CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 CASE REVIEWER POST MIDTERMS

Prepared by: Joseph Migrio, I-E Batch 2009 Foreword: I call the items listed in here EmDees (MD=Mini-Digests) [ 2005, all rights reserved ] It is advised that the person using this reviewer was able to read parts and parcel of the original case. Nothing beats experiencing the REAL THING. But dont let me stop you from doing whatever you want to this reviewer. The statements after the D: are the doctrines laid down by the Supreme Court in the particular case. The phrase inside the [ ] after every case name and citation are the key words that the author used to better remember the facts of the case. Hope these EmDees help in your review! Good Luck! Facts and doctrines are stated in the opinion of the Ponente (as cited) and/or the author/editor. Article VIII JUDICIAL POWER Section 1 Santiago v. Bautista 32 SCRA 188 [Honor List] BARREDO, J.: Petitioner is a sixth grader graduating with the honor rank of third place. His parents thereafter filed a suit against the screening committee of said school claiming that their son should have been ranked first place. Held: Dismissed D:, It is necessary that there be a law that gives rise to some SPECIFIC RIGHTS of persons or property under which adverse claims are made before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts. In re Laureta 148 SCRA 382 [Unsatisfied with the SC] PER CURIAM: Laureta was dissatisfied with the decision of the SC. She then filed a complaint with the Sandiganbayan against the Justices who voted against her in her case. Held: Dismissed and reprimanded. D: The Supreme Court is Supreme the third great department of the government entrusted exclusively with the judicial power to adjudicate with finality all justiciable disputes, public and private. No other department or agency may pass upon its judgments or declare them unjust. Villarosa v. HRET 340 SCRA 396 (none yet, my apologies) Montescarlos v. Comelec 384 SCRA 269 [SK elections] CARPIO, J.: Petitioners demand that the SK elections be held in May, but Congress nonetheless passed a law postponing the elections to November. Petitioners then filed this petition. During the pendency of the case, Congress passed a law moving the elections to July, a date which was amenable to petitioners. Held: Petition dismissed there is no controversy to talk about. D: The judiciary cannot interfere if there is no ACTUAL CONTROVERSY/CASE to talk about. Further, there can be no justiciable controversy involving the constitutionality of a proposed bill. PCGG v. Cocofed 372 SCRA 462 [Sequestered UCBP stocks] PANGANIBAN, J.: During the pendency of the coco levy funds case against Cojuanco, the PCGG was able to sequester the stocks of UCPB which has allegedly been ill-gotten. Cojuanco moved for the election of the board of UCPB but the Sandiganbayan enjoined the PCGG from voting the sequestered shares of stocks. Held: Reversed. D: SC can review/reverse even the decision of an independent tribunal such as the Sandiganbayan if the latter acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. PCGG v. Desierto 397 SCRA 171 [Disini/Westinghouse Bataan Nuclear Plant] PANGANIBAN, J.: This is a case about the awarding of the contract of the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant. The same was awarded to Westinghouse though Private Respondent Disini by corrupt practices, as alleged by the PCGG in their complaint with the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman then dismissed the case for lack of prima

facie evidence. Held: Reversed. Ombudsman was required to file appropriate criminal charges against private respondent. D: When the investigatory and prosecutory prerogative of the Ombudsman is gravely abused through a gross misappreciation of evidence and a whimsical dismissal of the complaint, the SC has the constitutional duty to reverse the ombudsman. Section 2 Power of Congress over courts jurisdiction Mantruste Systems, Inc. v. Court of Appeals 179 SCRA 136 [APT TRO] GRIO-AQUINO, J.: Petitioner entered into a lease agreement with the government to operate the Bayview Hotel. Thereafter, the President, exercising her legislative powers, issued a Proclamation creating the Asset Privatization Trust (APT) for the privatization of government establishments, including the said hotel. APT then moved to acquire the hotel for bidding from petitioner. The latter then moved for a preliminary injunction against the acquisition and the trial court granted it. Upon appeal, the CA reversed the lower courts decision, thus lifting the injunction, because of the provision in the Proclamation prohibiting the issuance of any restraining order or injunction against the Trust in connection with the acquisition, sale or disposition of assets transferred to it. Held: CA decision affirmed. D: The power to define, prescribe, or apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts belongs to the legislature. There can be no justification for judicial interference in the business of an administrative agency, except when it violates a citizens constitutional rights, or commits a grave abuse of discretion, or acts in excess of, or without jurisdiction. Phividec v. Velez 199 SCRA 405 [Counsel-Arbiter] GRIO-AQUINO, J.: Respondent filed in the RTC a complaint for the foreclosure of mortgage against Petitioner. Petitioner moved to dismiss because of a PD stating that all disputes, claims and controversies solely between or among the departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the Government xxx arising from the interpretation and application of statutes, contracts or agreements, shall henceforth be administratively settled or adjudicated xxx. Court denied the dismissal and declared it unconstitutional. Held: Reversed. D: Laws that prescribe administrative procedures for the settlement of certain types of disputes between Government offices do not diminish the jurisdiction of courts and hence not unconstitutional. Malaga v. Penachos, Jr. 213 SCRA 516 [TRO for Gov. Construction] CRUZ, J.: Pre-qualification, Bids, Awards Committee (PBAC) of Iloilo State College of Fisheries invited the biding for the construction of their buildings. Petitioners bid late and insisted that it was due to the procedural irregularities caused by PBAC. TC issued a restraining order for the awarding of the contract. PBAC contended that the TRO is invalid because there is a law prohibiting issuance of such with respect to government construction. Held: TRO valid - laws prohibiting issuance of TROs do not automatically shield the agency from judicial scrutiny. D: Prohibitions to the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders by courts are valid in controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases. On issues definitely outside of this dimension and involving questions of law, courts could not be prevented by law from exercising their power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts. Section 3 Fiscal Autonomy Radiowealth, Inc. v. Agregado 86 Phil 429 [TELETALK] PER CURIAM: Petitioner entered into a contract with the SC to purchase P585 worth of Teletalk. The Property Requisition Committee appointed by the President disapproved the purchase. Held: Granted disapproval reversed D: The courts independence of the legislative branch with regard to the acquisition of fixtures, supplies and equipments is bound up with and subject to its dependence upon the Congress for appropriation. But it is considered that the SC is supreme and independent of the executive in this sphere. It stands to reason that the Chief Executive has no more authority to encroach on the SC in the choice of instruments needed to carry its functions. Bengzon v. Drilon 208 SCRA 133 [Veto of Pension]

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: Ibid. President vetoed the provision in the GAA allotting pension payments to retired judges and justices. Held: Veto invalid D: What is fiscal autonomy? It is a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes the power and authority xxx to disburse sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their duties. It means freedom from outside control. Section 4 Firestone Ceramics v. Court of Appeals 334 SCRA 465 [Division to En Banc] PURISIMA, J.: SC Third Division promulgated a decision against the petition. Petitioners moved for reconsideration and to refer the case to EN BANC. Held: Third Division denied the recon and the referral to EN BANC by 4-1, Justice Purisima being the lone dissenter. But EN BANC voted 9-5 to accept the case because it was deemed of sufficient importance to merit attention. D: The act of the SC in accepting cases for the Banc to pass upon is a legitimate and valid exercise of its RESIDUAL POWER xxx All other cases as the court en banc by a majority of its actual membership may deem sufficient importance to merit its attention. Fortich v. Corona 312 SCRA 751 [2-2 Resolution Vote] YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: This is an issue about Respondents MR that was resolved and, by a 2-2 vote, affirmed the previous decision, junking the MR. Respondents argue that the MR should have been referred to the En Banc because no decision has been made about the said motion. Held/D: A careful reading of Art VIII, Section 4(3) of the Constitution reveals the intention of the framers to draw a distinction between cases, on the one hand, and matters, on the other, such that cases are decided and matters are resolved. Only cases are referred to the Court en banc for a decision when the required number of votes were not obtained this rule does not apply in the resolution of a motion for reconsideration. Section 5 Judicial Review Marbury v. Madison 1 Cranch 137 [Judicial Review] MASHALL: Declaration of the power of judicial review of the courts: It is empathically the province and the duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases must, of necessity, expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each. The judicial power xxx is extended to all cases arising under the Constitution. Tan v. Macapagal 43 SCRA 678 [ConCon change of Gov] FERNANDO, J.: Petitioners, as taxpayers, wanted the courts to declare that the Constitutional Convention has no power to adopt a new system of government. Held: Denied D: The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of the statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. Moreover, as far as a taxpayers suit is concerned, this court is not devoid of discretion as to whether or not it should be entertained. PACU v. Secretary of Education 97 Phil 806 [Power to issue/revoke permits] BENGZON, J.: A law was passed which contains, inter alia, a provision that before a private school be opened to the public, it must first obtain a permit from the Secretary of Education. Petitioners complained that the law will give the Secretary of Education unlimited and unregulated discretion upon the implementation of the law. Held: Denied D: Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest therein, however intellectually solid the problem may be. There should be an actual case that complainants were directly affected before the courts could take review. The Court does not entertain hypothetical scenarios. Gonzales v. Marcos 65 SCRA 624 [CCP] FERNANDO, J.: The then President issued an Executive Order creating the Cultural Center of the Philippines. It should be noted that the funds administered for the CCP came from donations and contributions, not from taxation. Petitioners, as taxpayers, contested the Constitutionality of the Order, claiming that it is an encroachment of legislative prerogative. Held: Denied.

D: Taxpayer has no legal standing to question executive acts that do not involve the use of public funds. The doctrine in Tan v. Macapagal is reiterated, that the court is not devoid of discretion as to whether a taxpayer suit should be entertained. TELEBAP v. Comelec 289 SCRA 537 [Comelec Time] MENDOZA, J.: A law was passed which provides, among others, that certain timeslots of television and other would be reserved to the Comelec, free of charge, for the purposes of regulating campaign in broadcast media. This was dubbed as the Comelec Time. The Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines (TeleBAP), as registered voters and taxpayers, and GMA Networks filed a suit for the unconstitutionality of the said law. Held: TeleBAP has no legal standing, but GMA has. Petition denied. D: A citizen will be allowed to raise a constitutional question only when he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. Judicial Review: locus standi Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance 235 SCRA 630 [VAT] MENDOZA, J.: Ibid. Issue against the VAT being regressive in the sense that it will hit the poor and middleincome group. Held: It is an academic exercise. D: Public actions by non-Hohfeldian or ideological plaintiffs are now cognizable provided they meet the standing requirement of the Constitution. There must be before the Court a fully developed factual record that alone can impart to its adjudication the impact of actuality to ensure that decision-making is informed and wellgrounded. Solicitor General v. MMA 204 SCRA 837 [Confiscation of Drivers License] CRUZ, J.: Ibid. The complaint was issued against traffic enforcers. D: Validity of the law must be attacked directly, not collaterally; except: if it is of transcendental importance to the public. Joya v. PCGG 225 SCRA 568 [Painting auction] BELLOSILLO, J.: PCGG consigned Masters Paintings and period silverwares, seized by the said commission from Malacaang, to CHRISTIES for sale and public auction. COA then submitted to the President that the consignment was of doubtful legality. Petitioners, as taxpayers and artists deeply concerned with the preservation and protection of the countrys artistic wealth, then filed the suit to enjoin PCGG from commencing said auction. During the pendency of the case, the auction was nonetheless held. Held: Dismissed having failed to show that they are the legal owners of the artworks or that the valued pieces have become publicly owned, petitioners do not possess any clear legal right whatsoever to question their alleged unauthorized disposition. D: What is legal standing? Legal Standing means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The term interest is material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Moreover, the interest of the party plaintiff must be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and unrelated party. Macasiano v. NHA 224 SCRA 236 [Demolition/Relocation of Squatters] DAVIDE, JR., J.: There was a law passed stating mandatory guidelines in the demolition of squatters. Petitioner, as a consultant to the DPWH and as a taxpayer, filed for the constitutionality of the act. Held: Dismissed no legal standing. D: A proper party is one who has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures complained of. Mariano, Jr. v. Comelec 242 SCRA 211 [Mun.-City of Makati] PUNO, J.: Ibid. Petitioners also argue that the conversion of Makati will reset the term of the incumbent Mayor, allowing the latter to run again for another three terms. Held: Dismissed. This is only a hypothetical issue that is yet to ripen into an actual controversy. Moreover, petitioners who are residents of Taguig are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract issue.

Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. 224 SCRA 792 [TLAs] DAVIDE, JR., J.: Ibid. Petitioners sued as taxpayers and that they represent their generation as well as generation yet unborn. Held: Valid D: The personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Kilosbayan v. Guingona, Jr. 232 SCRA 110 [Joint Venture online lottery] J.: PCSO agreed to lease the facilities for the online lottery that are to be constructed by the Malaysian group. Petitioners averred, as taxpayers, that the contract is invalid because it is contrary to law. Held: Petition granted, lease declared invalid. D: Transcendental importance. A partys standing before the Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of the issues raised. Tatad v. Garcia 243 SCRA 436 [MRT 3] QUIASON, J.: DOTC entered into a contract under the BOT (Build Operate Transfer) law granting EDSA LRT Corporation, a foreign firm, a Build Lease Transfer (BLT) agreement for the proposed EDSA LRT III. Petitioners, as taxpayers and Senators, filed a suit against the agreement. Held: Dismissed but petitioners have standing as taxpayers. D: Follows the doctrine of Kilosbayan v. Guingona. Kilosbayan v. Morato 250 SCRA 540 [MR of Kilosbayan v. Guingona, Jr., ibid.] MENDOZA, J.: Motion for Reconsideration decision reversed. Petitioners do not question the validity of the law allowing lotteries. It is the contract entered into xxx which they are assailing. This case, therefore, does not raise issues of constitutionality but only of contract law, which petitioners, not being privies to the agreement, cannot raise. D: Only real parties in interest or those with standing, as the case may be, may invoke the judicial power. The jurisdiction of the Court, even in cases involving constitutional questions, is limited by the case and controversy requirement of Art VIII, Section 5. N: Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens and legislators have been allowed to sue but then only (1) in cases involving constitutional issues and (2) under certain conditions. Taxpayers illegal disbursement of public funds or where a tax measure is assailed as unconstitutional. Voters validity of election laws. Concerned citizens issues of transcendental importance which must be settled early. Legislators validity of any official action which they claim infringes their prerogatives quo legislators. Gonzales v. Narvasa 337 SCRA 733 [PCCR] GONZAGA-REYES, J.: Then President created the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR), a body that is tasked to make a report on the proposed amendments in the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner, as a citizen and taxpayer, assailed the constitutionality of the creation of such commission. Held: Denied moot; no legal standing as a citizen. D: An action is considered moot when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved have become academic or dead. If at all, as in the present case, it is only Congress which can claim any injury where it is alleged that the President has encroached upon the legislatures powers to create a public office and to propose amendments to the Charter. A taxpayers action is properly brought only when there is an exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. Bayan v. Executive Secretary 342 SCRA 449 [VFA] BUENA, J.: Ibid. Petitioners, as taxpayers and members of the Congress and IBP, assail the Constitutionality of the Visiting Forces Agreement. Held: Dismissed. D: Taxpayers suit refers to a case where the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. The standing of members of Congress as proper party cannot be upheld in the absence of a clear showing of any direct injury to their person or to the institution where they belong. The IBP lacks the legal capacity in the absence of a resolution from its Board of Governors authorizing its National President to commence the action. BUT, the Supreme Court may, in the exercise of its sound discretion, brush aside procedural barrier and take cognizance of petitions raising issues of paramount importance and constitutional significance.

Political Questions Marcos v. Manglapus 177 SCRA 688 [Marcos Return] CORTES, J.: Ibid. One of the defenses of respondent was that the issue was political. D: The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry. But nonetheless, there remain issues beyond the Courts jurisdiction the determination of which is exclusively for the President, for Congress, or for the people themselves through a plebiscite and referendum. The question for the Court to decide is whether or not there exist factual bases for the act of any branch or instrumentality of the government. Daza v. Singson 180 SCRA 496 [CA reorganization because of LDP] CRUZ, J.: Ibid. D: The political question doctrine is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of a particular measure. Jeffrey Liang v. People 355 SCRA 125 [Oral Defamation of an international official] YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: Petitioner, a Chinese national working in the ADB, was charged for oral defamation by a clerical employee of the same company. Petitioner claimed diplomatic immunity, and was supported by the Department of Foreign Affairs. Held: He was not entitled to diplomatic immunity. D: PUNO (concurring): The authority of the executive department (DFA) to certify that certain employees are entitled to immunity is limited only to acts done in their official capacity. The acts done in private are cognizable in the Court. Rule-making power Bustos v. Lucero 81 Phil 648 [Cross-examine during Prelim. Investigation] TUASON, J.: Petitioner, an accused in a criminal examination, wished to remand his case back to the Justice of the Peace because he did not have the time to cross-examine the witness against him during the preliminary investigation. Held: Denied D: Promulgation of rules about preliminary investigation does not violate citizens substantial rights. As a matter of fact, preliminary investigation may be done away with entirely without infringing the constitutional right of an accused under the due process clause to a fair trial. In re Cunanan 94 Phil 534 [Bar-Flunkers Law] DIOKNO, J.: Congress passed a law setting the passing rate for the Bar for the previous bar exams. Held: Law invalid. D: The Supreme Court has the primary power in relation to their admission to the Bar/practice of law. Javellana v. Department of Interior 212 SCRA 475 [Councilor/Lawyer] GRIO-AQUINO, J.: Councilman continued to practice law without permission from DILG, in violation of the Departments memorandum and LGC rules. Petitioner contended that the Supreme Court has the sole power to regulate the practice of law. Held: Dismissed D: As a matter of policy, the Court accords great respect to the decisions and/or actions of administrative authorities, as long as the regulation of lawyers does not encroach upon the Judiciarys power and that the regulation is for the effective discharge of their duties. Maniago v. Court of Appeals 253 SCRA 674 [Bus/Jeepney accident] MENDOZA, J.: This is a criminal and civil case in a bus and jeepney accident. Petitioner moved to dismiss the civil case in view of the pending criminal case. TC denied, and CA also denied. Petitioner contended that respondent did not reserve the right for a separate civil case as required in the Rules of Criminal Procedure. Held: Granted. D: The requirement that before a separate civil action may be brought must first be reserved, does not impair, diminish or defeat substantive rights, but only regulates their exercise in the general interest of orderly procedure. Fabian v. Desierto 295 SCRA 470 [Appeal of Ombudsman] Ibid. D: The Supreme Court can promulgate rules on appeals, that should not infringe substantive rights.

Section 6 Supervision of Courts Maceda v. Vasquez 221 SCRA 464 [Complaint against a judge] NOCON, J.: Aberia complained against Petitioner, a presiding judge in a regional trial court, before the Office of the Ombudsman. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint pending in the Ombudsman. Held: Petition granted. D: It is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges and court personnels compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit a violation thereof. People v. Gacott, Jr. 246 SCRA 52 [Judge Reprimand] REGALADO, J.: Defendant was reprimanded by the Supreme Court Third Division. Petitioner contended that the Constitution requires that all administrative cases must be decided by the court en banc. Held: Petitioner denied. D: In instances involving dismissal of judges, the administrative cases must be deliberated upon and decided by the full court itself. But the court can promulgate rules regulating the administrative cases that are to be heard en banc [an administrative case can be decided by a division if the penalty imposed does not exceed suspension of more than one year or a fine of P10, 000, or both]. To require the entire Court to deliberate upon and participate in ALL administrative matters or cases regardless of the sanctions, imposable or imposed, would result in a congested docket docket and undue delay. Judge Fuentes v. Ombudsman 368 SCRA 36 [Clerk of Court] PARDO, J.: Petitioner judge was charged by Respondent of graft and corrupt practices. Held: Ombudsman cannot proceed with the charges. D: The Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or administrative complaint against judges. The Ombudsman must indorse the case to the Supreme Court for appropriate action. Article VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. Judge Caoibis v. Ombudsman 361 SCRA 395 [Judge punched judge] BUENA, J.: Two judges punched each other in the Halls of Justice. Private respondent judge filed a criminal case against petitioner judge before the Sandiganbayan. Petition moved to dismiss because of lack of jurisdiction. Held: Granted. D: The Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases against judges and court personnel filed before it, referred to the Supreme Court for determination as to whether an administrative aspect is involved therein. The Ombudsman cannot dictate to, and bind the Court, to its findings that a case before it does or does not have administrative implications. Section 10 Salary of Justices and Judges Nitafan v. CIR 152 SCRA 284 [Withholding tax] MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: A law was passed making a deduction of withholding tax from the salaries of government officials, including judges. Petitioner complained that any deduction, including deductions for tax purposes, runs afoul with the Constitutional prohibition that the salaries of the judges shall not be decreased during their continuance in office. Held: Denied. D: Salaries of Justices and Judges are subject to income taxation, as intended by the framers of the organic law. Section 11 Security of Tenure Vargas v. Rilloraza 80 Phil 297 [Peoples Court Act Temporary Justices] HILADO, J.: A law was passed, just after the Japanese occupation, disqualifying Justices of the Supreme Court from sitting in a deliberation in a case against an accused who held a position in the Japanese-controlled government if said Justice participated in the said government. The Act further requires that the President appoint temporary judges will sit-in in place of the disqualified judges for the purpose of deliberating on the case. Held: Provision in the Peoples Court Act unconstitutional. D: No temporary composition of the Supreme Court is authorized by the constitution. The Court, as established under the charter, is one of the permanent institutions of the government.

De La Llana v. Alba 112 SCRA 294 [Judicial Reorganization] FERNANDO, C.J.: A law was passed reorganizing the judiciary, from the Court of Appeals to the lowest court, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals. Petitioners argue that the reorganization amounted to a violation of their security of tenure. Held: Denied. D: Abolition of the office does not mean removal. There is no tenure to talk about in a non-existent office. However, abolition of an office is valid, if done in good faith. Section 14 Decisions and petitions, minute resolutions Air France v. Carrascoso 18 SCRA 155 [First Class Ejection] SANCHEZ, J.: Respondent filed a case against petitioner when he was asked to vacate his first-class plane seat for a white man. Court of Appeals granted respondents demand. Petitioner contended that the Court of Appeals failed to make complete findings of fact on all issues properly laid before it, that the facts alleged by petitioner were not included in the decision. Held: Denied. D: A court of justice is not hidebound to write in its decision every bit and piece of evidence presented by one party and the other upon the issues raised. Neither is it to be burdened with the obligation to specify in the sentence the facts which a party considered as proved. Valdez v. Court of Appeals 194 SCRA 360 [Double sale of lot] GANCAYO, J.: This is about a double sale of lot of Ante to Valdez and Viernes. Lower court awarded the lot to Ante. Petitioner then appealed to the CA, but the latter affirmed the lower courts decision in toto. Held: Granted lower court did not state the facts, SC tried the facts of the case. D: The courts are required to state the facts where their conclusions are grounded. They should avoid the tendency to generalize and form conclusions without detailing the facts from which conclusions are deduced. Of course, when a petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a discretion of the court is denied due course, it is not necessary that such findings of facts be made. However, the denial must state the legal basis thereof. People v. Lizada -396 SCRA 62 [Fininger nya ako] CALLEJO, SR., J.: Rape case against defendant Lizada. Petitioner sought for a re-hearing because the lower court merely summarized the testimonies of both parties and made the decretal portion of the said decision. Held: Petition granted, case reviewed by the SC. D: The trial court is mandated to set out in its decision the facts which have been proved and its conclusions culled therefrom, as well as its resolution on the issues and the factual and legal basis for its resolution it should not merely reproduce the respective testimonies of witnesses of both parties and come out with its decretal conclusion. Section 15 Court Administrator v. Quianola 317 SCRA 37 [Court Backlog] PANGANIBAN, J.: There was a huge backlog of pending cases in the court of respondent judge. Office of the Court Administrator recommended administrative penalties to respondent judge and clerk of court. Held: OCA recommendation well-taken and applied. D: The failure of a judge to decide cases promptly and expeditiously within the constitutionally prescribed 90day period constitutes gross inefficiency, which consequently warrants administrative sanctions. Re: Problem of Delays in cases in the Sandiganbayan 370 SCRA 658 [Period for special courts] PARDO, J.: IBP complained about the huge delay of case disposition in the Sandiganbayan. D: How much time does the Sandiganbayan have in deciding cases? The 12 month period prescribed for lower collegiate courts in the constitution applies only to the Court of Appeals. Special courts like the Sandiganbayan, while also considered collegiate, are required to decide decisions as governed by their charter and/or their rules, which in this case, is 3 months.

