G.R. No. 17958 February 27, 1922 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

LOL-LO and SARAW, defendants-appellants. Thos. D. Aitken for appellants. Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee. MALCOLM, J.: The days when pirates roamed the seas, when picturesque buccaneers like Captain Avery and Captain Kidd and Bartholomew Roberts gripped the imagination, when grostesque brutes like Blackbeard flourished, seem far away in the pages of history and romance. Nevertheless, the record before us tells a tale of twentieth century piracy in the south seas, but stripped of all touches of chivalry or of generosity, so as to present a horrible case of rapine and near murder. On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left matuta, a Dutch possession, for Peta, another Dutch possession. In one of the boats was one individual, a Dutch subject, and in the other boat eleven men, women, and children, likewise subjects of Holland. After a number of days of navigation, at about 7 o'clock in the evening, the second boat arrived between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was surrounded by six vintas manned by twenty-four Moros all armed. The Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, too for themselves all of the cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally violated two of the women by methods too horrible to the described. All of the persons on the Dutch boat, with the exception of the two young women, were again placed on it and holes were made in it, the idea that it would submerge, although as a matter of fact, these people, after eleven days of hardship and privation, were succored violating them, the Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the Moro marauder were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro the two women were able to escape. Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands. There they were arrested and were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy. A demurrer was interposed by counsel de officio for the Moros, based on the grounds that the offense charged was not within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, nor of any court of the Philippine Islands, and that the facts did not constitute a public offense, under the laws in force in the Philippine Islands. After the demurrer was overruled by the trial judge, trial was had, and a judgment was rendered finding the two defendants guilty and sentencing each of them to life imprisonment ( cadena perpetua ), to return together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, to the offended parties, the thirty-nine sacks of copras which had been robbed, or to indemnify them in the amount of 924 rupees, and to pay a one-half part of the costs. A very learned and exhaustive brief has been filed in this court by the attorney de officio . By a process of elimination, however, certain questions can be quickly disposed of. The proven facts are not disputed. All of the elements of the crime of piracy are present. Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi , and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility.

It cannot be contended with any degree of force as was done in the lover court and as is again done in this court, that the Court of First Instance was without jurisdiction of the case. Pirates are in law hostes humani generis . Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits. As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes." (U.S. vs. Furlong [1820], 5 Wheat., 184.) The most serious question which is squarely presented to this court for decision for the first time is whether or not the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy are still in force. Article 153 to 156 of the Penal Code reads as follows: ART. 153. The crime of piracy committed against Spaniards, or the subjects of another nation not at war with Spain, shall be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal tocadena perpetua If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with Spain, it shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor ART. 154. Those who commit the crimes referred to in the first paragraph of the next preceding article shall suffer the penalty of cadena perpetua or death, and those who commit the crimes referred to in the second paragraph of the same article, from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua : 1. Whenever they have seized some vessel by boarding or firing upon the same. 2. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, or by any of the physical injuries specified in articles four hundred and fourteen and four hundred and fifteen and in paragraphs one and two of article four hundred and sixteen. 3. Whenever it is accompanied by any of the offenses against chastity specified in Chapter II, Title IX, of this book. 4. Whenever the pirates have abandoned any persons without means of saving themselves. 5. In every case, the captain or skipper of the pirates. ART. 155. With respect to the provisions of this title, as well as all others of this code, when Spain is mentioned it shall be understood as including any part of the national territory. ART. 156. For the purpose of applying the provisions of this code, every person, who, according to the Constitution of the Monarchy, has the status of a Spaniard shall be considered as such. The general rules of public law recognized and acted on by the United States relating to the effect of a transfer of territory from another State to the United States are well-known. The political law of the former sovereignty is necessarily changed. The municipal law in so far as it is consistent with the Constitution, the laws of the United States, or the characteristics and institutions of the government, remains in force. As a corollary to the main rules, laws subsisting at the time of transfer, designed to secure good order and peace in the community, which are strictly of a municipal character, continue until by

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direct action of the new government they are altered or repealed. (Chicago, Rock Islands, etc., R. Co. vs. McGlinn [1885], 114 U.S., 542.) These principles of the public law were given specific application to the Philippines by the Instructions of President McKinley of May 19, 1898, to General Wesley Meritt, the Commanding General of the Army of Occupation in the Philippines, when he said: Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, and immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants, the municipal laws of the conquered territory, such as affect private rights of person and property, and provide for the punishment of crime , are considered as continuing in force, so far as they are compatible with the new order of things, until they are suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent; and practice they are not usually abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force, and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals, substantially as they were before the occupations. This enlightened practice is so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion. (Official Gazette, Preliminary Number, Jan. 1, 1903, p. 1. See also General Merritt Proclamation of August 14, 1898.) It cannot admit of doubt that the articles of the Spanish Penal Code dealing with piracy were meant to include the Philippine Islands. Article 156 of the Penal Code in relation to article 1 of the Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, would also make the provisions of the Code applicable not only to Spaniards but to Filipinos. The opinion of Grotius was that piracy by the law of nations is the same thing as piracy by the civil law, and he has never been disputed. The specific provisions of the Penal Code are similar in tenor to statutory provisions elsewhere and to the concepts of the public law. This must necessarily be so, considering that the Penal Code finds its inspiration in this respect in the Novelas, the Partidas , and the Novisima Recopilacion The Constitution of the United States declares that the Congress shall have the power to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations. (U.S. Const. Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 10.) The Congress, in putting on the statute books the necessary ancillary legislation, provided that whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations , and is afterwards brought into or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life. (U.S. Crim. Code, sec. 290; penalty formerly death: U.S. Rev. Stat., sec. 5368.) The framers of the Constitution and the members of Congress were content to let a definition of piracy rest on its universal conception under the law of nations. It is evident that the provisions of the Penal Code now in force in the Philippines relating to piracy are not inconsistent with the corresponding provisions in force in the United States. By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the United States. A logical construction of articles of the Penal Code, like the articles dealing with the crime of piracy, would be that wherever "Spain" is mentioned, it should be substituted by the words "United States" and wherever "Spaniards" are mentioned, the word should be substituted by the expression "citizens of the United States and citizens of the Philippine Islands." somewhat similar reasoning led this court in the case of United States vs. Smith ([1919], 39 Phil., 533) to give to the word "authority" as found in the Penal Code a limited meaning, which would no longer comprehend all religious, military, and civil officers, but only public officers in the Government of the Philippine Islands.

Under the construction above indicated, article 153 of the Penal Code would read as follows: The crime of piracy committed against citizens of the United States and citizens of the Philippine Islands, or the subjects of another nation not at war with the United States, shall be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua. If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with the United States, it shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor. We hold those provisions of the Penal code dealing with the crime of piracy, notably articles 153 and 154, to be still in force in the Philippines. The crime falls under the first paragraph of article 153 of the Penal Code in relation to article 154. There are present at least two of the circumstances named in the last cited article as authorizing either cadena perpetua or death. The crime of piracy was accompanied by (1) an offense against chastity and (2) the abandonment of persons without apparent means of saving themselves. It is, therefore, only necessary for us to determine as to whether the penalty of cadena perpetua or death should be imposed. In this connection, the trial court, finding present the one aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, and compensating the same by the one mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction provided by article 11, as amended, of the Penal Code, sentenced the accused to life imprisonment. At least three aggravating circumstances, that the wrong done in the commission of the crime was deliberately augmented by causing other wrongs not necessary for its commission, that advantage was taken of superior strength, and that means were employed which added ignominy to the natural effects of the act, must also be taken into consideration in fixing the penalty. Considering, therefore, the number and importance of the qualifying and aggravating circumstances here present, which cannot be offset by the sole mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction, and the horrible nature of the crime committed, it becomes our duty to impose capital punishment. The vote upon the sentence is unanimous with regard to the propriety of the imposition of the death penalty upon the defendant and appellant Lo-lo (the accused who raped on of the women), but is not unanimous with regard to the court, Mr. Justice Romualdez, registers his nonconformity. In accordance with provisions of Act No. 2726, it results, therefore, that the judgment of the trial court as to the defendant and appellant Saraw is affirmed, and is reversed as to the defendant and appellant Lol-lo, who is found guilty of the crime of piracy and is sentenced therefor to be hung until dead, at such time and place as shall be fixed by the judge of first instance of the Twentysixth Judicial District. The two appellants together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, shall indemnify jointly and severally the offended parties in the equivalent of 924 rupees, and shall pay a one-half part of the costs of both instances. So ordered. Araullo, C.J., Johnson, Avancea, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur. G.R. No. L-52787 February 28, 1985 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JESUS HECTO, PEDRO HECTO and LORETO HECTO, accused, PEDRO HECTO and LORETO HECTO, defendants-appellants.

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RELOVA, J.: From the decision of the then Court of First Instance of Leyte, rendered after trial in Criminal Case No. 1093, finding accused Pedro Hecto and Loreto Hecto guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder with direct assault upon a person in authority and sentencing "each of them to the death penalty to be executed at a date to be set and in the manner provided for by law and to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of Barrio Captain Catalino Pedrosa (represented by Mrs. Caridad B. Pedrosa of San Isidro, Dulag, Leyte) in the amount of P12,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay 2/6 of the costs," (p. 22, Rollo) the aforementioned accused have appealed to this Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Following are the facts.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Sometime in January or February 1972, brothers Jesus Hecto and Pedro Hecto slaughtered a carabao in barrio San Isidro, municipality of Dulag, Province of Leyte. They did not pay the corresponding tumbada or slaughter fee and upon learning of this non-payment, Barangay Captain Catalino Pedrosa asked him (Jesus) to pay the same. Jesus replied that he could not yet pay the required slaughter fee because those who bought meat from him had not also paid him yet. Thereafter, Pedrosa met Municipal Treasurer Benedicto de la Paz who informed him that according to the Hecto brothers they had already paid the slaughter fee to him (Pedrosa). Pedrosa denied having received the fee mentioned.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On February 27, 1972, Catalino Pedrosa and his wife went to visit their farm and on their way home, about 3:00 in the afternoon, they met Jesus and Pedro Hecto. Pedrosa confronted the two about the false information they gave the municipal official concerning the alleged payment of the slaughter fee to him. A heated discussion ensued and the Hectos tried to attack Pedrosa. Mrs. Caridad Pedrosa pulled her husband away and the trouble was averted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library About 6:00 in the afternoon of March 24, 1972, Catalino Pedrosa left his house in barangay San Isidro to accompany a two-year old nephew to the house of the child's parents. On his way back, about 6:30 he was shot by Jesus Hecto and Pedro Hecto and thereafter stabbed by Marcial Hecto and Roberto Silvano.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Caridad Pedrosa at the time was in her house preparing supper. Upon hearing the sound of a gunfire, she immediately ran to the door. However, she was prevented from going down the house by Loreto Hecto and Faustino Silvano, son and nephew, respectively, of Jesus Hecto. They pointed their guns at her. Notwithstanding, Caridad, could see Jesus Hecto pointing a gun at her husband, Catalino Pedrosa, who was already lying on the ground face up. This was followed by Pedro Hecto who also fired his own gun at Pedrosa. Thereafter, Jesus Hecto, Pedro Hecto, Marcial Hecto and Roberto Silvano carried the victim to a nearby ditch where Roberto and Marcial took turns in stabbing him with their bolos. The four assailants then walked away. Loreto Hecto and Faustino Silvano who were at the door of the house of the Pedrosas guarding Caridad joined the four.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The police was informed of the incident. Acting Chief of Police Nerio dela Cruz, with several policemen, arrived at the scene of the incident at about 8:00 that evening. They found the dead Pedrosa with three gunshots and three stab wounds on his body.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

During the trial of the case, the accused Jesus Hecto died shortly after he had testified. Accordingly, the case against him was dismissed by the court. Trial proceeded against Pedro and Loreto Hecto while their confederates: Roberto Silvano, Marcial Hecto and Faustino Silvano remained at large.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The defense of appellants Loreto Hecto and Pedro Hecto was denial. Loreto testified that at the date and time of the incident he was in his house two kilometers away from barangay San Isidro drinking tuba with his hired farm laborers, Pablo Lirios and Felicito Bico. In the morning of that day, March 24, 1972, his farm laborers plowed his cornfield until about 4:00 in the afternoon. He then offered them tuba which they drank together in his house. About 6:00, his sister Lolita arrived telling them that their father Jesus fought with Catalino Pedrosa. He then left for barrio San Isidro to see his parents and, as a precautionary measure, he brought his mother Maria Ganaron to his house.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Appellant Pedro Hecto declared that on March 23 and 24, 1972 he stayed in his house because the palay which was harvested on March 21 was being threshed by Beato Andrade and Victor Isyo. The threshing was finished about 11:00 in the evening of March 24. About 9:00 some members of the police force of Dulag went to his house looking for his brother Jesus Hecto. They left upon finding that he was not there. About an hour later, Jesus arrived and said that he had killed somebody and that he was going to town to surrender. After a few days, he (Pedro Hecto) left for Tacloban City where he worked as carpenter until he was arrested on June 17, 1972.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Appellants claim that the trial court erred (1) in relying on inadmissible evidence in making a finding of facts relevant to the judgment of conviction; (2) in rendering a judgment of conviction even if their respective guilts were not proven beyond reasonable doubt; and (3) in finding that the crime of murder was committed with assault upon a person in virtual law authority.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles library With respect to the first assigned error, We agree with appellants that the sworn statement of Constancio Bollena who did not testify at the hearing should not have been admitted and considered by the trial court. In said affidavit, Bollena said that he was talking with Pedrosa when Jesus Hecto, Pedro Hecto, Loreto Hecto, Marcial Hecto, Roberto Silvano and Faustino Silvano arrived; that after Loreto Hecto and Faustino Silvano proceeded to Pedrosas house, Jesus Hecto immediately drew and fired his gun twice at Pedrosa; that Jesus then turned his attention to Bollena who ran away and succeeded in evading the shot fired at him by Jesus. As aptly stated by the Solicitor General in his brief, the affidavit of Bollena should not be considered in passing judgment upon the guilt or innocence of herein appellants. "Such statement is hearsay evidence for the reason that Bollena never testified in court. Appellants did not have the opportunity to cross examine him and test his credibility. " (p. 167, Rollo) chanrobles virtual law library However, the conviction of appellants Pedro Hecto and Loreto Hecto by the trial court was not entirely based on the affidavit of Bollena. There were the testimonies of Caridad Pedrosa and Mario Cadayong. Hereunder are the said testimonies of Caridad Pedrosa, wife of the victimQ You said that you were inside your house. Immediately after you heard the first gunshot, what did you do? chanrobles virtual law library ATTY. SANTOS: chanrobles virtual law library

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Answered already, Your Honor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library COURT: chanrobles virtual law library Let her answer because her testimony on this point is not very clear.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library FISCAL CABLITAS: chanrobles virtual law library A I ran towards the door of the house.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Q And you said you were threatened by Loreto and Faustino with guns. Where were you threatened by them? chanrobles virtual law library A I was threatened by the door of our house because I was not able to go down. When I opened the door they threatened me with guns.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library Q Did you know what was that gun report-the fourth gunshot report about? chanrobles virtual law library A Yes, sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Q What was it about? chanrobles virtual law library A The gunshot was fired by Pedro Hecto. I could see him still holding the gun.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Q To whom was it aimed when you saw that gun which he fired? chanrobles virtual law library A Towards my husband.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library Q When this fourth gunfire was made, were Loreto and Faustino still pointing their guns at you? chanrobles virtual law library A Yes, they were still pointing their guns me.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library at

A The four (4) of them.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Q Who? chanrobles virtual law library A Jesus Hecto, Pedro Hecto, Marcial Hecto and Roberto Silvano.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library FISCAL CABLITAS: chanrobles virtual law library Q Your husband, as you said, was the barrio captain of your place at the time when he was gunned down by the accused and by the other persons charged in the information who are simply residents of the place who are supposed to be under him. Will you please ten the Court the reason why your husband was killed? chanrobles virtual law library xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library A It was in the month of January or February when Jesus Hecto slaughtered their carabao.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Q What year? chanrobles virtual law library A 1972.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Q And then? chanrobles virtual law library A My husband asked for the permit of slaughtering the carabao.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Q What is this "tumbada" in your local parlance? chanrobles virtual law library A Whenever somebody slaughter a carabao, a certain amount is asked from them.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library Q For what is this amount-where does this go? chanrobles virtual law library A For the treasurer.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles library municipal virtual law

Q Municipal treasurer or barrio treasurer? chanrobles virtual law library A Municipal treasurer.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Q And then, was Jesus Hecto able to pay the 'tumbada' to the barrio captain, your husband? chanrobles virtual law library A Jesus Hecto did not give the amount to my husband because according to Jesus Hecto, the persons who partook of the carabao did not pay him yet.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library FISCAL CABLITAS: chanrobles virtual law library

Q How did you manage to see what was happening to your husband? chanrobles virtual law library A Because I looked at the two (2) persons pointing their guns to me and at the same time I looked also at the place where my husband has fallen? chanrobles virtual law library xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library Q After your husband was fired upon by Pedro Hecto what happened after that? chanrobles virtual law library A They lifted my husband to the culvert.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Q Who lifted your husband? chanrobles virtual law library

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I am asking for the motive, Your Honor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library COURT: chanrobles virtual law library Witness is being asked on what she knows about the motive.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library FISCAL CABLITAS: chanrobles virtual law library A Benedicto de la Paz asked my husband about the amount as payment for the slaughter of the carabao as according to his information, the amount was already given to him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Q As a result of this, do you know what happened on February 27, 1972, as a result of this 'tumbada' in questions? chanrobles virtual law library A We were from our farm when we passed by Pedro and Jesus Hecto at the waiting shed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Q And then? chanrobles virtual law library A My husband confronted Jesus Hector by saying 'You have told there that you have already given the amount as payment for the slaughter of the carabao; but why did you tell them when you have not given me this amount yet?' chanrobles virtual law library Q What happened after this? chanrobles virtual law library A There was an exchange of words between my husband and Jesus Hecto.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Q And then? chanrobles virtual law library A I held my husband because they were about to harm my husband.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Q Who were about to harm your husband? chanrobles virtual law library A Pedro Hecto and Jesus Hecto.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Q What did you do? chanrobles virtual law library A I held my husband and we went home.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Q And what did Jesus Hecto and Perdo Hecto do when you held your husband and you went home? chanrobles virtual law library A He said 'Ikaw, Captain, ka nga estrikto, magkikita kita ha iba nga adlaw' Meaning, 'You, Bo. Captain, you are very strict. We will see each other some day.' (pp. 310, 311, 314, 315, 323, 324, 325, and 326, tsn., Hearing on January 28, 1975) and of Mario Cadayong: Q You said Catalino Pedrosa was killed, do you know how he was killed? chanrobles virtual law library

A Yes, sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Q How? chanrobles virtual law library A He was shot.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Q By whom? chanrobles virtual law library A He was shot by Jesus Hecto and Pedro Hecto.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Q Now you are talking about shots, you mean to say that there were guns during the incident chanrobles virtual law library A Yes, sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Q How many guns have you seen? chanrobles virtual law library A Pedro and Jesus Hecto were having one gun each.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library Q And when while you were running towards the coconut tree to take cover, you heard a second shot? chanrobles virtual law library A I did not run because the coconut tree was very near. While I was going to that tree to hide I saw Jesus Hecto holding the gun and firing the second fire.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library x x x x x x x x x chanrobles virtual law library COURT: chanrobles virtual law library Just answer the question whether Catalino Pedrosa died after quivering.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library WITNESS: chanrobles virtual law library A Not yet because he was still shot.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library ATTY. TAN: chanrobles virtual law library Q He was shot by whom? chanrobles virtual law library A Pedro Hecto. (pp. 432, 433, 435 & 445, tsn., June 3, 1976 hearing) chanrobles virtual law library xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library COURT: chanrobles virtual law library Will you describe to us in proper sequence what you saw from the time Jesus Hecto pointed his gun to Catalino Pedrosa who was already fallen on the ground shaking? chanrobles virtual law library A Catalino was shot again by Pedro. Catalino Pedrosa was carried by Pedro Hecto, Jesus Hecto and Roberto Silvano to the ditch. After that, Catalino was stabbed by Roberto and after that

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he was again stabbed by Marcial. We were stepping backwards as we saw Man Caring pointed to with a gun by someone.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Q Who is Man Caring? chanrobles virtual law library A Caridad Pedrosa.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Q Who was pointing a gun at Caridad Pedrosa? chanrobles virtual law library A Loreto and Faustino.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library Q How about Roberto? You said he stabbed Catalino. What weapon did he use in stabbing at your uncle? chanrobles virtual law library A He used a pisaw, a small bolo. Maybe it was pisaw. (Witness indicating a length of one-third of a meter.) chanrobles virtual law library xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library Q Did you see Pedro Hecto actually fire upon Catalino Pedrosa? chanrobles virtual law library A Yes, sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Q Was Catalino hit? chanrobles virtual law library A Maybe, he was hit because Catalino was just in front of Pedro and whose position was lying face upwards.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Q When Jesus Hecto fired upon Catalino Pedrosa, referring to the second shot you saw, was Pedro around? chanrobles virtual law library A Yes, sir. He was around. (pp. 243, 244, 245, 247, tsn., September 9, 1975 hearing) chanrobles virtual law library xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library Q When for the first time did you see Pedro Hecto in the scene of the incident? chanrobles virtual law library A I saw them when they were going to the waiting shed. I saw Jesus Hecto, Pedro Hecto, Marcial Hecto, Roberto Silvano going to the waiting shed. (p. 450, tsn., June 3, 1976 hearing) Thus, it is clear that Mrs. Caridad Pedrosa and Mario Cadayong saw the killing of the victim, Catalino Pedrosa Considering the concerted action of Jesus Hecto, appellants Pedro and Loreto Hecto, Marcial Hecto, Roberto and Faustino Silvano, conspiracy among them has been successfully established by the prosecution. While their companions were slaying the deceased, appellant Loreto Hecto and Faustino Silvano were by the stairs of the house of Catalino to prevent any assistance which could come therefrom. After they had accomplished their criminal or unlawful purpose, they left together. Time and again We have ruled that concert of action at the time of consummating a crime and the form and manner in which assistance is rendered to the

person or persons inflicting the fatal wounds on their victim determine complicity where it would not be otherwise evident. In a conspiracy, all are liable for the acts of one.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The fact that appellants went into hiding after the incident is evidence of guilt. Pedro Hecto was arrested two months later in Tacloban City, while Loreto Hecto presented himself before the authorities in March 1974 or after two years. Their three companions have not yet been arrested up to now.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Against the testimony of the People's witnesses, appellants Loreto and Pedro Hecto claim that they were elsewhere when the killing took place. Well established is the rule that where the accused have been positively Identified by witnesses as perpetrators of the offense, the defense of alibi is futile and unavailing.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library We now come to the contention of the defense that the trial court erred in convicting them of the complex crime of murder with assault upon a person in authority. They pointed out that when the barangay captain was killed he was not in actual performance of his official duties. Be that as it may, the fact is, the attack on the deceased was occasioned by the official duties done by him. As the barangay captain, it was his duty to enforce the laws and ordinances within the barangay. If in the enforcement thereof he incurs the enmity of his people who thereafter treacherously slew him, the crime committed is murder with assault upon a person in authority.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that for lack of necessary votes the sentence is reduced to reclusion perpetua and the indemnity increased to P30,000.00. With costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library SO ORDERED. G.R. No. L-16806 December 22, 1961

SERGIO DEL ROSARIO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. CONCEPCION, J.: chanrobles virtual law library Accused of counterfeiting Philippine treasury notes, Sergio del Rosario, Alfonso Araneta and Benedicto del Pilar were convicted by the Court of First Instance of Davao of illegal possession of said forged treasury notes and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from 8 years and 1 day to 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, and pay a fine of P5,000, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, as well as a proportionate part of the costs. On appeal, the judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, except insofar as the maximum of said indeterminate penalty which was increased to 10 years, 8 months and 1 day of prision mayor. The case is before us on appeal by certiorari taken by Sergio del Rosario.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It appears that, after showing to complainant Apolinario del Rosario the Philippine one-peso bills Exhibits C, E and G and the Philippine two-peso bill Exhibit H, and inducing him to believe that the same were counterfeit paper money manufactured by them, although in fact they were genuine treasury notes of the Philippine Government one of the digits of each of which had been altered and changed, the

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aforementioned defendants had succeeded in obtaining P1,700.00 from said complainant, in the City of Davao, on June 23, 1955, for the avowed purpose of financing the manufacture of more counterfeit treasury notes of the Philippines. The only question raised in this appeal is whether the possession of said Exhibits C, E, G and H constitutes a violation of Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant maintains that, being genuine treasury notes of our government, the possession thereof cannot be illegal. We find no merit in this pretense.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It is not disputed that a portion of the last digit 9 of Serial No. F-79692619 of Exhibit C, had been erased and changed so as to read 0 and that similar erasures and changes had been made in the penultimate digit 9 in Serial No. F-79692691 of Exhibit E, in the last digit in Serial No. D-716326 of Exhibit G, and in the last digit 9 of Serial No. D-716329 of Exhibit H.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Articles 160 and 169 of the Revised Penal Code read: ART. 168. Illegal possession and use of false treasury or bank notes and other instruments of credit. - Unless the act be one of those coming under the provisions of any of the preceding articles, any person who shall knowingly use or have in his possession, with intent to use any of the false or falsified instruments referred to in this section, shall suffer the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed in said articles.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library ART. 169. How forgery is committed. - The forgery referred to in this section may be committed by any of the following means;chanrobles virtual law library 1. By giving to a treasury or bank note or any instrument payable to bearer or to order mentioned therein, the appearance of a true and genuine document.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 2. By erasing, substituting, counterfeiting or altering by any means the figures, letters, words or signs contained therein. It is clear from these provisions that the possession of genuine treasury notes of the Philippines any of "the figures, letters, words or signs contained" in which had been erased and or altered, with knowledge of such notes, as they were used by petitioner herein and his co-defendants in the manner adverted to above, is punishable under said Article 168, in relation to Article 166, subdivision (1), of the Revised Penal Code (U.S. vs. Gardner, 3 Phil., 398; U.S. vs. Solito, 36 Phil., 785).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Being in accordance with the facts and the law, the decision appealed from is, accordingly, affirmed, with costs against petitioner Sergio del Rosario. It is so ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library G.R. No. 82197 March 13, 1989 MANUEL L. SIQUIAN petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. Cortes & Reyna Law Firm for petitioner. The Solicitor General for respondents.

