Con Crim Pro

Introduction
Monday, January 10, 2011
8:13 PM
I. Course Overview:
a. Mid‐term
b. Final Exam
c. Focus on application of Constitution to criminal defendants rather than procedural history
II. Due Process vs. Crime Control
a. Dichotomous: some people willing to trade one more for the other
III. The System
a. Trial Court:
b. Case is heard
c. If defendant is aquited, case ends
i. Can be appealed to intermediate appellate court
ii. If conviction is reversed, it's retried in trial court with exceptions
iii. Whoever loses in court of special appeals can appeal to court of appeals in MD
iv. Whoever loses that, can petition to SCOTUS
v. If defendant loses all the way up, can file writ of habeus corpus
1) Goes to Fed. Dist Court
2) Whoever loses can appeal to US Ct of Appeals
3) Whoever loses can appeal to SCOTUS
vi. So:
7 SCOTUS 4
US Ct of appeals 6 3 State Ct of Appeals
1)
Fed Dist Court 5 2 Intermediate Appellate Ct
1 Trial Court
d. Getting to trial
i. Arrested, Complaint filed, or indictment
1) Indictment: Grand jury usually 23 citizens who come to court to hear evidence from prosecution. Hearsay
is allowed.
a) True bill of indictment gets drawn by the grand jury
ii. Arraignment
1) Right to counsel
2) Right to discovery
3) Charges and rights are read to him
4) Purpose is to get a plea
a) You can abstain
iii. Motions
1) e.g. motion to suppress evidence, supress confession, or identification (line‐up)
a) e.g. motions to sever case, etc.
iv. Hearings
1) Preliminary hearings
2) Motions hearings
v. Trial
vi. Sentencing
e. 14th amendment
i. Incorporates bill of rights into states through word "liberty"
f. Right to a jury trial
i. Is it a fundamental right?
ii. Duncan v Louisiana:
1) "Fundamental" concerns whether it's fundamental to one's fundamental sense looking at history, tradition
and values; in that sense jury trial is fundamental
iii. 12 person jury is not fundamental
1) 6 is the key number in Georgia
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2) Looks at purpose behind protection and decided 6 is the magic number
iv. Unanimous jury is not fundamental
g. Due Process
i. Procedural Due process
1) e.g. Hearing required, notice, rules of process, protections, etc.
ii. Substantive Due Process
1) Government overreaching, e.g. "did government go too far" (arbitrary and irrational in their actions?)
2) ROCHIN v. CALIFORNIA
a) Facts:
i) Police barge into house, police notice guy swallows pills, they turn him upside down to get pills
out, then induce vomitting (take him to hospital to pump his stomach)
b) Court:
i) Violated due process: "shocks the conscience"
ii) Standards of conduct
One. Methods cannot offend the sense of justice or shock the conscience
Two. We get two different standards!
3) IRVINE v CALIFORNIA
a) Facts:
i) Place listening device and kept going in and kept moving it
b) Court:
i) Key: no physical intrusion, no coercion, violence, etc.
One. It was merely a trespass on property
4) BREITHAUPT
a) Facts:
i) Blood test to an unconscious person
b) Court:
i) Not a big intrusion to a person, looking at the level of intrusion to determine whether it shocks
the conscience
5) SCHMERBER v CALIFORNIA
a) Facts:
6) Blood used against you not self‐incrimination?
a) 5th amendment protects against self‐incrimination
i) Person cant be compelled to be a witness against himself
One. Not testimonial evidence (words)
First. Content of the words is what counts… so using someone's voice or way
defendant's words sound does not necessarily have 5th amendment protection
1. No compulsory self‐incrimination for sound of voice of a robber "give me
your money or I'll kill you"
Two. So blood can be used as evidence, or something else
Three. But diaries, letters, etc., that can have 5th amendment protection.
7) COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO v LEWIS
a) Facts:
i) High speed chase, reckless pursuit
ii) Defendant killed
b) Court:
i) Police did not violate substantive due process even when defendant killed
ii) It doesn’t shock the conscience where defendant "did it to himself"
IV. RECAP
a. 14th Amendment incorporates virtually all bill of rights into states.
b. Substantive Due Process:
i. Government cannot overreach, act in an irrational manner
1) e.g. Did the police do too much?
2) Rochin v. California
3) "Shocks the conscience" test
4) Substantial physical intrusion violates 4th amendment
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4th Am.: Exclusionary Rule
Thursday, January 13, 2011
10:28 AM
I. Generally:
a. Exclusionary rule kicks in with a violation of the 4th amendment (so after you determine
whether there's been a violation of search and seizure rule)
b. Remember, all applies to public authorities/agents of the government, so Kmart security
searching you is not a 4th amendment violation, unless of course some officer held him to it.
II. WOLF V. COLORADO
a. 4th amendment is fundamental to our system, and 4th amendment should be applied to
states
b. Weeks v. US
i. Because exclusionary rule is not in 4th amendment, no need to apply to the states
c. Issue: Must a state exclude in prosecution's case evidence if it determines the 4th
amendment was violated in obtaining that evidence
i. Is the exclusionary rule part of the 4th amendment's fundamental
d. Court: Exclusionary rule does not apply to the states
e. Rationale:
i. You can file a civil suit!
1) Civil suits in practice don't work too well
ii. Exclusionary rule is not in the 4th amendment, it was judicially crafted
III. MAPP V OHIO
a. Facts:
i. Police go to house where resident was suspected of bomb‐making
ii. Police had warrant for bomb‐making equipment, but Mapp was a pornographer who
didn't know anything about bombs. Police found stuff related to the porn
iii. They were going to use the pornography against her even though they had no warrant
b. Issue: Whether evidence obtained in violation of the 4th amendment should be excluded at
the state level?
i. (Should the exclusionary rule be applied to the states?
c. Court: overturns Wolf, exclusionary rule applies to the states (BUT EXCLUSIONARY RULE
APPLIES WITH EXCEPTIONS… see cases below)
d. Rationale (behind the exclusionary rule):
i. Deterrence: send message in the future to police that they must conduct proper
searches and seizures
ii. Judicial integrity: Having courts embody the law, so they should use only evidence
that is legally obtained.
IV. US v LEON (The good faith exception)
a. Issue: Whether evidence can be used when the search warrant is later found to be invalid
b. Court: When police get warrant (and only when they get a warrant), if the search and
seizure violated the 4th amendment, but search and seizure was done in good faith but
warrant was insufficient, when the prosecution shows that it was not obtained in good faith,
it can be included into evidence.
c. Rationale:
i. Deterrence: purpose of the exclusionary rule is deterrence, and if we suppress
evidence based on a warrant (where judge finds probable cause) it doesn't go toward
deterrence because the officer did nothing wrong! Also won't have any effect on the
judge because judge doesn't have the goal of fighting crime and convicting a
defendant. Though there may be some deterrence that can flow to judges because
judges don't like to be reversed!
ii. If officer acted in good faith, this can save the evidence
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iii. Judicial integrity: Court argues that judicial integrity and deterrence are the same
1) Judicial integrity argument stands in the way of the "good faith" exception as
court is using illegally obtained evidence
2) Judicial integrity is dead now!
d. Hypo: affidavit for warrant says detective just has a feeling, magistrate signs off, and you go
and get the evidence
e. Good faith has to be reasonable
i. So, it has to be close… can't be stupid about your good faith, can't be an idiot
f. Warrant cases: "even though this evidence was seized in violation of the 4th amendment, if
the officer acted in reasonable good faith (relied in reasonable good faith on the warrant)
the evidence does not need to be excluded.
V. MASSACHUSETS v SHEPPARD
a. Applies good faith exception
b. Facts: Detective couldn’t get a form on a Sunday for a homicide warrant, so prepared a drug
charge warrant. Evidence collected by detective was later suppressed because warrant
failed to particularly describe the items to be seized (they had the wrong form)
c. Issue: Whether good faith exception applies when office knows that warrant is bad?
d. Court: Good faith exception applies where officer reasonably relied on magistrate (believing
it was good)
e. Rationale:
i. Officer reasonably relied on the magistrate, who said it was okay to conduct search
and seizure
ii. Deterrence: No need to deter magistrates
VI. GROH V. RAMIREZ
a. Facts: Officer prepared the warrant himself for the magistrate. Put the right thing into the
wrong area.
b. Issue: Whether good faith exception rule rely where warrant is deficient and officer
conducts illegal search.
c. Court: Good faith exception does not apply where the warrant is so facially deficient that
there's no way officer can reasonably presume
d. Rationale:
i. Officer was not relying on the judge… he was the one who made the mistake twice
and the judge made a mistake and judge did not realize his own mistake.
ii. Judge's signature alone does not induce reliance by officer.
VII. MICHIGAN V. DEFILLIPPO (***didn't cover in review***)
a. Facts: Stop and search procedure used to search people. Certain officer stopped someone
and searched him
b. Court: statute was unconstitutional, so officer who acted based on that statute conducted
illegal search and seizure so therefore the evidence should be suppressed.
VIII. ILLINOIS v. KRULL
a. Legislative statute being relied on by officer
b. Facts: Cop issued warrantless inspection.
c. Court: statute was unconstitutional, but because he reasonably relied on the statute, this is
like a good faith exception and evidence will not be suppressed.
d. Rationale: Doesn't serve deterrence function where there's a statute and the officer is
following that statute, what deterrence to officer would there be in making evidence
inadmissible?
e. Dissent: Excluding evidence would deter legislatures from passing these sorts of anti‐crime
bills that are too tough.
IX. US v. CACERES
a. IRS forming own rules and violating them
b. If executive has its own remedy for the violations of its own rules and the agency violates its
own rules, court won't hold that against them, and evidence can come in.
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c. Rationale:
i. The rules are there to protect against violations and so a violation shouldn't be used
against them since the alternative is just having no rules at all!
ii. If you exclude evidence a government agency gets in violating its own rules, you
therefore get a counter deterrence since they wont want as many rules on
themselves.
X. HUDSON v. MICHIGAN
a. Facts: Knock‐and announce‐‐police have to announce their presence and wait before
entering. Police have to notify a person of a search… idea is to protect safety of officers who
are barging in (could be confused with home invaders)
b. Issue: whether exclusionary applies after 4th amendment violation involving knock‐and‐
announce case.
c. Court: No, exclusionary rule does not apply here… you can include evidence where police
violated 4th amendment by knock and announce violation
d. Rationale:
i. Deterrence: One's privacy when being intruded upon is outweighed by evidence
getting flushed down the toilet or other ways evidence might disappear
ii. Civil remedies exist still! (Even though they suck)
e. Does this case matter? No, knock and announce isnt enforced much anyway. If police can
make a reasonable showing that defendant could have grabbed a weapon or disappear the
evidence, the court will throw out the knock and announce violation and you'll never reach
the question of the exclusionary rule anyway.
XI. US v CALANDRA
a. Grand jury (before trial) and Sentencing (after trial)
b. Issue: could evidence seized in violation of 4th amendment be used in an indictment of
Calandra?
c. Yes, exclusionary rule does not apply to proceedings before trial. It also doesn't apply to
sentencing, evidence seized in connection with sentencing, it can be used (i.e.
XII. PENN BOARD OF PROBATION V SCOTT
a. Parole exception (parole revocation hearing)
b. Whether evidence seized in violation can be used in parole hearings
c. Court: exclusionary rule does not apply at a parole revocation hearing
d. Rationale:
i. Deterrence: police officer will be minimally deterred from doing this when they know
their parole status and there's not really a greater likelihood that police will do
something bad. Parole officer is more of an administrative authority, he's not really
there to "ferret" out the crime, supposedly. (Although parole officers are there to
catch people doing bad stuff)
ii. Parole revocation hearings have no jury, more flexible
XIII. PLYMOUTH SEDAN v PENN
a. Forfeiture hearings
i. Where government seizes car to have person forfeit property used illegally
b. Issue: whether forfeiture proceedings apply exclusionary rule
c. Court: exclusionary rule doesn't apply
d. Rationale: only criminal proceedings
XIV. U.S. v JANIS
XV. INS v LOPEZ MENDOZA
a. Deportation proceedings
b. Whether exclusionary rules applies to deportation proceedings
c. Court: exclusionary rule not applicable
d. Rationale:
i. Court does balance and reaches conclusion that costs outweigh the benefits of
applying exclusionary rule and deterrence is not great enough
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1) It complicates removal proceedings
2) Crowded circumstances
ii. Deterrence:
1) Deterrence: you can still deport someone even if you suppress some evidence,
so little deterrence for INS
2) Foreigners don't fall under "the people" of the constitution and they won't be
able to fight it once removed anyway.
XVI. ARIZONA v EVANS
a. Facts:
i. Warrant was no longer good (they found retrospectively) and evidence was seized
pursuant to the arguably illegal warrant.
b. Court: exclusionary rule does not apply
c. Rationale:
i. Deterrence: no need to deter civilian clerks and since there's no deterrence to be
achieved, there's no need to apply exclusionary rule.
d. Dissent: Clerks would be more careful if they knew evidence could be seized!
XVII. HERRING v US
a. Does exclusionary rule only apply where there's deliberate intent by authority?
b. Facts: Search was based on warrant that wasn't in existence
c. Court: exclusionary rule doesn't apply in this instance because officers didn't act
deliberately, recklessly, or flagrantly.
d. Rationale: There's no actual warrant in existence even though officer relied on there being
one.
i. Did police act deliberately? Court: yes, they did and this should go to whether
exclusionary apply. Police were negligent.
ii. Deterrence: Careless is not the standard, it has to go beyond that, so no need to deter
carelessness… only concerned with deterring intentional behavior.
e. This sounds like good faith exception, but this has to do with there being no warrent
XVIII. SEE HANDOUT "FOURTH AMENDMENT MODEL"
a. Analytical approach suggested by prof.
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Was there a search?: Protected areas and interests
Tuesday, January 18, 2011
11:10 AM
I. Generally:
a. What constitutes a search, or Is it a search? Depends on whether there is a reasonable
expectation of privacy.
b. Test of whether it violates 4th amendment at this stage is "Is it a search?"
II. KATZ v. US
a. Telephone booth, does wiretapping constitute a search?
b. Facts: Defendant transferring wagering information over the phone (placing a bet over the
phone in a public phone booth)
c. Court: violation of 4th amendment, it was a search
d. Reasonable expectation of privacy: phone booth is like the bedroom, though it's not
necessarily the place but the expectation that you will not be spied on over the phone in a
phone booth
i. Subjective: Does defendant expect privacy? (i.e. shutting door on phone booth)
ii. Objective: Reasonableness, whether other people would expect there to be privacy?
(i.e. you should know someone can hear you in an open phone booth, i.e. shut the
door would permit reasonable expectation)
e. Stewart: "the 4th amendment protects people not places"… "what he seeks to preserve as
private even in an area he perceives as public"
f. HYPO: Police work out deal with bookie to listen in on his coversation with Katz. Is this a
search? It this an illegal search?
i. Common law considerations:
1) Property: Bookie owns conversation and can share it once he gets it from Katz
2) Torts: assuming the risk when speaking to another person that someone will
overhear you and you take that risk
g. DOUBLE CHECK THE RULE ON THIS
III. CALIFORNIA v. GREENWOOD
a. Garbage, no expectation of privacy
b. Facts: Police ask garbage collectors for trash
c. Court: Not a search because there's no expectation of privacy
i. Expectation of privacy does not exist with garbage.
d. Rationale:
i. People can go through your belongings in the trash when it's out on the curb. That's
why people shred documents.
e. Hypo: what if trashcan were on his driveway? Probably not, and even if it's in your house
against your house. But if it's in your house, perhaps. Even if you put drugs inside a million
containers then place it in opaque container, still no expectation of privacy.
IV. ABANDONMENT:
a. Look at act and the intent of the actor to determine whether there is an abandonment
b. It's a volitional act, and with respect to privacy, it is no longer a search because no longer
expectation of privacy when there is abandonment.
V. VENNER v STATE OF MARYLAND
a. Excrement
b. Facts: Drug mule, admitted into hospital and nurses collected excrements
c. Issue: whether balloons with drugs inside were admissible
d. Court: invoke abandonment
i. Swallowing the drugs is a volitional act and there's an implied intent to abandon the
drugs.
VI. BOONE
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a. Facts: Didn’t pay rent and was getting tossed from his apartment. Authorities wanted to
protect the public from anything that could be harmful
i. Expectation of privacy? He didn't pay his rent, so constructive abandonment (should
have known he can get thrown from apartment and people can go through it)
ii. Or just because you don't pay your rent, should you expect to have all your furniture
rifled through on the street?
b. Court: Reasonable expectation of privacy. This was a search… went with 2nd view of
expectation of privacy. Just because you don't pay your rent doesn't mean there's
abandonment.
VII. OLIVER v US
a. "Open fields"
b. Police suspected marijuana and went across "no trespassing" sign
c. Hester said 4th amendment protects persons, houses, papers, and effects, but this doesn't
accord with Katz which seems to suggest that it protects reasonable expectation of privacy.
d. Curtilige (protected) vs Open Field (unprotected)
e. Factors to determine whether area is curilige
i. Proximity to home
ii. Whether or not enclosed
iii. Use of the area (association with the house)
iv. Protecting from observation of people passing by (can it be seen?)
f. If it's an open field, no expectation of privacy.
VIII. RILEY
a. Police flew over D's yard and saw through greenhouse through opening in the top to see
marijuana
b. Surveillance constitute a search?
c. Court: No
i. No reasonable expectation of privacy in the greenhouse.
ii. Because the greenhouse is uncovered, you can see it from the air, even if it's from a
helicopter from a above
IX. HUDSON
a. No reasonable expectation of privacy from a jail
b. But, how about an envelope looking for shotguns?
i. Normally you can't look at an envelope, but this is prison and security is paramount.
ii. Body cavity searches have some protection though.
X. CARDWELL (pg. 263)
a. ???
XI. NY v Class
a. Expectation of privacy in a car, but officer is allowed to see your VIN number without
constituting a search
XII. BOND
a. Facts: Found meth after picking up bag and feeling it. They felt a brick of something and
believed it was drugs.
b. Is it a search to pick up and feel a bag? Is there an expectation of privacy on a bus, train or
other form of public transport?
i. No reasonable expectation of privacy… other people may pick it up and feel it.
XIII. KYLLO
a. Police suspected marijuana being grown in Ds home. Police use heat sensor to detect
whether there is a lamp there for the purpose of growing marijuana.
b. Does this constitute a search?
c. Was there a reasonable expectation of privacy?
d. Court:
i. Constitutes a search!
ii. Thermal imaging device is like enhancing senses in order to place an authority in the
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home (goes through the home)
e. Things to consider in determination:
i. Is it the home? Enhances expectation of privacy
1) Is it a car? Protected to a lesser degree than the home.
ii. How sophisticated and intrusive is the technology? Is it generally available to the
public?
1) If it's sophisticated and not generally available then it more likely makes a
search
XIV. US V PLACE
a. Canine sniffing by well‐trained narcotics dog
b. You have an expectation of privacy in your suitcase
c. Court: dog sniffing it not a search.
XV. ILLINOIS V CABALLES
a. Dog sniffing a car a search?
b. Court: No.
XVI. Kmart employee example… private search, doesn't compel 4th amendment analysis
XVII. KNOTTS & KARO
a. Electronic tracking (beepers) dealing with whereabouts in a public area
b. Knotts: Never went inside the home. Place a beeper on the car to trace his whereabouts. D
was saying
i. Court: Police were augmenting their senses and they have to right to follow or
seveillence you in public. There's no difference if they put a beeper on the car.
c. Karo: READ AGAIN
d. Was a search because it intruded into home
e. Issue: reliance on the beeper. Is the beeper just a replacement for tracking someone
visually, like in public?
XVIII. DOW CHMICAL v US
a. Arial photograph of a chemical company's industrial complex
b. Court: not a search
i. What they were looking for and how they were looking were different.
ii. REVISIT THIS CASE.
XIX. Generally
a. There must be:
i. Probable cause
ii. Warrant
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Probable Cause
Tuesday, January 25, 2011
10:36 AM
I. Perspective
a. Reliability: Should we believe the informant? (Heart side)
b. Basis of knowledge: where did he get info and how does he know what he knows.
II. Generally
a. Applies to all searches and seizures
b. Searches based on warrants, did magistrate understand reliability and basis of knowledge?
c. 2 parts to a warrant
i. Affidavit (where probable cause exists)
1) … can be written by someone other than the informant
d. Probable cause means more likely than not.
III. 2 PRONGS: (see handout)
a. Reliability Factors:
i. Past relationship
ii. Declaration against penal interest (e.g. "I bought drugs on this street!")
iii. Independent corroboration (e.g. officer corroborating what the informant told him, or
the informant having a history)
iv. Sworn statement
v. Sworn statement by someone whose status makes them inherently more reliable (e.g.
victim, police officer, etc.
vi. e.g. Least reliable is the anonymous informant
vii. Reputation of the defendant (e.g. defendant is a known drug dealer)
viii. Details are predictive
ix. Special knowledge (not everyone would know)
b. Basis of Knowledge
i. (2 ways to show knowledge)
1) Sensory perception
a) (seeing something first hand can show ones basis of knowledge)
b) Or hearing someone say something, or feeling or tasting the drugs
2) Detail
a) Can substitute sensory perception
IV. Test for probable cause always called Aguilar test: must have information about why the person is
reliable as well as basis of knowledge
V. Spinelli v US
a. Facts: informant says Spinelli is a book keeper and travels between states
i. Police corroborate phone numbers informant provided
ii. Spinelli was also going in and out of his house, which police corroborated
iii. Reliability? Yes, officers were corroborating details provided by informant.
iv. What's missing? Basis of knowledge of informant…
1) ANYONE could have known what informant knew (knowing address, phone
numbers, etc.)
2) Basis of knowledge not demonstrated by these details.
b. Court: Not sufficient to make it more likely than not that defendant was engaged in
gambling…
i. details need to be particular or unique?
VI. Draper v. US
a. Facts: FBI goes to train station and see defendant coming off train information predicted he
would
b. Details provided basis of knowledge because it showed reliability (informant was named and

police could corroborate details informant provided) and basis of knowledge was good
because (knew defendant?)
VII. ILLINOIS v GATES
a. Facts: anonymous letter (authors of letter not putting themselves at risk)… told about
husband and wife going to and from FL. Provides who would drive down, wife would leaves
back of drugs, husband flies down and drives it back and couple brag about their lifestyle.
i. Special knowledge
ii. Police check details and were about to corroborate
b. Court:
i. Totality of circumstances test
1) Used to look at reliability AND basis of knowledge
2) Gates erases line and look at all the factors and evaluate them together.
a) If there's a shortfall in one area, other area can make up for it.
c. Substantial basis standard:
d. The duty of the reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial
basis for concluding that probable cause existed
e. Reviewing court will no longer do a de novo review of the magistrate (reviewing court used
to look at whether magistrate had probable cause)
i. Rationale:
1) System prefers police go to magistrate and gets warrant before it takes place,
and not making it so rigorous helps reach this aim
2) Don’t want to suppress so much evidence
3) Feel better when search warrants are issued
f. Four corners rule:
i. Court actually discusses going to Chicago, but the affidavit never mentioned this
g. Tries to sweep Draper under the rug by saying it wouldn’t have met the Spinelli test since
though reliable, the informants details didn’t demonstrate any basis of knowledge (this just
isnt true because under the Spinelli test, enough details can meet the basis of knowledge
prong)
h. Gate's new test makes it easier to meet probable cause.
VIII. MASS v UPTON
a. Facts: search of a motel room by police looking for burglarized stuff. Call from burglers ex‐
girlfriend and she admits who she is. She tells police about motor home was full of stolen
stuff and she was able to detail the stolen stuff. Police go to trailer, sees trailer there and
b. 2 prongs:
i. Reliable: Informant corroborates what was stolen! Then police corroborate this.
ii. Basis of knowledge: very specific details.
c. Court: This wouldn't have met Aguilar‐Spinelli test (although it probably really would have)
but this is a good example of why we need this new totality of circumstances test
d. Something about the Mass constitution offering more protection to citizens?
IX. "STALENESS"
a. Generally
i. Looks to see WHEN the information came in. When warrant was issued and when it
was executed
ii. Ex. Reliable informant told me that stolen milk located at 123 charles street. Warrant
issued 4 months after this tip… so probable cause goes stale the same way that the
milk would.
1) Must be probably cause that evidence is still there when the warrant is ISSUED.
iii. Factors to consider:
1) Consumable and moveable?
2) Character of the crime? (drugs are very repeatable)
3) Evidence perishable?
4) Location (outside on the street versus the attic of the house)

5) How long ago information received
6) How transitory is the defendant
7) Connection between info and place to be searched.
b. US v Steeves (297)
i. Money and the bag not likely in the house 3 months later because consumable and
moveable.
X. US v GRUBBS
a. Anticipatory search warrant
b. Facts: child porn tape… at the time warrant was issued, the tape was not there so there
wasn't probable cause just yet
c. There will be probable cause, and at that time if condition is met, then search can be
executed
d. Court:
i. Anticipatory warrant meets probable cause if the condition is probably met…
ii. 3 things must be present:
1) __
2) __
3) __
XI. State v Morris
a. Missed.
XII.

Re‐read this section
Tuesday, February 01, 2011
6:58 PM
Warrant exceptions: See handout
Maryland v. Pringle (2003) – police stopped a car for speeding (@3am) and searched it to find narcotics

which the passenger admitted to owning. The police arrested pringle, and he confessed to owning them.
However, Pringle moved to stop the confession from being admitted, because there wasn’t good
enough probable cause to assume that he should have been arrested.
Trial Court denied passenger’s motion to suppress evidence because it came from an illegal arrest.
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that absent specific facts tending to show D’s knowledge and
dominion or control over the drugs, the mere finding of the drugs was insufficient to show probable
cause for arrest in possession. However, the officer did have a probable cause to believe a felony was
committed, but not for arrest for possession.
ISSUE: whether the officer had probable cause to believe that Pringle committed that crime.
Totality of circumstances… more likely than not… probably cause
Distinguished from bar where customer and relationship with bar was not enough.
So, when person's name is NOT ON THE WARRANT: Connection to location and people actually searched
are major considerations
Yabarra v. Illinois – police officers obtained a warrant to search a tavern and its bartender for evidence
of possession of controlled substance. HOLDING: Pat down searches of all patrons was held to be
unconstitutional absent an individual suspicion.
Wyoming v. Houghton – HOLDING: a car passanger will often be engaged in a common enterprise with
the driver, and have the same interest in concealing the fruits of the evidence of their wrongdoing.
***it was reasonable for the cop to think there was a common enterprise among the three men.
Di Re – where an informant told the police that he would be given illegal coupons, the police steaked
out the situation, and the person who gave the cupons was a passenger in a car which DiRe was driving.
The officers hd no info implicating DiRe’s possession of the cupons, unless presence in the car warranted
that inference – therefore, the officers lacked probable cause to believe that he was involved in the
crime. HOLDING: “Any inference that everyone on the scene of a crime is a party to it must disappear if
the government informer singles out the guilty person.”
HOLDING: the officer had probable cause to believe that Pringle had committed the crime of possession
of a controlled substance.
Notes and Questions
1. Leavell v. Commonwealth (1987) HOLDING: the person who owns or exercises dominion and
control over a motor vehicle in which contraband is concealed is deemed to possess the
contraband.
2. State v. Thomas (1992) ISSUE: if the same facts can be used to implicate more than one person in
a crime that could have been committed by one of them, can probable cause be found to exist?
HOLDING: Yes.
Other Sources of Probable Cause

1. Informant from an alleged victim of, or witness to, a crime –
a. State v. Paszek (1971) – an ordinary citizen who reports a crime has been committed in his
presence, or that the crime will occur, is on much different grounds than a police informer.
He is a witness to criminal activity who acts with an inrtent to aid the police in law
enforecement because of his concerns for society or his own safety. He does not expect any
gain whereas an informer often does.
b. ISSUE: whether the general description given by the victim and/or witness is sufficient to
justify the arrest of any one person.
c. Brown v. US (1966) HOLDING: discrepencies which can be a result of the victim’s excitement
or poor visibility or the suspect’s changing clothes, do not destroy the ascertainment made
on the basis of the accurate portion of the identification, which is by itself enough to
constitute probable cause.
2. Direct observations by police – probable cause determination must be made solely upon
suspicious conduct observed by police.
a. Brooks v. US (1960) – the probabilities must be measured by the standards of the
reasonable, cautious and prudent peace officer as he sees them, and not those of the casual
passerby”
3. Information and orders from official channels
a. Whiteley v. Warden (1971) – a description in a police bulletin for two men caused a police
officer who recognized them to arrest them. The warrant was not made on probable cause
but. HOLDING: the arrests were legal because the officers reasonably assumed that whoever
authorized the bulletin had probable cause to direct the arrest.
i. OVERRULED: otherwise illegal arrests cannot be insulated from challenge by the
decision of the instigating officer to rely on fellow officers to make the arrest.
b. In Evans they distinguished whitely – which says whitely is still good law. LOOK FOR
SOMETHING IN KJ’S or JOSH’s NOTES ABOUT THESE TWO CASES.
Search Warrants
1. The “neutral and detached magistrate” requirement
a. Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971) a warrant for a defendant’s car was (ambiguously)
issued. HOLDING: this violaqted a fundamental premise of both the 4th and 14th. ??? MUST
BE NEUTRAL.
b. Connally v. Georgia (1977) (GROSSMAN’S FAVE CASE – I DIDN’T GET INTO IT) – p. 307
c. Rooker v. Commonwealth (1974) HOLDING: where a judge issues a search warrant based
upon an affidavit which he does not read, he makes no determination of probable cause but
merely serves as a rubber stamp for the police. This is improper even though the affidavit
actually shows probable cause for the issuance of a warrant. NO RUBBER STAMP.
d. Shadwick v. City of Tampa (1972) HOLDING: a warrant issuing magistrate must meet two
tests:
i. He must be neutral and detached
ii. He must be capable of determining whether probable cause exists for the
requested arrest or search.
e. US v. Davis (1972)
2. Particular descriptions of the place to be searched –
a. 4th amendment requirement: requirement of particularity in the description of the place to
be searched and item. How reasonable was the description and how reasonable was the
execution?
b. It is enough if the description is such that the officer with a search warrant can, with
reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place intended”
c. Steele v. US (1925)
d. State v. Blackburn (1973)
e. Maryland v. Garrison (1987) police obtained a search warrant to search the person of one

person and a residence but when contraband was found realized that it was in a separate
apartment than was authorized to search. WRONG PLACE, WRONG STUFF! NO PROBABLE
CAUSE.
i. HOLDING: the execution of the search warrant was valid because the officers’
failure to realize the overbredth of the warrant was objectively understandable
and reasonable. THEY WERE WRONG, BUT THEY WERE REASONABLY WRONG.
1. Issue: how clearly marked was the distinction between apartments? Not
enough – the mistake was reasonable.
3. Particular description of the things to be seized
a. Go‐Bart Importing Co. v. US (1931): The fourth amendment requirement of particularity in
the description of the persons or things to be seized is intended to prevent general
searches, to prevent the seizure of objects on the mistaken assumption that they’ll fall
within the magistrate’s authorization and to prevent the issuance of warrants on loose,
vague or doubtful base of fact.
i. Consistent with these three purposes, are certain general principles which may
be distilled from the decided cases in this area:
a. Particular description of the things to be seized
b. Particular descriptions of the place to be searched
c. The “neutral and detached magistrate” requirement
1. A greater degree of ambiguity will be tolerated when the police have done
the best that could be expected under the circumstances, by acquiring all
the descriptive facts which reasonable investigation of this type of crime
could be expected to uncover and by ensuring that all of those facts were
included in the warrant.
2. A more general type of description will be sufficient when the natures of
the objects to be seized are such that they could not be expected to have
more specific characteristics.
3. A less precise description is required of property which is, because of its
particular character, contraband.
4. Failure to provide all of the available descriptive facts is not a basis for
questioning the adequacy of the description when the omitted facts could
not have been expected to be of assistance to the executing officer
5. An error in the statement of certain descriptive facts is not a basis for
questioning the adequacy of the description if the executing officer was
nonetheless able to determine from the other facts provided, that the
object was that intended by the description.
6. Greater care in description is ordinarily called for when the type of
property sought is generally in lawful use in substantial quantities
7. A more particular description than otherwise might be necessary is
required when other objects of the same classification are likely to be
found at the particular place to be searched.
8. The greatest care in description is required when the consequences of a
seizure of innocent articles by mistake is most substantial (ex: when the
place to be searched is an attorney’s office)
9. The mere fact that some items were admittently improperly seized in
execution of the warrant does not mean that the warrant was not
sufficiently particular
10. The 4th does not require particularity with respect to the criminal activity
suspected.
11. Some leeway will be tolerated where it appears additional time could
have resulted in more particularized description, where there was some
urgency to conduct a search before defendant had the opportunity to
remove or destroy evidence.

