mission No. <3! 207 FLOWN 28 JUN 1945 copyno 1<° HEADQUARTERS Fe ald Pi APO 234SEGRET HRADQUARTERS ‘XI BOMBER COBAND ‘APO 234 ‘TAOTIOAL MISSIN REPORT Missions No. 234 235s Field Order Nos 92 236 & 237 Targets: Urbon Areas of Okayana, Sasebo, Mojiy and Nobe da 28/29 June 1945 ‘Table of Contents Page Hos Tactical Narrative. ss svereereeeeevessee a Annex A - Operations seeeeeseeeeeee n Part I - Navigatim Track Chart + ++» 12 @ Fart II — Mean Points of Impact - 2 + + A Fart lil Babings see ree cece e es i Fart IV - Flight Bugineering Ohaste «eee + 15 Fert V- Radar Approach Charts,» seevee 1 = Fert Vie Radars ceeeeseccecces 2 ATs Part VII - Gamnerys’s + + 6 eseee 22 r\8 Part VIII = Air-Sea Rosoue Charts we ee es 3 Annex B- Weather ss eeeeeeccecereeees 8 3\ 8 Port I~ Jeather Simaryssseee eee ee Bh Gea Fort II - Chart~-Foreoast Weather va g Observed Weather sa sees 25 Fart III - Prqmostic Maps eevee s . Part IV - Synoptic Map» see reeeeee 2 Annex C - Cammnicatims, sees eee reece eee 28 Port I- Fb ese esse ee 29 & Part If- Radios es eveee te 38 Annex D- Intelligences ese seecreceecees 99 Fert 1 - Bnecry Air Oppositims seeeeee 3h Fart II - Enemy Antiaircrafte « + + vee Bh Fart III - Damgo Asccaoments « 7. Section A Ckayana, Missin Nos 23k. s+ 37 Section B - Sasebo, Missi Nos 235 44+ 39 Section 0 = Moji, Mission No. 2364606 hi Section D = Nobecka, Mission Nov 237 6» lik Annex 2 Consolidated Statistical Sumaryy sees ee 46 Annex F - XXI-Bonber Camand Field Order. +++ ++ Annex G+ Distribution wees eee seer erece 60 Prepared By? A-2 Section {OEE Denber Cemmanaseser? pugagtegaaegacaseeeet + SECRET ' :By auth of the C.Get +001 bomber Gonmand ¢ 1 {28 sun 45 SDS + ‘an HEADQUARTERS 2c BOMBER COMMAND APO 234, SUBIECT: Report of Iueendiery Strikes Against Ckeyama, Sasebo, Yojt and Nobeoka, 26/29 June 1945» TO + Commanding General, Twentieth Air Foros, Tashington 25, PeCy 1, IDANTIFECATEON OF MISSIONS: ay Field Order Munber 91, Headquarters 20 bonber Commands dated 28 Jane 1945, directed Sth, 73rd, 313th am) 714th Bombardment Wings to take part in h nofmal-effért incendiary strikes against ‘the urban areas of Osayama,’Saseto, Moji and Nobeoka in 201 Bonber Conmand Missions Munber 23h, 2355 236, ani 237 respectivelye be Beceche Sueatthed! (1) Beimacy Visual and Rader Tangotat Mission Torso Hine Foros Required 23h Okayama Urban Area = 58th ‘4 Groups 235 Sasebo Urban Area Tard ‘4 Groups 236. Moji Urban Area 313th 3 Groups 237 Nobeoka Urban drea 3ikth ‘4 Groups (2) No secondary or last resort targets were specifieds 2. STRATEGY AND PLANS OF OPERATION: as Selection of D-Day! These missions were to be a continuation of the Command's policy of employing the radar method of night bombing to attack 4 cities simltancously. Bxperience gained on previous incendiary strikes (see Tactical Mission Reports for Wissions 206 through 209 und Missicns 210 through 212 for details was utilized to plan these efforts. On the basis of a weather prediction presented on 28 June, firm decision was made to strikes be Importance of Tarseta! (1) Mission Sumber 231. Okavana! Located 100 miles west of Osaka and 12 miles north of the Inland Sea port’of Una, Okayama is Smportant because of its nimerous small industries, many of which are believed to be producing aireraft parts for the Tanashima plant of the Uitaubishi Aircraft Company, ‘In addition, the city has a large réil- road station and repair yards, being on the important San~yo Tine, sul has an inportant arsenal, Tho railroad yards are on the wast sido of the city and the arsenal is about } mile north of the city, Shaped like a bullet, Okayama points south 2} miles on its north-south axis and is 1 mile wide on its east-west axiseField Order No. 92 SEQRET HEADQUARTERS 2X1 BOBER COMAND ABO 234 ‘TACTICAL MISSIGN REPORT Missions No. 23h, 2354 236 & 237 Targets: Urban Areas of Okayama, Sasebo, Moji, and Nobe ca ‘Tactical Narrative. « Annex A - Amex B - annex D+ Annex B - Annex F - XXI-Bambor Camand Pica Orders Annex G - 28/29 June 195 Table of Gontonta. Operations sss esses eee Fart I = Navigition Track Ghart Fart II - ean Points of Impact « Tort HET Danbings es vee Fart IV - Flight Bnginsering Charts Fart V - Radar Approach Ohart: Fort Wi- Fadare eee eee Part VII = Gumarys's soe oo Fart VIII Air-Soa Roseue Chart Montiar o.00 53's ¢d8 0s 2 34 stele Fart I - voathor Sumary. «5 Fart I - Chart--Foreoast Weather va Gbserved Weather + + + + Fart II - Prognostic Map + wart IV + Synoptic Maps + es Cammnications, +++ e+e Part I= PQ oes ‘ ee Part IT - Radios es cess oe Intelligences see sees ony Fart I = Ene Air Oppositian tre Fart II - Rieny Antiaireraft. see Fart III - Damage Assosments tee Seotin A= Okayama, Mission Noe 23s Section B - Sasebo, Mianion Na, 235 5 Section © = Moji, Missin No, 236+ 6 Sectian D- Nobecka, Mosicn Nos 237. Consolidated Statistical Sumarys + + « Distribution sees eee Prepared By: Ae2 Section {OH Bomber Command SECREDcer DECLASSIFIED NUPHS 3M secRet saad geneaeggeegete SECRET 1 auth of the GG. soupgoreno oor BOMBER coMuAnD 4P0 234, SUBJECT: Roport of Ideondiary Strikes Against Okayana, Sasebo, Yeji and Nobecka, 26/29 June 1945. 10 + Commanding General, Twentieth Air Fores, Washington 25, DO» 1, TDEWIETCaTT oN oF MESsTONS: a, FicldCrer Number 91, Headquarters 2X1 posber Conmani Gated 26 Tine 1945, directed Sith, 73rd, 3igth and 54th Bumbarduent ings to take part in j nomal-ffort incendiary strikes against tho urban aroas of Gkayana, Saseto, Mbji and Nebeoka in 20 Boaber Coumand Missions Nunbor 23h, 235, 236, and 237, respectively. be Targets Specified! () Zeimary Visual and Rater Tarestat Mission Tarset tae Horne Required 23 Ocayena Urban area S8th 4 Groups 235 Sasebo Urban Area 73rd 4 Groups 236 ‘Moji Urban Area 313th 3 Groups 237 Nobocka Urban Area 31th 1, Growpa (2) No secondary or last resort targets were specified. 2. STRATEGY sND FLANS OF OPERATION: a+ Solecticn o¢ Da! Thess missions were to be a contimiation of the Comand's policy of employing the radar method of night bombing to attack 4 cities similtaneously. Experience gained on previous incendiary strikes (seo Tactical Mission Reports for Missions 206 through 209 and Wasions 210 through 212 for details) as utilized to plan those efforta. On the basis of a woather Prediction presented on 20 Tune, firm decision was made to strike, be Targotat (1) Wiagion Number 23), Okavamat Located 100 miles west of Osoka and 12 miles north of the Iniand Sea port‘of Una, Okayama ie important becatise of its numerous small industries, many of which are believed to be producing aircraft parts for the Tamashima plant of the Mitsubishi Aircratt Company. ‘In addition, the eity has a large r4il- road station and repair yards, being on the important Sen-yo line, and has an important ersenal. The railroad yards are on the west side of the city ami the arsenal ia haut } mila north of the city, Shaped Like a bullet, Okayana points south 2b miles on its north-south axis and is 1 mile wide on its east-eat axise“ | SEQRET (2) Minaion mbar 2354, Sancho! Sasgho Se the, mesterne ost oity of Japan teing on the aervbesat tip of Kyuss Tt ie Tocated aa the porknern end of Sesedé Bay, which io the northeastern inlet and inner harbor for Sasedo Ko, the only entrance to the slags closed Onurd Bay, Built up around the water ‘front and along the Sasébo River deltas the oity ie one of the 4 principal naval bases in Japan, having faetlitien to service ani repair el types of naval unite ant 2 tortor odpeble of accommonating a large fleet. Tt ix the site of Gu arsoaly as well ae en aircraft ‘factory and nearby asseubly plant. Sasebo, having @ poptlation of 205,000, is about 2) miles long on & northrest-northeast axis and is about $ mile wide, lying chiefly on ‘the east side of the Sasebo Rivers | @) + On the northern tip of | Kyushu aerosa the strait from Sisondseki, loji is ono of the ‘rin cities (with Shimonoseki) that control all rail traffic between Honshu ani Hyualiie Tun 2 citios have 5 fediroed yaris and « large mmber of wharvese In addition, there are numerous industries in and around thoes’ oj extends along the smuthern ooast of the SkMmonoscki Straits fof about § miles and measures inland from $ to 14 milese (4) Mingion Nunbor 237. Hohaoim: Located sbout, half amy up the coast of Kyusti and about 1} miles fron the sen, Sascbo eo Lies across the forks of the Gokase md Oso Rivers. Tt is one of the mut lnjurtail cutters fur uiditery explosive preavetion in Janae having within ito city limits | plants that produce explosives and basic chenicals therefor. The Asahi Bonberg Oupramoniua Plant (Target 90.33+-131;) produces large quantities of pieric acid and cleum, Nobeoka's population in 1940'was 80,000. The built-up aren , 3 of tho eity is about 1} square miles, being about 2 miles long by 12 1S eae ietty a shout Uh sau et ee eras tags aces eese Toe a y ESS by the fenks of the 2 rivers, which are considered to be good fire Fog breaks <2| 5 ig 2i 5 & zy mot : e FW (1) Bommne Elana? 