Article IX CONSTITUTIONAL COMISSIONS Section 6 Rules of Procedure Aruelo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals 227 SCRA 311 [5-day filing time] QUIASON, J.: Aruelo claimed that Respondent filed his counterclaim before the RTC out of time because the Comelec rules require that such counterclaims be submitted five (5) days after the receipt of summons. He also contends that the respondents filing of Bill of Particulars and Motion to Dismiss are prohibited under the aforementioned rules of procedures, hence did not extend the filing time. Held: Denied. D: The Constitutional Commissions can not adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of certain pleadings in the regular courts. The power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice, and procedure in all courts is vested on the Supreme Court. Judicial Review Cua v. Comelec 156 SCRA 582 [2-1 Division; 3-2 en banc; quorum] PER CURIAM: Comelec rules provide that divisions (consisting of 3 members) must vote unanimously vote to effect a decision, otherwise it should be referred to en banc. Division voted 2-1, favoring Petitioner, and the referral to en banc was voted 3-2. Respondent enjoined Petitioner for assuming office in view of the complaint by Private Respondent. Petitioner argues that the Division decision was, in the first place, valid, notwithstanding the Comelec rules. Held: Granted D: The 2-1 decisions rendered by a division is valid under Article IX-A Section 7 of the Constitution. Judicial review can prosper in cases of interpretation of Constitutional procedures. Mison v. COA 187 SCRA 445 [Sunk ship and 4 letters to COA] NARVASA, J.: Private respondent claimed for the payment from COA of the ship which sunk under the custody of the Bureau of Customs. The Manager, by authority of the acting Chairman, denied the claim. MR denied by another commissioner. Private respondent again sent another letter to reconsider. Chairman, for the commission, and signed by the 3 members of the Commission, reconsidered the decision. Held: The Managers decision void ab initio, and the Chairmans decision held valid. D: A single member of the Commission, let alone a Manager of the Technical Service Office, cannot promulgate decisions of the said Commission. Only members of the Commission, duly approved by a quorum of its members can validly enforce or render judgments brought to its jurisdiction. Paredes v. Comelec 127 SCRA 653 [Turncoatism through KBL meetings] FERNANDO, C.J.: Petitioners sought disqualification of private respondent as an elective official on the grounds of turncoatism. Comelec dismissed their claims on the grounds duly established by the facts at hand. Held: Dismissed. Comelec ruling binding. D: There must be arbitrariness in the decision/s made by the Commission for judicial review to prosper. Otherwise, the factual findings of such Commission are binding upon the courts. Mateo v. Court of Appeals 247 SCRA 284 PUNO, J.: Respondent, then Morong Water District (MOWAD) General Manager, was dismissed by petitioners. The former then went to the RTC to challenge the dismissal. Petitioner moved to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Court a quo denied. Held: Reversed. RTC has no jurisdiction. D: Judicial review can prosper in matters relating to jurisdiction of the Commissions. Section 7 Filipino Engineering and Machine Shop v. Ferrer 135 SCRA 25 [Voting Booths] CUEVAS, J.: Comelec awarded the contract of voting booths to private respondent. Petitioner complained to the CFI, contesting that the award was invalid. Held: Dismissed. D: It is the Supreme Court, not any other courts, that has exclusive jurisdiction to review on certiorari final decisions, orders or rulings of the Commission. Further, the issues that can be brought on certiorari are those final decisions, orders, or rulings made in the capacity of their adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions, not merely administrative matters (such as in the present case). Saligumba v. COA 117 SCRA 669 [COA administrative case appealed to SC]

ABAD SANTOS, J.: Petitioner sought the dismissal of a COA employee. COA dropped the case. Petitioner then transmitted the case to the SC for review. Held: Denied. D: Administrative matters, such as dismissal cases, within the Commission can not be appealed to the SC. Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Corp. v. COA 146 SCRA 602 [Most favored treatment clause] PARAS, J.: Petitioner PT&T was required, under its charter, to pay 1 % franchise tax on their gross receipts. Under the same charter, there was a most favored treatment clause reducing its tax obligations to equal future franchisees rates if it is favorable to the Petitioner. DOMSAT was granted franchise and was required to pay only %. Petitioner insisted that they only have to pay % under the most favored treatment clause. COA, in a letter addressed to petitioner, found the contention w/o merit. Petitioner then appealed to SC. Held: Dismissed. D: Opinion letters sent by Commissions do not decide issues. These are not decisions, orders, or final awards that are appealable to the SC. Ambil v. Comelec 344 SCRA 358 [Guiani case] PARDO, J.: Petitioner won in an election but the Guiani Decision stated otherwise. Guiani retired before the promulgation of the contested decision. Comelec resolved to promulgate it on a certain date, which petitioner sought injunction for. Held: Dismissed, petition premature. D: SC has no jurisdiction over interlocutory (incomplete, not yet final) orders of the Commission. Dumayas, Jr. v. Comelec 357 SCRA 358 [2nd Div. granted, en banc reversed] QUISUMBING, J.: Petitioner, in an election case, sought to exclude certain precincts from the counting. Comelec 2nd div granted the motion. Respondent moved for an MR to the en banc. Meanwhile, petitioner was proclaimed winner on 1998. On 2000, some of the members retiring, en banc issued an order annulling the proclamation and declaring petitioner as the winner. Held: Comelec decision affirmed. D: If at the time a decision was promulgated, a member of the Commission who had earlier signed or registered his vote has vacated his office, his vote on the decision must automatically be withdrawn or cancelled. However, if, despite the cancellation, there would be no effect to the decision, the decision must stand. A. Civil Service Commission (CSC) NASECO v. National Labor Relations Commission 168 SCRA 122 [with original charter] PADILLA, J.: Does the NLRC have jurisdiction over labor cases of tertiary government-owned and controlled corporations subsidized under the corporation code? Held: No, only GOCCs with original charter. MWSS v. Hernandez 143 SCRA 602 [Contractual Employees] NARVASA, J.: MWSS failed to pay monetary benefits to its contractual employees. NLRC rendered a decision adverse to MWSS. Petitioner claimed that it is the CSC, not the NLRC which has jurisdiction over the case. Held: Granted. D: All cases of employees, regular or contractual, of the government and GOCCs with original charters are under the jurisdiction of the CSC. CSC v. Salas 274 SCRA 414 [confidential employee] REGALADO, J.: There was a provision in the PAGCOR charter stating that all employees of the casinos xxx shall be classified as confidential employees. Salas was hired by PAGCOR and was assigned in a casino. PAGCOR thereafter dismissed him for lack of confidence, he being an alleged confidential employee. Salas contested the dismissal because the nature of his job is not truly confidential. Held: Granted. D: Confidential employees are not only determined as such based on executive/legislative declaration, but also, and more importantly, the nature of their job. ADDENDUM: Competitive examination are dispensed with to positions which are policy-determining, primarily confidential, or highly technical, but not the requirement of merit and fitness. Merit and fitness can be determined in a different manner other than competitive examination. Samson v. Court of Appeals 145 SCRA 654 [Assistant Secretary] ALAMPAY, J.: Petitioner mayor dismissed his assistant secretary for lack of confidence. Respondent complained that his job was not confidential. Petitioner contended that when the law spoke of Secretaries, it included assistant secretaries. Held: Denied, respondent not confidential employee.

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D: An assistant secretary, although termed as secretary and may incidentally perform work that is confidential is technically different from a secretary of the mayor. Statutory exceptions (e.g. the one excluding secretaries from competitive employees) are to be strictly but reasonably construed.

Hernandez v. Villegas 14 SCRA 544 [Illegal Transfer] REGALA, J.: Respondent was transferred from a position which is primarily confidential in nature, to another, without cause. Held: Invalid. D: Officials/employees holding primarily confidential positions may not be removed or suspended without cause. They continue only for so long as confidence in them endures. Their termination can be justified on the ground of loss of confidence because it is an expiration of, not removal from, office. Achacoso v. Macaraig 195 SCRA 235 [Temporary employees] CRUZ, J.: Petitioner, a non-eligible for Career Executive Service (CES) was appointed Administrator of POEA. The President thereafter appointed another, now a CES eligible, to the same position. Held: Replacement valid. D: Employees who do not meet the required qualifications for office are only considered temporary. Permanent status can only be given to employees that have the said requirements. Briones v. Osmea 104 Phil 588 [Abolished and created new positions] REYES, J. B. L., J.: Petitioner mayor abolished the positions in the local government, and creating new offices. Held: Abolition invalid. D: It is well-settled that CSC eligibles that have rendered long and honorable service should not be sacrificed in favor of non-eligibles given positions of recent creation. Furthermore, the abolition done (as in the present case) in bad faith, undermining the security of tenure of the employees, are invalid. Mayor v. Macaraig 194 SCRA 672 [Law declaring positions vacant; implied abolition] NARVASA, J.: A law was passed declaring vacant certain positions in the NLRC. Those that were affected claimed that it undermined their security of tenure. Issue: Is abolition implied? Held: No. D: In order for an abolition to be impliedly effected, there must be an essential inconsistency between the old law (position) and the new one. Binamira v. Garrucho, Jr. 188 SCRA 154 [Appointment v. Designation] CRUZ, J.: Petitioner was designated by the Minister of Tourism as General Manager for the Phil Tourism Authority. Thereafter, the new President appointed another to the same position. Petitioner sought security of tenure. Held: Dismissed, petitioner was merely designated by the then minister of tourism. D: Appointment is the selection, by a person with such authority, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition by law of additional duties on the incumbent official. Designated employees shall hold office only in a temporary capacity. Borres v. Court of Appeals 153 SCRA 120 [Senior Security Guard] PADILLA, J.: The previous mayor of Cebu city hired respondents as Senior Security Guard and bodyguards for the office of Vice-Mayor. As an acting mayor, newly-elected vice-mayor, petitioner, terminated the services of respondents because of lack of confidence. CA prohibited the termination. Held: Granted, decision reversed. D: Executive pronouncements can be no more than initial determinations, whether a position is highly confidential or not, that are not conclusive in case of conflict. Luego v. CSC 143 SCRA 327 [Permanent v. Temporary] CRUZ, J.: Petitioner was appointed as permanent by the Cebu mayor as an Administrative Officer. The CSC approved the appointment as merely temporary because of a pending case against the petitioner. Thereafter, the CSC approved the permanent appointment of another person to the same position. Petitioner contested. Held: Granted. D: The CSC has no power to determine the kind or nature of the appointments. When the appointee is qualified and all other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest the appointment as determined by the appointing body.

