ARTICLES:Terrorism in pakistan

(1):Pakistan:A Great deal of ruin in a nation

TYPICAL Backwater operative, says a senior military officer, gesturing towards a muscular Westerner with a shaven head and tattoos, striding through the lobby of Islamabads Marriott Hotel. Pakistanis believe their country is thick with Americans working for private security companies contracted to the Central Intelligence Agency; and indeed, the physique of some of the guests at the Marriott hardly suggests desk-bound jobs. Pakistan is not a country for those of a nervous disposition. Even the Marriott lacks the comforting familiarity of the standard international hotel, for the place was blown up in 2008 by a lorry loaded with explosives. The main entrance is no longer accessible from the road; guards check under the bonnets of approaching cars, and guests are dropped off at a screening centre a long walk away.

Some 30,000 people have been killed in the past four years in terrorism, sectarianism and army attacks on the terrorists. The number of attacks in Pakistans heartland is on the rise, and Pakistani terrorists have gone global in their ambitions. This year there have been unprecedented displays of fundamentalist religious and anti-Western feeling. All this might be expected in Somalia or Yemen, but not in a country of great sophistication which boasts an elite educated at Oxbridge and the Ivy League, which produces brilliant novelists, artists and scientists, and is armed with nuclear weapons.

Demonstrations in support of the murderer of Salman Taseer, the governor of Punjab, in January, startled and horrified Pakistans liberals. Mr Taseer was killed by his guard, Malik Mumtaz Qadri, who objected to his bosss campaign to reform the countrys strict blasphemy law. Some suggest that the demonstrations were whipped up by the opposition to frighten the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) government, since Mr Taseer was a member of the party. Others say the army encouraged them, because it likes to remind the Americans of the seriousness of the fundamentalist threat. But conversations with Lahoris playing Sunday cricket in the park beside the Badshahi mosque suggest that the demonstrations expressed the feelings of many. We are all angry about these things, says Gul Sher, a goldsmith, of Mr Taseers campaign to reform the law on blasphemy. God gave Qadri the courage to do something about it.

Pakistani liberals have always taken comfort from the fundamentalists poor showing in elections and the tolerant, Sufi version of Islam traditionally prevalent in rural Pakistan. But polling by the Pew Research Centre suggests that Pakistanis take a hard line on religious matters these days (see chart 1). It may be that they always did, and that the elite failed to notice. It may be that urbanisation and the growing influence of hard-line Wahhabi-style Islam have widened the gap between the liberal elite and the rest. The Pakistani elites have lived in a kind of cocoon, says Salman Raja, a Lahore lawyer. They go to Aitchison College [in Lahore]. They go abroad to universityA lot of us are asking ourselves whether this country has changed while our backs were turned. The response to another death suggests that the hostility towards Mr Taseer may not have been only about religion. Two months later Shahbaz Bhatti, the minister for minorities, was murdered for the same reason. Yet his killing did not trigger jubilation. Mr Taseers offence may have been compounded by the widespread perception that he, like most of the elite, was Westernised. His mother was British, he held parties at his house, and he posted photos on the internet of his children doing normal Western teenage thingsswimming and laughing with the opposite sexthat caused a scandal in Pakistan. The West in general, and America in particular, are unpopular. It was not always thus. Before the Soviet Union left Afghanistan, around a third of Pakistanis regarded Americans as untrustworthy. Since then, a fairly stable two-thirds have done so. The latest poll on the matter (see chart 1) suggests that Pakistanis see America as more of a threat to their country than India or the Pakistani Taliban. It was carried out in 2009, but anecdotal evidence confirms that the views have not changed. America is behind all of our troubles, says Mohammed Shafiq, a street-hawker.

(march31 2011) Islamabad and Lahore.

