1 Jeremy Michael Derek Williams III Dr.

Gordon Wilson PHIL 255 April 19th , 2011 A Critical Look at the Arguments For and Against the Conversion of Supposition Theory into Modern Symbolic Logic

In his paper Ockham's Supposition and Modern Logic(Matthews 1964), Matthews claims that the conversion of Ockham's theory of supposition into modern symbolic logic is impossible. This idea is challenged by Priest and Read in their own Formalization of Ockham's Theory of Supposition(Priest and Read 1977). With this paper I intend to show that, (while their work held minor flaws, as a whole they were correct in their refutation of Matthews and in fact created a cohesive method for the conversion of Ockham's supposition to the modern logical standard.) [To this end I will begin with a brief introduction to the theory itself before discussing Matthews' argument against the conversion. From here I will explain Priest and Reads counter argument and the subsequent flaws found in their work. I will conclude by showing that despite any errors the authors achieved their stated goal and proposed a new standard for understanding a complex topic.] Translated to English for the first time in the 1960's, Buridan's Sophismata gave modern scholars their first look at supposition theory. Since then, many other works have been translated which deal with this topic of word meanings. The underlying theme of the theory is what a term signifies either by itself or in the context of a proposition. It is in this propositional context that supposition theory enters its usefulness in explaining how terms of various logical propositions relate to one another and how they can be used incorrectly to relate differing concepts under a false banner of validity. The most unbiased definition for supposition theory comes from Novaes when she writes

2 Very generally put, supposition is the property of terms (occurring in propositions) of standing for things, so that these things can be talked about by means of propositions.(Novaes 2010) This leaves us with a working definition by which to move into William of Ockham's work on the topic. Ockham's contribution the the burgeoning theory was his idea of a mental language in which concepts themselves serve as the sign representing the universal. This along with redefining key concepts such as specification served to separate Ockham from the other authors of his time and give modern scholars cause to latch onto him as a basis of understanding the theory as a whole. A point which would draw much observation would be the modes of supposition Ockham applied to the various proposition types (Spade 2002): The A-type (All X is Y) X has confused and distributive supposition while Y has unknown supposition The E-type (No X is Y ) X and Y have confused and distributive supposition The I-type (Some X is Y) X and Y have determinate supposition

The O-type (Some X is not Y) X has determinate supposition while Y has confused and distributive supposition These assignments would prove useful to later writers such as Matthews, Priest, Read and Spade not only for determining where supposition fits in terms of medieval logic but for assigning it a place in a modern symbolic framework. Matthews was one of the first to put Ockhams newly rediscovered theory to use. Gareth Matthews published several works on the supposition theory often concentrating on the works of Ockham. It is in his 1964 paper, however, that he submits the idea that converting the theory to a modern conversion would be doomed to failure. He bases his refutation on the earlier work of Philotheus Boehner in which Boehner claimed, A particular, affirmative, categorical proposition . . . is

3 interpreted by the in exactly the same manner as by modern logicians (Boehner 1952). To show how the modern views differed from that of the medieval Matthews relied on the I-Type proposition with the example being: (1)Some man is an animal Which descends per normal rules to become: (2) man is an animal or that man is an animal . . . and so on. Matthews believed that the formalization referred to by Boehner for the I-Type proposition would be as follows: (3)(x)(Fx*Gx) which would then imply: (4)Fx1*Gx1 * v * Fx2*Gx2 * v * . . . From here, Matthews makes the argument for (1) and (2) being equivalent under Aristotelian logic but denies that (3) and (4) would be equivalent under modern logical standard. His denial rests on the idea that while (3) does imply (4) the reverse is untrue therefore the equivalence is not complete. Matthews proceeds to look at Boehners comparison of the inference seen in the (3) and (4) to the decension seen in the (1) and (2). To combat this idea Matthews points out that the difficulties in showing predicate and subject supposition at the same time. Here Matthews reverts back to the formulas from before and shows the reason (4) cannot be used in this situation is that it cannot be expanded into the seperate ideas necessary namely (5) This man is an animal or that man is an animal . . . and (6) Some man is this animal or some man is that animal . . . Matthews concludes by pointing out his findings thus far we have found two reasons for denying that the I proposition is interpreted by modern logicians