2 (a) Patemnination of Bomb load: e Le Tt was specified that all airplanes would carry 100 per cent loads of incendiary bonbs and clusters. Hach Ting was instructed to have the first 12 aireraft airborne, which vere ¥0 include the best radar crews, act as a pathfinder forces Pa 2 Jim): a+ Tho pathfinder, and the first and second Groups to be airborne weré to carry AN-M47A2 incendiary bombs, fused with an instantaneous nose, ad the third ani fourth Groups to be airborne wore to carry Baj8 inoendiary clusters, set to open 5000 feet above the target. be Tho napais-filled I-47 inoontiary boabe oe we ale arnt ean when they were tsed by pathfinders and apiroximately half of the main Erroes. Bip SNe ciustoce, nck ccorniaiig 98 Ty Loosuliney easy had not previously been used as a major part of any boub load by this Ooumand, Recent tests conductod in the United Statos indicated thils Vaud was superior to tho M69 for uso against typical Japanose structures, Another consideration in determining the lead was utilisation of the available incendiary supply in the most efficient manner possible. The fuzings specified hal proved saktsfactory on ~2e SECREDDECLASSIFIED 2 5 BK wana Dat SEoREL 2 vombing Provious incondicry otrilos. Tt vas astimatod tho radar ‘accuracy would be sufficiont to placo a density of approximately 225 tons per square mile on the target aren. 2+ Wanton Number 295, Saacbo (7ara tine): fae Te woo Airoctod that the ttrat Group to oondiary be airborne and pathfinder aircreft were to carry E48 4 slustors, tho next 2 Groups wero to carry ANMAO 7A tnoondiary olusters fand tha fourth Group was to carry ANRM/6 incendiary boabs» The Gluatora woro to bo sot to open 5000 foot above the target ant tho bonbs vero to bo fuzod with an instantanoous nose and non~deloy taile he Tho tergot area was highly industrialized and contained many varohouses and other structures that would require ‘the moderate to heavy penotration chatacteristics of the munition loads Specified for this Tinge In addition, the bombs vere chosen because of their firo-sotting capabilities and in accordance with tie most efficiout utilization of available suppliese 2 Tho Enii8 elustors wore chosen for the reasons listed for Mission Number 23 The Mel7 clusters wore selected since the Me50 boabs they contained were considered superior for tho industrial typo structures and tho reeidontial areas that were to be attacked. he six/6 boabs wore solected ror tho Group scneaurea to attack last bocause experience from previous missions indicated that the aircraft etriking last usually droppod short of the man points of impact, If this hold true on this attack, then these bonbs would fall on dook ari warohouse aroas, whero the Im76's inoondiary characteristies woro dosirabloe Ae Macion Near 226, vosi (ain tine): Qs The Pathfinders and 2 Groups vere to carry AN-W\742 incondiary bonbs, fuzed with an instantancous nosy ani the third aroup vas to carry B-l6 incondiary clustera containing AA69 boubs ani sot to open 5000 fect above the targets Ds Tho area to be attacked was a congestedy Aighly-inflamnble arca, including industry nd a considerable storage ares, primarily of voolen or plastor constructions, Consiétont with efficinnt utiltzation of available supply of incendiaries, it waa decided to combine tho munitions listed above to effect greatest poasible destruction, Ais Mission Nimber 237, Nobooka, (31kth Tine) Qs Pathfinders and 2 Groupa were to earry ANe7A2 ineondiary bons, fuged with an instantansous nege, and 2 Groups wore to carry Ba} aimable clusters, containing M-69'bonbs and set to open $000 fect above the target. Tho bombe vere to ba dropped before tho clusters to saturate firo defenses and to gain inercascd, effectiveness from tho 1-69"s4 The area to bo attacked was long and narrow, consisting of mixed industrial and residential structures whiob hed uany fire divisions, Since tho target aroa was considered 8 Gifficult one to attack by radar l, Groups were dispatched as it yas planned to placo tonmge of 225 tons ber sguiara mile on the targot area to assure destruction, Tho bouba and clusters selected had the proper ponotration and fire-setting capabilitics necossary against the type of structures comprising the target areasa SBCRED 1 Custers wero to be act to open 5000 feet stove the target to taste surina functioning offiosenay when they toro released Rion tho altitudes specifiode ~The intervalonater sottings specific’ for elt missions, 100 fest for Il? incendiary bonbs and 50 fost for M~76 incendiary bombs ani clusters, had been found effective Previous attacks of this type. * (b) Boxing Data: (For photowaphs and locations of targot aroas, as well as wean points of inpact, see Annex A, Part IT), 1. Minsion Yimber 2%. kavama: The moan point of impact selected was in the center of the city, with a probable stroular arror of 4,000 feet including most of the city and its industrial concentration, as woll as the railroad yards in the west sections & 2 10: The'mean point of Ampact selected was in the northeast section of the city, with a Probable olroular errer of 4000 feot including the major portion of ‘the city proper, as well as a considerable portion of the southeast sections 2 2 + The mean point of impact solocted was in the center of Moji, with a probable circular error of 4000 fect including the main parts of the city. he My The man point of impact selected was on tho oouth end Of tho main highway bridge and a probable circular error of 4000 feet ineluded most of ‘the city and all of the important industry in the southern sections Ss n these radar missions, the primary factors in determining the axes of attack were thé best possible radar ruis pnd the flak dofonosa in the target ureas, which are discussed fully in the Radar afd Antiaireraft sections that follow. Boubing altitules, axes of attack, length of runs ani other pertinent bombing data were as follows: wim Se, |, oot) (earess) (ailos) (minutes) (degrees) 254 11,000 to 12,800. 