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20/11/2010 PHD ' , (0544443239 ) : Freud, S. (1899). Screen memories. Standard Edition, 3, 301-322. London: The Hogarth Press.

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"What is recorded as a mnemic image is not the relevant experience itselfin this respect the resistance gets its way; what is recorded is another psychical element closely associated with the objectionable oneand in this respect the first principle shows its strength, the principle which endeavours to fix important impressions by establishing reproducible mnemic images. The result of the conflict is therefore that, instead of the mnemic image which would have been justified by the original event, another is produced which has been to some degree associatively displaced from the former one. And since the elements of the experience which aroused objection were precisely the important ones, the substituted memory will necessarily lack those important elements and will in consequence most probably strike us as trivia."(p. 306)

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. It is precisely the coarsely sensual element in the phantasy which explains why it " does not develop into a conscious phantasy but must be content to find its way allusively and under a flowery disguise into a childhood scene. But why precisely, into a childhood scene, I should like to know? For the sake of its innocence, perhaps. Can you imagine a greater contrast to these designs for gross sexual aggression than childish pranks? "(p. 316). , .

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: The recognition of this fact must diminish the distinction we have drawn between " screen memories and other memories derived from our childhood. It may indeed be questioned whether we have any memories at all from our childhood: memories relating to our childhood may be all that we possess. Our childhood memories show us our earliest years not as they were but as they appeared at the later periods when the memories were aroused. In these periods of arousal, the childhood memories did not, as people are accustomed to say, emerge; they were formed at that time. And a number of motives, with no concern for historical accuracy, had a part in forming them, as well as in the selection of the memories themselves."(p. 321)

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One is thus forced by various considerations to suspect that in the so-called earliest " childhood memories we possess not the genuine memory-trace but a later revision of it, a revision which may have been subjected to the influences of a variety of later psychical forces. Thus the childhood memories of individuals come in general to acquire the significance of screen memories and in doing so offer a remarkable analogy with the childhood memories that a nation preserves in its store of legends and myths." (p. 46-47).

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"In some cases I have had an impression that the familiar childhood amnesia, which is theoretically so important to us, is completely counterbalanced by screen memories. Not only some but all of what is essential from childhood has been retained in these memories. It is simply a question of knowing how to extract it out of them by analysis. They represent the forgotten years of childhood as adequately as the manifest content of a dream represents the dream-thoughts."(p.147) "I have called these childhood memories screen memories, and with a thorough analysis everything that has been forgotten can be extracted from them" (pp.199-200)

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.(6) (7) : " The theory of deferred action or screen memory suggests, by the problematic nature of the sign it requires, that childhood is a name given to the intersection of the objective and the subjective in the project of representing ourselves to ourselves. We return to it as if it were genuine, as identity; but at the same time it returns to us as the expression of another, as difference."(p.304) .

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? ? ? References 1. Freud, S. (1899). Letter from Freud to Fliess, May 25, 1899. The Complete Letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess, 1887-1904, 351-352. 2. Freud, S. (1914). Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through (Further Recommendations on the Technique of Psycho-Analysis II). The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XII (1911-1913): The Case of Schreber, Papers on Technique and Other Works, 145-156. 3. Freud, S. (1901). The Psychopathology of Everyday Life: Forgetting, Slips of the Tongue, Bungled Actions, Superstitions and Errors (1901). The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume VI (1901): The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, vii-296. 4. Freud, S. (1916). Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis. The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XV (19151916): Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis (Parts I and II), 1-240. , (2004 ) . .5

6. Mahon, E., Battin-Mahon, D. (1983). The Fate of Screen Memories in Psychoanalysis. Psychoanal. St. Child, 38:459-479 7. Laguardia, E. (1982). The Return of Childhood in Autobiography: Freud's Screen Memories. Psychoanal. Contemp. Thought, 5:293-305. 8. Bjorklund, D. F. (2000). False-memory creation in children and adults: theory,

research, and implications. Routledge.

9. Meyerson, J. (2010). Memory Focused Interventions (MFI) as a Therapeutic Strategy in Hypnotic Psychotherapy. American Journal of Clinical Hypnosis, 52: 3. 189-203 Jan .

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