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Santiago, Jr. v. CSC 178 SCRA 733 [I-III, II Protested] MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: Santiago, a collector of customs I, was appointed to a higher position of collector of customs III. Respondent, a collector of customs II protested the promotional appointment because he is the next in rank. CSC granted respondents prayer. Held: Reversed. D: The appointing power has a wide latitude of choices as to who is best qualified for the position. CSC has no authority to replace the appointing authoritys decision as to whom the latter shall appoint. Astraquillo v. Manglapus 190 SCRA 280 [Ambassadors; appointment] NARVASA, J.: Petitioners were appointed ambassadors to different countries. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs, by the authority of the President, then terminated their services. Petitioners complained and contended that they were employed under the career service and thus granted security of tenure. Held: Denied. D: Appointments not based on merit and fitness xxx determined by competitive examinations, or based on highly technical qualifications have their tenure coterminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasures. Grino v. CSC 190 SCRA 458 (none yet, my apoligies) SSS Employees v. Court of Appeals 175 SCRA 686 [SSS Strike] CORTES, J.: SSS-EA, petitioners, staged a strike against SSS. Issue: Do SSS employees have the right to strike? Held: No. Aquino v. CSC 208 SCRA 240 [DECS revocation] MEDIALDEA, J.: Aquino was designated Supply Officer I. Two years later, DECS issued a promotional appointment to respondent, attested by the CSC as permanent. Petitioner protested. DECS then awarded the position to Aquino because the latter is more qualified. CSC reversed. Held: CSC decision affirmed. D: The moment the discretionary power of appointment has been exercised AND the appointee, having the minimum requirements required by law, assumed office, the said appointment cannot be revoked by the appointing authority on the ground merely that the protestant is more qualified that the first appointee. Blaquera et al v. CSC 226 SCRA 278 [DENR Coterminous Reorganization] GRIO-AQUINO, J.: DENR, pursuant to the E.O. issued by then President Aquino, reorganized and turned into coterminous employees some 800+ permanent employees, pending new appointments thereto. Held: Invalid. D: Changing employees status from permanent/regular to mere hold-overs will not pass the test of good faith to validate the reorganization. PNOC v. NLRC 222 SCRA 831 [PNOC ran for councilor] NARVASA, C.J.: Respondent, a PNOC employee, ran for councilor. The Omnibus Election Code states that public employees including those of government-owned and controlled corporations shall be deemed ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of a certificate of candidacy. PNOC then terminated the services of respondent. NLRC declared the dismissal invalid. Held: Reversed. D: Doctrine of NASECO reaffirmed, only GOCCs with original charters are covered under the Civil Service. (PNOC was incorporated under the general corporation code. Furthermore, the section of the Omnibus Election code covers all government-owned and controlled corporations, whether with original charter or not. Lapinid v. CSC 197 SCRA 106 [CSC revoked Pets appointment] CRUZ, J.: Petitioner was appointed Terminal Supervisor by the Philippine Ports Authority. Respondent protested, claiming that the he was more eligible than the petitioner. CSC granted the request and replaced respondent in place of petitioner. Held: REVERSED. D: The CSC cannot revoke an appointment simply because someone is more qualified than the appointee. The CSC has no power of appointment except over its own personnel. They only have the authority to review appointments only to ascertain if the appointee possesses the required qualifications.

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De la Cruz v. Court of Appeals 305 SCRA 303 [Public School Teachers strike] BELLOSILLO, J.: Petitioners, some public school teachers, joined the 1990 mass protest actions, leaving classrooms without instructors. DECS secretary administratively charged them and eventually terminated their services. Held: Affirmed, DECSs decision valid. D: The rights to peacefully assemble are not withheld from public employees, but such rights must be exercised so as not to prejudice the public welfare. Had they protested/assembled during their free time within the bounds of law, no one could have held them liable for their participation in the mass actions. Saduete v. Municipality of Surigao 72 Phil 485 [Engineers Double compensation] MORAN, J.: Saduete, a district engineer, was designated by respondent as sanitary and waterworks engineer. Under the old law, district engineers in general were allowed additional compensation. Petitioner demanded the payment of the additional compensation. Held: Denied. D: The authority required by the Constitution to receive double or additional compensation is a specific authority given to particular employee/s or officers of the Government because of peculiar or exceptional reasons warranting the payment thereof. Peralta v. Mathay 38 SCRA 256 [COLA, incentives, Xmas bonus] FERNANDO, J.: Main Issue: Are incentives, COLA, and Christmas bonuses considered as additional/double compensation and, thus, prohibited by the Constitution? Held: Yes. EXCEPT: If the nature of the COLA is in a form of reimbursement from expenses of a government employee in the exercise of his/her official duties. Santos v. Court of Appeals 345 SCRA 553 [Judge MMA double retirement] DAVIDE, JR., C.J.: Petitioner retired from being a judge and was awarded retirement gratuity and pension for his service. Thereafter, he was appointed by the MMA. Subsequently, the MMA was reorganized and petitioner opted to retire and receive is retirement benefits for his services in the MMA. Petitioner claimed under the second paragraph of Sec 8 Article IXB, pensions are not double compensations, thus he is not prohibited from receiving pensions from his services all the way from his service as a judge to an official of the MMA, not only for the services for the latter. Held: Denied. D: The separation pay/retirement gratuity must only relate to the employment thus affected. Given two or more employments all in the government, the benefits from the former having been claimed, pensions/gratuities/separation pay must only relate to the services rendered in his final position. B. Commission on Elections (Comelec) Brillantes v. Yorac 192 SCRA 358 [Acting Chair] CRUZ, J.: Respondent was appointed as Acting Chairman of the Comelec in view of the vacancy in the seat. Petitioner contended that the President has no authority to appoint temporary commissioners because it would undermine the independence of the Commission. Held: Granted, appointment unconstitutional. D: The choice of a temporary chairman of the Comelec is within the discretion of the Commission itself, and such discretion cannot be exercised for it, even with its consent, by the President of the Philippines. Cayetano v. Monsod 201 SCRA 296 [Practice of law, defined] PARAS, J.: What is the practice of law as a required qualification for the Commissions members? D: Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. The modern concept of law practice does not only cover those that directly relates to the practice, but also activities that are incidental and related thereto. Pangilinan v. Comelec 228 SCRA 36 [Pre-proclamation controversies] PADILLA, J.: A law was passed disallowing Comelecs jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controversies in the election of the Members of the House of Representatives. Petitioner contends the unconstitutionality of the law. Held: Dismissed. D: The phrase including pre-proclamation controversies used in Sec 3 Article IX-C of the Constitution should be construed as referring only to pre-proclamation controversies in election cases that fall within the original jurisdiction of the Comelec, i.e., election cases pertaining to the election of regional, provincial, and city officials.

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Sarmiento v. Comelec 212 SCRA 307 [en banc at first instance] DAVIDE, JR., J.: Comelec en banc heard the special (pre-proclamation) cases without first referring them to any of the divisions. Held: Resolutions null and void. D: Election cases include pre-proclamation controversies, and all such cases must first be heard and decided by a Division of the Commission. The Commission, sitting en banc, does not have the authority to hear and decide the same at the first instance. Flores v. Comelec 184 SCRA 484 [Barangay] CRUZ, J.: There was a law passed giving appellate jurisdiction to the RTC in barangay election cases decided by the MTC. Comelec refused petitioners appeal from the RTC decision because the law states that the appellate decision of the RTC are final and non-appealable. Held: Law unconstitutional. D: Comelec should not be deprived of their appellate jurisdiction over election cases, even in barangay elections. Decisions of the MTC must be directly appealed to the Comelec, and not to the RTC. Galido v. Comelec 193 SCRA 78 [Bohol Mayor] PADILLA, J.: Respondent lost in the Mayoral race against petitioner. Latter then contested through the RTC of Bohol. Having unfavorable results, he then appealed to the Comelec which the latter granted. Petitioner then elevated the case to the SC on certiorari. Given Sec 2(2) Article IX-C declaring that election contests involving municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and non-appealable, can petitioner transmit the case to the SC? Held: Yes. D: The clause in the aforementioned Sec of Article IX-C of the Constitution does not preclude recourse to the SC by way of a special civil action of certiorari. People v. Hon. Delgado 189 SCRA 715 [Reinvestigation ordered by RTC] GANCAYO, J.: Comelec files information against respondent in the corresponding RTC. Respondent judge then ordered petitioner to reinvestigate before he could serve any warrant of arrest. Petitioner Comelec contended that their actions (filing of info) are reversible only by the order of the SC. Held: Petition dismissed. D: The RTC has authority to review actions of the Comelec in the investigation and prosecution of election offenses files in the same court. Decisions in election contests or administrative questions, on the other hand, are subject to judicial review only by the SC. People v. Judge Inting 187 SCRA 788 [Prosecuting power of Comelec] GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: Provincial election supervisor filed to the RTC a prima facie case against private respondent. Respondent judge retracted the issuance of the warrant of arrest and required the case be approved by the Provincial Fiscal because any warrant could be issued. Held: Reversed. D: Comelec is empowered to conduct preliminary investigations in cases involving election offenses for the purpose of determining probable cause. Hence, the Provincial Fiscal assumes no role in the prosecution of election offenses. The Fiscal can only file an information charging an election offense if the same has been deputized by the Comelec, not under the sole authority of his office. Corpus v. Tanodbayan 149 SCRA 281 [Comelec or Tanodbayan?] CORTES, J.: Petitioners, officials of the Comelec, were accused of violating election laws. Respondent filed the case to the COMELEC, which the latter dismissed. Respondent then filed it with the tanodbayan which the latter also dismissed. Held: Comelec, not the tanodbayan, has jurisdiction. D: It is the nature of the offense and not the personality of the offender that matters. As long as the offense is an election offense, jurisdiction over the same rests exclusively with the Comelec. People v. Basilla 179 SCRA 87 [Prosecution deputation] FELICIANO, J.: TC dismissed the information filed by the Provincial Fiscal (deputized by the Comelec) concerning violations of election laws. Held: Reversed. D: The Comelec can, with the concurrence of the President, deputize other prosecuting arms of the government to act on complaints on violation of election laws. The deputation would be warranted even after election period.

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Tan v. Comelec 237 SCRA 353 [Admin case v. deputies] VITUG, J.: Petitioner, a city prosecutor for Davao, was designated as Vice-Chairman for the Board of Canvassers in Davao. Respondent then filed in the COMELEC administrative charges against the petitioner. Petitioner moved to dismiss on the ground that he is subject only to the authority of the Exec Department where he was actually employed. Held: Denied. D: Though the Commission may only recommend disciplinary actions to the Executive against its deputized agents, it is the Comelec who should conduct the administrative inquiry prior to the said recommendation. Reyes v. Regional Trial Court 244 SCRA 41 [Division straight to SC] MENDOZA, J.: Petitioner won against respondent for councilor. Respondent contested in the RTC, which the latter granted. Petitioner appealed to the Comelec, where the latters 1st Division dismissed. Petitioner then brought the case straight to the SC. Held: Dismissed. D: A motion for reconsideration before the Comelec en banc is required for the filing of a petition for certiorari to the SC. Otherwise stated, only a decision of Comelec en banc may be brought to the SC. Salazar v. Comelec- 184 SCRA 433 [lack of interest] MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: Comelec 1st division denied Petitioners motion on the ground of lack of interest on the part of petitioner. Petitioner moved for an MR, which the 1st Division also denied. Petitioner contended that only the en banc can resolve an MR. Held: Dismissed. D: Resolutions dismissing petitions on the ground of lack of interest due to the petitioners failure to appear for hearing is not a Decision or of such nature that a motion for reconsideration thereof would call for resolution by the Comelec en banc. Sanidad v. Comelec 181 SCRA 529 [Plebiscite for CAR, prohibition on Writers] MEDIALDEA, J.: A plebiscite was scheduled for the ratification of the organic law of CAR. To this effect, Comelec prohibited columnists, commentators, or announcers to campaign for or against plebiscite issues. Petitioner contended that it violates constitutional rights. Held: Granted. D: The Constitution cannot be construed to mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite periods. The latter are neither franchise-holders nor candidates for any election. C. Commission on Audit (COA) Dincong v. Guingona, Jr. 162 SCRA 782 [Pakyao] MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: Layson was hired on pakyao basis to renovate the Bureau of Treasuries office in Iloilo. After petitioners retirement as the Acting Regional Director, the resident auditor reduced Laysons daily rate of P40 to P18. COA affirmed the auditors disallowance. Held: It was within the power of COA to disallow/reduce the wage, but it was still reversed on different grounds (i.e. the pakyao agreement). D: COA is empowered to review and evaluate government expenditures, including contracts entered into by the government. Danville Maritime, Inc. v. COA 175 SCRA 701 [T/T Andres Bonifacio] GANCAYCO, J.: PNOC decided to sell, through bidding, its tanker vessel T/T Andres Bonifacio. The petitioner submitted the only bid for the vessel. COA declared that there was a failure in the bidding and ordered a re-bidding. Petitioner contested. Held: Denied. D: COA has exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefore and promulgate accounting rules and regulations. Interpretation given by the COA to the term public bidding and what constitutes its failure are given great weight. Philippine Operations, Inc. v. Auditor General 94 Phil 868 [Sawmill barter] LABRADOR, J.: Petitioner made a barter agreement with the Director of Prisons (a sawmill for 350,000 board feet of sawed lumber). Complications arose and the DoP failed to deliver the lumber. Petitioner complained to the Auditor General seeking reimbursement for damages. Auditor dismissed the case. Held: Auditor has no jurisdiction. D: The accounts referred to in Sec 2(1) of Article IX-D refers only to moneyed/liquidated claims. The COA (then Auditor General) has no jurisdiction over claims for unliquidated damages, such as from barters.

