Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sage.
Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Sage Publications, Inc. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal of
Conflict Resolution.
http://www.jstor.org
A Conflict Analysis of the
Armenian-Azerbaijani Dispute
NIALL M. FRASER
KEITH W. HIPEL
JOHN JAWORSKY
RALPH ZULJAN
Universityof Waterloo
Inthefollowingsections,a comprehensiveconflictanalysis,usingDecision-
Maker,is presented.Two separatepoints in time have been chosen to model
the conflict.The firstmoment,18 October1988, precedesthe centralgovern-
ment's imposition of a "special administration"for the NKAO in January
1989, after escalating tensions between Armenians and Azerbaijanis;the
second momentselected, 30 January1990, coincides with Moscow sending
in large-scale militaryforces to end a massive outbreakof intercommunal
violence throughoutArmeniaand Azerbaijan.Each conflict model is intro-
duced by a historicalbackgroundsection. After the model is specified and
the resultsare determined,a discussion of the resultsfollows.
TABLE 1
Decision Makersand Optionsfor the October1988 Conflict Model
TABLE 1 Continued
sensitivity tests were performed,and these showed that several other equi-
libriacan occur.However,none alterthe conclusionsdrawnfrom the present
model.
TABLE2
Decision Makers'Preferencesand
Their Meaningsfor the October1988 Conflict Model
Decision Maker
and Preferences Meaning
1. Moscow
2 Moscow maintainsthe statusquo.
-5 The Armenianpeople do not demonstrate.
7 The Azerbaijanigovernmentmaintainsthe statusquo for NKAO.
-8 TheAzerbaijanigovernmentdoesnottryto integrateNKAOintoAzerbaijan.
-1 Moscow does not transferNKAO to Armenia.
-10 The Azerbaijanipeople do not retaliateagainstthe Armenians.
-9 The Azerbaijanipeople do not applypressureon theArmeniansin NKAO.
-4 The Armeniangovernmentdoes not supportthe demandsto incorporate
NKAO into Armenia.
6 The Armeniandissidentsagitateopenly.
3 Moscow improvesconditionsfor Armeniansin NKAO.
2. Armeniangovernment
3 Moscow improvesconditionsfor Armeniansin NKAO.
4 The Armeniangovernmentsupportsthe demandsto incorporateNKAO
into Armenia.
-10 The Azerbaijanipeople do not retaliateagainstthe Armenians.
I Moscow transfersNKAO to Armenia.
-8 TheAzerbaijanigovernmentdoes nottryto integrateNKAOintoAzerbaijan.
-9 The Azerbaijanipeople do not applypressureon theArmeniansin NKAO.
7 The Azerbaijanigovernmentmaintainsthe statusquo for NKAO.
-5 The Armenianpeople do not demonstrate.
6 The Armeniandissidentsagitateopenly.
2 Moscow maintainsthe statusquo.
3. Armenianpeople
1 Moscow transferNKAO to Armenia.
4 The Armeniangovernmentsupportsthe demandsto incorporateNKAO
intoArmenia.
-8 TheAzerbaijanigovernmentdoesnottryto integrateNKAOintoAzerbaijan.
5 The Armenianpeople demonstrate.
3 Moscow improvesconditionsfor Armeniansin NKAO.
-10 The Azerbaijanipeople do not retaliateagainstthe Armenians.
-9 The Azerbaijanipeople do not applypressureon the Armeniansin NKAO.
-2 Moscow does not maintainthe status quo.
7 The Azerbaijanigovernmentmaintainsthe statusquo for NKAO.
6 The Armeniandissidentsagitateopenly.
DISPUTE
Fraser e al. /ARMENIAN-AZERBAUJANI 665
TABLE2 Continued
Decision Maker
and Preferences Meaning
4. Armeniandissidents
1 Moscow transfersNKAO to Armenia.
5 The Armenianpeople demonstrate.
4 The Armeniangovernmentsupportsthe demandsto incorporateNKAO
intoArmenia.