305 28 hb ateht 235 10,000 to 10,800 49 ast 6 riche 236 10,000 to 10,800 515 3 gb 7 akght 237 10,000 to 10,800 259 53 6 2 lett (2) Navieation: () Mgsion mber 2341 Route ‘Reasons for Choice Base to Ivo Jim Tactical Doctrines Shhogoreas49508 ‘The onal island of Mishima, just south of * Awaji Shima and which was oasily identifiable, was in line with the bast approach to the init Point and was choson.as the departure point. whe SECRETDECLASSIFIED Fay | NN H S05 Authority to Su2bNe1 34208 (TP) to ‘Target to Sigeet ‘The southeast tip of Shodo Shima, which gave fa goed radar return, was chosey for the best radar approach to the targote A ioft turn was specified off the target to void flak defenses of Tanashimae 34h0N=133958 to Ivo Tint to Bases Tactigad Doctrines Route Base to Two Jina to gosot-agoyoe 3051130132 to 3226N-129058 to SPyoNaapIge (=P) to Target to S14 7H-130902 to Two Tima to Baso outa, Baso to Two Jima to 53243MW1 32938 (IP) to 333M-191268 (IP) to. ‘Target to. 3302N-135058 Tyo Tima to Base Route Baae to Ivo Tima to 324gN-232932 (IP) to (b) Mission Number 295: Egagons for Choice, Tactical Doctrine. ‘This casily sdontified tip of lower Xyusim vias dosignatod as landfall. ‘The southwestern tip of Kyushu, which was expected to give a good approach to the ini tial point As well as be a good navigational chock point, was solected as the departure pointe This was designated as a check and turning point on to tho initial pointe Aiphodgh tho initial point was a dead-reckoning Point, it could be easily checked off surround~ ing islanis for accurate positioning to make the best bond run on to tho targets A right tura was specified off the target, with a climb to be made to 12,000 feet, ‘This point was picked to avoid the Nobecim defenses. Tactical Doctrine, (c) Viesion Number 236: Rasuons tor Gwiee Tactical Doctrines The easily identifica island of Okino Shim on the southwest tip of Shikoku was selected, as the departure points ‘mn oasily identified radar point to tho left of Use Airfield which could be utilized for the best bonb run to the target was aelected as the initial point, A right turn was designated off the tarent to avoid incoming planes. Tan's ende Tactical Doctrines (4) Wasion Number 27+ Rengona for Choice ‘Tactical Dootrines Okino Shima, vasily“taentitiea on the southe West tip of Shikolu, was selected as the depart= ure ani initial point because it afforded the nly possible radar approach to the target. aoe SEORETDECLASSIFIED. SEQREL Target A deft turn was dooignated to land's end. to Tyo Jima to Base ‘Taotical Doctrines (3) Hight Busineorine’ wore 0a (a) Designated altitudes und specds wore plan for maximum fuel economy ani safety. No assemblies wore to be maior (b) uel reserve data indicated no bocb bay tanks Would bo required and tho average fuel load of approxinately 6700 gallons vas expoctod to be sufficiont. (c) No maximm or minimm bomb loads‘were speci- fied. ‘ith cach aircraft's potential capadity béing 17,000 pounda, it was expected that airplates of the 56th, 73rd. and 51ith ings Would average 15,000 pounds, and B-29's of the 313¢h Wing would average 1i,,000 pounis. It vas ostimated that the emmiticn load would be 300 pounds, (4) Baton: : (a) Mission Number 294. Okavamet Je Tho route to Okayama was planned to use the maximn nuabor of chgek pointe’ to establish a good axis of attacks From the departure point, NieShima, to the target there were 5 to 6 excollont radar check points directly on courses 2+ Hithor the slant of Iau, which is small but ahows up distinctly, or tho position of 3436N = 13402158 could bo used as back slant range offsst aiming points. In addition, the river mouth at the initial point could be utilized for effect release, Tho targot is on a flat terrain ani givos an excellent radar returns (e) Mission Manbor 295, Snesko: 2, Sasebo vas one of the most difficult targets to identify, located in hilly terrain ani with built-up areas in surrounding valloys, it vas difficult to chooso an axis of attack or on initial point. The 73rd Ting suggested its own route, using a @ond-rockoning point for an initial pointe The Wing's ruasoa for Unis recomendation vas that a reforcnoe turn could be made easier by homing on an island than ona bearing turn. The Wing statod that Tader operators could mke a raiar procedure initial point tun, using a reference point and then offact bonbing fron the coaste (c) Misaton Number 236, Mois? A. Tt was decidod to approach Yo ji from the east to the west to escape tho Shimonoseki defensts. Ey using tho @istinctive coastline chock point north of Takada, 335430N = 13100302, | a good offset aiming point could bo utilized and a right turn off the targot could be specifica to escapo hoavy defenses. Tho offct points for back slant range release and use of Shinonogeki Harbor for forvard fixod-angle offset roference wore oxeellont from a radar standpoint, Tho straits near Noji aro wide and show up on the radar scope as a dofinito water broaky. @ Migalon Mamber 297, tohaska: d+ Nobeoka offered a difficult problem for solocting an initial point duo to the natural fire breaks in theDECLASSIFIED Nara Date 5/M/ LL iy WUE HS 8, SEQRED ty sain snd confusing ceastlino which surround it, mt Sarvs aero, ae ‘the east. Okino Shima was chosen as an initial point, although 1¢ Provided for a difficult 45-mile flight over open waters a only 1 check point boing available, 3b miles frou the targets This was et asai tenet a ee (5) Rau (a) Tt was planned to havo 16 ROM Obsorvers soarch for oarly-varning, gun-laying ani searchlight radars and to conduct @ general soareh in the 20-20 mogacyele and 38+3000 negacyele regions 4 search also vas to be conducted for enory voice comminieations in ‘the 4-16 megncycle band from landfall to land's ends (>) Since it would be impossible to obtain an effective barrage on theso night missions due to the fact the airplanes ‘ere scheduled to bomb singly, it was decided to omploy 1 special Jaming airplano por Group to barrage amt spot jam the gun-laying and Searchlight ratar frequencies in the more hoavily-defondod Moji and Sasobo areas. Tho dofonsos of Okayama and Nobecka did not warrant tho use of special jaming tactios. (ce) The special airplanes were to be equipped to barrage jam the 78 and 190-210 mogacyole regions ani to spot jan any gun-laying or searchlight radars that appoar outside of tho barrage. These airplanes wore to carry additional quantitios of rope" (window). (a) Tho 323th Ting, which was to attack Moji, vas to dispatch 3’airplanes to orbit the point 3356N = 15@B8B at altitudes of 15,000, 15,500 and 16,000 foot with a radiua of 10 ‘miles while the bombor stfeam ras over the target. The 73rd Wing, which was to attack Sasebo, vas to diapatoh 4 Airplanes to orbit the point 3307N - 229ULE at nititmdes af 15,000, 15,500, 16,000 ma 16,500 fect mith @ Faius of 10 miles while tho bomber stream was over tho targote (6) AirsSoa Roscus: Tho Navy.was furnishod with details of those missions and was to pYovide tho dir-sea rescue facilitics Listed on tho chart in annex 4, Part VIII, vhich also ineludos posi- tions of the Suzer-Dmbea to be provided by tis Commade. a of =o 2 (2) Enemy Air Omosition: It vas estimated that no more then 30 fighters would be capable of interception on these Mivoious'since Uno Inland Soa patrol, which covers the aross to bo attackod, was belioved to havo that many aircraft available. (2) Shon Antiaizeratt: (a)’ Mission Number 23k: The Oeayamn Aofonsee included 5 hoary guna, 1} modiun automatic gins ani } searchliguts. | For that Toason flok was not a uajor consideration in the planning. Tho route Planned avoided all know flak areas aa the breakaway £9 | ‘tho vest and thon south was to avoid the Tanashima defenses. An | altitude of attack of 21,000 feet as sjocifiod duo to radar consider | ations. | () Masten Number 295+ 4s Soasbo's defenses included 60 heavy guns,ig Nara Date 5/4/ LL SECRET 129 moaium automatie woapons aul 6 coarchlighte, though the gin @ofonses wero adequate, the soarchlight defenso was considered wealte This vas a serious voalmoss since on previcus night missions illumination boing a nocossary prerequisite to accurate flaky Tho route selected avoided all known ‘ar axons ant wie ecisthr attack nae wiustea on tho backs of the run that'gavo the bost radar return. Duo to the zather heavy gun defenses, an attack altatudo of 10,000 fect vas spocified, since automatic weapons would bo less offective at that altitude and the small nuaber of goarchlighte indicated that only moderately accurate flak might be experienced, A broakavay to the east vas designated to avoid other flak areas, (0) Mission Number 296+ ‘Le Defenses of the Moji-Shimonoseki area included 97 heavy guns, 21 modium voapons and 27 searcblichts, miny ©f the last boing radar controllod. 