CORTES, J.: The information charging petitioner Manuel L. Siquian, the then municipal mayor of Angadanan, Isabela, of the crime of falsification of public document under Art. 171, p. 4 of the Revised Penal Code filed by Second Assistant Provincial Fiscal before Branch XX of the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela reads as follows: That on or about the lst day of July, 1975, in the Municipality of Angadanan, Province of Isabela, and within the preliminary jurisdiction of this Honorable court, the accused Manuel L. Siquian, being then the Municipal Mayor of Angadanan, Isabela, taking advantage of his position as such Municipal Mayor did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously prepare and, sign a false document, knowing it to be false, to wit. An official communication to the Civil Service Commissioner, dated July 1, 1975, which is required by law in order to support the appointment of a certain Jesusa B. Carreon to the position of clerk in the Office of the Municipal Secretary which (sic) he appointed as such by stating and making it appear in said document that there was such a position existing and that funds therefore were available. When in truth and in fact, as said accused well-know (sic), there was no such position or item and no funds were available for said position in the Fiscal Budget of Angadanan for 1975-76, nor was there any special ordinance creating said position and appropriating the necessary funds therefor. xxx [Rollo, pp. 23-24.] Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense charged and the trial of the case ensued. The facts as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) are as follows: It appears from the evidence that sometime in June 1975, Jesusa Carreon, 20 years old, single and a resident of Ilagan, Isabela, went to the accused Manuel L. Siquian, Mayor of the Municipality of Angadanan, Province of Isabela, to apply for employment in the office of the Mayor. Earlier, she and her friends went to the Municipal Hall of Angadanan to ask information if there was any vacancy. When she was informed that there was, she went to see the accused in his house. The accused must have agreed to appoint her because he accompanied her to the office of the Municipal Secretary, Emilio Valenzuela. The latter, however, was not there. Even so, the accused told Jesusa Carreon to report for work the following day and that she should be included in the budget. The accused then accompanied her to the Office of the Municipal Treasurer, Calo Battung the treasurer agreed that she could report for work. One week after, Jesusa Carreon went alone to the Office of the Municipal Secretary. He was there. When she went to the accused, she was told to go back to the Municipal Secretary to work for her appointment papers. She was appointed clerk to the Municipal Secretary in the Office of the Municipal Secretary, on July 1, 1975 by the accused. xxx Accompanying her appointment is the certification, among others, of the availability of funds CS Form No. 203) dated July 1, 1975, issued by the accused Manuel L. Siquian, pursuant to the requirements of Memorandum Circular No. 5, Series of 1975, addressed to the Commissioner of Civil Service, Manila (Exh. "C").

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xxx Jesusa Carreon took her oath of Office (Exh. "A-l") on July 1, 1975, and promptly began to work on the same day. Her monthly salary was P 120.00. She rendered services for the months of July, August, September, October, November and December 1975 (Exhibits "B", "B-l" to "B-5"). She was not, however, paid. As early as October 1975, she went to the Municipal Treasurer to receive her salary, but she was told that there was no money yet. In November 1975, she went to see the accused, but the latter told her to see the treasurer. She went to the treasurer who told her that there was no money. because of this, she went to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan at the Provincial Capitol in Ilagan, Isabela, to ask (sic) information regarding her unpaid salaries. She was interviewed by Atty. Efren Ambrosia Provincial Administrator. Atty. Ambrosio asked her if she had complete appointment papers. hereafter, she filed her verified complaint dated April 20, 1976, against the accused. Her complaint is addressed to Governor Faustino N. Dy (Exhibit "G" and "G-1"). It also appears from the evidence that the Municipal council of Angadanan, Isabela, failed to enact the annual budget for the municipality for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976 (Exhs. "H", "H-l", and "H-2"). Accordingly, and pursuant to PD No. 477, the annual budget for the previous Fiscal Year 1974-1975, was deemed re-enacted (Exh. "H- l"). Thus, the Municipal Plantilla of Personnel for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976 is the same as the Plantilla of Personnel for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976. No supplemental budget was enacted by the municipal council of Angadanan. In the Plantilla of Personnel for 1974-1975, which was deemed re-enacted for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976, there was no new item or appropriation for the position of clerk in the Office of the Municipal Secretary of Angadanan, Isabela. The new position of clerk in the office of the Municipal Council appearing in the Municipal Plantilla for Personnel (Exhibit "H-2") for 19741975, was filled up as early as October 16, 1974 by the accused when he appointed Clarita G. Ramirez to that position (Exhibits "J" and "J-2"). With respect to the new position of a Clerk to the office of the Municipal Mayor in the Plantilla for 1974-1975, it was already filled-up by the appointment of Miss Marivic A. Tallod on June 16, 1975, by the accused (Exhibits "K" and "K4"). As early as June 28, 1974, the same position was held by Miss Felicidad Visitacion who was appointed by the accused, but she resigned (Exhs. "K" and "K-l"). xxx [Rollo, pp. 26, 28, 29-30.] After trial, the Court found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and decreed: WHEREFORE, finding the accused Manuel L. Siquian guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification of public document as charged in the information, the Court hereby sentences said accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from FIVE (5) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correctional (sic) as minimum to SEVEN YEARS ofprision mayor as maximum and to pay a fine of THREE THOUSAND (P 3,000.00) PESOS. SO ORDERED. [Rollo, p. 35.] On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals ruled as follows:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is in accordance with law and the evidence and is hereby therefore affirmed. Costs against the accused- appellant. SO ORDERED. [Rollo, p. 42.] Hence, this petition for review seeking reversal of the CA decision and the acquittal of petitioner Manuel L. Siquian. Petitioner contends that the respondent court has decided a question of substance not in accord with law and jurisprudence when it affirmed the decision of the trial court convicting him of the crime of falsification despite the following A. The evidence on record which consists of the testimony of the prosecution's principal witness, shows the absence of criminal intent on the part of the accused. B. There is no evidence that the accused took advantage of his position as Municipal Mayor when he made the allegedly falsified certification. C. The statement that "Funds for the position are available" is not a narration of facts but a conclusion of law. D. The petitioner was deprived of his right to due process of law when the trial court proceeded with the trial in his absence despite a pending petition for change of venue with the Supreme Court. [Rollo, p. 13.] Petitioner's arguments, however, are bereft of any merit. The offense of falsification by a public officer under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code is committed by "any public officer, employee or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts: . . . 4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of fact; . . .' It is settled that in this fourth kind of falsification, the following requisites must concur: (a) That the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) hat he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and (c) That the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false Cabigas v. People, G.R. No. 67472, July 3, 1987, 152 SCRA 18. All these requisites had been fully met in the case at bar. Petitioner, a public officer, being then the mayor of the municipality of Angadanan, Isabela, made an untruthful statement in the narration of facts contained in the certification which he issued in connection with the appointment of complainant Jesusa Carreon. The certification, having been issued by a public official in the exercise of the function of his office is a public document [U.S. v. Asensi, 34 Phil. 765 (1915)]. It is immaterial whether or not the Civil Service Commissioner to whom the certification was addressed received the document issued by petitioner. Since the certification was prepared by petitioner in accordance with the standard forms prescribed by the government (specifically the Civil Service Commission) pursuant to law, the certification was invested with the character of a public document [People v. Asensi, supra citing U.S. v. Vy Guico, 12 Phil. 209 (1908)] falsification of which is punishable under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. Here, falsification of such document was committed when the petitioner stated that funds were available for the position to which Jesusa Carreon was appointed when he knew that, in reality, the position itself did not even exist and no funds had been appropriated therefor.

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Petitioner's stance that the certification which he issued contained no narration of facts but rather a conclusion of law is not meritorious. The respondent court, upholding the Solicitor General's arguments, correctly ruled as follows: Conclusion of law" is defined as a proposition not arrived at by any process of natural reasoning from a fact or combination of facts stated but by the application of the artificial rules of law to the facts pleaded [Levins v. Rovegno, 71 Cal. 273, 12 p. 161; Black's Law Dict., p. 362]. From the above-cited definition, it can be deduced that the certification by the appellant that 'funds for the position are available' does not require the application of the artificial rules of law.To certify that funds are available for the position what one should do was (sic) to refer to the budget and plantilla of personnel of the applicable fiscal year and ascertain if such item exists and funds are allocated therefor. In the present case, despite the presence of the records which shows that there is no position and funds therefor referred to in the certification, the appellant, fully aware of the data provided by the records, certified falsely that "funds for the position are available" [Rollo, p. 41). It is undisputed that the Municipal Council of Angadanan failed to enact the annual budget of the municipality for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976 and therefore, the annual budget for the last fiscal year, 1974-1975, was deemed re-enacted under P.D. No. 477. In the Municipal Plantilla of Personnel (Exh. "B-2") accompanying the Annual Budget for the Municipality of Angadanan, Isabela for the Fiscal Year 1974-1975, there is no such position as Clerk to the Municipal Secretary in the Office of the Municipal Secretary, the position to which Jesusa Carreon was appointed. Accordingly, there is no appropriation made in the Annual Budget for the Fiscal Year 1974-1975 for such position, thus rendering petitioner's statement in his certification utterly false. The requisite of absolute falsity of the statement made in the document is met when there exists not even an iota of colorable truth in what is declared in the narration of facts [U.S. v. Bayot, 10 Phil. 518 (1908)], as in this case. From the foregoing, it can be seen that the first and third requirements laid down in the Cabigas case, supra, are fully satisfied. The second element of the offense is likewise present. Under the civil service rules and regulations, specifically the Guidelines in the Preparation of Appointment for Original Appointment(Exhs. "D" and "D-3"), a certification of the availability of funds for the position to be filled up is required to be signed by the head of office or any officer who has been delegated the authority to sign. As an officer authorized by law to issue this certification which is designated as Civil Service Form No. 203, as revised, the petitioner has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him in said certification which includes information as to the availability of the funds for the position being filled up. Contrary to petitioner's claim, the existence of a wrongful intent to injure a third person is not necessary when the falsified document is a public document. This has already been authoritatively decreed in the 1955 case of People v. Po Giok To [96 Phil. 913 (1955)]. The Court in the aforementioned case explicitly stated that wrongful intent on the part of the accused to injure a third person is not an essential element of the crime of falsification of public document. The rationale for this principal distinction between falsification of public and private documents has been stated by the Court in this wise: "In the falsification of public or official documents, whether by public officials or private persons, it is unnecessary that there be present the Idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person, for the reason that, in contradistinction to private documents, the principal thing punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of truth as therein solemnly proclaimed" [People

v. Po Giok To, supra at 918, citing People v. Pacana, 47 Phil. 48 (1924)]. In falsification of public documents therefore, the controlling consideration is the public character of a document and the existence of any prejudice caused to third persons or, at least, the intent to cause such damage becomes immaterial [People v. Pacana, supra ]. Petitioner's plea for acquittal on the ground that the evidence for the prosecution shows the absence of criminal intent on his part must be denied. While this Court has declared good faith as a valid defense to falsification of public documents by making untruthful statements in a narration of facts [U.S. v. San Jose, 7 Phil. 604 (1907)], such defense cannot serve to exonerate the petitioner since the element of good faith has not clearly been shown to exist in the case at bar. Under the applicable law at the time, petitioner, as municipal mayor of Angadanan, Isabela presides at all meetings of the municipal council [Section 2621 (d), Revised Administrative Code] and signs all ordinances and resolutions passed by the municipal council [Section 2624 (c), Revised Administrative Code]. He was thus aware that (1) for failure to enact a budget for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976, Ordinance No. V of the Municipal Council of Angadanan, Isabela which was the Municipal Annual Budget of Angadanan, Isabela for Fiscal Year 1974-1975 was re-enacted and (2) that under the Municipal Plantilla of Personnel for that fiscal year, there were no funds appropriated for the position of clerk to the municipal secretary. His knowledge of these facts is shown by the fact that he even affixed his signature in attestation to the correctness of these documents; i.e. Ordinance No. V and Municipal Plantilla of Personnel. [ See Exhs. "H-1" and "H-2", Folder of Exhibits, pp. 27-32]. He cannot claim good faith in issuing a certification of the availability of funds for the questioned position since at the time he issued such certification on July 1, 1975, the fiscal year 1975- 1976 had already commenced and no new ordinance creating the new position to which he appointed Jesusa Carreon had been enacted by the municipal council. In view of the foregoing considerations, petitioner must be held criminally liable for his act of issuing the absolutely false certification as to the availability of funds for the subject position. The law considers his act criminal since it amounts to an untruthful statement in a narration of facts in a public document [Article 171 (4), Revised Penal Code]. Criminal intent and the will to commit a crime are presumed to exist on the part of the person who executes an act which the law punishes, unless the contrary shall appear [United States v. Apostol, 14 Phil. 92 (1909)]. In this case, the presumption that petitioner committed the act with criminal intention, which arose from proof of his commission of the unlawful act, stands unrebutted. Petitioner's claim that there was no showing that he took advantage of his official position in falsifying the document should likewise be rejected. This essential element of falsification of a public document by public officer requires that the offender "abuse his office or use the influences prestige or ascendancy which his office gives him, in committing the crime" [U.S. v. Rodriguez, 19 Phil. 150 (1911)]. Abuse of public office is considered present when the offender falsifies a document in connection with the duties of his office which consist of either making or preparing or otherwise intervening in the preparation of a document [U.S. v. Inosanto 20 Phil. 376 (1911); People v. Santiago Uy, 101 Phil. 159 (1957)], as in the case of petitioner who was charged with the duty of issuing the certification necessary for the appointment of Jesusa Carreon. Finally, the alleged denial of due process of law committed by the trial court when it proceeded with the trial of the case in the absence of the petitioner despite a pending petition for change of venue with the Supreme Court is totally unfounded. A careful

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and thorough review of the record reveals that petitioner had been afforded due process when the trial court, in view of the absence of petitioner, granted continuances to enable the defense to present its evidence although the prosecution had rested its case as early as December 7, 1978. [ See Original Records, p. 253, et seq. ] It is a basic postulate in law that what is repugnant to due process is not lack of previous notice but absolute lack of opportunity to be heard [Tajonera v. Lamaroza, G.R. Nos. L48097 & 49035, December 19, 1981, 110 SCRA 438]. Hence, this Court laid down this criterion to determine whether an accused in a criminal case has been properly accorded due process of law: . . . (I)f an accused has been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction and proceeded against under the orderly processes of law, and only punished after inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him, with an opportunity to be heard, and a judgment awarded within the authority of a constitutional law, then he has had due process of law. . . . [People v. Muit G.R. No. L-48875, October 21, 1982, 117 SCRA 696 citing People v. Castillo, 776 Phil. 73 (1946); Emphasis supplied.] Thus, there is no denial of due process when an accused is afforded the chance to present evidence on his behalf but due to his repeated, unjustifiable failure to appear at the hearings, the trial court ordered the case to be deemed submitted upon the evidence presented by the prosecution. For under such circumstances, he will be deemed to have waived his right to be present during the trial [Section 1 (c), Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Court] and his right to adduce evidence on his behalf [People v. Angco, 103 Phil. 33 (1958).] It is true that he filed a petition for change of venue with the Supreme Court. However, on the date set for the hearing of the petitioner's urgent motion to suspend the proceedings in the trial court due to the pendency of the petition for change of venue, he also failed to appear [ See Order dated January 18, 1985, Original Records, p. 428]. In fact, Atty. Romeo Calixto, one of the counsel for the petitioner, manifested before the trial court that he was - withdrawing as counsel for his client for the reason that he has lost contact with the latter who already went abroad [See Original Records, p. 435]. Hence, the trial court cannot be faulted for rendering its decision on the basis solely of the evidence presented by the prosecution. WHEREFORE, the appealed decision being in conformity with law and settled jurisprudence, the same is AFFIRMED and the instant petition is hereby DENIED. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. L-65006 October 31, 1990* REOLANDI DIAZ, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents. Paterno R. Canlas Law Offices for petitioner. PARAS, J.: In Criminal Case No. 934 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Fifth Judicial District, Branch VI, San Fernando,

Pampanga, petitioner Reolandi Diaz was charged with the crime of Falsification of Official Document committed as follows: That on or about the 5th day of December 1972, in the Municipality of San Fernando, Province of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Reolandi M. DIAZ, then a Senior Clerk at the Jose Abad Santos High School and, therefore, a public employee, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit falsification of official documents, to wit: by executing and filing in the office of the Civil Service Commission of said municipality a Personal Data Sheet, CS Form No. 212(65), an official document, stating and malting it appear therein that he was a fourth year Bachelor of Arts student in 1950-54 at the Cosmopolitan and Harvardian Colleges which document is a requirement for his reappointment as School Administrative Assistant I of the Jose Abad Santos High School and wherein the academic requirement to said Position is at least a fourth year college undergraduate, when in truth and in fact, the said accused well knew that the statement is false and he did not reach the fourth year in a Bachelor of Arts degree course, and consequently, by reason of said untruthful narration of facts, his appointment to the said position was approved by the Civil Service Commission. All contrary to law. (p. 44, Rollo ) After trial following a plea of not guilty upon arraignment, petitioner was found guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision is as follows: WHEREFORE and in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds the accused Reolandi M. Diaz guilty as charged of the crime of falsification of official document penalized under Article 171, paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal Code, and he is therefore sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional , as minimum, to six (6) years and (1) day of prision mayor , as maximum, and to pay a fine of ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Costs against the accused. (pp. 55-56, Rollo ) Petitioner appealed the aforesaid judgment of conviction to the Intermediate Appellate Court, said appeal being docketed thereat as CA-G.R. No. 24580- Cr. In its Decision promulgated on April 7,1983, the respondent court modified the trial court's decision by increasing the maximum of the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment in the event of non-payment of the fine due to insolvency, but affirmed the verdict of conviction in all other respects. The pertinent and dispositive portions of respondent court's decision read: The penalty for the offense of falsification of an official document committed under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code is (prision mayor) and a fine not to exceed P5,000.00. The correct penalty that should be imposed on the appellant applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is imprisonment of Two (2) Years, Four (4) Months and One (1) Day of (prison correctional) as minimum to Eight (8) Years and One (1) Day of (prision mayor) as maximum In cam of nonpayment of the fine of P1,000.00 due to insolvency, the appellant should be subject to subsidiary imprisonment. WHEREFORE, with the above modification as to the penalty and the imposition of subsidiary imprisonment in case of

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insolvency, the decision appealed from is affirmed in all other respects with costs against accused- appellant' (P. 68, Rollo ) Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied, hence, the present recourse. It is the contention of petitioner that he is entitled to an acquittal because 1. The findings of the lower court adopted by the respondent intermediate Appellate Court that he was not a fourth year A-B. College student is contrary to the evidence presented. 2. The respondent intermediate Appellate Court gravely commuted an error of law in convicting him as he did not have any legal obligation to state in CS Form 212 that he was a fourth year college student. 3. The Intermediate Appellate Court committed a grave abuse of discretion in finding that the transcript of records (Exhibit I) is spurious. Upon the following facts, found by both the trial court and respondent Intermediate Appellate Court, to have been sufficiently and satisfactorily established by the evidence on record, it appears that petitioner Reolandi Diaz was a senior clerk at the Jose Abad Santos High School in San Fernando, Pampanga. In 1972 he sought appointment as School Administrative Assistant I of the same school and as one of the requirements for appointment to said position, filled up the prescribed personal information sheet, Civil Service Form 212, and swore to the truth and veracity of the data and information therein furnished by him before the proper administering officer. As one of the required informations, he indicated in Exh "A" that his highest educational attainment was Fourth Year A.B. (Liberal Arts) allegedly pursued or obtained at the Cosmopolitan and Harvardian Colleges, respectively, during the years 1950 to 1954 inclusive. On the basis thereof, he was extended an appointment as School Administrative Assistant I (Exh. "B"). His personal information sheet (Exh. "A") together with his appointment paper (Exh. "B"), the certification as to the availability of funds for the position (Exh. "C") and the resolution of the Provincial Board of Pampanga creating the position (Exh. "D") were all forwarded to the Civil Service Commission for the approval of petitioner's appointment. But contrary to petitioner's claim that his highest educational attainment was Fourth Year A.B. which he allegedly took at the Cosmopolitan and Harvardian Colleges during the years 1950 to 1954, he was never enrolled at the Cosmopolitan Colleges which later became the Abad Santos Educational Institution and still later the Ortanez University-at any time during the period covering the years from 1950 to 1954, inclusive as certified to by the Registrar of Ortanez University, Mr. Atilano D. Solomon. Likewise, petitioner was never a student at the Harvardian Colleges in Tondo, during the first quarter of school year 19531954, inclusive, as certified to by the school's President, Mrs. Virginia King vda. de Yap. Neither did petitioner ever enroll as a collegiate student at the Harvardian Colleges in San Fernando, Pampanga after he finished his secondary course in the same school in June 1950, as certified to by its Executive Director, Atty. Arnulfo Garcia. Also, the name of petitioner was not included in all the enrollment lists of college students submitted to the then Bureau of Private Schools of the Department of Education by the Harvardian Colleges at San Fernando, Pampanga and at Tondo,

Manila, during the period during which petitioner claimed to have been enrolled. The same thing is true with the list submitted by the Cosmopolitan Colleges to the said bureau. The petitioner did not take the witness stand. He only presented in evidence an alleged transcript of record (Exh. 1) purporting to show that he took up collegiate courses at the Philippine Harvardian College in Tondo, Manila, beginning from the first quarter of the school year 1951-1952 up to the first quarter of school year 1953-1954 which transcript of record was allegedly signed by Mrs. Virginia King vda. de Yap, for and in behalf of the then President of the school, Ildefonso Yap. But Mrs. Virginia Yap, testifying for the prosecution disowned the said signature. Besides, at the bottom portion of the transcript is a printed notation reading this is only valid with the college seal and signature of Pres. Ildefonso D. Yap. Exhibit "I" lacks the imprint of the college seal and the signature of President Ildefonso Yap himself. No other corroborating piece of evidence was presented by petitioner. Contrary to petitioner's posture, there was ample, solid and conclusive evidence adduced by the prosecution to prove that he was not a fourth year A.B. undergraduate. It was clearly established that the statement made by the accused that he reached fourth year A.B. and that he studied for this course (Liberal Arts) at the Cosmopolitan Colleges and the Harvardian Colleges from the years 1950-1954, is devoid of truth. The records of these colleges do not at all reveal that petitioner was even enrolled at any time from 1950 to 1954 in its College of Liberal Arts. His name does not appear and could not be found in the enrollment lists submitted to the Bureau of Private Schools by these colleges. While the petitioner in his defense presented an alleged transcript (Exh. purporting to show that he took up collegiate course at the Philippine Harvardian College in Tondo, Manila, beginning from the first quarter of the school year 1951-1952 up to the first quarter of the school year 1953-1954, both the trial court and the respondent court correctly disregarded said transcript as having emanated from a spurious source. The transcript presented lacks the authenticating marks-the imprint of the college seal and the signature of the President of the college. As correctly observed by the trial court It is also quite significant to note in this score that the accused in his defense failed to present any corroborating piece of evidence which will show that he was indeed enrolled in the Philippine Harvardian Colleges from the first quarter of the school year 1953- 1954. If he had enrolled as a student during this period of time and he was positive that the transcript of records issued to him and in his possession is genuine and valid, it could have been easy for him to introduce corroborating evidence, i.e., the testimony of any of his classmates or teachers in the different subjects that he took to support his claim that he studied and passed these collegiate courses at the said school. But this he failed to do despite all the opportunities open to him and in the face of damning evidence all showing that he had not really enrolled in this school or in the other school mentioned by him the personal information sheet that he filed up as requirement for his appointment. (p. 53, Rollo ) Following the doctrine laid down, however, in the case of People v. Rufo B. Cruz, No. L-15132, May 25,1960,108 Phil. 255 and the earlier case of United States v. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil. 119, the crime committed under the foregoing facts, is perjury. This offense, as defined in Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code is the willful and corrupt assertion of a falsehood under oath or