-8 TheAzerbaijanigovernmentdoesnottryto integrateNKAOintoAzerbaijan.
3 Moscow improvesconditionsfor Armeniansin NKAO.
-7 The Azerbaijanigovernmentdoes not maintainthe statusquo for NKAO.
-2 Moscow does not maintainthe status quo.
-10 The Azerbaijanipeople do not retaliateagainstthe Armenians.
-9 The Azerbaijanipeopledo not applypressureon the Armeniansin NKAO.
6 The Armeniandissidentsagitateopenly.
5. Azerbaijanigovernment
-1 Moscow does not transferNKAO to Armenia.
2 Moscow maintainsthe statusquo.
8 The Azerbaijanigovernmenttriesto integrateNKAO into Azerbaijan.
7 The Azerbaijanigovernmentmaintainsthe statusquo for NKAO.
-10 The Azerbaijanipeople do not retaliateagainstthe Armenians.
9 The Azerbaijanipeople apply pressureon the Armeniansin NKAO.
-5 The Armenianpeople do not demonstrate.
-4 The Armeniangovernmentdoes not supportthe demandsto incorporate
NKAO into Armenia.
3 Moscow improvesconditionsfor Armeniansin NKAO.
6 The Armeniandissidentsagitateopenly.
6. Azerbaijanipeople
-1 Moscow does not transferNKAO to Armenia.
8 The Azerbaijanigovernmenttriesto integrateNKAO into Azerbaijan.
-3 Moscow does not improveconditionsfor Armeniansin NKAO.
9 The Azerbaijanipeople apply pressureon the Armeniansin NKAO.
7 The Azerbaijanigovernmentmaintainsthe statusquo for NKAO.
2 Moscow maintainsthe statusquo.
10 The Azerbaijanipeople retaliateagainstthe Armenians.
-5 The Armenianpeople do not demonstrate.
-4 The Armeniangovernmentdoes not supportthe demandsto incorporate
NKAO into Armenia.
6 The Armeniandissidentsagitateopenly.
1. Moscow
1. NKAOtoArmenia N N N N N
2. StatusQuo Y Y Y Y Y
3. ImproveNKAO
conditions N N N N N
2. ArmenianGovernment
4. SupportDemands N N - Y Y Y
3. ArmenianPeople
5. Demonstrate N N N N - Y
4. ArmenianDissidents
6. Agitate Openly Y Y Y Y Y
5. AzerbaijaniGovernment
7. StatusQuo Y- . Y .- Y - N N
8. IntegrateNKAO N -. N -. N -. Y Y
6. AzerbaijaniPeople
9. Slow Pressure Y Y Y Y Y
10.Retaliate N -. Y Y Y Y
Figure 1: Progression from the Status Quo to the Very Strong Equilibrium in the
Armenian-Azerbaijani Conflict
The prediction that the decision makermost likely to move first would
be the Azerbaijanipeople (transitoryoutcome 1) was borne out in mid-
November 1988 when a series of demonstrationsin Baku, lasting eighteen
days, grew to include several hundredthousandindividuals.The protestors
demandedthatthe NKAO lose its statusas an autonomousoblastby coming
underthe routineadministrationof Azerbaijan.These demonstrationscoin-
cided with growing intercommunalviolence and the first mention of a new
organizationknown as the PopularFront of Azerbaijan,which was set up
supposedly by Azerbaijani intellectuals to further perestroika(USSR 25
August 1989).
These events likely increasedthe Armeniangovernment'sdetermination
to supportactively public demandsto annexthe NKAO (transitoryoutcome
2). However,there is no solid informationon the steps which the Armenian
governmentplannedto takein responseto the demonstrationsin Baku, since
a meetingof the ArmenianSupremeSoviet on 22 Novemberwas prematurely
adjournedbecause of the worseningsituationin Azerbaijan.The earthquake
in Armeniaon 7 DecemberfurtherdisruptedtheArmeniangovernment'splan
of action.