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Insurance Company of North America v. Republic 21 SCRA 40 [Recovery from government] BENGZON, J.P., J.: Petitioner sought the recovery through the CFI of the insured value of a shipment allegedly lost in the custody of respondent. Issue: Where to file it? CFI or Auditor General? Held: CFI. D: Where the existence of a specific and fixed debt is at issue, the COA (Auditor General) has power to act on the claim; but when not only the existence but also the amount of an unfixed and undetermined debt is involved, said official loses its jurisdiction over it. Ramos v. Aruino 39 SCRA 256 [Investigative powers of COA] FERNANDO, J.: Auditor General approved, with finality, certain vouchers in favor of petitioner. Can the Provincial Fiscal, respondent, institute criminal action against the petitioner without violating the investigative power of the COA? Held: Yes. D: The duty of the Auditor General to investigate goes no further than requiring him to call the attention of the proper administrative officer, and that the finality of the said officers decision relates solely to the administrative, not criminal, aspect of the matter. In other words, COA has no power to criminally prosecute. Blue Bar Coconut Philippines v. Tantuico 163 SCRA 716 [CCSF, PCA] GUTIERREZ, JR.: Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) levied funds from petitioners for the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund (CCSF) where petitioner would get government subsidy. COA interfered and withheld some subsidies that are due to petitioners. Petitioner contended that COAs jurisdiction only extends to GOCCs, not to petitioners. Held: Denied. D: Private entities which handle government funds or subsidies in trust may be examined or audited in the handling of said funds by the government auditors (COA). National Housing Authority v. COA 226 SCRA 55 [NHA loan from Germany] PUNO, J.: NHA entered into a contract with Germanys KFW. KFW agreed to grant a loan provided that a foreign consultant was to be hired. The loan contract extended and extended, together with the rehiring of the consultant. COA disallowed the extension of the services of the foreign consultant because it was an unnecessary expenditure. Petitioner contended that it was integral to the loan agreement with Germany. Held: Petition denied. D: The constitution grants COA the power to promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable (IUEEU) expenditure of government funds and properties. Mamaril v. Domingo 227 SCRA 206 [Evaluator/Computer] QUIASON, J.: Petitioner was employed in the LTO as an Evaluator/Computer. During his employment, he committed errors in evaluating, resulting in under-collection of fees. He then opted for early retirement but COA withheld the retirement benefits due to him. Petitioner contended that the disallowance was invalid because he was merely performing clerical duties. Held: Dismissed, COA has jurisdiction. D: State audit is not limited to accountable officers and settlement of accounts, but also includes accounting functions and the adoption in the audited agencies of internal controls. Sambeli v. Province of Isabela 210 SCRA 80 [overpricing] PARAS, J.: Petitioner made a deal with the Province of Isabela. COA then made a declaration that the amount agreed upon was overpriced and directed petitioner to refund the overpriced amount. Pet contended that the contract was already perfected and there was partial delivery. Held: Dismissed, COA decision affirmed. D: COA has the power to stop payment of price stipulated in government contracts that are highly irregular or unnecessary, or scandalously excessive or extravagant. Osmea v. COA 230 SCRA 585 [abattoir] NOCON, J.: Cebu mayor entered into an agreement with a private company for the construction of a modern abattoir (slaughterhouse) but the amount agreed upon was higher than the available attested funds. COA voided the contract, liability borne by the one who instituted it. Held: Affirmed. D: COA has the power to void government contracts involving public funds if the amount in the agreement exceeds the amount attested by the COA for such project.

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Osmea v. COA 238 SCRA 463 [settlement for P30,000] NARVASA, C.J.: A certain individual sued the city government of Cebu for the death of one of her sons allegedly due to the negligence of government doctors. The city then entered into an amicable settlement in the amount of P30,000. COA disallowed the disbursement because public money could not be used for private benefits. Held: Reversed. D: Apparently, the COA has no power to disallow compromise agreements, it being encouraged even by the Civil Code. Bustamante v. COA 216 SCRA 134 Petitioner was an employee of the National Power Corporation (NPC) and was issued a government vehicle. He then additionally asked for the transportation allowance due to the corporations employees. Auditor disallowed the issuance because of the COA circular prohibiting the issuance of a vehicle to a person receiving transportation allowance (this can work both ways). Held: Decision affirmed D: The powers of the directors of GOCCs are subordinate to COAs Constitutional mandate. Orocio v. COA 213 SCRA 109 [Thermal Plant] DAVIDE, JR., J.: Malaya Thermal Power Plant. There was an accident where the General Counsel for NPC ordered the payment of hospitalization bills to the injured. COA General Counsel then, by authority of the Commission, disallowed the payment of hospitalization bills, as recommended by the unit auditor to NPC. Held: Reversed, COA order set aside. D: COA is not bound by the opinions of the legal counsel of agency or instrumentality regarding necessity of agencys expenditures. However, the General Counsel of the COA cannot act for the Commission itself, he is not even a Commissioner. Caltex Philippines v. COA 208 SCRA 726 [OPSF] DAVIDE, JR., J.: OPSF. COA disallowed the reimbursement of Caltex from the OPSF. Caltex contended that only the Office of Energy Affairs (OEA) has the power to disallow recovery from the OPSF because OEA directly handles the said funds. Held: Denied. D: COA has to power to disallow illegal expenditures of the government, even though it funds are directly handled by some other government agency. _________________________ ARTICLE X - LOCAL GOVERNMENT Section 2 Local Autonomy San Juan v. CSC 196 SCRA 69 [Provincial Budget Officer recommendation by Government] GUTTIEREZ, JR., J.: Petitioner contested the appointment of respondent as Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal. Respondent was appointed by the recommendation of the Regional Director. Petitioner claims that E.O. 112 mandatorily require that the recommendation must come from the Provincial Government, thus the appointment was invalid. Held: Granted. D: The national officials must comply with the constitutional provisions on local autonomy, preference always favoring more autonomy for localities. Laguna Lake Development Authority v. Court of Appeals 231 SCRA 292 [Garbage Dump in Caloocan] Ibid. One of the cases that national regulation was preferred over local autonomy because of public interest. Basco v. PAGCOR 197 SCRA 52 [Annulment of PAGCOR Charter] PARAS, J.: Petitioner sought to annul the charter of PAGCOR because, inter alia, it prevents the local governments to impose a municipal tax to it. Held: Denied. D: Municipal corporations have no inherent power to tax. Their power to tax must always yield to a legislative act. Magtajas v. Pryce Properties 234 SCRA 255 [Casino in Cagayan] [Stat. Con. case] D: Local governments cannot pass ordinances that are contrary to national law/charter.

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Philippine Petroleum Corporation v. Municipality of Pililla 198 SCRA 82 PARAS, J.: Petitioner refused to pay the municipal tax because the existing municipal circular provided for its exception. Incidentally, the law which it was based on was amended to remove the exceptions. Held: Denied. D: Only Congress, and not administrative agencies, can limit and define the power of local governments to tax. Lina, Jr V. Pao, G.R. No. 129093, 364 SCRA 76 [PCSO - objection ordinance] QUISUMBING, J.: PCSO decided to put up lottery terminals in Laguna. Mayor did not grant the permit because of a local ordinance objecting to any form of gambling. Respondent judge ruled the invalidity of the ordinance. Held: Affirmed. D: Local governments cannot enact ordinances that are contrary to acts of Congress. Section 3 Local Government Code Sanchez v. Comelec 193 SCRA 317 [Recall; no LGC yet] BIDIN, J.: D: Before the adoption of a new Local Government Code (LGC) under the new constitution, the previous LGC under the previous constitution is deemed effective. Garcia v. Comelec 227 SCRA 100 [Preparatory Recall Assembly] PUNO, J.: Petitioner assails the constitutionality of the Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA). LGC states that the system of recall can be initiated not only by the people but also by the PRA. Held: Denied. D: The constitution does not provide that the initiative for recall come solely from the people. Section 4 General Supervision Drilon v. Mayor Lim 235 SCRA 135 [Appeal to DOJ of tax ordinance] CRUZ, J.: LGC granted the Secretary of Justice appellate jurisdiction to the issues on the legality or constitutionality of a tax ordinance passed by the local government councils. Manila judge declared it unconstitutional because it gave power of control, not only supervision, to the President through the DOJ. Held: Not unconstitutional because LGC grants the power of supervision only to the procedure of passing the tax ordinance. D: Control and Supervision distinguished: An officer in control may do or undo an act of his subordinate. The supervisor merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but has no authority to lay down such rules. Ganzon v. Court of Appeals 200 SCRA 271 [LGC - suspension] SARMIENTO, J.: LGC authorized the Secretary of Local Government to suspend local elective officials pending investigation of complaints. Petitioner mayor contended that the power of supervision does not include the power to remove/dismiss any local official. Held: Denied. D: Congress retains the power to give authority of disciplinary sanctions to the Executive. Section 5 Manila Electric v. Province of Laguna 131359, 306 SCRA 750 [Franchise tax] VITUG, J.: Meralcos franchise required them to pay 2% franchise tax in lieu of all taxes. In the advent of the LGC, the Provincial Board of Laguna issued an ordinance imposing a provincial franchise tax to the said corporation. Meralco paid it under protest. Held: Dismissed D: Local governments have the power to impose additional taxes subject to the provisions of the LGC. Section 6 Pimentel v. Aguirre G.R. No. 132988, 336 SCRA 201 [withheld IRA] PANGANIBAN, J.: President withheld 10% of the IRA due to the local governments to ease up the financial crisis. Held: Invalid. D: Constitution mandates that the shares of local governments from the national taxes be automatically released.

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Section 8 Premise: LGC provides that local officials terms shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms [Sec 8, Article X Constitution] Borja v. Comelec 295 SCRA 157 [Vice-Mayor Mayor by operation of law] MENDOZA, J.: Respondent was elected vice-mayor. Soon after, the incumbent mayor died, thus respondent served he remaining term of the mayor. Can he run for Mayor for three more terms, or only 2? Held: He can run for three. D: It is not enough that the official served the term of office. He must also be elected to count the said election as an additional term for the prohibition. Lonzanida v. Comelec G.R. No. 135150, 311 SCRA 602 [Replaced through election protest] GONZAGA-REYES, J.: Petitioner was the Mayor for 2 consecutive terms. On the third term, he again won and assumed the Mayors office. After the elections, he was replaced by respondent by virtue of an election protest filed by the latter. Can he run again for mayor for the next elections? Held: Yes. D: It is also required that the official must have fully served his term in office for the prohibition to stand. INVOLUNTARY renunciation of office, such as disqualification, is considered interruption and thus not counted for the three-term limit. Adormeo v. Comelec G.R. No. 147927, 376 SCRA 90 [3rd Term won n recall] QUISUMBING, J.: Respondent served for 2 consecutive terms as mayor. On the next elections, he lost. Subsequently, a recall election was held, respondent gathering the majority votes and replacing the incumbent. Can he run for the next elections as, again, mayor? Held: Yes. D: Being elected in a recall election does not constitute a service of a full term, thus do not constitute a part of the three-term bar rule for disqualification. Socrates v. Comelec - G.R. No. 154512, 391 SCRA 453 [4th Term recall election] CARPIO, J.: Respondent was the mayor for 3 full terms. During the incumbency of the new mayor, the PRA initiated a recall election for the mayoral position. Can respondent run in the recall election? Held: Yes. D: The official who served for 3 consecutive terms cannot seek reelection only for the next regular election following immediately following his last term. Special elections are not covered under the prohibition. David v. Comelec - G.R. No. 127116, 271 SCRA 90 [Term of Barangay Officials] PANGANIBAN, J.: Barangay officials complained that the LGC reduced their term to 3 years. They argue that the constitution prohibits Congress to issue a term limit to barangay officials. Held: Dismissed. D: The constitution left it to Congress to determine the terms of barangay officials, always subject to the Congress acts. Section 9 Local sectoral representatives Supangan, Jr. v. Santos 189 SCRA 56 [Sectoral Appointed by DILG] PARAS, J.: DILG secretary appointed sectoral representatives pursuant to the LGC. Congress has the power to determine the procedures for appointments for local sectoral representatives. Section 10 Creation of political units Tan v. Comelec 142 SCRA 727 [Negros del Norte plebiscite] ALAMPAY, J.: Congress passed a law creating the province of Negros del Norte (Mother province is Negros Occidental). One of the provisions stated that the plebiscite will be held in the cities only covered by the newly created province. Petitioners contested the unconstitutionality of the law. Held: Granted. D: A plebiscite for creating a new province should include the preparation of the residents of the mother province for the plebiscite to conform to the constitutional requirements. Padilla, Jr. v. Comelec G.R. No. 103328, 214 SCRA 335 [Tulay-Na-Lupa] ROMERO, J.: Congress created a municipality. Plebiscite was conducted comprising of the new municipality and the mother city. Plebiscite failed. Petitioner governor contested that the plebiscite was invalid because the