(2)Pakistan s fight against Taliban The crumbling center

THE assassination on January 4th of Salman Taseer by Malik Mumtaz Qadri, a commando in his security detail, contained a chilling message: the Barelvi sect of Islam has become a militant new force in Pakistani politics. Most Pakistanis are Barelvis. They have traditionally disavowed violence, followed the peaceful Sufi traditions of the subcontinent, and paid homage to scores of saints, big and small, at tombs across the country. Mr Qadri is also a Barelvi. But when he determined to punish Mr Taseer for supposedly committing blasphemythe governor of Punjab province had campaigned against Pakistans blasphemy lawMr Qadri seems to have been influenced by the rise of firebrand Barelvi mullahs calling for all blasphemers (on their definition) to be killed. After Mr Qadris arrest, Barelvis marched in their thousands, along with co-religionists of other sects, parties and persuasions, shouting death to blasphemers. Lawyers showered rose petals on the murderer, and the policemen guarding him have uploaded approving videos of him on YouTube. A full-blown, allparty religious revival has erupted, a disturbing turn for both state and society. The Talibanwho hail from the hardline Deobandi sect of Islam, close to the Wahhabism espoused by Osama bin Ladenhave stoked the mainstream resurgence. Facing defeat by Pakistans army in the tribal areas of the north-west, the Taliban struck urban targets, including police stations and the armys general headquarters. When the government persuaded Barelvi mullahs to condemn suicide-bombings as unIslamic, the Taliban assassinated them and bombed their mosques and Sufi shrines. Yet the trauma has made the Barelvi leaders more militant, not less. The anti-blasphemy bandwagon makes common cause with the Taliban. Other groups have sensed an opportunity for an Islamic political revival, including non-Taliban Deobandi and Wahhabi groups. Two such groupings play a critical role in Pakistani politics. The Jamiat i Ulema e Islam (JUI), a Deobandi outfit, is led by a pragmatist, Maulana Fazal ur Rehman. The JUI contests elections in the tribal areas, and is a coalition partner of the ruling Pakistan Peoples Party. But Mr Rehman must heed hardliners inclined to abandon parliamentary politics and switch loyalties to the Taliban. So the JUI is against the war on terror because it is an American war. It has also condemned Mr Taseer. The other grouping represents Lashkar-e-Taiba, notorious anti-India jihadists. The organisation is banned, but charities front for it. Both groupings hate America, retain close links with the ISI, Pakistans powerful military intelligence agency, and detect Western plots behind Mr Taseers campaign to amend the blasphemy laws. Anti-American sentiment, in turn, provides the excuse for the government and army not to do more against the havens in North Waziristan of the Taliban, al-Qaeda and Taliban associates in the Haqqani network. The army says that, apart from being stretched by having to hold former Taliban areas and to defend its border with India, it cannot go into Waziristan without full public backing. This week Americas vice-president, Joe Biden, was in the capital, Islamabad, urging action. Pointing to a rising tide of antiAmerican passion, the government and army appear to have shrugged their shoulders.

(jan13th 2011)

(3)Terrorism in Pakistan;Baloch and Sindhis excluded

Pakistan is the biggest concern of the civilized world, a country steeped into Extremism, terrorism and with a foreign policy of exporting terror to neighboring countries India, Afghanistan and Bangladesh.

Recently a report published in The Economist under the heading, A great deal of ruin in a nation, Why Islam took a violent and intolerant turn in Pakistan, presented a bleak picture of recovery. Table of statistics in proportion of extremism and terrorism on the ethnic basis shows that Fortunately Baloch and Sindhis nations are not involved in terrorism; as they are regarded only liberal people in Pakistan.

One of also astounding revelations is that six major extremist organisations in Pakistan derive their source of cadres from Punjabi ethnic group. Four out of six groups constitute of Punabi. Pashtuns lag much behind by constituting only two out of six. Mohajirs also represents one.It is worth mentioning here that Punjabis have not only outnumbered other nations in the extremist groups but also in Pakistan military and state institutions. Pashtun has also the second number similarly. Mohajir also hold sway of third position. On the same pattern Baloch and Sindhi are excluded. It means that if in future extremists take control of Pakistani state, it does not change the power structure on the ethnic basis. It also omens for sindhis and Baloch that they have no better prospect in either case. Punjabi extremists will retian the power, followed by Pashtun and Mohajir extremists. But these statics ignore other variables and policies of Pakistani state and extremist groups that have a thrust to spread extremism to remaining parts and ethnic groups in Pakistan, which have resisted with full strength so far. One of the great concerns of the liberal groups in Balochistan and Sindh is the ongoing military operations in Balochistan against secular Baloch. The targets are not only Sarmachars (equivalent of freedom fighters in Balochi) but non-combatant liberal and secular people who find it hard to co-exist with Islamabads brand of Islam. Among them are students, intellectuals, lawyers, novelists, filmmakers, singers, farmers and almost all groups. According to Amnesty International, thousands of Baloch have gone missing since Islamabad started its military operations in Balochistan in 2004. So far 130 mutilated bodies of Baloch missing persons have been recovered in a short span of 7 moths. Many believe the figures are the tip of iceberg, fearing the fate thousands of other political prisoners lingering in Islamabads military torture cells, facing inhuman brutalities which supersede tortures in Nazis concentration camps.