4. Particular description, reliance affidavit – can a particular defect in a warrant be overcome by a
sufficient description in the supporting affidavit?
a. Groh v. Ramirez, ISSUE: whether there had been a valid, with warrant search:
i. HOLDING: the fact that the application aqeduately described the “things to be
seized” does not save the warrant from its facial invalidity. 4th requires
particularity in the warrant, NOT its supporting documents.
ii. WHY? Because the warrant it what is being consulted during the search, not
other unknown supporting documents.
iii. NEW ISSUE: since the search was “functionally equivalent to a search authorized
by a valid warrant” was it correct to assert that the case was one in which a
reasonable warrantless search was made?
1. Since the executing officers acted on the basis of the description in the
supporting documents the scope of the search did not exceed the limits of
the application.
2. HOLDING: Unless the particular items described in the affidavit are also
set forth in the warrant itself, there can be no written assurance that the
magistrate actually found probable cause to search for, and to seize, every
item mentioned in the affidavit.
a. The mere fact that the Magistrate issues a warrant, does not mean
that he agreed that the scope of the search should be as broad as
the affiant’s request.
5. Neutrality, particularity, and “good faith”
Execution of the Warrant
1. Time of Execution –
a. Within 10 days:
i. US v. Nepstead (1970) – execution within the time is proper, provided that the
probable cause recited in the affidavit continues until the time of execution,
giving consideration to the intervening knowledge of the officers and the
passage of time.
b. Night time/Day time
i. Generally – search warrants may be served only in the daytime.
ii. Gooding v. US (1974) HOLDING: the federal statute relating to searches for
controlled substances required no special showing for a nighttime search other
than that the contraband is likely to be on the property at that time.
c. No one is home
i. US v Gervato (1973) rejected the holding that: a search warrant executed in the
absence of an occupant constitutes an unreasonable search bc there exists the
possibility of a general search of pilferage by officers of law.
1. Sneak and Peak Search Warrants – authorizing police to enter premises,
look around, and then depart without leaving any notice of the search, are
directly executed when it is known no one is present.
ii. Berger v. NY – imposed two limitations on sneak and peak search warrants:
1. The court should not allow the officers to dispense with advance or
contemporaneous notice of the search unless they have made a showing
of reasonable necessity for the delay; and,
2. The court should nonetheless require the officers to give appropriate
person notice of the search within a reasonable time of the covert entry.
2. Gaining entry
a. Winson v. Arkansas (1995) – commonlaw doctrine that a police officer is required to
knowck and announce, but then is ok to break down the door.
b. Richards v. Wisconsin (1997) – rejected supreme court’s holding htat po are never required
to knowck and announce when executing a search warrant in a felony drug investigation.

TWO SERIOUS CONCERNS:
i. The exception contains considerable overgeneralization – while drug
investigation poses special risks to officer’s safety, and the preservation of
evidence, not every investigation will to such a substantial degree.
ii. The reasons for creating an exception in one category can, be applied to others
Ex: bank robberies.
c. TO justify a No Knock Entry – police must have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and
announcing their presence, under a particular circumstance, would be dangerous or futile,
or that is would inhibit the effective investigation of crime ex: destruction of evidence. (this
should be required whenever the reasonableness of a No Knock Entry is challenged.)
i. A magistrates decision not to authorize a No Knock Entry should not be
interpreted to remove the officers authority to exercise independent judgment.
d. US v. Banks (2003): Occupant was actually in shower and did not hear the officers.
i. ISSUES (1) how long a wait is necessary before the police may reasonably
conclude they have been refused admittance.(whether the occupants failure to
admit the police fairly suggested a refusal to let them in) (2) what shorter wait
will suffice because of what kind of exigent circumstances.
ii. HOLDING (1): in the case that there is no reason to suspect an immediate risk,
the reasonable time may well be longer when the police make a forced entry,
since they should be more certain the occupant has had time. (2) where the
police claim exigent need to enter, and such claim is deemed legitimate when
assessed under essentially the same criteria that apply to whether
announcement is excused under Richards, then the crucial fact is not time to
reach the door but the exigency claimed.
3. Search of persons on the premises
a. Ybarra v. Illionois (1979) HOLDING: A persons propinquity to others independently
suspected of criminal activity without more does not give rise to probable cause to search
that person.
i. GROSSMAN: There must be a link between the person being searched and the
place being searched in order to make it ok – that the person was there, in the
bar, isn’t enough. Merely being present at a location where a search is taking
place does not make it ok to search the person. BUT if you’re one of two people
present at a drug factory – this is enough of a nexus to justify a search. A spouse
of a target isn’t enough, but it’s a relevant factor – a good start.
ii. Terry v. Ohio – reasonable frisk for weapons – must be supported by a reasonable belief
that he was armed and presently dangerous must form the predicate to a patdown of a
person for weapons.
b. LA County v. Rettele (2007) NAKED WHITE PEOPLE CASE – a CIVIL SUIT – police obtained
two search warrants to search the persons and homes of four black suspects connected with
a fraud identity‐theft crime ring – one who owned a registered handgun.
i. Police entered on a warrant at 7:15 am and found Rettele and his gf in bed,
naked. The police noticed that they were white, but still made them get out of
bed and stand there for one or two minutes before dressing.
ii. HOLDING: not unreasonable.
1. Good question: what were the damages? Embarrassment? If there were
new tenants in the house, how OLD was the warrant? Staleness – woulda
been a good argument.
4. Detention of persons on the premises
a. Michigan v. Summers (1981) – A man was detained while the police exercised a search
warrant of his home and found contraband (2 hours) and then searched the man (he had
heroin).
i. HOLDING: Some seizures constitute such limited intrustions on the personal
security of those detained and are justified by such substantial law enforcement

interests that they may be made on less than probable cause, so long as police
have an articulable basis for suspecting criminal activity.
1. GROSSMAN: A substantial connection between the man and the house –
theres a warrant – so theres probable cause to believe theres something in
the house ‐ so no probable cause to search the man until they found
something – once they did they searched the man.
2. REASONS
a. Preventing the flight of the attendant
b. Minimizing the risk of harm to the officers
c. Minimizing risk of harm to occupant
d. Orderly completion of search (open locked things and avoid use of
force)
e. The existence of a search warrant provides objective justification for
detention.
ii. DISSENT: too much. This could mean being detained for several hours.
b. Muehler v. Mena (2005) search warrant for deadly weapons and gang related stuff. Ms.
Mena and three other occupants were detained in handcuffs for 2‐3 hours of the search.
i. GROSSMAN: (Compare with Rettelle). How different? Very small justification –
very short detainment.
1. The more the justification – the longer they can detain.
ii. HOLDING: though handcuffing made it way more intrusive, the action was
reasonable bc the governmental interests outweighed the marginal intrusion
because the inherently dangerous situation was minimized w handcuffs.
iii. CONCURR: (1) is the search extends to the point where the handcuffs can cause
real pain or discomfort, provision must be made to alter the conditions of
detention at least long enough to attend the needs of the detainee (2) the
restraint should be removed if at any point during the search, it would be
readily apparent to any objectively reasonable officer that removing the
handcuffs would not compromise the officers safety or risk interference.
5. Intensity and duration of the search
a. Police officers may only look where the described items might be concealed. Once the items
are found, the search must stop. If you’re looking for a shotgun, you can’t look in a small
filing cabinet. Looking for cocaine – can basically look anywhere. If you find one bag of
cocaine, you font have to stop – bc there could be more! If you’re looking for a stolen
diamond tiara and you find it – it is time to stop! IF they find cocaine while searching for the
tiara, then they can keep searching!! BC they now have probable cause to believe there is
further crime.
6. Seizure of items not named in the search warrant
a. GROSSMAN: “DON’T WORRY ABOUT THIS CASE” Horton v. California (1990) – police had a warrant to
search a home for the proceeds of a bank robbery (including two rings) but the affidavit said the weapons used
as well. Only the weapons were found. And they were not in plain view and the search was not inadvertent – it
was specific.
i. HOLDING: if the officer has a valid warrant to search for one item and merely a suspicion
concerning the second, whether or not it amounts to probable cause, we fail to see why that
suspicion should immunize the second item from seizure if it is found during a lawful search for
the first. SPECIFIC SEARCHES/WARRANTS can be converted to GENERAL WARRANTS.
1. Inadvertence is only for warrantless searches.
7. Presence of third parties
a. Wilson v. Layne (1999) police enter a home under the authority of a warrant to search for a
stolen property – the presence of third parties to identify the stolen property is OK.
i. BUT the presence of members of the media is unconstitutional because it is not
in aid of the execution of the warrant.
8. Delivery of warrant
a. An officer executing a search warrant must deliver a copy of the warrant at the place

searched. It assures the individual whose property is searched of the need to search and the
limits of the search.
Special Problems: Computer Searches
1. Police are with increasing frequency using search warrants to seek information stored on computers, give
rise to special problems.
a. State v. Evers (2003) a detectives search warrant affidavit indicated that after entering a child porn
chat room he received an email of child porn froma sender with a certain screen name and which aol
provided the billing address.
i. ISSUE: whether the police may issue a warrant for that address.
2. US v. Riccardi – police got a warrant for a computer and all items within.
3. US v. Hudspeth (2006) – a warrant for search business records logically and reasonably includes a search of
computer data.
a. People v. Gall (2001) – authorizes and prefers taking the computer to search it at another location.
4. Gall ‐ must a second warrant be obtained for a computer when a second warrant isn’t needed to take a
filing cabinet?
5. Arizona v. Hicks – the mere recording of the serial numbers idd not constitute a seizure because it did not
interfere with the possessary interest.
a. What about recording the contents of the hard drive and leaving with it?
6. Limited in Intensity
7. US v. Gourde (2006) pg 221
322‐325

Warrantless Arrests and Searches of the Person
Wednesday, February 02, 2011
10:06 PM
I. Warrant exceptions
II. US v Watson
Warrentless Arrests And Searches of the Person
US v. Watson (1976)
Background: informant told federal postal inspector that Watson supplied him with a a stolen
credit card and agreed to give him more. Informant signald officer where officer arrested Watson
without a warrant as he is authorized to do.
Exigency exception: e.g. seizing a suit case with probable cause and they hear a ticking bomb… or
if someone is running away. Doesn't apply in this case
Court of Appeals: held the arrest unconstitutional because the inspector had time to get a warrant
and he did not. Nothing indicates that a warrant is needed for a valid arrest for a felony.
Supreme Court: Prefer a warrant if possible, BUT the balance struck by the common law in
generally authorizing felony arrests on probable cause, but without warrant has survived,
substantially intact.
Congressional statute alone cannot be dispositive, but court uses it as a factor.
We now allow seizures in public without a warrant when (or if you are arrested where you do not
have an expectation of privacy), you do not need a warrant.
a. You and expectation of privacy are operative terms: so you would not have expectation of
privacy in another persons home even though you are inside a home.
CONCURR: MARSHAL? STEVENS?
Considerations: (1) whether the privacy of our citizens will be better protected by ordinarily
requiring a warrant to be issued before they may be arrested; and (2) whether a warrant
requirement would
I. Atwater v City of Lago Vista
a. Facts: Woman driving with kids in front seat without seatbelts. She didn’t have her purse
and she was arrested.
b. Court: intent of framers is unclear
i. Something
II. Tennessee v Garner
a. Extent of a seizure
b. Facts: There was a seizure (arrest) when there is deadly force used in a pursuit…. Seizure
was lethal
c. Court: even with probable cause, the seizure can go too far.
i. Factors: dark, night, circumstances of the crime (grave life threatening crime
committed)
ii. This means deadly force more reasonable
d. 4th amendment is involved not only whether there was a seizure, but also the EXTENT of
the seizure
III. O'Conner case (review)

IV. Scott v Harris
a.
b. Facts: high speed car chase through urban area, police car bumped driver and the guy spun
out and was paralyzed. Civil suit by defendant… of course he loses.
c. Court: weighs factors:
i. Innocence of bystanders versus culpability of defendant
ii. Cops were reasonable
1) Rationale: allowing cops to conduct a high speed pursuit prevents criminals
from getting the signal that if they drive 80 mph after committing a crime you
can get away scott free.
V. GERSTEIN V PUGH
a. Court: although you can arrest a person without a warrant, you cannot detain a person for
an extended period of time without a warrant. Need magistrate to issue a warrant
promptly.
i. Hearing determines probable cause
b. Anytime you arrest a person, you don’t need a warrant for the arrest, but need one within a
reasonable period of time to detain for any extended period of time
VI. COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE v MCLAUGHLIN
a. 48 hour period to have hearing to keep a person in custody unless state has good cause for
delay
b. Hearing: non‐adverserial, no cross, none of that. Every state has preliminary hearings so
states can make sure they have a case. So, practically speaking, GERSTEIN hearing has been
incorporated into these preliminary hearings that are held within 48 hours or a reasonable
time thereafter
SEARCH INCIDENT TO A LAWFUL ARREST
I. US v ROBINSON
a. What a search incident to an arrest involves
b. Facts: Defendant driving around DC without a proper permit. Officer pulls him over, full
blown search: finds a cigarette pack… finds drugs inside
c. Def: they didn’t have probable cause or justification to search him. Not even a suspicion.
They were arresting him after revocation of his operator's permit.
d. State: because they were going to arrest him and detain him, they needed to search him for
weapons and conserve evidence for trial. (these two purposes of full blown search versus a
pat down which is just for weapons).
e. Court: police need no more probable cause to conduct this search despite it only being
pulled over for
i. Determining extent of search: you look at purpose of the search (pull a weapon or
destroy evidence)
1) So here, police could search in his pockets or anywhere he can reach… can
search wallet and cigarette pack.
ii. If the arrest lacked probable cause, then the search would be illegal (here, search was
incident to a lawful arrest)
II. GUSTAFSON v FLORIDA
a. Court: Doesn't matter how minor the offense is, any arrest can justify a lawful search
i. Policy: simplicity for officers
III. ATWATER v CITY of LAGO VISTA
a. Defendant: saying she can’t go to jail for this offense, so why is arrest justified?
b. Court: Difficult for officer to make a determination on the severity of the offense and
whether its jailable?
i. Difficult for officer to know prior record
ii. Officer's discretion: want to limit this to prevent abuse

c. Dissent: you shouldn’t jail someone for an offense like this and the intrusion is pretty grave.
IV. VIRGINIA v MOORE
a. Search incident to a lawful arrest (lawful being by 4th amendment standards, not lawful
under state law)
b. Atwater: offense is non‐jailable ultimately, but doesn't say you cant arrest someone
c. Virginia statute says: you cannot arrest someone
d. Facts: officers arrest the guy anyway!
e. Court: doesn't matter what state statute says, 4th amendment doesn't incorporate statutes,
but court sets out minimum standards which is probably cause and court determined they
had probable cause
i. So, arrest was unlawful under VA law and crime was VA crime, but court says NONE
OF THAT MATTERS… what's important is whether 4th amendment was complied with
and in this case there was probably cause
f. So, "lawful arrest" means federal. You can break state law but comply with probable cause
federal standard, and it is lawful still.
i. VA can still give greater protection to its citizens.
g. Knolls case:
i. Police had right to make the arrest, but they chose not to, and they searched him
anyway.
1) Choosing not to make an arrest, then searching anyway? No, says the court…
whole point of the 4th amendment is to protect the public, so if you're going to
search, you have to arrest first!
V. WHREN v US (344‐361)
a. Facts: 1996 case in which plainclothes drug cops patrolling and saw truck turn without signal
and accelerated. Pulled over to make illegal turn. Officer saw in the car two large plastic
bags of cocaine. Seized it (plain view of officer).
b. Issue: was the stop lawful (the plain view rule only kicks in if the stop was lawful)
c. Court: Automobile stop is reasonable where the police have probably cause to believe that a
traffic violation has occurred
d. To stop a car is a seizure and driving a car is a 4th amendment protected activity
e. Def: this was a pretextual stop… police were using an illegal turn to pull over and search the
car
f. Court: subjective intent of the officer doesn't matter once probably cause is established (in
this case, a traffic violation)
i. Administrative searches (e.g. housing agency looking for bad wires, but not looking for
drugs or something) and inventory searches are okay
g. Does this strike at the heart of the probable cause requirement if cops can basically pull you
over for simply driving?
h. Can stop a car as long as sufficient suspicion of suspicious activity regardless of whatever.
VI. US v Edwards
a. Facts: police find paint chips way after arrest of suspected burglar
b. Def: could have gotten warrant, they had time! (this argument doesn't work anymore)
c. Court: don’t need to get warrant and search doesn’t have to occur contemporaneously in
certain situations, here, even if substantial period of time has passed.
VII. Schmerber v California
a. Warrant needed for blood test?
b. Court: Exigency exception
i. They needed to act quickly, and they didn't have time to get warrant, or else the
evidence (here the level of alcohol in the blood) would have disappeared
ii. Doesn't mean they can do it in every case, but where the intrusion is relatively
minimal, not unreasonable, when evidence is going to dissipate, that they not require
a warrant.
VIII. Winston v Lee

a. Court ordered surgery on defendant to remove bullet surgically to show that defendant was
the robber and was hit by the victim's gun fire.
b. Court: operation (search) would not be reasonable
i. The intrusion would be too great… this isn't a needle like Schmerber… this is a full
blown surgery.
ii. Also, there was no need to do it since there was lots of other evidence.
IX. Knowles v Iowa
a. Police stopped def for speeding and pusuant to statute authorizing citation issued a citation.
b. Court: no arrest, no search here!
i. There has to be an arrest first
c. When the police stop a car, it's a (limited) SEIZURE. They must have a reason (suspicion).
i. They can order the driver out of the car without reason.
ii. They can also order passengers out of a car without suspicion.
X. Cupp v Murphy
a. Def brough into for questioning about murder of wife. His fingernails were bloody. Police
got wipes of under fingernails. The arrest took place ONE MONTH after he was brought in.
So is this really a search incident to an arrest
b. Court: Yes, reasonable because of nature of evidence. Blood could disappear.
XI. Chimel v California
a. Issue: extent of search incident to arrest
b. Facts: Officers suspected Chimel robbed coin shop and they came to his house before he
arrived. Wife let them in. They have an arrest warrant for his arrest. He shows up, they
arrest him and ask permission to search throughout the house for the coins. He refuses.
They do full blown search anyway.
c. Police: search incident to lawful arrest. Police were also in the house lawfully already, so
what's the big deal if we search the rest of the house?
d. Court: Purpose and principle of the arrest is to make sure the suspect is not going to be
dangerous or hide evidence… so no justification here to search the whole house. Search is
limited to the reach of the defendant (within grabable area, with some slack for police)
XII. Hypo:
a. Police ask def to go in and get coat… he grabs coat then search his closet (this sounds like a
pretext if it takes place in the summer.. Maybe not in the winter… i.e. the grabable area)
b. The grabable area might not really move with the defendant if hes going throughout the
house.
XIII. Maryland v Buie
a. Facts: arrest warrant for guy wearing a red track suit after a robbery. Go to one of the
suspects home who is under surveillance. Goes into basement to "freeze" it during a
protective sweep. The suit was in plain sight.
i. They arrest the defendant (immediately after, they can protect immediate area‐‐ area
within immediate control)
1) They don’t need any other suspicion or probably cause to do that, for safety
ii. (we'll get to this later) If they want to search elsewhere, need articulable suspicion
(legit suspicion) based on objective facts and suspicion… if they have articulable
suspicion, they can look throughout rest of house for suspects.
1) Here, there were two suspects from an armed robbery, so there's some
suspicion that the other robber is around
2) This is a protective sweep
b. Limited search**
XIV. Washington v Chrisman
a. How limited in cross threshold of the house even if no threat of danger
b. Warrentless entry of premises on college campus. Kid was carrying liquor and he was
under‐aged.
c. Officer arrests kid, accompanies kid to his dorm and they needed to go back to the

dorm/house. All arrestee pose dangers so officer has right o make sure immediate area of
control has anything dangerous. Officer, finds drugs here and it was okay
d. No pretext of going back to the room, so officer had a right to stay with the subject even if
there was no danger
XV. Arizona v Hicks
a. Officers see fancy stereo equipment in house that was in horrible condition. Officer nudges
the stereo equipment to look at serial number.
b. Issue: what is "plain view" and how much can you disturb it.
c. Court: lifting stereo a few inches is a search. Scalia is a pricipalist… doesn’t care what the
practical implications are here. No probable cause to search and by nudging the equipment,
made it a search. They had legitimate reason to be in the house, but the search was a
different issue.
d. VICTORY for principalists!
XVI. Vale v Louisiana
a. Entering premises when making arrest outside.
b. Facts: guy comes out of house under surveillence for suspicion of heroin dealer. Police go
into house after they arrest outside though.
c. Police: guy was trying to hide all the drugs. Should be able to search the home.
d. Court: cannot search house if you arrest guy inside without suspicion, e.g. hearing toilet
flush or seeing someone inside.
i. Cops should have frozen the premises, gotten warrant, then came back
ii. Or cops should have waited for the guy to go in the house!
 Plain view rule:
• Requirements
1. Cops have to be there legally (e.g. dealing with an emergency, arrest warrant, permission to
go in, etc.)
2. Can see, smell, feel, taste, hear, etc. Any sense that is used that tells the officers that what
she senses evidence of a crime, she can seize the item (without searching, i.e. lifting, etc.)
3. Something.
 Segura v. United States
o Police observed a drug sale; arrested one suspect lawfully downstairs and then went
upstairs to apt to arrest the other suspect; admin delays held up the search warrant, so they
waited in the apartment until the search warrant was issued. Essentially, the apartment was
frozen from the inside.
o Issue: admissability of drugs in back room that they see in cursory inspection but they don’t
seize right away. Drugs also in the foyer
o Ct admits evidence of drugs from back room; problem is that entry was unlawful.
o The police did not search the house, they simply secured it. The court essentially
holds that when the police seized the house, as in this case, the affidavit for the warrant
they received 19 hours later did not include drugs. It was ok to freeze the premises and then
conduct a search 19 hours later.
** No big deal what police did because they didn’t accomplish anything by their illegal entry.
They got a warrant, and they did not tell judge wen they got the warrant that they saw the
drugs. Instead, they had probably cause before entry, so because they had a valid warrant,
doesn't matter whether there was a legal entry.
*Understand: The Ct severed what police did illegally which was the entry and then the
ultimate seizure of the drugs that resulted from the legally obtained warrant
 Illinois v McAurther
• Wife told cops husband had marijuana under couch. Husband refused to let him search house,
police went to get a search warrant.
• Court: restriction to not allow him to go back into house without officer was reasonable.
Reasonable because he could have gone in to destroy drugs. He was complaining that the
detention was unlawful.

• When police have reasonable belief of destruction of evidence this allows….
• See page 363 top for consideration in determining exigency on destruction of evidence to act on
probable cause…
 Homicide Exception?
• Not an exception. Mincy v Arizona… just because there's been a homicade doesn’t give them right
to do a full blown search.
 Thompson…
• Too long to be justified by exigency.
 Brigham City v Stuart
• Officers see juvenile hit adults who were holding him in the mouth and blood was going
everywhere. Officers go in an see something in plain view. Issue is whether entry was lawful.
Police himself said he went in to enforce the law, but court says this doesn't matter. Aid doctrine
applies… which is objective measure.
• I was called on for this one.
 Payton v. New York
o 2 fact patterns
 Police obtained evidence and had PC to believe that ∆ had murderd a gas station
manager, but did not get warrant. No one was at his home but lights on music
playing. They broke into his home using a crow bar; upon entry, they saw the 30‐
caliber shell casing in plain view and they seized it.
 For the plain view to apply, the police had to lawfully be in the ∆’s apartment.
 Issue: was the entry lawful? If it was not lawful, then no plain view
 Police had obtained evidence that Riddick had committed 2 armed robberies. They did
not obtain an arrest warrant, went to his home, and when the son opened the door,
the police saw Riddick inside in bed. Before arresting him, they opened a chest of
drawers 2 feet from the bed and searched, thereby seizing narcotics.
 But to do this search, they must do a lawful arrest and have legally entered the
premises.
 Search incident to arrest exception.
o Govt said they did not need a warrant to enter b/c searching for a person is diff from
searching for a thing
 Watson‐you can arrest someone in public if you have prob cause but no warrant; diff
btwn search and arrest
 Here, rather, the court returned to the principle of a high standard of probable cause
for entry of a home. Absent exigent circumstances, they can not enter without a
warrant. The person must pose a threat of harm or imminent destruction of vital
evidence. Just because there is probable cause that one who committed a felony is
within a home, does not mean that the police can enter the home.
 This case is different from prior situations, because it is a home, not a public area.
o The court says: In your home, you have the highest expectation of privacy. If you are
arrested there, then the approval of a magistrate (an arrest warrant) is required.
 Not a property based decision, it’s a privacy based decision.
o Need to know: when police arrest where person has expectation of privacy, they need
warrant or warrant exception.
 Warrant prevents police from crossing threshold.
 Exigency: “Hot Pursuit” (another warrant exception)
 Brigan City v Something
• Rendering assistance by seeing incident through screen door constituted exigent circumstance,
which is exception to warrant search
o Hypo: The police had PC to believe the ∆ just shot the victim on the street. They are chasing
him down as he runs away. He runs into his house and slams the door. Does the officer still
need an arrest warrant? No, both historically and common‐sense wise.

 Crime needs to be “reasonably recently” committed.
 Police have right to enter house w/o warrant.
o Factors of hot pursuit on pg 368 from Dorman, need to record here…
o Hot doesn’t have to be hot. Can be warm. See Dorman.
o Welsh v. Wisconsin
 Police arrest Welsh in his home after witness reported him drunk driving and
stumbling through field after crashing car in field.
 Wisconsin had classified drunk driving as a non‐criminal, traffic offense.
 So the state couldn’t rely on hot pursuit because even though there was PC the crime
occurred and the evidence is the BAC level, WI has chosen not to criminalize this.
 One of the factors of hot pursuit: dangerousness of ∆, closeness of time to the
event, the classification of the crime.
 The less serious the crime is classified, the more likely the court is going to
require an arrest warrant for an arrest.
 Hot pursuit distinguishes serious from non‐serious crimes; here, the danger
posed had ceased once he got out of the car.
 Hot pursuit doesn’t apply well here because there was no immediate or continuous
pursuit of the petitioner from the scene of the crime and was no longer dangerous.
 Also, this was a lesser offense, not manslaughter or something.
 Note: the result might be diff if there was a crime here like a manslaughter b/c he was
in an auto accident as a result of the DUI.
 Steagald v. United States
o The police had an arrest warrant for Lyons, and entered his friend’s home, the ∆ now, to
arrest Lyons, saw drugs in plain view à arrested ∆.
o The police would have needed a search warrant for Lyons house. The key is not the format it
takes, but that there is judicial authorization for the entry. Without that, Steagal’s rights are
violated by the entry à illegal entry.
 The drugs found in plain view cannot be used.
 The police tried to argue that the drugs were admissable b/c they were in plain
view, but here, did the police have a right to be in Steagald’s house looking for
Lyons???? If no right to be there, then no plain view rule.
 The rationale is that police can’t just go into anyone’s house to arrest someone else;
this violates the homeowner’s rights
o BUT Lyons has no expectation of privacy in Stegals apt. If Lyons just happened to be there
and in possession of drugs, he could be liable for drugs found in plain view (thought he may
have expectation if he were staying overnight).
o So entry can be unlawful as to one, but not unlawful as to the other man
o w/o warrant, entry into stegald’s apt violated stegald’s expectation of privacy, but would
not have violated lyons’ right to privacy
o Police could have made this legal by getting search warrant for Steagald's home. Or an
adendem on Lyon's arrest warrant to be able to search Steagald's home.
 The automobile exception
o generally don’t need a warrant, only probable cause
o Not every search of auto leads to automobile exception.
o Has nothing to do with whether there is an arrest.
o Automobile exception IS:
 An exception to warrant rule, not probable cause rule
 When police have PC to believe there is evidence of crime in auto (drugs, gun, etc),
they can search anywhere in auto where evidence could be w/o warrant
 Arrest whether made or not made is entirely irrelevant to whether auto exception
applies

o So if an informant who is reliant reports he saw a shotgun in John Smith’s car, the police
have a right without a warrant to open the trunk of the car, but not the glove compartment,
because the gun wouldn’t fit there.
o Carol v. United States
 Carol was a bootlegger. Police had information he was illegally carrying
alcohol in his car. It looks weighed down. They have probable cause to stop Carol’s car
on the highway, do a search, and find the bootlegged whiskey, but never had a
warrant. Carol moves to suppress because he believe the police needed a warrant.
The court creates the automobile exception as a result of this because:
 Cars are inherently mobile; and
 There is a possibility of destruction of the evidence.
o So police were relieved of warrant requirement, almost like
exigency
o Chambers v. Morolman
 Armed robbery of a gas station; police have reason to believe the robbers and
evidence of the robbery were in a car seen driving nearby shortly thereafter.
 Meet carol test of PC
 The police stop the car and arrest the occupants. Didn’t search car on side of road, but
took car to police garage and searched there, do D argued no longer mobility, so auto
exception to warrant should not apply
 The court said that because the exigency existed in the beginning, it still applied when
the car was searched in the impoundment lot, even when there is plenty of time to
obtain a warrant.
o Coolidge v. New Hampshire‐ this is a rare holding‐ a case limited to it’s facts
 Child molestation and murder case in NH. Attorney General authorizes a search
warrant of suspect’s home. Everything found under that warrant was not permitted.
However, in dealing with Coolidge’s car, the automobile exception was thought to
apply.
 The US SC said the exception did NOT apply because the car had been immobile and
the police waited an entire year before searching the vehicle.
 They needed a warrant to search in this case, w/ respect to warrant requirement; but
all other cases say that auto exception applies
 California v. Carney‐ Motorhome case
o Police questioned a youth leaving a motor home and he confessed to having bought
marijuana from within in exchange for sexual favors. PC met where youth made a statement
against his penal interest. The youth knocked on the door, Carney exited and the police
entered and seized the motor home. A subsequent search revealed additional marijuana.
o Issue: does auto exception apply to motorhome to let evidence in w/o warrant?
o The court said that the exception commenced because of the ready mobility of motor
vehicles. Generally, motor homes will be treated as motor vehicles.
 This motor home was mobile, although not super mobile.
 Also, b/c the vehicle is very heavily regulated by govt, there is a diminished
expectation of privacy, you already have let the govt intrude…
 Periodic inspections, licensing requirements, etc.
 “Pervasive regulation doctrine”: highly dangerous industries mean govt can
regulate them pervasively; b/c businesses are regulated so pervasively, they
have a diminished expectation of privacy
o The ct likens this doctrine to the regs that apply to vehicles and this
is justification in case
o As opposed to book bag which is mobile but not regulated, so
they'd need a warrant with probable cause.

