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WLAN Security

Vulnerabilities and Threats

On-Wire Attacks Over-the-Air Attacks


Ad-hoc Wireless Bridge Evil Twin/Honeypot AP Reconnaissance
HACKER HACKER’S HACKER
AP

Client-to-client backdoor access Connection to malicious AP Seeking network vulnerabilities

Rogue Access Points Denial of Service Cracking Tools


HACKER HACKER
DENIAL OF
SERVICE

Backdoor network access Service disruption Sniffing and eavesdropping

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WLAN Security
Denial of Service Attacks

 RF Jamming
Any intentional or un-intentional RF transmitter in the same frequency
can adversely affect the WLAN
 DoS using 802.11 Management frames
Management frames are not authenticated today
Trivial to fake the source of a management frame
De-Authentication floods are probably the most worrisome
 Misuse of Spectrum (CSMA/CA – Egalitarian Access!)
“Silencing” the network with RTS/CTS floods, Big-NAV Attacks
 802.1X Authentication floods and Dictionary attacks
Overloading the system with unnecessary processing
Legacy implementations are prone to dictionary attacks, in addition to
other algorithm-based attacks
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Wireless Security
MAC Address Spoofing

 As with wired networks, MAC address and IP address spoofing


are possible, if not easy, in Wireless Networks
 Outsider (hostile) attack scenario
Does not know key/encryption policy
IP Address spoofing is not possible if Encryption is turned on (DHCP
messages are encrypted between the client and the AP)
MAC Address spoofing alone (i.e., without IP Address spoofing) may not
buy much if encryption is turned on
 Insider attack scenario
Seeking to obtain users’ secure info
MAC address and IP Address spoofing will not succeed if EAP/802.1x
authentication is used (unique encryption key is derived per
user (i.e., per MAC address))

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Wireless Security:
Sniffing and Reconnaissance

 First – Sniffing, or capturing packets over the air, is an


extremely useful troubleshooting methodology
 Sniffing, in the old days was reliant on very specific
cards and drivers
 Very easy to find support for most cards and drivers
today
 Cost (if you like to pay for it) of such software is
negligible (or, just use free/open source software)
 Provides an insight (with physical proximity) into the
network, services, and devices which comes in handy
when performing network reconnaissance

BRKAGG-2015_c2 © 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 55
Wireless Security
Man in the Middle Attack

 A MiTM is when an attacker poses as the network to


the client(s) and as a client to the actual network
The attacker forces a legitimate client off the network
The attacker lures the client to a honeypot
The attacker gains security credentials by intercepting user traffic

 Very easy to do with:


Sniffing, and war-driving to identify targets
MAC Address Spoofing
Rogue Device Setup
DoS Attacks

BRKAGG-2015_c2 © 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 56
Quick Look: Common WLAN
Exploits/Tools
 Remote-Exploit/Backtrack/Auditor
 Aircrack, WEPcrack, etc
 coWPAtty
 Kismet
 NetStumbler, Hotspotter, etc
 AirSnort
 Sniffing tools: OmniPeek, Wireshark
 dsniff, nmap
 wellenreiter
 asleap

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Ounce of Prevention…
Stop the Attack Before It Happens

On-Wire Attacks Over-the-Air Attacks


Ad-hoc Wireless Bridge Evil Twin/Honeypot AP Reconnaissance
HACKER HACKER’S HACKER
AP

Client-to-client backdoor access Connection to malicious AP Seeking network vulnerabilities


Cisco wIPS Detects These Attacks
Rogue Access Points Denial of Service Cracking Tools
HACKER HACKER
DENIAL OF
SERVICE

Backdoor network access Service disruption Sniffing and eavesdropping

BRKAGG-2015_c2 © 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 58
Ounce of Prevention…
Stop the Attack Before It Happens

On-Wire Attacks Over-the-Air Attacks


Ad-hoc Wireless Bridge Evil Twin/Honeypot AP Reconnaissance
HACKER MFP NeutralizesHACKER’S
all HACKER
AP
Management Frame
Exploits, such as Man-in-
the-Middle Attacks
Rogue
Client-to-client backdoor access
WPA2/802.11i
Connection to malicious AP Seeking network vulnerabilities
detection, classificati Neutralizes Recon
on and mitigation and Cracking Attacks
Rogue Access
addresses Points
these Denial of Service Cracking Tools
attacks HACKER HACKER
DENIAL OF
SERVICE

Backdoor network access Service disruption Sniffing and eavesdropping

BRKAGG-2015_c2 © 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 59
Cisco’s Attack Detection Mechanisms

Adaptive
Base IDS
wIPS
Built-in to
controller Requires MSE
software

Uses Local Uses wIPS


and Monitor Monitor Mode
Mode APs APs
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Adaptive wIPS Differences from Base
Controller IDS

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Adaptive wIPS Difference #1
Alarm Aggregation and Correlation
Base Controller IDS Adaptive wIPS

WCS
WCS

WLC MSE

AP WLC

AP

 No Alarm Correlation
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Adaptive wIPS Difference #2
Breadth of Alarms Detected
Base Controller IDS Adaptive wIPS

 Only 17 signatures
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Adaptive wIPS Difference #2
(Cont) – Attack Encyclopedia

 Available for each


alarm
 Accessible from the
wIPS profile page

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Adaptive wIPS Difference #3
Forensic Packet Capture

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Adaptive wIPS Difference #3
Forensic Packet Capture

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Adaptive wIPS Difference #4
Historic Reporting

1. Alarm information stored in MSE database


Maximum of 6 million alarms stored in MSE database

2. WCS queries the MSE database during report


generation
3. Reports created and viewed at WCS

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Adaptive wIPS
Types of Reports

 wIPS Alarm List Report


Use: Historic reporting of attacks
Summarized list of alarms contained within the MSE
Contains alarm type, SRC MAC, detecting AP, first seen time,
last seen time

 wIPS Top 10 AP Report


Use: Identifying ‘hot zones’ of attack
The top 10 wIPS access points with the most number of alarms
Includes critical, major, minor and warning levels of alarms

BRKAGG-2015_c2 © 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 68
Adaptive wIPS
Creating Reports • Filter by MSE
• Or by WLC

• Add/Remove Columns
• Sort by Columns
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Example Report
wIPS Alarm List

Attack
Timeline

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Example Report
wIPS Top 10 APs

Alarm Severities

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WCS Security Dashboard
Controller IDS
and Adaptive
wIPS Alarms
Security Index

Rogues by
Category

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Adaptive wIPS
Components and Functions

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Mobility Services Engine
Support for Cisco Motion Services
3310 Mobility Services Engine 3350 Mobility Services Engine

Supports Adaptive wIPS for up to 2000 Supports Adaptive wIPS for up to 3000
Monitor Mode APs Monitor Mode APs
Supports Context Aware for up to 2000 Supports Context Aware for up to 18000
tracked devices tracked devices

Requires WLC software version 4.2.130 or Requires WLC software version 4.2.130
later and WCS version 5.2 or later. or later and WCS version 5.1 or later.

 Mobility services may have different WLC/WCS software


requirements
 Adaptive wIPS is licensed on a per-monitor mode AP basis
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wIPS System Communication Diagram

The MSE is not


in the ‘data path’

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