identification and potentially, unrecoverable flight conditions. Most of
Accommodation (SFDIA) using experimental flight data of today’s high performance military aircraft as well as
a research aircraft model. Conventional approaches to the commercial jetliners feature a flight control system with
problem are based on observers and Kalman Filters while triple physical redundancy in the sensory capabilities. A
more recent methods are based on neural approximators. Fault Detection (FD) scheme monitors these components
The work described in this paper is based on the use of and, as a sensor failure is detected, it recovers the nominal
neural networks (NNs) as on-line learning non-linear functionality by switching from the faulty unit to one of the
approximators. The performances of two different neural two remaining back-up units. A voting-scheme between the
architectures were compared. The first architecture is based different signals from the sensors measuring the same
on a Multi Layer Perceptron (MLP) NN trained with the parameter is typically used for this task. However, there are
Extended Back Propagation algorithm (EBPA). The second special purpose aircraft (e.g. UAVs) and spacecraft where
architecture is based on a Radial Basis Function (RBF) NN reduced complexity, lower costs, and weight optimization
trained with the Extended-MRAN (EMRAN) algorithms. are major design specifications. For these classes of aircraft
The EMRAN algorithm is a training algorithm recently and spacecraft, an alternative approach can take advantage
developed for RBF networks which has shown remarkable of the analytical redundancy 1 existing in the system to
learning capabilities at a fraction of the memory provide fault tolerance capabilities. Analytical redundancy
requirements and computational effort typically associated is the known functional relationship existing between the
with RBF NNs. The experimental data for this study are system’s outputs, states and inputs. In other words, the
acquired from the flight-testing of a 1/24th semi-scale B777 information provided by a set of sensors along with a priori
research model designed, built, and flown at West Virginia knowledge of the system allows detecting and identifying
University (WVU). the faulty sensor, while estimating the related variable as a
function of other measured variables. Research on fault
List of Acronyms tolerance based on analytical redundancy has produced a
EBPA Extended Back Propagation Algorithm quite mature framework especially for linear systems 2,3.
EMRAN Extended Minimal Resource Allocating Currently, substantial research challenges are in the
Networks extension of the previous schemes to the case of nonlinear
MLP Multi Layer Perceptrion systems. Adaptive and on-line approximation
MRAN Minimal Resource Allocating Network methodologies are receiving considerable attention and the
NN Neural Network use of different types of Neural Networks (NNs) has been
RAN Resource Allocating Networks proposed to take advantage of some of their properties 4-6.
RBF Radial Basis Function The performance of a NN in approximating a given
SFDIA Sensor Failure Detection, Identification, function critically depends on its underlying structure as
and Accommodation well as on the featured training algorithm. The two classes
of NNs here considered are the Multi-Layer Perceptron
1. Introduction NNs (MLP NNs) 7 and the Radial Basis Function NNs
Fault tolerant flight control systems (FTFCS) are required (RBF NNs)8. Due to their approximation and adaptation
to accommodate failures in different components, mainly capabilities, both MLP and RBF NNs have been proposed
sensors and actuators. The effort described in this paper as estimators to approximate complex non-linear systems.
focuses on the sensor failure problem. Sensor failures are Within a larger picture both classes of NNs can be
critical when the measurements from the failed sensor are considered as “nonlinear approximators” and a systematic
used in the feedback loop of the flight control laws. procedure based on Lyapunov’s theory for creating non-
linear approximators with stability characteristics could be
applied to each class 9,10.
+
Assistant Professor.
*
Research assistant Professor.
**
Professor.
***
PhD Student.
 2. Description Of The B777 Model And Its
Electronic Payload
The aircraft model (shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2) is a
1/24th semi-scale B777 research designed, built, assembled,
instrumented, and flown at WVU 11. Scaled research
models do not exhibit acceptable flying qualities due to the
negative effect of the payload on the dynamic
characteristic. Therefore, specific changes were made to the
geometric and aerodynamic characteristics of the “perfectly
scaled” model to achieve desirable handling qualities. In
particular, the design aimed to achieve acceptable values
for two specific parameters, that is the Thrust/Weight
(T/W) and the Weight/Wing Surface (W/S) ratios. The
aircraft was essentially designed around its electronic
payload with a simple “2 component: tail/fuselage + wing”
architecture. The wing, featuring ailerons, inboard/outboard
flaps and housing the fuel tanks, was manufactured with
fiberglass, carbon fiber, foam, and lightweight plywood.
Figure 1 - B777 Model (in flight)
Figure 2 - B777 Model (during approach)
The fuselage was manufactured using carbon fiber as a
whole piece along with the horizontal tail and the vertical