 Administrative searches, e.g. municipal housing service goes into house and
looks for problems, or NRC has to inspect nuclear plants. PERVASIVE
REGULATION is what matters here.
o The court holds that the automobile exception does apply to motor homes‐ it is operable on
the streets and the objective observer would believe it was used as a vehicle, not a
residence.
 Does not matter that it was capable of functioning as a home.
o Note: certain traits may posit the motor home more as a fixed dwelling‐ for example: if it’s
elevated on blocks, connected to utilities, in a mobile home community, etc.
 MD v. Dyson
o No exigency needed for the automobile exception to warrant requirement.
 Florida v. White
o Upholds the warrant less seizure of car under the state forfeiture law on probable cause
that the motor vehicle was contraband.
o You can seize a car just like you can search it w/o warrant under auto exception.
 Chambers v. Maroney
o Assuming the police had the probable cause to stop the car, that doesn’t mean they
necessarily have the PC requisite to search the car.
Automobile searches: not every auto search is an “auto search” w/in legal meaning
Difference between searching cars and containers (for which police generally need a warrant) ‐ what
happens when there is a container in the car?
• Note: if police are looking for cocaine, they can look everywhere, but a bag of cocaine, well this
may be limited.
• General rule on containers: if you have a container in public, police can seize the container but
cant search it without a warrant
• Container in a car: automobile rule or container rule
• History:
o Chadwick: where you have container and container in a car, the container doesn’t lose its
expectation of privacy… so where you need a warrant to se
o Ross: same situation as Chadwick, but it depends on whether or not its treated as a
container and what probable cause goes to… if probable cause goes to car, then auto
exception.
o e.g. illegal substance in briefcase in car tip, and under ross you need a warrant here. BUT, if
tip is there's cocaine somewhere in the car, then police can search everywhere in the car.
• California v. Acevedo
○ Law b/f acevedo:
 Chadwick and sanders‐searches of suitcases in cars; the PC went to the suitcase; there
was not evidence of crime in the car, it was actually in the suitcase; ct said police
needed warrant to open the suitcase even though no warrant to search the car
 Ross‐the PC went to the car in general, including the suitcase; ct said it depends on
what the PC goes to—the car or the suitcase; if PC goes to the car, they can search car
and any containers w/o warrant
 In Acevedo‐the PC went to the container, not the car
 NEW RULE: Ct says law now is that no matter where Probable Cause goes to‐the car
or the container‐the police can open any container in car w/o warrant, the
containers need to reasonably contain the contraband at issue
○ Daza picked up a FedEx package the police knew contained marijuana and took it to his
apartment. Acevedo entered the apartment and left with the package, putting it in trunk of
his car. The police stopped him, opened the trunk and bag, and found marijuana.
○ A person expects more privacy in his luggage and personal effects than he does in his
automobile.

○ The anomaly exists where under Ross, the police could search the whole car, but under
Sanders, they would need a warrant for luggage.
○ Holding: The 4th Amendment does not require the police to obtain a warrant to open the
sack in a movable vehicle simply because they lack probable cause to search the entire car.
 The line between PC to search a vehicle and PC to search a package in that vehicle is
not always clear.
 Hypo: informant tells police there are drugs in the car—police has PC to search the
entire car; but if informant tells police that there are drugs in the car in a paper bag—
the police officer now has PC to search that paper bag, but needs a warrant, where he
would not need one just to search the vehicle.
 The other anomoly is that if you walk down the street w/ a suitcase, the police can
seize it but need a warrant to search it; but if you put the suitcase in your trunk, now
they can search it under vehicle exception (the dissent points this out, but the court
just lets this anomoly stand)
 Purpose of PC v. purpose of warrant, they are diff; PC means that police can’t stop just
anybody; warrant means that a neutral magistrate rather than police decide on
issuing the warrant
○ The police may search without a warrant any container found in an automobile if their
search is supported by probable cause.
 Only within the reasonable parts of the automobile (here, a search of the entire
vehicle would have been improper).
○ If there is PC to believe there is evidence of a crime in a car, whether it goes to a suitcase
or a container, or whether the information goes to the car in general, the police can open
the container in the car that could contain the evidence without a search warrant.
 They can still only look only where the evidence would reasonably be found (e.g. no
suitcase in the glove compartment), but once they find something it can give
probable cause to look further.
• Wyoming v. Houghton
○ A driver was pulled over and ordered out of the car when the police saw he had a syringe in
his pocket he admitted using for drugs. The 2 ladies in the backseat were ordered out of the
car and upon their search for contraband, the police found a purse belonging to one of the
passengers who claimed ownership and it contained drugs.
○ It was legal for police to search the passenger purse
○ The PC went to the driver, not the passenger, but the search of the passenger purse was
legal
○ If they didn’t let the police search the passenger purse, everytime a car is stopped, the
person that they have PC against wil just dump his contraband in the passenger purse and it
can’t be searched by police
○ Neither Ross nor historical precedence admits of a distinction among packages or containers
based on ownership.
○ Passengers, no less than drivers, possess a reduced expectation of privacy with regards to
the property they transport in cars, which travel in public thoroughfares, seldom serve as
the repository of personal effects.
○ As distinguished from Ybarra,
 the case relied on the significance of heightened protection against a search of one’s
person.
 Additionally, the government interests are substantial in securing contraband.
 And thirdly, a car is movable, whereas a bar is not.
○ This is more like pringle than ybarra (3 am, 3 drivers)
○ Remember, we need a warrant to search property found on a person in puiblic, but you don’t
need warrant to arrest a person in public
 Diff btwn property interest and personal privacy interest, property interest is held
higher than personal privacy interest

○ So if PC to believe evidence of crime in car, it does not matter who the property belongs to
and to whom or to what the probable cause went (under the automobile exception)
 This is different than police searching a bar (where they cannot search patrons)
 You probably cannot search the passenger herself either until after they search the
purse and they then have probable cause and can arrest then search her (search
incident to arrest)
• Texas v. Brown
○ Single purpose container
○ Balloon case‐ balloons are a rare “single‐purpose container” (e.g. a shot gun casing or
balloon) that by their very nature cannot support any reasonable expectation of privacy
because their contents can be inferred from their outward appearance.
○ Containers would normally need a warrant or warrant exception, but if the container is only
used for one purpose, there is no real expectation of privacy, b/c by seeing the container,
you know what the contents of the container are
○ Here, the plain view rule applies where you have a "single‐purpose container"
• Illinois v. Andrea
○ Issue: Whether an individual has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of a
previously lawfully searched container?
○ Customs agents found pot inside a table shipped into the country, they delivered it to the ∆,
and he was arrested after receiving it into his home.
 Customs agents can open anything that comes into country in natl security interest
and don’t need a warrant, it was legal for customs to open
○ No protected privacy interests remains in contraband in a container once government
officers lawfully have opened that container and identified its contents as illegal.
○ Gap in Surveillance Exception: There is a reasonable and objective standard applied to the
plain view doctrine in this case of controlled deliveries that where there is a substantial
likelihood that the contents of the container have been changed during the gap in
surveillance.
 Does the period of time that it was outside of view of officers, is expectation of
privacy restablished? (it was lost when they searched it the first time)
 Court: no. Here, not enough time to restablish expectation of privacy.
• AZ V. GANT
○ This is not the automobile exception; police do not need PC when search incident to arrest;
it is applied to automobile searches
○ NY v. Belton‐pulled D over and had PC to believe he was involved in illegal activity, so they
arrest him, take him away from car and later search the car, could police search the car
incident to arrest? They found a jacket there and supergold packet within which was kind of
pot; ct said that they wanted to create bright line rule; ct upholds evidence found in belton’s
car under search incident to arrest philosophy; RULE‐whatever is found in passenger area of
is admissable evidence and car can be searched incident to arrest (including glove
compartment and containers)(not the trunk though); RULE 2‐purpose of Chimel search
incident to arrest was the wingspan rule, but in car searches, if the D is handcuffed in police
car, then D can’t get evidence and destroy it or get weapons to use on police; so Ct did not
let chimel apply to car situations
○ In 2004‐thornton‐extended holding in belton; D exited vehicle and was arrested; so he was
arrested and could not possibly have reached anything inside the car at that point; but they
still let search of car go down
 Thorton: nature of arrest was different
 Belton and Thornton are abandoned
• OVERVIEW: Ct gets out of the Belton holding; they don’t overturn Belton, but they change what the holding
meant; Ct rejects broad reading of Belton so that police can’t automatically search a vehicle incident to
arrest; NOW, if arrestee is secured, the police can’t search the car UNLESS “reasonable belief” that there is
evidence of the crime D was arrested for in the car (if police have PC to search a car they can search w/o

warrant b/c of the automobile exception); but “reasonable belief” is a lesser standard than PC; must for be
crime D was arrested for, not just any crime. So 2 justifications for police to search car incident to arrest: if
D can reach weapons/evidence b/c unsecured after arrest (but this prob won’t happen b/c bad police policy,
police not supposed to leave D’s unattended to search, they secure secure as soon as arrest) OR reasonable
suspicion of evidence of that crime in the car
○ After respondent was arrested for driving with a suspended license, handcuffed, and locked in the
back of a patrol car, police officers searched his car and discovered cocaine in the pocket of a jacket
on the backseat. The Court determined that the search‐incident‐to‐arrest exception to the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement did not justify the search
○ Precedent was Chimel and Belton; Chimel and Belton should not be extended to this search
○ Chimel‐wingspan rule‐rationale‐officer safety, get weapons away from D
○ Belton‐Gant argued that Belton did not authorize the search of his vehicle because he posed no
threat to the officers after he was handcuffed in the patrol car and because he was arrested for a
traffic offense for which no evidence could be found in his vehicle.
 Unanswered question of Belton: Belton, which held that police may search the passenger
compartment of a vehicle and any containers therein as a contemporaneous incident of an
arrest of the vehicle's recent occupant, but can they search if the D is secured?
 Once D is secured, warrantless search is not justified as prevention of destruction of evidence
or police safety, these justifications just do not make sense so you can’t extend the rule here
like this
 Ct adopts narrow reading of Belton consistent w/ Chimel, rather than a broad reading and
practice of Belton
 Belton was one cop and 4 ppl in a car and he only had one set of cuffs, here there were 5
police and 3 suspects
○ Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only if the arrestee is within
reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to
believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. When these justifications are absent,
a search of an arrestee's vehicle will [*1724] be unreasonable unless police obtain a warrant or
show that another exception to the warrant [***34] requirement applies. The Arizona Supreme
Court correctly held that this case involved an unreasonable search. Accordingly, the judgment of the
State Supreme Court is affirmed.
 You can search incident to arrest passenger area of car (including glove compartment and any
container located withing‐‐ because D could have reached item there), but you cannot search
the trunk, and maybe not the back seat, under the search incident to arrest rationale.
INVENTORY EXCEPTION to 4th amendment warrant requirement
Analysis Key: do police have procedures that they use all the time or does it look like they're doing
something different here?
• South Dakota v. Opperman– inventory exception to the 4th Amendment
○ Inventory search background‐inventory search is NOT a search; if police inventory your
items, and find evidence of crime, its NOT a search and it can be admitted against you
 Despite no probable cause
 Despite no reasonable suspicion
○ Car doubleparked in downtown SD; police towed car to impoundment lot; inventoried
contents of car, not just plain view, but containers; incontainers there was evidence of
stolen property; ct said the police did not have right to search your car, but they did not
search the car, they just “inventoried” the car
○ His car was parked in downtown SD. Opperman argued the police had no PC to look in the
items of his car because it was illegally parked. The police said it was an inventory search
only and so they didn’t need PC or suspicion.
○ Inventory searches of automobiles are consistent with the 4th.
○ Since then, SD has amended its Constitution to provide greater protection to the citizens.
• Colorado v. Bertine
○ The ∆ was arrested for a DUI. He was taken into custody and the car taken to an
impoundment lot. The officer’s inventories the van before the tow truck arrives. The officer

opened a backpack where he found drugs and cash.
○ An inventory search is an exception to the warrant requirement AND PC
 Inventory not a criminal search, purpose is to safeguard the property of the ∆ and
prevent false claims, and guard police from danger.
○ An inventory is genuine if
 The police are acting in good faith, following standardized procedures, and are not
doing this for the sole purpose of investigation.
 In this case, there needs to be a reason for impounding the car in order to do the
inventory.
 (this eliminates the fear that the inventory is a “pretext” (ie‐whren) for a crim
investigation); limits police discretion
○ Where there is a legit reason for police not to impound the car, like there is a passenger into
whose custody it can be released, then they can’t impound and inventory it
○ The security of the storage facility does not completely eliminate the need for inventorying
 The police may still wish to protect themselves or the lot owners.
○ Holding: reasonable police regulations relating to inventory procedures administered in
good faith satisfy the 4th Amendment, even though courts might as a matter of hindsight be
able to devise equally reasonable rules requiring a different procedure.
• FL v Wells
○ How much discretion is allowed?
• MIDTERM
○ 1 hour
○ Download software and get exam ID (see email)
○ 1 fact pattern (basic situation, so know fact patterns of the cases and how the court
analyzed and came down… know some policy stuff too)
 Argue both sides of everything, going step by step

Stop and Frisk
Thursday, February 17, 2011
10:32 AM
STOP AND FRISK
Terry v. Ohio
 Landmark case
• Plainclothes detective observed 3 individuals casing a store in the afternoon
• Observed the men go back and forth by the store 24 times
• Police stopped the men, asked them to ID themselves, mumbled responses only
Patted down each of the suspects, 2 of them had pistols
o Mumbling is important because it didn’t dispel the officer’s suspicion… officers are
suspicious.
 ∆’s moved to suppress the evidence in the concealed weapons case
• D agmt: b/c Officer did not have PC and this search and seizure violated 4th Am PC requirement for
a crime in progress
 Ct said a search and a seizure occurred here
• Seizure defined: “when a reasonable person feels his freedom to leave is
restrained”
 When did seizure occur here precisely?
• When police approached D and said “stop” and Terry stopped, when Terry acquiesced to the
police, that is when the seizure took place
• At that time, what quantum of info did police need to justify the stop?
• Officer needed to have an did have “reasonable suspicion” that criminal activity was afoot; a belief
founded on objective factors to conclude that criminal activity is afoot
• Can be based on observations, inferences from experience, or other info that officer has about D
• “reasonable suspicion” is lesser standard than PC
• Terry is first case where ct said the stop based on reasonable suspicion is OK
• After the stop, b/c the D mumbled and did not ID himself, the police’s reasonable suspicion
continued
• If the suspect dispels the suspicion that originally permitted officer to undertake the detention, then
the officer must let him go
• If not, it will continue
• When can the pat down occur?
• Requires a second articulable suspicion, that police has articulable suspicion that suspect is armed
and dangerous
• This occurred b/c the D’s were not able to answer him
 If during patdown, police does not find weapon, but finds drug shaped item instead, and reaches to
pocket to get the drug item, this is not authorized, to reach into the pocket, the police needs PC which he
would not have at this point
• This is because “stop and frisk” is a limiited search (“pat down”)
 2 levels of seizure here:
• Stop
• Arrest
 Just like there can be two full blown searches
• Full blown search, like checking a suit case or a pocket
• Limited search, patting down the pockets
o A second, suspicion is needed to warrant a patdown. Nature of the crime itself here gave
officer that suspicion

o Articulable suspicion is needed for the patdown
o Probable cause is needed to search the pockets, e.g. feeling a hard object in the pocket.
o Patdown here is SOLEY to search for weaons
Hypo‐what if when retrieving the gun, white powder comes out as well‐then he has
probable cause to seize the narcotic
Hypo‐what if he smells marijuana as retrieving the weapon‐the smell gives him
Purpose has to be to look for weapons and within scope of the search, probable
cause arises when he smelles the marijuana
SEIZURE: definition above isnʹt so helpful.
Full‐blown seizure: When a persons freedom to leave is restrained in a significant
way (Terry seizure, but in a significant way)
ARTICULABLE SUSPICION:
Florida v. Bostick
 Two officers with badges and visible weapons boarded a bus
 Asked ∆ for ticket and ID, then requested his luggage and asked his consent to search
where drugs found
o Even if the consent made the search valid, if the initial seizure was invalid, then the
evidence should not be admitted
 What is definition of seizure as it applies on a bus?
o “Would reasonable person feel free to decline the officer’s request or to terminate the
encounter?”
o “free to leave” as the old seizure definition does not work on a bus b/c there are reasons
other than the police for passenger on bus not to leave, they don’t want to get off bus
and miss the bus and delay their trip
 Police don’t need to advise you that you can withhold consent to search
 Court: refusal to speak doesn’t justify raising officer suspicion
 Takeaway: need to look at circumstances. The seizure definition doesnʹt really stand on
its own.
 Seizure is more then officer saying ʺhello, Iʹd like to ask you a few questionsʺ
• Need more than that to be a seizure because you can walk away in the courtʹs
opinion.
• There needs to be something more like putting hand on shoulder or something
else.
US v. Drayton
 Another bus case
 3 police boarded bus and stood in front, back and one walked down aisle speaking with every passenger
 Police asked D’s if they consented to search of bags, no drugs found, and then police
asked D’s if they consented to search of their person which they did
 Again, the search was legal b/c consented to, but was the seizure that initially led to the search lawful?
 What is definition of seizure as it applies on a bus?

o “Would reasonable person feel free to decline the officer’s request or to terminate the
encounter?”
 Court: said NO seizure occurred
• When court determines something is neither a search nor a seizure, we have no 4th
amendment issue
o Why?
o Important Factors in determining whether thereʹs a seizure:
• No application of force, no intimidating movement, no overwhelming show of
force, no brandishing of weapons, no blocking of exits, no threat, no command, not
even authoritative voice
 What this means: If police did something other than their presence, a seizure may occur,
but here it was just their presence, so it’s not a seizure
 Analysis: Give definition, “feel free to leave”, and then assess what police did beyond just their presence
that suggests that a person should not feel free to leave
California v. Hodari
 Another aspect of seizure… changed definition a bit.
 Hodari fled upon seeing an approaching police car
 As the police chased the suspect on foot, he threw a small rock which when retrieved it
was cocaine
 Note: he abandoned the property, so it should be admissable, but if the abandonment
was based on a coerced, illegal seizure, what flows from illegal seizure shouldbe
suppressed (coerced abandonment)
 If it was a lawful seizure, then it could be abandonment, so was there a seizure?
 Court: No seizure
o Police never put hands on D
o D did not comply with their authority
o Had Hodari submitted to authority and stopped, he would have been seized
 Officer saying stop and chasing you down street is not a seizure, he needs to say stop and you need to
comply for it to be a seizure (Terry)
 Stop and chasing down street is not a seizure, and so 4th Am does not apply… he had not yet acquiesced
and stopped.
 Def of seizure: police lays hands on you or you acquiesce to police request to stop/submit to
authority
• So ʺnewʺ definition is when a reasonable person doesn’t free to leave and
acquieces or is actually grabbed?
Hypo: firing a shot at someone doesn’t implicate the 4th amendment because officer
hasn’t grabbed him and suspect hasn’t acquiesced to stop.
Brendlin v. California
 Traffic stop
 Are the passengers seized as well as the driver?
 Court: when you stop a car, everyone in the car is considered seized.
o Seizure: reasonable persons in the passenger position would NOT believe themselves to

be free to terminate the encounter
• This is a terry‐type detention where officer needs articulable suspicion
o Situation can evolve though, and this can become a full‐blown seizure where
they need probable cause
o Does a passenger feel his freedom to leave is restrained? Yes
Sibron v. New York
 A police officer watched Sibron for 10 hours
 Saw him speaking to known addicts, never heard any conversations
 Followed him in a diner and asked him to come out
 Told him you know what I am after, and he and Sibron reached into Sibron’s pocket at
same time and uncovered drugs
 Issue: Did police have articulable suspicion to make a Terry stop and frisk?
 First question: was there a seizure?
• Second question: When did the seizure occur?
o We need to figure out whether there was articulable suspicion to make a
Terry stop and frisk
 When the police asked the D to stop and the D acquiesced (Hodari)
• After Hodari, he was seized after he was asked to go outside then he acquisced…
at that point he is seized
 Court: No articulable suspicion at that point.
o No grounds for the stop just because he saw him talk to addicts
o Improper manner of frisk
o Nature of the crime matters. Watching the guy for 8 hours and nothing dangerous
about this situation unlike Terry, where there was a armed robbery afoot.
o Terry purpose was to stop an armed robbery from taking place; but here, the nature of
the crime was not as serious and not as imminent, more serious and more imminent, the
more the articulable suspicion given will be adequate
Cortez (not covered)
 Articulable suspicion
o Look at “totality of circumstances”
• e.g. if description of the suspect is very general, then may not enough for
articulable suspicion, unless he starts behaving really funny, then maybe.
• Particularized suspicion means particular to that person.
o What can the officer take into consideration?
 What he or she observes, hears, senses, feels
 Any information the officer may have
 Draw rational inferences
o Information must be particularized, must relate to the specific individual
6-Oct-08
Review from last class:

-Terry-there is something btwn arrest and nothing, which is limited detention, it can occur when
police have articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot; it implicates 4th Am; seizure
defined—but has been limited by later cases; articulable suspicion is objective facts that made
the police focus on the suspect; can detain for limited pd of time; purpose of Terry detention was
to eith er formulate PC to arrest, or release suspect, but if officer has second articulable
suspicion that suspect is armed or dangerous, he may pat down outer clothing looking only for
weapon
-what constitutes seizure?
Bus cases-freedom to leave n/a to bus b/c other things prevent freedom to leave; it was not a
seizure; officer has to do something more than just be there to make it a seizure; officer needs
to act agressively to make it a seizure, or instruction orally by police.
-D must actually be seized; officer must have control of him or lay hands on him or suspect
acquieszes; saying stop and then the person running is not seizure
-articulable suspicion-cortez-based on what officer observes and reasonable inferences officer
can draw from observations
Sibron-companion case to Terry; situation where D talked to addicts but that was not enough to
constitute articulable suspicion; difference here from terry was that terry crime was imminent
and serious, but this crime was lesser
Florida v. JL
 Police received an anonymous tip that a young black male wearing plaid shirt was carrying
a weapon; they saw the D standing on the corner and approached and patted him down
and he had a weapon
 Did this raise articulable suspicion?
 Court:
• No. Anonymous tip has the lowest form of reliability
• Anonymous tips must predict future actions that predict the specific plan to
corroborate the story
• No corroboration in this case, anyone could call up and say what this anonymous
tip said… this is basis of the holding
• No predictive detaiils (contrast with below)
Alabama v White
 Anonymous tip: woman is going to be leaving with drugs in briefcase. She drives to
place informant described.
 Court: (probable cause but not articulable suspicion?) Why? details of anonymous tip
were predictive and corroberated.
 What if tip is for terrorist wearing bomb? This is more serious crime than carrying
weapon?
o Prob police could pat him down; b/c bomb is more dangerous than gun; in Terry the
balance is state interest in public safety and personal interest in freedom from intrusion;
a bomb is a significant threat to public safety.
 United v. Sokolow- totality of the circumstances

o Case involving drug courier profiling.
o The articuable suspicion in this case was created by how the ∆ paid for the tickets
(with a roll of $20 bills), he traveled under a different name, came from Miami,
arrested in HI, he only stayed in Miami for 48 hours, even though the flight roundtrip
is 20 hrs; he appeared nervous; did not check luggage.
 All of this behavior was consistent with drug courier profiles
o D agmt was that the police only had articulable suspicion b/c of drug courier profile,

did not have independent thought by police
o Drug courier profiles:
 You came or went to drug source city (which was most cities)
 Would try to get off plane first, then last, then middle
 Nervous getting off plane
 The courier profile came into disrespect b/c it nearly applied to everyone
o HOLDING: the fact that these factors may be set forth in a profile does not detract
from the evidence itself.
o Under the “totality of circumstances” of all this evidence, there was articulable
suspicion
 United States v. Hensley- Terry applies to past crimes
o Terry also applies to past crimes
o Terry said “reas suspicion that criminal activity afoot”
o Terry stops are not limited to ongoing criminal conduct; Terry stop can be used when
the reasonable suspicion is of a past or completed criminal activity, but the crime
needs to be serious, more serious than a crime underway in normal Terry stop.
o Holding: if police have a reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable
facts, that a person they encounter was involved in or is wanted in connection with a
completed felony, then a Terry stop may be made to investigate that suspicion.
 Rationale: even though Terry stops for completed crimes serve less to prevent
crime and act under exigent cirsumstances, Terry stops for completed crimes
still promote govt interest in solving crimes and bringing offenders to justice;
this govt interest outweighs the person’s interest in being free from a stop.
 Illinois v. Wardlow- people running from a high crime area  articulable suspicion
o When does Terry type seizure become full blow seizure
 Look at factors: force used, etc.
o Caravan of police cars in a high drug area, the ∆ looked in the directions of the
officers and then ran away, officers stopped and frisked him, and found weapon.
o Holding: an individual’s presence in an area of expected criminal activity, standing
alone, is not enough to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion that th person
is committing a crime.
 In this case, it is the combination of the high crime area with his unprovoked
flight together provide reasonable suspicion.
 Running away not indicative of wrong doing, it might be innocent or might be
culpable, but the police have the right to clear up the ambiguity by stop and
frisk.
o But consider, who might run from police? Certain minorities are harassed by police
and have a good reason to run even if they aren’t guilty, just want to avoid police,
this now becomes articulable suspicion against them
Extent and Scope of Temporary Seizure

 A Terry type detention in it’s inception can become a full fledged search and seizure
o For example, force can escalate it, if the police detain you too long, if they subject
you to things intrusive in nature, etc.
 BUT If officer uses force to effect a proper Terry detention when suspect flees,
it is not raised to a full blown seizure
 BUT if it becomes a full blown seizure, remember, they need probable cause.
o Where does Terry stop become a custodial arrest?
 Analysis has two factors:
 Time/duration/length
 Scope or invasiveness
 Florida v. Royer
o Detectives questioned ∆ at an airport concourse and then asked him to accompany
them to a small interrogation room. He was asked to consent to a search of his
luggage, which he did. 15 minutes had elapsed at that point.
o The situation clearly escalated from a Terry “stop” to an investigatory seizure

when he was asked to produce the key to his luggage- as a practical matter he
was under “arrest.” They would have needed PC not just articulable suspicion.
 Definition of full blown seizure=when a reas person would feel his freedom to
leave is restrained in a significant way?
 Definition of seizure=when reas person would feel his freedom to leave is
restrained.
 The factors that lead to the full blown seizure here rather than Terry stop:
moved from concourse to private, investigation room, he was detained 15 mins,
terry was only initially detained for few seconds
 What was the purpose of putting D in the room? To isolate him and get him to
consent to search his bags
 Ct says that sometimes moving D during Terry stop will be OK but there should
be evidence on record that it was related to safety and security
 Had D consented to the search in the concourse, any evidence would have
been admissable against him.
 United States v. Sharpe- no fixed time on when Terry becomes full blown seizure
o Has Terry detention impermissably exceeded time length?
o Facts: Overloaded camper traveling in tandem with a Pontiac. The Pontiac pulled
over pursuant to the police order, but the camper did not. When backup arrived, he
left Pontiac to go to the camper, which had been stopped by another patrolman.
Eventually arrested the camper driver after smelling marijuana. The camper driver is
Savage, the D here
 So, he needed PC and warrant/warrant exception to search; here, he had PC
b/c he smelled the marijuana, and he had warrant exception b/c automobile
exception is exception to warrant requirement to search.
o The court held the delay of 20 minutes was not unreasonable and did not become a
full blown seizure b/c:
 the ∆ himself caused the delay
 the officers acted reasonably under the circumstances and dispelled of the
situation as quickly as possible; time was eaten up coordinating 2 officers to
pull over b/c d didn’t pull over originally
 Ct wanted to avoid judicial second guessing of officer actions
 As long as police were diligent in investigating to dispel the suspicion quickly,
then it will be OK even though 20 mins is a long time, longer than the 15 mins.
In the previous case
 Police did not need to employ least restrictive alternative, but the least
restrictive alternative UNDER the circumstances
 So, Royer factors + cause of delay
 Weighed down camper was articulable suspicion
 Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court- don’t worry a lot about this case
o Police get anonymous call that someone just assaulted woman and the D matched
the description and he was stopped.
o ∆ was convicted for not complying with the “stop and identify” statute under NV law.
 D argued conviction violated 4th and 5th Am (self incrim)
 Ct interpreted Terry to mean that 4th Am does not require D to answer
questions; but here, issue is, can state impose a requirement to answer
questions w.o violating the 4th Am??
o The court upheld the requirement of the statute that required the D to ID himself
based on balancing test:
 3 reasons:
 1) Requesting someone for identity has a relation to the purpose and demands
of a Terry stop; here, reason for asking for ID was connected to purpose of
investigation
 2) the threat of criminal sanction helps to ensure that the request for identity
does not become a legal nullity (teeth); and
 3) such a threat does not alter the nature of the stop itself and was reasonably

related in scope to the circumstances which justified the stop.
o Berkemer v. McCarty
 Dissent emphasized that this case had dicta that said that a Terry suspect was
not obliged to answer questions
 Also said that traffic stops are more like Terry stops than full blown arrests
 Illinois v. Caballes- as long as the detention is lawful, its ok if detention is not extended
o ∆ stopped by trooper for speeding 71 in 65 zone. Another trooper, overhearing this,
showed up at the scene and brought his drug dog with him, unsolicited. While the
first officer was still writing the tickey, the drug dog detected drugs and the police
found marijuana in trunk.
 When drug sniffs the marijuana, police have PC, and they can search car b/c
they have PC and auto exception to warrant requirement.
o The lower court overturned the ∆’s conviction because the use of the dog
unjustifiably enlarged the scope of a routine traffic stop.
o D argued that the stop became unlawful b/c it was prolonged to have a new purpose
which was to search for drugs; terry says that the nature of the investigative activity
needs to be related to the stop, and this was a traffic stop, did not have to do with
drugs
o Ct says dog sniffing is a non-event
o The US SC held: even if a seizure is lawful at its inception, it can violate the 4th
Amendment if its manner of execution unreasonably infringes interests protected by
the Constitution.
o Ultimately, conducting the dog sniff is not within the scope of the original detention,
but it did not change the character of a traffic stop and a dog sniff is really not a
search. So long as the detention was proper, he was not further detained in order for
the dog sniff to occur b/c officer was still writing ticket- the dog sniff does not change
the nature of the detention.
 If had extended the ∆’s stay, the dog sniff then would change the nature and be
illegal.
 Notes: dogs are used to intimidate ppl, dog sniffs prolong the stop
 Souter dissent: dogs are infallible
 Ohio v. Robinette- if at the end of the detention, don’t extend it longer, consent obtaining ok.
o A deputy on drug patrol stopped ∆ for speeding. He examined the license, issued a
verbal warning, and then immediately asked if ∆ had any drugs in the car. The ∆ said
no, and then consented to a search of his vehicle  some pot and a pill.
o The state court said the evidence would be suppressed because the right to be
secure would include informing him he had the right to leave after a valid detention
before the officer attempts to engage in consensual interrogation.
 The state court was trying to create a bright line rule—SCOTUS says they like
to avoid bright line rules, but prof says they DO use bright lines
o Issue: is such a warning a prerequisite to a voluntary consent? No
o SCOTUS decides that no warning is needed because they asked for the consent
immediately afterwards- the police did not detain him after that point of having issued
the warning.
o Stevens dissent focuses on fact that the rpp would not feel free to leave; officer used
this technique 786 times in one yr
Temporary Seizure of Effects