4 in the same way it was interpreted by Ockham. First, a single quantifier is normally all that is used in modern logic for an I proposition; but in order to parallel the two suppositional descents we should need two quantifiers. Second, and even more important, the modern parallel to suppositional descent involves a wastage of disjuncts (Matthews 1964). Matthews finishes his argument by analyzing the difference of how the A-type proposition would be viewed. He once again notes that when converting to modern logic the A-type still accounts for only one of the quantifiers needed to deal with the dual supposition nature of the proposition. The point of this whole line of reasoning being that the conjunction seen from an A-type proposition stands out for not being able to convert to the disjunction needed to make the descent from A to I types as Ockham shows is possible via supposition. Ockham being able to descend from the A-type to the I-type is possible only because they differ merely in quantification of terms. When it comes to quantification of variables, Matthews argues, the descent cannot be made at all. Thus, the problem converting supposition is not a problem dealing with the universals involved but instead a matter of what is being quantified. This intrinsic difference in how the two systems work (supposition theory and modern symbolic logic) leads Matthews to decide, that the idea that Ockham and modern logicians agree on the interpretation of particular propositions but differ on the interpretation of universal propositions is both wrong and wrongheaded Matthews (1964). and thus the conversion from one to another was simply a task that could not be validated. It was Priest and Read who offered an objection to Matthews results by offering their own formalization. This formalization is capable of infinite Boolean combinations (Priest and Read 1972), which the authors deemed necessary to fulfill Ockham's notion that men as a universal would mean that the number of men which exist are infinite. The language the authors rely on bears the results as follows, which Priest and Read will rely on for the duration of their argument (5)W (x)(Pj(x) <->V x = wi)
IaW,

5 (6)W (x)(x = w, -> (x)) <-*>(x/w,) (7)W (x)(x = w, & <(x)) <-> (x/w,). The language is then used to show the various types of supposition possible such as distributive, confused-and-distributive and merely confused, before being used to examine the I-type proposition used by Matthews. The resulting formulation of some P1 is P2 becomes (x)(P,(x) & Pt(x)). Priest and Read show that decent is possible through the supposition of both sides using this new language and result in equivalencies which prove the formula true. Having shown their formalization to be effective as a tool the authors looks at the consequences their tool has on the problems of other authors, especially the problem of multiple quantification shown by Dummett and the problem of the O-type proposition seen in another of Matthews works (Matthews 1973). For Priest and Read the O-type proposition is formalized as: (11)(x)(P1(x)*P2(x)) which is not equivalent to its descent of: (12)LeW2 (x)(P1(x)*P2(x)) However it is equivalent to (13) (x)(P1(x)*LeW2W1(x))

Which would apply via De Morgan's law. Based on this Preist and Read declare that the O-type proposition has merely confused and determinate supposition depending on which part of the supposition you decide to descend from. Priest and Read conclude by noting that they have succesfully converted a decensus theory of Ockham's supposition into a working, coherent theory under modern symbolic logic. The counter argument to the work of Priest and Read comes from Weidmann. Weidmann uses yet a third formalization, a 'sorted calculus of individuals with identity as its only predicate'. Borrowed