2+ The route vas over vator and avoided flak roas. An approach from the southeast was planned and although it was an upvini approach, it was tho only one that avoided the heavy Yaunta defanaca wont of the Shimonoanki Straite. The breakavay to ‘the north’was specified to avoid tho samo defonses, following the breakaway, airorett woro to make a 180=dogres turn back over the water to avoid tho Ube arose A baso attack altitude of 10,000 foot Wes specified. (4) Aiaajon Mumhor 257: Only manger and inaccurate flak was expected from the 6 hoavy guna ad tho 2 medium woapons at Nobeoka. For that roason flak vas not 9 major consideration in planning. The route was planned to avoid other flak areas and a base attack altitude of 10,000 fect waa specific’. 3. EGQTON oe Te EsstoNs: ae Take-off! Take-off was accomplished as follows: Fothfinters Mreratt First Last Wiasion ng Aichorna Airhorme © Takesott Takacoft 23h (58th 12 leg 2810152, 2811512 3 ph 1332808052 2809172 236 3i3th 12 89 2807562 2609172, 237 Slkth a mo eomez = 280 XAT B.C, TOTAL 48 46. 2807562, 2811512 DECLASSIFIED. iy VEY: (2) Buoy Antiniraratt: (Soo Annox D, Part II, for details), Various typos of antiaireratt activity sere reported on hose missions, vith a majority being ineffectives (3) Damage Assessmant! Soo Annox D, Part III, for © dotains By (a) Wanton Noe 23h: Okayama city danage was approxinately 2.13 square miles, oF 63 per cont of the built-up aroa, Seven numbored targets vere inoluted in the demagal areas 3 (>) Maston No. 225: Sasobe oity demage was «97 ‘square mile, or 48 per cent of the built-up area, Three numbered targets were included in the damged areny (c) Mission Nos 256: Damage to Moji totalled .302 square miles, or 25.9 yor cent of tho eity's builtqup area, with 2 numbered targets being included in the damaged areas * @)_ Mission Noo 297: Damage to Nobooka totalled 152 aquare miles, or 96 per cont of tho city's builtup areas Tnfustrinl danage included 2 numbered targets ani 3 target areas Bick, Geos Seis. wae aa ome SEQRET osSPERTIONS Part I - Navigation Track Ohart Part IT - Mean Points of Impact, Part I11 ~ Bonbing Part IV - Flight Enginsering Chart NM | elt A 3s Part V = Radar Approach Charts Part VI ~ Radar | Fart VII - Gunnery Part VITI - Air-Sea Rescue Chart sue SECRELAPR i945 PARTIINAVIGATION TRAGK CHART or = MISSION NO234—239 DATE 22 JUNE 1945 | Xx BOMCOM.—_| vase ist F385 8 ae SHh— 560503 [Benes 281 5a 281 30 ‘gt | est 13832 | 2eicion nigoe | sleaee 1088 | 361368 2508 | 2614392088, NPWS BAK wana Date 5/M/ LL sion N at a, the greatest aigtioutty encountered waa sacks and trbule ence over the arent aren, Aireraft bombing during the latter part of See CaS Face antch covered she sining point and nade ae ea ome oarte galt, After fires hed boon started the turbulence Te a eee CeI™ jsetcdos will bo‘planncd for Cutirovoporations See none eaeeacetya, in aoue, casos shacklos vere torn from the rox Sere eee are esa ad ao bo voieased mencally after leering tar Ape NN A es Oe erceeshae to thenen eneks sis. af Ser haod pune eltetely tnrough honey sunke,, Tne odzoraft reported Saree en Laying eeorles and Zireperted malfunction of boub Fecks, >, The IP was reported as highly satisfactory, Wo connont was. ade on the axis of attack, Average drift reported was 5° right, Con pressibility for the 58th Wing was o¢ minutes, 2, Mission No, 235, Sgsebo Urban Area: a, Bombing was accomplished with radar performing tho principal sighting operation. as undercast at tho target varied from 6/10 to 10/10, thus preventing visual Tune, which a few aircraft with inoperative raaar bad difficulty in making, by, Sight deviations in axis of attack were caused by a poor ‘gorn at tho IP, One aireraft reported aalfunction of mechanical doors and 202.76 bende were ealvoed, One afreratt released 11 M-l7Al incen= diary clusters whon tho racks failed to release olostrically, c, The average drift reported was 5° right, Compressibility for the 73rd Wing was 76 minuto 3. Mise: 290, Nook Urtan Aree: a, Tho greatest difficulty entountersd was 6/10 to 10/10 under east at the target area, which made accurate bonbing impossible for air~ craft with inoperative radar, Six aireraft reported malfunction of D=10 shackles and 1 aircraft reported malfunction of forward bomb bay doors, b, The IP was reported as aatisfactory, The average drift roported was 4° right, Comprossibility for the 313th Wing was 92 min- wt 4, on 257, Hi uy: 2a" a, The only difficulty oncountered was scattored clouds and smoke over tho targot area, This proved no grout obstacle and bombing vas accomplished with radar porforning the principal sighting operation, Malfunction of racks wore reported in 2 aircraft, Few other malfunctions wore reported, , Tho IP was roported as satisfactory, The average drift reported was 3° left, Compressibility for this attack was 91 minutes, ere SEQRELFI = 2 g 2 Blonr EVG(NELRING Bom Ak jTUpe (Fee7) 30,000) 25 00G--: — Fore Aeserve (2%) Gorzons) /000| feo 620) x00) (Foes Zopo {00% (40) goa 600 sol heer : DIEAPPROACHES TO OKAYAMA | ACTUAL SCOPE PHOTOS Ace sect x18. s aeFig. APPROACHES TO SASEBO ACTUAL SCOPE PHOTOS ALTITUDE APPROX 7900! ‘A-2 SECTION ¥X1 BOMBER COMMAND‘CONFIDENTIAL ne APPROACHES TO SHIMONOSEKI AND MOdJI ACTUAL SCOPE PHOTOS ALT. APPROXIMATELY 7000’ Ar2 SECTION xx! 8.6 ol Xx a6 = ———————————SSSSaaoaa[Conrivenniat = SHEET RW BI APPROACHES TO NOBEOKA ACTUAL SCOPE PHOTOS ALTITUDE 10900 FEET |EPRODUCED BY 3TH ENGR AVN Tor y |DECLASSIFIED is iE S & & iw 3, Average no, of rounds fired in combat per turret! by 2 Bete ca 8 1, Maktunctions: G.P.0er, 1 elevation stroute. servo, duanplidyne 3 no seccniney Sontrsl, @ turret hunt in olevation and 9 yrs, walle outy Gaby 50 UG: Hone, 8, Forsontars of eautnnont sperative: son 00% -2l- SECRET‘secret DATE. nt xxI BOMCOM. —_| y AIRSSEA RESCUE AIR-SEA RESCUE CHART @— svemarine O- surrace vessel A= DUMBO A— surer_oumeo exe pene arsars. \ ae ps ee Genie otal Sat go" see 400 aye TRACE CHART XXI BOMGER CONIWAND SECRET FVERET REPROD SOMETOBaan fs. wht Shacdeon dnd’ tve une fis Bove Serer one i he wee ein mat Seeee oe tee on Yom, ese ade ma ie Pestng. te envy SeTkt ehend 6 50y ah, Part I= Weather Sumary Part If = Chart - Poreoast vs, Observed Woather im Part IIT - Prognostic Map Part IV - Synoptic Map DECLASSIFIED ry > a 2 2 ry Ld BAR waren Date 5 > oops GSONELRENTLaL=D HS DECLASSIF ty VP BAEK nara SOREIDENTIAL EARLI = WSATHM SUnOURE 1, PhaNuIie PORSCAST Bases: low cloud base 1800 tops 612,000 ft, with seattered tn- 3 teanhsiey caper ebroughest ‘cunuleninbas, stability showers throughout the area and f Router To 180K: as bas Zo 510M; 6/10 low cloud vase 1500 tops 6000 rt, with scattered upper clouds, To coast: 10/10 lows middle and high cloud layered oxsept where onerging takes place in front. along zone 100 miles wide at 320M, Targets: Tekye: 4/10 low cloud baco 2000 tops S000 ft, with 8-10/10 middle U1 to 18,000 Pt, end 6/10 high cload 26~26,000 ft, increasing to solid layers in afternoon and evening, Fost: 10/10 low, niddle and high cloud in well defined layers Increasing to nearly roll cloud to $0,000 feet in rain in the eventing. 2, OPERATIONAL. Bi Bases at Take-Off: Soautored Yow) widdie aud high eloude with widely ecattarad Veht showors, Route: There will be scattered low and high clouds to S0°H with soattered middle clouds end widely sonttored showers to 20°M, Fron 30° to S1°N there will be broken low, middle and high Clouts and fron there to the targots thor vill be overcast lon, middle and high cloude, with moderato rain reducing visibility to one-half milo, Targets: 9/10 low clouds, base 1600 ft, tops 12,000 ft; 10/10 middlo eleuds, base 10,000 ft, top £1,000 ft; 10/10 high clouds at 25,000 ft, Winds at 16,000 ft will be 280° ct 50 knots, on Return? Scattered low, middle and high clouds with widely scattered light showers, Bas 3, QUOSSRVED WEATHER Bases at Take-Orf+ Troken low clouds and overcast middle elods, with heavy showers at Guam reducing visibility to 1 mile and delaying take-off, Route Outgoing: To S0°M: Scattered low and middle clouds with considersble build up and showers at 21°H, 30°H to target areas: A weak front in this zone gave broken to overcast lew clouds and overcast middlc clouds in luyore with an overcast deck of high clouds and a little light rain, Targets: Okayana: Clear over the tom, but broken low clouds in the area, and 8/10 middle clouds, base 15,000 fts winds at 11,000 ft were 280° at 23 knots, Sascbo: 9/10 low clouds, top 8000 ft; 6/10 middle clouds, ba: 10,000 ft, top 12,000 ft} 3/10 high clouds at 20,000 ft; winds at 11,000 ft wore 265° at 25 knots, Wojis 10/10 low clouds, top 6-8000 ft; 10/10 middle clouds, base 13,000 ft, top 18,000 ft; winds at 11,000 ft were 270° at 30 knots, Nobeoka: 6-9/10 low clouds, top 5000 ft; 10/10 middle clouds, bas. 14,000 ft; winds at 10,000 ft wore 230 at 25 knots, Besos on Return: Sonttered ow clouds and broken middle clouds with occ Light showers in the vicinity, ional ~ ae SOMRIDENTLALWINLVEM G3AUESEO A z S io &> =P SS ; (4% ° 6) INAF 62-62 ° WBMAVaM 1S¥93¥03 eecosemtece'ts2 snoiss 9pied dour SON pe sy Fons beSh Reha sts vctar tp bivity 2 S005 iL NPWS INARA Date 5) DECLASSIFIED Fy. Athos KX Missions We. 234. 