 United States v. Van Leeuwen- can detain an item under Terry for a R period of time
o A postal clerk was suspicious of 2 packages of coins. The police noted the return
addresses were fake and held the packages for slightly more than a day while they
investigated; Mailer had Canadian licence plates, the addressees were under
investigation for illegal coin trade
 They got a warrant to search, but it was a day after the packages were
detained
 They could never detain a person for a whole day
o Holding: basd on Terry, the detention of mail could at some point become an

unreasonable seizure of papers or effects, but this detention was conducted promptly
and that most of the delay was attributable to the time delay in TN and couldn’t reach
TN authorities until next day.
 Police can detain effects if they have reasonable suspicion, the standard that
applies to ppl applies to effects
 United States v. Place- luggage detaining time can be too long where it interferes with traveler’s
liberty interest
o ∆, a suspected drug courier, was stopped and his luggage was seized by federal
agents in La Guardia. He was let go but they kept his luggage. They took the bags
to Kennedy, where a trained narcotics dog reacted positively. The bags were held
until Monday (from Friday afternoon) when the warrant was obtained.
o Ct applied Terry balancing interest approach
 The packaging in van leeuwan only interfered with the possessory interest.
Here, it interferes with possessory AND liberty interest in proceeding in his
travel itinerary.
 When police seize luggqage from suspect, the same limits that apply to
detentions of person define the permissible scope of an investigative detention
of luggage on less than PC.
 They also took into account the police diligence; police were not very diligent
here, they knew when suspect would arrive and they could have made
accommodations to have dogs there to minimize the 4th Am intrustion
 The 90 minute detention made the seizure unreasonable.
 A 90 minute intrusion is serious. The court holds that in this situation, this is a
substantial depravation and more of an intrusion
 The 90 minutes must have been btwn the La Guardia stop and the
Kennedy dog sniff that gave them PC
o Once they have PC, assuming the delay is not outrageous, then the delay is ok.
 The problem was not holding it over the weekend once there was PC, it was
the initial holding from La Guardia to Kennedy for 90 minutes before they had
PC that was the problem; the 90 mins. During which they only had articulable
suspicion was unreasonably long
 90 mins. Is too long of a detention under Terry
Midterm: covers 4th Am, won’t cover sub DP, terrorist, won’t cover administrative searches
(might be on final), it will be an essay question, you can type but need to download software,
use 7 digit student ID, “discuss all issues related to admissability of X evidence…”; need to
argue both sides; ID what is stop, seizure, analyze, conclude
*N-Z-take midterm in 212 on 10/8
Last class:
JL-black male on corner, that is not RAS even though gun dangerous-if bomb, things might be
diff
Sokolow-totality of circumstances
Hensley-Terry also applies to past crimes, not just imminent crimes, but crime needs to be more
serious
Wardlow-in high crime area, running away from police can amt to RAS
Royer-Terry detention escalated into full blown seizure; factors-if it extends a long time, if you
are taken to another place, especially if its isolated, if you are not told free to leave, if purpose of
police is consent, not getting a weapon
Sharp-20 min detention can still be under Terry if D was responsible for delay and if police were
diligent
Heibel-don’t worry about
Caballes, Robinette-what can happen during and at conclusion of terry search; dog can be
brought to sniff during traffic stop if traffic stop still in progress, b/c dog sniff not a search, as
long as the detention is not extended or intentified; asking for consent was allowed too
Van leeuwen-mail can be detained w/ RAS just like person, can be longer for mail than person

Place-if only have RAS and take luggage from a traveler, then you are impeding his liberty
interest, a 90 min delay with only RAS was too long for terry detention
Expansion of Protective Searches

 Adams v. Williams
o An informant that officer knew came to the police to tell them that D in nearby car
had drugs and a gun in his waist band.
o Officer approached car and asked D to step out of car, but D refused, and officer
reached right for the gun in the waistband
o Ct concluded that officer had reason to fear for his safety; under Terry, need pat
down first, but here, reaching right for gun was limited intrusion designed to insure
officer safety, and it was reasonable
o Dissent pointed out that the D’s possession of the gun was entirely legal by Conn
law, so there is no reason police should feel danger.
 Note 2, p. 430- certain types of offenses and situations reasonably may make an officer believe
the situation will be dangerous and pose a possibility of armed violence; there the police may
automatically frisk.
o Factors are: ppl present in high crime or drug involved locations who engage in
allegedly evasive behavior towards police
o African americans and hispanics pay a higher price for stop and frisk than whites do
 Minnesota v. Dickerson- plain feel rule
o Officer was in the process of a Terry stop and frisk; Officer had RAS of criminal
activity afoot
 Gang activity in area, or someone being a weapons dealer, or drug dealing (b/c
drug dealers carry weapons), all can give rise to RAS
o But when he was frisking, he felt small lump in D’s pocket, he felt around the lump
more and concluded it was crack in a baggie, then he removed it from the D’s pocket
o The officer kept feeling the lump after he knew it was not a weapon, and so he
overstepped the bounds of Terry
o in the split second, it took the officer to determined from the squeeze of the lump in
the pocket that it was crack cocaine, the extra manipulation is illegal because at that
point it became a search for which the officer did not have probable cause.
 Michigan v. Long- pat-down of a car
o Plain sense rule doesn’t apply in that one second that officer knew that it was not a
weapon… no longer authority under Terry to continue. (once suspicion is dispelled,
there needs to be new suspicion, ie not a gun, but the pat down creates waft of
marijuana)
o 2 deputies saw a car swerve into a ditch and stopped to investigate. Long was the
only occupant, and he met the deputies at the rear of the car. He showed ID, and
was returning to the car to get his registration (which was in the car) and officers saw
a hunting knife on the floorboard so the officers stopped him, frisked him, and then
searched the vehicle and found marijuana under an armrest.
o Lower Ct said that no reas. fear to perform the car search b/c the suspect was
effectively under their control at that time
 Higher ct said no, he could easily break away during stop, if no arrest, he gets
access to weapon again
o Holding: search of passenger compartment of auto, limited to areas where weapon
could be, is permissible if the officer has articulable suspicion that suspect is
dangerous and might get immediate control of a weapon.
 Hypo-a tire iron might let the officers do a terry search as well
 Police could not look in ashtray b/c too small for weapon, but here armrest
could contain a weapon, so it was OK; anything else the find while lawfully
searching is OK
o This is like a pat-down of the car, only to look for weapons, as in a limited Terry
circumstance.
o Dissent: more intrusive than Terry; perverse b/c absence of PC to arrest compels the
conclusion that a broad search, traditionally associated w/ search incident to arrest,

must be permitted based on RAS
8-Oct-08
 Fingerprints
o Davis v. Mississippi
 Brief detention for investigation
 Petitioner and 24 other young black men were detained at a police station for
questioning and fingerprinting in connection with a rape. The only evidence had
been the fingerprints from the crime and a general victim description.
Ultimately, Petitioner’s fingerprints matched and the evidence was admitted in
trial.
 Holding: Ct held that here, the prints were a result of a seizure of petitioner that
violated the 4th Am, and prints should have been excluded.
 But Ct indicated that a detention for a purpose of fingerprinting on less
than PC might be permissible
 Fingerprinting in and of itself involved none of the probing into an individual’s
private life, not like getting the 3rd degree from the police in interrogation, it
can’t be used as a form of harassment b/c only need to be fingerprinted once
 BUT here, the fingerprinting was intrusive b/c the police never even tried to use
procedures that would comply with 4th Am.
 Fingerprinting + interrogation = full blown seizure.
 The way they were detained was closer to an arrest because their
detention was not authorized and they were interrogated.
o You can fingerprint someone on scene of crime if you have RAS
o Police find a class ring at the scene of a crime. Ok to bring in all of the students from
that grade (there were 22 of them) because more selective.
o RAS is good enough to bring you to station to fingerprint you
o US v. Dionisio
 Holding: the 4th Am is not violated by supoena of witness to come to grand jury
to give voice examplars
 Don’t need PC or reasonableness to subpoena someone b/c subpoena is not a
4th Am seizure
 Ppl do not have reas expectation in sound of their voice in the way they do in a
particular conversation, the public hears your voice everyday
• Dunaway v. New York- illegal seizure of confession
o Police suspected Dunaway of an attempted robbery and homicide, but lacked PC to
arrest; police picked him up for questioning; driven to police HQ and put in
interrogation room; read Miranda rights; questioned by police; waived counsel; within
an hour he gave incriminating statements.
o Issue: can D’s statements be used against him? The statements were let in as
evidence at his trial.
 We deal w/ 4th Am b/c D said his arrest was illegal b/c it lacked PC
o Lower Ct said that officers could detain someone on RAS for questioning for brief
and reas pd of time under carefully controlled conditions.
o SCOTUS reversed
 Distinguished Terry: this was the same as a traditional arrest, he was not
questioned briefly where he was found, but taken to police HQ
 Never told he was free to go—ct said he would have been
restrained physically if he tried
o A full blown seizure is like an arrest.
o They have articulable suspicion to detain him but this was not like Terry, it was more
like an arrest just w/o the formality of arrest and to do it, they would have needed PC
 detention for custodial interrogation-regardless of its label- intrudes so severely
on interests by the 4th Amendment as necessarily to trigger the safeguards
against illegal arrest.
o Ct thought that making this treatment an exception to PC requirement would just

negate effect of the 4th Am.
o Govt argued that ct should adopt a balancing test of reasonable police conduct
under circumstances, ct said no
o Evidence was inadmissable
o Miranda doesn’t negate 4th amendment , it only applies to 5th amendment
o Review: Terry-look to length, if moved, if put in interrogation room, if not told
you can leave, if police says he would have used force on you to keep you
there
o Dissent-said no 4th Am seizure occurred b/c police behavior was free of physical
force or show of authority
 See STOP AND FRISK chart

Administrative Search
Thursday, February 24, 2011
11:04 AM
 Administrative Searches (not on the midterm)

 Idea behind it:
o Need for agencies other than police to effectively administer their purpose
 Don’t want to require them to have PC or RAS to search, agencies need to act
w/o suspicion to effectively do their job
o There are certain businesses that are so inherenetly dangerous (ie mine, nuclear
plant, music, vehicles even, stores that sell country music, etc.), they have a
diminished exectation of privacy because they have to expect constant inspection
 If the primary purpose of these searches is criminal, then it's not an
administrative search. There are clear cases (nuclear facility inspection), there
are mixes (ie firemarshal inspecting a second time because of belief there was
arson, or automobile parts dealership believed to sell stolen car parts)
o Balancing need and intrusion (in many of these cases? All of them?)
o How pervasively regulated is it?
o Is there a public interest other than law enforcement?
o Is the agency's plan non-discriminatory? (e.g. searching every HS student?)
o Is there a special need? If there is, we balance intrusiveness versus need
o Camara
 Deals with fire, health, housing code inspections
 Agency found something in plain view
 Plain view is a huge rule… they can seize it if they are in a place they
have a right to be, they sense it, and claim as evidence in a crime.
 Agency had a general warrant (they didn’t know exactly which house had the
problem)
 General warrants you need general probable cause (sometimes don't
need warrant at all if pervasively regulated?)
 If occupant refuses to consent to inpection, authorities need to get warrant, and
PC is automatically present if the admin standards are being followed
 Standards vary, but might be: passage of time, nature of blgd, condition
of area, not necessarily knowledge of specific blgd
 The court held it was ok because…
 Purpose not criminal activity
 Limited intrusion
 Historical acceptance of these searches
 No other technique would let the agency do its job effectively; don’t want
to wait til the building burns down until you can search it
 Therefore, it is a reasonable action on the part of the administrative agency.
o Michigan v. Clifford
 Deals with firemarshals (not firefighters who rush in to save people in a fire)
who investigate cause of fire after its extinguished; marshall can go in w/in
reasonable time to determine cause of fire; but if he goes back in again and is
looking for evidence, then he is searching and needs PC, warrant/warrant
exception
o Marshall v. Barlow
 Camara also applies not only to private dwellings, but admin agencies can get
warrants for business inspections too
 Ct has also upheld warrantless business inspections
 b/c Diminished expectation of privacy in certain industries because they

are pervasively regulated- inspections must be carefully limited in time,
place, and scope.
o New York v. Burger
 Ct upheld warrantless search of junkyard
 Even though the admin prob concerned social problem (stolen prop),
which is also criminal; it was a mixed purpose, but it was OK
• Border searches
o When anyone crosses the border into another country, they are always subject to a
warrantless search.
 Strip searches?
 Higher standard: Need real suspicion to do it; for body cavity, need
clear indication to do it
 Need articulable suspicion (individualized, particularized are both same thing)
needed to pull over cars individually
 Area searches: Look up rule on area searches.
o US v. Ramsey
 That same principal applies to mail. Do not need probable cause, suspicion, or
a warrant to open it.
 Can’t read the mail though, can just “inspect” it
 Search const b/c border search principle applied: the searches are
“reasonable” b/c the person or mail entered country from outside
o Michigan v. Clifford
 Fire fighting- they do not need a warrant- and they can stay and
investigate the causes of the fire.
• Vehicle Checkpoints
 If you are in an individual car, the police need RAS to stop the car.
 If the police stop you at a checkpoint where it is done systematically, the police
do not need RAS to stop you.
 Ortiz-Car stops at the border looking for smugglers can only be done with
probable cause
 Martinez-Fuerte-you don’t need any RAS to briefly question though
 DE v. Prouse
 With respect to non-border situations, absent R suspicion, the police may
not stop individual vehicles for the purpose of checking the driver’s
license and the registration of the automobile.
o But states can do road block stops b/c there is no discretion of
police there
o Sobriety Checkpoints- Sitz
 Sobriety checkpoints are upheld. The intrusion on motorists is slight, the
program limited the officers’ discretion, it seriously addressed drunk driving,
and checkpoints are a reasonable alternative.
 Test = Reasonableness: degree of intrusion versus need for intrusion.
 Here, they defer to police dept. after balance leaves checkpoint
o Terrorist Checkpoints
 Airports are likely terrorist threats; ppl can be asked for ID
 Gilmore v. gonzalez-passengers and luggage can be xrayed; closer scrutiny is
OK under suspicious circumstances; passengers can be randomly tested
 NY subway-backpacks and containers can be searched
 Upheld because of the nature of the danger. A balancing test occurs- intrusion
on the individual v. need of government to do this.
o Searches of Students
 New Jersey v. TLO
 School acts in loco parentis
 Student has expectation of privacy in bookbag, but its diminished

 Searched the purse of a student without PC or warrant, but there was AS
b/c student under authority of school.
o Search justified b/c student violating a school rule
o Can’t be excessively intrusive for the student
o Drug testing
 Safford v. Redding (TWEN)-
 Issue: whether 13-year-old student's Fourth Amendment right was violated
when she was subjected to a search of her bra and underwear by school
officials acting on AS that she had brought forbidden prescription and
over-the-counter drugs to school.
 Ct held: NO reason to suspect drugs presented a danger or were in her
underwear, so search was UNCONST, but officials entitled to qualified immunity
(because there is reason to question the clarity with which the right was
established).
 Facts: she got called to principal’s office and they had her planner with
knives, cigarette, lighter, markers in it; she said she gave the planner to her
friend and stuff inside wasn’t hers; principal also showed her Rx strength
Ibuprofin and Naproxin (school policy that you can’t have pills w/o
notifying school); said rumors that she gave to students; she said they
weren’t hers and she consented to search of backpack, nothing found, then
searched her clothes at nurse office, then made her remove her bra and
expose the waist of her underwear, no pills found
 Her mom sued saying it was a strip search unconst under 4th; school defense was
qualified immunity
 Ct said schools don’t need PC to search, but need AS (“moderate chance for
finding evidence of wrongdoing)
 Kid said he got sick from pills he got from classmate; he ID’d friend of savanah,
she had savanah’s day planner and the pills on her; they were friends and in
trouble maker group
 Schools can search backpacks and outer clothing on RAS, but not underclothing,
strip searches
 Test: reasonableness = intrusion versus need.
 If school is going to make a more intrusive search of a student other than
backpack, they need more suspicion, more grounds for the search; the pills
were not dangerous and there was no indication that savanah had anything
in her underwear
o Drug Testing
 Generally:
 Making you do a pee test without suspicion
 We don't want indiscriminate searches!
 Natl Treasure Ees Uniion
 Ct held that suspicionless testing of ees is reasonable for ees who apply
for promotions to positions directly involving the interdiction of illegal
drugs or to a position where they carry a firearm
 Balance weighed in favor of govt interest over the personal interest
 Skinner
 Blood and urine tests of railway engineers after major train accidents to
see if under the influence is OK (if safety violation, breath and urine tests
OK) and no requirement of RAS.
 Special danger in performing this job under the influence; diminished
expectation of privacy, and limited discretion in carrying out the testing
 Von Rob case
 Customs agents who carry guns are dangerous, so no AS needed for

drug test
 Other cases
 Truck drivers without articulable suspicion?
 Dentists test without AS?
 Football players can be tested without AS? Because of history of drug
use, yes.
 Need suspicion to test politicians, no history, not dangerous
 Earls
 Ct upheld randon testing of students involved in extra curriculars
 All students who voluntarily subject themselves to additional regulations
by opting for extracurricular activities has as a consequence a limited
expectation of privacy.
 Govt interest in war on drugs justified it, there was specific evidence of
drug use at the schools, and the policy was effective at targeting drug use
 Samson v. California
o Parolees
o Samson was on state parole in CA following a conviction for being a felon in
possession of a firearm; walking down street; stopped by officer who asked him if he
had an outstanding arrest warrant; he said no, officer verified, officer searched him
and found methamphetamine; and it was admissable evidence;
o He was subject to a search and seizure based solely on being a parolee which was
authorized by state statute.
o Issue: whether a condition of release can so diminish or eliminate a released
prisoner’s reasonable expectation of privacy that suspicionless search by a law
enforcement officer would not offend the 4th Amendment?
o 1) Totality of the circumstances analysis/ BALANCING TEST (need versus intrusion):
 Knights case-probationer could be searched anytime, w/o cause-several days
after probation, police suspected him of arson and vandalism-searched his apt
and found arson and drug paraphanalia
 Probation is on the continuum of punishments. Probationers do not enjoy the
same absolute liberty, they are more likely than an ordinary citizen to violate
the law, and they have more of an incentive to conceal their activity.
 Knights also knew about this condition of his probation and he still
violated
 Balancing Test- government interest is introducing probations back into
community but preventing recidivism; probationers are more likely to violate the
law
 Parolees has a lowered expectation of privacy
 Signed something authorizing searches
 He would otherwise be in prison, so this parole is conditional liberty
 Held: when officer has RAS that probationer subject to search condition is
engaged in criminal activity, there is enough likelihood that crim conduct is
occurring that an intrusion on the probationer’s significanlty diminished privacy
interests is reasonable.
o Here, parolee Samson has even less privacy that probationer Knight
 Again, there was a parole search condition
 Samson did not have a legit expectation of privacy
 State interest-recidivism-CA had 70% recidivism rate on parolees
o The 4th Amendment does not prohibit a police officer from conducting a suspicionless
search of parolee
 Parolees have incentive to conceal-if they get caught, will go to jail
 Fedl govt and some states do though require RAS
o Dissent: police discretion, no cases have said that search w/o suspicion of parolees
is OK, they need to at least have a suspicion; special needs doctrine
 Compulsory DNA testing of convicted felons? Most states say OK

• In MD, even arrestees can be forced to give their DNA.
 See FACTORS GOVERNING ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCHES chart
Midterm will cover consent, but nothing after consent

Schneckloth-consent can be voluntary w/o being knowing; knowing is factor in totality of
circumstances; consent defined as the absence of coersion; D does not have to be told they
have right to withhold consent b/f consent obtained
*can’t extend the time of detention to get your consent b/c consent would flow from illegal
detention (Terry)

Consent
Tuesday, March 01, 2011
10:33 AM
 Consent Searches
o Schneckloth v. Bustamonte- when the ∆ consents to a search, it is valid if it is
voluntary (voluntary if there is absence of coercion)
 A police officer stopped a car containing 6 men when he observed a
traffic violation, headlight out, licesnce plate light out. Asked driver for
license and he did not have one, then officer asked passenger who said
he was owner’s brother if officer could search the car; passenger said,
Sure.
 Found stolen checks under the seat, and charges made against
Bustamonte.
 Issue: What must the state prove to demonstrate consent was voluntary?
 Does defendant have to be told he can refuse consent? Corut: No.
 A search authorized by valid consent may be the only means of
obtaining important and reliable evidence.
 Consent may not be coerced, by explicit or implicit means, by
implied threat or covert force.
 Knowledge of the right to refuse is not dispositive
 Voluntariness for this purpose is absence of coercion- so ∆ doesn’t have
to know he has the right to withhold his consent- it can be considered but
is not dispositive.
 If you told everyone they had the right to refuse, they would refuse.
 What actions did the police take, words did they use, etc. to
demonstrate coercion, or lack thereof.
 The court distinguishes between trial rights and non-trial rights.
 If it goes to a fair trial, then it is more imp than this, innocence or
guilt more important than admissability of evidence
 Also diff from miranda, b/c custodial interrogation situation is more
coercive than consent to search car
 The ∆ does not need to know that he has a right to refuse consent in
order to determine his consent involuntary (although it may be a factor).
 Would a reasonable person feel like they had no choice but to consent?
 We look at the totality of the circumstances, i.e. looking to whether
consent was voluntary:
 Did they indicate to him in some way that he had to consent
◊ Did they use force
◊ Did they show authority/say something that would be forceful
◊ Did they lay their hands on him
 See bottom pg. 450:
◊ Any defenedant that's subject of search….
o Just telling the defendant he can refuse consent would
eliminate this as a defense!
o Bumper v. NC- Went to the house of the ∆’s grandmother. They said they had
a warrant to search, so she let them in. It turns out there was no warrant. The
court held it was not voluntary consent, but mere acquiescence to authority.
 the consent was not “voluntary”
 HYPO: if police says if you don’t let me search, I will get warrant, this is
prob not going to be coersion if they really have PC and could get that
warrant
o When a ∆ is in custody and chooses to give consent- unclear how the US SC

has held. Most courts say voluntary consent can still be given even if in
custody.
 Can you consent when you are under arrest? Cts are split.; need to look
at totality of circumstances
o Consent by Deception (trickery)
 How was the ∆ deceived?
 Can the police obtain entry into a person’s house through false
pretenses?
o The police cannot pose as someone they are not and
gain entry to the house through false pretenses (i.e.
plumber).
o This is distinguished from the case where a ∆ is engaged
in an illegal activity and invites the undercover officer in
to engage in an illegal activity- here the consent is valid
b/c he is invited.
 So it depends on the kind of deception used, b/c
the D “assumed the risk” by inviting police in for
illegal purpose, even if police using deception, it’s
OK, it’s valid, b/c police being invited in for illegal
purpose
 Consent by deception is mostly invalid.
◊ When it's okay: pretend to be someone and invite someone for
unlawful purposes… person who invited him in knew he was
coming in for illegal purposes
◊ When it's not okay: pretend someone and invite someone in
for lawful purposes
 When you look at totality of circumstances to see whether consent was
voluntary, person being under arrest at the time is probably a factor
o Scope of Consent (how far can search go when you consent?)
 Florida v. Jimeno- did the consent given by the ∆ to search the car for
drugs have within it, implicitly, consent to open containers within the car
or did the officer have to obtain a second consent to search those
containers?
 Sometimes. Dependent on whether the ∆ gave consent and what it
meant-
 Two factors:
o 1) What would a reasonable police officer in this position
believe the D authorized him to do?
o 2) The item/container itself.
 Hypo: officer tells D he is looking for shotgun, D consents to search
of car, officer in this situation cannot reasonably believe the D
consented to a search of a small paper bag that contained drugs
under this test, or the glove compartment or something like that.
 BUT if officer just asks D if he can search the car, not telling what he
is looking for, and D says yes, police can look anywhere in the car
(can’t rip up seats though b/c htat is overly intrusive)
 What about a locked suitcase in the trunk? Is this within the general
consent to search in the car? Yes, this is probably w/in the general
consent to search the car, they can open and search a locked
container in the car
 Generally, if officer doesn’t make clear what he will be looking for,
he can look anywhere (probably not though if consenting to search
of car, but cops rip open suitcase)
o Apparent Authority / Third Party Consent
 Matlock-if somebody has the authority b/c of joint ownership, or
possession of prop, or relationship like hub/wife, the 3rd party can

authorize police to search item or location, assuming the person has
authority to give consent to police to engage in the search
 A business can be held to consent if a reasonable person would believe a
person of an agency giving consent is authorized to.
 A third party can consent to a search of your property if that partry has
interest in some connection to allow them to give that consent.
 I.e. if you share an apartment with someone, you can give consent
for them to enter.
 In marriages, the relationship between the parties give the party
who is not the center of the search to give consent to the search.
 Conversely, if you are the owner of the car, but not the driver, you can
consent to a search under the driver’s seat, but not the driver himself.
 Note the importance of the relationship to the area being searched.
o Illinois v. Rodriguez- even where the consent is no longer valid, if the officer
could reasonably believe the individual had authority for consent, the consent is
valid.
 Girl didn’t have authority at the time because she broke up with defendant
and doesn’t live there
 Had she lived there at the time she gave consent, she could have
 Court: still authorized search because reasonableness of the officers
 Rationale: she had apparent authority because she referred to it as
"our apartment" and she had the key. A reasonable police officer
would think she had authority.
 Apparent authority
 Stoner v. CA-hotel clerk gave permission for po. To search D’s
room; did clerk have actual authority to search the room? No, b/c if
you rent room in hotel, you are not giving clerk right to search it, but
it would be diff if cleaning lady found something in plain view and
turned it over to police b/c cleaning lady would have actual authority.
o Ct came up with concept of apparent authority-but Ct
said it did not apply here, b/c police officer could not
reasonably believe that clerk could consent to the
search.
 In Rodriquez-ex girlfriend beat by D; had keys to the house; she let police
in to his house and they saw cocaine in plain view. She had keys still and
language implied it was her place so police thought they entered lawfully;
the D challenged the lawful entry b/c no actual authority, but state argued
that she had apparent authority
 The real issue is whether the police had consent such that the plain view
rule could apply and they could seize the cocaine?
 Common Authority Test- rests on use of the mutual property by persons
generally having join access or contol for most purposes.
 Here, she had moved out a month before the search at issue- so she
does not have actual authority. However, in this situation, a reasonable
police officer could reasonably believe that she did have consent because
she has clothing, a key, and referred to it as “our” apartment.
 When it’s a 4th Amendment issue, its always a question of
reasonableness
 Principle of Apparent Authority- does the 3rd party have actual
authority based on their relationship to the target of the search or
the premises or item of the search? IF NO, then the next question is:
would a reasonable police officer reasonably believe that 3d party
had actual authority? If so, then the consent is ok.
o Stoner v. California
 A hotel, even though it owns the room, can NOT give consent to search
the guests’ rooms

o Relationships:
 Hub/wife-almost always they can give consent to a search for the other,
not even just in common areas, but in any area; in case where wife gave
consent to search gym on prop she never went into, consent still valid
(almost going to be okay)
 One exception: wife says search OK, locked briefcase in drawer
labeled with his name, this might pose a problem b/c it is SO
obviously just his property
 A landlord cannot consent to a search of his tenant’s premises.
 Parent/child
 Parent can almost always give consent for search of child’s
room/possessions
 What about child authorizing search of parents? Minor child cannot
consent to search of parents property, but can let police in and if
police see something in plain view, it’s admissable; if child over 18,
can consent to search of common areas, usually parents room too
 Co-tenants-can consent to search of other roommate room, but can’t
authorize search of belongings in that room if its not theirs (court
examines relationship and the bedroom, e.g. was door locked? Did she
just move in?)
 Employer/Employee-ER can’t give authority to search EE desk, but can
let police in to just look at office
 Limits on 3rd party consent-hub says search wife’s stuff, I can’t stand her,
lock her up, it would depend on totality of circumstances
 Georgia v. Randolph
o Limit of 3rd party consent
o "Yes" and "No" to search
o The husband did not consent to search of the house for drugs, but the wife did.
They seized drugs upstairs in the bedroom which were in plain view.
o This was an invalid consent search- where people living together disagree over
the use of their common quarters, a resolution must come through voluntary
accommodation. The non-consenting party who is present must be honored.
 Court looks at reasonableness.
 The more reasonable person honors the individual who says no.
 Ct looks at it like any guest—if one person tells the guest no, can’t enter,
and one person tells the guest yes, can enter, the reas. guest would not
enter, so police should act the same way
 Where there is a parent and child, and child says no, cops will probably
go with parent. Where a spouse is beating on the husband who is saying
no, the cops probably can search there too.
o HYPO: The non-consenting party is not there. Police actually plan it that way
b/c they know he would not consent. The police may accept the consent of the
wife to enter and search b/c non-consenting party is there.
 If police ask hub consent, he says no, and then leaves house, police
approach house 10 secs later and wife consents, randolph would control?
If one party is not there, then probably too bad for the defendant who
would have sayid no.
 Consent can be withdrawn at any time and police must leave
 Hoffa v. United States
o Jimmy Hoffa-connected to organized crime/mob
o Hoffa had a trial and jury was hung; evidence that Hoffa tampered w/ the jury;
so there was a new trial; Partin was in mob too and was in trouble for an
unrelated offense, so he worked with govt to inform on Hoffa about
conversations they had in Hoffa’s hotel about the jury tampering
o Hoffa argued this was an illegal search: Partin’s entry in hotel for the purpose

of informing on him was deception; he had expectation of privacy in the private
hotel room
o Ct said key was that Hoffa did not rely on the privacy of the hotel room, he was
relying on the privacy of his conversation with Partin; post-Katz, if you both
share the conversation, either you assume the risk it can be communicated to
govt or either party can give it away under property analysis
 No interest legitimately protected by the 4th Amendment is involved
because petitioner was not relying upon the security of his hotel suite-
Partin was in the suite by invitation. Instead, the petitioner was relying
upon his misplaced confidence that Partin would not reveal his
wrongdoing. He assumed the risk because he voluntarily told the
information to Partin when he voluntarily invited Partin into his hotel room.
 A misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his
wrongdoing will not reveal a protection.
 Wasn’t so much entry into hotel room that was problem
o If D let’s govt informant in to discuss illegal activity, this is consent for an illegal
purpose, like the D inviting someone in for a drug deal is diff from police posing
as plumber
o D argued due process-
 D argued that if govt violates sense of justice/shocks conscience, then the
evidence should not be admissable; ct said it was for jury to decide
credibility of the informant
o Dissent: this type of informer undermines the integrity of the truth-finding
process.
 United States v. White
o Police gave informant wire to wear
o Ct says if we let police use informant like in Hoffa, we might as well let them
wear a wire to get the info accurate
o Dissent and defense say that this has chilling effect on all human interaction if
you know anyone talking to you can have wire on and police can hear; will be a
detriment to free society
o Ct decides that there is no difference btwn under agent reporting back on
convo or having govt record convo; the wire makes no difference;
o Where one party consents to convo, it’s not a 4th Am vio regardless of means
used to communicate the info to the govt
o By discussing something with another person, that is giving up the right to
expectation of privacy of the conversation.
 Doesn’t mean an individual can be wiretapped. Unless a 3rd party gives
up his consent.
MidTerm Exam
I. (discuss admissibility of A, B, & C, and do it in order)
II. Most important thing is spotting each issue on his exam
III. 60 minutes