Written by:Adeenag Baloch(jan 4 2011)

(4):Pakistan:A victim of terrorism

Pakistan is the biggest concern of the civilized world, a country steeped into Extremism, terrorism and with a foreign policy of exporting terror to neighboring countries India, Afghanistan and Bangladesh.

Recently a report published in The Economist under the heading, A great deal of ruin in a nation, Why Islam took a violent and intolerant turn in Pakistan, presented a bleak picture of recovery. Table of statistics in proportion of extremism and terrorism on the ethnic basis shows that Fortunately Baloch and Sindhis nations are not involved in terrorism; as they are regarded only liberal people in Pakistan.

One of also astounding revelations is that six major extremist organisations in Pakistan derive their source of cadres from Punjabi ethnic group. Four out of six groups constitute of Punabi. Pashtuns lag much behind by constituting only two out of six. Mohajirs also represents one.It is worth mentioning here that Punjabis have not only outnumbered other nations in the extremist groups but also in Pakistan military and state institutions. Pashtun has also the second number similarly. Mohajir also hold sway of third position. On the same pattern Baloch and Sindhi are excluded. It means that if in future extremists take control of Pakistani state, it does not change the power structure on the ethnic basis. It also omens for sindhis and Baloch that they have no better prospect in either case. Punjabi extremists will retian the power, followed by Pashtun and Mohajir extremists. But these statics ignore other variables and policies of Pakistani state and extremist groups that have a thrust to spread extremism to remaining parts and ethnic groups in Pakistan, which have resisted with full strength so far. One of the great concerns of the liberal groups in Balochistan and Sindh is the ongoing military operations in Balochistan against secular Baloch. The targets are not only Sarmachars (equivalent of freedom fighters in Balochi) but non-combatant liberal and secular people who find it hard to co-exist with Islamabads brand of Islam. Among them are students, intellectuals, lawyers, novelists, filmmakers, singers, farmers and almost all groups. According to Amnesty International, thousands of Baloch have gone missing since Islamabad started its military operations in Balochistan in 2004. So far 130 mutilated bodies of Baloch missing persons have been recovered in a short span of 7 moths. Many believe the figures are the tip of iceberg, fearing the fate thousands of other political prisoners lingering in Islamabads military torture cells, facing inhuman brutalities which supersede tortures in Nazis concentration camps.

Written by:Dr Nida Shami(article from dawn news paper)