235, 296 ant 237 28/20 June 1965 -20- SHQRERSEQRET To continue search in the 20-3000 ms, region, adare in ©, To barrage jan the gun-laying and search light radar ‘the 7284 and 190-210 mo, dand and to spot jan any gun-laying signals ‘that appeared outside tho barrage in an offert to render the eneny do- fenses ineffective, @, To confuse enony searchlight activity and gun-leying radare ‘vy the use of rope, 8, Twonty-three observers participated and used the following equipment to accomplish tho soarch and jamming: SI4-APT-1, 203-APQ-2, LAPTAS (Modified), 15-ARYW8, 23-iFR-d, QnAPAL1, SeAPAL6, 4-APAH24, SeAPR=7, 2-APR-5 and 2eANQ-1, 1, Rope was dispensed at the rate of 3 bundles per 10 seconds for protection against soarchlights, ©, Three special janning airplanes were employed by the 313th ings and 4 special jamming airplanes wore onpleyed by the 7Sré Wings ‘to chrole tho target areas, Theso airplanes were equipped to epot and barrage Jom the frequency bands of ths enemy gun-leying and searchlight radars, The jamming airplanes renainod in the targat area until the last airplane hed bonbod, . Results: 8, The special jamming airplanes. were exployed for the first time on the missions to Meji and Sasebo with apparently good results, Bocause of the undercast resulting in meager searchlight activity, i¢ wos difficult to evaluate the offectivensss of the jamming, The barrage waa reported aa satisfactory, A numer of enony signals with tho chars acteristics of searchlight and gun-laying redars was jammed and many of ‘those radars were turned off, », Rope was dispensed by the special Jaming airplanes and the strike aircraft but no definite conclusions could be drawn rogarding its ueoruiness, &, Thirty intercepts wore mado ond aro Listed at the end of ‘this section, 4, Renarka: a, A #860 me, signal ms hoard at S4¢ON-1S3S5E but could not ve Adontitioa, >, Bnemy voice communications wore heard on frequencies of and 91 mc. at 3352N-13088B in ths Meji rem, ie Fe? EP 229 SEQRETSEGRES Lior op mzncerEs 00068 0500 30 SAN Is1ssE o6zs45 CLIO 21 lel § Hi OH Coore 0680 32 S0SOK lass5E 062945 0435 Zl 122 S$ HY OM 00073 2500 09 3s62K 13059R o62945 o215 21 12) § Gh 90075 1360 20 ScOON 290500 osco45 O445 21 122 P EN CHT 00074 0505 40 Sga0N 15800R 067045 0455 21 122 P BY CHT 00076 0474 24 3020K 134008 067945 0440 21 lze S WT car 00078 1000 06 S352" 13059B ose9d5 oo8i ZL 12) $ OL OTS 0007 O476 30 SLEEK leads o6295 C17 al 121 $ WORE 0078 1500 05 S852 19083 o62945 clz? 2 iz S$ GL OnAOS 0000 o4so $9 SSO iseoss ocpos clos ml 17) $ Hi 00082 0250 20 aso 1S050E 062945 O150 21 lel S Bi CHT 00083 0100 25 S280" 133008 062945 0040 21 121 S zi 001010202 00090 1000 00 sed0K 1g1z0B 062945 0120 21 121 S Ei 00010002 00090 0150 25 s8s2R 1G0S0E 062045 0290 21 121 $ Hi olo10a2 00098 070 24 SOO 13350E osze45 O9 21 122 S Bi o0101022 0009 0100 20 SELEN 1S0L0R ospods 0035 21 121 S Ei oolm0z2 00088 0405 15 selex lasleE 082945 0205 al 121 S Bi coll0z2 0089 0500 20 S2OK lamSR O€z0%5 0080 21 121 S$ Hi ooLcl0z02 Colo 9600 19 S852 19050 o6ze45 0200 21 121 § Bi. oDlOL0202 ODL? 0100 12 sasaH 13050E osz948 0226 21 lal S Bi coLos000 00148 0480 05 S200N 13600B 062845 1915 21 122 P EW 001030003 Core oreo 0 SouoK Amicon ccnoe clx0 ot ior S XC onanannnn 0016s 0490 25 2250 15z05E 062915 OZ15 21 121 S Bi 000030003 QOLSS 0480 0S S340 13461 062845 1843 21 lz2 P EW 001030003 00185 0700 08 Sasa 13050 062945 0187 zl 121 S$ BF ~001030003 Oov74 B42 0 SIGs lasisB o6z05 0265 21 121 S EV 001050003 OOELS 0485 00 S2A6 15300 B 06205 OBIS 21 I21 § 00525 0000 CO SISEH As0G0N OcEo5 O52 al iol 8 00540 0000 00 S200 13350R Ogzgd5 0517 al lal § 02360 0000 00 SiON 13400R 062945 0400 a lal 8 EARL IL = RADIO CONSOLIDATED MISSICN REPORTS 1, Strike Reports: Thirty-three Strilce Reports wore received au- ring theso missions, Strike roports received by wings were as follows: 9; 78rd, 8; S1dth, 6; and Slate, 10, 2, Box Transmissions: Usepac woathor ond time signals on the halts hour ahd hour wore transmitted fron the Ground Station, No othor *P* type messages wore transnitted, 5, Enequousios: The Sth ond 78rd ings roportod gulte a few ine stanooa of Intorferonoo and juming on their dtrive Croguanetees oses= Goa vate Piles tas GOTT Cipengunas eas atatane tae thee ee Potlo operstors ard pilots reported that the CHT station, Haale Seipee® os jommed stfeotively, Jeanine var mere grauinont norch of fos aetna Tarafesay sn the footing wen 96 to'200 por eort effective: Repastie, ofthe Hoo of fay or night the plane fron the eh Wing have fron for Gears, cin Sevart Sta'toea the same’ “inne of dete oar tae Bhan tem; bagpipe and vordabio or sliding O¥’and notaen pasetae ee peraontago Divaktown of traffic per treqeensyy 18 see Gent aero ceage Shoes Bt por sent on 7 nogaoyolery and Bl per oanttan if eageaeate ko ke lo = ies PpSufi RAD DECLASSIFIED ® Q 2 2 a 8 Sgonar 4, Navigational Aids: Six requests for HF/DF bonrings were ro~ ooived and all were obtained, Tho S8th Wing reported that 1t took 5 and 5 ninutes to obtain 2 bearings fron AAS D/F facilities, Only 1 airoraft asked for a VEF/DF bearing and it was obtained, Radio rangety hones and hrasdeant atotiona wore used effectively. 5, Not DiscinLine ond Soourtty: Sxoolont net discipline and security were reported duriag these missions, Thore were no violations of security roperted and vory few instances of aerial eperatore broak- ing in on othor airoraft!s transuiseion 6, Enemy Zronemigelone: The following incidents of Jamming, in- terforence and enemy tranmaissions were roperted during this mission: 2, $020 koa: (2). GW from 211302 to 2917152, 2525007 te 201600%, 2916002 ‘to 2519302, 2816182, to 2016552 vas offoctive, (2) dop not using OF fron 2816452 to 2817182 was vory effective, (3) Unidentified O7 fron 2816452 to 2517182 was effective, (4) CW cell 9DT from 2817003 te 2518302 was effective, (5) OM, untdentitiod, from 2817302 to #819302 and 2617452 to 2018482 was partially effective to very effective. >, S618 kee: (2) OW code with no all between 2518002 and 2518002 was ineffective, (2) Ve with oalts DYT and TPH votwean 2015452 and 2615552 wre ineffective, (3) CW with cal 9DT betwoon 2817002 and 2518302 was par- tially effective, (4) Jamming of *Strixo" message vith CW at 2618502 was very effective, (5) CW code at 2019082 mas ineffective, (6) Harmonic of 3310 kes, "OOV392 V 54754" was partiall; effective, 5 4 (7) oi with call 907 interatttently was partially effective ©, 10305 kes: Mogligibie. 4, S145 koa: (1) Japanese Net causing O7 interts ve OF interference between xd ma000a maa effoutive’ (hie interference had deoreasey this peor inifactivansie af « night frequensy), ee (2) Steady tone lasting one hale our at 2815208 wae ve effective and blocked out ground station, a ise nti S82SSGRET (3) Junbied CW between 2510008 and 212007 was Ineffeosives e. S086 keer (2). Unknown stats ‘and £51902 was ineffective, on sending V's and dashes between 201820% (2) Steady OF otgnal and interference from Hary point te point station at 281130 wore effective, (3) Steady tone lasting 30 minutes beginning ot 2815400 was partially effective, £, 10880 koat (1) High pitched toney modulated, covering a 10 ko band intermittently throughout a Sehour Period was Partially effective, (2) Unintetigibie OV beginning et 2029082, heard only when groma station mas tranonitting mas partially effective to very effective, (3) Station using cold sien *LZF? sending V's and cell ster at 2510082 was partially effective, (4) Roaring sound from 2616302 until 819502 was vory effec: tive, ke 3990.kog: CW at 2910502 and 2811582 was partially effective to vary affection, hy [8S koa: OW votwoon 2512487 ani 2816202 was partially effective te effestive, Included in this group was SDP testing continu ously. 