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affirmation administered by authority of law on a material matter. The said article provides Art. 183. False testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn affirmation. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any person who, knowingly making untruthful statements and not being included in the provisions of the next preceding articles, shall testify under oath or make an affidavit upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires. Any person who, in case of a solemn affirmation made in lieu of an oath, shall commit any of the falsehoods mentioned in this and the three preceding articles of this section shall suffer respective penalties provided therein. In that case of People v. Cruz , supra, the accused Rufo B. Cruz failed up an application form (Civil Service Form No. 2) for the patrolman examination. He stated therein that he had never been accused, indicted or tried for violation of any law, ordinance or regulation before any court, when in truth and in fact, as the accused well knew, he had been prosecuted and tried before the Justice of the Peace of Cainta, Rizal, for different crimes. The application was signed and sworn to by him before the municipal mayor of Cainta, Rizal. This Court in that case held: This article is similar to Section 3 of Act No. 1697 of the Philippine Commission, which was formerly the law punishing perjury. Under said section 3 of that Act, this Court, in the case of United States v. Tupasi Molina (29 Phil. 119), held that a person, who stated under oath in his application to take police examination that he had never been convicted of any crime, when as a matter of fact he has previous convictions, committed perjury. The facts in that case are almost exactly analogous to those in the present, and we find no reason, either in law or in the arguments of the Solicitor General to modify or reverse the conclusion of this Court therein. More so, because all the elements of the offense of perjury defined in Art. 183 of the Revised Penal Code concur in the present case. The elements of the crime of perjury are (a) That the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material matter. (b) That the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to receive and administer oath. (c) That in that statement or affidavit, the accused made a and deliberate assertion of a falsehood. (d) That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal purpose. All the foregoing elements are present in the case at bar. Perjury under Art. 183 of the Revised Penal Code carries a lesser penalty. The penalty for this crime is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period. Since there is no mitigating and aggravating circumstance the penalty should be imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty should be from four (4) months of arresto mayor as minimum to one (1) year and one (1) day of prision correccional as maximum.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from is modified as follows: (a) The accused Reolandi Diaz is found guilty of the crime of perjury defined and penalized under Art. 183 of the Revised Penal Code; and (b) The accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of from four (4) months of arrests mayor as minimum to one (1) year and one (1) day of prision correccional as maximum. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. L-28232 February 6, 1971 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. JAIME JOSE Y GOMEZ, ET AL., defendants. JAIME JOSE Y GOMEZ, BASILIO PINEDA, JR., alias "BOY," EDGARDO AQUINO Y PAYUMO and ROGELIO CAAL Y SEVILLA, defendants-appellants. Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo and Solicitor Augusto M. Amores for plaintiff-appellee. Baizas, Alberto and Associates, Andreciano F. Caballero and Lota, Paraiso, Garcia and Dueas for defendant-appellant Jaime G. Jose. Mabanag, Eliger and Associates for defendant-appellant Basilio Pineda, Jr. Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo and Feliciano for defendant-appellant Edgardo P. Aquino. Antonio Coronel Law Office and Roberto J. Ignacio for defendant-appellant Rogelio S. Canial. PER CURIAM: The amended complaint filed in this case in the court below, reads as follows: The undersigned complainant accuses JAIME JOSE Y GOMEZ, BASILIO PINEDA, JR. Alias "BOY," EDUARDO AQUINO Y PAYUMO alias "EDDIE" and ROGELIO CAAL Y SEVILLA alias "ROGER," as principals, WONG LAY PUENG, SILVERIO GUANZON Y ROMERO and JESSIE GUION Y ENVOLTARIO as accomplices, of the crime of Forcible Abduction with rape, committed as follows: That on or about the 26th day of June, 1967, in Quezon City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed principal accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd design, forcibly abduct the undersigned complainant against her will, and did, then and there take her, pursuant to their common criminal design, to the Swanky Hotel in Pasay City, where each of the four (4) accused, by means of force and intimidation, and with the use of a deadly weapon, have carnal knowledge of the undersigned complainant against her will, to her damage and prejudice in such amount as may be awarded to her under the provisions of the civil code. That WONG LAY PUENG, SILVERIO GUANZON y ROMERO, and JESSIE GUION y ENVOLTARIO without taking a direct part in the execution of the offense either by forcing, inducing the principal accused to execute, or cooperating in its execution by an indispensable act, did, then and there cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts, that is, by cooperating, aiding, abetting and permitting the principal accused in sequestering the undersigned complainant in one of the rooms of the Swanky Hotel then under the control of the accused Wong Lay Pueng, Silverio

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Guanzon y Romero and Jessie Guion y Envoltario, thus supplying material and moral aid in the consummation of the offense. That the aforestated offense has been attended by the following aggravating circumstances: 1. Use of a motor vehicle. 2. Night time sought purposely to facilitate the commission of the crime and to make its discovery difficult; 3. Abuse of superior strength; 4. That means were employed or circumstances brought about which added ignominy to the natural effects of the act; and 5. That the wrong done in the commission of the crime be deliberately augmented by causing other wrong not necessary for the commission. CONTRARY TO LAW. Upon arraignment, Basilio Pineda, Jr. pleaded guilty to the charge imputed in the above-quoted amended complaint; however, in an order dated July 11, 1967, the court reserved judgment "until such time as the prosecution shall have concluded presenting all of its evidence to prove the aggravating circumstances listed in the complaint." Upon the other hand, the rest of the defendants went to trial on their respective pleas of not guilty. After the merits, the court below rendered its decision on October 2, 1967, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Jaime Jose, Rogelio Caal, Eduardo Aquino and Basilio Pineda, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of forcible abduction with rape as described under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and hereby sentences each of them to the death penalty to be executed at a date to be set and in the manner provided for by law; and each to indemnify the complainant in the amount of ten thousand pesos. On the ground that the prosecution has failed to establish a prima facie case against the accomplices Wong Lay Pueng, Silverio Guanzon y Romero, and Jessie Guion y Envoltario, the Motion to Dismiss filed for and in their behalf is hereby granted, and the case dismissed against the aforementioned accused. Insofar as the car used in the abduction of the victim which Jaime Jose identified by pointing to it from the window of the courtroom and pictures of which were submitted and marked as Exhibits "M" and "M-1," and which Jaime Jose in his testimony admitted belonged to him, pursuant to Art. 45 of the Revised Penal Code, which requires the confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the crime, the Court hereby orders its confiscation. This case is now before us by virtue of the appeal interposed by Basilio Pineda, Jr., Edgardo Aquino, and Jaime Jose, and for automatic review as regards Rogelio Caal. However, for practical purposes all of them shall hereafter be referred to as appellants. The complainant, Magdalena "Maggie" de la Riva, was, at the time of the incident, 25 years old and single; she graduated from high school in 1958 at Maryknoll College and finished the secretarial course in 1960 at St. Theresa's College. Movie actress by profession, she was receiving P8,000.00 per picture. It was part of her work to perform in radio broadcasts and television shows, where she was paid P800.00 per month in permanent

shows, P300.00 per month in live promotional shows, and from P100.00 to P200.00 per appearance as guest in other shows. So it was that at about 4:30 o'clock in the morning of June 26, 1967, Miss De la Riva, homeward bound from the ABS Studio on Roxas Blvd., Pasay City, was driving her bantam car accompanied by her maid Helen Calderon, who was also at the front seat. Her house was at No. 48, 12th Street, New Manila, Quezon City. She was already near her destination when a Pontiac two-door convertible car with four men aboard (later identified as the four appellants) came abreast of her car and tried to bump it. She stepped on her brakes to avoid a collision, and then pressed on the gas and swerved her car to the left, at which moment she was already in front of her house gate; but because the driver of the other car (Basilio Pineda, Jr.) also accelerated his speed, the two cars almost collided for the second time. This prompted Miss De la Riva, who was justifiably annoyed, to ask: "Ano ba?" Forthwith, Pineda stopped the car which he was driving, jumped out of it and rushed towards her. The girl became so frightened at this turn of events that she tooted the horn of her car continuously. Undaunted, Pineda opened the door of Miss De la Riva's car and grabbed the lady's left arm. The girl held on tenaciously to her car's steering wheel and, together with her maid, started to scream. Her strength, however, proved no match to that of Pineda, who succeeded in pulling her out of her car. Seeing her mistress' predicament, the maid jumped out of the car and took hold of Miss De la Riva's right arm in an effort to free her from Pineda's grip. The latter, however, was able to drag Miss De la Riva toward the Pontiac convertible car, whose motor was all the while running. When Miss De la Riva, who was being pulled by Pineda, was very near the Pontiac car, the three men inside started to assist their friend: one of them held her by the neck, while the two others held her arms and legs. All three were now pulling Miss De la Riva inside the car. Before she was completely in, appellant Pineda jumped unto the driver's seat and sped away in the direction of Broadway Street. The maid was left behind. The complainant was made to sit between Jaime Jose and Edgardo Aquino at the back seat; Basilio Pineda, Jr. was at the wheel, while Rogelio Caal was seated beside him. Miss De la Riva entreated the appellants to release her; but all she got in response were jeers, abusive and impolite language that the appellants and threats that the appellants would finish her with their Thompson and throw acid at her face if she did not keep quiet. In the meantime, the two men seated on each side of Miss De la Riva started to get busy with her body: Jose put one arm around the complainant and forced his lips upon hers, while Aquino placed his arms on her thighs and lifted her skirt. The girl tried to resist them. She continuously implored her captors to release her, telling them that she was the only breadwinner in the family and that her mother was alone at home and needed her company because her father was already dead. Upon learning of the demise of Miss De la Riva's father, Aquino remarked that the situation was much better than he thought since no one could take revenge against them. By now Miss De la Riva was beginning to realize the futility of her pleas. She made the sign of the cross and started to pray. The appellants became angry and cursed her. Every now and then Aquino would stand up and talk in whispers with Pineda, after which the two would exchange knowing glances with Caal and Jose. The car reached a dead-end street. Pineda turned the car around and headed towards Victoria Street. Then the car proceeded to Araneta Avenue, Sta. Mesa Street, Shaw Boulevard, thence to Epifanio de los Santos Avenue. When the car reached Makati, Aquino took a handkerchief from his pocket and, with the help of Jose, blindfolded Miss De la Riva. The latter was told not to shout or else she would be stabbed or shot with a Thompson.

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Not long after, the car came to a stop at the Swanky Hotel in Pasay City The blindfolded lady was led out of the car to one of the rooms on the second floor of the hotel. Inside the room Miss De la Riva was made to sit on a bed. Her blindfold was removed. She saw Pineda and Aquino standing in front of her, and Jose and Caal sitting beside her, all of them smiling meaningfully. Pineda told the complainant: "Magburlesque ka para sa amin." The other three expressed their approval and ordered Miss De la Riva to disrobe. The complainant ignored the command. One of the appellants suggested putting off the light so that the complainant would not be ashamed. The idea, however, was rejected by the others, who said that it would be more pleasurable for them if the light was on. Miss De la Riva was told to remove her stocking in order, according to them, to make the proceedings more exciting. Reluctantly, she did as directed, but so slowly did she proceed with the assigned task that the appellants cursed her and threatened her again with the Thompson and the acid. They started pushing Miss De la Riva around. One of them pulled down the zipper of her dress; another unhooked her brassiere. She held on tightly to her dress to prevent it from being pulled down, but her efforts were in vain: her dress, together with her brassiere, fell on the floor. The complainant was now completely naked before the four men, who were kneeling in front of her and feasting their eyes on her private parts. This ordeal lasted for about ten minutes, during which the complainant, in all her nakedness, was asked twice or thrice to turn around. Then Pineda picked up her clothes and left the room with his other companions. The complainant tried to look for a blanket with which to cover herself, but she could not find one. Very soon, Jose reentered the room and began undressing himself. Miss De la Riva, who was sitting on the bed trying to cover her bareness with her hands, implored him to ask his friends to release her. Instead of answering her, he pushed her backward and pinned her down on the bed. Miss De la Riva and Jose struggled against each other; and because the complainant was putting up stiff resistance, Jose cursed her and hit her several times on the stomach and other parts of the body. The complainant crossed her legs tightly, but her attacker was able to force them open. Jose succeeded in having carnal knowledge of the complainant. He then left the room. The other three took their turns. Aquino entered the room next. A struggle ensued between him and Miss De la Riva during which he hit, her on different parts of the body. Like Jose, Aquino succeeded in abusing the complainant. The girl was now in a state of shock. Aquino called the others into the room. They poured water on her face and slapped her to revive her. Afterwards, three of the accused left the room, leaving Pineda and the complainant After some struggle during which Pineda hit her, the former succeeded in forcing his carnal desire on the latter. When the complainant went into a state of shock for the second time, the three other men went into the room again poured water on the complainant's face and slapped her several times. The complainant heard them say that they had to revive her so she would know what was happening. Jose, Aquino and Pineda then left the room. It was now appellant Canal's turn. There was a struggle between him and Miss De la Riva. Like the other three appellants before him, he hit the complainant on different parts of the body and succeeded in forcing his carnal lust on her. Mention must be made of the fact that while each of mention must be made the four appellants was struggling with the complainant, the other three were outside the room, just behind the door, threatening the complainant with acid and telling her

to give in because she could not, after all, escape what with their presence. After the appellants had been through with the sexual carnage, they gave Miss De la Riva her clothes, told her to get dressed and put on her stockings, and to wash her face and comb her hair, to give the impression that nothing had happened to her. They told her to tell her mother that she was mistaken by a group of men for a hostess, and that when the group found out that she was a movie actress, she was released without being harmed. She was warned not to inform the police; for if she did and they were apprehended, they would simply post bail and later hunt her up and disfigure her face with acid. The appellants then blindfolded Miss De la Riva again and led her down from the hotel room. Because she was stumbling, she had to be carried into the car. Inside the car, a appellant Jose held her head down on his lap, and kept it in that position during the trip, to prevent her from being seen by others. Meanwhile, the four appellants were discussing the question of where to drop Miss De la Riva. They finally decided on a spot in front of the Free Press Building not far from Epifanio de los Santos Avenue near Channel 5 to make it appear, according to them, that the complainant had just come from the studio. Pineda asked Jose to alight and call a taxicab, but to choose one which did not come from a well-known company. Jose did as requested, letting several taxicabs pass by before flagging a UBL taxicab. After they warned again Miss De la Riva not to inform anyone of what had happened to her, appellant Canal accompanied her to the taxicab. The time was a little past 6:00 o'clock. When Miss De la Riva was already inside the cab and alone with the driver, Miguel F. Campos, she broke down and cried. She kept asking the driver if a car was following them; and each time the driver answered her in the negative. It was 6:30 o'clock or some two hours after the abduction when Miss De la Riva reached home. Her mother, her brotherin-law Ben Suba, as well as several PC officers, policemen and reporters, were at the house. Upon seeing her mother, the complainant ran toward her and said, "Mommy, Mommy, I have been raped. All four of them raped me." The mother brought her daughter upstairs. Upon her mother's instruction, the complainant immediately took a bath and a douche. The older woman also instructed her daughter to douche himself two or three times daily with a strong solution to prevent infection and pregnancy. The family doctor, who was afterwards summoned, treated the complainant for external physical injuries. The doctor was not, however, told about the sexual assaults. Neither was Pat. Pablo Pascual, the police officer who had been sent by the desk officer, Sgt. Dimla, to the De la Riva residence when the latter received from a mobile patrol a report of the snatching. When Miss De la Riva arrived home from her harrowing experience, Pat. Pascual attempted to question her, but Ben Suba requested him to postpone the interrogation until she could be ready for it. At that time, mother and daughter were still undecided on what to do. On the afternoon of June 28, 1967, the complainant family gathered to discuss what steps, if any, should be taken. After some agonizing moments, a decision was reached: the authorities had to be informed. Thus, early on the morning of June 29, 1967, or on the fourth day after the incident, Miss De la Riva, accompanied by her lawyer, Atty. Regina O. Benitez, and by some members of the family, went to the Quezon City Police Department Headquarters, filed a complaint and executed a statement (Exh. "B") wherein she narrated the incident and gave descriptions of the four men who abused her. In the afternoon of the same day, the complainant submitted herself ito a medicointernal examination by Dr. Ernesto Brion, NBI Chief MedicoLegal Officer.

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During the physical examination of the complainant by Dr. Brion on June 29, 1967, Pat. Pascual was also at the NBI office. There he received a telephone call from the police headquarters to the effect that one of the suspects had been apprehended. That evening, the complainant and Pat. Pascual proceeded to the headquarters where Miss De la Riva identified appellant Jaime Jose from among a group of persons inside the Office of the Chief of Police of Quezon City as one of the four men he abducted and raped her. She executed another statement (Exh. "B-1") wherein she made a formal identification of Jose and related the role played by him. At about 9:00 o'clock of the same evening, appellant Jose executed a statement (Exh. "I") before Pat. Marcos G. Vias. In his statement, which was duly sworn. Jose admitted that he knew about, and was involved in, the June 26 incident. He named the other line appellants as his companions. Jose stated, among other things, that upon the initiative of Pineda, he and the other three waited for Miss De la Riva to come out of the ABS Studio; that his group gave chase to the complainant's car; that it was Pineda who blindfolded her and that only Pineda and Aquino criminally assaulted the complainant. After Exh, "I" was executed by Jose, an informant furnished Pat. Vinas with a picture of appellant Edgardo Aquino. The picture was shown to Miss De la Riva, who declared in her sworn statement (Exh. "B-3") that the man in the picture was one of her abductors and rapists. The same picture was shown to Jose, who, in another sworn statement (Exh. "I-l"), identified the man in the picture as appellant Aquino. After the apprehension of Jose, the other three soon fell into the hands of the authorities: Pineda and Caal on July 1, 1967, in Lipa City, and Aquino on July 5, 1967, in the province of Batangas. On the evening of July 1, 1967. Miss De la Riva pointed to Pineda and Caal as among the four persons who abducted and raped her. She picked them out from among several person in the Office of the Chief of Police of Quezon City. Later in the same evening, Miss De la Riva executed a sworn statement (Exh. B-2)wherein she made the same identification of the two appellants from among a group of persons in the Office of the Chief of the Detective Bureau, adding that appellant Caal had tattoo marks on his right hip. After the identification, one of the policemen took appellant Caal downstairs and undressed him, and he saw, imprinted on the said appellant's right hip, the words "Bahala na Gang." Appellant Caal and Pineda executed and swore to separate statements on the day of their arrest. In his statement (Exh. "G"), appellant Caal confirmed the information previously given by Jose that the four of them waited for Miss De la Riva to come down from the ABS Studio, and that they had planned to abduct and rape her. Appellant Caal admitted that all four of them participated in the commission of the crime, but he would make it appear that insofar as he was concerned the complainant yielded her body to him on condition that he would release her. Pineda executed a statement (Exh. "J") stating that he and his other three companions wept to the ABS Studio, and that, on learning that Miss De la Riva was there, they made plans to wait for her and to follow her. He admitted that his group followed her car and snatched her and took her to the Swanky Hotel. He would make it appear, however, that the complainant voluntarily acceded to having sexual intercourse with him. In his medical report (Exh. "K"), Dr. Brion noted the presence of multiple contusions and bruises on different parts of the complainant's body, as well as of genital injuries. On the witness stand the doctor was shown several photographs of the complainant taken in his presence and under his supervision. With the aid of the photographs and the medical reports, the doctor explained to the court that he found contusions or

bruises on the complainant's chest, shoulders, arms and forearms, right arm index finger, thighs, right knee and legs. He also declared that when he was examining her, Miss De la Riva complained of slight tenderness around the neck, on the abdominal wall and at the sites of the extragenital physical injuries, and that on pressing the said injuries, he elicited a sigh of pain or tenderness on the part of the subject. The injuries, according to Dr. Brion, could have been caused blows administered by a closed fist or by the palm of the hand, and could have been inflicted on the subject while she was being raped. It was the doctor's opinion that they could have been sustained on or about June 26, 1967. In connection with the genital examination, the doctor declared that he found injuries on the subject's genitalia which could have been produced by sexual intercourse committed on June 26, 1967. He said that he failed to find spermatozoa. He explained, however, that spermatozoa are not usually found in the vagina after the lapse of three days from the last intercourse, not to mention the possibility that the subject might have douched herself. The three appellants who pleaded not guilty (Jose, Aquino and Caal) took the witness stand. We quote hereunder the portions of the decision under review relative to the theory of the defense: Their story is that they and their co-accused Pineda had gone to the Ulog Cocktail Lounge somewhere in Mabini street in Manila, and there killed time from 9:30 in the evening of June 25 until closing time, which was about 3:30 in the early morning of the next day. At the cocktail lounge they had listened to the music while enjoying some drinks. Between them they had consumed a whole bottle of whisky, so much so that at least Aquino became drunk, according to his own testimony. They had been joined at their table by a certain Frankie whom they met only that night. Come time to go home, their new acquaintance asked to be dropped at his home in Cubao. The five men piled into the redbodied, black topped two-door convertible Plymouth (Pontiac) car of Jaime Jose, and with Pineda at the wheel repaired to Cubao After dislodging their new friend, Pineda steered the car to Espaa Extension to bring Aquino to his home in Mayon Street. But somewhere in Espaa Extension before the Rotonda a small car whizzed to them almost hitting them. They saw that the driver was a woman. Pineda gave chase and coming abreast of the small car he shouted, "Putang ina mo, kamuntik na kaming mamatay." The woman continued on her way. Now Pineda saying "let us teach her a lesson," sped after her and when she swerved ostensibly to enter a gate, Pineda stopped his car behind being hurriedly got down, striding to the small car, opened the door and started dragging the girl out. Both Jose and Aquino confirm the presence of another woman inside the girl's car, who helped the girl struggle to get free from Pineda's grip; and that the struggle lasted about ten minutes before Pineda finally succeeded in pushing the girl into the red convertible. All the three accused insist they did nothing to aid Pineda: but they also admit that they did nothing to stop him. Now the defense contends that Pineda cruised around and around the area just to scare the girl who was in truth so scared that she begged them to let her be and return her to her home. She turned to Jose in appeal, but this one told her he could net do anything as the "boss" was Pineda. Aquino heard her plead with Jose "do you not have a sister yourself?" but did not bear the other plea 'do you not have a mother?' Then Pineda stopped at the corner of the street where he had forcibly snatched the girl presumably to return her, but then suddenly changing his mind he said, 'why don't you do a strip tease for us. I'll pay you P1,000.00 and the girl taunted, 'are you kidding?': that after a little while she consented to do the performance as long as it would not last too long and provided the spectators were limited to the four of them.