tail. Additional servos on the fuselage include a nose wheel
and a brake servo. The B777 aircraft propulsion system
features two ducted fan engines with a nine-rotor blade
system with an engine shroud/rotor hub assembly. The units
are housed in scaled engine nacelles to add realism to the
model. The main characteristics are summarized in Table 1.
Fuselage length 8.75 ft
Wing span 8.92 ft
Wing surface 11.3 ft2
Weight (with R/C components, 46 lb.
48 oz. Fuel, and payload)
Maximum thrust (approx.) 24.0 lb.
Weight (with R/C components, 30.2 lb.
48 oz. fuel)
Table 1 – WVU B777 Research Model Characteristics
The onboard computer package, featuring a CPU board, a
passive backplane, a 16 MB RAM Disk card, a data
acquisition card and a chassis frame, is the core of the
aircraft electronic payload since it executes the data
acquisition software to acquire the data from all the sensors.
The 16 MB RAM disk stores the on-board software and the
recorded flight data, which, upon landing, are retrieved
through laptop computer via parallel port. The aircraft
transmitter/receiver unit features a 10-channel
programmable/menu driven system with the capabilities of
customizing aircraft controls with a built-in microprocessor.
This ground unit allows the pilot to command the
conventional aircraft controls with the addition of mixing
control surfaces and programming maneuver functions. In
terms of the sensor capabilities, the electronic payload
features a unit with 3 gyros and 3 accelerometers, an air-
data probe with pressure sensors for altitude and airspeed
measurements, an aerodynamic vane with potentiometers
for the aerodynamic angles, and potentiometers at the
hinges of each control surface for the measurement of the
surface deflections. Additional components of the payload
include batteries and power converters. A total of 33 flights
have been performed with 16 flight tests specifically for
SFDIA purposes.
3. Learning-Based SFDIA
Analytical redundancy based methods have been widely
discussed by several authors 12-15. Specific applications
have also been developed in the field of flight control
systems 4,6,16-18. In these methods an analytical model of the
system is used inside within “observers” to provide
estimates of measured variables. This redundancy is then
used both to detect a fault and to provide fault tolerance
capability to the system.
3.1. Estimation of the longitudinal dynamics
The most relevant signals that characterize the longitudinal
dynamics of an aircraft are:
• Angle of attack α [rad];
• Pitch rate q [rad/sec];
• Normal acceleration az [g];
• Elevator deflection δe [rad].
• Velocity relative to the air V [m/s]
• Altitude H [m]
The analytical redundancy between these signals is ensured
by the equations of motion of the aircraft and in particular
by the “normal force equation” below expressed along the
body fixed reference frame:
maz = ρ ( H )V 2 SC z (α , δ e ,V , a z / V 2 , q / V ) / 2 (1)
where m is the aircraft mass, az is the normal acceleration
measured at the center of gravity, S is the reference surface,
ρ is the air density, and Cz is the normal force non-
dimensional coefficient (which is a function of α, q/V and
δe). In this effort it was assumed - without any loss of
generality - that a failure can occur only on the sensors
measuring α, q, and az . The analytical redundancy between
the variables involved in (1) has been exploited to build up
the input-out models required in the SFDIA scheme. In
particular, the following estimation models where
employed:
( )
αˆ ( k + 1) = fα V (k ), H ( k ), a z ( k ) / V 2 (k ), q( k ) / V (k ),δ e ( k )
qˆ ( k + 1) = f q ( H (k ),V (k ), a (k ) / V
z
2
( k ),α ( k ), δ e ( k )
aˆ z (k + 1) = f az ( H ( k ),V (k ), q (k ) / V (k ),α (k ), δ e (k ) )
2 another threshold S20 the state of the sensor is then declared
The signals az/V and q/V have been used in the above
relationships instead of az and q because they allow for the
non-linearities of the functions from (2-4) to be smoother
and, therefore, easier to be identified. In general, since the
non-linearities in aircraft dynamics are relevant, the use of
non-linear approximators is required.
3.2. Residual generation
The purpose of residual generation is to check if the actual
measurements fit the process model. This can be
accomplished by analysing the trend of the following
residual signals ri(k) :
rα (k ) = α (k ) − αˆ (k ) + nα (k ) + Fα (k − k f ) (5)
rq (k ) = q (k ) − qˆ (k ) + nq (k ) + Fq (k − k f )
raz (k ) = a z (k ) − aˆ z (k ) + naz ( k ) + Faz (k − k f )
where ni(k) is the measurement noise and Fi(k-kf) is the
additive fault modeling function. Typically this function is
different from zero after the occurrence of the fault at the
instant k=kf. The residual set (5-7) has not been designed to
exhibit predefined sensitivities to different faults. In other
words a single measured quantity should not have impact
on a specific residual, based on the structured residuals
generation approach 13-15. Therefore the models expressed
in (2-4) and (5-7) can be used as “virtual sensors” or as
“residual generators” respectively.
3.3. Modelling of the Sensors Failures
Typically the failure modelling function F(k-kf) is described
by step and ramp functions representing abrupt and
incipient faults (bias or drift) respectively. Within this effort
a linear ramp-like function is assumed. Thus, the failure is
modelled as follows:
0 k < kf