Network Surveillance
2:14 PM
Network Surveillance
-person has expectation of privacy in computer; if you hook into network like school, you
maintain expectation of privacy in emails or sites visited, unless operator of network informs you
they are monitoring you, then there is no expectation of privacy; in a business, no 4th Am
protection, b/c 4th Am only protects govt action, so only if you work for govt; statutes limit
businesses
If they tell you we are monitoring your emails, you have no reasonable expectation of privacy?
Historical roots:
Wiretapping
 Olmstead v. United States- pre-Katz
o Wiretapping D’s phone did not constitute a 4th Amendment search.
o Ct says diff btwn phone convo and sealed ltrs; govt only listening to their words- no
trespassing- and because a word is not a thing, you are not searching it; it is not a
tangible property effect (this was back when 4th Am protected property, pre-Katz)
o Katz & Berger
 Federal gov’t and a number of states began to experiment with the use of
various wiretapping techniques; state statutes limited what police could do;
after Katz ct took a look at if these statutes were const under katz
 Berger
 First statute to authorize government wiretapping.
 Ct said NY wiretapping law did not provide sufficient protection- it did not
make clear which particular conversation the gov’t had a right to listen to
so they could listen to as much as they wanted to, did not ID the crime the
conversation implicated (lack of PC, particularity requirements in warrant
requirement); police could listen for 60 days, could easily get a renewal,
no requirement to stop the tap after the key conversation was heard, and
finally there was no requirement to tell the ∆ what convos were tapped
and why.
 NY statute was unconstitutional
 Now, the warrantless interception of telephone calls normally will violate the 4th
Amendment absent special circumstances such as consent to monitoring.
 OMNIBUS CRIME CONTROL ACT-Title 3 (18 USC § 510)- the portion that deals with
nonconsensual communications (think wiretapping)
o Protects above and beyond the 4th Amendment.
o If states want to wiretap, the state must have a statute that provides at least as much
protection as Title 3.
o When does Title 3 apply?
 Applies only to protect non-consensual interceptions of recorded conversations
(no party consents to recording)
 If one party consents, then no problem
 In MD, statute says that all parties must consent (more protective)in order
for there to be a recording
 ONLY affects wire oral conversations
 N/A to video tapes w/ no sound
o If the gov’t comes in and sets up a video camera to monitor,
that does NOT violate title 3 because it’s not oral; would still
implicate 4th
 N/A to Pen registers: gov’t keeping track of the numbers you dial on your
phone does not deal with title 3.
o There are special designations within the title as to who can get Title 3 orders or

warrants- but not just any police officer can.
o How do you comply with Title 3?
 Need to file an application (like an affidavit for search warrant purposes) that
must detail the nature of the crime, the facility to be taped, the type of
communication sought, the identity of the party to be tapped, and ALL
applications must say there was no other safe and reasonable procedure that
could have been tried and was not.
 Govt must detail type of info seeking, ID of targeted party, what PC you
have that convo will take place; must be statement in every wire tap app
that no other reas means could have produced the same info
 Think of this as a last resort for law and order.
 Judge signs off on app and issues order; the order provides the rules and limits
under which the gov’t must operate in order to conduct the wiretap.
 Can only intercept “relevant convos”: meaning it goes to what the PC
went to
 No exact rules about when the wiretap specifically needs to be turned
off… just when it’s reasonable
 Until the officer is certain the purpose of the conversation doesn’t deal
with the crime, then the officer doesn’t have to turn it off.
 Think, small talk.
 If ppl using a code, police can decifer the code, and continue to listen
 Police need to stop listening when they get the info they seek
 The termination date must occur when either the key conversation has been
heard or the end of 30 days at the most.
 If you want to renew the tap order, you must get a new order with a new
application showing that there is PC to believe a NEW call will come in.
 After the conversation is over, you must notify the party about the tap and
inventory the contents (transcribe); if investigation ongoing, might not be
required to notify the party that they are going to keep wiretapping them
 There’s an exigency exception
 Plainview rule applies to defendant airing other crimes
o Remedies for Title 3 violations:
 When Title 3 is violated, the information cannot be used at all! Not even in
grand jury, sentencing, civil cases, this is diff from exclusionary rule
 E.g. if spouse records other spouse to show he’s been fooling around, it
violates title 3 and MD wiretap statute. Remedy: can’t be used at all.
 It applies to public AND private parties and the information cannot be used for
any purpose.
 When title 3 is violated, there are civil and criminal penalties that result
 The person can go to jail.
 There is not a good faith exception.
o Differences in MD w/ the MD Wire Tap Order
 One party consent to the tap is not good enough; both parties must know.
 No expectation of privacy in cordless phones- it goes through an intermediary and the gov’t can
thus get a hold of it; now the technology is encrypted so govt cant listen in any longer
 Expectation of privacy in cell phone conversations
 Generally have an expectation of privacy in stored email.
 Smith v. Maryland
o Once you give up your expectation of privacy to one entity, you give it up to
everybody, e.g. giving up your phone call record to the telecom
o Using a pen registry recorded by the phone company that was submitted to the
police, the police discovered ∆ was calling and harassing the woman he robbed and
used the pen register records to nail him.
o D assumed the risk-Once you reveal the numbers you are dialing to the phone

company, and you should realize that b/c of constructive notice that the numbers are
on your bill, then you have given it up to the govt as well; no expectation of privacy in
the phone numbers you dial.
o So basically, the government can always yank your phone registry.
 No expectation of privacy in a mail cover.
 United States v. Forrester
o Pen register case applied to info transmitted through ISPs; ISPs have access to your
IP addresses where you send emails and the sites you visit; and so you have no
expectation of privacy
o Dictum-URL, particular page on site may have 4th Am protection, but just the sites
you access and email addresses you receive and send, not protected by privacy
interests
o BUT content of those emails is protected privacy
o Here, NO search because no content.
 Internet users must rely on 3rd party equipment to engage in communication.
 The IP addresses do not necessarily reveal any more about the underlying
contents of communication.
 This is different from URLs, which identifies the particular documents
viewed within a website.
o Mail has even less protection than phone.
US v US dist ct. broader discretion with permission of FISA judge. FISA order must be directed
at a foreign power or agent must show:
- Parties involved are the kinds of parties that threatened the US.
- Other stuff
- NOT TESTED
SEARCH AND SEIZURE DONE

22-Oct-08
Review:
-finished search and seizure for awhile; will still be on final b/c always comes up
-Hoffa-no 4th Am protection in conversation if someone consents to tell police about it, no
significance that the informant was wired
-Network surveillance-Olmstead-not a seizure b/c not tangible; changed with Katz
-Berger-wiretapping statute lacked particularity, invalid
-Title3-wiretap statute; regs wiretapping; provides protection for indiv from being wiretapped
above and beyond the 4th Am; for it to apply, must be interception of oral communication (not
video) AND must be nonconsensual (if either party consents to the tap, then title 3 is n/a-not
difference in MD); conforming to title 3-fill in from outline-app, order equivalent of warrant which
has minimization requirements, inventoried, remedies-more severe than 4th Am violations under
exclusionary rule
-Smith v. MD-pen registers; not a search b/c all revelaed is #s person dials and not contents of
convo over the phone; and b/c you are on constructive notice that the phone co. has these
records and that they could share it w/ govt at any time
-forester-same thing w/ computers; email addresses, ip numbers, no expectation of privacy, but
privacy in content of your emails

Confessions
2:14 PM
Confession
 Evidentiary significance of certain terms
o Statement- anything that defendant says
o Admission-anything that defendant says which may be inculpatory; “I was there, but
did not shoot”;
 any statement that partially inculpates someone or can be interpreted as
partially involving them in a criminal activity
o Confession-you tell police you committed every element of the crime
 = a statement and an admission which tell the police enough to give them
probable cause to arrest you.
 If a confession is allowed, so is a statement and an admission.
 This is because a lot of times, those exculpatory statements are really
helpful to the prosecutor.
 For constitutional purposes, the rules are same for statements, admissions, and
confessions
 Four ways to challenge/attack statements by defendants
o 5th Amendment
 “classic coersion/compulsion”-beating statement out of D
 Can even mean not allowing to go to bathroom, etc.
o 5th Am-Miranda specifically
o 6th Am-Denied the right to council
o 4th Amendment- illegal search or seizure (flowing from a 5th/6th violation)
 Dunaway case: defendant picked up and under full seizure, without probable
cause, seizure was violation and confession flowing therefrom was illegal.
 History of Confessions in the United States
o Initial approach: “Reliability”
 In old days, statements could be beaten out of someone so long as it could be
shown to be “reliable.”
 Reliability could be shown by extrinsic evidence.
 Constitutional Protection of Due Process- unfair to use a statement poven to be
unreliable.
o “Police Method” Analysis
 Even if statement “reliable,” would not allow statement in if extracted by
“coersion”
 If the method was so outrageous then the statement could not come in
regardless of its reliability.
 Became tougher when police started using “psychological” methods
 Ex: bright lights in eyes, isolation, good cop/bad cop
 Polygraphs-prof says they are junk
o 5th amendment
 Prevents a person from being a witness against himself
 The trilema: on the stand, I did it = guilty, I didn't do it = perjury, I'm not talking =
implied guilt
 6th amendment? Guarantees right to counsel, used to only be when
prosecution began
 Ashcraft
 44 hour interrogation too long to be reliable.
 McNabb-Mallory Rule

o Federal statute says you have to bring D b/f magistrate in certain amt of time; police
didn’t do it in time; in the interim, D’s made voluntary confessions
o SCOTUS suppressed the confessions
o NOT under const, rather under fed statute, so the decision was not binding on the
states
o BUT a handful of states adopted the same rule willingly; still GOOD LAW at fedl level
 MD: where D is not brought to mag within reasonable period of time, that's only
one factor in determining whether statement is admissible.
 Only applies to Fed Courts
 Right to Counsel
 Crooker v. California-
o Not entitled to counsel in a police station, refers more to court
o 6th Amendment- in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to
counsel.
o D attended 1 year of law school, when he was talking to the police, he was aware of
his right to remain silent and specifically requested to contact his lawyer, which the
police denied; eventually confession
o He argued his right to counsel was violated; his confession should be barred
although voluntary.
o Ct knows that atty will tell client to shut up; said this would preclude police
interrogation; keeps the confession in
o Ct said right to counsel does not apply til trial begins based on lang of 6th Am
 Holding: in police station, where D arrested, and where he knows his right to be silent, he
has no right to counsel even though he asks for, and police can continue to question him
 Cicencia v. La Gay- D asked for atty; lawyer was at the station and asked to see the ∆; right to
counsel has not happened yet b/c not trial yet; 6th Am does not apply yet to protect the D
o Extended holding of Crooker even when D is not sophisticated.
 Spano v. New York- dicta-first indication that 6th Am applies b/f trial; maybe “all crim
prosecutions” means b/f trial
 REMEMBER: RIGHT TO COUNSEL BEGINS WHEN CHARGES ARE BROUGHT
FORMALLY TO DEFENDANT (see below)
 **Massiah v. United States**
o Landmark case
o D indicted on federal drug violation; he called for lawyer, pled not guilty, was
released on bail; he then got into a car with a co-∆ who (unbeknownst to Massiah)
had agreed to cooperate with the police. While in the car, Massiah made
incriminating statements which the state tried to use at trial.
 4th amendment violation? Remember Katz. Once someone releases this
information by talking to someone else, they no longer have a reasonable
expectation of privacy so it’s not an illegal search or seizure.
o The state said there was no compulsion here.
o The court held that this was a completely extrajudicial police-orchestrated
proceeding and he was denied the basic protections of the right to counsel when this
was used against him at his trial. It’s decisive that he made his statements after he
had been indicted because the right to counsel attaches after one is engaged in
adversarial proceedings.
 He couldn’t have been expected to keep up his guard like that because he had
no idea they were trying to get a statement from him.
o 5th Amendment- protects you from compulsory self-incrimination- but the 6th
Amendment has no such requirement- so the lack of compulsion has no relation to
what is being done here.
o HOLDING: Once D is protected by 6th Amendment (indicted/arraigned), the
police are forbidden from “deliberately eliciting” a statement from the D w/o
affording him the right to counsel; any statement obtained cannot be admitted
against D in criminal trial.
 Indictment and arraignment (arraignment is the other method)… if

government deliberately elicits a statement during this stage, this is 6th
amendment territory
 Indictment is formal process for charging someone w/ crime once
grand jury has convened; alternatively,
 Arraignment-person arrested and arraigned (no grand jury);
arraignment is first appearance in ct;
 what SCOTUS holds here is that “formal judicial process” begins
when D indicted or arraigned
 Arrest DOES NOT trigger 6th Am
 When one is protected by 6th Amendment- the 6th Amendment is NOT triggered by arrest.
o When one has been indicted or arraigned or the formal judicial process has begun
 Indictment- when a grand jury sits and hears cases and decides there is
enough information to charge an individual with a crime
 Arraignment- when a person is brought before a magistrate and please guilty or
not guilty
 Formal judicial process- a little fuzzy b/c each state starts the process
differently.
 His exam- the 6th Amendment will never commence by this idea of
beginning formal judicial process
 Sometimes D is indicted before arrested… 6th amendment starts when he's
indicted. NOT TRIGGERED BY ARREST.
 Cannon 9:
 Designed for civil cases… attorney cannot speak to adverse client without client's attorney
being there.
 Escobedo v. Illinois
o D’s brother-in-law was fatally shot; did not talk and was released; retained atty; next
day other suspect implicates the D; D was picked up again and requested his
attorney; the attorney arrived at the police station and tried unsuccessfully to speak
to his client while D also asking for his atty; after a confrontation arranged by the
police between the other suspect and D, D implicated himself in the murder
o Holding: When the process shifts from investigatory to accusatory- when its focus is
on the accused and its purpose is to elicit a confession- our adversary system begins
to operate, and , under the circumstances here, the accused must be permitted to
consult with his lawyer.
o Not good law, but never overturned. Merely confined to it’s facts which are a
“jumble”; not a landmark case like Massiah
 He was arrested, so 6th Am has not kicked in yet; BUT Ct applies 6th Am in this
case even though he was not indicted/arraigned yet, b/c he was focus of
investigation at the time and requested and denied counsel, and police diverted
counsel from him, 6th Am applied to him
 Why? police exploited the situation-they exposed him to his co-D and they
turned on eachother; Ct said there was something wrong with this
o This case is limited to the facts, so ignore this case.
 Malloy v. Hogan
o Ct begins to think in terms of what compulsory self incrim means other than being on
witness stand; does it apply in police station?
 Thus we come to Miranda
o Both statutory (not really) and a US SC decision.
o Similar to Brown b/c looks to other disciplines like sociology/psychology, which
played imp role in segregation
27-Oct-08
Review:
-confessions/admissions/statements-can be suppressed under 5th Am/14th Am-DP, classic
coersion; 5th-miranda; 6th-right to counsel; illegal search/seizure that led to confession under 4th

-statements no admitted if police coersion
-lead to psycho methods to get statement
-mcnabb/mallory-ct held when fedl statute that said D needs to be in front of magis in reas time,
and if made confession if statute not complied with, the confession suppressed; no in MD, just in
fedl ct
-6th Am-right to counsel-as applied to statements made by D in which ct expressed skepticism
about right to counsel
-massiah-where govt deliberately elicits statement from D after he’s in 6th Am country-
indicted/arraigned (not arrested) by informant even, this violates 6th Am right to counsel;
statement inadmissable
-escobido-does not matter if not arraigned/indicted yet, but forget it b/c it is a case limited to its
own facts; D is only in 6th Am when he is indicted/arraigned, not mere arrest/custody.
-Miranda-landmark case

Miranda & 6th Amendment
Thursday, March 17, 2011
10:29 AM
Miranda
 Miranda is a 5th Amendment case-right ag self incrimination
o Up until that point, the cases like Miranda had been decided as 6th Amendment
cases (right to counsel)
o 6th Amendment- applies when someone is indicted or arraigned…. Not when
someone is arrested
o Miranda not indicted/arraigned, so the 5th is applied- one does not have to testify
against oneself.
o When Miranda talks about the 5th amendment, it talks about the right to counsel
being implied into the language of self-incrimination
o So, 5th amendment now:
 The nature of custodial interrogation is inherently coercive b/c of isolating the ∆, separating him,
surrounding him by the police.  revolution #1
o There is compulsion present every single time a D is in custody
o This happens all the time. This means the instant he is sequestered there is natural
coercion.
o Even if Miranda is not technically a witness, the fact that what he says will be used
later in court, then it’s like he is being a witness against himself. One can be a
witness against oneself.  revolution #2
 The “inherent coercive nature” (b/c person all alone, anxious) of the custodial interrogation
makes it such that a person cannot protect their 5th Amendment right ag. self-incrim w/o the
right to have an attorney present.  novel holding #1
o Applies ONLY in a “custodial interrogation”
 CUSTODY: Same definition as “full-blown seizure” under 4th –would
“reasonable person feel freedom restrained in significant way?”
 Factors for custody same as 4th limited seizure becoming “full-blown seizure”
 Take you somewhere else, is it private interrogation room, how many
police, told free to leave, if police intent to get you to consent to search
 Custody ALWAYS applies self-incrimination compulsion clause
 Interogation ALWAYS applies self-incrimination witness clause
 Hypo: If police knock on your door and ask you something, then you don’t need
Miranda, b/c you are not in “custodial interrogation”
 Holding: when D in custody, and he is being interrogated, and statement/admission/
confession govt wants to use as evidence in case in chief, before they can use, they
must show D was given 4 Miranda warnings, and that he made knowing, intelligent,
voluntary waiver of rights given under those warnings
o 4 warnings: (prof takes judicial notice that we know all 4 warnings from law & order)
 right to remain silent, anything he says can be held against him, he has the
right to counsel, and if he cannot afford it, it will be afforded to him, do you
understand the rights?
o Everyone gets ALL 4 rights each time- never presume they know the rights
 Bright line rule-if police doesn’t tell bill gates that atty will be provided if he can’t
afford it, then confession OUT
o If a ∆ is not asked a question, then it is not an interrogation. One must be in custody
and be interrogated for Miranda to apply and for a statement to be inadmissible.
 It must be in response to a question posed by police that related to crime
 Hypo: this can come in w/o Miranda even if D in custody-what do you want for
lunch? Anything but poison I gave my wife
 No miranda because the question was not meant to illicit a response.
o Not: all statements inadmissable w/o Miranda warning

o Ct says custodial situation still coersive after Miranda rights, but at least it’s a break
o If D waives rights and then changes mind and invoke the right again, police need to
stop questioning him
o Govt has burden to prove D waived the rights
 Silence by itself does not constitute a waiver- he must indicate in some way
that he understands those rights and is willing to give them up.
 Here, signing a paper might be needed, or repeating that he is aware of
the rights, but mere silence is not waiver
 Police can’t trick him into waiving the rights, but once he waives the right, then
they can trick him
 e.g. cop, after D waives his rights, says we have your fingerprints even
though they don’t, courts much more willing to allow admission of D's
statement.
o To be valid, waiver must be “intelligent, knowing, voluntary”
 Intelligent basically means knowing; this is just a phrase, not dictionary
definition of the words
 Doesn’t mean the D was “intelligent” to confess what they did, it’s usually
stupid to do that
 Just did he understand basically.
o Waiver is a “subjective” determination (not “objective” like custody).
 Not based on r.p.p., but ON THIS D
 Factors like personal characteristics, intoxication, young, etc. are IMP
 BUT generally Ct looks at what the police think—as long as he is not totally
drunk, cracked out, mentally incompetent, its going to be valid (based on later
cases)
 Doesn’t matter if it’s an alibi or an inculpatory statement- can’t use them w/out Miranda.
 Analysis:
o Does Miranda apply?
 Was he in custody? (number of officers, how long detained, what time of night,
location, etc.)
 Was he interrogated?
 If no, Miranda does not apply
 If yes, did police conform to Miranda?
 4 warnings?
 Knowing intelligent voluntary waiver?
 "Intelligent" = knowingly
 Is the state trying to introduce the statement into evidence.
 If did not comply, what is the remedy?
 Police can’t use statement against D in case in chief
 PPL furious about Miranda-dissent and law enforcement community believed this would stop
confessions- although it hasn’t really. Miranda has become basically statutory.
 Omnibus statute-congress said certain holdings of ct were not valid; including Miranda (basically
overturning it)-said all confessions which were voluntary are admissable; but no one in DOJ
tried to use this act b/c it was legally disrespected, then came Dickerson
Dickerson
 Tried to use the omnibus act to get in a confession that violated Miranda, but complied with the
omnibus
o Big Issue: will ct enforce the omnibus or miranda?
 Dickerson made a statement in custodial interrogation and it was found inadmissible. He had
been indicted for some incriminating statements made at an FBI field office. The 4th Circuit
Court of Appeals found that § 3501 had been satisfied even though no Miranda warnings and so

his statement could be admitted.
 Went up to SCOTUS
 Ct had eroded Miranda, and Rehnquist disparaged Miranda, so ppl thought it would overturn
Miranda, he wrote the maj opinion, and did not overturn it
 Issue: Is Miranda const decision?
o If no, then legis can overturn it
o BUT if yes, then SCOTUS ultimate interpreter of CONST, supreme law of land
 Holding: Miranda WAS a const decision, it was based on 5th Am, said so in case and applied to
state cts for yrs and yrs
 Also part of the reason they do not overrule it is pragmatics:
o Rehnquist-pragmatist-cares about real results
o Scalia-principalist-original intent of framers imp
 Stare decisis:
o Miranda is embedded in our culture (on movies, tv, books) and to wrench it from the
criminal justice system would do more harm than good.
 No constitutional rule is immutable- just because they have altered the way they have looked at
it does not mean it is being divested of its constitutional underpinning.
 Scalia dissent-SCOTUS did not apply Miranda, weakened Miranda and undercut Miranda as
const holding many times, even said it was not const holding, it just created prophylactic
protections
 So basically, upheld miranda and all the cases that under cut it, all const, all good law
29-Oct-08
Review
-Miranda-rev #1-priv ag self incrim which requires compulsion, that compulsion was present
EVERY time there was custodial interrogation; rev#2-5th Am applies even at police station, not
just on witness stand, b/c officer in ct will later use your testimony in ct; applies when D in
custody and interrogated; same factors for custody as full blown seizure; AND interrogation-will
look at today-the question relates to the crime; if Miranda applies, how to police adhere? Police
must give D 4 miranda rights EVERY time and D must knowingly, intell, voluntarily waive the
rights (more than silence, but not much) b/f any statement can be used in crim trial; D can stop
at any time and police must honor his right to silence or counsel even if previously waived
-Dickerson-reaffirmed Miranda const holding, applies to states, the congressional statute that
tried to overturn Miranda was unconst b/c Miranda was unconst and congress can’t overturn a
const decision by ct (Marbury); const b/c states always followed it and stare decisis-its
embedded in our culture; the opinions that eroded it though are all still good law too.
The Miranda Erosion Cases- how the Court makes sure to limit Miranda
 The undercutting and redefining of Miranda
o Miranda v. Tucker-defense wanted to exclude witness testimony whose ID police
learned about in violation of Miranda; talked about profilactic rights; Miranda might be
other than const
 Duckworth v. Eagan
o ∆ was suspected of murder and the police took him to the station for questioning.
While there, they read him a waiver, the key language was “you can have an atty, if
you can’t afford one, you will be appointed one if and when you go to court.”
 Technically, counsel won’t come to police station, the police just have to stop
questioning when you ask for counsel under Miranda
o Holding: the warning was close enough- it touched all the bases of Miranda. Miranda
doesn’t mean you actually get lawyer in the police station- only that you have the
right to one if the police decide to question you.
 Officer INTENT imp:
 Was he deliberately trying to trick the D to get a confession?
 To violate Miranda, warnings must be so misleading, creating such a

misunderstanding, that the D could not understand his rights.
 The police do not need to be given the warning words EXACTLY
 EXAMPLE of deceptive warning:
 “What you say can be used for or against you.” Deceptive because a ∆
probably can’t help himself by making a statement; Cts have held that is
intentionally deceptive and will throw the statement OUT
o Testing adequacy of the warnings:
 If court believes officer was not deliberately misleading the D
 Even if the court is convinced not misleading, if the info is so confusing that one
would reaosnably misunderstand the miranda warnings…
o If officer says a statement can be used FOR D, that is automatically invalid.
o Analysis:
 4 warnings exactly?
 Intent of officer?
 Was it so misleading that D would not understand the rights?
 Florida v Powell:
 Holding: warnings were enough even though they werent the clearest way of saying it. If
D likely believed to not be deliberately misled and even there wasn’t, misunderstanding is
not so fundamental that person would be confused… miranda warnings are probably okay
 Colorado v. Spring
o D arrested for a firearm violation
o He was mirandized and questioned and waived re: the firearms transactions, then
they started asking him if he ever shot someone-he admitted that he had shot
someone once.
o Later, the same officers questioned him again and he admitted he was involved in
murder, was convicted of that murder.
o D agmt: the first waiver was not valid since the police didn’t inform him of the full
extent of the investigation, he thought they were just investigating illegal firearms and
it went into a murder investigation; SO the second confession should not be
admissable b/c fruit of the poisonous tree
o Holding: his first confession waiver was knowing and intelligent; he doesn’t have to
be advised of the content and extent of the investigation for waiver to be knowing
and voluntary waiver (“ANYTHING you say can be used against you”); “you don’t
have to know every possible consequence” of talking.
o So, if you waive your rights, you waive them… unless the interrogation goes on for a
very long time or other stuff (see below)
 Miranda Test:
o Does Miranda apply?
 When there is both custody and interrogation.
o If it applies, what do the police have to do to comply with it’s requirements?
 They give the warnings and get a voluntary and intelligent waiver
o What happens if they don’t comply?
 Sometimes the statements are repressed.
o Begin with custody (when you are restrained such that a reasonable person would
feel his freedom is restrained in a significant way).
o Beckwith v. US
 IRS came to interview ∆ at home. They gave him a modified Miranda warning.
He gave incriminating statements.
 He argued for need for full warnings because he was clearly focus of the
investigation (think Escobedo). Focus doesn’t trigger miranda… custody does.
 Holding: Miranda defines focus as being after one is taken into custody. He
was never taken into custody so the focus wasn’t on him.
 It was IRS, not police; it was at home, not station.
 Notes:
 Not custodial to be subpoenaed in grand jury, to be in traffic stop w/

police (terry)
o Stansbury v. CA
 Definition of custody: would a reasonable person believe his freedom was
restrained in a significant way?
 Objective inquiry: the knowingly stuff for waiver is subjective.
 Reaffirms what custody means, similar to full blown seizure
 Imp when the police have not formally arrested, cuffed you, if not, you
have to go through these factors
 Custody is an objective test- what a reasonable person in the ∆’s position
would think. So an officer’s evolving but unarticulated suspicions do not affect
the objective circumstances of an interrogation or interview, and thus cannot
affect the Miranda custody inquiry.
 When dealing with an inquiry, the subjective intent or feelings of the
officer shouldn’t matter UNLESS they are communicated or manifested in
some way.
o LOCATION: one of the factors that determines custody
 You are questioned in the police station- more intense than at a home.
 doesn’t mean that every time you’re in the station, you’re in custody and
every time at home, you’re not.
o Other factors:
 Number of police
 Time of day-late at night indicates custody
 Was D told free to leave
 Did police move the D for questioning
 Interrogation room
 Police intent-Did police want to get a confession from you
o Texas
 Even in your home looking at the tot of circumstances, look at factors in
determining custody.
o California case
 Police station can be non-custodial and home can be custodial.
o Bealer
 Even where D is accompanied by police, and told he's free to go, and other
factors… not custodial?
 Reread.
o Minnesota v. Murphy- privilege against self-incrimination is self-executing regarding
questioning by a probation officer.
 He was reporting to his PO (he had committed rape and murder years earlier).
There is a duty to respond honestly to one’s PO. Self-incrimination issue.
 Probation means you don’t go to jail, but you are on probation and can go
if you violate, there are other conditions on it
 Issue: he should have been given Miranda to protect his rights in questioning
by PO
 Argument #1: The PO is like a cop = custodial setting? Court says no.
 Argument #2: The law requires him to answer the PO’s questions- and this
involves his 5th Amendment right ag self incrim; EXCEPT-D must invoke those
rights, they are not self-executing; Murphy could have asserted himself, but did
not, it’s on him, not the police to invoke.
 Non-custodial interogation
o Yarborough v. Alvarado
 17 ½ year old ∆ helped another person steal a truck and shoot someone;
parents brought him to the police station for questioning; he was separated
from his parents into a small room and questioned for 2 hours without being
given his Miranda warnings. He eventually admitted to helping steal the truck
and aiding in the murder of the driver.