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Pineda sped the car until they got to Swanky Hotel where he and Maggie alighted first, but not before Maggie had borrowed a handkerchief from one of them to cover her face as she went up the Hotel. The three followed, and when they saw the pair enter a room, they quickly caught up. All the three accused testify that as soon as they got into the room, Maggie de la Riva asked the boys to close the windows before she. undressed in front of them. They themselves also removed their clothing. Two of them removed their pants retaining their briefs, while Boy Pineda and Caal stripped to the skin "because it was hot." The three accused declared that they saw Boy Pineda hand P100.00 to Maggie and they heard him promise her that he would pay the balance of P900.00 later. Whereupon, the show which lasted about 10 minutes began with the naked girl walking back and forth the room about 4 to 5 times. This accomplished, all of them dressed up once more and the three accused (Jaime Jose, Eduardo Aquino and Rogelio Caal) left the room to wait in the car for Boy Pineda and Maggie de la Riva who were apparently still discussing the mode of payment of the balance. Three minutes later Maggie de la Riva and Boy Pineda joined them. Now, the question of how and where to drop Maggie came up and it is testified to by the accused that it was Maggie's idea that they should drop her near the ABS Studio so that it would appear as if she had just come from her work. Jaime Jose was picked by the police on the morning of June 29 along Buendia Avenue. Aquino testifies how, on June 29 Pineda went to him with a problem. He did not have the P900.00 with which to pay Maggie the balance of her "show" and he was afraid that if he did not pay, Maggie would have her goons after him. He wanted Aquino to go with him to Lipa City where he had relatives and where he could help raise the money. Aquino readily obliged, and to make the company complete they invited Caal to join them. They used another car of Jaime Jose, different from the one they had used the day before. At Lipa, Aquino detached himself from his compassions and proceeded alone to the barrio allegedly to visit his relatives. In the meantime his two companions had remained in the City and had, according to Canal, gone to live in a house very close to the municipal hall building. They later moved to another house where the PC and Quezon City police posse found and arrested them. Aquino was the last to be apprehended, when having read in the newspapers that he was wanted, he surrendered on July 5 to Mrs. Aurelia Leviste, wife of the governor of Batangas. The striptease-act-for-a-fee story on which the defense theory is anchored, defies one's credulity and reason, and had utterly to counteract the evidence for the prosecution, particularly the complainant's testimony and Dr. Brion's medical report and testimony. We quote with approval the able dissertion of the trial judge on this point: As main defense in the charge of rape, the three accused advance the proposition that nothing happened in Swanky Hotel except a strip-tease exhibition which the complaint agreed to do for them for fee of P1,000.00, P100.00 down and the balance to be paid "later." The flaw in this connection lies in its utter inverisimilitude. The Court cannot believe that any woman exists, even one habitual engaged in this kind of entertainment (which Maggie de la Riva has not been proven to be) who would consent (and as easily and promptly as defense claims) to do a performance, not even for all money in the worlds after the rough handling she experienced from these wolves in men's clothing who now hungered for a show. There is no fury to match a woman stirred to indignation. A woman's pride is far stronger than her yen for money, and her revenge much more keen. The Court cannot believe that after the rudeness and meanness of these men to her, Maggie would in so short an interval of time forget her indignation and so readily consent to satisfy their immoral curiosity about her. The woman in her would urge her to turn the men's hankering as a weapon of revenge by denying them their pleasure.

Besides, the manner of payment offered for the performance is again something beyond even the wildest expectations. Assuming that the woman whom the accused had abducted was in this kind of trade assuming that the price offered was to her satisfaction, whom woman would be willing to perform first and be paid later? It is simply preposterous to believe that Maggie de la Riva should have consent to do a striptease act for a measly down-payment of P100.00 and the balance to be paid God knows when. Since when are exposition of the flesh paid on the installment basis? By the very precautious nature of their pitiful calling, women who sell their attractions are usually very shrewed and it is to be expected that they could demand full payment before curtain call. How was Maggie to collect later when she did not even know who these man were, where they lived, whether they could be trusted with a promise to pay later (!) whether she could ever find them again? If there is anything that had struck the Court about the complaint, it is her courage, her intelligence and her alertness. Only a stupid woman, and a most stupid one that, could have been persuaded to do what the defense want this Court to believe Maggie de la Riva consented to do. Finally, it is odd that not one of these men should have mentioned this circumstances during their interview with anyone, either the press, their police interrogator, the person who negotiated their surrender (as in the case of Aquino) or even their counsel. One cannot escape the very strong suspicion that this story is a last ditch, desperate attempt to save the day for the accused. It truly underscores the hopelessness of their stand and projects all the more clearly their guilt. Then there is the incident of the men's stripping themselves. Why was there need for this? The Court realizes that in its desperate need of an explanation for Maggie's positive identification of Caal as the man with the tattoo mark on his right buttock, the defense concocted the sickeningly incident story that the four men removed their underclothing in the presence of a woman simply "because it was hot." What kind of men were these who were so devoid of any sense of decency that they thought nothing of adding insult to injury by not only inducing a woman a strip before them, but for forcing her to perform before a naked audience? And then they have gall to argue that "nothing" happened. For males of cold and phlegmatic blood and disposition it could be credible, but not for men of torrid regions like ours where quick passions and hot tempers are the rule rather than the exception! All of these consideration set aside, notwithstanding, it is quite obvious that the version of the defense has not been able to explain away a very vital piece of evidence of prosecution which, if unexplained, cannot but reduce any defense unavailing. The result of the physical (external and internal) examination conducted on the person of Maggie de la Riva in the afternoon of June 29, the pertinent findings of which quoted earlier in this decision, establish beyond doubt that at the time that Maggie de la Riva was examined she bore on her body traces of physical and sexual assault. The only attempt to an explanation made by the defense is either one of the following: (1) the insinuation that when Maggie de la Riva and Boy Pineda were left behind in the hotel room the bruises and the sexual attack could have taken place then. But then, the defense itself says that these two persons rejoined the three after three or four minutes! It is physically impossible, in such a short time, for Boy Pineda to have attacked the girl and inflicted on her all of these injuries; (2) it was suggested by the defense that Maggie de la Riva could have inflicted all of those injuries upon herself just to make out a case against the accused. The examining physician rules out this preposterous proposition, verily it does not take much stretch of the imagination to see how utterly impossible this would be, and for what purpose?

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Was P900.00 which she had failed to collect worth that much self-torture? And what about all the shame, embarrassment and publicity she would (as she eventually did) expose herself to? If she really had not been raped would she have gone thru all of these tribulation? A woman does not easily trump up rape charges for she has much more to lose in the notoriety the case will reap her, her honor and that of her family, than in the redress she demands (Canastre 82-480; Medina, C.A. 1943 O.G. 151; Medina y Puno, CA O.G. 338; CA 55 O.G. 7666; Galamito, L-6302, August 25, 1954); (3) it could also be argued that the contusions and bruises could have been inflicted on Maggie during her struggle with Pineda when the latter pulled and pushed her into the red convertible car. The telltale injuries, however, discount this possibility, for the location in which many of the bruises and traumas were located (particularly on the inner portion of her thighs) could not have been cause by any struggle save by those of a woman trying to resists the brutal and bestial attack on her honor. In their Memorandum the accused contend that Maggie's sole and uncorroborated testimony should not be rated any credence at all as against the concerted declaration of the the accused. In the first place, it is not correct to say that Maggie's declaration was uncorroborated she has for corroboration nothing less than the written extra-judicial statements of Jose and Canal. But even assuming that Maggie stood alone in her statements, the cases cited by the accused in their Memorandum notwithstanding which the Court does not consider in point anyway, jurisprudence has confirmed the ruling that numbers is the least vital element in gauging the weight of evidence. What is more important is which of the declarations is the more credible, the more logical, the more reasonable, the more prone to be biased or polluted. (Ricarte 44 OG 2234; Damian CA-GR No. 25523, April 24, 1959). Besides, it should be borne in maid that in the most detestable crime of rape in which a man is at his worst the testimony of the offended party most often is the only one available to prove directly its commission and that corroboration by other eyewitnesses would in certain cases place a serious doubt as to the probability of its commission, so trial courts of justice are most often placed in a position of having to accept such uncorroborated testimony if the same is in regards conclusive, logical and probable (Landicho, VIII ACR 530). We shall now consider the points raised by the appellants in their briefs. 1. Appellants Jose, Aquino and Caal deny having had anything to do with the abduction of Miss De la Riva. They point to Pineda (who entered a plea of guilty) as the sole author thereof, but they generously contend that even as to him the act was purged at any taint of criminality by the complainant's subsequent consent to perform a striptease show for a fee, a circumstance which, it is claimed, negated the existence of the element of lewd design. This line of defense has evidently leg no to stand on. The evidence is clear and overwhelming that all the appellants participated in the forcible abduction. Miss De la Riva declared on the witness stand, as well as in her sworn statements, that they helped one another in dragging her into the car against her will; that she did not know them personally; that while inside the car, Jose and Aquino, between whom she was seated, toyed with her body, the former forcing his lips on hers, and the latter touching her thighs and raising her skirt; that meaningful and knowing glances were in the meanwhile being exchanged among the four; and that all of them later took turns in ravishing her at the Swanky Hotel. This testimony, whose evidentiary weight has not in the least been overthrown by the defense, more than suffices to establish the crimes charged in the amended complaint. In the light thereof, appellants' protestation that they

were not motivated by lewd designs must be rejected as absolutely without factual basis. 2. The commission of rape by each of the appellants has, as held by the court below, likewise been clearly established. Jose, Aquino and Canal contend that the absence of semen in the complainant's vagina disproves the fact of rape. The contention is untenable. Dr. Brion of the NBI, who testified as an expert, declared that semen is not usually found in the vagina after three days from the last intercourse, especially if the subject has douched herself within that period. In the present case, the examination was conducted on the fourth day after the incident, and the complainant had douched herself to avoid infection and pregnancy. Furthermore, the absence of spermatozoa does not disprove the consummation of rape, the important consideration being, not the emission of semen, but penetration (People vs Hernandez, 49 Phil., 980). Aquino's suggestion that the abrasions on the cervix were caused by the tough tip of a noozle deliberately used by the complainant to strengthen her alleged fabricated tale of rape, is absurd, if not cruel. It is difficult to imagine that any sane woman, who is single and earning as much Miss Dela Riva did, would inflict injuries on her genital organ by puncturing the same with a sharply-pointed instrument in order to strike back at four strangers who allegedly would not pay her the sum of P900.00 due her for a striptease act. Besides, Dr. Brion testified that the insertion of such an instrument in the genital organ would not result in the kind of injuries he found in the mucosa of the cervix. 3. Other evidence and considerations exist which indubitably establish the commission of successive rapes by the four appellants. Upon Miss De la Riva's arrival at her house in the morning of June 26, 1967, she immediately told her mother, " Mommy Mommy, I have been raped. All four of them raped me." This utterance, which is part of the res gestae , commands strong probative value, considering that it was made by the complainant to her mother who, in cases of this nature was the most logical person in whom a daughter would confide the truth. Aquino and Canal would make capital of the fact that Miss De la Riva stated to the reporters on the morning of June 26, that she was not abused. Her statement to the press is understandable. At that time the complainant, who had not yet consulted her family on a matter which concerned her reputation as well as that of her family, and her career, was not then in a position to reveal publicly what had happened to her. This is one reason why the complainant did not immediately inform the authorities of the tragedy that befell her. Another reason is that she was threatened with disfiguration. And there were, of course, the traumas found by Dr. Brion on different parts of the complainant's body. Could they, too, have been self-inflicted? Or, as suggested, could they possibly have been inflicted by appellant Pineda alone, when the story given by the other three is that Pineda and the complainant were left in the hotel room for only three or four minutes, and that they came out to join them in what they would picture to be a cordial atmosphere, the complainant even allegedly suggesting that she be dropped on a spot where people would reasonably presume her to have come from a studio? Equally important is the complainant's public disclosure of her tragedy, which led to the examination of her private parts and lay her open to risks of future public ridicule and diminution of popularity and earnings as a movie actress. 4. Jose and Canal seek the exclusion of their extrajudicial statements from the mass of evidence on the grounds that they were secured from them by force and intimidation, and that the incriminating details therein were supplied by the police investigators. We are not convinced that the statements were involuntarily given, or that the details recited therein were concocted by the authorities. The statements were given in the presence of several people and subscribed and sworn to before the City Fiscal of Quezon City, to whom neither of the aforesaid appellants intimated the use of inordinate methods by the police.

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They are replete with details which could hardly be known to the police; and although it is suggested that the authorities could have secured such details from their various informers, no evidence at all was presented to establish the truth of such allegation. While in their statements Jose and Canal admitted having waited together with the two other appellants for Miss De la Riva at the ABS Studio, each of them attempted in the same statements to exculpate himself: appellant Jose stated that only Pineda and Aquino criminally abused the complainant; while appellant Canal would make it appear that the complainant willingly allowed him to have sexual intercourse with her. Had the statements been prepared by the authorities, they would hardly have contained matters which were apparently designed to exculpate the affiants. It is significant, too, that the said two appellants did not see it fit to inform any of their friends or relatives of the alleged use of force and intimidation by the police. Dr. Mariano Nario of the Quezon City Police Department, who examined appellant Canal after the latter made his statement, found no trace of injury on any part of the said appellant's body in spite of the claims that he was boxed on the stomach and that one of his arms was burned with a cigarette lighter. In the circumstances, and considering, further, that the police officers who took down their statements categorically denied on the witness stand that the two appellants were tortured, or that any detail in the statements was supplied by them or by anyone other than the affiants themselves, We see no reason to depart from the trial court's well-considered conclusion that the statements were voluntarily given. However, even disregarding the in-custody statements of Jose and Canal, We find that the mass of evidence for the prosecution on record will suffice to secure the conviction of the two. The admissibility of his extrajudicial statements is likewise being questioned by Jose on the other ground that he was not assisted by counsel during the custodial interrogations. He cites the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in Messiah vs. U.S. (377 U.S. 201), Escobedo vs. Illinois (378 U.S. 478) and Miranda vs. Arizona (384 U.S. 436). The provision of the Constitution of the Philippines in point is Article III (Bill of Rights), Section 1, par. 17 of which provides: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall ... enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel ..." While the said provision is identical to that in the Constitution of the United States, in this jurisdiction the term criminal prosecutions was interpreted by this Court, in U.S. vs. Beecham, 23 Phil., 258 (1912), in connection with a similar provision in the Philippine Bill of Rights (Section 5 of Act of Congress of July 1, 1902) to mean proceedings before the trial court from arraignment to rendition of the judgment. Implementing the said constitutional provision, We have provided in Section 1, Rule 115 of the Rules of Court that "In all criminal prosecutions the defendant shall be entitled ... (b) to be present and defend in person and by attorney at every stage of the proceedings, that is, from the arraignment to the promulgation of the judgment ." The only instances where an accused is entitled to counsel before arraignment, if he so requests, are during the second stage of the preliminary investigation (Rule 112, Section 11) and after the arrest (Rule 113, Section 18). The rule in the United States need not be unquestioningly adhered to in this jurisdiction, not only because it has no binding effect here, but also because in interpreting a provision of the Constitution the meaning attached thereto at the time of the adoption thereof should be considered. And even there the said rule is not yet quite settled, as can be deduced from the absence of unanimity in the voting by the members of the United States Supreme Court in all the three above-cited cases. 5. Appellant Pineda claims that insofar as he is concerned there was a mistrial resulting in gross miscarriage of justice. He contends that because the charge against him and his coappellants is a capital offense and the amended complaint cited aggravating circumstances, which, if proved, would raise the

penalty to death, it was the duty of the court to insist on his presence during all stages of the trial. The contention is untenable. While a plea of guilty is mitigating, at the same time it constitutes an admission of all the material facts alleged in the information, including the aggravating circumstances, and it matters not that the offense is capital, for the admission (plea of guilty) covers both the crime and its attendant circumstances qualifying and/or aggravating the crime (People vs. Boyles, et al., L-15308, May 29, 1964, citing People vs. Ama, L-14783, April 29, 1961, and People vs. Parete, L-15515, April 29, 1961). Because of the aforesaid legal effect of Pineda's plea of guilty, it was not incumbent upon the trial court to receive his evidence, much less to require his presence in court. It would be different had appellant Pineda requested the court to allow him to prove mitigating circumstances, for then it would be the better part of discretion on the part of the trial court to grant his request. (Cf. People vs. Arconado, L-16175, February 28, 1962.) The case of U.S. vs. Agcaoili (31 Phil., 91), cited by Pineda, is not in point, for there this Court ordered a new trial because it found for a fact that the accused, who had pleaded guilty, "did not intend to admit that he committed the offense with the aggravating circumstances" mentioned in the information. We are not in a position to make a similar finding here. The transcript of the proceedings during the arraignment shows that Pineda's counsel, Atty. Lota prefaced his client's plea of guilty with the statement that I have advised him (Pineda) about the technicalities in plain simple language of the contents of aggravating circumstances and apprised him of the penalty he would get, and we have given said accused time to think. After a while I consulted him for three times and his decision was still the same. Three days after the arraignment, the same counsel stated in court that he had always been averse to Pineda's idea of pleading guilty, because "I know the circumstances called for the imposition of the maximum penalty considering the aggravating circumstances ," but that he acceded to his client's wish only after the fiscal had stated that he would recommend to the court the imposition of life imprisonment on his client. To be sure, any such recommendation does not bind the Court. The situation here, therefore, is far different from that obtaining in U.S. vs. Agcaoili, supra 6. Two of the appellants Jose and Caal bewail the enormous publicity that attended the case from the start of investigation to the trial. In spite of the said publicity, however, it appears that the court a quo was able to give the appellants a fair hearing. For one thing, three of the seven (7) original accused were acquitted. For another thing, Jose himself admits in his brief that the Trial Judge "had not been influenced by adverse and unfair comments of the press, unmindful of the rights of the accused to a presumption of innocence and to fair trial." We are convinced that the herein four appellants have conspired together to commit the crimes imputed to them in the amended information quoted at the beginning of this decision. There is no doubt at all that the forcible abduction of the complainant from in front of her house in Quezon City, was a necessary if not indispensable means which enabled them to commit the various and the successive acts of rape upon her person. It bears noting, however, that even while the first act of rape was being performed, the crime of forcible abduction had already been consummated, so that each of the three succeeding (crimes of the same nature can not legally be considered as still connected with the abduction in other words, they should be detached from, and considered independently of, that of forcible abduction and, therefore, the former can no longer be complexed with the latter.

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What kind of rape was committed? Undoubtedly, it is that which is punishable by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, under paragraph 3, Article 335, as amended by Republic Act No. 4111 which took effect on June 20, 1964, and which provides as follows: ART. 335. When and how rape committed .Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: 1. By using force or intimidation; 2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and 3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present. The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be death. When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be likewise death. When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death. As regards, therefore, the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, the first of the crimes committed, the latter is definitely the more serious; hence, pursuant the provision of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty prescribed shall be imposed in its maximum period. Consequently, the appellants should suffer the extreme penalty of death. In this regard, there is hardly any necessity to consider the attendance of aggravating circumstances, for the same would not alter the nature of the penalty to be imposed. Nevertheless, to put matters in their proper perspective and for the purpose of determining the proper penalty to be imposed in each of the other three crimes of simple rape, it behooves Us to make a definite finding in this connection to the effect that the commission of said crimes was attended with the following aggravating circumstances: (a) nighttime, appellants having purposely sought such circumstance to facilitate the commission of these crimes; (b) abuse of superior strength, the crime having been committed by the four appellants in conspiracy with one another (Cf. People vs. De Guzman, et al., 51 Phil., 105, 113); (c) ignominy, since the appellants in ordering the complainant to exhibit to them her complete nakedness for about ten minutes, before raping her, brought about a circumstance which tended to make the effects of the crime more humiliating; and (d) use of a motor vehicle. With respect to appellants Jose, Aquino and Ca__al, none of these aggravating circumstances has been offset by any mitigating circumstance. Appellant Pineda should, however, be credited with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty, a factor which does not in the least affect the nature of the proper penalties to be imposed, for the reason that there would still be three aggravating circumstances remaining. As a result, appellants should likewise be made to suffer the extreme penalty of death in each of these three simple crimes of rape. (Art. 63, par. 2, Revised Penal Code.) In refusing to impose as many death penalties as there are offenses committed, the trial court applied by analogy Article 70

of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that "the maximum duration of all the penalties therein imposed upon the appellant shall not be more than threefold the length of time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon the appellant, which should not exceed forty years." The said court is of the opinion that since a man has only one life to pay for a wrong, the ends of justice would be served, and society and the victim would be vindicated just as well, if only one death penalty were imposed on each of the appellants. We cannot agree with the trial court. Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code can only be taken into account in connection with the service of the sentence imposed, not in the imposition of the penalty (People vs. Escares, 55 Off. Gaz., 623). In holding that only one death penalty should be imposed because man has only one life, the trial court ignored the principle enunciated in the very case it cited, namely, U.S. vs. Balaba, 37 Phil., 260, where this Court, in affirming the judgment of the trial court, found the accused guilty of two murders and one homicide and imposed upon him two death sentences for the murders and a prison term for the homicide. In not applying the said principle, the court a quo said that the case of Balaba is different from the present case, for while in the former case the accused was found to have committed three distinct offenses, here only one offense is charged, even if complex. As We have explained earlier herein, four crimes were committed, charged and proved. There is, therefore, no substantial difference between the two cases insofar as the basic philosophy involved is concerned, for the fact remains that in the case of Balaba this Court did not hesitate to affirm the two death sentences imposed on the accused by the trial court. In People vs. Peralta , et al., L-19060, October 29, 1968, in which this Court imposed on each of the six accused three death penalties for three distinct and separate crimes of murder, We said that "since it is the settled rule that once conspiracy is established, the act of one conspirator is attributable to all, then each conspirator must be held liable for each of the felonious acts committed as a result of the conspiracy, regardless of the nature and severity of the appropriate penalties prescribed by law." In the said case (which was promulgated after the decision of the court a quo had been handed down) We had occasion to discuss at length the legality and practicality of imposing multiple death penalties, thus: The imposition of multiple death penalties is decried by some as a useless formality, an exercise in futility. It is contended, undeniably enough, that a death convict, like all mortals, has only one life to forfeit. And because of this physiological and biological attribute of man, it is reasoned that the imposition of multiple death penalties is impractical and futile because after the service of one capital penalty, the execution of the rest of the death penalties will naturally be rendered impossible. The foregoing opposition to the multiple imposition of death penalties suffers from four basic flaws: (1) it fails to consider the legality of imposing multiple capital penalties; (2) it fails to distinguish between imposition of penalty and service of sentence; (3) it ignores the fact that multiple death sentences could be served simultaneously; and (4) it overlooks the practical merits of imposing multiple death penalties. The imposition of a penalty and the service of a sentence are two distinct, though related, concepts. The imposition of the proper penalty or penalties is determined by the nature, gravity and number of offenses charged and proved, whereas service of sentence is determined by the severity and character of the penalty or penalties imposed. In the imposition of the proper penalty or penalties, the court does not concern itself with the possibility or practicality of the service of the sentence, since actual service is a contingency subject to varied factors like the successful escape of the convict, grant of executive clemency or natural death of the prisoner. All that go into the imposition of the proper penalty or penalties, to reiterate, are the nature,

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gravity and number of the offenses charged and proved and the corresponding penalties prescribed by law. Multiple death penalties are not impossible to serve because they will have to be executed simultaneously. A cursory reading of article 70 will show that there are only two moves of serving two or more (multiple) penalties: simultaneously or successively . The first rule is that two or more penalties shall be served simultaneously if the nature of the penalties will so permit. In the case of multiple capital penalties, the nature of said penal sanctions does not only permit but actually necessitates simultaneous service. The imposition of multiple death penalties, far from being a useless formality, has practical importance. The sentencing of an accused to several capital penalties is an indelible badge of his extreme criminal perversity, which may not be accurately projected by the imposition of only one death sentence irrespective of the number of capital felonies for which he is liable. Showing thus the reprehensible character of the convict in its real dimensions, the possibility of a grant of executive clemency is justifiably reduced in no small measure. Hence, the imposition of multiple death penalties could effectively serve as deterrent to an improvident grant of pardon or commutation. Faced with the utter delinquency of such a convict, the proper penitentiary authorities would exercise judicious restraint in recommending clemency or leniency in his behalf. Granting, however, that the Chief Executive, in the exercise of his constitutional power to pardon (one of the presidential prerogatives which is almost absolute) deems it proper to commute the multiple death penalties to multiple life imprisonments, then the practical effect is that the convict has to serve the maximum forty (40) years of multiple life sentences. If only one death penalty is imposed, and then is commuted to life imprisonment, the convict will have to serve a maximum of only thirty years corresponding to a single life sentence. We are, therefore, of the opinion that in view of the existence of conspiracy among them and of our finding as regards the nature and number of the crimes committed, as well as of the presence of aggravating circumstances, four death penalties should be imposed in the premises. Before Us is a petition for intervention filed by Filipinas Investment & Finance Corporation asking for reversal of that portion of the judgment of the court below ordering the confiscation of the car used by the appellants in abducting the complainant. The aforesaid car is a 1965 two-door Pontiac sedan with Motor No. WT-222410, Serial No. 2376752110777, Plate No. H-33284, File No. 11584171, alleged by the intervenor to be in the custody of Major Ernesto San Diego of the Quezon City Police Department. The car is registered in the name of Mrs. Dolores Gomez. On April 4, 1967, Mrs. Dolores Gomez, mother of an appellant Jaime G. Jose, bought the car from the Malayan Motors Corporation and simultaneously executed a chattel mortgage thereon to secure payment of the purchase price of P13,200, which was stipulated to be payable in 24 monthly installments of P550 beginning May 4, 1967 up to April 4, 1969. The mortgage was duly registered with the Land Transportation Commission and inscribed in the Chattel Mortgage Registry. The mortgage lien was annotated on the motor registration certificate. On April 17, 1967, for value received and with notice to Mrs. Gomez, the Malayan Motors Corporation assigned its credit against Mrs. Gomez, as well as the chattel mortgage, to the intervenor. The assignment was duly registered with the Land Transportation Commission and annotated on the registration certificate.