(5):Pakistan Armys Complex Counter-Militance Strategy

The Pakistan Armys counter-militancy strategy has remained largely an enigma. In the past, the Army has been reluctant to engage in classic counterinsurgency operations despite the spread of rebellion across vast tracts of territory in the FATA and its spillover into Punjab. While the government is continually raising the bogey of loss of sovereignty due to the drone attacks on Al Qaeda in its territory, it feigns ignorance of the absence of its writ in these very areas. The recent military operation launched by the Army in Swat, Buner and Dir has once again focused attention on Pakistans approach to counter-militancy. There are two components to Pakistans counter-militancy strategy, the military and the political. The military approach is fairly straightforward. The Army uses high-intensity kinetic operations for search and destroy missions as seen in Swat using fighter aircraft, attack helicopters, heavy artillery and ground troops to target militant strong points, hideouts, ammunition and logistics dumps and command and control centres. The aim is to destroy the physical infrastructure of militancy and reclaim territory. This invariably results in generating a stream of refugees running into millions in the recent operation in the Malakand Agency, while the Taliban manages to get away. During the Swat operations it is believed that approximately 1,100 militants were killed or injured out of an estimated total of 4,000-5,000 indicating that almost three-fourths escaped the Army dragnet. On reestablishing control, the Army hands over such areas to the Frontier Corps or its poorer cousin, the Frontier Constabulary, who lack arms, training, equipment and motivation to fight, jihadi militancy with its emphasis on martyrdom. Thus, the Taliban invariably reoccupy their old positions and target civilians who have acted against their interests, publicly beheading or assassinating them. In Swat, the Army has announced that it would continue to stay on for a year or so while simultaneously asking the civil population to assist the Army in vigilance against the Taliban. Given past experience including its penchant to raise the India bogey, there is no surety this time around that the Army will stick to its word. Thus, the Pakistan Armys reluctance to put boots on the ground remains its greatest failing and its refusal to directly engage with society caught in the cleft of the Taliban and the military has resulted in thousands of refugees. In fourth-generation warfare, the people and society are centres of gravity and by refusing to recognize this central facet, the Armys approach has remained kinetic and will possibly continue to be so. The Pakistan Armys military strategy is simple but results in complex outcomes and while its political strategy is more sophisticated, it results in even more unpredictable consequences. This was evident in the Razmak Cadet College kidnapping incident recently. By placing its faith in the Taliban leader Gul Bahadur from North Waziristan to escort the Razmak cadets, the lives of many were put at peril. At what cost the release of the cadets was obtained is not clear but the Taliban would have certainly extracted many concessions. Yet the Army is perhaps willing to humour such groups regarded as, strategic assets as long as they restrict their activities towards forces inimical to Pakistani interests without realizing that this seriously undermines Pakistans role as an ally in any joint countermilitancy campaign with other countries. The structure of governance in Pakistans tribal areas with the political agent, the frontier corps, the army, the intelligence agency, tribal leadership and the Taliban is also manipulated to advantage as a part of this political strategy by making peace deals and political contracts to relieve pressure whenever the Army finds itself in a corner. Most recently, the Army used the tribal leaders and the mullahs to engage Baitullah Mehsud in peace talks when the Army launched operations in Swat, while President Zardari announced that the next objective was Waziristan.

Written by:Rahul bohnsle(10 june 2009)

(6):Blood Emeralds:Feeding The Taliban In Swat

Afghanistans Taliban have poppys lucre to fund their operations and their Pakistani brethren have found a friend in emeralds. Swats emeralds, some of the finest available in the world and next only to the ones mined in Colombia, are now under the control of the Taliban, who in a span of four months have occupied two of the largest mines in Swat and in a remarkable show of efficiency, have already started round-the-clock mining operations where workers share up to 50 per cent of their daily find with the Taliban. Most emeralds mined here range from just under a carat to over five and fetch anywhere between US$1,000 to over US$100,000 in the international market. What funds like these can do for the coffers of the Taliban is not very hard to imagine. What is hard to imagine is the complete absence of alarm and state inaction over these rich mines being taken over by the Taliban. Interestingly and rather disturbingly, Pakistan press coverage on the issue has remained low, just like it had been when the Taliban meticulously defaced a 23-foot high statue of a meditating Buddha, dating back to the 7th century, carved in a rock at a Jehanabad village in October 2007 which led to an international outrage. Swats emerald mines are seemingly the latest victims of state apathy and media disregard. Reports of the Fiza Ghat mines falling in the hands of the Taliban first appeared in the international press almost four months after the takeover and were subsequently published by the Pakistan press as a truncated news item 48 hours later. The Gojaro Killay Amnavi mine takeover was reported by an Indian news agency and found space in Pakistans press, exactly as it was published, over 24 hours after the first report; a clear indication of the seriousness or the lack of it attached to these events in Pakistan. It was about four months ago that the Taliban reportedly took control of the mines in Fiza Ghat, said to hold largest deposits of emeralds in South Asia along with the Panjshir mines in Afghanistan, located in the mountains that ring Mingora. These mines, said to have been under government control before violent unrest swept through the Swat Valley, have in their heyday between 1978 and 1988 yielded a quarter of a million carats of emeralds. The second takeover took place on 1 April, when over 70 armed militants stormed into the mine at Gojaro Killay Amnavi area in Shangla district which had been leased by the Pakistan government to the US firm Luxury International for Rs.40 million a year but the firm discontinued their work at the mine when violence in Swat saw an upsurge. Within a day armed militants reportedly started mining operations after employing about a 1000 local people as workers and have also built trenches and bunkers. According to reports, the costs of mining at both locations are being split equally between the workers and the Taliban who run the operations based on Sharia; which translates into clear threat of amputation for theft and harsh punishment for breaking any other rules laid down by the Taliban. This in effect means that only those with strong Taliban sympathies have been allowed to work in the mines, giving the lie to the Taliban argument that the mines have been reopened to ensure employment and a better life for the local people. These mines now represent another Pandoras Box of troubles for Islamabad. Not only does it lose out on revenue that is now in the hands of the Taliban for financing their operations, the emeralds now being mined here are nothing less than conflict emeralds and should ideally come under sharp international scrutiny which can only mean more pressure on the Pakistan political top brass.