 SCOTUS-this was OK, not custodial situation
 Some factors weigh toward, others against custody.
 Reas person feels free to leave, factors:
o Police did not transport him, he came on own
o Not threatened
o Placed under arrest
o Not target of investigation b/c police focused on another’s
crimes
o Parents waited in lobby, implied would not be there long
o Offered to take a break
o He left after the questioning
 What factors showed custody
o Brought by parents not on his own technically
o Parents not present during interview, told not allowed
o 2 hr questioning is long (think Terry-seconds)
 What about his age?
o D agmt: Youth is objective—you can tell youth by looking at
the person, police don’t need to guess; it should matter and
affect the custody determination
o Ct says age does not factor; its just based on the rpp feel… a
purely objective standard; But this was close to 18, so if much
younger, the ct might disagree
o Age is a subjective factor and it plays no role
Interrogation
 Generally: Miranda doesn’t protect against administrative questions. It covers questions
about the crime.
o Rhode Island v. Innis
 Patrolmen arrested ∆, suspected of robbing and shooting a taxicab driver;
mirandized and asked to speak to a lawyer; while he was in the back of the
patrol car, the officers discussed the danger a missing gun could pose to
handicap children in the area; D obviously felt bad and started talking—told
them where the gun was and the gun was admitted as evidence  convicted of
murder.
 So wasn’t a question and wasn’t directed at D
 D agmt: he was clearly in custody; and the remark about the kids was an
interrogation, and it was improper after he invoked his miranda rights
 Ct said it was not interrogation
 Holding: Court finds this is not interrogation b/c there was no express
questioning. Not reasonably likely to evoke a response from the suspect.
 Definition of interrogation (still now):
 Interrogation=words or actions on part of police, that they should
have known, to be reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response
o express questioning or its functional equivalent.
o Its both an Objective &Subjective Test
 Whether a R police officer would know (objective) his or her words would
likely evoke a response from the suspect (subjective)- but he would only
know this if he knew of the particular sensitivities of the suspect (objective
again)
 What factors go to police should have known?
o Evidence in record that police knew he had a handicapped
child (not here)
o Or if he was unusually upset at time of arrest, this would push
him over the edge (not here)

 If you don’t have direct question posed to D, it could be words or actions, it can
still be interrogation under this case
 Actions example-putting kilo of coke in front of D and saying the other guy
said the was yours, and he starts talking
 Interrogation is direct questioning about crime, and its functional equivalent (so
above… e.g. believe reasonably likely to elicit…)
 Two areas to look at:
 Reasonably likely part
 Would the target be susceptible to some reasponse, e.g. father of a
handicapped child and they knew this
 South Dakota v Neville
 Asking D if he wishes to take a test for DUI… if D says no, police are allowed to use that
refusal as evidence of a crime…
 Court: not a violation of Miranda, falls outside Miranda.
 Theoretically, every drunk person wouldn’t be able to competently waive their rights.
 Arizona v. Mauro
o It is not custodial interrogation within the meaning of Miranda for the police to accede
to the request of a ∆’s wife to speak with the ∆ in the presence of a police officer who
had placed a tape recorder in plain sight. The intent of the officer is unclear and
doesn’t show that she was being sent in with the purpose of eliciting incriminating
statements. And it’s not improper that an officer be present in the room.
o But to us, putting the wife in the room with the D, the police probably think something
incriminating is going to happen
o Factors weigh ag custodial interrogation:
 Wife asked to go in, police said not a good idea
 Tape recorded in plain sight
 Told it was going to be recorded
 Officer did nothing wrong
o So begin w/ definition of interrogation, but ct will also look at what that particular
officer did (officer did nothing wrong)
o Court is giong to look at whether detective is intentionally trying to mislead.
 Key here: no overt govt. pressure.
Review:
Duckworth v. Eagan-misleading 4 warnings about atty to D; but warning touched all bases of
Miranda; was not deliberately misleading and the police statemetn was the truth; the
misunderstanding was not profound; close enough, as long as do not profoundly mislead the D,
OK
CO springworth-police questioned D about one case and then about another case; once D
waives, its OK, don’t have to go down same investigation path
Miranda arises during custody and interrogation-both terms of art; need both apply Miranda
Orosko-where questioning occurs is not determinative to be custodial
Mathiason and Bieler-not custodial even though questioning in police station
Location of questioning important for custody, but not determinative
Mccarty-traffic stop not full blown seizure, or custody, so don’t need miranda rights, but could
escalate and then miranda needed
Murphy-D required to answer certain questions by law in probation mtgs; D not in custodial
situation; he had 5th Am right against compulsory incrimination but the D needed to invoke the
right himself, self executing, no requirement for police to inform him of the rights
2 hr questioning of boy-did not determine custodial issue but worth reading b/c custodial
examination and for fact that ct stressed hard that custody is subjective, and ct reluctant to use
objective standards for custody
After custody, looked at interrogation
RO v. innes-interrogation can occur through something other than direct questioning; like
statement from one officer to another; as long as “:functional equivalent” of interrogation-any
words or actions on part of police hey should know are likely to elicit statement from D; in case,

police should not and did not think that their words were going to elicit statement b/c did not
know he was particularly vulnerable or if he had handicapped child; but did make clear that
interrogation can be other than questioning of D
AZ v. Morrow-if police did nothing wrong, reluctant to throw statement out under Miranda; the
d’s wife involved; she asked to go in, no coersion or pressure; so not interrogation
 GOVERNMENT USE OF AGENTS

 Illinois v. Perkins
o Miranda not violated
o Not violative of Miranda where a secret government agent, posing as a prisoner, is
placed in the same cell with an incarcerated suspect and induces him to discuss the
crime for which he has been arrested- this is NOT custodial interrogation.
 b/c not “coersive”
 but there was deception: why was it OK?
 When one in custody and interrogated, Miranda applies, can’t
deceive to get waiver of Miranda; but if no custody and
interrogation, deception OK b/c Miranda n/a
 You can’t be coerced w/o knowing you are being coerced; this is
what makes it “compulsory” self incrim; if no coercion, no Miranda
 The suspect is not aware he is talking to a police officer and
voluntarily gives a statement and so it requires no Miranda
warnings.
 There must be some knowledge of coercion
o Court: without coercion there is no 5th amendment implication… you have to feel
pressure to get compulsion and since he was not in police environment… so
generally, Miranda doesn't protect in a jail plant situation.
o Miranda does not apply; b/c not custody and interrogation in sense of those terms
o Hypo: if D mirandized, and does not waive, they can still do this, b/c really miranda
does not apply
o Hypo: if D indicted, would the statement be admissible? No, b/c in 6th Am territory,
police can’t deliberately elicit statement from D (Massiah)
 Coercion not requisite element for 6th Am to apply the way it is for 5th Am
to apply
o Might be 5th Am due process violation though
o So there's a difference between jail plants in Miranda situation and plants once D
has been indicted.
 Pennsylvania v. Muniz
o A drunk driver took a field sobriety test and an in custody sobriety test without being
Mirandized. Only when he refused a breathalyzer test did he receive his Miranda
warnings. Asked 7 booking questions: name, address, etc., included a 6th question
“what was the year of your 6th birthday?” which he did not know the answer. In his
2nd questioning, he gave some incriminating responses because of the manner in
which he responded.
o Issue: he was trying to suppress the 7 booking questions
 Ct said the questions were not “testimonial”, they are not incriminating,
they are just admin, content of those questions is entirely admissable
 Testimonial meaning being a witness against yourself.
 Routine booking questions are ok even if the nature of the speech to
answer them is incriminating- that’s physical evidence, not testimony.
 The 6th birthday question is testimonial because it is content based and
designed to elicit mental state; question designed to check cognitive
ability, if so drunk, you would mess up probably… any way he answers is
probably a bad answers (it's a trilemma)
 They didn't really care what the response was… they wanted to
know whether he was slurring his speech.

 If reasonably likely to elicit a response = questioning.
o General Holding: Routine booking questions are always ok- when you go beyod that,
5th Amendment considerations come into play.
 5th Am protects what you say, not other evidence like slurring speech,
way you look, that is not testimonial
Silence is not admissible, but demeanor evidence is…

o United States v. Velarde-Gomez
 ∆ attempted to enter the US from Mexico; customs official found 63
pounds of marijuana in the car. Before being advised of his Miranda
rights, he was told of the pot being held in the car and he did not speak
physically respond. At trial, the prosecutor emphasized the ∆’s demeanor,
he was not acting surprised.
 Holding: the government’s evidence of physical or emotional reaction is
tantamount to evidence of silence and the district court erred in admitting
it…. When they were saying that he didn't look surprised or upset (this is
based on silence)
 Once an individual is placed in custody, they have a right to remain
silent in the face of gov’t questioning, regardless of whether the
Miranda warnings are given.
 Physical and demeanor evidence does not engender 5th Amendment
protections.
 Demeanor is admissible though even though silence is not.
o Hibel
 When police have a good reason to stop someone as part of
investigation, and there is a statute, can always “stop and identify”
 Does Miranda apply?
 Giving one’s name is not incrim, with exception of when you give
name and it’s really incriminating evidence
 Not testiminial to give your name
 Don’t need to comply with 5th amendment because its not that likely
that disclosure of a name would present a danger of incrimination.
 New York v. Quarles- public safety exception
o Suspect was apprehended in the rear of a supermarket; woman had identified him as
a rapist with a weapon; arrested him, cuffed him, pointed gun at him; he was in
custody clearly; the police asked him for the gun without reading him his Miranda
rights, even though he was in custody
o Was it interrogation? yes
 Definition-question to D about crime, words or actions likely to elicit
criminal response
 Both custody and interrogation
o Miranda applies, but this is an exception to Miranda
o “Public Safety Exception”- when real danger to public safety, and police don’t
administer Miranda and get waiver, its admissable; the protection against self-
incrimination is balanced against the need to keep the public safe-
considerations of public policy justify the officer’s failure to provide Miranda
warnings before he asked questions devoted to locating the abandoned
weapon.
 like “exigency” in 4th Am-police need to act quickly do can’t get
warrant
 balance that usually requires Miranda tips against not giving the warnings
when the public safety is in danger; but note that there was no balancing
test in Miranda
o here, officer said no danger, no one was in the supermarket at that time, but ct said if
it seems like rpp believes public safety, its going to be OK, even though conceded to
be no real public safety problem here

o evidence won’t be suppressed if police do nothing wrong
o review: 5th Am; self incrim OK, what is not OK is “compulsory” self incrim;
need coersion for 5th Am rights to rise
o O’Connor concurrence-the gun was recovered; D argued that b/c Miranda was
violated, the gun should be excluded as fruit of poisonous tree; but later ct
distinguishes miranda coersion from real coersion; fruit of poisonous tree does not
apply to miranda to exclude later evidence
 And officers did nothing wrong.
The Rescue Doctrine-

o Dealt mainly with kidnappings.
 hypo: kidnapper; he came with ransom demand to tell us where he is
keeping child; supposed to met parent but met police instead; decide to
coerse the D to get the location of burial out of the D by throwing him
against the wall; question-is statement admissable?
o Leon v. State- the use of police threats and physical violence at the scene of arrest in
order to ascertain the kidnap victim’s whereabouts “did not constitutionally infect later
confessions.”
o Not clear if the statements from force actually get into evidence, but they won’t infect
later evidence that is collected
 WAIVER:
o After D in custody and interrogated, D must make knowing, voluntary and intelligent
WAIVER of the rights
 Taping and Recording ∆s Statements- should tape recordings of the warnings and police
questionings be required?
o Really good idea to do it. Helps both sides if done properly; Make sure to do it the
right way and give the rights. But difficult to tape re-cord all the confessions, so some
states don’t want to risk that confessions would be out if not videotaped.
o But anytime it can be, it should be, protects both sides
 North Carolina v. Butler
o Issue that D waived Miranda rights but wouldn’t sign paper acknowledging it
o Does waiver need to be express or implied? Does not have to be express, can be
implied, as long as more than silence
 Connecticut v. Barrett- qualified or conditional waiver
o While in custody, a ∆ was thrice Mirandized. Respondent said he would talk about it,
but refused to sign a written confession;
 He may have thought there was a different effect written statement has versus
spoken… fundamental misunderstanding of his writes therefore an unknowing
waiver?
o Miranda rights give a right to choose between speech and silence- he chose to
speak.
o Limited Waivers are OK- but here the expressed right to counsel before making a
written statement did not serve as an invocation of the right for all purposes.
o But you do have to understand that your oral testimony can be used against you
o Can waive a written statement and still have your voluntary oral statement admitted.
o D controlled situation here, he wanted to speak, not write, the police honored his
request; makes sense, but if Miranda waiver needs to be knowing, what could it
mean that he could speak it but not sign it, might mean that he does not understand
that oral statement could be used against him but not written statement; in any event,
the ct does not buy it; D can make qualified or limited waiver, he waived, and so its
waiver
10-Nov-08
Review:
-looked at jail plants-never a miranda problem-b/c can’t be coersed w/o knowing you are
coersed (can be manip or deceived though); b/c he did not know it was a police, the warnings
did not need to be triggered; these facts could be a problem though if the D was

indicted/arraigned for 6th Am purposes-no deliberate eliciting after 6th Am country
-if testimonial evidence, then need miranda warnings, if not testiminial, then no miranda
-silence v. demeanor-police can testify about D demeanor; however lack of surprise/upset
based on silence, that is punishment for exercising right to silence and 5th Am; fine line btwn
demeanor which is admissable and silence which is no admissable
-public safety exception-where reas police officer would feel danger to public, any statement D
makes that result from police trying to alleviate public safety are admissable; the gun in
supermarket was OK; an exception to miranda
-rescue docrtine-how much force can police use? They can use a lot in graduating amounts
depending on nature of the danger
-waiver-can be implied as well as explicit; can be limited or qualified; if D says will speak, but will
not write confession, that is OK
What happens after you assert or waive your rights?

 You can always decide to re-assert them.
 Remember, the only way to be impeached is if you take the stand in your own case.
Fare v. Michael C-juvenile asked for probation officer; D argued requesting probation officer was
same as asking for atty;
ct said no, not the same; you have to ask for atty, they can keep questioning you if you ask for
friend, parent, another ct officer; asking for anybody atty does not invoke miranda
Right to counsel, not to see probation officer. Probation officer does not meet attorney right.
This is a 13 year old, age may be an issue still.
Fair v. Michael C.-ct made clear that role of atty unique; when juvenile asks for anyone but atty,
not same as invoking miranda right of counsel
Second generation of Miranda-
-right to silence v. right to atty
Mosely-if police wait long enough after silence invoked; and then re-mirandize, then
interrogation OK
Evans-if D asks for counsel, D cannot be reinterrogated unless he initiates
Roberson-if asks for counsel, can’t question him again, even if about diff crime
Minich-even where D has counsel, or has consulted with counsel, if police come to him, its still
not valid b/c he did not initiate
David v. US-right to counsel must be clear, if ambiguous, police don’t need to clear it up, they
can plow ahead and question him w/o clearing up the ambiguity about if he wants counsel or not
OR v. bradshaw-what constitutes initiation in D invoking counsel; broad standard-“what is going
to happen to me now?”; ct said that evinces generalized desire to talk about SM of investigation
MI v. jackson-ct applied 5th Am edwards rule to 6th Am situation
Mentejo-ct overrules MI v. jackson; 6th Am diff from 5th Am; edwards prevents police badgering
when D asks for counsel; in 6th they can come back to him after he asks for counsel
 Berghuis v Thompkins
Van Chester Thompkins was considered a suspect in a fatal shooting . After advising Thompkins of his

Miranda rights, police officers interrogated him. Thompkins did not state at any time that he wanted to rely on his
right to remain silent, nor that he did not want to talk to the police, nor that he wanted an attorney. He had been
almost completely silent during the 3‐hour interrogation and the few sporadic comments he made had no bearing on
the case[3] (police described it as "nearly a monologue"[4]), but near the end, detectives changed their approach and
"tried a spiritual tac[k]" [5] and an "appeal to his conscience and religious beliefs".[6]Thompkins was asked in
sequence ‐ did he believe in God, did he prayto God, and did he pray to God to forgive him for shooting the victim. He
answered "yes" to each of these.[1][2]
Issue: Thompkins made a motion to suppress his statements, claiming that he had invoked his Fifth Amendment right

to remain silent, that he had not waived that right, and that his inculpatory statements were involuntary. possibility
of parole.

The Court held that unless the suspect actually stated that he was relying on that right, his subsequent voluntary
statements could be used in court and police could continue to question him.
The mere act of remaining silent was, on its own, insufficient to imply the suspect has invoked his or her rights.
Furthermore, a voluntary reply even after lengthy silence could be construed as implying a waiver.
dissent, argued that Miranda and other previous cases had required a claimed waiver of a constitutional right to be

shown more strongly, especially in light of a lengthy interrogation with a possible "compelling influence" during which
the accused had remained almost entirely silent for almost 3 hours prior to the self‐incriminating statement.
Pasted from <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Berghuis_v._Thompkins>
Miranda makes clear that silence is not a waiver and burden on prosecution to show waiver is a
heavy one. But since Miranda, this is a lot less of a burden. Court never before considered
silence a waiver, and court here seems to be holding that silence followed by a statement is a
waiver. This is a departure from Miranda.
You basically have to speak to stay silent now. They can alternatively talk to him and if he makes
statement, it's admissible.
What happens when D invokes Miranda rights?

-diff btwn when D asks for silence v. asks for atty
Issue of Waiver After Assertion
 Michigan v. Moseley
o Silence versus requesting counsel
o D said he wanted to remain silent; we know that if person invokes Miranda, the
police need to stop questioning
o BUT if police “scrupulously honor” D’s right to “silence,” then Ct says they can come
back and try to reinterrogate and re-mirandize and try to get a waiver
 To “scrupulously honor”, police need to:
 Stop questioning immediately when miranda rights invoked
 Wait suffifient amt of time:
o Police stopped for 2 hrs, which ct thought was sufficient
enough waiting pd; the longer amt of time, the more
scrupulous for the ct
o But can be as short as 30 mins.
 Re-mirandize after a time of silence and waiver
o If a person who needs Miranda rights demands their Miranda rights and wants to
keep quiet, the police must scrupulously honor/comply. If the police leave the
defendant alone (~2 hours), then it’s been honored and at best they are taken back
to the starting point (must re-Mirandize).
o If D requests counsel then police are prohibited from coming back to him unlike in
silence (unless D initiates questioning)
 Issue: what constitutes scrupulous honor by police of D's invocation of right to remain
silent.
 Court: no it did not carry over because robbery detective complied with request and 2nd
detective was focused on a separate crime.
 Most people assert their Miranda rights in a 6th Amendment way by demanding a lawyer &
once the ∆ demands a lawyer, the police have no right to come back and question-
but the police do not have to get the lawyer for the ∆ (so long as no questions).
o The ∆ may talk to the police if they then request a withdrawal of counsel OR initiate
(directly or indirectly) a conversation with the police  then that again takes it back
to square 1 (re-Mirandize).
 Diff btwn D asserting “right to remain silent” and “asking for atty”:
 After request for silence, police can come back and ask again if:
o Minimal requirements for the resumption of questioning once a suspect asserts his

right to remain silent: 1) immediately ceasing the interrogation; 2) suspending
questioning entirely for a significant period (30-45 minutes); 3) giving a fresh set of
Miranda warnings at the outset of the second interrogation.
 Edwards v. Arizona***
o Issue: whether he can be subjected to another interogation once D has invoked right
to counsel.
o Holding: when D invokes right to counsel, police may not come back and interrogate
him further, even if wait and remirandize (as in Mosely), unless he has atty w/ him or
he initiates the questioning (diff from Mosely, where D only asked for “silence”)
o This is 5th amendment counsel because it stems from Miranda.
o To Ct, there is a difference btwn “I want to remain silent” and “I want my atty” (but
prof says in real life to the D there is no difference, it just means im helpless without
counsel so go away!)
o Not in a custodial situation? So can't come question him again?
 Arizona v. Roberson
o Once a suspect effectively asserts his right to counsel, the police cannot even initiate
interrogation about other crimes.
o Hypo: what if he says, I want my atty for this case-do cops need to honor? Can they
ask him about another case now? Prof says that prob the police still can’t interrogate
him about a diff case; no qualified waivers here, but unsettled law
 6th Am is “offense specific”-only protects you for crime you have
been indicted/arraigned for; so police could ask D about another
investigation that he IS not indicted/arraigned for; those statements
are not admissable
 This is diff from miranda protections-miranda does not matter what
crime/investigation it’s about, once you ask for atty, they can’t ask
you about anything else
 6th amendment only protects you against a crime you’ve been
arraigned or indicted for. The rest does not trigger the 6th
amendment.
 Minnick v. Mississippi
o Facts: 2 months after he committed murder, D arrested; he was interviewed by FBI
agents, and refused to waive miranda, and requested counsel; an attorney was
appointed; D talked with atty; later sheriff came back and re-interrogated him and he
waived miranda and confessed
o Issue: Does Edwards’ protection cease once the suspect has consulted with a
lawyer?
o Holding: When counsel is requested, interrogation must cease, and officials may not
reinitiate interrogation without counsel present, whether or not the accused has
consulted with his attorney.
 D is helpless even after he speaks to attorney.
 Even though police did exactly what D asked.
o Again, b/c ct has drawn difference btwn asking for silence and asking for counsel;
asking for counsel has much greater protection.
 When D requests right to silence, police can come back whereas they can't for D asking
right to counsel.
 MD v Shatzer
Michael Shatzer, the respondent in the case, was an inmate in the Maryland penal system, serving time for
child sexual abuse. Police wanted to question Shatzer about allegations that he had sexually abused his son.
Shatzer declined to speak without his attorney present, at which point the interview ended (per Edwards). The
police closed the investigation and Shatzer returned to the prison population. Three years later the police
opened a new investigation and again asked to question Shatzer. This time Shatzer waived his right to have an
attorney present; only after making incriminating statements did Shatzer ask for an attorney. With this
evidence in hand, Shatzer was convicted of sexual child abuse . The court denied Shatzer's motion to suppress
his confession, reasoning that the three years between the two interviews counted as a break in custody.[2]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed, holding that even if there were a break in custody

exception to Edwards, being released back into the prison population would not constitute such.[3] The state of
Maryland petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted on January 26, 2009.[4]
Court held that police may re‐open questioning of a suspect who has asked for counsel (thereby underEdwards
v. Arizona ending questioning) if there has been a 14‐day or more break in Miranda custody. (Edwards basically
expires after 14 days… he wants counsel and remains in custody for 14 days, on the 15th day, the police can
come back and question the D if he is given rights and he waives those rights). The ruling distinguished
Edwards, which had not specified a limit.
Pasted from <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maryland_v._Shatzer>
If you ask for counsel, you're not asking it for all time in this case, you get it for 14 days.
Assuming he was in custody, it's still okay to come back in 14 days. If he's not in custody,
Edwards doesn't apply because Miranda doesn't apply… they could come back right
away. Remember custody means freedom is restrained in a significant way, but court
says re: being released to general population, he had a chance to reacclimate to his
normal prison life. So if he's in a holding cell that's custodial interogation. Sure, he's not
free to leave, but this is a different environment.
When he's in custody, then free, then in custoday again (during interrogation), anything
more than 14 days of custody allows for requestioning.
 Oregon v. Bradshaw
o Court's definition of "initiation"
o ∆ was suspected of causing the death of a minor through his drunk driving. He asked
for a lawyer and the police immediately terminated the conversation. D asked what
would happen next? Police gave him a polygraph and said this shows you are lying,
why don’t you talk to me and clear it up
o Interrogation=questions put to D or functional equivalent of questioning which are
from RI v. Innis (things reas likely to …, subjective/objective)
o Issue: whether D initiated question when he asked what is going to happen to me
now?
o Court: D expressed desire to continue with discussion.
o What does “initiation” mean under Edwards?
 “Initiation”=desire on part of accused to open up more generalized
discussion related directly or indirectly to investigation
 So , “what is going to happen to me now?”-ct says this is “initiation” –he
was in essence opening discussion about his criminal activity—prof says
this is BS, it was just a normal reaction asking where he was going
next/what was next step in process (this was more reasonable
interpretation)
o Some inquiries, like a request for water/coffee, are so routine they can not be said to
express a desire on the part of the ∆ to open up a conversation related to the
investigation. Such inquiries or statements by either the ∆ or the police officer will not
generally “initiate” conversation.
o But note that “initiation” is interpreted very broadly (anything other than I’d like
coffee)
NEXT CLASS (3 people then me)
 Blake v. State
o 17 year old taken to the station in his boxers, thrown in a cell, he is Mirandized and
demands a lawyer so they stop talking. Later the ∆ is given his charging document
but ineligible for the death penalty unless 18 (so the charging document was

incorrect). The ∆ then decides to talk to the police. But because he had not gotten a
lawyer and he didn’t initiate the conversation, they weren’t allowed to talk to him.
 The charging document would be reasonably likely to elicit a response-
deemed to be asking questions when they were not allowed to.
o Issue: Was the charging document the functional equivalent of interrogation?
o Voluntariness always applies- regardless of whether or not the Miranda rights have
been given.
o Miranda is a knowing and intelligent waiver.
o Later in Court of Appeals for Fed. Car jacking: Unlike Innis, the statement is a mere
taunt and police weren't praying on some vulnerability of D.
 Davis v. United States

o Sailor suspected of murder; waived miranda; asked him questions; then he started
waffling on if he wanted lawyer or not "I might want an attorney, no I'm not asking for
a lawyer, no I don't want one; they kept questioning him after Miranda regiven. Then
he says I think I want a lawyer before I say anything.
o The admissions he made were admitted in the trial to convict him; affirmed
o Rule: suspect must “unambiguously” request counsel. The questioning by an officer
does not have to cease immediately simply because a reference to an attorney is
made.
 “unambiguous”=must articulately ask for counsel such that reasonable
police would understand that he wants counsel
o State distinguished these circumstances from:
 Mueller v. Commonwealth-detectives influenced D to waive counsel; atty
said this was wrong, b/c the navy guys were just trying to clarify if he
wanted counsel, not trying to confuse him or deceive him or influence him
from right to counsel
 but the ct just came up with their own rule, if waffling, or if police
influence, both are OK, there is a bright line, the D needs to
unambiguously
o Courts are all over the place on establishing a bright line rule on what exactly is
unambiguous
o Remember, burghuis v thompkins says request to remain silent probably same
rule… needs to be unambiguous.
 Michigan v. Jackson (NOT GOOD LAW)

o Facts:
 Ds agreed to waive their rights and talk to police without counsel but before
arrangments
 At arraignments Ds requested counsel
 After arraignments they were given their rights again, given written waivers and
police were able to obtain confessions
o The confessions were invalid because the post-arraignment waiver of 6th
Amendment rights were invalid.
o Ct applies edwards reasoning to 6th Am situation by analogy; similar to edwards 5th
miranda situation where D requests counsel in non-custodial situation, in ct, when
you request counsel and you are arraigned, you have same rights as 5th Am edwards
situation; police cannot come and question you unless you initiate the questioning
 McNeil v. Wisconsin
○ Facts:
 After arrest for armed robbery, McNeil was represented by a public defender at
a bail hearing.
 After McNeil went back to jail, a sheriff visited him, McNeil waived his Miranda
rights and sheriff asked him questions about a factually unrelated murder &
attempted murder.

 The statements came in at trial and he was convicted of murder and attempted
murder.
○ Issue: In a 6th amendment situation, whether police can initiate questions about
crimes other than the one with which D was charged.
○ The 6th Amendment right to counsel provides less protection than does Miranda.
Miranda protects from police-initiated interrogation related to any crime, whereas the
6th only protects from the specific crime- can question about crimes other than the
one with which one is charged.
 Montejo LA case (overturns michgan v. jackson)

o Facts:
 Montejo was charged with first degree murder
 Court ordered appointment of counsel
 Later that day police read montejo his Miranda rights, then took him on a trip to
locate the murder weapon.
 Montejo weirdly enough decided to write a inculpatory apology letter to the
widow of the murder victim.
 He met his attorney after the trip.
 His letter was admitted into evidence at trial.
o In LA they appt you atty w/o asking you if you want one (diff from states that make
you actually ask for attys, like michigan v. jackson); the D was appointed the atty,
and stood mute, so diff from jackson
o Ct says no distinction btwn states which appoint counsels and states who make you
request counsel
o So under michican v. jackson, the statement should be suppressed
o But ct decides to overturn michigan v. jackson-
o Issue: can police come back and question D again if he is not initiating or rep by
counsel right there;
o edwards in a 5th amendment situation says no if D is in custody;
 5th amendment situation always involves some sort of coersion or compulsory
self incrimination… where this isn't present in 6th amendment situation.
 So it's different when you ask for counsel in a 6th amendment situation *(5th
you're saying im helpless without an attorney)
o jackson extended that to non-miranda by analogy within 6th Am country;
o in 6th Am, the concern is stopping the badgering; in 6th Am this is not as important as
in 5th Am- b/c the custodial interrogation badgering involves compulsion (miranda
basis);
o when D says wants counsel in custodial interrogation saying I am helpless to
represent myself; anytime police come back is badgering in custodial interrogation;
that inherent compulsion is not present in 6th Am when the D is indicted/arraigned
(not in custody when being questioned)-not as worried about badgering in that
situation; badgering is foundation of edwards, so no basis for edwards approach in
6th Am, noncustodial situation; and if D in custody, then he is protected by
miranda,roberson, minnich, and edwards
o
 Moran v. Burbine
o Facts:
 While a ∆ who had been arrested and Mirandized was in custody and had
made waivers and confessed to murder. He never requested an attorney
during his interrogation (which was prior to arraignment).
 his sister had gotten him a lawyer. The police had said to attorney they would
not interview that night. They decided to though. The ∆ never asked for and
never knew his sister got him a lawyer.
 Police took him to interrogation room and conducted the first of a series of

interviews about the murder, he was given his miranda rights, and signed
written wiavers and declined to use telephone available in the room. He didn’t
want an attorney.
o Issue: Whether either the conduct of the police or respondent’s ignorance of the
attorney’s efforts to reach him taints the validity of the waivers and therefore requires
exclusion of the confessions.
o Court: events occuring outside the presence of the suspect and unknown to him
have no bearing on ability to comprehend and knowingly/intelligently waive rights.
o Court: no deception here.
o D argues right to counsel was violated under 6th Am and 5th Am Miranda
 He was not in 6th Am country b/c not indicted/arraigned
 He did not invoke his 5th Am himself (and it can’t be invoked for you)
o Lawyers cannot assert 5th Amendment rights.
o The waiver is valid.
 But what about deception?
 No concern that they decived the atty and the sister by saying no
investigation that night
 No concern that they did not tell him that atty wanted to see him
o Said “ignorance is bliss”-he didn’t know about the atty, so no
coersion/deception
 Note: deliberate or reckless withholding of information by the police that is
harmful to the ∆ is not allowed.
o What about 5th Am DP?
 Does it shock the conscience? No, ct always limits application of miranda
o Consequence for police is that they know they can tell the atty anything and it won’t
factor, they can lie to atty as much as they want
o Might be diff if D asks police if sister got him an atty and they lie; b/c that would be
deliberate deception to him, which is what matters
o If they used trickery after waiver, this might be different
 United States v. Bin Laden (NOT TESTED)

o Two defendants charged with bombings of US embassies in east africa and kenya
were interogated, without being mirandized or opportunity to have lawyer under
advice of rights form.
o Issue: When US law enforcement subject non-American citizen abroad to custodial
interrogation, must they mirandize them?
o Miranda applies to overseas interrogations conduct by US law enforcement.
 Three ways to keep a confession out under federal law
o 5th Amendment voluntariness under totality of the circumstances applies all the time,
whenever the government talks to you. Gov’t proves by a preponderance of the
evidence it was voluntary. General factual totality of the circumstances.
o 5th Amendment Miranda- which doesn’t always applies- only applies to custodial
interrogation- when one is charged by a cop. This is conjunctive with voluntariness.
This is when the 5th Amendment lawyer applies.
o Miranda II- when the prosecutor charges the suspect and there is formal judicial
adversarial proceeding- 6th Amendment right to counsel then arises, whether or not
one is in custody.
 Estelle v. Smith
o Facts:
 ∆ was indicted for murder in Texas. The state announced it would seek death
penalty.
 The judge ordered a psychiatric evaluation over wishes of D attorney. The
doctor determined his capacity to stand trial; at sentencing Dr testified as to the
respondent’s future dangerousness based on statements D made to the Dr.