1, 10080 kegs Code transmission at 2339002 was partially effective, Je S410 kos, 7520 kes and 11160 kos: Negligible, 7, Distress: The 8th Wing Ground Station rei . ved 2 reports wien included position and signtings of Flares, marker and life raft 1. Zauinment Mekfunctions: AN/ART-15, 1 no PA grid voltages BC= 348 1 antonna broken; AI/ARN~7, 3 inoperative, 2 needle hunting; SOR-269, 5 sonso antennas broken, 1 tuning cable stuck; SCR-522, 4 inoperative, 3 woak and intermittent; Intorphono, § inoperative, 4 excessively noisy. 4 Weak, Antormittent and leaking, 1 foot microphone switch inoperative, 1 ntorephone switch inoperative, 1 microphone button inoperative; Mit 6 inoperative, 5 stuck, 1 antenna wire broken, 1 lost weight, oe bo te a be es raws oe 5A LL NARA Date 5 AK ¥ 28/29 Tune 1945 =33- SEQREDg SEGRET ‘PART I = BND AIR_OEPOSIRION 1 dn ostinated 10 enowy atroraft were sighted an nate 5 unagaressive attacks. Since the wing efforts were saninst, i ae ferent targets and cloud coverage was varied from GAYU to ‘over target arena, the Jupaisse night Tighter control apparently had vectoring problense a, with 1 B29 25 Three Bakas were reported in the Okayana areay fron the 58th Fing claining a Bake destroyed. The twin-engine enecy Plane reported as launchirg this Baka continued on course tows 3-29 ae if the Jap pilot intemted to rom the Superfortrass= 3s The usual blinking of nunning lights, and flashing on and off of landing lights by eneuy airoraft was roporteds 4 No enowy aircraft wore claimed as destroyed nor damaged ty B29 exer a4 Tho primary targot vas boubed by 138 aircraft of the 58th Wing between 17432 apd 19072 froa 12,000 to 13,300 fest. Axis ‘of attack varied from 2779-918, Teather conditions varied fron AYU to 7/10 undercaste be No flak mas reported en route to the targote c+ Over tho target flak was desoribed as meager, inaccurate and heavys 44° On withdrawal meager and inaccurate, medium flak vas Observed 12,000 feet over Maunugane (317N = 133475). A tow hoa Durste vere also observed from a distance bursting over Tanashine (3a35N - 133058). ee No aireraft were dofinitely lost to flak on this mission, although l'atrerart was ost to unknowm causes. No aircraft sustained flak danegee ft. Saoroblicht activites (2) A tow searchlight beans (1 to 3) were reported in the target area, Two aircraft wore picked up and held for a brict interval. Control vas rated inoffective. 11 beans were whites (2) One ineffective beam was cbaorvat at SLL9N = 193528 (Northern part of Shikoku). + Miacallaneous Antinireratt Observations! (2) A *ttroverks' display was soon inediately above the target areas J vas described as a ‘oparkler® effect acecuponiod ty flying burning porticlos an! presented a doneo curtain oro ime sarcot Detvon, 6009 an 20,000 foots Shy of ali avaliable satormst ion concorsing this dlsplay indicated’ thet 1¢ was duo yo ponsvia seeanturo explosion of the Me\7 and/or Iki8 bosbae a (2) The blackout was described as good to excellent. 4 sity, probably Tokushima, to the vest of the course near the depart= ure point vas reported lighted. are SECRETSe SECRET 2+ Washon No, 295 = Suaabot Tha primary target vas boobed by U1 eirorart ({neluding 1B pethfinder airéraft) of the 7374 ing betmeen 15372 and. 165 from 10,100 to 11,700 feet. Axia of attack varied from 29°°3H = Weathor was reported as 8/10 to 10/10 undercast mith wi knots fron 270". be Mo flak was reported en route to the targets | Anaccurate c+ Over tho target flak was described as neagers ‘amd heavy, Nediun flak was qnoomtered along boob Tun, starting ‘about 2 minutos from bomb release and Lasting 30 seconds te 21 minutes. It wat very meager and inaccurate for the first aircraft over tho targot, but ineroased to generally nederate and inaccurate fas the strike progrossod. Control was barrages roraft were Alluninated by S/La because of undercast. The maximm number of S/L'e observed a9 10s. 4. On withdraval flak vas encountored at Land's end (32008 ~ 151508)" and off shore at 3132N - 131268. In both caso it'was monger, inaccurate and medium Alreraft vere at 10,000 to 13,000 fox e+ Mo aircraft were lost or danaged aa a result of fisk on this mission. f. Magollaneous Antiaivaratt Obasrvationa? (2) Tyo aireratt reported 12 inaccurate ground-to~ air rockets over the target, They came up vith a reddish roskot trail and burned out at 9000 foot without axplodings (2) Sixetuelve orange-colered flares wore observed, over tho targot. They exploded at 9000 feat into brilliant white Hiekts and burned about 1 minuto. (3) Crows of the 498th Bomb Group observed 38 largo ‘orange-colored bursts in the target area, Thoy were about 40 fect * in dimoter and occurred at 13,000 foot. They would spill out fire, dio out slightly, drop about 00 fect there another similar explosion would occur. Thin cycle occurred |; tines for anch projectile. (4) Another group of 25 crange-colored bursts was observed and those voro quite similar to those heretofore described excopt that only the original explosion occurred. These bursta wore 6 to & foot in dianetor. Thoy soened to hane in tho sky after a slight upvant thrust fron the original oxplosion, ‘Tho flase emanating fron tho burst ran down to form a conical shapod mass with the point of burst as tho apex, ‘The lensth of this mass vas inated at 500 to 1000 foot. Tho ontire masa would slowly sottle and burn out in about 2 minutes. The possibility that those obsorra- tions wero premature explosions of B-29 released bombs vas quostion= able in viow of tho fact that 6 of those poculiar burals ware observed at Kuanoto on withiraval, s fer as is known, no aireraft bonbed Kunanotos . 3+ Migaton Nox 296 = Moi: a. Tho primary target vas bonbel Uy 91 strerart of the aiSth Ting betiioeh 15112 ang 16132 trem 9900 to 11,600 fects ‘ike Of attack was 310%, ‘Teather was reported aa 8/10 to 10/10 undoreact with winds of 30 knote fron 275°,Bi waa d: S SECRED ant be a route to the targot meager. inaccurate, neary nodium f1ak va encountered in tho vieinity of tho T.Ps, possibly emanating from Usa Airficld (33938 - 131168)- ee Over the target flak was described 28 moagery inaccurate sand hoowys” ROM eperaters reperted 5 GR signnia in the target, ara one of which wont off the air shortly after jaming startede a bey flak was reported as theager to moderate and inaccurate. Some ae Foachod aa high aa 14,000 foots A fow searchlight Donna wore obsGrv Erping to plaseo tho ndercast witht auccosse Ivo aoarcblights wore reported et tra Jina. a. On'withdraval after a broakazay to the north one aireraft received meager, inaccurate ami modiua flak from tho Kawanishi area (3300 = 132258) through a 7/10 undereaste os Mo aireraft wore lost or damaged as 2 result of flak on thic missions f. Tuolve groindstowair rockets were reported over tho targot areas he Migsion Nos 297 = lobedkat ae Tho primary target was boubed by 117 Aircraft of the SUyth Wing otwwoon 16462 and 16172 from 7000 to 12,000 fect, Axis of attack varied from 250°-276% be No route flek was encountered en route to or on with- dzavel from tho target ce Over tho target arda only ijl aireraft reported any flake Is was described as very meager, inaccurate and heavy. Fifty-two aircraft reported modiu flak a¢ monger and inaccurate, Sone possible rocket fire was reported coming from the target arcas 4, Mo aircraft were lost or damaged as a result of flak on this mission, Several aircraft reported flak from naval vossols as follows: 32908 = 192308 = Medina floke SUN = 132558 = Hoavy flak (20 bursts) 3100N = 139008 = Heavy flak (90 bursta) f. Blackout in the target aroa vas goods ~ 36° SgoRaT5m z SE 2 CQONEIDENTLIAL at. = NN: 2. Summary! 