Mrs. Gomez failed to pay any of the installments due, in view of which the intervenor filed on July 5, 1967, an action for replevin against her (Civil Case No. 69993, Court of First Instance of Manila) as a preliminary step to foreclosure of the chattel mortgage. On July 7, 1967, the court issued an order for the seizure of the car. The sheriff, however, could not enforce the writ of replevin because the car was not in Mrs. Gomez' possession, the same having been used by her son, appellant Jaime G. Jose, together with the other appellants in this case, in the abduction of Miss De la Riva, as a result of which the car was seized by the Quezon City police and placed in the custody of Major San Diego, who refused to surrender it to the sheriff on the ground that it would be used as evidence in the trial of the criminal case. During the pendency of that criminal case in the court below, or on July 26, 1967, the intervenor filed with the said court a petition for intervention. The said petition was not, however, acted upon. On October 2, 1967, the trial court rendered its judgment in the present case ordering the car's confiscation as an instrument of the crime. Although not notified of the said decision, the intervenor filed, on October 17, 1967, a motion for reconsideration of the order of confiscation; but the same was denied on October 31, 1967, on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the case in view of the automatic elevation thereof to this Court. The intervenor then filed a petition for relief from judgement, but the same was also denied. On February 5, 1968, judgement was rendered in the replevin case ordering Mrs. Gomez to deliver the car to the intervenor so that the chattel mortgage thereon could be foreclosed, or, in the alternative, to pay the intervenor the sum of P13,200 with interest thereon at 12% per annum from July 5, 1968, the premium bond, attorney's fees, and the costs of suit. The judgment became final and executory. Attempts to execute the judgment against the properties of Mrs. Gomez were unavailing; the writ of execution was returned by the sheriff unsatisfied. On July 26, 1968, the present petition for intervention was filed with this Court, which allowed the intervenor to file a brief. In his brief the Solicitor General contends, among others, that the court a quo having found that appellant Jose is the owner of the car, the order of confiscation is correct. Considering that the car in question is registered in the name of Mrs. Dolores Gomez, who, in the absence of strong evidence to the contrary, must be considered as the lawful owner thereof; that the only basis of the court a quo in concluding that the said car belongs to appellant Jose were the latter's statements during the trial of the criminal case to that effect; that the said statement were not, however, intended to be, nor could constitute, a claim of ownership over the car adverse to his mother, but were made simply in answer to questions propounded in court for the sole purpose of establishing the identity of the defendant who furnished the car used by the appellants in the commission of the crime; that the chattel mortgage on the car and its assignment in the favor of the intervenor were made several months before the date of commission of the crimes charged, which circumstance forecloses the possibility of collusion to prevent the State from confiscating the car; that the final judgement in the replevin case can only be executed by delivering the possession of the car to the intervenor for foreclosure of the chattel mortgage; and the Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code bars the confiscation and forfeiture of an instrument or tool used in the commission of the crime if such "be the property of a third person not liable for the offense," it is the sense of this Court that the order of the court below for confiscation of the car in question should be set aside and that the said car should be ordered delivered to the intervenor for foreclosure as decreed in the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila in the replevin case, Civil Case No. 69993.

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 Before the actual promulgation of this decision, this Court received a formal manifestation on the part of the Solicitor General to the effect that Rogelio Caal, one of the herein appellants, died in prison on December 28, 1970. As a result of this development, this case is hereby dismissed as to him alone, and only insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, with onefourth (1/4) of the costs declared de oficio WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby modified as follows: appellants Jaime G. Jose, Basilio Pineda, Jr., and Edgardo P. Aquino are pronounced guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, and each and every one of them is likewise convicted of three (3) other crimes of rape. As a consequence thereof, each of them is hereby sentenced to four (4) death penalties; all of them shall, jointly and severally, indemnify the complainant of the sum of P10,000.00 in each of the four crimes, or a total of 40,000.00; and each shall pay onefourth (1/4) of the costs. Insofar as the car used in the commission of the crime is concerned, the order of the court a quo for its confiscation is hereby set aside; and whoever is in custody thereof is hereby ordered to deliver its possession to intervenor Filipinas Investment & Finance Corporation in accordance with the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No. 69993 thereof. Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur. Barredo and Teehankee, JJ., took no part. G.R. No. 80042 March 28, 1990 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ADOLFO QUIONES, RONILO CANABA, AMADO CONDA, JR., ZALDY CIVICO and ALFREDO ABAN, accused-appellants. The Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Citizens Legal Assistance Office for accused-appellants. CRUZ, J.: On June 30, 1986, the bodies of three men were found in a wooded area in barangay Tuaco, Basud, Camarines Norte. The corpses were in a state of decomposition and bore various contusions, stab and bullet wounds, and other injuries indicating foul play. The victims were later positively identified as Alexander Sy, Augusto Gabo and Frisco Marcellana. In due time, an information for robbery with multiple homicide was filed against Adolfo Quiones, Alfredo Aban, Zaldy Civico, Ronilo Canaba, Amado Conda, Jr., Santiago Solarte, Armando Buitre and one John Doe. 1 On their arraignment on November 13, 1986, Quiones, Canaba, Aban, Civico and Conda pleaded not guilty. On November 20, 1986, Conda, Canaba, and Quiones withdrew their plea of not guilty and entered a plea of guilty. 2 On April 1, 1986, Conda was allowed to withdraw his former plea of guilty and substitute the same With not guilty. 3 Solarte escaped and is presently at large while Buitre was killed in an encounter with the Manila police. 4

Judge Luis D. Dictado of the Regional Trial Court of Daet, Camarines Norte directed the prosecution to present evidence also against Quiones and Canaba despite their plea of guilty, which they maintained even after being informed of its possible consequences, including the death penalty. After trial, judgment was rendered convicting all the accused (except Solarte, who had not yet been arrested, and Buitre). 5 The evidence for the prosecution established that the three victims were riding in a dark blue Mitsubishi car at about seven o'clock in the evening of June 27 or 28, 1986, when they were intercepted along the Maharlika Highway in the above-named barangay by the accused, who had placed sacks on the road to block the way. The three were taken to the nearby woods where they were killed. 6 According to his brother, Napoleon, Alexander Sy was at that time carrying P300,000.00, representing the weekly collections of his business, a necklace with pendant worth P20,000.00, a P10,000.00 diamond ring, and a licensed .22 caliber handgun. 7 All this, together with the other articles belonging to the victims, were taken by the accused, who also used the car in fleeing to Sapang Palay, where it was recovered without the stereo and the spare tire. 8 The first to be picked up for questioning was Conda, who implicated the other accused and led a police team to the house of Sonny Tabalan, where Solarte was hiding, Inexplicably, Conda and Solarte both escaped. However, the police found in Tabalan's house one live grenade, one .38 caliber pistol, a defective air rifle with magazine, and a wooden rifle which he said had been brought there by Solarte and Quiones. In separate extra-judicial statements, 9 both Quiones and Canaba identified these weapons as the ones used in the commission of the crime.10 Testifying for the prosecution, Francisco Bariuan declared that on July 7, 1986, Solarte came to his house and asked him to pawn a watch for P300.00. Solarte returned the following day with Canaba and Conda. They were carrying guns and a grenade. Solarte informed him that they were the ones who, together with Buitre, Quiones and Aban, had killed Sy and his companions. He and Solarte left later to hire jeep and Canaba and Conda stayed behind, warning him that they would blow up his house if he squealed on them. 11 But the case for the prosecution really depended on the statements of the accused themselves, principally Quiones and Canaba. Both were informed of their constitutional rights before their investigation and were actually assisted by Atty. Santiago Ceneta when they gave their separate confessions. 12 Both confessed to the crime charged and narrated in detail their participation in its commission. Quiones later testified that he had been subjected to torture to force him to admit the killing and robbery, 13 but as the trial judge noted, no proof of such coercion was ever presented in court. Moreover, the witness' narration of the commission of the offense substantially jibed with the testimony of the other accused, thus negating the suspicion that it had been merely concocted. Understandably, Quiones sought to minimize his participation in this crime by claiming that he stayed in the car when the three victims were forcibly taken to the woods where they were robbed and slain. 14 This is another indication that the had not been manhandled into signing the confession. lt is important to note that when asked at the trial if he was affirming his extra-judicial statement, he categorically said he was, 15 thus in effect reiterating his detailed account of the conduct of the several accused, including their escape to Manila in the stolen car and their distribution of the loot among themselves. This was now a judicial confession. Interestingly, Quiones also admitted to two other hold-ups and his

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membership in another gang of robbers headed by one Kapitan Mitra, an unnecessary embellishment that lent further credence to his confession. 16 Canaba's own statement corroborated Quiones' confession and provided more elaboration. Like Quiones, he admitted that they had placed sacks on the load and forced the three victims to go with them to the parke where they were unclothed and killed, two by Buitre and the third by Solarte. Quiones remained in the car. Afterwards, the accused distributed the cash among themselves, each receiving P10,000.00, with Solarte and Buitre getting the weapons also. Using Sy's car, they proceeded to Sapang Palay after leaving the weapons with Sonny Tabalan in his house in Tigbinan. 17 Conda also gave an extra-judicial confession, but this was not made with the assistance of counsel and so must be rejected. It is totally worthless and inadmissible against him. Such a confession is anathema in a free society. It was not recognized even during the era of martial law under the 1973 Constitution as interpreted by the Court in People v. Galit . 18 And it is also scorned under the present Constitution, which is more deeply committed to the protection of the rights of the accused. Civico also gave an extra-judicial confession, likewise without the assistance of counsel. 19 But testifying on his behalf, he purged it of invalidity when he freely affirmed it on the stand in the presence of the judge himself and with the assistance of defense counsel. 20 By so testifying, he in effect reiterated but validly this time his earlier narration, replete with all the damming details, of the commission of the crime. The Court is satisfied that the evidence against the accused is sufficient to justify their conviction. The declarations of the prosecution witnesses and more so of defendants Quiones and Canaba, both of whom had pleaded guilty are telling enough to toll their guilt. The seized weapons and the other exhibits offer strong corroboration that has not been refuted. The state of the cadavers of the swollen scrotums and the protruding tongues tell a tale of their own of the defendants' perverted ruthlessness. By contrast, the defense was practically one of mere denial. Even the claimed maltreatment of Quiones has not been established. It is clear from the evidence on record that there was a conspiracy among the perpetrators of the crime to rob and slay. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. This need not be established by direct evidence but may be proven through the series of acts done by each of the accused in pursuance of the common unlawful purpose. 21 Proof of conspiracy in the case at bar was supplied, paradoxically enough, mainly by defendants Quiones and Canaba themselves. From the time they blocked the road to waylay their prey to the killing and robbing in the woods, to the distribution of the loot and their escape in the stolen car, all the accused were acting in concert and in accordance with their common plan. It is argued that Civico and Aban were not part of the conspiracy and that Quiones himself categorically said so in answer to a question from the prosecution. Interpreting this merely as a gesture of loyalty or perhaps goodwill or charity toward his fellow criminals, we dismiss it as a falsity. On the other hand, Civico himself admitted his own participation in the offense, and in his sworn confession (which he affirmed in court) also implicated Aban. And there is also Bariuan's testimony that Aban was one of the armed group, including the other accused, that went to his house on July 8, 1986, and talked of their

commission of the crime. These declarations are enough to place the two defendants within the conspiracy together with the other defendants. In a conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all and every one of the conspirators is guilty with the others in equal degree. Hence, every member of the group that perpetrated the killing and robbery of the three victims must suffer the same penalty prescribed by law even if they had different modes of participation in the commission of the crime. 22 The trial judge found all the accused guilty as charged and sentenced each of them to serve the triple penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay actual and compensatory damages in the amount of P380,000.00 to the heirs of Alexander Sy, P50,000.00 to the heirs of Augusta Gabo, and P50,000.00 to the heirs of Frisco Marcellana. The firearms were also confiscated in favor of the State. The Court finds that the accused were incorrectly charged with robbery with multiple homicide and so were also incorrectly sentenced by the trial court. The reason is that there is no crime of robbery with multiple homicide under the Revised Penal Code. The charge should have been for robbery with homicide only regardless of the fact that three persons were killed in the commission of the robbery. In this special complex crime, the number of persons killed is immaterial and does not increase the penalty prescribed in Article 294 of the said Code. As held inPeople v. Cabuena : 23 But it was error to sentence the appellants to three life imprisonments each as if 3 separate crimes had been committed. The complex crime of robbery with homicide is not to be multiplied with the number of persons killed. As was said by this Court in People vs. Madrid (88 Phil. 1), "the general concept of this crime does not limit the taking of human life to one single victim making the slaying of human being in excess of that number punishable as separate individual offense or offenses. All the homicides or murders are merged in the composite, integrated whole that is robbery with homicide so long as the killings were perpetrated by reason or on the occasion of the robbery. The penalty prescribed for the crime of robbery with homicide is reclusion perpetua, to be imposed only once even if multiple killings accompanied the robbery. Furthermore, the discussion by the trial court of the attendant circumstances was unnecessary because Article 63 of the Code provides that when the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied without regard to the mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the crime. The civil indemnity for each of the three victims is reduced to P30,000.00, to be paid to their respective heirs. The heirs of Alexander Sy are also awarded the additional sum P330,000.00, representing the value of the articles taken from him by the accused. WHEREFORE, the conviction of all the accused-appellants is AFFIRMED, but each of them is sentenced to only one term of reclusion perpetua for the crime of robbery with homicide. The monetary awards are also modified in accordance with the preceding paragraph. It is so ordered. G.R. No. 97471 February 17, 1993 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

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ISABELO PUNO y GUEVARRA, alias "Beloy," and ENRIQUE AMURAO y PUNO, alias "Enry," accusedappellants. The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Edward C. Castaeda for accused-appellants. REGALADO, J.: The primal issue for resolution in this case is whether accusedappellants committed the felony of kidnapping for ransom under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as charged in the information; or a violation of Presidential Decree No. 532 (AntiPiracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974), as contended by the Solicitor General and found by the trial court; or the offense of simple robbery punished by Paragraph 5, Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as claimed by the defense. In an information dated and filed on May 31, 1989 in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 103, as Criminal Case No. Q-57404 thereof, appellants were charged with kidnapping for ransom allegedly committed in the following manner: That on or about the 13th day of January, 1988 in Quezon City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then private individuals, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping each other, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap and carry away one MARIA DEL SOCORRO SARMIENTO y MUTUC * for the purpose of extorting ransom, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party in such amount as may be awarded to her under the provisions of the Civil Code. 1 On a plea of not guilty when arraigned, 2 appellants went to trial which ultimately resulted in a judgment promulgated on September 26, 1990 finding them guilty of robbery with extortion committed on a highway, punishable under Presidential Decree No. 532, with this disposition in the fallo thereof: ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused ISABELO PUNO and ENRIQUE AMURAO GUILTY as principals of robbery with extortion committed on a highway and, in accordance with P.D. 532, they are both sentenced to a jail term of reclusion perpetua The two accused are likewise ordered to pay jointly and severally the offended private victim Ma. Socorro M. Sarmiento the sum of P7,000.00 as actual damages and P3,000.00 as temperate damages. 3 Before us now in this appeal, appellants contend that the court a quo erred (1) in convicting them under Presidential Decree No. 532 since they were not expressly charged with a crime therein; (2) in applying Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court since the charge under said presidential decree is not the offense proved and cannot rightly be used as the offense proved which is necessarily included in the offense charged. 4 For the material antecedents of this case, we quote with approval the following counter-statement of facts in the People's brief 5 which adopted the established findings of the court a quo , documenting the same with page references to the transcripts of the proceedings, and which we note are without any substantial divergence in the version proffered by the defense. This is a prosecution for kidnapping for ransom allegedly done on January 13, 1988 by the two accused (tsn, Jan. 8, 1990, p. 7).

Mrs. Maria Socorro Mutuc-Sarmiento owns a bakeshop in Araneta Avenue, Quezon City called Nika Cakes and Pastries. She has a driver of her own just as her husband does ( Ibid ., pp. 4-6). At around 5:00 in the afternoon of January 13, 1988, the accused Isabelo Puno, who is the personal driver of Mrs. Sarmiento's husband (who was then away in Davao purportedly on account of local election there) arrived at the bakeshop. He told Mrs. Socorro that her own driver Fred had to go to Pampanga on an emergency (something bad befell a child), so Isabelo will temporary ( sic ) take his place ( Id ., pp. 8-9). Mrs. Socorro's time to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig came and so she got into the Mercedes Benz of her husband with Isabelo on ( sic ) the wheel. After the car turned right in ( sic ) a corner of Araneta Avenue, it stopped. A young man, accused Enrique Amurao, boarded the car beside the driver ( Id ., pp. 910). Once inside, Enrique clambered on top of the back side of the front seat and went onto where Ma. Socorro was seated at the rear. He poke ( sic ) a gun at her ( Id ., p. 10). Isabelo, who earlier told her that Enrique is his nephew announced, "ma'm, you know, I want to get money from you." She said she has money inside her bag and they may get it just so they will let her go. The bag contained P7,000.00 and was taken ( Id ., pp. 11-14). Further on, the two told her they wanted P100,000.00 more. Ma. Socorro agreed to give them that but would they drop her at her gas station in Kamagong St., Makati where the money is? The car went about the Sta. Mesa area. Meanwhile, Ma. Socorro clutched her Rosary and prayed. Enrique's gun was menacingly storing ( sic ) at her soft bread ( sic ) brown, perfumed neck. He said he is an NPA and threatened her ( Id ., p.15). The car sped off north towards the North superhighway. There Isabelo, Beloy as he is called, asked Ma. Socorro to issue a check for P100,000.00. Ma. Socorro complied. She drafted 3 checks in denominations of two for P30 thousand and one for P40 thousand. Enrique ordered her to swallow a pill but she refused ( Id ., pp. 17-23). Beloy turned the car around towards Metro Manila. Later, he changed his mind and turned the car again towards Pampanga. Ma. Socorro, according to her, jumped out of the car then, crossed to the other side of the superhighway and, after some vehicles ignored her, she was finally able to flag down a fish vendors van. Her dress had blood because, according to Ma. Socorro, she fell down on the ground and was injured when she jumped out of the car. Her dress was torn too ( Id ., pp. 23-26). On reaching Balintawak, Ma. Socorro reported the matter to CAPCOM ( Id ., p. 27). Both accused were, day after, arrested. Enrique was arrested trying to encash Ma. Socorro's P40,000.00 check at PCI Bank, Makati. (tsn, Oct. 18, 1989, pp. 10-13) 6 As observed by the court below, the defense does not dispute said narrative of complainant, except that, according to appellant Puno, he stopped the car at North Diversion and freely allowed complainant to step out of the car. He even slowed the car down as he drove away, until he saw that his employer had gotten a ride, and he claimed that she fell down when she stubbed her toe while running across the highway. 7

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Appellants further testified that they brought the Mercedez Benz car to Dolores, San Fernando, Pampanga and parked it near a barangay or police outpost. They thereafter ate at a restaurant and divided their loot. 8 Much later, when he took the stand at the trial of this case, appellant Puno tried to mitigate his liability by explaining that he was in dire need of money for the medication of his ulcers. 9 On these relatively simple facts, and as noted at the start of this opinion, three theories have been advanced as to what crime was committed by appellants. The trial court cohered with the submission of the defense that the crime could not be kidnapping for ransom as charged in the information. We likewise agree. Prefatorily, it is worth recalling an accepted tenet in criminal law that in the determination of the crime for which the accused should be held liable in those instances where his acts partake of the nature of variant offenses, and the same holds true with regard to the modifying or qualifying circumstances thereof, his motive and specific intent in perpetrating the acts complained of are invaluable aids in arriving at a correct appreciation and accurate conclusion thereon. Thus, to illustrate, the motive of the accused has been held to be relevant or essential to determine the specific nature of the crime as, for instance, whether a murder was committed in the furtherance of rebellion in which case the latter absorbs the former, or whether the accused had his own personal motives for committing the murder independent of his membership in the rebellious movement in which case rebellion and murder would constitute separate offenses. 10 Also, where injuries were inflicted on a person in authority who was not then in the actual performance of his official duties, the motive of the offender assumes importance because if the attack was by reason of the previous performance of official duties by the person in authority, the crime would be direct assault; otherwise, it would only be physical injuries. 11 In the case at bar, there is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any motive, nurtured prior to or at the time they committed the wrongful acts against complainant, other than the extortion of money from her under the compulsion of threats or intimidation. This much is admitted by both appellants, without any other esoteric qualification or dubious justification. Appellant Puno, as already stated, candidly laid the blame for his predicament on his need for funds for, in his own testimony, "(w)hile we were along the way Mam ( sic ) Corina was telling me "Beloy, I know your family very well and I know that your ( sic ) not (a) bad person, why are you doing this?" I told her "Mam, ( sic ), because I need money and I had an ulcer and that I have been getting an (sic ) advances from our office but they refused to give me any bale ( sic ). . . ." 12 With respect to the specific intent of appellants vis-a-vis the charge that they had kidnapped the victim, we can rely on the proverbial rule of ancient respectability that for this crime to exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual intent of the malefactors was to deprive the offended party of her liberty, 13 and not where such restraint of her freedom of action was merely an incident in the commission of another offense primarily intended by the offenders. Hence, as early as United States vs Ancheta , 14 and consistently reiterated thereafter, 15 it has been held that the detention and/or forcible taking away of the victims by the accused, even for an appreciable period of time but for the primary and ultimate purpose of killing them, holds the offenders liable for taking their lives or such other offenses they committed in relation thereto, but the incidental deprivation of the victims' liberty does not constitute kidnapping or serious illegal detention.

