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For all the differences between Alexander Lukashenko and Mikheil Saakashvili, their
attitude to demonstrations by the opposition is very similar. This proposition may
sound criminal until you look at it through the lens of the law.
By law both Lukashenko and Saakashvili had every right to break up any
unsanctioned demonstration. This happened in Minsk last winter and in Tbilisi on
May 25. The consequences and response were completely different, but this isn’t the
point, even though there was a lack of objectivity in how they were portrayed. But
everyone has the right to political interpretation, and we do not live in an absolutely
black and white world.
However, as regards Saakashvili, especially after his performance with clubs and
police and his attempts to blame opposition leader Nino Burdzhanadze for the death
of a policeman during the effort to break up the rally, the change of attitude is
becoming more obvious. In this volatile time of Arab revolutions and universal protest
against authoritarian rule (against dictators, tyrants, satraps and autocratic rulers) it is
very difficult to apply double standards – to see some things in one place and turn a
blind eye to very similar things in others.
All American and European newspapers acknowledge that the change of attitude to
Georgia and in Georgia itself would be much more pronounced if Saakashvili did not
have Russia for a neighbor. Both the West and Georgia make allowances for Georgia’s
proximity to Russia in order not to be blamed for being too pro-Russian.
The process of updating the view of the Georgian president, as well as his government
and entourage, is bound to develop faster after the events of May 21-25. It will hardly
lead to an early change in the Tbilisi regime. Nobody is predicting a change of power
in Georgia before 2013 unless the opposition becomes strong enough for that, but for
the time being this looks unlikely.
However, the attitude toward Saakashvili is obviously changing. Many more people
understand now that democracy and Saakashvili are not synonymous and that
Georgia and Saakashvili are different things.
These metamorphoses are taking place not only in the expert community but also,
tacitly, in the U.S. administration. Jackson Diehl from The Washington Post wrote
about Saakashvili: “The truth is that it would be considerably easier for the United
States to defend Georgia and its democracy [the author means 'from Russia' without
mentioning this] if it did not have to defend — and depend on — Saakashvili
himself…The crude public attacks on him by Putin and sidekick Dmitry Medvedev,
who publicly called him a ‘lunatic’ and ‘bastard,’ have only served to strengthen
Saakashvili both in Washington and Tbilisi.” This is usually said when it is clear that
someone has become a burden but “he’s our son-of-a-bitch” and must be defended so
that there is some counterweight to the Russian bear.
Here is another brilliant passage worth quoting in full. Paul Saunders, executive
director of The Nixon Center, wrote: “Ultimately, however, it wouldn’t matter to
Georgia’s president whether the United States was a democracy, a theocracy or ruled
by Martians so long as he could use Washington to change the dynamics of Georgian-
Russian relations.”
Saakashvili should be given high marks for his ability to manipulate public opinion.
He is indeed very good at brainwashing his donors.
On the eve of U.S. Vice President Joe Biden’s visit to Tbilisi in 2009, Saakashvili
announced election reforms (direct elections of city mayors) and promised the
opposition a cable channel for broadcasting all over Georgia. Biden, who is susceptible
to flattery, was surrounded with such attention that he promised Misha (Saakashvili)
an alliance for a long time to come. His words carried little weight but had a big
propaganda effect.
In the summer of 2010, Tbilisi was looking forward to the arrival of U.S. Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton. It was important to determine how much Tbilisi could rely on
the support of the Obama administration. The opposition to Saakashvili was growing
and his former supporters were quitting his camp. Tbilisi was dying for a show of U.S.
sympathy.
It did not conceal that if Ms Clinton mentioned even once “Georgia’s illegally
occupied territories” (that is, Abkhazia and South Ossetia), the visit could be regarded
a success. However, on this point Clinton was evasive. She said only that Washington
does not agree with the presence of Russian troops in Abkhazia and South Ossetia,
and that the U.S. and Russia are working together through the OSCE Minsk Group to
settle the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict even though they cannot agree on Georgia. On
her tour, Clinton repeatedly emphasized that although Moscow and Washington are
resetting their relations, they will not necessarily agree on every issue. This statement
was intended to encourage the opponents of the reset, while not committing the
Obama administration to anything specific. But Clinton could have said the same
about the U.S. relations with Israel, France or Germany. It’s diplomatic boilerplate,
nothing more. The expectations of the Saakashvili regime were not quite justified.
Autocratic inheritance
“I think that Misha tends toward the authoritarian,” said Scott Horton, a human rights
lawyer in the United States who taught Mr. Saakashvili when he was a student at
Columbia Law School in the mid-1990s, later hired him at a law firm in New York,
and has remained friendly with him. He mentioned Saakashvili’s attitude to
presidential prerogatives and authority, attempts to marginalize the parliament and
belittle the opposition.
But it cannot all be laid at Saakashvili’s door. Authoritarian tendencies are regional
specialty.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s and do not necessarily represent those of
RIA Novosti.