F (k − k f ) =  A ⋅ (k − k f ) / TR k f ≤ k < k f + TR (8)

 A k ≥ k f + TR
where TR is the duration of the ramp and A is the final
value. By varying TR it is possible to model either hard or
soft failures.
3.4. Detection and Accommodation Procedure
The filtered residual vector is processed by an isolation and
accommodation logic in order to infer information about the
health status of sensors. When the squared filtered residual
exceeds a predefined threshold S10, the state of the
corresponding sensor is declared suspect (fault detection)
(2) and a procedure is invoked to decide on the health status of
) (3)
this sensor. At the same time the learning of the NN is
stopped to avoid that the NN learns from the “failure-
(4) contaminated” measurement. If the filtered residual exceeds
faulty (fault declaration), a failure procedure is enabled,
and an accommodated variable ya(k) is provided as output.
Thus, the accommodation procedure substitutes the faulty
measurement with the estimation given by the NN. As for
any SFDIA approach, the following capabilities are critical:
1) Failure detectability and false alarm rate (the sooner
the fault is detected and the least the number of false
alarm it is, the better is the SFDI system).
2) Estimation error (The least is the estimation error, the
better is the quality of the accommodation).
The used fault isolation and accommodation scheme is only
a step toward the development of a realistic and reliable
online scheme, on the other hand, the main purpose of this
(6)
paper was to investigate, using real flight data, the
(7) suitability of different online neural approximators for fault
detection purposes rather than focusing on failure
identification and accommodation issues.
4. Neural Networks for On-line Approximation
In recent years neural networks have been used effectively
in pattern recognition, optimization, signal classification
and control problems. The two main classes of neural
architectures that have emerged are the Multi Layer
Perceptron (MLP) NN 7 and the Radial Basis Function
(RBF) Networks NN 8.
Multi-Layer Perceptron with Extended Back-Propagation
(MLP-EBP).
It is a 3-layer architecture NN, with the following sigmoid
activation function at each of the neurons:
U −L
f ( net , U , L, T ) = − net
+L (9)
1+ e T
where U,L, and T are the upper bound, the lower bound and
the slope at the origin of the activation function
respectively. The EBPA updates not only the matrices of
the weights between input/hidden layers and hidden/output 5. Application to the WVU B777 Flight Data
layers - W(k) and V(k) respectively - but also the parameters
U,L,T at the neurons at the hidden and output layers 18. Four flight data windows of approximately 200 sec each
from 4 different flights of the WVU B777 model were used
“Conventional” Radial Basis Function (RBF) for the SFDIA experiment. The first two sets of flight data
were used for off line training purposes while the last two
In the “conventional” RBF NN the estimations ys ∈ ℜ m are
were used for validation purposes. Figure 3 shows a typical
expressed as a linear combination of M Gaussian Basis time history of q(k) and its estimation, during the
functions: occurrence of a simulated failure on the pitch gyro at time
( x − µ )T ( x − µ ) tf =150 s using the EMRAN algorithm. To highlight the
−
ys ( x ) = We 2σ 2
(10) effects of the failure a “large bias” failure type was selected
(A=10 deg/sec TR=1 sec).
where x ∈ ℜ is the input vector, the parameters µj and σj
n
yai (k ) = yˆi (k )
are the basis center and width respectively. In the 0.6
MRAN-NN
conventional implementation the hidden layer neurons are a 0.5
nominal
estimated
priori statically allocated on a uniform grid that covers the failed
0.4
whole input space and only the weight wij are updated. This fault