4. Gkayana City danngo resulting from XC Bonber Command Mission 234 of 29 June 1945 18 about 2433 aquare ites or 63 Der of tho city's builteup arca. Tho built-up area orse! 3698 square miLeo. 3 od, with tho exception bs Tho entire ofty is virtually destroyed, wit! of the north portion ani the northwest portion across tho railroads 2. Ttenization of Tntustrial Danae! a J About 10 small buildings destroyods Target 3 por cont destrayode b 1 6296, + one Large aut one meta Dullding gutted; about 10 aoall buildings destroyed. Target about 85 dor cont danagod or destroyed. ee 2xr Gab, 0 + Two large buildings gutted; vt § saill buildings destroyed. targot shout 95 per cont damaged a. Tancot 0 62%. Gas Works: About § small buildings destroyed, Target about 20 far cont destroyed. os Taneet XAT 6298, Chemical Plant: no netiim na sbout 8 small buildings destroyed. Target about 50 por cent destroyed. t. Target XXI 62h), Unidentitiet Industrial Area: Three Large buildings gutted; 11 emall buildings dostroyed. Target about 95 por cont danagod or dostroyods ee ina Cast 1 Two medium and about 6 small buildings destroyed. Target approximately 80 por cent destroyed. he Qthor Tansotat Castio and Baxtacks 22 aro 100% dostroyed, At least 29 smal) and modiun unidentificd industrial plats 2 are 50% destroyed, Fonainder show n0 visible danage. ‘Tprents outside builteup area: (within 5 miles radius of conter of city). be eS . Mupbsred targets ‘Dames 1204 Omgck Stean Pougr Plant eo seins ‘XXI 6231 Barracks & Arsenal Nong visible XOX 6058 Unidentified Heavy Industry None visible XI 6059 Unidentified Chemical Industry None visiblo Other targets: Btean Power Plant (on river 3 of city) None visibl ecient victt (etneank to voree atest) one Yheible Geet bases Gat Sop vine Payor Mad Kone visible Coneet Plant ees viaitie Raferanca!IU Survey Roport 116, 16 June 19h5, nclogura:danctated enlargecont shoving danage appears on the folloving PABO® Z © Rana on KET RLM, AT Tse Repeat thoy cnet Moe 490 and Speotal +37 « SONEEDENTIGLr) b re) $ Es Re 2 i Hy osnews DECLASSIFIED Authority SEGRET + Munber of aircraft wslue asimeth etebitisation: 534, e, Averace maxinun range (in nautical miles) of tareste: 69,5 at 7000 ft, 68 at 12,000 rt, f, Average maxinun rango (in nautical miles) of beavons: 135 at 7000 rt, 158 at 12,000 ft, g- Averass maximun range of Jupansse coast: 58,9 nautical mile h, Humber of failures in lead planes: 6 4, Very light interforonce eneountored. APN=4 and APNA9: e tr 426 ution) ea) SRATLIVG WIRE ELNED (2) Ground-wave 540 900 (2) Sky-wave 1069 1231 b, There wore 25 sots roported inoperative, 3, TEE, SoR-696: a, Equipment reported checked as SCP, by Two sets were dnoperative, bolute Altinetor SOR=T18: 1. A total of 259 sets was operative, 1, There were no failures of oguipnont, a, There wore 387 individual crew radar release: . Identification of initial points, landfall, and moan points of impact was reported in all casos as good, - 26 SECRETSTASSIFIED TE MPH 6075 BAR waa date 5AM/LL e GONELDENTLAL 1, Suman of Danae: Bullteup area! Sqe Mi, total - 234i Sas Me destroyed - «97 Por cont destroyod - 42 Planned target area! 2.0 sae mi, Per cont destroyed: 48 Total damage to date 97 sa me Fer cent of built-up area! U2 Targets danaged by ourront strike: 3 mmbered: 2 other Note: no previous danage Damage within Limits of built-up area! Resteoyod Area dames from current strike: Soe Mia Soe Mi, Fer cont Built-up area (Urban) +33 a7 Builtoup area (Industrial) 20h, Fe Built-up area (Total) 7 a2 Damage to targetat Damage 90436-752 Dockyard oe 7°"758 Naval arsenal & Baginecring Depot 258 "845 Provision hart Naval Barracks 258 Militery Barracks 50% Damage outside built-up area (within 5 mile radius of center of city): None Reference: 4iF air Objective Folder 90.36 Inelosuret Mosae annotated to show damage follows this Sections © YOM 2,0, CIU Dea, Report Noy 1294 - 39° SONEIDENTIaLa GONELRENSLAS ‘BAND IIL = SEOMLON ¢ = wisE pase sssESaIENT. 8 FULL 25 1. Sumary! fy Danage’to Nosh (9043} Urban) rowulting fron 20, Beaker Command Mission 2365 29 June 1945. totale, 0-302,8a Piss. EAS Fopresented 2649 per cont of the entire city area of the offy ia 412 age mie) bs Tho nain concoutration of damage is along the water= front in the vestorn section’of tho city. Tie ares is, creuded with unidentified intustries, to a point about 2000’ 6 . Mo ji Contral c+ Industrial damage’ included targets ‘uty hart = 1068 destroyed) ant gy Host Ordnance Stéraze. 2 30% desteoved and 70% guttod. Target, 4B; Moi Southern Wharf vas 5X destroyed or resoved, and target 1110, Moji RR Station and Yards, was undamaged. au 1 anor. SQ. MILES SQ. MILES PER CENT 3° Baliteup urban area 5 eke? 2 Budt.up Induotriad aren losated along ~~ - ~ the western watertronts_ _ _ — Q214 _ — 021055 _ — QoS _ _ ‘Total builtsup area 1,328 ~~ "0.302 ~ 26.9 * "Built-up urban arpa" ineludes the residential and commercial 3+ Ttemtzntion of Thaystrial Duuaaet 2 % tae Wj Central, tart 100% destroyed. ag Uoji Ordnance Storage ‘30% destroyed and TK gutted. Reference! AGF 90.34 Shimonoacki irea 12 July 1945 Inclosure: Annotated enlargenent (3PR5%192-2:6) showing damage appears at the conclusion of this section, * Based on JX B,C, CTU Ded, Report Noy 125 and Special Supplements Targets within limits of built-up area! Target 90.3}-6068 Grain Stores, no visible damecs Dawes Other! Ansano Fortiand Consnt Coy Tone Visible Grain Stores None visible Tetertront Tarchouses 20 Barracks tres moe 18 Small Unidentified Industries 7 are 1008 destroyed Fpmscta cutalde built-ur argai(within § miles radiue of conter of eity) %043LkO Moji Conling Station Ye Kobe Stool orks None Visio + 2201 Kanero Rail Torey Stipa & Yards None Visible " 2163 Moji Coaling Station Yards None Visible © 1859 Tokyo Rope life. 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Bo) 2 83) 5 g al § J 2 wmrour DATA TO» AIRORAPT AIRBORNE ua us oa 1 avo. Baszo wr. oF atacaarr | 74964 ver 72330 75h AVERAGE USEFUL LOAD 592k, 60428 59848 60390 tivgs wo. oF Bows tosDED | nixed ond | mixed rosa [mixed tous | uixed Lesa ANG. wi, OF pubibS LOaDED: 14565, 14706 ‘Laygue 14984 AVERAGE FUEL LOADED 0kk 6751 o7le 6628 \ avo. wr. OF FUEL LowED | 39264 40506 soar 39768 ves MISC. STOUT 5985 saab sat 5038 pye, owoss wr. wt ace ovr | 334178 135403 pare 136004 ‘Excludes 5 pathfinder aircraft. teiL 3 la S = | iz O| a3 BE Et § PAK aes Date 5 ee SEgRaTz Q 2 2 yi 8 Nara Date S/H/ LL f SECRET FRoM: COMORIBOUCOM 21 SEGRE TO + COMGENBOWG 58 By Auth of 6G XXI BC -ENBOM IG 3 cove: 33 COVRENBOIIG 314 - et Hose te ee Tnitiale Date FO: COMGENBOUYG 315, (CO3RD PHOTO XXI BOR contaND ‘ quatt 0600 26 JUNE 1945 FIELD ORDIR META 92 WPS FOR PLOTTING: Japan Aviation Chart 24218,880 1, Onitted, 2y XAT Duidom abtacko Okayama, Sasebo, Neji and Nobeoka Urban Areas on D-Day. 3. a4 Sth Vang: (2) ‘Target: Okayama Urban trea, Primery Radar and Visucl, wr Force Required 071097 Normal Effort UPI Reference: WET BonCom Litho-Mosie Okayama Aron 90.27 ~ Urban. (2) Routes Base Two Jima 3410301 ~ 13449308. 3u26N - 134208 (IP) Target. 3y40N = 133358 Left Turn Tro Jina Base Offset. aining point ~ either Inu Shima or (3436N ~ 13402153) (3) Atitude of Attack? Bese 11,000 ~ 11,800 feet. (4) Altitude Enroute to Tar: plus 800 fect, Sven thousand to even thousand (5) Catsbrated Indicated jMirspeod! 205 MPH. (6) Bomb Load: 2 groups New'/'s Ineonaiary Bombs 2 groups Ee\S Incendinry Clusters First a/0 takeoff st Zoro Hour plus 135 minutes. Sagebo Urben Aven, Prinnry Visual and Redar. Foree Required onan? Newman Bffort SECRET 4446/3Authority 0 (PH. BAK nara Date 5/0/ L SECRET FIELD OROER NUMBER 91 CONTINUED oe MPI Reference: XXT BonCom Litho-Mosaie Sasebo Area 90.36 ‘Urbany (2) Routes Base Two Jim 3059N = 130403 3015N ~ 130138 3226N - 129058 Bey2n ~ 129138 (IP) aoe = 12939508 | (ROAP) faract . Right Tum climbing to 12,000 fect. 31478 ~ 131308 Two Jina Base (3) Axtitude of ittackt 10,000 ~ 10,900 feet. (4) Altitade Enroute to Targett Even thousand to even thousand pine 800 feat. (5) centbreted Indionted Mrapeod! 