 The basis of testimony was on the judge-ordered competency to stand trial test
o D argued that material used at competency proceeding being used against him in
sentencing was violation of 5th and 6th Am rights
o The court held the ∆’s 5th and 6th rights were violated by the use of the doctor’s
testimony.
 5th amendment rights are applicable to the psychiatric evaluation
 No police here, but it was enough like custodial interrogation
 This is the only non-police dominated situation where Miranda was
held to apply
 Did not matter that the statements were being used at sentencing
rather than at trial b/c the statements were being used against him
at his “execution”
 Combine all those things
 Contrast minnisota v Murphy case where probation officer wasn't
police.
 6th amendment rights because at the time of the evaluation, ∆ had been
indicted; he was in 6th Am country
 no atty present at the psych interview
 the D did not ask for the interview, it was judge ordered
o A state-ordered psych interview can’t be used against the D at crim trial or at
sentencing
Review:
-sister atty case; it’s not a miranda prob b/c D knowingly, voluntarily, intelligently waived his
rights; did not matter that he did not know about the atty; diff from escobido b/c in escobido
asked to see his atty and police did not let him
-was custodial w/o police blue; in competency exam which is where coersion happened;
comptency interview was used during sentencing; violated his 6th right b/c no right to counsel
and violated miranda b/c it was like custody b/c it was court compelled
-chavez-1983 suit; ct said even though the D had statement taken in violation of miranda, it did
not matter b/c the evidence was never used against him in a trial; taking of statement in violation
of miranda is not 5th violation; what violates the 5th is using that statement in court, not the taking
of the statement
 Chavez v. Martinez
o 1983 civil suit
o D was shot and police accompanied him to hosp; no miranda
o SCOTUS said that D’s const rights were not violated
o D was never charged with crime;
 But claimed that police violated his 5th Am right against compulsory incrim
and 14th Am DP right to be free from coersive questioning
o 5th Am begins when you are in custody and being interrogated
o Even though he was not charged, he still argues that his Miranda was violated; Ct
says that b/c statements were never used against him in ct, the 5th does not apply,
b/c 5th compels you against witness against himself, if statements never used against
you in ct, then no miranda violation!
o DP: Did not shock conscience b/c he was being treated by medical ppl during the
interrogation, so it did not make him sicker
o Like immunity, you can compel someone to tell you what they did if you promise not
to use it against them in a crim proceeding
Fruit of Poisonous tree: when const violation, the evidence derived from const violation is
unconst (exclu rule); if secondary evidence derived from that const violation, it’s also
inadmissable b/c its fruit of poisonous tree
Hypo: if police beat statement out of D, that is classic 5th Am coersion, if the gun they find as

result of the statement, the gun is suppressed too b/c flows from the initial violation
Miranda: constitutional decision, but no fruits of poisonous tree concerns… miranda is a
profilactic rule
 Is Physical Evidence or a “Second Confession” derived from a Failure to Comply with the
Miranda Rules Admissible?
o Oregon v. Elstad- An un-Mirandized voluntary statement does not preclude a later
Miranda waived voluntary statement.
 Facts: made first statement w/ no miranda; then mirandized; waived; and
made a second voluntary statement
 Issue: first statement not admiss b/c taken in violation of miranda
 But is second statement admissable?
 Ct says yes; b/c Miranda is not “real” const protection, it’s prophylactic
 No fruit of poisonous tree consequences
 Note: this is different from “classic coersion” 5th Am violation, beating
statement out of D, which will result in suppression under fruits of
poisonous tree
o United States v. Patane
 Gun, like a statement in Miranda is not fruit of poinsonus tree (remember
Miranda statement is not like classic coercion, which is a constitutional
violation and poisonous tree applies)
 The ∆ was arrested outside his home; began giving the ∆ Miranda
warnings but was interrupted, said he knew the rights- the defendant told
him where the gun was.
 Issue: can physical evidence recovered by admitted even though he did
not receive miranda rights?
 RULE: The privilege against compelled self-incrimination protects against
involuntary statements and evidence derived therefrom, but does not
suppress physical evidence that is the fruit of an unMirandized, but
voluntary statement.
 The self-incrimination clause cannot be violated by the intro of non-
testimonial evidence (nontestimonial b/c physical evidence) obtained as a
result of voluntary statements.
 Ct: b/c mere miranda violation, and miranda designed to protect
statements not being used, here, the statement will not be used, but the
GUN will be used, which is nontestimonial physical evidence; miranda
designed to make you not be a witness against youself (but to prof this
does not make sense b/c the classic coersion leads to nontestimonial too)
 Concurrence: “Miranda must be accommodated to other objectives of
crim justice sys” (need to balance miranda with catching the bad guys)
 Gun=derivative evidence
 Dissent: encourages police to violate miranda b/c even if they can’t use
the statement, they can use the derivitave evidence
o Police began the “miranda two-step”: police would ask D for statement; he would say
yes I was there; then they would mirandize him; he would waive; ask him the same
thing; the second statement would be admissable b/c miranda not subject to fruits
o Missouri v. Siebert
 Miranda “two step” case
 ∆ was not Mirandized and question for 30-40 minutes. Then she was
given a break, Mirandized, and asked to confirm the information she
provided the first time.
 Holding: A mid-stream recitation of warnings after interrogation and
unwarned confession can not effectively comply with Miranda, and so the
2nd , repeated statement after a warning is inadmissible.
 The other cases are still good law, so how does this application get w/in
fruits?; how it gets around elstad w/o overturning:

 The second statement is not a second statement really, it was still
part of the first statement; everything the D said comprised ONE
statement and the whole thing violated miranda
 What factors do you look at for “one statement” determination:
 Subjective intent of officer does not matter (b/c too diff to accurately
understand and assess, ct does not want to do this)
 So the court comes up with objective factors (that indicate the officer
subjective intent)
o “overlap”—extent that conversations have same SMs?
o Completeness and detail of questions in first round
 Systematic, detailed questions (full interrogation) v.
a passing question
o Timing and setting of statements
 The more separated by time and by place, the less
its indicative of one statement
o Continuity of police (not very imp)
 Same police or do they change?
o Do police ask questions that connect the first with second?
 “Remember you just answered…”
o Was D told the first statement was inadmissable?
The “Due Process”- Voluntariness Test
Hypo: officer 1 says to officer 2, the victim was lousy drug dealer and I would like to shake hand
of the one who blew him away; is this admissable? Ask handicapped child case (Innis) test—
was it functional equivalent of interrogation, where the police should have reas known that the
statements were likely to elicit response? The factors were if police knew something particular
about the D or if he was upset. Here, no, so it would probably not be functional equivalent of
interrogation.
Trickery: (depends on when it happens)
GR: If D waives his rights, and then trickery used, its OK, unless it overbears the will of the D
GR: If police trick D into waiving his rights, ie-pre-waiver trickery, then its not OK
Braun-totality of circumstances approach to trickery; the D had gone to law school, he was
trying to manip detectives; the trickery did not overbore his will, but most of the time telling D
that they won’t prosecute him will overbear his will and will result in suppression.
Note: police overbear D’s will if they tell D they won’t prosecute and he makes statement and
they use it to prosecute him.
What if police tell D ppl saw you do it: that statement will be admitted
*once police get D to waive rights, they can use trickery
 Trickery: Police elicitation of a confession by deliberate distortion of material fact, by failure to
disclose to ∆ a material fact, or by playing on ∆’s emotions. Promises of leniency, for example,
are too likely to be deceptive.
 Key = when and how much
o Once D waives rights, then courts more willing to give police trickery (unless it
"overbears the will of the D")
o e.g. If you tell us what you did we'll drop the charges… courts believe this overbears
the will of the D. Courts also don't like police creating false evidence (like fake
document)
o e.g. "just you and me, buddy" negated miranda and isnt admissible.
 State v. Cayward
o The built-in adversariness of police interrogations do not encompass that the police
will knowingly fabricate tangible documentation.
o Police can lie to D about fingerprint evidence, but they can’t actually show him
smudged fingerprints
o They can say we have eyewitness, but can’t bring in two ppl and lie and tell you they
are the witnesses
o But prof does not see the diff, why does one overbear his will and one does not?
 Arizona v. Fulminante- offering to protect a prisoner from physical harm by inmates

o D was in prison for assaulting and killing child; ppl who do such crimes are targeted
and abused by prison inmates in jail target; ∆ was befriended by an informant inmate
who promised ∆ protection if the ∆ told the truth b/c the informant was mobster. ∆
confessed to murder. Using a totality of the circumstances, the confession was held
coerced because it promised protection from physical harm.
o Note: he was indicted/arraigned and in prison for one crime, but the confession he
made was for another crime, so 6th Am does not apply b/c its crime specific; 5th Am
did not apply either b/c he was clearly in custody, but he was not under typical
interrogation, b/c no police blue there; the argument is that it is a 5th Am coercive
confession
o Not classic coercion in classic sense, but exploited threat that existed to D that was
very real from the other inmates, so that was coercion (under 5th Am classic
coercion)
o 5th amendment violation is classic coercion which applies here
o Court: not 6th amendment violation because not indicted or arraigned, and Miranda
not available because not custodial interrogation environment. Violation of 5th
amendment rights beyond Miranda because police exploited coercive environment
around inmate, and they therefore adopted the coercion of the inmates.
o All facts being the same except it were a fellow inmate who coerces the confession,
then goes to fed later, this is not state action and 5th amendment doesn’t apply
because inmate wasn't agent of the government at the time.
 Colorado v. Connelly
o A ∆ had been mirandized and confessed, but it was later discovered he was
schizophrenic, in a psychotic state at the time of the confession; god told him to
confess
o D argued he did not confess freely and voluntarily, it was not an act of free will
o Why was it admissable even though not act of free will by D:
o Holding: coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a
confession is not voluntary within the meaning of the DPC.
o Police did not coerse him; no state action here
o No 5th Am violation when the coersion does not come from the govt
o If there is no state action to induce statement, there's no violation. Police did nothing
wrong and nothing to exclude/suppress.
o While D can't argue Due Process, he might argue unreliable statement under
evidence. Also, prejudicial impact might outweigh probative value.
o Hypo: if third party tells you that they will beat you if you don’t confess?; again, this is
not state action, and so its OK
o No matter what they do to D, if there's no state action, there's no suppression.
 US v Fellers
 Fellers says there are no fruits of poisonous tree consequences.
o Not a core protection
 BUT Most courts have held 6th amendment has fruits of poisonous tree consequences.
 Remember, Missouri v Siebert… are two statements treated as one?
o Using Siebert factors:
FALSE CONFESSIONS:
Central Park Jogger case:
Woman was jogging in CP, she was assaulted and raped by one or more people. Police picked
up some gang kids and mirandized them. A bunch of the kids confessed after police were not
following good procedure. 13 years later, they caught a guy who actually committed the rape.
Review:
Elstat-when statement taken in violation of Miranda, and leads to second statement, fruits does
not apply to the second statement; second statement admissable
Applied to tangible secondary evidence in Patane; D mentioned gun in mirandaless statement;

gun was not testimonial; it was admissable; no fruits
Siebert-fruits applies to miranda two-step by police; adheres to elstad but says that if the second
statement is really part of the first, then that’s when fruits applies; factors for court to look at:
Completeness and details of ? in first round
-overlapping content of two statements
-timing and setting of statements, taken same place/time?
-continuit of police personnel—does not matter much
-did questions themselves treat the statement as if it was continuation; is there references back
to first statement?
Trickery:
-by po in obtaining statements: look at when and how much
When-before miranda? Once D waives miranda, courts let po use trickery
How much? Limit: can’t overbear will of D ; ie, we will dismiss if you tell us
Fulminante-5th applies w/o miranda; coersion not from govt agent but from situation; govt
exploited the coersion from the prison and that implicated the 5th ; not miranda violation, but 5th
violation (classic coersion?)
-distinguished from case with the mentally ill D who argued no free will; ct said police did
nothing to get statement from him; if unreliable b/c be was mentally ill, then that is an evidence
issue, not a const issue; no DP/no 5th Am violation b/c no state action
 Incorporation- 5th and 6th Amendment Overlap

o Massiah- If a person is formally charged, indicted, or preliminary hearing- at every
point where there is a critical stage (like confession), then the 6th Amendment gives
the ∆ a right to an attorney- generally the 6th Amendment gives a right in every felony
and incarcerable misdemeanor to an attorney and counsel must be with you at every
critical stage post-judicial adversarial proceedings. Waiver of the 6th requires a
knowing and intelligent waiver.
 Case where the ∆ was released on bail after being indicted and co-∆
permitted an agent to listen to incriminating statements made by the ∆ in
the car of the co-∆. ∆’s 6th right to counsel was violated.
 When the cops charge you, that triggers the 5th Amendment- under the
post judicial adversarial proceedings right to an attorney. When the
lawyer indicts or charges you, that triggers the 6th. If simultaneously
arrested and charged, then dual rights.
o Miranda lawyer entitlement when in custody or interrogated.
o Brewer v. Williams
 Girl kidnapped from Y on Xmas eve; boy said he helped load bundle into
D’s car with skinny white legs; D drove north with her and raped/killed;
turned himself in next day in davenport, 160 mi. N of Des Moines; he was
arraigned in Davenport; he had atty in davenport and an atty in des
moines; attys said that po were not to interrogate him in car
 In car po gave him the “christian burial speech” pg. 723
 They knew he was religious zealot and mentally ill
 The speech was an effort by police to deliberately elicit info from the D
 D caved and on way home told po where she was buried on way
him and stopped and showed po the body
 “deliberately elicit” reminds you of innis which can be “interrogation”
 Case decided b/f innis, but if decided today, it would clearly violate
innis
o Definition of interogation… in this case they know his
vulnerability, whereas in innis they didn't know his vulnerability
 What about edwards?
 Would also be edwards violation
 He invoked right to counsel and he did not initiate questioning
 Ct held on 6th Am right to counsel grounds; deliberate elicitation of

statement by po in violation of massiah; the statements about where body
was should never have been admitted by the lower ct
 Should have fruits consequences that body should not be
admissable either, but ct says that its up to state to admit the
evidence on theory that body would have been discovered anyway
w/o the statement
 Holding: the right to counsel is triggered when the police a) formally
initiate prosecution and 2) take steps designed to elicit an incriminating
statement.
 4th Amendment rights are waived under totality of the circumstances.
 6th right to counsel is always a knowing and intelligent waive- applicable
during interrogation- don’t need to give a 6th warning if already gave a 5th
Amendment Miranda warning.
o Generally, the court does not apply the poisoned fruit doctrine to violations of
Miranda.
 See United States v. Fellers-
 Does 6th Am have fruits consequences? This circuit says No.
 Goes back to police deterrence:
 Exclusion is inapplicable because its use would not serve the goal
of deterrence of the 6th.
o Patterson v. Illinois
 D was in gang; members arrested; he was indicted and asked police, who
else was was arrested? D said, why didn’t you indict so and so, he did
everything!
 Officer handed D miranda waiver form and he waived
 Holding: a knowing, intelligent waiver of Miranda 5th Amendment rights is
sufficient to waive the 6th Amendment right to counsel as well.
 The D was in 6th Am country b/c he had been indicted
 Do you need diff waivers and warnings in 6th Am?
 When D in 6th, not immune from questioning; way you get warnings is
miranda; miranda protects 5th, but also 6th ; way you waive the warning s
same as waiving Miranda
 With respect to giving/waiving warnings in 6th; miranda warning and
waiver satisfies 6th Am waiver too
 two places 5th and 6th are diff: (????)
 Burbine-In 6th, the police can continue to investigate, but they can’t
interfere with D and his atty in order to investigate
 Jail plants
 Court: Miranda rights give sufficient notice of right to counsel so wiaver of
miranda rights is enough to waive counsel under 6th amendment.
 Court is basically saying the additional protections probably don’t
matter
o No Contact Rule: PR rule in civil cases says that in representing a client, a lawyer
shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a party the lawyer
knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the
consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so.
 Argument is that pros do this when they take statements from D, so does
it violate ethics?
o Maine v. Moulton
 D charged with variety of crimes; co-D becomes scared by some of D’s
statements; he goes to govt and tells him he is scared; agents tell him to
wear wire and get him to make statements
 police want to use the D’s statements in the crime he was already
indicted for AND for new charges against D for threatening witnesses
 Ct holding:

 the ∆’s own incriminating statements can not be used by the
prosecution as evidence against the ∆ at trial (Massiah)
 But b/c 6th Am is offense specific, only applies to charges you are
indicted/arraigned for, so it can’t be used in the current trial he is
already indicted on, but can be used in future charges b/c he was
not in 6th Am country yet
 State argument is that police did nothing wrong in continuing
investigation; so there is no deterrent value in excluding the evidence; the
court holds here that even though the police did nothing wrong, that the
evidence is still out
 So, just because police do the right thing, maybe it's not totally
admissible.
o US v. Henry
 Jail plant case
 Why was this 6th Am violation? But not miranda violation?
 jail plants are not miranda violations b/c there is no police blue presence
(custodial interrogation) and so there is no coercion; you cannot be
coerced w/o knowing you were coerced
 but plant still deliberately elicited the statement in violation of the 6th
 ct decides that this was a 6th Am violation; by just putting the plant there
“intentionally creating a situation likely to induce D to make incrimin
statements without assistance of counsel”; he was not a passive listener,
but he engaged in conversations with the D while cell mate
 to be passive, plant can be put in close proximity of D but can’t stimulate
convos about crime charged
 BUT NOTE: passive listener that is jail plant is not deliberately eliciting
 How far does Henry go?
 Hypo: what if you just stick voice recorder in the cell by an inmate
and transferring inmate… but passive recording device is not going
to be 6th amendment violation.
o Kuhlmann v Wilson
 Jail plant
 Police tell informant to keep his ears open. D told same exact story the
same as police. Informant says D "your story doesn't sound too good"
 Few days later D's brother visits, and brother says parents pissed D killed
the guy.
 D admits stuff.
 Ct decides that no intentional intent to deliberately elicit statement from D
 Henry violation? Trial thought it was admissible, SCOTUS distinguishes it
from Henry… state got confession by chance.
 No deliberate elicitation by police
 Plant was merely listening
 There was an intervening circumstance which was that the D’s bro visit
upset the D and he vented to the plant
 With plant cases you need to look at whether there was deliberate
elicitation
 Once the 6th Amendment right to counsel arises, does it attach to all other offenses closely
related to the particular offense charged?
o Texas v. Cobb
 Facts: ∆ had confessed to the burglary of a home, but at that time said he
didn’t know what happened to the mom and baby. He was indicted for
burglary and counsel was appointed. While in custody, he then waived his
Miranda rights and confessed to the murder of mom and baby (now with
Patterson, this waives 6th amendment too).
 Holding: the 6th Amendment is offense specific. It does not attach until a
prosecution is commenced. A ∆’s statements regarding offenses for

which he had not been charged were admissible.
 Based on blockburger which is used in double jeopardy analysis
 In order for two crimes to not be the same crime, each has to have
an element that is different from the element of the other crime. If
you don’t, you have lesser included offense, e.g. driving while
intoxicated and driving with suspended license
o DWI requires intoxication while suspension doesn’t have that
element while suspended license offense requires suspended
license. Meanwhiile larcency is lesser included of robbery, so
considered same crime.
 Significance: there can still be 6th amendment violation, we still have to
see how broad that protection is… question is whther it applies to other
crimes
 Defense is saying theyre the same crimes… murder stems from the
burglary!
o Court rejects this
 Hypo: everything same except that statement D made was about the
burglary and they want to use at his burglary which he has been indicted
for already; D argues he has been appointed counsel and he can’t be
questioned unless he initiates questioning; montejo-edwards protection,
appointment of atty at proceeding is not same as invoking counsel from
miranda; no iniation, edwards like protection in 6th Am situation; in non-
custodial situation, we do not prove edwards protection
 Edwards-in 5th miranda, po can’t come back and interr unless he initiates
 Mich said applied to 6th
 Montejo-said initiation requirement does not apply to 6th ; type of
badgering from edwards in non-custodial situation does not apply
 If he is given rights and waives, even if he did not initiate, the statements
are OK
 But here, he was in custody; before that he waived his right to counsel in
the courtroom; never invoked right to counsel in custodial interrogation,
so that is why edwards does not apply
 Court: even though offenses from same event, doesn't mean they're the
same offense.
o Holding: just b/c 2 crimes occur from same transaction, not same crime; for 2 crimes
to be diff crime, the crimes need to have a different element; murder and burglary
have many diff elements; what about if only one diff element? robbery and larceny—
larceny is a lesser included crime of robbery; has all the same elements as robbery,
so it’s the same crime as robbery; but robbery is not same crime as larceny.
 How broad are these 5th (protective against self-incrimination) and 6th (right to counsel)?
o Miranda’s 5th is question-based  it applies to every questioning. When asserting a
question-based right, can’t ask anything.
o But where the ∆ is indicted but NOT under arrest, that 6th right is more narrow as to
what the ∆ is charged  more limited scope of inapplicable questioning.
o HYPO: If charged with a burglary and not under arrest, police can question about a
murder without Mirandizing.
 Note what offenses are in the charging document.
o 6 Amendment applies to where formally charged and attaches to all critical
th
proceedings.
 When do Violations of Miranda, Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, and 14th Amendment
Occur?
o Chavez v. Martinez
 During an altercation with a police officer, Martinez was shot 5 times and
paralyzed from the waist down. Chavez questioned him while receiving
treatment in the hospital, pausing occasionally for emergency treatment.
Martinez was never Mirandized.

 This is NOT a 5th Amendment violation: the 5th protects against being
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against oneself. Neither
coercive questioning nor the failure to give Miranda warnings violates the
5th unless the ∆ is prosecuted or the statements used in a criminal case.
 There is no evidence the purpose of the questioning was to violate
his rights or interfere with medical treatment.

Right to Counsel ‐ ID
Thursday, April 14, 2011
11:04 AM
Right to Counsel: Identifications
-williams-today would be innis violation b/c deliberately eliciting by christian burial

-patterson-you can waive 6th Am rights same way you can waive Miranda; giving miranda warnings and
waiving them sufficies to waive 6th Am; but remember montejo when D requests counsel, unless he
initiates, this only applies in 5th Am not 6th Am
-maine v. moulton-d had statement elicited from him by co-D working for govt; police did right thing but
statement still suppressed b/c violated massiah
-jail plants-unlike miranda, typical jail plant does not invoke miranda b/c no coersion; but has 6th Am
consequences b.c that does not require custodial interrogation; henry-6th am massiah violation; but in
kuhlman-agent was acting like passive listener; he did say something, but the intervening cause was the
upsetting visit form the brother; there was no cause and effect from the agent; in jail plant, say its not
miranda, say if its 6th am violation, and say if there was some action by plant to elicit the info based on
henry and kuhlman
-texas-what police can question about when D in 6th Am country; if he invokes his rights, can they
question him about same case? Yes as long as charges are diff, charge is not lesser included charge
(blockburger); so can’t question hime about burglary, but can question him about murder, b/c diff crimes,
diff offenses, 6th Am is offense specific. If one lesser included of the other, then same offense, and can’t
be asked about, but if diff crimes, like burglary and robbery, then D can be asked about other crime, that
he has not been arraigned/indicted for
Confessions Analysis:
-does it violate classic 5th coersion?
-Fulminante coersion?
-Miranda 5th violation?
-6th Am violation?
-right to counsel, was he in 6th did po deliverately elicit?
-don’t forget 4th, was there an illegal seizure, on less than PC, statement might not be admissable b/c
flowed form illegal seizure.
Generally:
-when statement suppressed it’s not b/c its untrue, its b/c there was a procedural flaw; guilty may go free
-but suggestiveness in IDs that leads to mis-IDs, innocent may be convicted
so first look to see if there's suggestiveness… then look at reliability factors
How good a look witness got, certaintly, time between crime and ID, etc…
Ways D’s can challenge IDs:

-DP (fairness)-if suggestiveness of ID, it puts in mind of witness that this is the person, that is unfair
-6th AM-right to counsel; if atty was required at a certain ID proceeding, and was not present, and was not
waived by D, then the ID does not come in
Kind of ID proceedings:
-lineup-4-5 ppl standing in eyesight of witness; corporeal, face to face ID
-showup-one on one, D presented to witness and asked if he robbed you
-photo show up-shown one photo, and witness asked is this him
-photo arrray-witness shown series of photos and needs to pick D
What does pros want to get into evidence at trial?

-any of the above ID proceedings (pretrial ID)
-in-court ID (moment in court where witness points to the D); very important trial tactic
-overt and non-overt suggestiveness can happen in IDs
Trilogy of cases: wade-gilbert-stovall

 Identifications are faulty- certain people can differentiate or ID different characteristics/features better
than others.
o The 6th right to counsel re: confessions and IDs applies where the ∆ has been formally
charged and the ID has to be after the start of adversary judicial process.
o But what about the critical stage? Interrogation is critical, but basically IDs are either:
 1) a line up ß this is a critical stage to the court because difficult for the ∆ to explain
everything re: what took place to his attorney
 2) show up ß 1 on 1 ID, which is also critical b/c difficult to re-create.
 3) photographic array ß NOT critical because it can be re-created.
o US v. Wade:
 Facts: D was a bankrobber; he robbed bank w/ strips of tape on sides of his face;
cashier and VP were there; later he was indicted and arrested; there was a lineup at the
courthouse for the cashier and the VP to ID the D; through doors they saw him outside
in custody of FBI agent and then saw 5-6 others show up separately; positively ID’d
him in lineup; at trial the witnesses ID’d him in court too
 Issue: can a lineup w/ no counsel present prevent the later courtroom ID?
 Ct determines that the D has the right to counsel at lineup; it’s a critical stage in the
process
 Govt agmt: lineup is only “preparatory”: But Ct distinguishes it from the analysis
of fingerprints and blood b/c atty can confront those experts on C/E in
meaningful way; If atty not present at the lineup, the right to confrontation AT
TRIAL implicated b/c D not able to portray for ct what happened in the lineup
that may have been improper
o Both the physical ID and the voice ID is not 5th Am violation;
nontestimonial things
 Policies: Mistaken ID’s; Suggestion, intentional or not by police; improper
influence
o Gilbert-sister case to this one; 100 witnesses were put in auditorium
and they ID’d the D in front of the entire group; this is very
suggestive
 If counsel is to do effective cross exam of ID, he needs to be present at the
lineup.
 Rule: under 6th Am, police must notify D and his counsel that there is going
to be a lineup; D can intelligently waive counsel presence at lineup; so if 6th
is violated, then the pretrial ID is excluded automatically.
 What about the in-court ID following an unconst pre-trial ID?
 It won’t be “per se” excluded if the line up is tainted or no counsel present
 There are fruits consequences for improper lineups but they may be
overcome if there is an “independent basis” for ID other than the
suggestive/tainted lineup that is proven by clear and convincing evidence
 i.e. If prosecutor can prove that witness is making ID not from tainted
lineup but incident to the crime.
o This determination is made by judge at a Wade hearing
o How it really works: if pros shows the witness got a good look and
has had the same story, then in court ID allowed in
o But if witness barely saw the perp at time of crime, then the in court
ID won’t come in
o Most of the time the independent basis was found
 Factors to test if in court ID is OK:
o Prior opportunity to observe the alleged crim act
o Existence of any discrepancy btwn any prelineup description and the
D’s actual description
o Any ID prior to lineup of another person
o ID by pic of D prior to lineup

o Failure to ID the D on a prior occasion
o Lapse of time btwn alleged act and lineup ID
o Facts that are disclosed concerning conduct of lineup
 5th Amendment
o No self incrimination implications because IDs by nature are
NOT testimonial.
 Black Dissent: the in court ID should be OK even if no counsel there as long as
the pros does not use the lineup as evidence in its case in chief; the independent
source rule is too impractical
 White/Harlan/Stewart Dissent:
 has more faith in police procedures than majority; the probs are not as
widespread as maj says;
 makes no sense that you allow court room ID’s where accused is in
custody and charged, but lineups not OK
 defense attys are going to try to control the lineup process and wreak
havoc
o Notes after:
 In real life, attys have passive role in lineups
 If D refuses lineup, the pros can use it against him as circumstantial evidence of
guilt; can compel by ct order to participate in lineup
 Stovall
 D brought in to be ID’d by assault victim in hospital
 Wade-gilbert applies retroactively
 D raised DP argument to the ID
 Question: under totality of circumstances, was the ID procedure “so
impermissably suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of
irreparable misidentification”
 Omnibus crime control act tried to repeal wade-gilbert in fedl pros; but no one
follows it
o Only post-indictment line up and post-indictment show up implicate the 6th.
 Kirby v. Illinois
 Facts: D’s arrested for robbery that occurred 2 days later; D’s were brought to
squad room where they were the only non-police people; the victim came in and
immediately ID’d the D’s as the robbers
 Issue: does Wade-Gilbert rule extend to pre-indictment showups?
 Ct: NO, it does not-the right to counsel does not attach to any identification
conducted prior to the start of judicial adversarial proceedings or a trial (b/f 6th
Am country—indictment/arraignment)
o The only time in all const cases that the right to counsel attached b/f
6th Am country was Escobido, but that case is limited to own facts
 Policy: Kinds of IDs court doesn't want to stop. Getting a lawyer for these
frustrates the need to ID people quickly while their image is fresh in the mind of
the victim.
 The right to counsel is attached but its not a critical stage in the cases of:
fingerprints, blood sample, clothing sample, hair sample, handwriting sample,
photo arrays.
 At this time, the remedy is Stovall for DP violations
 Dissent: the policy of counsel at ID’s is to safeguard D’s const right to
confrontation and effective assistance of counsel at trial, and this policy does not
matter if it’s before or after indictment/arraignment
o When is formal judicial process initiated?
 Moore v. Illinois-
 This was critical stage b/c filing of formal criminal charges, the only time this

applied was in this case; he won’t test on, use 6th Am as your guide in test/on bar
o Police brought rape victim to D’s prelim hearing for ID;
impermissably suggestive b/c the vic was told she was going to see
the suspect, told his name, and the pros was reciting the evidence
they had against the D
o Should be excluded, does not matter that this was pre-indictment
 6th amendment applies here because there were formal proceedings even though
its not an indictment or arraignment (here, inauguration of formal judicial
proceedings)
 United States v. Ash- A photographic display does not implicate the right to counsel
since the accused himself is not present & asserts no right to be present.
 Just before D’s trial, police did a photo array with the witnesses; 3
positively ID’d the D and one witness was not sure
 Ct says no right to counsel at photo array because D wasn't present
 Main purpose of protection is to protect during ID thing itself.
Because D isn't present in photo ID.
 Contrast with Wade.
 So, unfairness during ID lineup is different from ID photo.
 It’s different than lineup; D is at lineup and having counsel there prevents
him from being misled or taken advantage of; b/c D does not need to be
there, counsel does not need to be there either
 Pros needs to be able to interview witnesses; D atty can interview those
same witnesses
 A photo array is not a critical stage.
 If the D wants to challenge the photo array, he can raise Stovall DP
challenge
 Concurring: different from lineup, less likelihood of improper suggestion;
if unfair, the atty can C/E the witness about it
 Dissent: Court interprets Wade wrong. The purpose of an attorney at a
line up is to protect the ∆ at trial, not at the line up; at photo array, risk of
mis-ID is just as great as at lineup, maybe more in fact b/c photos are 2D;
risk of suggestionWade did not turn on presence of D, it turned on ability
to reconstruct the ID and challenge it AT TRIAL
 Rule: when D in 6th Am, he has right to counsel in ONLY corporeal ID’s;
if not, its excluded; in court ID can come in if pros proves independent
ID’s
o 5th Amendment Due Process- applies all the time to ALL IDs. This determines what
identifications are admissible bc ALL ids are regulated by DPC (including the 6th).
 Stovall (again)
 The victim was stabbed and in hospital; said robbed and assaulted by black male;
the D’s arraignment was postponed to allow D to get counsel; b/f D got counsel,
the po brought D to victim hospital room for ID in cuffs and she positively ID’d
him
 D attacks the ID as being suggestive
o Bringing D to vic with no one else to pick from is suspect… grossly
unfair
 Rule: under totality of circumstances, was the ID procedure “so
impermissably suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of
irreparable misidentification”; if so, pretrial and in court IDs may be
excluded
 There was suggestiveness, but ct did not suppress it, b/c these were
exigent circumstances (Dr. was dying):
o Here, police did what they needed to do in circumstances; she

was in hospital, not sure how long she would make it; she
couldn’t come to station for proper ID
 Look for impermissible and unnecessary suggestiveness à but this changed over time to
a test of reliability overall. It is only when the ID is so unrealiable so as not to be able
to be shown to the fact finder.
 After stovall, if D attacked ID as suggestive, then that ID procedure, if suggestive, pros
could not use at trial, but could get in court in if independent (same as wade)
o Any ID made post-indictment without a knowing and intelligent waiver and without an
attorney then the reliability doesn’t matter- but at this point must also satisfy due process
rights. What if the ID is then made again in court? When the out of court ID is kept out
because it violates the 6th, the in court ID is also kept out unless you can show by clear and
convincing evidence that the ID in court is independent of the tainted ID made out of court.
Neil v. Biggers (don’t worry about this case).
 Reliability Factors include: witness opportunity to view ∆ during the crime, witness
degree of attention, accuracy of witness prior descriptions, levels of witness certainty in
making ID, length of time between crime & ID
 Manson v. Brathwaite
 Facts: Glover was undercover police; bought drugs from suspect; described
suspect to another police officer; 2 days later the other police officer put a picture
of the suspect on Glover’s desk; Glover said it was the same guy he bought drugs
from; Glover made positive in court ID
 Issue: so suggestive that ID (not in court ID, that just goes to independent basis)
would be excluded?
 Ct looks to Neil v. Biggers
o Suspect was convicted of rape on evidence of his visual and voice ID
at one-person stationhouse show up that was 7 mos. after the crime
o Central issue: was the ID reliable under the totality of circumstances
even though a suggestive procedure was used?
o Ct determined that there was no substantial likelihood of mis-ID on
those facts
o Here, Biggers would say that the admission of testimony concerning
a suggestive and unnecessary ID procedure does not violate DP so
long as the ID process is reliable.
o But Biggers was pre-Stovall, and there might be a different rule post-
Stovall
 Analysis
o D argues that the ID was suggestive (one photo) and unnecessary (no
ER); proposes per se exclusionary rule
o Ct says that there is a split in circuits and there are 2 rules being
applies to such out of court ID’s
 2 approaches: per se exclusion or totality of circumstances
o #1-Per Se Exclusion
 Focuses on procedures, and excludes evidence of out of
court ID if obtained through unnecessary and suggestive
procedures
 Policies:
o Eliminiting evidence w/ questionable
reliability
o Deterrence of po and pros
o Assures against risk of mis-ID
 Need independent basis for ID other than the suggestive
ID (seeing at the crime)
o #2-Totality of the Circumstances (ct says more lenient)
 If reliabile, it outweighs the suggestiveness.
 Ct says the per se rule goes too far b/c it excludes reliable evidence

 Compare two approaches
 Reliability-per se rule goes too far b/c excludes reliable evidence; Totality
test is better
 Deterrence -per se more deterrent, but totality will have police influence
too
 Administration of justice-per se rule has drawbacks; denies jury reliable
evidence and D may go free
 Ct picks totality of circumstances/reliability test
 Rule: if and only if D can show ID was suggestive, the ct will look at 5
factors
 What Good courts do: Is it suggestive? Then, is it reliable? Then, re-look
at the suggestiveness, then rule.
o If suggestiveness outweighs reliability, you can suppress both
in court ID and pretrial ID
o But if suggestive DOES NOT outweigh reliability, then both
pretrial ID and post-trial ID out
 5 factors to determine if reliability outweighs suggestiveness from Biggers
 Opportunity of witness at time of crime to view ∆.
 Witnesses degree of attention
 like red dye explodes after robbery and draws attention to perpetrator
 Accuracy of description given before the ID
 Witnesses level of certainty at confrontation
 Time btwn. the crime and the identification
(weigh these factors against the suggestiveness of the ID)
o Dissent:
 Would choose the per se exclusionary rule
 It’s not inflexible b/c in court ID can be admitted as long as it’s independent
 Other exclusionary rules criticized because they exclude reliable/relevant evidence, but
suggestive witness ID’s are excluded b/c they are unreliable
 DP violations should be measured by police conduct, but ct is basing DP violation on
how likely it is that D is guilty or not
o A good ID is where the individual is ID’d for the first time when seen by the victim/witness
and the identifier never misidentifies and then identifies in court.
o Unreliability is seen 1) in the way you construct the scenario or 2) how the identification
scenario is implemented (telling that the perp is in the lineup). Probably need pretty strong
evidence to show reliability.
 Fruits of the poisonous tree- can’t use the fruits of bad conduct.
 Critical stage- one that would be detrimental to the suspects right to trial if counsel was absent.