approach requires an exponentially increasing number of 0.3

basis functions versus the dimension of the input space. 0.2

q (r/sec) accommodation

0.1
Fully Tuned Extended Minimal Resource Allocation
Network RBF (EMRAN-RBF). 0

To avoid the dimensionality problems associated with the -0.1 ACCOMMODATED ACCOMMODATED =
= NOMINAL ESTIMATED
conventional RBF, a sequential learning technique for RBF
NNs has been introduced 19. The resulting architecture was -0.2

named the Resource Allocating Network (RAN) and has

144 146 148 150 152 154 156 158
shown to be suitable for online modeling of non-stationary time

processes with only an incremental growth in model Figure 3 - Failure on the q gyro at tf = 150 sec
complexity. The RAN learning algorithm proceeds as
follows: At each sampling instant, new neurons are added if MRAN-NN: Residuals and thresholds
4000
all the following 3 criteria are met:
Current estimation error criteria: error must be bigger than S1o • AEα
alpha

2000
S2o • LE
a threshold:
e(k ) = y(k ) − yˆ (k ) ≥ E1 0
rα(k)
144 146 148 150 152 154 156 158
Novelty criteria: the nearest center distance must be bigger 1500
S1o • AEq
than a threshold: 1000
S2o • LE
M
q

inf
j =1
x( k ) − µ j (k ) ≥ E2 500 rq(k)

0
Windowed mean error criteria: windowed mean error must 144 146 148 150 152 154 156 158
1500
be bigger than a threshold:
S1o • AEaz
T 1000

T∑
1 [ y ( k − T + i ) − yˆ ( k − T + i )] ≥ E3
az

S2o • LE
500
i =0 raz(k)

If one (or more) of the above criteria are not met, the 0
144 146 148 150 152 154 156 158
existing network parameters (the centers µj, the weights wij time