Written by:Urvashi j kumar(6 april 2009)

(7):Baitullah masaood Alleged Death,For Better Or For Worse

Fact: a missile strike destroyed Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud father-in-laws house in Zanghora, South Waziristan, on 5 August 2009. Fact: no one knows for sure if Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) chief was either killed or injured in the blast, his second wife reportedly did not survive the attack. Since then, various contradictory statements have been made by US officials, Pakistani intelligence and Taliban commanders to confirm or invalidate Mehsuds death. It was US media sources that first issued reports two days after the strike saying Mehsud might have been among the dead in Zanghora. Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi was the first Pakistani official to express the governments feeling that Baitullah was killed on Wednesday, based on a phone call made by one of his aides. This was followed by Interior Minister Rehman Maliks speech to the National Assembly on Monday, quoting intelligence reports to better illustrate this point. Yet, neither the Governement nor the Taliban have been able to produce any material evidence that TTPs charismatic leader is either dead or alive. Time will reveal the truth most Pakistani commentators say. But patience will be required here, for one cannot step in South Waziristan to confirm the facts so easily. Thus Maliks statement that DNA tests may be conducted to prove Mehsud is dead, remains questionable. The likelihood of seeing the body of TTP leader if proved to be deceased is decreasing each day and observers may have to be content with the mere absence of Mehsuds leadership in the future to corroborate the governments claims. This is not the first time that the TTP leader has been reported seriously ill or dead, but the last episode in late September 2008 did not see any fighting among major Taliban figures following the news, and this perhaps may be the best indicator so far that Mehsud actually is dead. Indeed, the rumour around the fate of Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Omars appointed man in Pakistan has been followed by other reports, much more relevant to this extent than the simple proclamation of Mehsuds death. Again, both governmental sources and Taliban factions opposed to Mehsuds leadership have been keen on reporting to newspapers last Sunday that fighting erupted between Baitullahs deputy Hakimullah Mehsud and TTP senior commander Waliur Rehman, allegedly leaving several dead and wounding TTP suicide bomber mastermind Qari Husain. Though long-time TTP internal opponent Haji Turkistan Bittani appeared eager to proclaim all of Baitullahs close associates were left dead in the quarrel, Interior Minister Rehman Malik refers to intelligence sources to affirm one out of the two potential successors to Baitullahs reign was killed in the shootout. Yet, Waliur Rehman called a Reuters reporter on Sunday denying the claims there had ever been a shooting or that a special meeting was held to consider any new change in the TTPs functioning. Beyond the question of the game being played by both the Pakistani government and the Taliban over the information given out, several major questions arise. First being the issue of the TTPs Rs 3 billion wealth in both funds and ammunitions, and the fight over it. Baitullah is reported to have built a considerable financial system, from real investments in Duba to robberies and abductions, in Punjab or Gulf states accounts, thus allowing him to cope with the major expenditures of the movement. This also allowed him to buy the allegiance of a force estimated to be 20 to 30.000 fighters strong, whose salaries represent Rs 600 million a year. For whoever takes the lead, money matters will come first and tribal commitment will come second, since the new leader will need to guarantee a certain continuity in the payment of the wages to prevent further discord. In addition, the potential death of Baitullah Mehsud in a missile strike does not end the debate about whether Pakistan should condemn US drone attacks or embrace them. Interior Minister Malik has already stated to journalist Hamid Mir that even if Baitullah Mehsud is killed, I condemn US drone attacks in Pakistan. The Pakistani opposition, usually rather keen on condemning the US attacks, remained silent in parliament on Monday. In fact, no one knows exactly if Mehsuds death should be celebrated as such. Two contradictory feelings are fighting each other: the sense that the Pakistani government got rid of its most serious contestant and troublemaker, and the fear of what next? We can only but agree with Hamid Mir that Pakistan should learn from its own security policy mistakes for Baitullah Mehsud was a product of the state. Unfortunately, such elements are still available for the Taliban, and there is much less to hope than to fear of the news.