668 JOURNALOFCONFLICTRESOLUTION
In the fifteen monthssince the first model of the conflict over the NKAO
was developed, a numberof substantivechanges occurredin the real-world
conflict which are accountedfor in a revised model and analysis presented
here. This model was constructedbased on informationavailable on 30
January1990. Note thatDecisionMakeris sufficiently flexible to allow for
a virtuallydaily revision of the conflict model in orderto account for new
information,andthis allows the conflict models to have a dynamicstructure.
Table 3 indicates the new set of decision makersand options available.
Notice that in contrastwith the first model's decision makersand options,
formalpopularoppositiongroups now exist in both republics.In the Arme-
nian SSR, the duality of dissidents and the people supportingthe dissident
positionhas been replacedby a single decision maker,the Karabakhsupport-
ers, which representsArmeniansoutside the governmentseeking to change
the NKAO's status. The PopularFront of Azerbaijanreplaces the earlier
model's Azerbaijanipeople decision maker;this is in recognitionof the fact
that an organizedoppositionhas formed aroundAzerbaijan'sintelligentsia,
who were not considered in the original model. The three government
decisionmakerspresentedin the firstmodel remainunchangedin thisrevised
model. Some considerationwas given to the possibility of including other
decision makers,such as Turkeyand Iran,which have ethnic and historical
ties to the CentralAsian republics.However, such externalactors have no
identifiable options which could be considered viable. Furthermore,it is
believed thatsuch decision makers'influences can be presentedadequately
in termsof adjustmentsto Moscow's relativepreferences.
While an effortwas madeto changethe decision makersso thatthey were
more representativeof the real-worldsituation,the centralaims in revising
the options were greater precision in specifying particularoptions (e.g.,
options 14, 15, and 16) and considerationof some radicalpossibilitiesbased
on historicalprecedents(e.g., options 4 and 13). Consequently,the analysis
results were expected to yield superiorconclusions aboutpossible conflict
resolutions.
Fraser et al. LARMENIAN-AZERBAIJANI
DISPUTE 671
TABLE 3
Decision Makersand Optionsfor the January1990 Conflict Model
TABLE4
Decision Makers'Preferencesfor the January1990 Conflict Model
6and12 3 3 11 11
1 2 2 -3 -3
5 6 and 12 7 -2 -2
-11 -14 8 -1 -1
2 -15 9 5 5
-13 -16 6and 12 10 14
7 1 if 14/15/16 -11 6 and 12 15
-9 -11 -14 -9 16
-8 10 -15 -8 13
10 7 -16 -7 -9
-16 8 1 if 14/15/16 14 -8
-15 9 -5 15 -7
-14 5 -4 16 6and12
-4 -4 -10 13 10
-3 -13 -13 4 4
the integrationof the NKAO (options 10 and 11); and the PopularFront
protests against developments (option 14). The noteworthydifference be-
tween the two very strong equilibria depends on whether the Armenian
governmentattemptsto silence the Karabakhsupporters(option 6). When
Armeniadoes crackdown (i.e., it takesoption6), the Azerbaijanigovernment
is preparedto discuss the future of the NKAO (option 12). Otherwise,
Azerbaijandoes not negotiate with Armenia. However, Armenia's crack-
downwill notguaranteethatAzerbaijanwill negotiate,since one of the strong
equilibria is identical to the very strong equilibrium whereby Armenia
suppressesthe Karabakhsupportersbutthe Azerbaijanigovernmentdoes not
respond(i.e., takes option 12).
Another result of the stability analysis with substantiveimplications is
thatthe PopularFront'sbehaviorcannotbe determinedwith any accuracyin
any given situation.In fact, one reasonwhy so many equilibriaexist is that
each of the four possible PopularFrontstrategies,given a fixed strategyfor
each of the other decision makerswhich generatesan equilibrium,happens
to be an equilibrium.Therefore,the attemptto ascertainwhat the Popular
Front'sstrategywill be in the NKAO conflict did not succeed; this suggests
thatits preferencesareuncertain.Severalotherattemptsto modelthe Popular
Front's preferences also produced this result. Consequently, there is no
certaintyaboutwhat Azerbaijan'spopularoppositionwill do in the NKAO
conflict.