and the variances σj) are adjusted using the on-line learning
algorithm. To avoid an excessive increase of the Network
size a pruning strategy can also be applied leading to the
so-called Minimal RAN (MRAN) 20. Furthermore, the
adaptation algorithm is called Extended MRAN (EMRAN)
when the parameters are updated following a “winner takes
it all” strategy. More precisely, using the EMRAN
algorithm only the parameters of the most activated neurons
are updated, while all the others are unchanged. This
strategy implies a significant reduction of the number of
parameters to be updated online with just small
performance degradation with respect to the MRAN.
Figure 4 - Residuals associated with a failure on the q gyro at tf = 150
Figure 4 shows the time histories of the residual signals.
The three residuals are generated subtracting the three
EMRAN-generated estimations, respectively to q, α, and az.
After the failure the residuals increase. However, due to the
different sensitivities to a fault on the q gyro, only r_q(k)
exceeds the thresholds. In particular at t=151.2 s the
threshold S1o is exceeded; therefore the learning of the
three NNs is preventively halted. At t=151.5 s the failure on
the sensor q(k) is “officially” declared since r_q(k) also
exceeds the threshold S2o. From this moment on, the on-
line neural estimate of q(k) is used in lieu of the
measurement from the faulty sensor. The failure time percentage %AE in which a sensor is declared “faulty”
identification was possible since the residuals r_az(k) and before a true failure declaration is evaluated to assess the
r_α(k) remain well below their thresholds. false accommodation rate. Finally, the parameters MEE(k),
STDEE(k) and POWEE(k) are introduced to evaluate the
5.1. Neural Networks comparison goodness of the accommodation system.These parameters
represent the mean, the variance and the power of the
The capabilities of detecting small amplitude and slowly absolute estimation error over the whole data file. Table 1
drifting bias failures are strictly related to three aspects: and 2 show these results for the two architectures.
• level of noise in the measured signal; Analysing the results in Table 2, some conclusion can be
• level of accuracy of the estimator; drawn for the MLP approximator. For moderate values of
• level of the on-line learning rate. the learning rate a substantial decrease in false alarms is
While the presence of measurement noise is independent of observed. An increase in the detectability ratio DR can be
the implemented algorithm, the other two aspects are seen without a corresponding increase in the power of the
critically dependent on the performance of the selected error (POWEE). The price to pay is generally an increase in
estimator. In particular, the selection of the learning rate the delay for failure declaration (TLE, TAE); however, this
ηο is reached as the result of a trade-off since it should be effect is relatively modest. These results highlight the
high enough to allow the learning of a new aircraft benefit of introducing an on-line learning scheme, at least
operating condition while, at the same time, small enough for MLP approximators, to improve the degree of reliability
to avoid the learning of a faulty measurement from slow of the detection scheme and to guarantee satisfactory
drifting fault. On this basis, the performances of the two performances in all the working conditions. However the
different NN architectures (EMRAN and MLP-EBP) were learning rate cannot be increased arbitrarily; in fact, an
compared by varying the level of the learning rate on the excessive value increases the possibility that the SFDIA
data of one validation flight, where at the time t=tf=90 sec a scheme “learns” a faulty pattern before a failure is declared
step of 5 deg/sec (7.4% of the maximum value of the pitch and properly accommodated. This risk is confirmed by the
rate) was artificially injected on the measured q signal to analysis of the last columns in the tables, where high
simulate the effect of a sensor failure. The comparison of learning rates prevented the detection of the failures. This is
the performance of the two schemes is performed through also consistent with a significant decrease in the
the evaluation of different SFDIA indicators: TLE and detectability ratio. Furthermore higher learning rates
TAE. TLE is the time in which a sensor is declared suspect compromise the integrity of the global approximation
while TAE is the time at which it is finally declared faulty. capability of the NN, which can have adverse effects at
To evaluate the performance of the detection/identification post-failure conditions when the neural approximator has to
system, the detectability ratio (DR) between the main peak supply reliable estimates using only the learned data. The
of the filtered residual signal during the failure transient (90 fact that for low learning rates the post-failure POWEE
< t < 100) and the peak of the filtered residual before failure index takes on small values shows the possibility of using
(0 < t < 90) is considered. This ratio quantifies the the neural estimator as “virtual sensor” after a failure
detectability provided by the scheme. declaration. The RBF-EMRAN NNs have generally shown
better performance. Their approximation and generalization
L.R.( η) 0 ηο 2ηο. 4ηο capabilities are confirmed by the absence of false alarms
TLE 93 93.39 93.71 94.71 even without learning, by the high values of the
TAE 93.89 94.25 94.97 95.95
%LE 0 0 0 25.14737 detectability ratio, and by the lowest values of the POWEE
%AE 0 0 0 25.61053 index.
DR 11.63651 11.49651 12.35879 12.19832
MEE -1.73646 -2.04047 -2.39899 -3.95824
STDEE 2.452785 2.407548 2.369341 2.202287
POWEE 9.031454 9.959815 11.36895 20.51775
6. Conclusions
Table 1 – EMRAN-RBF; ηo=0.0001 A NN-based scheme SFDIA has been analyzed using
L.R.( η) 0 ηο 2ηο. 4ηο experimental flight data from the WVU B777 research
TLE 94.74 94.22 94.32 95.32 aircraft model. The scheme was implemented with 2 neural
TAE 95.82 95.66 95.76 96.44
%LE 3.9 0.726316 0.084211 7.942105 architectures, that is the MLP-EBPA NN and the RBF-
%AE 0 0 0 9.657895 EMRAN NN. The scheme has shown to be successful in
DR 3.588593 4.149321 4.352193 3.53532 the detection, isolation and accommodation of failures
MEE -2.30202 -2.29437 -2.44726 -3.49016 “injected” on the WVU B777 flight data. The mapping
STDEE 2.322125 2.322165 2.320881 2.167919
POWEE 10.69157 10.65659 11.37558 16.88107 accuracy and the generalization capabilities of both classes
Table 2 – MLP-EBPA; ηo=0.00006 of NNs have shown to be critical for the performance of the
scheme. The comparison of the two different architectures
Furthermore, the time percentage %LE in which a sensor is shows that MLP-EBPA-based scheme was, in general,
declared “suspect” before a true failure detection is reported slightly outperformed by the RBF-EMRAN-based scheme.
to assess the false detection (false alarm) rate. Similarly the
 Acknowledgement
Support for authors has been provided through grants from
the NASA West Virginia Space Consortium, the Institute
for Software Research, and (for the 2nd author) a
scholarship from the Italian National Research Council.
The authors wish to sincerely thank the reviewers, although
it was not possible to completely answer to all their
questions, their comments helped us to pinpoint several
errors and clarify some issues.
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