That appellants in this case had no intention whatsoever to kidnap or deprive the complainant of her personal liberty is clearly demonstrated in the veritably confessional testimony of appellant Puno: Q At what point did Mrs. Sarmiento handed ( sic ) the bag containing the P7,000.00 to your nephew? A Santo Domingo Exit. Q And how about the checks, where were you already when the checks was ( sic ) being handed to you? A Also at the Sto. Domingo exit when she signed the checks. Q If your intention was just to robbed ( sic ) her, why is it that you still did not allow her to stay at Sto. Domingo, after all you already received the money and the checks? A Because we had an agreement with her that when she signed the checks we will take her to her house at Villa ( sic ) Verde. Q And why did you not bring her back to her house at Valle Verde when she is ( sic ) already given you the checks? A Because while we were on the way back I (sic) came to my mind that if we reach Balintawak or some other place along the way we might be apprehended by the police. So when we reached Santa Rita exit I told her "Mam ( sic ) we will already stop and allow you to get out of the car." 16 Neither can we consider the amounts given to appellants as equivalent to or in the nature of ransom, considering the immediacy of their obtention thereof from the complainant personally. Ransom, in municipal criminal law, is the money, price or consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a captured person or persons, a payment that releases from captivity. 17 It can hardly be assumed that when complainant readily gave the cash and checks demanded from her at gun point, what she gave under the circumstances of this case can be equated with or was in the concept of ransom in the law of kidnapping. These were merely amounts involuntarily surrendered by the victim upon the occasion of a robbery or of which she was summarily divested by appellants. Accordingly, while we hold that the crime committed is robbery as defined in Article 293 of the Code, we, however, reject the theory of the trial court that the same constitutes the highway robbery contemplated in and punished by Presidential Decree No. 532. The lower court, in support of its theory, offers this ratiocination: The court agrees that the crime is robbery. But it is also clear from the allegation in the information that the victim was carried away and extorted for more money. The accused admitted that the robbery was carried on from Araneta Avenue up to the North Superhighway. They likewise admitted that along the way they intimidated Ma. Socorro to produce more money that she had with her at the time for which reason Ma. Socorro, not having more cash, drew out three checks. . . In view of the foregoing the court is of the opinion that the crimes committed is that punishable under P.D. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974) under which where robbery on the highway is accompanied by extortion the penalty is reclusion perpetua 18 The Solicitor General concurs, with the observation that pursuant to the repealing clause in Section 5 of said decree,

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"P.D. No- 532 is a modification of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, particularly Article 267 which are inconsistent with it." 19 Such opinion and complementary submission consequently necessitate an evaluation of the correct interplay between and the legal effects of Presidential Decree No. 532 on the pertinent Provisions of the Revised Penal Code, on which matter we are not aware that any definitive pronouncement has as yet been made. Contrary to the postulation of the Solicitor General, Presidential Decree No. 532 is not a modification of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code on kidnapping and serious illegal detention, but of Articles 306 and 307 on brigandage. This is evident from the fact that the relevant portion thereof which treats of "highway robbery" invariably uses this term in the alternative and synonymously with brigandage, that is, as "highway robbery/brigandage." This is but in line with our previous ruling, and which still holds sway in criminal law, that highway robbers ( ladrones ) and brigands are synonymous. 20 Harking back to the origin of our law on brigandage ( bandolerismo ) in order to put our discussion thereon in the proper context and perspective, we find that a band of brigands, also known as highwaymen or freebooters, is more than a gang of ordinary robbers. Jurisprudence on the matter reveals that during the early part of the American occupation of our country, roving bands were organized for robbery and pillage and since the then existing law against robbery was inadequate to cope with such moving bands of outlaws, the Brigandage Law was passed. 21 The following salient distinctions between brigandage and robbery are succinctly explained in a treatise on the subject and are of continuing validity: The main object of the Brigandage Law is to prevent the formation of bands of robbers. The heart of the offense consists in the formation of a band by more than three armed persons for the purpose indicated in art. 306. Such formation is sufficient to constitute a violation of art. 306. It would not be necessary to show, in a prosecution under it, that a member or members of the band actually committed robbery or kidnapping or any other purpose attainable by violent means. The crime is proven when the organization and purpose of the band are shown to be such as are contemplated by art 306. On the other hand, if robbery is committed by a band, whose members were not primarily organized for the purpose of committing robbery or kidnapping, etc, the crime would not be brigandage, but only robbery . Simply because robbery was committed by a band of more than three armed persons, it would not follow that it was committed by a band of brigands. In the Spanish text of art. 306, it is required that the band "sala a los campos para dedicarse a robar." 22 (Emphasis supplied). In fine, the purpose of brigandage is, inter alia , indiscriminate highway robbery. If the purpose is only a particular robbery, the crime is only robbery, or robbery in band if there are at least four armed participants. 23 The martial law legislator, in creating and promulgating Presidential Decree No. 532 for the objectives announced therein, could not have been unaware of that distinction and is presumed to have adopted the same, there being no indication to the contrary. This conclusion is buttressed by the rule on contemporaneous construction, since it is one drawn from the time when and the circumstances under which the decree to be construed originated. Contemporaneous exposition or construction is the best and strongest in the law. 24 Further, that Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes as highway robbery or brigandage only acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against any person or persons on Philippine highways as defined therein, and not acts of robbery

committed against only a predetermined or particular victim, is evident from the preambular clauses thereof, to wit: WHEREAS, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal that lawless elements are still committing acts of depredation upon the persons and properties of innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another , thereby disturbing the peace, order and tranquility of the nation and stunting the economic and social progress of the people : WHEREAS, such acts of depredations constitute . . . highway robbery/brigandage which are among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries ; WHEREAS, it is imperative that said lawless elements be discouraged from perpetrating such acts of depredaions by imposing heavy penalty on the offenders, with the end in view ofeliminating all obstacles to the economic, social, educational and community progress of the people . (Emphasis supplied). Indeed, it is hard to conceive of how a single act of robbery against a particular person chosen by the accused as their specific victim could be considered as committed on the "innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another," and which single act of depredation would be capable of "stunting the economic and social progress of the people" as to be considered "among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries," and would accordingly constitute an obstacle "to the economic, social, educational and community progress of the people, " such that said isolated act would constitute the highway robbery or brigandage contemplated and punished in said decree. This would be an exaggeration bordering on the ridiculous. True, Presidential Decree No. 532 did introduce amendments to Articles 306 and 307 of the Revised Penal Code by increasing the penalties, albeit limiting its applicability to the offenses stated therein when committed on the highways and without prejudice to the liability for such acts if committed. Furthermore, the decree does not require that there be at least four armed persons forming a band of robbers; and the presumption in the Code that said accused are brigands if they use unlicensed firearms no longer obtains under the decree. But, and this we broadly underline, the essence of brigandage under the Code as a crime of depredation wherein the unlawful acts are directed not only against specific, intended or preconceived victims, but against any and all prospective victims anywhere on the highway and whosoever they may potentially be, is the same as the concept of brigandage which is maintained in Presidential Decree No. 532, in the same manner as it was under its aforementioned precursor in the Code and, for that matter, under the old Brigandage Law. 25 Erroneous advertence is nevertheless made by the court below to the fact that the crime of robbery committed by appellants should be covered by the said amendatory decree just because it was committed on a highway. Aside from what has already been stressed regarding the absence of the requisite elements which thereby necessarily puts the offense charged outside the purview and intendment of that presidential issuance, it would be absurd to adopt a literal interpretation that any unlawful taking of property committed on our highways would be covered thereby. It is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the spirit or intent of the law should not be subordinated to the letter thereof. Trite as it may appear, we have perforce to stress the elementary caveat that he who considers merely the letter of an instrument goes but skin deep into its meaning, 26 and the fundamental rule that criminal justice inclines in favor of the milder form of liability in case of doubt.

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If the mere fact that the offense charged was committed on a highway would be the determinant for the application of Presidential Decree No. 532, it would not be farfetched to expect mischievous, if not absurd, effects on the corpus of our substantive criminal law. While we eschew resort to a reductio ad absurdum line of reasoning, we apprehend that the aforestated theory adopted by the trial court falls far short of the desideratum in the interpretation of laws, that is, to avoid absurdities and conflicts. For, if a motor vehicle, either stationary or moving on a highway, is forcibly taken at gun point by the accused who happened to take a fancy thereto, would the location of the vehicle at the time of the unlawful taking necessarily put the offense within the ambit of Presidential Decree No. 532, thus rendering nugatory the categorical provisions of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972? 27 And, if the scenario is one where the subject matter of the unlawful asportation is large cattle which are incidentally being herded along and traversing the same highway and are impulsively set upon by the accused, should we apply Presidential Decree No. 532 and completely disregard the explicit prescriptions in the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974? 28 We do not entertain any doubt, therefore, that the coincidental fact that the robbery in the present case was committed inside a car which, in the natural course of things, was casually operating on a highway, is not within the situation envisaged by Section 2(e) of the decree in its definition of terms. Besides, that particular provision precisely defines "highway robbery/brigandage" and, as we have amply demonstrated, the single act of robbery conceived and committed by appellants in this case does not constitute highway robbery or brigandage. Accordingly, we hold that the offense committed by appellants is simple robbery defined in Article 293 and punished under Paragraph 5 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code with prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period. Appellants have indisputably acted in conspiracy as shown by their concerted acts evidentiary of a unity of thought and community of purpose. In the determination of their respective liabilities, the aggravating circumstances of craft 29 shall be appreciated against both appellants and that of abuse of confidence shall be further applied against appellant Puno, with no mitigating circumstance in favor of either of them. At any rate, the intimidation having been made with the use of a firearm, the penalty shall be imposed in the maximum period as decreed by Article 295 of the Code. We further hold that there is no procedural obstacle to the conviction of appellants of the crime of simple robbery upon an information charging them with kidnapping for ransom, since the former offense which has been proved is necessarily included in the latter offense with which they are charged. 30 For the former offense, it is sufficient that the elements of unlawful taking, with intent to gain, of personal property through intimidation of the owner or possessor thereof shall be, as it has been, proved in the case at bar. Intent to gain ( animus lucrandi ) is presumed to be alleged in an information where it is charged that there was unlawful taking ( apoderamiento ) and appropriation by the offender of the things subject of the robbery. 31 These foregoing elements are necessarily included in the information filed against appellants which, as formulated, allege that they wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnapped and extorted ransom from the complainant. Such allegations, if not expressly but at the very least by necessary implication, clearly convey that the taking of complainant's money and checks (inaccurately termed as ransom) was unlawful, with intent to gain, and through intimidation. It cannot be logically argued that such a charge of kidnapping for ransom does not include but could negate the presence of any of the elements of robbery through intimidation of persons. 32

WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the trial court is hereby SET ASIDE and another one is rendered CONVICTING accused-appellants Isabelo Puno y Guevarra and Enrique Amurao y Puno of robbery as Punished in Paragraph 5 of Article 294, in relation to Article 295, of the Revised Penal Code and IMPOSING on each of them an indeterminate sentence of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional , as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor , as maximum, and jointly and severally pay the offended party, Maria del Socorro M. Sarmiento, the amounts of P7,000.00 as actual damages and P20,000.00 as moral damages, with costs. SO ORDERED. G.R. Nos. 59568-76 January 11, 1990 PETER NIERRAS, petitioner, vs. HON. AUXENCIO C. DACUYCUY and HON. ANTONIO S. LOPEZ, in their capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch IV, Court of First Instance of Leyte, Palo, Leyte, and City Fiscal of Tacloban City, Leyte, respectively, respondents. Victor C. Veloso for petitioner. PARAS, J.: Before Us is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction for the annulment of the resolution dated September 17, 1981 of the respondent Judge Auxencio C. Dacuycuy in nine (9) criminal cases, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Peter Nierras" docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 4379, 4380, 4381, 4382, 4383, 4384, 4385, 4386 and 4387, for estafa under Article 315 (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code which denied petitioner's motion to quash. Said motion to quash was filed by petitioner on the ground of double jeopardy as these offenses were already included in Criminal Cases Nos. 3790, 3791, 3792, 3793, 4085, 4122, 4123, 4124, and 4125, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Peter Nierras," for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law or Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, pending before the lower court. In both sets of criminal cases, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment before the lower court. However, immediately after his plea of not guilty in these estafa cases, petitioner moved in open court to be allowed to withdraw his plea of not guilty upon his filing of a motion to quash, which was denied by respondent Judge ruling as follows: The motion to quash should be and is hereby denied. Accused Peter Nierras allegedly issued the checks in favor of complainant Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation in payment of oil products which the latter delivered to him simultaneously with the issuance of the checks. xxx xxx xxx . . . The crime of estafa committed by means of bouncing checks is not committed by mere issuance of a check. Under Art. 315, par. 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 4885, the following are the elements of estafa: (1) the postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check was issued; (2) lack of or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (3) damage to the payee thereof (People v. Sabio, 86 SCRA 568). Under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (1979) the mere issuance of a check without sufficient funds issued in payment of a simultaneous obligation and the check was dishonored upon presentation for that estafa

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is committed under the Revised Penal Code. At the same time, the drawer will also be liable under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 for offense of issuing a check without sufficient funds (pp. 1-2, Resolution On Motion To Quash dated September 17, 1981; Annex "MM", Petition). (p. 100, Rollo ) The issue now submitted for Our consideration is whether the filing of the nine (9) other informations for estafa against petitioner under the Revised Penal Code after he had earlier been charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for issuing the same bouncing checks will put him in jeopardy of being convicted twice for the same offenses. In other words, can petitioner be held liable for the nine criminal cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and separately also be held liable for the crime of estafa under Article 315 (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code for the issuance of the same bouncing checks? It appears that petitioner, a customer of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, purchased oil products from it. Simultaneous with the delivery of the products, he issued nine (9) checks in payment thereof. Upon presentation to the Philippine National Bank at Naval, Leyte, said checks were dishonored for the reason that his account was already closed. Thereafter, Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation repeatedly demanded of petitioner either to deposit funds for his checks or pay for the oil products he had purchased but he failed and refused to do either. Petitioner argues that he would be placed in double jeopardy as all the elements of estafa under Article 315 (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code are also present in that crime punishable under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 namely (1) "the postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check was issued; (2) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check and (3) damage to the payee thereof." Petitioner's contentions are devoid of merit. Petitioner is charged with two (2) distinct and separate offenses, first under Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 approved on April 3, 1979 which provides that: Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court. and, second, under Article 315, (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code which states as follows: Art. 315. Swindling (estafa) . Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned herein below . . xxx xxx xxx 2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts, executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; xxx xxx xxx (d) By postdating a check or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check.

What petitioner failed to mention in his argument is the fact that deceit and damage are essential elements in Article 315 (2-d) Revised Penal Code, but are not required in Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Under the latter law, mere issuance of a check that is dishonored gives rise to the presumption of knowledge on the part of the drawer that he issued the same without sufficient funds and hence punishable (People v. Veridiano, 132 SCRA 523) which is not so under the Penal Code. Other differences between the two also include the following: (1) a drawer of a dishonored check may be convicted under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 even if he had issued the same for a pre existing obligation, while under Article 315 (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code such circumstance negates criminal liability; (2) specific and different penalties are imposed in each of the two offenses; (3) estafa is essentially a crime against property, while violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 is principally a crime against public interest as it does injury to the entire banking system; (4) violations of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code are mala in se , while those of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 are mala prohibita These differences are better understood by presenting the pertinent discussions on the passage of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 between the author of the bill, former Solicitor General and Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the Honorable Estelito P. Mendoza, presented in the memorandum for the government as follows: MR. MENDOZA. If there is evidence demonstrating that the act committed does not only violate this proposed Act but also the Revised Penal Code, there will be further prosecution under the Revised Penal Code . That is why it is proposed in this Act that there be a single uniform penalty for all violations in this Act. However the court is given the discretion whether to impose imprisonment or fine or both or also in whatever severity the court may consider appropriate under the circumstances. xxx xxx xxx MR. VELOSO, F. The other way around, it is not so. So precisely, if I file a case for estafa against a particular person for issuance of a bouncing check, then necessarily I can also be prosecuted under this proposed bill. On the other hand, if a person is prosecuted under the proposed bill, it does not necessarily follow that he can be prosecuted for estafa. MR. MENDOZA. This is simply because that in a certain set of circumstances, the offense under this Act is the only offense committed while under a different set of circumstances, not only the offense described in this Act is committed but also estafa. So that, for example, if a check with sufficient funds is issued in payment of a pre-existing obligation and the position of the Government should turn out to be correct that there is no estafa, then the drawer of the check would only be liable under this Act but not under the Revised Penal Code. But if he issues a check in payment, or contemporaneously with incurring, of an obligation, then he will be liable not only for estafa but also for violation for this Act. There is a difference between the two cases. In that situation where the check was issued in payment of a pre-existing obligation, the issuance of the check does not cause damage to the payee and so it is but appropriate that he should not be held for estafa but only for violating this Act. But if he issued a check to induce another , to part with a valuable consideration and the check bounces, then he does inflict an injury to the payee of the check apart from violating this law . In that case, it should be but fair that he be subject to prosecution not only for estafa but also for violating this law. MR. VELOSO, F. Yes, I agree with the Solicitor General on that point but my worry is with respect to situations where there is prosecution first to estafa.

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MR. MENDOZA. Well, if there is estafa . . MR. VELOSO, F. Estafa committed by the issuance of a bouncing check, in which case it will be mandatory on the part of the prosecuting official to also file a case for violation of this offense under the proposed bill. MR. MENDOZA. Yes, that is correct. In such a situation because if the offender did not only cause injury on account of the issuance of the check but did issue a bouncing check penalized under this Act, then he will be liable for prosecution under both laws. I would admit that perhaps in such situation, the penalty may be somewhat severe. As a matter of fact, in other jurisdictions, the issuance of bouncing checks is penalized with substantially lower penalty. However, because of the situation in the Philippines, the situation being now relatively grave that practically everybody is complaining about bouncing checks, may be it is necessary at least initially, at this point in time for us to impose a rather severe penalty and even allow liability not only under this Act but also for estafa. Then perhaps, after the necessary discipline has been inculcated in our people and that the incidence of the offense has been reduced, we may then decide to amend the law and reduce the penalty. But at this time, shall we say the evil is of such magnitude that only a dramatic and expeditious effort to prosecute persons who issue bouncing checks may be necessary to curb quickly this evil. (explanations given by Solicitor General ESTELITO P. MENDOZA at the Batasan Pambansa during his sponsorship speech of BP 22 which he authored, pages 1037-1038, Record of the Batasan, Plenary Session No. 70, Dec. 4, 1978). (Emphasis supplied). (pp. 115-117, Rollo or pp. 9-11, Memorandum for respondents). Furthermore, Section 5 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 provides that: Prosecution under this Act shall be without prejudice to any liability for violation of any provision of the Revised Penal Code. While the filing of the two sets of Information under the provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 and under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, on estafa, may refer to identical acts committed by petitioner, the prosecution thereof cannot be limited to one offense, because a single criminal act may give rise to a multiplicity of offenses and where there is variance or differences between the elements of an offense in one law and another law as in the case at bar there will be no double jeopardy because what the rule on double jeopardy prohibits refers to identity of elements in the two (2) offenses. Otherwise stated prosecution for the same act is not prohibited. What is forbidden is prosecution for the same offense . Hence, the mere filing of the two (2) sets of information does not itself give rise to double jeopardy (People v. Miraflores, 115 SCRA 570). In the instant petition, certiorari is not the proper remedy. We have held in Acharon v Purisima, et al . (13 SCRA 309) that "when a motion to quash a criminal case is denied, remedy is notcertiorari but to go to court without prejudice to reiterating special defenses invoked in the motion, and if after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law," invoking the rule laid down in People v Magdaluyo (1 SCRA 990). If the petitioner cannot appeal at this state of the proceeding, it is because there is still a necessity for the trial on the merits wherein the parties may present proofs in support of their contentions and not because the remedy of appeal is unavailing. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED. [G.R. No. 91041 : December 10, 1990.] 192 SCRA 277 JOSE A. SADDUL, JR., Petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. DECISION GRIO-AQUINO, J.: Before the Court is the Second Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioner, Jose A. Saddul, Jr., praying that we set aside our resolution of April 16, 1990 denying his petition for review of the decision promulgated on September 1, 1989 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 06234, entitled: "The People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee vs. Jose A. Saddul, Jr., Accused-Appellant" which affirmed on appeal the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, finding him guilty of estafa under Article 315, par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code. After deliberating on the motion for reconsideration and the respondents' comments, the Court resolved to grant the motion and set aside its resolution of April 16, 1990. In 1973, the petitioner became a vice-president and director of Amalgamated Motors (Phils.) Inc. (AMPI for brevity) (p. 5, tsn, February 15, 1988). AMPI was then a wholly-owned subsidiary of British Leyland (p. 31, tsn, November 9, 1989). It was the sole distributor in the Philippines of British and Japanese heavy equipment, trucks, farm implements, spare parts, and other automotive products and machines manufactured by Leyland International, Land Rover Ltd. (LAND ROVER for brevity), Avelyn Barfourd, Mitsubishi, and Furokawa (p. 7, tsn, February 15, 1988; p. 6, tsn, November 9, 1987). Since 1980, Felimon R. Cuevas had been a dealer of AMPI for government sales. In 1981, he bought into the company and became its majority stockholder and president (p. 5, tsn, February 15, 1988). Upon Cuevas' ascendancy in the corporation, Saddul was made a director as well as Executive Vice-President and General Manager. As such, he was in charge of the operations of the company and was "delegated" to make sales of some units and spare parts (p. 7, tsn, November 9, 1989). As distributor not only of British but also Japanese automotive products, AMPI carried an inventory of some P15 to P20 million worth of spare parts of the companies it represented in the Philippines (p. 37, tsn, November 9, 1987). In 1985, LAND ROVER supplied P1.5 million worth of spare parts to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) through AMPI, but the merchandise were returned to AMPI because they were not the correct items needed by the AFP (p. 27, tsn, February 15, 1988). The parts were kept by AMPI pending disposal instructions from LAND ROVER. On March 4, 1985, Erwin Lyndsay, LAND ROVER's area manager for Southeast Asia, sent the following letter to Saddul, Executive Vice-President and General Manager of AMPI, regarding the spare parts rejected by the AFP: "Dear Joe: "Further to my letter dated 27 February 1985, we have now given consideration to the matter of disposal of the Land Rover parts wrongly supplied to A.F.P. and currently held by Ampi on our behalf, pending disposal instructions from us. "As agreed in principle during our meeting, we now authorize you to undertake the disposal of the parts at the best possible prices available from your local market.

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"We would expect you to detail to us all sales of part number, quantity sold and price obtained. "We agree that a sum amounting to 20% of the sale value be retained by Amalgamated Motors as a handling charge and that the balance is placed into a separate client account which will be available to LRPE or any other party authorized by LRPE. "I trust that these arrangements meet with your approval and will satisfactorily solve the problem of the AFP parts disposal. "If you have any problems with the above arrangements or need any further authorizations at this stage, please do not hesitate to contact me. "Yours sincerely, "(SGD) "ERWIN LYNDSAY Area ManagerSouth East Asia" (Emphasis ours: Exh. I or F. pp. 126, 141 RTC Record.) Saddul sold some of the spare parts (worth P143,085.00) to Rover Motor Parts (a different entity from LAND ROVER) whose president was Jose P. Garcia. The sales were evidenced by AMPI Sales Invoices (Exhs. A, A-1, to A-8) and summarized in the Statement of Accounts dated June 9, 1986 (Exh. B) sent by AMPI to Rover Motor Parts. Payments were made by the buyer to Saddul. AMPI's 20% handling commission on the sale amounted to P28,617. Pursuant to LAND ROVER's directive that sale value of these spare parts be "placed into a separate client account which will be available to LRPE or any other party authorized by LRPE" (Exh. 1 or F), Saddul did not deposit the proceeds of the sales in AMPI's account but held them in trust for LAND ROVER. Saddul testified thus: "ATTY. ROBLES: "Q Is there any reason why you have not remitted to Amalgamated Motors Philippines this 20% handling charge? "A The reason is this transaction covered a lot of spare parts and the P143,085.00 was only a part of the entire shipment so that there is still an amount due to Land Rover Ltd. I was requested by Land Rover Ltd. to hold on to the 20% until a proper account of the other side could be made and proceeds of items which I do not know, only they would know, how much is owing Amalgamated Motors Philippines, Inc." (p. 10, tsn, February 15, 1988.) "Atty. CALIMA: "Q So, in other words, the instructions were given to you before you sold to Rover Motor Parts? "A Generally, the instruction was to sell it for Land Rover and which I did, sir. Subsequently, when sales proceeds were received, I asked them what will I do with the money and they said, keep the money until I can give you the necessary authority to open account for Land Rover. "Q My question to you is when did you receive the instruction from Land Rover? After the sale or before the sale was effected to Rover Motor Parts? "A Instructions for what? "Q To withhold the proceeds and not to remit the proceeds?