240 26H, (6) Bonb Load: 1st airborne grou: E-ké Clusters 2nd and 3nd airborne groups? M-17 Cluster Ath cdrborne group: 1x76 Clustors (7) Tine Control: First A/C takeoff at Zero Hour. (8) 73rd Wing will dispatch 4 special jamming 4/C to orbit a point (3307N = 1294/8) with a radius of 10 miles while bombor strean is over target. The altitude of tw lowest Jamming 4/C will bo 15,000 feet. 13th Ming: (2) Tercet: Mogi Urban area. Mer Fores Required. 092130 3. Gps Normal Bffort MPT Reference! XT RonCom Titho-llosaie Shimonosoki Area 90.34 ~ Urban. (2) Route: Base Tyo Jina Baugh = 132333 3334N - 131268 Target - Right Turn 3302N - 133058 Two Jina Base Offset aiming point: Hither 335430N ~ 13100308 or O62U4 2nd OAP Reference: Samo as MPI reference, SESRETECLA Authorty WU PH SECRET FISLD ORDER NBER 91 CONTINUED a BASE wars pate 57H UL G) (4) G) (6) ” (a) Altitude of Attack: 10,000 ~ 10,600 feet. ‘Altitude Enroute to Target? Odd thousnnd to odd thousand plus 800 feet. Calibrated Indicated MMrepoed: 235 MPH. Bor Load: 2 groups Mei? IB! 1 group Incendiary Clusters containiny I-69 bonbs. Tine Control: Firet 4/C takeoff at Zero Hour, 313th ‘Ting will dispatch 3 special jamming 11/C to orbit 2 point 3556N = 130588 with a radius of 10 milos while borbor strean Zs over target. ‘The altitude of tho lovest nJe wil be 15,000 fact. uth Wing® q@ (2) @g) () (5) (6) (7) (a) @) (2) Target? Mobeoka Urben area, Prinary Visual and Radars arr ow Pores Required 052069 323530 = 13144508 Norn=1 affort WPI Reference: XLT BonCom Litho-fosaic, Nobecka Jiroa Wo. 90.38 ~ Urban. Routes Base Iwo Jima, 3243 = 132338, (IP) ‘Target - left Turn Two Jina Base Altitude of Attack: 10,000 - 10,800 fect. Altitude Enroute to Targett: Odd thousand to odd thousand plus 800 fect. Attitude on Rotumn to Bosc: 12,000 fect or aboves Gaddpeuted Talteated Adrepoed! 205 MPH, Bonb Lond: 2 groups Mal? TBs. 2 groups Incendiary Clusters containing N~69 bobs. Timo Control: Firet 4/C tokeoff at Zoro Hour plus 90 minutes, D-Day end Zero Hour: 281800 King othod of littackt By individuel 4/0 with main force preceded by 12 pathfinder 4/C, Wing will attonpt to campress attack to within 70 minutos. fo ws PR w bs 8SECR FIELD ORDSR MIMBER 91 CONTINUED (3) First 12 aircraft of each wing will be designated pathfiniers, flom by best radar boxbing crews. (a) Mreraft. schedulod to takeoff first will carry the MONT type Thoendiary Bonb including patnfinier elroraft. (5) Bonb Fusing? (0) Tacendtary Clustorst To open 5,000 fest, abovo the target. (b) way BH (c) ™-76 TBts: Instent nose and non-delay tail. Instantaneous nose, (6) Intervalonater Sottines (2) All Clusters and M-76: 50 fect. oe : (b) Meh? IB'ss 100 fects be Sy NE aeenges Teetical Wssion Nusbert Okayama = No, 234 Sasebo Nos 235 Mj = Noy 236 Nobeoka = No. 237 5. Communications: a. (1) The spoeial jamming airoraft for the 73rd and 313th Vins will bo equipped te barrage jan the regions 190=210 and 72-8 nezacycles, Spot jamsing will be conducted over the frequoncy ranges 190-190 nnd 210-220 mogacyeles as Cc desired by the Wing ROM Officer andas governed by the capacity of each wing, Th addition, all strike etreraft will be equipped with ono Jamer within the barrage band Visted above providing aufficient equipment 1s available. BAK nana Dae 57H (2) For the wings whore special Jamming planes are not specified, each squadron will be equipped to barrego jan the rezion 190-210 negacyeles. Spot jamming will be con- Gucted over the froqueney ranzoe 180-190, 210-720 and 72— 4 mogneyeles as desired by the "ling ROM officer and as governed by the equipment available. (3) Observations of the extent end reliability of the barrage will be mdo while over the target. (4) Jammors will be kept in operation at all. times whon closer ‘than 50 niles to tho Mainland, and will be turned off at all other tines, oxcopt for preflight and postflight fro~ quoney checks which aro to be made on the ground while the Jammers aro installed in the cirplanes. Be: Kisssn Gg “ky TOK ‘CONGENBOMCOM 21, a4 p/ortis DISTRIBUTION: 2 on we.wo iL NNEY So 1ARA Date 5: DECLASSIFIED Author BK, 28/29 June 1945 on BESTRIGZERDECLASSIFIED SMe E 2 a hes 7 8 9 23 = 2h 2 - 27 28 29 - 33 7 38 - 67 68 = 69 70 RESTRICTED Sommanting Goneral: Aray Air Foroes: Comarting Tonerei! Dies aray Stravesic Air Forees (Rear) Commanding cenerel, U.S, Arcy Strategie Air Forces (Cast) aie erate, Usde ivey Strategic Ar Faxoes (Guan) Commanding Genoral; Twentieth Air Fores Cammemting Ooneral; Benth Air Force’ (Ckinaws) Gamandor in Chief, U.S. Army forces, Pacific Gator of Naval Opatations, OP16-7 Comanter in Chief; Pacific Fleot (dv 4) Comenier in Chi Comanier’Air Fores, Pacific Fleet Comardor; Third Fleet Commander; Tift: Foot Comander, First Carrier Task Forse Comandex, Marianad i Cminding General; U.S, Army Torooa, “Middle Pacific Commanding Generali Commanding Generali Coun ding General, Oomnanding Generals Commanding General; ‘Aiea Aix Forces, SPA Fer East Air Forces UeS. Strategie Air Forsos in Mbditerranean Allied Air Forces Fifteenth Air Force Seventh Air Forco Commanding General; VII Bonber Command Comaniing Goneral, VII Fighter Ooemand Commanding General; Eleventh Air Force Camunding' General, 30st Fighter Ting Comand Hg, Allied Air Forces, STPA’ TIN: Senior Intelligence Officer, RedsAsFe Oomenter in Chie?, U.S. amty Forces, Pacific TIN 0-2 (Por Saction 225 ROM) officer in Charge, Joint Intelligence Center Pacific Ocean Ares Commaniing General, Army Air Fores ABIN: 49/48 Intelligence Commanding Géneral, aray Air Forces SHIN: 40/A3, Intelligence, Collection Division ee ee General, U.S. Army Strategie Mr Forces (Guam) ‘ATIN! Intelligente eee et Ghaceals UsS. Aray Strategic Mir Foroes (Guan) ATIN' Communications POR: Counter Meagures Air Analysis Center Cemending Officer, Iwentieth Air Foroo Toad Orew School Brigadier Genefal, H.S. Hansell, 3r+ Chicf of Sta¢f, Twontieth Air Foroo Deputy 0/8, Ophay Twentieth Air Force a0 of S, 4-2, Trontieth Air Force Chemical Warfare ‘Officer, Twentieth Air Force Onduance Officer, MWentiéth Air Force Director of Tactics, A-3, Twentieth Air Force Historical Officer, Twentieth Air Force LGTEDRESTRICTED Counarting General; 58th Bonbardnent iting Commding General; 73rd Bonbardnent Wing Gonmanding General; 313th Bonberdment Ting Commanding Geusral; J1)¢h Boxbarament Ting Comanding Goneral; 315th Boubardment Wing Comanding Officer; 3rd Photo Reconnaissance Sq Cormanting Officer, 55th Reconnaiasance Sa, Long Range “eather : Commanding Officer, Twentieth Aix Fores Coubat Staging Genter (Provisional) Connanding Officer; 33nd Statistieal Control Unit Commanding Officer; Sth Bomb Group (VH) Commanding 9th Boub Group (VH) Coumanding 26th Bou Group (YH) Commanding 1oeh wen Group (VA) Command ng 29th Bow Group (VE) Commanding 39th Bob Group (VE) ‘Commanding {oth Bonb Group (VE) Commanding Officer; 330¢n Bond Group (VH) Commanding Officer: 331s Boab Group (VHD Comanding Officer; lijkeh Bonb Group (V3) Commanding Officer, 462nd Bomb Group (WH) BESSESBeequmesees F BIRRLeRe Cocmanding 68th Boab Group (VE) Gommanding 3 ugrth Ben Group (VH) Conmandine 498th Bomb Group (VE) Commanding 14ggth Bem’ Group (VE) Commanding, ‘500th Bomb Group (Vi) 107 Commanding Borst Bomb Group (VH) 108 Commanding Soend Bomb Group (VE) 109 Commanding Offieer; 50ljth Boab Group (VH) io Commanding Officer, 505th Boab Group (Vi) mi Commanding Orficer, 509th Gaapoaite Group ue Coumanding Officer; 15¢h Fighter Group (VIR) us Commanding Officer; 2lst Fighter Group (VIA) € 1h Comanding Officer; lyth Fighter Group (VIR) 1g Comanding Officer, 506th Fighter Group (VLR) 1g Reporting Unit; 4-2; Twentieth Air Faroe (File Copy) 117 - 130 Reporting Unit, 42, Twentieth air Foree RESTRICTED