Written by:Jeremie lance(13 august 2009)

(8):Obama,s Af-Pak strategy:Why it will not work

Signaling a new approach to the long war in Afghanistan, the new US administration announced a comprehensive new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan on 27 March. Pakistan which expected a tougher strategy by Obama has reasons to cheer it. As part of the new strategy, the US plans to raise the level of its combat troops in Afghanistan to the level of 60,000 by the end of summer. With the new Af-PAK strategy which the US will present to NATO at its 50th anniversary summit in April, the US also plans to rope in other powers of the region including Russia, China and Iran. While it would be premature to judge how a wider coalition would impact regional security, a series of announcements made recently by the US administration suggest that the new strategy is merely an extension of the old strategy. Measures such as tripling economic assistance to Pakistan to a figure of US$US7.5 billion and the increase in military aid to US$2.8 billion, both spread over the next five year period, as also carrying out future drone attacks inside Pakistans territory only after consultation with Pakistans government, point to a softening of the war on terrorism. As indicative of further softening, the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recently announced that the new US administration had dropped the clich war on terror. However, with war on terror removed from the lexicon of US new Af- Pak strategy, the US will be required to coin a new phraseology to justify its continued military presence in Afghanistan. Clearly, the US new strategic assessment of Pakistan is seriously flawed if it is based on the assumption that Pakistan will outlive the gestation period to fully capitalize the economic and military assistance over the next five years. Given the extent to which Islamic radicalization has taken over Pakistan and Taliban with its presence felt in cities like Lahore and Peshawar, it can be safely argued that Pakistan will self-destruct sooner rather than later. Pakistan is largely dependent on foreign aid to sustain its economy and to that extent war on terror is a blessing in disguise as far as Pakistan is concerned. On the pretext of fighting Taliban, Pakistan received over US$10 billion dollars from the Bush administration, of which a large chunk went towards buying heavy military hardware like fighter jets and tanks which could be used against India. With another US$10 billion in the offing, there is little surety that Pakistan will not hoodwink the US again, although Obama has assured that future aid to Pakistan will be conditional to fulfilling its promises in the war on terror. However, the larger question that remains is, why would Pakistan let the war on terrorism be over when it has helped it to fill up its empty coffers with hard cash and its military with sophisticated weapons? Buoyed by Obamas largesse, Islamabad has stepped up its efforts to acquire drones which have turned out to be the most effective US weapon so far against the Taliban. The US is just as desperate to retain Pakistan as a strategic asset as Pakistan is desperate to regain Afghanistan. The US will not let go of Pakistan and Pakistan will not let go of Taliban. Islamabad is banking on Taliban to help it regain its strategic leverage in Afghanistan which opens Pakistans gateway to the Middle East and the energy-rich Central Asia. However, Pakistans duplicity in the war on terror is proving to be suicidal for Islamabad itself. Hypothetical though it might sound, the Talibans taking complete control of Pakistan is also a possibility. The Taliban defeated powerful Russian forces in the past and is today better organized and equipped. They are also believed to have sympathizers within Pakistans military establishments. Hence, it remains doubtful whether Pakistan army can really withstand a Taliban onslaught should it happen at some point of time in future. Written by:Sanjay kumar(6 april 2009)