"A The instruction to hold, it is after the sale, sir." (p. 23-24, tsn, February 15, 1988.) "ATTY. CALIMA: "Q And inspite (sic) of the fact that Amalgamated Motors Philippines, Inc. can retain 20% handling charge you were still instructed not to remit the 20% to Amalgamated Motors? x x x "J. SADDUL JR.: "A Yes, sir, I was told pending full accounting of the entire volume of the transaction. As soon as the entire transaction is worked out through the accounting process then we will know whether Land Rover will owe Mr. Cuevas or Mr. Cuevas will owe Land Rover. "Q But again Mr. Witness, you will agree to this portion referring to the handling charge, it is not qualified by proper accounting? "A No, it is not, sir. In the letter, it is not." (p. 28, tsn, February 15, 1988.) Saddul was "terminated" by AMPI in the early part of 1986 for cause or causes that Cuevas did not disclose, but, according to Edgar Guilatco, a prosecution witness, Saddul "left the company" (pp. 6-7, tsn, January 6, 1988). He thereupon formed his own outfit which he named "Multipart Motors International, Inc." What appears in the record is that on May 30, 1986, Lyndsay wrote a letter to Saddul enclosing "a note which effectively authorizes you to act as our distributor" (Exh. 5).: nad This appointment, although not yet official, must have leaked to, and deeply wounded AMPI's President Felimon Cuevas. It was presumably the reason why in a letter of the same date, May 30, 1986, through counsel Atty. Benjamin G. Calima, AMPI demanded from Saddul an accounting of the spare parts supposedly worth P575,053.50 sold by him to Rover Motor Parts "during the time when you were still connected with the company" (Exh. E). On November 10, 1986, Lyndsay wrote a letter to Cuevas requesting for a statement on AMPI's inventory of British Leyland spare parts, indicating: "1. Opening stock by part number. "2. Sales made by part number and price obtained. "3. Net proceeds credited to client account. "4. Present stock holding by part number." (p. 127; Exh. G, RTC Record.) Cuevas replied by telex that some of those spare parts had been sold by Saddul who did not turn over the proceeds to AMPI, and that he (Cuevas) filed a criminal case against Saddul "to recover the money so I can remit immediately" (Exh. H). On March 26, 1987, Lyndsay sent a reply-telex requesting information as to "which items have been sold and at what price and which items remain in stock" and sought "a reconciliation of this stock" (Exh. I). On June 3, 1987, based on Cuevas' complaint, an information for estafa in the amount of P143,085.00 (I.S. No. 86-20607) was filed against Saddul in the Regional Trial Court of Manila: "That in or about and during the period comprised between February 12, 1985 and September 10, 1985, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud AMALGAMATED MOTORS (PHILS.), INC., a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines with business address at Leyland House, 21st corner Railroad Sts., Port Area, this City, in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, being then the Executive Vice-President and General

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Manager of said Amalgamated Motors (Phils.), Inc., having been authorized by Land Rover Parts & Equipment Ltd., England, to undertake disposal of rejected spare parts and engines at the best possible prices available in the local market, which rejected spare parts and engines were then held by Amalgamated Motors (Phils.), Inc. in behalf of the Land Rover Parts & Equipment Ltd. pending disposal and instructions from the latter company, actually disposed and offered the said parts and engines for sale to a certain Jose P. Garcia and obtained from the latter the sum of P143,085.00 as purchase price of the same, and the said accused, once in possession of the said sum of P143,085.00, far from complying with his obligation to turn over the proceeds of the sale to said Amalgamated Motors Phils., Inc., failed and refused, and still fails and refuses to do so notwithstanding demands made upon him, and instead, with intent to defraud, he wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted the same to his own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said AMALGAMATED MOTORS (PHILS.) INC. in the aforesaid total amount of P143,085.00, Philippine currency." (Emphasis supplied; p. 1, RTC Record).: rd On August 6, 1987, Lyndsay wrote Cuevas requesting that all British Leyland parts in the possession of AMPI be delivered to Saddul's Multipart Motors Philippines, Inc. "who is our new parts distributor for the Philippines." He further advised Cuevas that "in view of the change in distributorship to Multipart Motors, we will not hold you (AMPI) liable" for the proceeds (P143,085.00) of the spare parts sold by Saddul to Rover Motor Parts. The letter reads as follows: "6 August 1987 "Amalgamated Motors (Phils.) Inc. Railroad Street Corner 21st Street Port Area Manila Philippines Attention Col. Felimon R. Cuevas Dear Sirs, "We have been advised that Security Bank and Trust Co. have obtained a Writ of Attachment over your properties and assets. We further understand that the parts supplied in error to Philippine Armed Forces and returned to Amalgamated Motors for safe keeping have been included under the Attachment. We therefore request that you inform the bank and the Court that these parts do not form part of your properties and assets and should in consequence, be released from the Attachment. "We should also be pleased if you would transfer these parts to: "Multipart Motors Philippines Inc. who is our new parts distributor for the Philippines. "We would take this opportunity to raise the matter of the parts and major units which were already disposed of before the granting of the Writ of Attachment. "We have been advised by Mr. Jose A. Saddul that he is holding proceeds of sale, amounting to Pesos 143,084.00, of some of the subject parts in line with instructions contained in our letter dated 4 March 1985. We believe that you are aware of this arrangement. Please note that in view of the change in distributorship to Multipart Motors, we will not hold you liable for this amount, but will accept accounts from Mr. Saddul covering the parts he has sold. As agreed, we will provide Amalgamated Motors with a handling charge amounting to 20% of the proceeds and sale of these parts.: nad

"With regard to the balance of parts held by you, we shall be grateful if you will provide to us an account detailing sales made. Upon receipt we will settle your handling charges at 20% of sales as agreed. "We look forward to hearing from you. "Yours sincerely, (SGD) ERWIN LYNDSAY Regional Manager Export Sales" (Italics supplied; Exh. 2, pp. 142-143, RTC Record) Despite the advice from Land Rover, AMPI prosecuted the criminal case against Saddul. On August 29, 1988, the trial court rendered a decision finding him guilty of estafa with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence (Art. 315, subpar. 1-b, Rev. Penal Code). The dispositive part of the decision reads as follows: "WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Jose A. Saddul, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa, defined and penalized under Article 315, par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, involving the amount of P28,617.00 and in the absence of any modifying circumstance, hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum, to indemnify the offended party, Amalgamated Motors (Phils.), Inc., in the amount of P28,617.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs." (p. 26, Rollo.) Saddul appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CR No. 06234.) On September 1, 1989, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. Hence, this petition for review. The Court has carefully considered the petition for review on Certiorari and its annexes, as well as the comments of the public respondent, including the original records which the Court caused to be elevated for examination. We find merit in the petition for review. One of the ways of committing the crime of estafa with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence is: "(b) By misappropriating or converting to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property." (Art. 315, par. 1 subpar. b, Rev. Penal Code.).chanrobles virtual law library The appropriation or conversion of money or property received, to the prejudice of the owner thereof, is the essence of estafa through misappropriation (Ramirez, 9 Phil. 67). The words "convert" and "misappropriate" connote an act of using or disposing of another's property as if it were one's own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. To misappropriate to one's own use includes, not only conversion to one's personal advantage, but also every attempt to dispose of the property of another without right. (Webber vs. Court of Appeals, 57 OG 2937; People vs. Panes, 37 Phil. 118.) Conversion is an unauthorized assumption and exercise of the right of ownership over goods or personal chattels belonging to another, resulting in the alteration of their condition or the exclusion of the owner's rights. It takes place when a person actually appropriates the property of another to his own benefit,

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use, and enjoyment (Trinidad vs. Court of Appeals, 53 OG 731 citing Bouvier's Law Dictionary). The elements of the crime of embezzlement or estafa with abuse of confidence are: (a) that personal property is received in trust, on commission, for administration or under any other circumstance involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though the obligation is guaranteed by a bond; (b) that there is conversion or diversion of such property by the person who has so received it or a denial on his part that he received it; (c) that such conversion, diversion or denial is to the injury of another, and (d) that there be demand for the return of the property, (p. 247, Vol. III, 1988 Ed., Revised Penal Code by R.C. Aquino) The first element of the crime does not exist in this case because Saddul did not receive the Leyland Automotive spare parts from Cuevas or AMPI in trust, on commission, for administration, or under a duty to make delivery of, or return the same. Saddul received the Leyland spare parts from the AFP in trust for LAND ROVER which authorized him to sell them ("we now authorize you to undertake the disposal of the parts at the best possible prices available from your local market" - Exh. 1 or F, p. 126, RTC Record). Since Saddul did not convert or divert the property (he sold them in accordance with the authority given to him by Land Rover) nor did he deny that he received them, the second element of the crime was also not present. Saddul's failure to deliver the proceeds of the sale of the spare parts to AMPI or Cuevas did not constitute a conversion or diversion to the injury of the latter who, not being the owner of the property, incurred no loss and suffered no injury on account of Saddul's retention of the said proceeds while awaiting Land Rover's instructions regarding the special account where he should deposit them. Saddul simply complied with the directive in Land Rover's letter of March 4, 1985 that the proceeds be "placed into a separate client account which will be available to LRPE or any other party authorized by LRPE" (Exh. 1 or F). Implicit in this directive was an injunction not to deliver the proceeds to AMPI. The third element of the crime charged is absent.:-cralaw The fourth and final element of demand for the return of the property is also lacking. AMPI or Cuevas made no demand for the return of the spare parts sold by Saddul because Cuevas knew that those spare parts were to be sold for the account of Land Rover. While it is true that under Lyndsay's letter of March 4, 1985 (Exh. 1 or F) AMPI was entitled to a handling commission of 20% of the sale value of the spare parts (equivalent to P28,617.00) which Saddul failed to deliver to AMPI, Saddul explained that he subsequently received instructions from Land Rover to hold the 20% commission until AMPI shall have given an accounting of the remaining Leyland spare parts (worth P1.2 million) still held by AMPI. (pp. 10, 23-28, tsn, February 15, 1988.) That testimony of Saddul was not controverted by the complainant. On the contrary, it was confirmed by Lyndsay's letter dated August 6, 1987 to AMPI or Cuevas (Exh. 2) asking for an accounting of "balance of the parts held by you . . . upon receipt (of which) ** we will settle your handling charges at 20% of sales as agreed."

By obeying the instructions of Land Rover to withhold payment of AMPI's 20% handling charge (P28,617.00) Saddul did not become liable for embezzlement to AMPI for he did not receive that sum from AMPI. It was part of the price he received from Rover Motor Parts, the buyer of the spare parts. "Where the accused did not receive the money from the complainant for safekeeping or on commission or for administration and in trust, he is not criminally liable for failure to return the money." (Jose Barredo vs. Court of Appeals, 54 OG 1037). AMPI's recourse, in order to recover its 20% handling charge, is to file a civil action to collect that amount from its erstwhile principal, Land Rover, not this criminal action for estafa against Saddul.: nad WHEREFORE, the petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the resolution dated April 16, 1990 is granted. The decision dated September 1, 1989, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 06234 is hereby reversed and set aside. The petitioner is acquitted of the crime charged, with costs de oficio. SO ORDERED. SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. 82495 : December 10, 1990.] 192 SCRA 246 ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. HON. SECRETARY SEDFREY ORDOEZ (Public Respondent) and ALFREDO CHING (Private Respondent), Respondents. DECISION PADILLA, J.: In this special civil action for Certiorari, the interpretation by the Department of Justice of the penal provision of PD 115, the Trust Receipts Law, is assailed by petitioner. The relevant facts are as follows: On 23 January 1981, Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM, for short) thru its duly authorized officer, private respondent Alfredo Ching, applied for the issuance of commercial letters of credit with petitioner's Makati branch to finance the purchase of 500 M/T Magtar Branch Dolomites and one (1) Lot High Fired Refractory Sliding Nozzle Bricks. Petitioner issued an irrevocable letter of credit in favor of Nikko Industry Co., Ltd. (Nikko) by virtue of which the latter drew four (4) drafts which were accepted by PBM and duly honored and paid by the petitioner bank.:- nad To secure payment of the amount covered by the drafts, and in consideration of the transfer by petitioner of the possession of the goods to PBM, the latter as entrustee, thru private respondent, executed four (4) Trust Receipt Agreements with maturity dates on 19 May, 3 and 24 June 1981 acknowledging petitioner's ownership of the goods and its (PBM'S) obligation to turn over the proceeds of the sale of the goods, if sold, or to return the same, if unsold within the stated period. Out of the said obligation resulted an overdue amount of P1,475,274.09. Despite repeated demands, PBM failed and refused to either turn over the proceeds of the sale of the goods or to return the same. On 7 September 1984, petitioner filed a criminal complaint against private respondent for violation of PD 115 before the office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal. After preliminary investigation wherein private respondent failed to appear or

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submit a counter-affidavit and even refused to receive the subpoena, the Fiscal found a prima facie case for violation of PD 115 on four (4) counts and filed the corresponding information in court. Private respondent appealed the Fiscal's resolution to the Department of Justice on three (3) grounds: 1. Lack of proper preliminary investigation; 2. The Provincial Fiscal of Rizal did not have jurisdiction over the case, as respondent's obligation was purely civil; 3. There had been a novation of the obligation by the substitution of the person of the Rehabilitation Receivers in place of both PBM and private respondent Ching. Then Secretary of Justice (now Senator) Neptali A. Gonzales, in a 24 September 1986 letter/resolution, 1 held: "Your contention that respondent's obligation was purely a civil one, is without any merit. The four (4) Trust Receipt Agreements entered into by respondent and complainant appear regular in form and in substance. Their agreement regarding interest, not being contrary to law, public policy or morals, public order or good custom, is a valid stipulation which does not change the character of the said Trust Receipt Agreements. Further, as precisely pointed out by complainant, raw materials for manufacture of goods to be ultimately sold are proper objects of a trust receipt. Thus, respondent's failure to remit to the complainant proceeds of the sale of the finished products if sold or the finished products themselves if not sold, at the maturity dates of the trust receipts, constitutes a violation of P.D. 115." 2 A motion for reconsideration alleged that, as PBM was under rehabilitation receivership, no criminal liability can be imputed to herein respondent Ching. On 17 March 1987, Undersecretary Silvestre H. Bello III denied said motion. The pertinent portion of the denial resolution states::-cralaw "It cannot be denied that the offense was consummated long before the appointment of rehabilitation receivers. The filing of a criminal case against respondent Ching is not only for the purpose of effectuating a collection of a debt but primarily for the purpose of punishing an offender for a crime committed not only against the complaining witness but also against the state. The crime of estafa for violation of the Trust Receipts Law is a special offense or mala prohibita. It is a fundamental rule in criminal law that when the crime is punished by a special law, the act alone, irrespective of its motives, constitutes the offense. In the instant case the failure of the entrustee to pay complainant the remaining balance of the value of the goods covered by the trust receipt when the same became due constitutes the offense penalized under Section 13 of P.D. No. 115; and on the basis of this failure alone, the prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case (Res. No. 671, s. 1981; Allied Banking Corporation vs. Reinhard Sagemuller, et al., Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, September 18, 1981). "Likewise untenable is your contention that 'rehabilitation proceedings must stay the attempt to enforce a liability in view of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1758.' Section 4 of P.D. No. 1758, provides, among others: '. . . Provided, further, that upon appointment of a management committee, rehabilitation receiver, board or body, pursuant to this Decree, all actions for claims against corporations, partnerships or associations under management or receivership pending before any court, tribunal, board or body shall be suspended accordingly. "You will note that the term 'all actions for claims' refer only to actions for money claims but not to criminal liability of offenders." 3 Another motion for reconsideration was filed by respondent on 9 April 1987 to which an opposition was filed by the petitioner. Private respondent also filed a supplemental request for

reconsideration dated 28 December 1987 with two (2) additional grounds, namely: ". . . 3) there is no evidence on record to show that respondent was in particeps criminis in the act complained of; and 4) there could be no violation of the trust receipt agreements because the articles imported by the corporation and subject of the trust receipts were fungible or consummable goods and do not form part of the steel product itself. These goods were not procured to be sold in whatever state or condition they were in or were supposed to be after the manufacturing process." 4 Because of private respondent's clarification that the goods subject of the trust receipt agreements were dolomites which were specifically used for patching purposes over the surface of furnaces and nozzle bricks which are insulating materials in the lower portion of the ladle which do not form part of the steel product itself, Justice Secretary Sedfrey Ordoez, on 11 January 1988, "rectified" his predecessor's supposed reversible error, and held::-cralaw ". . . it is clear that what the law contemplates or covers are goods which have, for their ultimate destination, the sale thereof or if unsold, their surrender to the entruster, this whether the goods are in their original form or in their manufactured/processed state. Since the goods covered by the trust receipts and subject matter of these proceedings are to be utilized in the operation of the equipment and machineries of the corporation, they could not have been contemplated as being covered by PD 115. It is axiomatic that penal statutes are strictly construed against the state and liberally in favor of the accused (People vs. Purisima, 86 SCRA 542, People vs. Terrado, 125 SCRA 648). This means that penal statutes cannot be enlarged or extended by intendment, implication, or any equitable consideration (People vs. Garcia, 85 Phil. 651). Thus, not all transactions covered by trust receipts may be considered as trust receipt transactions defined and penalized under PD 115. x x x Apparently, the trust receipt agreements were executed as security for the payment of the drafts. As such, the main transaction was that of a loan. . . . In essence, therefore, the relationship between the Bank and the corporation, consequently, the respondent herein likewise included, is that of debtor and creditor. x x x WHEREFORE, premises considered, our resolution dated September 24, 1986, recorded 119 Resolution No. 456, series of 1986, and that dated March 17, 1987, the latter being necessarily dependent upon and incidental to the former, are hereby abrogated and abandoned. You are hereby directed to move for the withdrawal of the informations and the dismissal of the criminal cases filed in court . . ." 5 This time, petitioner Allied Bank filed a motion for reconsideration of the Ordoez resolution, which was resolved by the Department of Justice on 17 February 1988, enunciating that PD 115 covers goods or components of goods which are ultimately destined for sale. It concluded that: ". . . The goods subject of the instant case were shown to have been used and/or consumed in the operation of the equipment and machineries of the corporation, and are therefore outside the ambit of the provisions of PD 115 albeit covered by Trust Receipt agreements . . . Finally, it is noted that under the Sia vs. People (121 SCRA 655 (1983), and Vintola vs. Insular Bank of Asia and America (150 SCRA 578 (1987) rulings, the trend in the Supreme Court appears to be to the effect that trust receipts under PD 115 are treated as security documents for basically loan transactions, so much so that criminal liability is virtually obliterated and limiting liability of the accused to the civil aspect only.

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WHEREFORE, your motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED." 6 From the Department of Justice, petitioner is now before this Court praying for writs ofCertiorari and prohibition to annul the 11 January and 17 February 1988 DOJ rulings, mainly on two (2) grounds: 1. public respondent is without power or authority to declare that a violation of PD 115 is not criminally punishable, thereby rendering a portion of said law inoperative or ineffectual.: nad 2. public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion in holding that the goods covered by the trust receipts are outside the contemplation of PD 115. Private and public respondents both filed their comments on the petition to which a consolidated reply was filed. After the submission of the parties' respective memoranda, the case was calendared for deliberation. Does the penal provision of PD 115 (Trust Receipts Law) apply when the goods covered by a Trust Receipt do not form part of the finished products which are ultimately sold but are instead, utilized/used up in the operation of the equipment and machineries of the entrustee-manufacturer? The answer must be in the affirmative, Section 4 of said PD 115 says in part: "Sec. 4. What constitutes a trust receipt transaction. A trust receipt transaction, within the meaning of this Decree, is any transaction by and between a person referred to in this Decree as the entrustee, and another person referred to in this Decree as the entrustee, whereby the entruster, who owns or holds absolute title or security interests over certain specified goods, documents or instruments, releases the same to the possession of the entrustee upon the latter's execution and delivery to the entruster of a signed document called a 'trust receipt' wherein the entrustee binds himself to hold the designated goods, documents or instruments in trust for the entruster and to sell or otherwise dispose of the goods, documents or instruments with the obligation to turn over to the entruster the proceeds thereof to the extent of the amount owing to the entruster or as appears in the trust receipt or the goods, documents or instruments themselves, if they are unsold or not otherwise disposed of, in accordance with the terms and conditions specified in the trust receipt, . . ." Respondent Ching contends that PBM is not in the business of selling Magtar Branch Dolomites or High Fired Refractory Sliding Nozzle Bricks, it is a manufacturer of steel and steel products. But PBM, as entrustee under the trust receipts has, under Sec. 9 of PD 115, the following obligations, inter alia: (a) receive the proceeds of sale, in trust for the entruster and turn over the same to the entruster to the extent of the amount owing to him or as appears on the trust receipt; (b) keep said goods or proceeds thereof whether in money or whatever form, separate and capable of identification as property of the entruster; (c) return the goods, documents or instruments in the event of nonsale, or upon demand of the entruster; and (d) observe all other terms and conditions of the trust receipt not contrary to the provisions of said Decree. 7 The trust receipts, there is an obligation to repay the entruster. 8 Their terms are to be interpreted in accordance with the general rules on contracts, the law being alert in all cases to prevent fraud on the part of either party to the transaction. 9 The entrustee binds himself to sell or otherwise dispose of the entrusted goods with the obligation to turn over to the entruster the proceeds if sold, or return the goods if unsold or not otherwise disposed of, in accordance with the terms and conditions specified in the trust receipt. A violation of this undertaking constitutes estafa under Sec. 13, PD 115. And even assuming the absence of a clear provision in the trust receipt agreement, Lee v. Rodil 10 and Sia v. CA 11 have held:

Acts involving the violation of trust receipt agreements occurring after 29 January 1973 (when PD 115 was issued) would render the accused criminally liable for estafa under par. 1(b), Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code, pursuant to the explicit provision in Sec. 13 of PD 115. 12 The act punishable is malum prohibitum. Respondent Secretary's prognostication of the Supreme Court's supposed inclination to treat trust receipts as mere security documents for loan transactions, thereby obliterating criminal liability, appears to be a misjudgment. 13 In an attempt to escape criminal liability, private respondent claims PD 115 covers goods which are ultimately destined for sale and not goods for use in manufacture. But the wording of Sec. 13 covers failure to turn over the proceeds of the sale of entrusted goods, or to return said goods if unsold or disposed of in accordance with the terms of the trust receipts. Private respondent claims that at the time of PBM's application for the issuance of the LC's, it was not represented to the petitioner that the items were intended for sale, 14 hence, there was no deceit resulting in a violation of the trust receipts which would constitute a criminal liability. Again, we cannot uphold this contention. The non-payment of the amount covered by a trust receipt is an act violative of the entrustee's obligation to pay. There is no reason why the law should not apply to all transactions covered by trust receipts, except those expressly excluded. 15 The Court takes judicial notice of customary banking and business practices where trust receipts are used for importation of heavy equipment, machineries and supplies used in manufacturing operations. We are perplexed by the statements in the assailed DOJ resolution that the goods subject of the instant case are outside the ambit of the provisions of PD 115 albeit covered by Trust Receipt Agreements (17 February 1988 resolution) and that not all transactions covered by trust receipts may be considered as trust receipt transactions defined and penalized under PD 115 (11 January 1988 resolution). A construction should be avoided when it affords an opportunity to defeat compliance with the terms of a statute.: nad "A construction of a statute which creates an inconsistency should be avoided when a reasonable interpretation can be adopted which will not do violence to the plain words of the act and will carry out the intention of Congress. In the construction of statutes, the courts start with the assumption that the legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not to be presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. Hence, it is a general principle, embodied in the maxim, 'ut res magis valeat quam pereat,' that the courts should, if reasonably possible to do so without violence to the spirit and language of an act, so interpret the statute to give it efficient operation and effect as a whole. An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided, under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative, or nugatory." 16 The penal provision of PD 115 encompasses any act violative of an obligation covered by the trust receipt; it is not limited to transactions in goods which are to be sold (retailed), reshipped, stored or processed as a component of a product ultimately sold. To uphold the Justice Department's ruling would contravene not only the letter but the spirit of PD 115. "An examination of P.D. 115 shows the growing importance of trust receipts in Philippine business, the need to provide for the rights and obligations of parties to a trust receipt transaction, the study of the problems involved and the action by monetary authorities, and the necessity of regulating the enforcement of rights arising from default or violations of trust receipt agreements. The legislative intent to meet a pressing need is clearly expressed . . ." 17

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WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The temporary restraining order issued on 13 April 1988 restraining the enforcement of the questioned DOJ resolutions dated 11 January 1988 and 17 February 1988 directing the provincial fiscal to move for the dismissal of the criminal case filed before the RTC of Makati, Branch 143 and the withdrawal of IS-No. 843140, is made permanent. Let this case be remanded to said RTC for disposition in accordance with this decision. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. L-63559 May 30, 1986 NEWSWEEK, INC., Petitioner, vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, and NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE PLANTERS INC., BINALBAGANISABELA PLANTERS ASSOCIATION, INC., ASOCIACION DE AGRICULTORES DE LA CARLOTA, LA CASTELLANA y PONTEVEDRA, INC., DONEDCO PLANTERS ASSOCIATION INC., ARMANDO GUSTILO, ENRIQUE ROJAS, ALFREDO MONTELIBANO, JR., PABLO SOLA, JOSE MONTALVO, VICENTE GUSTILO, JOSEPH MARANON, ROBERTO CUENCA, JOSE SICANGCO, FLORENCIO ALONSO, MIGUEL GATUSLAO, PEDRO YULO, MARINO RUBIN and BENJAMIN BAUTISTA, Respondents. San Juan, Africa, Gonzales & San Agustin Law Offices for private respondents. -->

public in general. They prayed that defendants be ordered to pay them PlM as actual and compensatory damages, and such amounts for moral, exemplary and corrective damages as the court may determine, plus expenses of litigation, attorney's fees and costs of suit. A photo copy of the article was attached to the complaint.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On November 5, 1981, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that (1) the printed article sued upon is not actionable in fact and in law; and (2) the complaint is bereft of allegations that state, much less support a cause of action. It pointed out the non-libelous nature of the article and, consequently, the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action. Private respondents filed an Opposition to the motion to dismiss and petitioner filed a reply.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On March 17, 1982, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss, stating that the grounds on which the motion to dismiss are predicated are not indubitable as the complaint on its face states a valid cause of action; and the question as to whether the printed article sued upon its actionable or not is a matter of evidence. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied on May 28, 1982.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On June 18, 1982, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with respondent Court (CA-G. R. No. 14406) seeking the annulment of the aforecited trial court's Orders for having been issued with such a grave abuse of discretion as amounting to lack of jurisdiction and praying for the dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library As earlier stated, respondent Court affirmed the trial court's Orders in a Decision dated December 17, 1982 and ordered the case to be tried on the merits on the grounds that -(1) the complaint contains allegations of fact which called for the presentation of evidence; and (2) certiorari under Rule 65 cannot be made to substitute for an appeal where an appeal would lie at a proper time. Subsequently, on March 10, 1983, the respondent Court denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid decision, hence this petition.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The proper remedy which petitioner should have taken from the decision of respondent Court is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and not the special civil action of certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of said Rules. However, since the petition was filed on time within fifteen days from notice of the Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, we shall treat the same as a petition for review on certiorari. The two (2) issues raised in the petition are: (1) whether or not the private respondents' complaint failed to state a cause of action; and (2) whether or not the petition for certiorari and prohibition is proper to question the denial of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library First, petitioner argues that private respondents' complaint failed to state a cause of action because the complaint made no allegation that anything contained in the article complained of regarding sugarcane planters referred specifically to any one of the private respondents; that libel can be committed only against individual reputation; and that in cases where libel is claimed to have been directed at a group, there is actionable defamation only if the libel can be said to reach beyond the mere collectivity to do damage to a specific, individual group member's reputation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