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ruling in Tan vs. Comelec has been repealed by the new constitution, and that only the new municipality must take part in the plebiscite. Held: Tan case still controlling. Section 11 MMDA v. Bel-Air Village G.R. No. 135962, 328 SCRA 836 [Police/Legislative power of MMDA] PUNO, J.: Petitioner MMDA ordered the opening of a street inside Bel-Air. Respondent complained that the MMDA has no power to issue such order. Court granted the injunction. Held: Affirmed. D: The grant of police power must be given by the legislature. MMDA was not granted police power. On the other hand, local governments possess such power by virtue of the LGC. Section 12 Classification of cities Abella v. Comelec 201 SCRA 253 [Ormoc ran for Government] GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: Charter of Ormoc prohibits its citizens to vote for provincial officials. Petitioner, a resident thereof, ran for Provincial Governor. Petitioner argued that prohibition to vote does not refer to a prohibition to run. Comelec denied the claim. Held: Affirmed. D: The independence from the province carries with it the prohibition or mandate directed to their registered voters not to vote and be voted for the provincial elective officers. Section 14 Cordillera Broad Coalition v. COA 181 SCRA 495 [CAR] CORTES, J.: President created the Cordillera Administrative Region pending the passage of the organic act of the Cordilleras for plebiscite. Petitioner complained attesting that the creation of CAR pre-empts the creation by Congress. Held: Denied. D: Administrative regions are not autonomous regions. It is merely a transitory agency in anticipation of the enactment of the organic act. Section 18 Creation of autonomous region Abbas v. Comelec 179 SCRA 287 [Voting plebiscite for ARMM] CORTES, J.: Congress passed the organic act of ARMM ready for the plebiscite. Petitioner sought the unconstitutionality of the act because it is contrary to the procedure laid down in the constitution (i.e. second paragraph of Sec 18, Art X). Held: Dismissed. D: The creation of the autonomous region is made to depend, not on the total majority of votes in the plebiscite, but on the will of the majority in each of the constituent units. Leonor v. Cordillera Bodong Administration 194 SCRA 101 [Maeng Tribal Court] GRIO-AQUINO, J.: Petitioner was sentenced by the Maeng Tribal Court in Abra for payments in a land dispute case. Petitioner then forwarded it to the SC alleging lack of jurisdiction of the Maeng Tribal Court. Held: Granted. D: CAR did not acquire autonomy, hence only regular courts have jurisdiction over cases within their jurisdiction. Cordillera Broad Coalition v. COA 181 SCRA 495 Ibid. Section 20 Pandi v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 116850, 380 SCRA 436 [Appointments by Autonomous Regions] CARPIO, J.: Petitioner was appointed by the secretary of DOH-ARMM as OIC to the Provincial Health Office. Respondent was appointed in the same position by the Provincial Governor of Lanao del Sur. CA affirmed respondents appointment. Held: Reversed. D: Authority to appoint officials must be granted by the organic act, else national laws shall apply. (incomplete)

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ARTICLE XI - ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS Section 1 Public office a public trust Hipolito v. Mergas 195 SCRA 6 [Estafa, crim charges dismissed] PER CURIAM: Respondent was a deputy sheriff of the RTC in Manila. Petitioner charged respondent of estafa. Criminal charges were dismissed, but evidence still subsisted. Held: Court ordered his suspension. D: Dismissal of a criminal case files against a public officer is not per se a bar to administrative sanctions against the said public officer. Section 3 Impeachment Romulo v. Yiguez 141 SCRA 203 [Impeachment v. Marcos] PATAJO, J.: Batasan filed an impeachment complaint against Marcos. Committee dismissed the complaint because it lacked form/substance. A Batasan member then moved for the recall of the complaint. Batasan dismissed it. Petitioner prayed for the unconstitutionality of the Batasan rules on impeachment. Held: Denied. D: The Supreme Court cannot compel the Batasan to conduct an impeachment trial. Further, the House has the power to promulgate rules on impeachment, and as long as such rules are not inconsistent with the constitution, they are valid. In re Gonzales 160 SCRA 771 [Disbarment v. Fernan] PER CURIAM: Cuenco asked Gonzales (Tanodbayan) to file charges for DISBARMENT against Justice Fernan. Held: Denied. D: A public officer whose membership in the Philippine Bar is a qualification for the office held by him and removable only by impeachment (i.e. Supreme Court Justices) cannot be charged with disbarment during his membership, nor can he (or any impeachable officer) be charged criminally or administratively where the penalty is removal from office. Section 4 The Sandiganbayan Nuez v. Sandiganbayan 111 SCRA 433 [Constitutionality of Sandiganbayan no appeal to CA] FERNANDO, C.J., J.: Petitioner was accused of estafa before the Sandiganbayan. The former then contests the constitutionality of the said court on the ground that it removes the right of an appeal because only the SC can review its decisions, and only on certiorari. Held: Dismissed. D: Sandiganbayan is not a constitutional body, but a statutory creation. Sandiganbayan Decree does not dilute the right to appeal even if no intermediate appeal to the Court of Appeals is prescribed therein. According to its unique procedures, the accused is given by the Sandiganbayan enough chances (3-vote requirement) to obtain substantial justice. Mayor Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan 128 SCRA 324 [Grave coercion Cases handled by the Sandiganbayan] RELOVA, J.: Petitioner was charged of grave coercion before the Sandiganbayan. He then moved to quash the complaint on the ground the respondent court has no jurisdiction because the complaint was not a graft and corrupt practice. Held: Denied. D: The Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan under the Constitution is not only over criminal or civil cases involving graft and corruption, but also to other crimes committed by them in relation to their office. Section 7 The Ombudsman and the Tanodbayan Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan 160 SCRA 843 [Tanodbayan (OSP) v. Ombudsman (Tanodbayan)] PER CURIAM: Petitioner was charged criminally by the incumbent Tanodbayan (the Tanodbayan before the 87 Constitution). Petitioner stressed that the existing Tanodbayan lost its powers to prosecute/file complaints by virtue of the new constitution. Held: Granted. D: Under the new constitution, the old Tanodbayan (now OSP) is a mere subordinate of the Ombudsman (New Tanodbayan) and can only investigate and prosecute cases only upon the latters authority.

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Quimpo v. Tanodbayan 146 SCRA 137 [Petrophil under Tanodbayans jurisdiction?] MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: Is Petrophil Corp, a private company organized under the corporation code and subsequently bought by the government (PNOC) under the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman? Respondent Tanodbayan ruled that it was not within his jurisdiction. Held: Reversed. D: The Ombudsmans jurisdiction over GOCCs does not distinguish between those with original charters and those that dont. Section 12 Power to investigate Deloso v. Domingo 191 SCRA 545 [Multiple Murder] GRIO-AQUINO, J.: Petitioner governor was charged with multiple murder. Respondent Ombudsman filed the charges but petitioner opposed, stating that respondent only has jurisdiction over crimes in relation to their office. Held: Denied. D: The office of the Ombudsman has the power and duty to act on complaints against public officials, whether done in the in relation to their office or not, as long as it was done during his tenure. Section 13 Powers of the Ombudsman Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan 194 SCRA 474 [PCGG investigates graft charges] GANCAYCO, J.: Cruz was charged by the PCGG for graft and corrupt practices. Petitioner moved to dismiss because PCGG has no authority to investigate such cases, such power belonging to the Ombudsman. Held: Granted. D: The power granted to the Ombudsman is NOT EXCLUSIVE. (Nevertheless, in the case, the petition was granted because PCGG has no authority to investigate the said case) Buenaseda v. Flavier 226 SCRA 645 [Preventive suspension] QUIASON, J.: Does the Ombudsman have the power to order preventive suspension pending an administrative case against a public official? Held: Yes. D: The Constitutional requirement that the Ombudsman merely recommends the suspension of erring public officers to the officer concerned refers only to suspension as punishment. The constitution does not prohibit the issuance of preventive suspension for the proper administration of justice. Natividad v. Felix G.R. No. 111616, 229 SCRA 681 [Exclusive jurisdiction of OMB] ROMERO, J.: Petitioner Mayor was charged of murder by the Provincial Prosecutor. Petitioner moved to quash on the ground that the Ombudsman has exclusive jurisdiction over illegal acts by public officers. Held: Denied. D: The Ombudsman only has primary, not exclusive, jurisdiction over cases of public officials. However, the Ombudsman has exclusive jurisdiction only if the two circumstances as required by law are present (1. the offense committed must be in relation to his office; 2. the penalty prescribed be higher than prision correctional) Concerned Officials of MWSS v. Vasquez 240 SCRA 502 [Ombudsman canceling bids] VITUG, J.: MWSS had a contract with respondents. Soon after, the former made a public bidding for its projects. Respondents complained to the Ombudsman for the bidding. Ombudsman granted it. Held: Reversed. D: Powers, functions, and duties of the Ombudsman, enumerated: Investigatory, Prosecutory, Public Assistance, Authority to Inquire and Obtain Information, and Function to Adopt, Institute and Implement preventive measures. The power of the Ombudsman does not include the power to reverse discretionary acts made by a government agency. Lastimosa v. Vasquez 243 SCRA 497 [Supervision and control of deputies] MENDOZA, J.: A rape case against a mayor was filed to the office of the Ombudsman. The latter then referred it to the provincial prosecutor, petitioner herein, and directed petitioner to institute the said rape case in the RTC. However, petitioner only filed charges of acts of lasciviousness against the mayor. Ombudsman then ordered petitioners preventive suspension pending the latters administrative charges because of disobedience. Held: Affirmed

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D: The Ombudsman is authorized to call on prosecutors for assistance, and such prosecutors comes under the control and supervision and possible contempt by the former. Almonte v. Vasquez 244 SCRA 286 [disclosure of document letter-complaint] MENDOZA, J.: Petitioners were officers of the Economic Intelligence Bureau (EIIB). An anonymous letter was received by several government offices, alleging the petitioner misappropriated and falsified EIIBs funds. Relying on this, the Ombudsman issued a subpoena duces tecum requiring the EIIB to produce all the documents relating to its personnel service funds. Held: Decision affirmed. D: The Ombudsman can act on any complaint in any form or manner concerning official acts or omissions, even an unsigned and unverified letter-complaint. Raro v. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 108431, 355 SCRA 581 [Malabo referral/preliminary investigation] YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: A complaint was addressed to petitioner (Corporate Secretary of PCSO). The Ombudsman then referred it to the NBI. After receiving the report from the latter, the Ombudsman then filed charges against petitioner. Petitioner contended that the Ombudsman lost its jurisdiction when it referred the case to the NBI. Held: Dismissed. D: Ombudsmans jurisdiction over preliminary investigation is not abdicated by referring the fact-findings to another agency. Section 18 Allegiance of public officers Caasi v. Court of Appeals 191 SCRA 229 [Green Card] GRIO-AQUINO, J.: Petitioner assailed the qualification of respondent mayor because the latter is a green card holder. Held: Article XI Sec 18 does not apply. Nevertheless, he is still disqualified because of his non-waiver of alien residency. D: Sec 18 of Article XI of the Constitution applies only to those who acquired the status of an immigrant during his tenure, not before. _________________________ ARTICLE XII - NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY Section 2 Alienation of natural resources Santa Rosa Mining Co. v. Leido, Jr. 156 SCRA 1 [mining lease application] PADILLA, J.: PD 1214 was issued requiring holders of mining claims to file a mining lease application. Petitioner filed it but under protest, contending that their mining claims have been declared as their own private property because of exclusive and repeated use. Held: Denied. D: The control over mineral lands is inherent in the sovereign power of the State. Mining claims are never owned by private companies, but always by the State, subject only to lease. San Miguel Corporation v. Court of Appeals 185 SCRA 722 [Proof of private ownership of land] FERNAN, C.J.: Petitioner Corporation (A Filipino Corp) bought a land from one Perez. Petitioner thereafter applied for the registration of the land, but was denied. Respondent court held that there was no evidence that the said land ceased to be public domain and that Perez actually owned it. Held: Decision affirmed. D: Open, exclusive, and undisputed possession of alienable public land for a period prescribed by law creates a legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and become private property. But evidence to this effect but be conclusively established. Utilization of natural resources Miners Association v. Factoran, Jr. 240 SCRA 100 [Conversion to production-sharing agreements] ROMERO, J.: DENR issued an order laying implementing an E.O. stating that all mining lease agreements which were granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution xxx shall be converted into production-sharing agreements xxx. Held: E.O. valid, it does not impair contracts.