Standing
10:53 AM
24-Nov-08
 Review:
 Next class 1:15 thurs start
 Last class: ID’s—trilogy of wade-gilbert-stovall; ct enumerated protections for D’s for ID procedures
 Wade-when D in 6th Am country, D has right to atty at line-up or show up (corporeal proceding); he can
waive the right; if he does not waive, that evidence inadmissable; in court ID can be admissable if witness
had independent basis for ID, not from recollection of tainted lineup, but form getting good look at D at
time of crime
 Kirby-ct limited protection to right only arising after ind/arr
 Ash-right n/a to photo arrays even after indictment (6th Am country)
 Stovall-made clear that DP applies in ID procedures where ID is so suggestive, b/c of exigency,
suggestive ID ok if necessary, but police should avoid suggestive procedures and can lead to DP violation
 #1-is there suggestiveness, if NO, no DP violation; if yes, then ct will look at reliability factors; both out
of ct and in court can be admissable if reliability outweighs suggestion
 “Standing” to Object to the Admission of Evidence
• If you are not the party aggrieved you have no basis to challenge.
o Alderman v. United States
 The suppression of the product of 4th Amendment violation can only be urged by those
whose rights were violated by the search itself, not those who are simply aggrieved by
the introduction of the damaging evidence.
 What it means: only the D whose 4th Am rights were violated can assert exclusionary
rule; if the evidence was obtained in violation of someone’s 4th Am rights, it does not
matter unless it was YOUR 4th Am rights
o You can only raise 4th Am/excl rule challenge if you were personally
victim of unreasonable police activity
 Dissent: says that exclusionary rule is supposed to deter police, as GENERAL
prohibition and this rule only applies to ONE person
o Alderman rule limits the number of ppl who can bring up the police
misconduct and get excl rule applied
o Padilla mentioned on FN of 173
 If one is charged as a co-conspirator, no expectation of privacy therefore no privacy.
o Payner
 IRS suspicious of Americans banking in Bahamas and one particular bank; when bank
official came to US for visit, IRS agents stole his suitcase and photographed hundreds of docs
from it; used to convict Payner one of the bank customers for fedl income tax violations;
Payner challenged the illegallity of the search and sought to exclude it, but his 4th rights were
not violated, the bank ee’s rights were… payner had no expectation of privacy in banker's
briefcase.
 Procedural:
 lower ct excluded the evidence under supervisory powers not 4th Am b/c of blatant
illegality of IRS actions (only other time was mcnabb-mallory)
 SCOTUS let the evidence in, was not going to make an exception to the standing
requirement of 4th excl rule (does not want cts to “indiscriminately” apply the rule);
bright line rule
o Jones
 Jones was occupying house of a friend; po searched house and used drug evidence against
Jones; ct said he can challenge the search b/c he was legit on the premises and he also had
automatic standing b/c nature of crime;
 b/c D convicted of narcotics possession; nature of narcotics makes it so you don’t want

to admit possession of them b/c that’s the crime BUT (self-incrimination) in order to
raise your standing to challenge an illegal 4th Am search, he had to admit possession
 Not fair to put D in position to argue 4th Am violation that he needs to admit possession of
drugs which self-incriminates him
 So ct says you don’t need to admit possession to prove standing in this situation; D has
automatic standing
o Simmons
 No more automatic standing; D must testify to possession to get standing , but the testimony
can’t be used by govt in crim trial on issue of guilt (so this means it can be used to impeach
him though if he takes stand or when the govt C/Es you they can bring up your standing
testimony)
 Salvucci-No automatic standing for 4th Amendment violations.
 Simmons says cant use statement in trial anymore and no reason to give automatic
standing in possessory crime. .. Mereley being charged with cocaine doesn’t give you
right to challenge automatically. If you're legitimately on the premisis, then you can
get standing.
 Prosecutorial contradiction—they are simultaneously maintaining that the D possessed the
good, but was not subject to 4th Am deprivation
o Residential Premises
 Alderman-if you are member of family regularly residing in a home, you can raise 4th
violation about the search even if you weren’t home when search happened (even if property
seized was someone else’s in the house)
 Jones-anyone on premises where search occurs has 4th Am challenge
 Ct limits Jones by Rakas—Jones correct outcome b/c Jones had a legit expectation of privacy
in the premises he was using even though his interest was not a CL property interest
 Minn. v Olsen-D’s status of overnight guest gave him reas expec of privacy in home
searched; he could challenge search under 4th
o Businesses
 Mankusi-police seized records belong to official from an office D shared with several other
union officials
 Crucial issue: did the D have a REP in the area searched?
 Here, yes, he did even though he shared space with others.
 Rule: indiv or corp in possession of business premises has standing and so do ee’s if there is a
nexus btwn the area searched and their work space
o Car passengers
o Rakas v. Illinois- a passenger in someones else’s car challenging the search
 Facts: D’s were passengers in car suspected of being getaway car in robbery; car stopped and
police found sawed off shotgun under passenger seat and shells in glove box
 Issue: can passengers challenge search of glove box and passenger seat on which they were
sitting?
 lower ct let the evidence in to convict them and scotus affirmed;
 Rule: b/c the passengers did not have reas exp of privacy in the areas of the car where the gun
and shells were found, it could come in against them
 Analysis should focus on the extent of the D’s 4th Am rights, rather than “separate” standing
consideration; question is whether “challenged search or seizure violated the 4th Am rights of
the D trying to exclude it”
 Passenger doesn’t have standing because no ownership of car or gun or shells. Jones was
different: jones or driver have a key, but a passenger does not have reasonable expectation of
privacy
 Search-when govt intrudes in area where person has REP; standing to challenge only happens
when YOU had REP in that area
 Standing should depend on whether the police action sought to be challenged is a search with
respect to the person challenging the intrusion. Essentially, did the disputed search and
seizure infringe an interest of the ∆ which the 4th Amendment was designed to protect?
 Hypo-it would be diff if the driver and the passenger were hub/wife, b/c of that relationship,
that passenger would have REP; merely being passenger does not confer standing, but

sometimes a relationship with driver/owner of car would change that
 Later brendlin case—the passengers could have challenged the initial seizure of the car and
them if they were not free to leave and if there was no RAS or PC to pull over the car in first
place; and if evidence flowed from the illegal seizure, then they could challenge the evidence
that way even if they couldn’t show possessory interest
 So, merely being a passenger doesn't give automatic standing.
 Another argument for standing: when they stopped his car this could have been a
seizure under 4th.
o Rawlings v. KY
 Rejected agmt that D could challenge search of someone else’s purse b/c D claimed
ownership of property (drugs) seized during search
 Rawlings and Cox were guests at Marquess house; police were coming to arrest Marquess
and Rawlings dumped drugs into Cox’s purse; Marquess not there to be arrested but police
were looking for him in house and saw drug evidence; so got search warrrant for the house
for drugs now; made Cox empty her purse and Rawlings admitted ownership of the drugs;
Rawlings did not have standing to challenge the purse search b/c he admitted that he did not
have expectation of privacy in Cox’s purse and other factors (he did not know her long, etc)
 he wanted to have standing to challenge the search b/c he claimed possessory
interest/ownership of the drugs, but ct says no, prop law does not control, REP does
 what factors went to him not having REP in purse:
 he only knew her for a few days
 he had not been keeping things in the purse before, this was first time he put something
in purse
 he did not have right to exclude anyone else from purse
 he admitted that he didn’t have REP in purse
 so even admitting ownership does not give you standing to challenge search, you need to
have REP to have standing
o Brendlin v. California
 A passenger as well as the driver within the meaning of the 4th can challenge the
constitutionality of the stop of a vehicle because a passenger and driver are both seized as the
result of a stop.
 The passenger is seized when a reasonable person does not feel free to terminate the
encounter.
 Facts: sheriffs stopped car to check regis for no reason; one deputy recognized the D,
passenger, as parole violator, D ordered out of car, arrested, searched; police found meth on
him; D charged with possession and man ufacture; he challenged the traffic stop was
unlawful seizure of his person and the drugs were fruits;
 Police said drugs were result of search incident to arrest
 lower ct said the officers did not have grounds to stop car (ras or pc) but evidence was
admissable; ct said passenger free to leave
 SCOTUS disagreed with lower ct; the evidence should be out; D was not saying that the
search of vehicle violated his rights, but said that traffic stop was unlawful seizure of his
person; the inquiry is would a reasonable passenger have felt free to terminate the encounter
with the police?
 Any reasonable passenger would not have felt free to leave w/o police permission
 Review: seizure is objective test based on mind of suspect; would RPP feel free to
leave after car was seized? Driver and passenger were both seized? Not subjective.
Does not matter what the officer's motive or intent was.
 Diff from Rakas-pass had expectation of privacy in car; here the claim is the illegal
seizure and what flowed from there was inadmissable
 Its objective test based on rpp not subjective test based on po motivation (po intent was
to stop the driver, did not care about passenger)
 Ct does not want evidence of arbitrary traffic stop to be admitted against all passengers
 D was seized from the moment the car acquiesced to police traffic stop (not at point of
arrest)

 First thing they did was stop the car; did they have RAS to stop the car? Here, no. you can’t
stop car w/o RAS. So what flowed from there would have been unlawful and inadmissable
also.
o Minn v. Olsen
 Whether overnight guest in house has REP; has automatic standing to challenge 4th Am
violations
o Minnesota v. Carter
 Facts: informant told police he was walking by a house and saw people bagging white
powder through window; police go and see same thing through blinds;
 Sidenote: Was this a search? ct did not say, but prof says yes b/c if you expose things in
your house, then you have no REP, but if you have blinds and po peek in them, then
your REP is vilated and that’s a search
 More facts: in the process of getting search warrant when D’s left home in vehicle and were
stopped and arrested; police search of vehicle found coke
 D’s were only in the apt for 2.5 hrs purely to use the apt to bag coke and gave Thomspon
coke to let them use her house to do it there
 Analysis: SCOTUS-A person can reasonably expect privacy in someone else’s home, like
where they spend the night, but here, NO:
 D was not spending night
 This was purely a business transaction
 D at house for relatively short time (2.5 hrs)
 lack of connection between the visitors and the lessee
 ALL shows they did not have REP in the premises and so can’t raise 4th Am right
violation
 Ct did not reach issue of whether the police officer conduct was a search when he looked
through the window
 Scalia concurs-says don’t use Katz, a “self-indulgent” test
 Kennedy concurs—his view is that almost all social guests have REP in host home and this
case supports that, but to prof, this is not really clear from the case
 Ginsburg Dissent—doesn’t care why the guest is there, for commercial purpose or social one,
they should have REP just as host does, they share the REP; police will use this case to get
evidence on home guests as long as they are not spending night; katz says we protect ppl
NOT places.
 So after this, daytime guests for business purposes do not have standing; overnight guests do;
daytime guests for social visits--?
 Standing and reasonable expectation of privacy are used interchangeably.
o The best REP is in one’s person. This expectation still exists in your person when you are in
someone else’s vehicle. An REP also exists in medical information.
 No REP in your physical characteristics (face, voice, etc.)
 No REP in the pen register- what phone numbers you’ve dialed etc. The conversation itself is
private, but the fact you called isn’t.
o There is an REP in one’s home- particularly against intrusion, even when there is no physical entry.
 Where a ∆ can claim REP in someone else’s home… Overnight guests have an REP. But no
REP for non-overnight guests present with consent.
 No REP in a prison cell. Lesser expectation of privacy when someone is arrested, but that
doesn’t mean it disappears altogether.
o Note curtilage- outside the curtilage no REP

Fruit of Poisonous Tree
11:26 AM
 Fruit of the Poisonous Tree

o Defined=evidence derived illegally from an unconst source is not admiss, and neither is evidence
that flows from it, even indirectly; derivitive evidence not admissable flowing from evidence
illegally obtained.
o We are studying the exceptions to the fruits rule
o Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States
 The government cannot use information obtained during an illegal search to subpoena the
very documents illegally viewed,
 BUT if in addition to the illegal source for the info, you had an independent lawful source, or
a legal way you came by the info, then the evidence MAY be admissable. (“independent
source doctrine”)
 Second exception is “attenuation” which means weakening; even if evidence is come at
illegally, and no ind source, if the effect of the orig illegality has weakened over time, then
exclus rule will not be applied; almost always used when D makes statement as result of
illegal arrest; if b/c of time and intervening circumstance, does not play a sig role anymore in
producing the statement
o Wong Sun v. United States- verbal evidence as “fruit”
 6 narco agents illegally broke into toy laundry; chased toy back into his living quarters;
cuffed him; toy told po that yee had been selling drugs; yee surrendered heroin and
implicated toy to 3rd party wong sun
 So are the drugs admissable ag toy?
 No b/c the illegal seizure of toy lead to the drugs being found on yee
 Can yee challenge the drugs found on his person?
 No, no standing for search of Toy's search… search was to toy not him.
 He has standing to challenge the search of himself, but can’t challenge the illegal
search of toy b/c his rights were not intruded upon
 Could challenge that the info leading to the warrant was not reliable
 But govt could argue good faith exception b/c there was a warrant issued
 Wong sun
 The effectof the unconst arrest weakened/attenuated over time
 Statement was not made til 2 days after illegal arrest; wong sun was free; he came back
to station to make statement on his own
 But for arrest he may not have made statement, still, the other factors can make it reas
to conclude that the statement was really not the product of the illegal arrest so no need
to apply excl rule
□ No strict BUT FOR test. Look to impact of illegal arrest on ultimate statement.
Here, he was let go, got to talk to friends and lawyer, and after 2 days, the
"poison" had weakened. So 4th amendment was violated, but exclusionary rule
is not applied.
 Verbal evidence which derives so immediately from an unlawful entry and an unauthorized
arrest is no less the ‘fruit’ of official illegality than the more common tangible fruits of the
unwarranted intrusion.
o Exceptions
 Independent source
 Attenuation: although illegality occurred, its impact has weakened over time.
 Doctrine of inevitable discovery
Review:

-standing-does D have right to challenge evi used ag him?
-4th Am is indiv right protection; unless you can claim your rights were violated, you have no standing to
challenge intro of evidence (Alderman)
-Payner-when lower ct tried to get around standing using supervisory powers, SCOTUS said no, even if
ridic conduct by po
-auto standing-if you are charged with possessory crime, you have auto have right to challenge intro of
drugs against you in trial; also if legit on premises, you have standing to challenge the search
-that got wittled away-in simmons-when D says drugs are mine to get standing, pros no longer able to use
the admission at trial
-salvucci-no longer do D’s have auto standing b.c charged with possessory crimes; they can make
challenge and admit they are his but can’t be used ag him at trial in pros case in chief, but can be used in
C/E
-issue, can evi be used ag passenger in car; passenger has no standing to challenge search of car; not b/c
legit on permises; only need REP in order to get standing; if relationship with owner you might have
standing; only way rakas could have had standing was to say the seizure was improper
-passenger has standing to challenge the stop of a car b/c passenger freedom restrained to leave; evi
flowed from illegal seizure was not admissable
-saying drugs are yours do not give you standing anymore (rawlings); you still need REP in area drugs
found; factors used to say why he has no REP
-standing guest has in someone elses’ house-olsen-if stay overnight you have auto standing; carter-
daytime guest does not have auto standing; if daytime guest for bus reason, you have no standing; if
daytime guest w/ social purpose, you might have REP/standing
-fruits of poisonous tree-exception to excl rule-the 4/5/6 has been violated, in addition to leon, good faith
exception, there are other exceptions; fruit/derivitave evidence rule; no only direct evidence suppressed,
but derivitive evidence suppressed too
Exceptions: independent source-lawful ind source leads to discovery of evidece, as well as unlawful
source; excl rule not applied if ind lawful source
Attenuation doctrine-illegallity, but effectof illegality weakens over time, so no need to suppress;
statement taken from D after illegal seizure, is time/manner of statement attenuated such that don’t need
to suppress evidence later secured (wong sun); intervening factors and time make const violation much
less and no need to suppress
Attenuation (continued)
o Brown v. Illinois- confession as the “fruit”
 D arrested on less than PC, so it was illegal full blown seizure (4th Am violation)
 After his Miranda warnings, he waived and made incriminating statement (so 5th Am
complied with)
 Miranda warnings were not good enough because miranda protects under 5th
amendment… and here illegal arrest under 4th amendment.
 Ct says no attenuation (to exclude evidence)
 Not admissible here
 Factors:
 How much time between arrest and confession (2 hours here)? How flagrant did po
act? Were miranda warnings given?
o The longer pd of time btwn seizure and statement, the more attenuation
o If intentional bad faith conduct by po, the less likely attenuation occurred
o New York v. Harris
 Where the police have probable cause to arrest a suspect, the exclusionary rule does not
bar the use of a statement made by the suspect outside his home even though the
statement is obtained after an in home arrest in violation of Payton
 po need warrant/exception to arrest you in home, and they did not; the statement that
flowed therefrom in the home was OUT; but the statement made outside home was
admissable).
 Because PC existed, the statement OUTSIDE the house was admissible.
 BUT if no PC, probably the statement outside the house would be out too.
 When police pull you out of house, if have PC but no warrant, the statement out of

house is admissable
□ If it's one statement, remember, then illegal entry means whole statement is
supressed.
o Segura v. United States
 Ind source rule-po had warrant for drugs in back room; did not say when applied to warrant
that they saw the drugs when in house first time and that’s why they knew they were there;
they gave ind evi of why they knew about the drugs, which was from the warrant
 Whether the initial entry was illegal or not was irrelevant to the question of admissibility and
exclusion of evidence seized pursuant to the search was not warranted as FOP à the evidence
from the warranted search is not excluded.
 Never actually seized the evidence in the back room--only glanced at it, and they had warrant
from independent information… separate source
o Murray v. United States
 Po illegally entered warehouse; marijuana observed by officers; then got warrant and came
back; in affadavit, put ind source evidence
 Rule: Evidence observed by the police during an illegal entry of premises need not be
excluded if such evidence is subsequently discovered during the execution of an
otherwise valid search warrant sought and issued on the basis of information wholly
unconnected to the prior entry.
 Po have PC to search house; break in; look for evi and if nothing there, no big deal;
saves trouble of getting warrant; if find evi, use your old PC to apply for warrant, not
fact that you saw stuff; this is perfectly fine under Murray
o United States v. Ceccolini- “tainted witness”
 Attenuation: Live witness can’t be fruit b/c person has free will to testify, even if po find
out their ID from a 4th Am violation, the person has free will to testify, so no fruits.
 An officer discovered illegal gambling slips while in a flower shop visiting a friend
who was an employee of the ∆. The employee confirmed the gambling slips belonged
to the ∆.
 Holding: A witness’ testimony should not have been suppressed because there was sufficient
attenuation between the illegal search and the testimony at trial.
 Note willingness of witness to freely testify
 Never going to have a fruit of poisonous tree issue with an independent witness.
o Williams- “Inevitable Discovery” Doctrine
 There had been a systematic search of an area for a little girl which ∆’s (illegally questioned)
incriminating statements revealed.
 Rule: evidence obtained in violation of 4/5/6 is admissable if it inevitably would have
been discovered.
 Does not matter if po act in good faith or not.
 What is burden of proof? the burden of proof is only preponderance of the evidence, so only
“more likely than not” that it would have been inevitably discovered
 Doctrine: if more than likely they would have come up with evidence anyway, let the
evidence in.
 Whether officer acted in good faith doesn't matter.
o IF const violation and exclusionary rule going to apply, 1) good faith, OR 2) does ind source rule,
3) attenuation apply? 4) is it more likely than not that po have found the evidence anyway
(inevitable discovery)? If so, no exclusionary rule applied.
 Use of Illegally Obtained Evidence for Impeachment Purposes
o Harris v. New York
 When statement taken in violation of miranda, pros can use it in C/E if D takes stand
and perjures himself, just can’t use the statement in case in chief.
 Remember prof’s case
 The privilege to testify in one’s defense cannot be construed to include the right to commit
perjury.
 Statements made following an arrest which contradicted trial testimony can be
admitted.
o Same for 4th Am violations-Havens-if evi seized in vio of 4th, then that evi can be used if D

takes the stand, and says he never had drugs on him, then pros can C/E him on that, and use
it to impeach him.
o Massiah violation-in 6th, it can also be used to impeach him.
o Great story about guy chopping up his GF, grossman put on video of confession to impeach D
when he was put on stand even though statement was supressed for miranda violation.
Final Review
-essay will be on last half; MCQ’s worth 3 pts each tot of 10 will be on whole yr, 1 40 pt essay
Timing: 30 min on MCQ; use 1 hr 15 mins on essay
Essay content: Statements, ID, standing, fruits
How do we challenge statement? (4 ways)
-classic coersion (beat it out or intense psych techniques); violates 5th and DP
-Miranda 5th
-6th Am
-4th Am-illegal seizure led to statement
Does the right apply?
-if right does not apply, then does not matter if they don’t conform to req.
-if it applies, did they conform? How do they conform? If not, what is remedy?
-classic coersion-does it apply? If use physical force or psych elements; remedy is statement is
suppressed.
-miranda 5th-does it apply? Applies when custody and interrogation? Custody is when reas person would
feel freedom restrained in sig way. Determines same as full blown seizure. If custody, also needs to be
interrogation. Need to always both talk about custoy + interrogation. Interrogation is express questioning
about crime or functional equivalent thereof which are words or actions by police that would be reas
likely to elicit statement from D (Innis). If custody and interrogation, then miranda applies. How do po
conform to miranda? Must give 4 miranda warnings. Were the warnings given adequately, touch all
bases? Must give all 4; if po deliberately misleads, they might be inadequate
-6th Am-does it apply? Was D indicted/ arraigned. massiah-if applies, po forbidden from deliberately
eliciting a statement? If applies, po conform if give miranda and D waives. Deliberately elicit=Words or
actions that are liely to create a situation that will induce D to make a statement; jail plant who engages
conversation violates 6th but not miranda; if break in time btwn jail plant convo and admission, it’s OK;
6th Am is offense specific; only applies to crime D indicted/arraigned for (depends on lesser included
defense)
-miranda applies only when in custody; 6th applies whether or not in custody
-if D asks for atty, in miranda, po can’t ask him about anything unless he initiates
-not a miranda violation if the sister gets him a atty, and po don’t let him know that, but this would violate
6th Am if in 6th Am country b/c po can’t interfere with him and atty in 6th Am country
-if arrest in house, and take statemnt out of house w/ PC, the statement admissable
-attenuation-time elapsed? Flagrant police? Miranda given?
-waiver? Mere silence not waiver, but not much more required.
-asking for anyone other than atty does not invoke atty
-waiver is subjective whereas custody is objective.
-if D makes qualified waiver, will speak but not write, that is OK.
-when D invokes his rights
-if wants to remain silent, under mosely, po can come back and question him as log as scrupulously honor
right to silence; wait reas time, give miranda again, waived.
-if D asks for counsel; po cannot wqustion him unless he initiates the questioning; if he talks about
general discussion about SM of investigation, that is OK; not offense specific, so they can’t talk to him
about ANY case at all, even if not the same case
-asking for atty needs to be crystal clear
-miranda exception-public safety exception-if po need for safety reasons to get at evidence, its amissable
-4/5-classic/6 all have fruits
-miranda and fruits?-none (elstad); unless statement leads to second statement that is product of first.
-IDs-2 ways to challenge; 6th – applies only in 6th Am country; how complied with? If D in corporeal ID
(lineup, showup), he msut have counsel or affirmatively waive counsel; if not, using it at trial violates his
6th rights, but pros can still get in court ID if it has an independent basis from the bad ID (n/a to photo
arrays)
-DP-D must say suggestiveness of ID outweighs reliability; was there suggestiveness? If none, no DP

issue; if suggestive, weigh it against reliability. Reliability factors—how good a look did witness get at
time? Paying attn? description? Certainty? How much time elapsed from crim to ID. if reliability
outweighs sugestiveness, both out and in ct ids are admissable. If reliability does not outweigh, then both
inadmissable.
Standing-is the person rights violated; if not, no claim.
4th -Does person have REP in area to be searched. Car, overnight guest. Fact that toy beat up and illegally
arrested does not mean that his coD can challenge, he can’t. also comes up if seized illegally.
Fruits-secondary evidence derived from illgality is inadmissable just as the direct evidence as result of
violation is.
Exceptions?
Ind source? Attenuation? Doctrine of inevitable discovery?
TOT: 1 hr 45 min.
25-Nov-08
Exam Review
 If there is a joint access, the ∆s share the risk that everyone can be brought in. However, if both ∆s are
there (they can only waive their own rights)- if
o See Randolph v. Georgia
 There are 4 ways to get in a house: consent, exigency, search warrant, and an arrest warrant. An arrest
warrant under Peyton includes a search warrant for the arrestee’s home provided there is reasonable cause
there is reason to believe the arrestee is present at the time
o Even when the warrant clause is the one controlling the entry, there is always a reasonableness
limitation upon the execution of an otherwise limitless warrant.
 Don’t need to knock and announce unless there is reason to believe a person will leave or
drugs be destroyed. Assuming the only way to get into the home is an arrest warrant and there
reasonable cause exists, reasonableness limitation dictates I can only go to places where it
would be reasonable to find the suspect.
 Regarding an individual who cuts short his Miranda warnings and says he already knows them- then it
becomes a factual question as to whether there was a knowing and intelligent waiver under totality of the
circumstances.
o Where there is an incident whether the cops know the individual knows his Miranda rights, like
Warnken, cannot assume he knows Miranda. Should still give him his rights.
 Harmless error where you’re, for example, Mirandizing a wealthy person and you forget to
says that if he can’t afford one, they will appoint one for him.
 Harmless Error and the 4th Amendment
o If the court made an error (i.e. someone filed a suppression motion to keep something out, like line-
ups under the 6th, and lost, then that evidence was permitted in), if you can demonstrate the judge
was incorrect and the evidence was inadmissible, then you win. New trial UNLESS it can be
demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that even though the evidence was not admissible, that
error did not contribute to the verdict, then the judgment is not reversible.
 HYPO: Warnken is in line with classmates to go to the casket of Kennedy. While in line, on
TV Oswald was shot. Suppose a confession was beat out of the killer of Oswald and the
testimony of the witnesses. The confession of the killer, even though unconstitutional, beyond
a reasonable doubt, there would be substantially the same verdict.
 Arizona v. Fulminate- Court extends the harmless error doctrine to prophylactic rules (to keep
out evidence to deter police misconduct) to facts that go to the integrity of the fact-finding
process.
 Remedy for violation of the 6th Amendment- like an improper ID or a statement comes in, then in terms
of this course, the remedy is a new trial. Don’t forget there is also a right to be free of counsel under the
6th Amendment.
 Process for Voluntariness Analysis
o If there is litigation over the admissibility of a statement, any statements are always analyzed under
voluntariness totality of the circumstances, which burdens the government to prove the
admissibility of the statement. But if the facts force you to look at arrest as well, then also have to
analyzed Miranda as well as voluntariness which applies all the time. If there is ANY information
telling that a suspect has been formally charged (i.e. arraignment), then the 6th has to be analyzed
(has the right to counsel been violated?).

 5th & 6th Amendment Overlap- 5th = cop questions, 6th = attorney questions
o Trying to figure out whether the individual is under arrest, formally charged, or both
 If under arrest, 5th Amendment rights apply to ALL questions
 If both or if just formally charged, then must do additional analysis to decide whether the
suspect was asked a question related to one or more questions related to what he is charged
with or whether he asked a question not related- questioning is a critical stage.
 Illegal search & seizure- what are the admissibility of statements?
o 5th Amendment totality, 5th Miranda right to counsel, 6th right to counsel.
o If the government prevails on all 3 grounds, then the statement can’t be kept out one would think.
However, if the suspect was arrested without probable cause, for the purpose of the 5th Amendment,
it doesn’t matter if the arrest was lawful or unlawful, then the statement may become fruit of the
poisonous tree and a tenuation of the taint. The arrest it and of itself being bad does not mean the
suspect can suppress himself. Can only argue the evidence seized pursuant to the arrest. If the
underlying arrest was invalid, then keep out the evidence and the otherwise voluntary statement as
fruit of the poisonous tree.
 The giving of Miranda in and of itself does not undue the harm of illegal police conduct.

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Introduction

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Maryland v. Pringle (2003) – police stopped a car for speeding (@3am) and searched it to find narcotics

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Review from last class:

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 United v. Sokolow- totality of the circumstances

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Extent and Scope of Temporary Seizure

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Temporary Seizure of Effects

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Expansion of Protective Searches

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 Administrative Searches (not on the midterm)

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Midterm will cover consent, but nothing after consent

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