Finally, it should be noted that in several strong equilibria, Moscow
chooses to resettle the Armenianspresentlyliving in the NKAO to another
partof the Soviet Union (e.g., Armenia;option4). Thatsuch an actionwould
lead to a stable situationand, possibly, a resolutionto the NKAO conflict,
implies thata radicalsolution should not be dismissed. Resettlementwould
not necessarily be a forcible action; hence there is no reason to believe a
Stalinist system would be a prerequisiteto implementing a resettlement
program.Rather,Moscow could offer economic incentivesfor Armeniansto
leave the NKAO.
CONCLUSIONS
with a convenient rationale for clamping down on other groups agitating for
greater national rights. Certainly, the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh and
the difficulty of resolving this conflict have very significant implications for
the multinational Soviet state.22As Gorbachev noted in a television address
on 1 July 1989, ethnic tensions and violence threaten his entire reform
program, "as well as the destiny and unity of our state" and the Soviet Union's
reputation abroad.
Conflict analysis is probably the most thoroughly formalized method-
ology based on rational actor assumptions and, as demonstrated by the
Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, conflict analysis methodology can be used
successfully for modeling and analyzing ethnic disputes. Besides furnishing
a prediction of what would take place in the NKAO conflict, conflict analysis
provides a better understanding of the dispute. DecisionMakerprovides a
comprehensive and flexible mechanism for the formulation and analysis of
a complex real-world conflict.
At the modeling stage, the conflict model is efficiently formulated in terms
of decision makers, options, and relative preferences:
* The key participantsare identified. In the early model, six main participants
were recognized,and in the latermodel, five.
* The importantactions availableto each of the participantsare identified.The
available actions are expressed as options for each of the decision makers.
Special relationshipsamong these options are also identified.
* The interests, goals, and aspirationsof each of the individual parties are
capturedin the preferences.For each decision maker, these preferencesare
expressed by listing options from most importantto least importantand by
stipulatingwhether or not a given option should be taken. If necessary, the
conditions underwhich the decision makerwishes the option to be taken or
not can be described.
REFERENCES
. 1971. The republic of Armenia: The first year, 1918-1919. Berkeley: University of
CaliforniaPress.
. 1982. The republic of Armenia: From Versailles to London, 1919-1920. Berkeley:
Universityof CaliforniaPress.
Howard, N. 1971. Paradoxes of rationality: Theory of metagames and political behavior.
Cambridge:MITPress.
Kaputikyan,S. 1989. An open letter.GlasnostInformationBulletin nos. 16-18:30.
Kazemzadeh,F. 1951. Thestrugglefor Transcaucasia.New York:PhilosophicalLibrary.
Lang, D. M. 1988. TheArmenians:A people in exile. London:Unwin Hyman.
Muradyan,I. 1989. GlasnostandNagorno-Karabakh: The public speaks. GlasnostInformation
Bulletin nos. 16-18:19-20, 22.
Polyakov,Y. 1988. The turbulentyears in the Caucasus:On the sources of national contradic-
tions in NagornyKarabakh.Moscow: Novosti PressAgency PublishingHouse.
Reese, W. 1988a. Turkishclaims to a say in the statusof Nakhichevan.RadioLibertyResearch
Bulletin 136/88 (28 March).
. 1988b. Situationin ArmeniaandAzerbaijansaid to be exacerbatedby lack of informa-
tion. Radio LibertyResearchBulletin532/88 (14 December).
Swietochowski,T. 1985. RussianAzerbaijan,1905-1920: Theshaping of national identityin a
Muslimcommunity.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.
WalkerC. J. 1980. Armenia:Thesurvivalof a nation. London:CroomHelm.
. 1988. Between Turkeyand Russia:Armenia'spredicament.The WorldToday(Aug.-
Sept.): 142-43.