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D: Concept of jura regala all natural resources are owned by the State. Sec 2 of Article XII does not apply retroactively. Lease agreements issued before the constitution are not covered by the said E.O.. Section 3 Director of Lands Director of Lands v. Judge Aquino 192 SCRA 296 [Declassifying Forest Reserves] FERNAN, C.J.: Respondent AIC registered a parcel of land in Abra. Petitioner contested that the land was part of the Cordillera Forest Reserve, and that the land also was limestone rich. Respondent Judge favored private respondent basing of the fact that the Bureau of Forestry raised NO OBJECTION to the exclusion of the disputed land from the Forest Reserve. Held: Reversed. D: It is no less than the President of the Philippines, upon the recommendation of the proper department head, who has the authority to classify lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands. Republic v. Court of Appeals 160 SCRA 228 [Half agri / half mining] CRUZ, J.: Respondent registered a land that was used for agriculture. Petitioners (mining companies) claimed that they had right over the land because of mineral deposits under the contested land. Held: Granted. D: Rights over lands are indivisible: it cannot be part alienable and part non-alienable. Regalian Doctrine: the doctrine reserves to the State all minerals that may be found in public and even private lands devoted to agricultural, commercial, residential or (for) any purpose other than mining. Right of corporations to acquire land Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court 146 SCRA 509 [ACME registers land] NARVASA, J.: Respondent ACME bought a land from the Dumagat Tribal group. Respondent thereafter registered the land but was opposed by petitioner, contending that (1) the land was still public, and (2) corporations could not acquire lands. Held: Land was private and respondent can acquire it. D: Corporation, given that they are qualified to hold lands of public domain, can acquire private lands. Section 8 Aliens and private land Ramirez v. Vda. De Ramirez 111 SCRA 704, 712 [Testamentary v. Intestate] ABAD SANTOS, J.: X dies, leaving his wife Y (a foreign national), the sole compulsory heir. In the formers will, he distributed the remaining properties to his companion, Z (also a foreign national). Held: Intestate succession to Y valid, testamentary succession to Z invalid. D: The Constitutional provision which allows aliens to acquire lands by succession does not apply to testamentary succession. Republic v. Court of Appeals 235 SCRA 567 [SEC 8, ART. XII] BIDIN, J.: Respondents were natural-born citizens when they bought a private land. They thereafter registered the land, not as Filipinos anymore, but as Canadian citizens. Held: Registration valid. D: A foreign national may register a land he bought while he was still a Filipino citizen. Ownership rests on the nationality on the date of purchase, not on the date of registration. Cheesman v. Intermediate Appellate Court 193 SCRA 93 [Married conjugal land] NARVASA, J.: Petitioner (a foreign national) was married to a Filipina. The wife then bought a house and lot and soon after sold it to a third person. Petitioner contested the sale because it was made without his consent. Held: Sale is valid. D: Land purchased by a Filipino does not extend to the foreigner spouse, even if the purchase was made with the latters money or by conjugal funds. Halli v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 113539, 287 SCRA 465 [waiver/transfer of succession to foreigner] PANGANIBAN, J.: Simeon, an American citizen, died, leaving his propertied in the Philippines to the compulsory heir: Helen, his widow, and her son David, both American citizens. Helen waived her succession rights in favor of David. Latter thereafter sold the land to a qualified Filipino. Petitioner contested the validity of the waiver and the sale. Held: Transfer was invalid but the petition is nonetheless dismissed.

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D: If land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a Filipino citizen or transfers it to a citizen he flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid. Section 10 Foreign investment Garcia v. BOI 191 SCRA 288 [Bataan Power Plant] Ibid. Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS 267 SCRA 408 [Bidding for Manila Hotel] Ibid. Paragraph 2 Section 10 Article XII of the Constitution is self-executing. Section 11 Public utilities Albano v. Reyes 175 SCRA 264 [PPA franchise by congress] PARAS, J.: The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) granted the contract to operate the Manila International Container Terminal (MICT) to ICTSI. Petitioner opposed the grant because the MICT, being a public utility, can only be operation by a person granted a franchise by the Congress, not by an Executive Agency (PPA). Held: Dismissed. D: Congress can grant certain administrative agencies to issue licenses for the operation of public utilities, as in the case of PPA. Tatad v. Garcia,Jr. 243 SCRA 436 [MRT 3 BLT/BOT] Ibid. D: What constitutes a public utility is not their ownership but their use to serve the public. Constitution does not require a franchise before one can own the facilities needed to operate a public utility so long as it does not operate them to serve the public. TELEBAP v. Comelec 289 SCRA 337 [Comelec Time] Ibid. Franchises granted by the government are always subject to Congressional action and amendments. Section 12 Taada v. Angara 272 SCRA 18 [WTO supra Art VII Sec. 21] Constitutionality of the WTO agreement. D: WTO Constitutional. Some sections of Article XII are not enforceable. The constitution, with the terms of Sec 12 of Article XII, did not intend an isolationist policy, rather, the same equally mandates the Philippines to be competitive both in the foreign and local markets. The section merely provides a bias in favor of Filipino labor, materials, and locally-produced goods. Section 16 Formation of private corporations National Development Co. v. Philippine Veterans Bank 192 SCRA 257 [P.D. rehabilitating AGRIX] CRUZ, J.: Respondent bank granted a mortgage loan to AGRIX. Soon after, AGRIX went bankrupt, so respondent went on to claim the loan granted by them. But Marcos issued a PD stating that all the mortgages xxx of the said corporation are extinguished and that Petitioner would aid its rehabilitation. Lower court declared the PD unconstitutional. Held: Affirmed. D: Private property cannot be simply taken by law from one person and given to another without any compensation and any known public purpose. Moreover, the new corporation, being neither owned nor controlled by the Government, should have been created only by a general and not a special law. Section 18 Telephone interconnections Republic v. PLDT 26 SCRA 620 [Compulsory agreement with Rep] REYES, J.B.L., J.: The Government Telephone System (GTS), a government creation, compelled PLDT to enter with it into an agreement whereby the former would use the latters trunk line for a fee. CFI denied the compulsory agreement. Held: Reversed.

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D: A government subsidy may exercise the sovereign power of eminent domain given that the purpose of such corporation is for public interest and welfare. PLDT v. NTC and Cellcom, Inc. (ETCI) 190 SCRA 717 [interconnection] MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: NTC compelled PLDT to interconnect with respondent (Cellcom) as part of the franchise granted to the latter. PLDT opposed the order. Held: Dismissed. D: The government, in the exercise of its plenary police power over the State, may intervene with property rights of private companies in the pursuit of government objectives. Section 19 Tatad v. Secretary of Energy 281 SCRA 330 [Oil deregulation law] PUNO, J.: Oil deregulation law provides, inter alia, (1) 4% tariff differential between crude and refined oil, (2) 10% minimum inventory requirement to oil companies, and (3) prohibition on predatory pricing. Petitioners contested that the aforementioned provisions violate Sec 19 Art XII of the constitution. Held: Granted D: The court can strike down a law if it does not serve the ends of preventing or regulating monopolies/oligopolies. A law that intends to regulate when, in fact, it does not, can be struck down by the Supreme Court as unconstitutional. Sec 19 of Article XII is enforceable. _________________________ ARTICLE XVI - GENERAL PROVISIONS Section 3 State immunity from suit Metran v. Paredes 79 Phil. 819 [Labor Demand sued Metran] HILADO, J.: NLU sued Metran, an office of the DPWH. Held: Metran immune from suit. D: A suit against a government office not having a charter is in fact a suit against the government, which is prohibited. National Airports Corp. v. Teodoro 91 Phil 203 [PAL action against Pet.] TUASON, J.: NAC, a government corporation incorporated under the corporation code, was abolished and the Civil Aeronautics Association took its place. PAL then instituted money claims against CAA for the money mistakenly given by PAL to NAC, before the latters abolition. Held: CAA not immune from suit. D: Immunity from suits is determined by the character of the objects which the entity was organized. Suits against state agencies with relation to matters in which they have assumed to act in a private or nongovernmental capacity, and various suits against corporations created for public purpose [engaging] in matters partaking more of the nature of ordinary business are not suits against the State. CAA v. Court of Appeals 167 SCRA 28 [CCA slipped and sued] CORTES, J.: Respondent slipped and broke his thigh while inside the Manila International Airport. Held: Claim of State immunity denied. D: Immunity from suit is determined by the character of the objects for which the entity was organized. Santos v. Santos 92 Phil. 281 [CCA land deal] PADILLA, J.: Private respondent sold a land belonging to Petitioner Santos to CAA. Petitioner sued CAA for recovery. Held: CAA not immune from suit. D: Where the State enters into a contract in furtherance of a legitimate aim and purpose and pursuant to constitutional legislative authority, whereby mutual and reciprocal benefits accrue and rights and obligations arise therefrom, and if the law granting the authority does not provide for or name of the officer against whom such action may be brought in case of a breach thereof, the state itself may be sued without its consent, because by entering into a contract, the sovereign state descended to the level of the citizen and its consent to be sued is implied from the very act of entering into such contract. Philrock v. Board of Liquidators 180 SCRA 171 [Suability vs. Liability] GRIO-AQUINO, J.: Petitioner sued REPACOM, a government agency, which the RTC granted. The latter then garnished respondents accounts to satisfy judgment. CA reversed the attachment. Held: Affirmed.

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D: When the State consents to be sued, it waives immunity from suit but not its lawful defenses to the action. When the government has been adjudged to be liable in a suit it has consented, the judgment cannot be enforced by execution against its funds because every disbursement of public funds must be covered by an appropriation passed by the legislature. Republic v. Felciano 148 SCRA 424 [Impleading the Republic as defendant] YAP, J.: Respondent impleaded the Republic as defendant in an action for recovery. D: Impleading the Republic as defendants amounts to suing the State, clearly without its consent, and thus prohibited. Moreover, consent to be sued must always come from the legislative authority. Mobil v. Customs Arrastre Service 185 SCRA 1120 (my apologies again) Syquia v. Almeda Lopez 84 Phil. 312 [Apartment lease by US Army] MONTEMAYOR, J.: Petitioner sought the recovery of the apartment plus payments for damages after the expiration of the lease agreement between him and the US Army. Held: Denied. D: If judgment will involve financial liability of the government, suit cannot prosper without he governments consent. Traders Royal Bank v. Court of Appeals 192 SCRA 305 [PBA] FERNAN, C.J.: Petitioner granted a load to respondent NMDC, a government instrumentality tasked with the function of disseminating government information, to broadcast PBA. Petitioner then demanded payment. Held: Granted, contract of NMPC with petitioner not a necessary incident of its prime governmental function. D: When a government entity enters into a contract which is proprietary in character but which involves an operation which is a necessary incident of its prime governmental function, said entity is still immune from suit. Otherwise, it constitutes an implied consent to be sued. Festejo v. Fernando 94 Phil. 504 Bureau director, acting without authority, expropriated a private land and converted it into irrigation ditches. Petitioner, the land owner, demanded compensation from respondent. Held: Petition granted. D: A public officer cannot shelter himself by the plea that he is a public agent acting under the color of his office when his acts are wholly without authority. Ministerio v. CFI 40 SCRA 464 [Expropriation] FERNANDO, J.: Government expropriated petitioners land. Petitioner demanded just compensation from respondent Department. CFI held that is was immune from suit. Held: reversed. D: A government entity/officer has no immunity from suit when (1) the controversy arose from unauthorized acts of public officers, and (2) the act violates or invades a Constitutional right/guarantee. Del Mar v. Philippine Veterans Administration 51 SCRA 340 [Pension WWII Vet] CASTRO, J.: Del Mar sought the payment of respondent PVA of his pension. Held: Granted. D: Another exception from a government entitys immunity from suit: When a claimant institutes an action against a functionary who fails to comply with his statutory duty to release the amount claimed from the public funds already appropriated by statute for the benefit of the said claimant. Carabao, Inc. v. Agricultural Productivity Commission 35 SCRA 224 [Fire Extinguishers] TEEHANKEE, J.: Petitioner sold fire extinguishers to respondent. Petitioner demanded payment through court action. Lower court dismissed the action. Held: Affirmed Commonwealth Act states that money claims should be filed with the Auditor General. D: The Legislative body has the power to determine which instrumentality of the government shall handle cases of suits against the government. SC/Judiciary only handle cases in cases of private persons and entities upon proper and time petitions. Baer v. Tizon 57 SCRA 1 [logging in Subic]

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FERNANDO, J.: Private respondent cut logs inside the US Naval Base in Subic, but was stopped by petitioner, the US Subic Naval Base Commander. Respondent prayed to enjoin petitioner from prohibiting the former to log, which the lower court soon after granted. Held: Reversed. D: Immunity from suits extends to foreign governments to its officials acting in its behalf, acting within their powers granted to them in treaties.