6 from Richard Price. In this language f1 and g1 represent particulars under the general terms F and G respectively. So that a rendering of the propositions of interest would be A-type (8)(f)(g)(f=g) I-type (9)(f)(g)(f=g) O-type (10)(f)(g)(fg) From this point the I-Type proposition is used to model the ability of this new language to handle descent. The descent to the disjunction of the I-type shows the equivalence with the original proposition while the conjunction bears no such exchange. Weidmann uses this to illustrate the Determinate supposition of the I-type before moving on do the same illustration with the A-type and Otype propositions. With the O-type Weidmann first attacks the arguments of Priest and Read. Where Priest and Read find a method of proving supposition within the O-type, and thus eliminate the need for any additional modes of supposition, Weidmann finds a problem when converting to his language of choice. Under Weidmann's formalization the O-Type proposition descends to : (12)(f)(f g1) * (f)(f g2) * . . . The problem comes in the fact that (12) is an expansion of (Vg)(f)(f g) rather than of (f)(Vg)(f g) which would be the case if the proposition had the supposition posited by Priest and Read. For Weidmann this only shows a problem if one presumes, as did Priest and Read, that the expansions of a descent must be equivalent to the original proposition to hold the supposition. If, according to Ockham this equivalence is unnecessary then the descent would yield the Confused-and-distributive supposition as initially assigned, rather than the merely confused and distributive supposition posited by Priest and Read. From this presumption Wiedmann declares that the work of Priest and Read is inherently flawed and in need of fine tuning. The problem with this need for fine tuning is that it fails to change the

7 substance or even the results of their work in any meaningful way. Weidmann say it best himself in the paper: Notwithstanding the fact that Ockham's analysis of particular negative propositions is misleading, it is not mistaken, because it is consistent with the premisses of Ockham's own theory of supposition (Weidmann 1979). and again a few lines later: The notion of merely confused supposition cannot be dispensed with, it is true, but not on the grounds on which Priest and Read think it to be indispensable (Weidmann 1979). Weidmann has taken the language system of Priest and Read an compared it to another which may or may not be able to sufficiently deal with the complexities observed by the latter. In doing so he has corrupted his own work and lost any credibility his work may have contained within. On top of this he dismisses the simplification of the theory offered by Priest and Read as unnecessary based on what Ockham might have been presumed to have thought regarding O-type propositions. Rather than gleaning what information was to be had from the primary source, Ockham's writings, Wiedmann is forced to infer ideas that may or may not have crossed the mind of Ockham. It is based on this evidence that I find fault with Wiedmann's criticisms. Had he made use of the same formalization used by Priest and Read, Weidmann could have denounced any mistakes validly. In his choosing to take the alternate language used by Price he encumbers his entire argument. Furthermore, by making his own presumptions about what is consistent with Ockham's theories but not offering any data to back up the argument he belittles the argument of Priest and Read by implying that they have not been able to deduce the same conclusion from the data supplied. To conclude, I hope this paper has shown that Priest and Read refute Matthews claim that there can be no working conversion of Ockham's theory of supposition to Modern symbolic logic. By offering a language set capable of coherently describing the rules and consequences of supposition

8 theory and using these consequences to better understand the role supposition may have played in the medieval understanding of propositions and universal ideas. Also, I hope the paper has shown the work of Priest and Read to be resilient enough to withstand the counter arguments of Weidmann by showing that the result in no significant changes to neither the body of the work nor the the conclusions drawn but rather rely on changing the motivation behind the results.

9 Works Cited

Hermann Weidemann. William of Ockham on Particular Negative Propositions Mind New Series, Vol. 88, No. 350 (Apr., 1979), pp. 270-275 Graham Priest and Stephen Read. The Formalization of Ockham's Theory of Supposition Mind New Series, Vol. 86, No. 341 (Jan., 1977), pp. 109-113 Gareth B. Matthews. Ockham's Supposition Theory and Modern Logic The Philosophical Review Vol. 73, No. 1 (Jan., 1964), pp. 91-99 Catarina Duthil Novaes. Supposition Theory The Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy (2011) Paul Vincent Spade. Thoughts, Words and Things: An Introduction to Late Medieval Logic and Semantic Theory. Spade (2001) Web William of Ockham. Summa Logicae, Trans. Paul Vincent Spade (1995)