Arcega v. Court of Appeals 66 SCRA 230 [refund from PNB BSP] CASTRO, J.: Petitioner sued the PNB and Bangko Sentral claiming the refund of the unauthorized payments on the foreign exchange tax. Held: Central Bank can be sued, directly or indirectly, according to its charter. D: When the charter of a government entity expresses its power to sue and be sued, said entity, thus, does not enjoy immunity from suit, whether direct or indirect. Republc v. Purisima 78 SCRA 470 [Rice and Corn Administration] FERNANDO, Acting C.J.: Rice and Corn Administration allegedly breached its contract with private respondent. Inside the contract, for the record, was the agencys consent to sue and be sued. Respondent sued and the lower court granted the motion. Held: Reversed. D: The consent to be sued to be effective must come from the State through a statute, not through any agreement made by the counsel of the government entity under question. Santiago v. Republic 87 SCRA 294 [Donation] FERNANDO, J.: Petitioner prayed for revocation of a DEED OF DONATION made with respondent (Bureau of Plant Industry) because the latter failed to install the necessary facilities as agreed upon. Lower court dismissed the motion. Held: Reversed. D: A donor of a land to the Government is entitled to go to court in case of an alleged breach of the conditions in the deed of donation. Consent to be sues is therein implied on grounds of equity. Philippine National Bank v. Pabalan 33 SCRA 505 (here I go again!) Rayo v. Court of First insurance of Bulacan 110 SCRA 456 [Napocor Angat Dam] ABAD SANTOS, J.: NaPoCor opened three (3) floodgates of Angat Dam because of a heavy typhoon, causing petitioners areas to be flooded. Latter then claimed for damages. Held: Granted. D: NPC has the separate personality and can sue and be sued because (1) it is a GOCC, and (2) its charter grants the power to sue and be sued. Municipality of San Fernando v. Judge Firme 195 SCRA 692 [Truck jeep collision] MEDIALDEA, J.: Private respondents jeep collided with petitioners dump truck. The former sued for damages and respondent court granted it. Held: Reversed. D: Municipalities cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its regular employees, who were then engaged in the discharge of governmental functions. Department of Agriculture v. NLRC 227 SCRA 693 [Sultan Security Agency] VITUG, J.: Petitioner contracted the services of Sultan Security Agency. Latters employees thereafter filed money claims against both Sultan and the Department. NLRC granted the claim. Held: Reversed. D: Not all contracts entered by the government acts as a waiver of its immunity from suit. The should still be a distinction between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and another which is done in its proprietary capacity. Moreover, money claims against the government should first be filed to the COA. PNR v. Intermediate Appellate Court 217 SCRA 401 [Train Bus collision] MELO, J.: There was a collision between a train and a Baliwag transit bus. Can PNR be sued? Held: Yes. D: Government entities NOT performing governmental functions are not immune from suit. Republic v. Sandoval 220 SCRA 124 [Mendiola Massacre] CAMPOS, JR., J.: Mendiola Massacre. Respondents sued military officials for the killing of twelve (12) rallyists. The military officials claimed immunity from suit. Held: Denied.

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D: Government officials are personally liable for acts committed beyond the scope of their authority. Immunity in international law Sanders v. Veridiano 162 SCRA 88 [Libel between 2 Americans] CRUZ, J.: Libel case, between two American military officers and citizens in Olongapo, about the change of respondents employment status. Held: Immune. D: Mere allegation that a government official is being sued in his personal capacity will not automatically remove him from the cover of the States immunity from suit. Moreover, the doctrine of State immunity is applicable not only to our government, but also to foreign states sought to be subjected to the jurisdiction of our courts. United States v. Guinto 182 SCRA 604 [Suits against U.S.] CRUZ, J.: U.S. was being sued here in the Philippines for several grounds. D: Rules and exceptions relating to state immunity apply to foreign states. Hence, foreign States may be sued in our local courts given that the requisites for express/implied consent are present. Shauf v. Court of Appeals 191 SCRA 713 [Guidance Counselor] REGALADO, J.: Respondents, officers of the Clark Air Base, refused petitioners employment as guidance counselor. Petitioner then complained on account of discrimination. CA dismissed it of the ground of nonsuability. Held: Reversed. D: An action at law or suit in equity against a State officer on the ground that he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under in unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the States immunity from suit. Immunity of suit cannot be used as an instrument of perpetrating injustice. United States v. Reyes 219 SCRA 192 [NEX] DAVIDE, JR. J.: Respondent was discriminately searched by petitioner, an official of the US Navy Exchange (NEX). Respondent instituted a case, but petitioner claims immunity. Held: Immunity denied. D: Same as Shauf. M. H. Wykie v. Rarang 209 SCRA 357 [Plan of the Day POD] GUTIERREZ, J.: Plan of the Day publication of the US Naval Station in Subic included libelous charges against respondents. Are the editors of POD immune from suit? Held: No. D: Public officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties where they have acted ultra vires or where there is showing of bad faith. Section 6 National Police Quiloa v. General Court Martial 206 SCRA 821 [Civilian Court or Court Martial] PADILLA, J.: Petitioner, a police officer, was tried before a court martial. Petitioner pleaded that he be tried before a civilian court. Held: Granted. D: Regular courts now have jurisdiction over criminal cases against members of the PNP because of the civilian nature of the Police Force. Carpio v. Executive Secretary 206 SCRA 290 [LGU v. NAPOLCOM on PNP appointments] PARAS, J.: A law was passed establishing the PNP under the DILG and appointments to local police forces are to be given by the LGUs. Petitioners sought its unconstitutionality on the ground that it derogates the power of control of the NAPOLCOM. Held: Denied D: It is clear that the local executives are only acting as representatives of the NAPOLCOM. As such deputies, they are answerable to the NAPOLCOM for their actions in the exercise of their functions under the said law. _________________________ ARTICLE XVII - AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS Section 2

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Initiative and Referendum Santiago v. Comelec G.R. No. 127325, 270 SCRA 106 [Delfin proposal (1997)] DAVIDE, JR., J.: Respondent Delfin proposed a constitutional amendment through the peoples initiative. Petitioner sought to prohibit Comelec from pushing through with the initiative and referendum because of an absence of legislation for the procedure. Held: Granted D: Sec 2 Article XVII is not self-executing. It needs Congressional action (i.e. a law must be passed) for peoples initiative to be valid. Section 3 Proposal of amendments Del Rosario v. Comelec 35 SCRA 367 (1970) D: The Constitutional Convention has the power to propose ANY amendment or revision to the Constitution, except those that violate jus cogens, or those established under international law. Imbong v. Comelec 35 SCRA 28 D: Congress has the authority to promulgate rules and regulations regarding a constitutional convention, either acting as a constituent assembly or merely a legislative body. Santiago v. Comelec 270 SCRA 106 Ibid. D: Peoples initiative can only propose amendments, not revisions, to the constitution. Tolentino v. Comelec 41 SCRA 702 (Reconsideration) BARREDO, J.: Limitations on the power of the ConCon. D: As to matters not related to its internal operation and the performance of its assigned mission to propose amendments to the Constitution, the Convention and its officers and members are all subject to all the provisions of the existing Constitution. Section 4 Ratification Planas v. Comelec 49 SCRA 105 CONCEPCION, C.J.: Marcos postponed the plebiscite for the ratification of the New Constitution. Held: Valid D: Ratification and the setting of dates thereof are political in nature and thus outside judicial review. Javellana v. Executive Secretary 50 SCRA 30 CONCEPCION, C.J.: Validity of (1) the Proclamation that the New Constitution has been duly ratified, (2) Citizens Assembly, (3) Constitution by acquiescence. Held: Valid. Proclamations declaring the successful ratification of the new Constitution is presumed to be valid until the contrary is shown. Mitra, Jr. v. Comelec 104 SCRA 59 D: The decision of the Supreme Court in Javellana v. Executive Secretary is controlling. Gonzales v. Comelec 21 SCRA 774 CONCEPCION, C.J.: Both houses passed a law calling for a plebiscite for amending the maximum number of Congressmen. Held: Law valid. Tolentino v. Comelec 41 SCRA 702 Ibid.: Further, the ConCon resolved that there would be a plebiscite for the first amendment, notwithstanding future proposals for amendments. Held: There can only be one ratification for ALL amendments proposed. D: Piece-meal ratification was not allowed. Question: Is this doctrine still valid under the 1987 Constitution? _________________________ ARTICLE XVIII - TRANSITORY PROVISIONS

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Section 15 Gaminde v. COA G.R. No. 140335, 347 SCRA 655 (2000) PARDO, J.: Petitioner was appointed ad interim as commissioner of COA in 1993, with a term ending in 1999. She claims that it should end in 2000 given the 7 year term required by the Constitution. Held: Dismissed. D: The rotation system provided in Article IX have their terms fixed. If, for example (as in the present case), the seat previously expired in 1992 and the appointee was subsequently appointed in 1993, the term only extend up to 1999, 7 years from 1992 not from 1993. Section 16 Security of tenure Dario v. Mison 176 SCRA 84 (1989) SARMIENTO, J.: President reorganized the Bureau of Customs. Secretary then terminated petitioners term in office but CSC reinstated them. Held: CSC decision affirmed. Issue: Can Civil Service employees be removed without just cause, following Sec 16 Article XVIII? D: Yes, if the removal was done before the effectivity of the new Constitution. Moreover, reorganization is valid only when done in good faith. Mendoza v. Qusumbing 186 SCRA 108 GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: Same situation and ruling as above. Section 25 Bayan v. Executive Secretary G.R. No. 138570, 342 SCRA 449 D: Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos. Under Sec 25, Article XVIII, all military bases, troops, or facilities are not allowed, whether permanent or temporary, unless duly concurred by the Senate. Section 26 Extent of PCGGs power Cojuangco, Jr. v. Roxas et. al 195 SCRA 797 Issue: Can PCGG vote on sequestered shares of stocks? Held: No. D: PCGG (1) may not exercise acts of ownership, and (2) has only powers of administration. BASECO v. PCGG G.R. No. 77645, 155 SCRA 60 OSG filed a complaint against petitioner. PCGG thereafter sequestered petitioners property. Held: PCGG has power to sequester the properties. D: Power to sequester, defined: to place or cause to be placed under its possession or control said property or any records pertaining thereto may be found for the purpose of preventing destruction, concealment, or dissipation of the same xxx until it can be determined that the property was, in truth, ill-gotten. Republic v. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 88336, 192 SCRA 743 PCGG moved to sell the sequestered aircraft. Sandiganbayan denied the order. Held: Affirmed. D: Selling sequestered properties is not within the ambit of mere administration. Section 27 Date of effectivity of the Constitution De Leon v. Esguerra 153 SCRA 602 D: 1987 Constitution took effect of February 2, 1987.

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