FERIA, J.: chanrobles virtual law library Petitioner, Newsweek, Inc., a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines, in this special action for certiorari, prohibition with preliminary injunction, seeks to annul the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court dated December 17, 1982 sustaining the Order of the then Court of First Instance of Bacolod City which denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss the complaint for libel filed by private respondents (Civil Case No. 15812), and the Resolution dated March 10, 1983 which denied its Motion for virtual Reconsideration.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles law library It appears that on March 5, 1981, private respondents, incorporated associations of sugarcane planters in Negros Occidental claiming to have 8,500 members and several individual sugar planters, filed Civil Case No. 15812 in their own behalf and/or as a class suit in behalf of all sugarcane planters in the province of Negros Occidental, against petitioner and two of petitioners' non-resident correspondents/reporters Fred Bruning and Barry Came. The complaint alleged that petitioner and the other defendants committed libel against them by the publication of the article "An Island of Fear" in the February 23, 1981 issue of petitioner's weekly news magazineNewsweek. The article supposedly portrayed the island province of Negros Occidental as a place dominated by big landowners or sugarcane planters who not only exploited the impoverished and underpaid sugarcane workers/laborers, but also brutalized and killed them with imprunity. Complainants therein alleged that said article, taken as a whole, showed a deliberate and malicious use of falsehood, slanted presentation and/or misrepresentation of facts intended to put them (sugarcane planters) in bad light, expose them to public ridicule, discredit and humiliation here in the Philippines and abroad, and make them objects of hatred, contempt and hostility of their agricultural workers and of the

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We agree with petitioner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In the case of Corpus vs. Cuaderno, Sr. (16 SCRA 807) this Court ruled that "in order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable (People vs. Monton, L-16772, November 30, 1962), although it is not necessary that he be named (19 A.L.R. 116)." In an earlier case, this Court declared that" ... defamatory matter which does not reveal the Identity of the person upon whom the imputation is cast, affords no ground of action unless it be shown that the readers of the libel could have Identified the personality of the individual defamed." (Kunkle vs. Cablenews-American and Lyons 42 Phil. 760).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library This principle has been recognized to be of vital importance, especially where a group or class of persons, as in the case at bar, claim to have been defamed, for it is evident that the larger the collectivity, the more difficult it is for the individual member to prove that the defamatory remarks apply to him. (Cf. 70 ALR 2d. 1384).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In the case of Uy Tioco vs. Yang Shu Wen , 32 Phil. 624, this Court held as follows: Defamatory remarks directed at a class or group of persons in general language only, are not actionable by individuals composing the class or group unless the statements are sweeping; and it is very probable that even then no action would lie where the body is composed of so large a number of persons that common sense would tell those to whom the publication was made that there was room for persons connected with the body to pursue an upright and law abiding course and that it would be unreasonable and absurd to condemn all because of the actions of a part. (supra p. 628). It is evident from the above ruling that where the defamation is alleged to have been directed at a group or class, it is essential that the statement must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to every individual in that group or class, or sufficiently specific so that each individual in the class or group can prove that the defamatory statement specifically pointed to him, so that he can bring the action separately, if need be.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library We note that private respondents filed a "class suit" in representation of all the 8,500 sugarcane planters of Negros Occidental. Petitioner disagrees and argues that the absence of any actionable basis in the complaint cannot be cured by the filing of a class suit on behalf of the aforesaid sugar planters.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library We find petitioner's meritorious.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles library contention virtual law

The disputed portion of the article which refers to plaintiff Sola and which was claimed to be libelous never singled out plaintiff Sola as a sugar planter. The news report merely stated that the victim had been arrested by members of a special police unit brought into the area by Pablo Sola, the mayor of Kabankalan. Hence, the report, referring as it does to an official act performed by an elective public official, is within the realm of privilege and protected by the constitutional guarantees of free speech and press.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The article further stated that Sola and the commander of the special police unit were arrested. The Court takes judicial notice of this fact. (People vs. Sola, 103 SCRA 393.) chanrobles virtual law library The second issue to be resolved here is whether or not the special civil action of certiorari or prohibition is available to petitioner whose motion to dismiss the complaint and subsequent motion for reconsideration were denied.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library As a general rule, an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and cannot be subject of appeal until final judgment or order is rendered. (Sec. 2 of Rule 4 1). The ordinary procedure to be followed in such a case is to file an answer, go to trial and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment. The same rule applies to an order denying a motion to quash, except that instead of filing an answer a plea is entered and no appeal lies from a judgment of acquittal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library This general rule is subject to certain exceptions. If the court, in denying the motion to dismiss or motion to quash, acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, then certiorari or prohibition lies. The reason is that it would be unfair to require the defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense, or is not the court of proper venue, or if the denial of the motion to dismiss or motion to quash is made with grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment. In such cases, the ordinary remedy of appeal cannot be plain and adequate. The following are a few examples of the exceptions to the general rule.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In De Jesus vs. Garcia (19 SCRA 554), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and prohibition against the City Court of Manila and directed the respondent court to dismiss the case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In Lopez vs. City Judge (18 SCRA 616), upon the denial of a motion to quash based on lack of jurisdiction over the offense, this Court granted the petition for prohibition and enjoined the respondent court from further proceeding in the case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In Enriquez vs. Macadaeg (84 Phil. 674), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on improper venue, this Court granted the petition for prohibition and enjoined the respondent judge from taking cognizance of the case except to dismiss the same.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In Manalo vs. Mariano (69 SCRA 80), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on bar by prior judgment, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and directed the respondent judge to dismiss the case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The case at bar is not a class suit. It is not a case where one or more may sue for the benefit of all (Mathay vs. Consolidated Bank and Trust Company, 58 SCRA 559) or where the representation of class interest affected by the judgment or decree is indispensable to make each member of the class an actual party (Borlaza vs. Polistico, 47 Phil. 348). We have here a case where each of the plaintiffs has a separate and distinct reputation in the community. They do not have a common or general interest in the subject matter of the controversy.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

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In Yuviengco vs. Dacuycuy (105 SCRA 668), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on the Statute of Frauds, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and dismissed the amended complaint.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In Tacas vs. Cariaso (72 SCRA 527), this Court granted the petition for certiorari after the motion to quash based on double jeopardy was denied by respondent judge and ordered him to desist from further action in the criminal case except to dismiss the same.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In People vs. Ramos (83 SCRA 11), the order denying the motion to quash based on prescription was set aside on certiorari and the criminal case was dismissed by this Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Respondent Court correctly stated the general rule and its exceptions. However, it ruled that none of the exceptions is present in the case at bar and that the case appears complex and complicated, necessitating a full-blown trial to get to the bottom of the controversy.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Petitioner's motion to dismiss is based on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action against it by pointing out the non-libelous nature of the article sued upon. There is no need of a trial in view of the conclusion of this Court that the article in question is not libelous. The specific allegation in the complaint, to the effect that the article attributed to the sugarcane planters the deaths and brutalization of sugarcane workers, is not borne out by a perusal of the actual text.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The complaint contains a recital of the favorable working conditions of the agricultural workers in the sugar industry and the various foundations and programs supported by planters' associations for the benefit of their workers. Undoubtedly, the statements in the article in question are sweeping and exaggerated; but, paraphrasing the ruling in the Uy Tioco case above quoted, it would be unreasonable and absurd to condemn the majority of the sugarcane planters, who have at heart the welfare of their workers, because of the actions of a part. Nonetheless, articles such as the one in question may also serve to prick the consciences of those who have but are not doing anything or enough for those who do not have.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On the other hand, petitioner would do well to heed the admonition of the President to media that they should check the sources of their information to ensure the publication of the truth. Freedom of the press, like all freedoms, should be exercised with responsibility.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library WHEREFORE, the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is reversed and the complaint in Civil Case No. 15812 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental is dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995 LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner, vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS, respondents. VITUG, J.: Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial provision introduced by the Family Code is Article 36 (as amended by E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July 1987), which declares: Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. The present petition for review on certiorari , at the instance of Leouel Santos ("Leouel"), brings into fore the above provision which is now invoked by him. Undaunted by the decisions of the court a quo 1 and the Court of Appeal, 2 Leouel persists in beseeching its application in his attempt to have his marriage with herein private respondent, Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos ("Julia"), declared a nullity. It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia. The meeting later proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy, and he was christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound to happen, Leouel averred, because of the frequent interference by Julia's parents into the young spouses family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel" over a number of other things, like when and where the couple should start living independently from Julia's parents or whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with his own parents. On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first time by long distance telephone. She promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the United States, where he underwent a training program under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail. Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the regional trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 30, a complaint for "Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code" (docketed, Civil Case No. 9814). Summons was served by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in Negros Oriental. On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel), opposed the complaint and denied its allegations, claiming, in main, that it was the petitioner who had, in fact, been irresponsible and incompetent. A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of their marriage was ruled out by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to the court). On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly been set, albeit unsuccessfully, by the court, Julia ultimately filed a

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manifestation, stating that she would neither appear nor submit evidence. On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. 3 Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the decision of the trial court. 4 The petition should be denied not only because of its noncompliance with Circular 28-91, which requires a certification of non-shopping, but also for its lack of merit. Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with him, for more than five years are circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life. In his own words, Leouel asserts: . . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos failed all these years to communicate with the petitioner. A wife who does not care to inform her husband about her whereabouts for a period of five years, more or less, is psychologically incapacitated. The family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity." The deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee, which has drafted the Code, can, however, provide an insight on the import of the provision. Art 35 . The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: xxx xxx xxx Art 36 . . . (7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration. On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon Law, Justice (Jose B.L.) Reyes suggested that they say "wanting in sufficient use," but Justice (Eduardo) Caguioa preferred to say "wanting in the sufficient use." On the other hand, Justice Reyes proposed that they say "wanting in sufficient reason." Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that the idea is that one is not lacking in judgment but that he is lacking in the exercise of judgment. He added that lack of judgment would make the marriage voidable. Judge (Alicia Sempio-) Diy remarked that lack of judgment is more serious than insufficient use of judgment and yet the latter would make the marriage null and void and the former only voidable. Justice Caguioa suggested that subparagraph (7) be modified to read: "That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration." Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was wanting in sufficient use of reason of judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage" refers to defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea in subparagraph (7), but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligations.

Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is also a psychological or mental incapacity, why is "insanity" only a ground for annulment and not for declaration or nullity? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that in insanity, there is the appearance of consent, which is the reason why it is a ground for voidable marriages, while subparagraph (7) does not refer to consent but to the very essence of marital obligations. Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in subparagraph (7), the word "mentally" be deleted, with which Justice Caguioa concurred. Judge Diy, however, prefers to retain the word "mentally." Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7) refers to psychological impotence. Justice (Ricardo) Puno stated that sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but not with another. Justice (Leonor Ines-) Luciano said that it is called selective impotency. Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies in the fact that in inserting the Canon Law annulment in the Family Code, the Committee used a language which describes a ground for voidable marriages under the Civil Code. Justice Caguioa added that in Canon Law, there are voidable marriages under the Canon Law, there are no voidable marriages Dean Gupit said that this is precisely the reason why they should make a distinction. Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the defects in marriage cannot be cured. Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is "insanity" a ground for void ab initio marriages? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that insanity is curable and there are lucid intervals, while psychological incapacity is not. On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the phrase "even if such lack or incapacity is made manifest" be modified to read "even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest." Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of the marriage, it is not apparent. Justice Caguioa stated that there are two interpretations of the phrase "psychological or mentally incapacitated" in the first one, there is vitiation of consent because one does not know all the consequences of the marriages, and if he had known these completely, he might not have consented to the marriage. xxx xxx xxx Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making psychological incapacity a ground for voidable marriages since otherwise it will encourage one who really understood the consequences of marriage to claim that he did not and to make excuses for invalidating the marriage by acting as if he did not understand the obligations of marriage. Dean Gupit added that it is a loose way of providing for divorce. xxx xxx xxx Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of incapacity by reason of defects in the mental faculties, which is less than insanity, there is a defect in consent and, therefore, it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are cases when the insanity is curable. He emphasized that psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties

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and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage. xxx xxx xxx On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.) Romero inquired if they do not consider it as going to the very essence of consent. She asked if they are really removing it from consent. In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that, ultimately, consent in general is effected but he stressed that his point is that it is not principally a vitiation of consent since there is a valid consent. He objected to the lumping together of the validity of the marriage celebration and the obligations attendant to marriage, which are completely different from each other, because they require a different capacity, which is eighteen years of age, for marriage but in contract, it is different. Justice Puno, however, felt that psychological incapacity is still a kind of vice of consent and that it should not be classified as a voidable marriage which is incapable of convalidation; it should be convalidated but there should be no prescription. In other words, as long as the defect has not been cured, there is always a right to annul the marriage and if the defect has been really cured, it should be a defense in the action for annulment so that when the action for annulment is instituted, the issue can be raised that actually, although one might have been psychologically incapacitated, at the time the action is brought, it is no longer true that he has no concept of the consequence of marriage. Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not cohabitation be a defense? In response, Justice Puno stated that even the bearing of children and cohabitation should not be a sign that psychological incapacity has been cured. Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still insanity of a lesser degree. Justice Luciano suggested that they invite a psychiatrist, who is the expert on this matter. Justice Caguioa, however, reiterated that psychological incapacity is not a defect in the mind but in the understanding of the consequences of marriage, and therefore, a psychiatrist will not be a help. Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that there is a lucid interval in insanity, there are also momentary periods when there is an understanding of the consequences of marriage. Justice Reyes and Dean Gupit remarked that the ground of psychological incapacity will not apply if the marriage was contracted at the time when there is understanding of the consequences of marriage. 5 xxx xxx xxx Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity to copulate among the grounds for void marriages. Justice Reyes commented that in some instances the impotence that in some instances the impotence is only temporary and only with respect to a particular person. Judge Diy stated that they can specify that it is incurable. Justice Caguioa remarked that the term "incurable" has a different meaning in law and in medicine. Judge Diy stated that "psychological incapacity" can also be cured. Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that "psychological incapacity" is incurable. Justice Puno observed that under the present draft provision, it is enough to show that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one was psychologically incapacitated so that later on if already he can comply with the essential marital obligations, the marriage is still void ab initio . Justice Caguioa explained that since in divorce, the psychological incapacity may occur after the marriage, in void marriages, it has to be at the time of the celebration of marriage. He, however, stressed that the idea in

the provision is that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations, which incapacity continues and later becomes manifest. Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is possible that after the marriage, one's psychological incapacity become manifest but later on he is cured. Justice Reyes and Justice Caguioa opined that the remedy in this case is to allow him to remarry. 6 xxx xxx xxx Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows: Art. 37. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated, to comply with the essential obligations of marriage shall likewise be void from the beginning even if such incapacity becomes manifest after its solemnization. Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be substituted with "although." On the other hand, Prof. Bautista proposed that the clause "although such incapacity becomes manifest after its solemnization" be deleted since it may encourage one to create the manifestation of psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa pointed out that, as in other provisions, they cannot argue on the basis of abuse. Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and physical incapacities, which are lesser in degree than psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa explained that mental and physical incapacities are vices of consent while psychological incapacity is not a species of vice or consent. Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the minutes of their February 9, 1984 meeting: "On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that the phrase "psychological or mental impotence" is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase. He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as "psychological or mental incapacity to discharge . . ." Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word "mental" precisely to distinguish it from vice of consent. He explained that "psychological incapacity" refers to lack of understanding of the essential obligations of marriage. Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last meeting, they have decided not to go into the classification of "psychological incapacity" because there was a lot of debate on it and that this is precisely the reason why they classified it as a special case. At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there having been annulments of marriages arising from psychological incapacity, Civil Law should not reconcile with Canon Law because it is a new ground even under Canon Law. Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common provision in Civil Law and in Canon Law, are they going to have a provision in the Family Code to the effect that marriages annulled or declared void by the church on the ground of psychological incapacity is automatically annulled in Civil Law? The other members replied negatively.

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Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37 should be retroactive or prospective in application. Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity because it is their answer to the problem of church annulments of marriages, which are still valid under the Civil Law. On the other hand, Justice Reyes and Justice Puno were concerned about the avalanche of cases. Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a vote, which the Committee approved. The members voted as follows:

One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties, 10 giving an account on how the third paragraph of Canon 1095 has been framed, states: The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any doubt that the legislator intended, indeed, to broaden the rule. A strict and narrow norm was proposed first: Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of marriage because of a grave psycho-sexual anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychosexualem) are unable to contract marriage ( cf.SCH/1975, canon 297, a new canon, novus); then a broader one followed:

(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero were for prospectivity. (2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof. Bautista and Director Eufemio were for retroactivity. (3) Prof. Baviera abstained.

. . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychicam) . . . ( cf. SCH/1980, canon 1049); then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to the pope ( cf. SCH/1982, canon 1095, 3); finally, a new version was promulgated:

Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the prescriptive period of ten years within which the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage should be filed in court. The Committee approved the suggestion. 7 It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in ultimately deciding to adopt the provision with less specificity than expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to allow some resiliency in its application. Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code Committee, has been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita vs Hon . Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994); thus: 8 The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis . Rather, the Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law. A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, 9 which reads: Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage: 1. who lack sufficient use of reason; 2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essentila matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and accepted mutually; 3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage . (Emphasis supplied.) Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that persuasive for having no juridical or secular effect, the jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the code's enactment, nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as impertinent for its value as an aid, at least, to the interpretation or construction of the codal provision.

because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas naturae psychiae). So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological anomaly, then the term anomaly was altogether eliminated. it would be, however, incorrect to draw the conclusion that the cause of the incapacity need not be some kind of psychological disorder; after all, normal and healthy person should be able to assume the ordinary obligations of marriage. Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity" defies any precise definition since psychological causes can be of an infinite variety. In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage," written by Ignatius Gramunt, Javier Hervada and LeRoy Wauck, the following explanation appears: This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage. Some psychosexual disorders and other disorders of personality can be the psychic cause of this defect, which is here described in legal terms. This particular type of incapacity consists of a real inability to render what is due by the contract . This could be compared to the incapacity of a farmer to enter a binding contract to deliver the crops which he cannot possibly reap; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage : the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The mere difficulty of assuming these obligations, which could be overcome by normal effort, obviously does not constitute incapacity. The canon contemplates a true psychological disorder which incapacitates a person from giving what is due ( cf. John Paul II, Address to R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987). However, if the marriage is to be declared invalid under this incapacity, it must be proved not only that the person is afflicted by a psychological defect, but that the defect did in fact deprive the person, at the moment of giving consent, of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and consequently of the possibility of being bound by these duties. Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1), who opines that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)

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incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's "Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This pschologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate." The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity. Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable. Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should continue to be reminded that innate in our society, then enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Article 1 of the Family Code, is that Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the

family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. (Emphasis supplied.) Our Constitution is no less emphatic: Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development. Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. (Article XV, 1987 Constitution). The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus of our laws on marriage and the family, and they are doubt the tenets we still hold on to. The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur. Feliciano, J., is on leave. Separate Opinions PADILLA, J., dissenting: It is difficult to dissent from a well-written and studied opinion as Mr. Justice Vitug's ponencia . But, after an extended reflection on the facts of this case, I cannot see my way clear into holding, as the majority do, that there is no ground for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and private respondent. To my mind, it is clear that private respondent has been shown to be psychologically incapacitated to comply with at least one essential marital obligation, i.e. that of living and cohabiting with her husband, herein petitioner. On the other hand, it has not been shown that petitioner does not deserve to live and cohabit with his wife, herein private respondent. There appears to be no disagreement that the term "psychological incapacity" defies precision in definition. But, as used in Article 36 of the Family Code as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage, the intent of the framers of the Code is evidently to expand and liberalize the grounds for nullifying a marriage, as well pointed out by Madam Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero in her separate opinion in this case. While it is true that the board term "psychological incapacity" can open the doors to abuse by couples who may wish to have an easy way out of their marriage, there are, however, enough safeguards against this contingency, among which, is the intervention by the State, through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence.

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In their case at bench, it has been abundantly established that private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos exhibits specific behavior which, to my mind, shows that she is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital obligations, to writ: a. It took her seven (7) months after she left for the United States to call up her husband. b. Julia promised to return home after her job contract expired in July 1989, but she never did and neither is there any showing that she informed her husband (herein petitioner) of her whereabouts in the U.S.A. c. When petitioner went to the United States on a mission for the Philippine Army, he exerted efforts to "touch base" with Julia; there were no similar efforts on the part of Julia; there were no similar efforts on the part of Julia to do the same. d. When petitioner filed this suit, more than five (5) years had elapsed, without Julia indicating her plans to rejoin the petitioner or her whereabouts. e. When petitioner filed this case in the trial court, Julia, in her answer, claimed that it is the former who has been irresponsible and incompetent. f. During the trial, Julia waived her right to appear and submit evidence. A spouse's obligation to live and cohabit with his/her partner in marriage is a basic ground rule in marriage, unless there are overpowering compelling reasons such as, for instance, an incurable contagious disease on the part of a spouse or cruelty of one partner, bordering on insanity. There may also be instances when, for economic and practical reasons, husband and wife have to live separately, but the marital bond between the spouses always remains. Mutual love and respect for each other would, in such cases, compel the absent spouse to at least have regular contracts with the other to inform the latter of his/her condition and whereabouts. In the present case, it is apparent that private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos has no intention of cohabiting with petitioner, her husband, or maintaining contact with him. In fact, her acts eloquently show that she does not want her husband to know of her whereabouts and neither has she any intention of living and cohabiting with him. To me there appears to be, on the part of private respondent, an unmistakeable indication of psychological incapacity to comply with her essential marital obligations, although these indications were made manifest after the celebration of the marriage. It would be a great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a much too restrictive interpretation of the law and compel the petitioner to continue to be married to a wife who for purposes of fulfilling her marital duties has, for all practical purposes, ceased to exist. Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the Court makes today. Is it not, in effect directly or indirectly, facilitating the transformation of petitioner into a "habitual tryster" or one forced to maintain illicit relations with another woman or women with emerging problems of illegitimate children, simply because he is denied by private respondent, his wife, the companionship and conjugal love which he has sought from her and to which he is legally entitled?

I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a sanction for absolute divorce but I submit that we should not constrict it to non-recognition of its evident purpose and thus deny to one like petitioner, an opportunity to turn a new leaf in his life by declaring his marriage a nullity by reason of his wife's psychological incapacity to perform an essential marital obligation. I therefore vote to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE the marriage between petitioner Leouel Santos and private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos VOID on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code. ROMERO, J., concurring: I agree under the circumstances of the case, petitioner is not entitled to have his marriage declared a nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of private respondent. However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Civil Code Revision Committee of the UP Law Center, I wish to add some observations. The letter 1 dated April 15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the Family Law and Civil Code Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the background of the inclusion of the present Article 36 in the Family Code. During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought of including a chapter on absolute divorce in the draft of a new Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been tasked by the IBP and the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact, some members of the Committee were in favor of a nofault divorce between the spouses after a number of years of separation, legal or de-facto . Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to prepare a proposal for an action for dissolution of marriage and the effects thereof based on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of separation between the spouses, with or without a judicial decree of legal separation, and (b) whenever a married person would have obtained a decree of absolute divorce in another country. Actually, such a proposal is one for absolute divorce but called by another name. Later, even the Civil Code Revision Committee took time to discuss the proposal of Justice Reyes on this matter. Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee and Family Law Committee started holding joint meetings on the preparation of the draft of the New Family Code, they agreed and formulated the definition of marriage as "a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by law." With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional concept of marriage of the Filipino people as a permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon which the family and society are founded, and also realizing the strong opposition that any provision on absolute divorce would encounter from the Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of our citizenry to whom the great majority of our people belong, the two Committees in their joint meetings did not pursue the idea of absolute divorce and instead opted for an action for judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage based on grounds available in the Canon Law. It was thought that such an action would not only be an acceptable alternative to

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divorce but would also solve the nagging problem of church annulments of marriages on grounds not recognized by the civil law of the State . Justice Reyes was thus requested to again prepare a draft of provisions on such action for celebration of invalidity of marriage. Still later, to avoid the overlapping of provisions on void marriages as found in the present Civil Code and those proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law, the two Committees now working as a Joint Committee in the preparation of a New Family Code decided to consolidate the present provisions on void marriages with the proposals of Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of an additional kind of void marriage in the enumeration of void marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit : "(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration." as well as the following implementing provisions: "Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or pleaded only on the basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage void, without prejudice to the provision of Article 34." "Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe." xxx xxx xxx It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today may already dissolved or annulled on the grounds proposed by the Joint Committee on declaration of nullity as well as annulment of marriages, thus rendering an absolute divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a conference with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo University as well as another meeting with Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint Committee was informed that since Vatican II, the Catholic Church has been declaring marriages null and void on the ground of "lack of due discretion" for causes that, in other jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for divorce, like teenage or premature marriages; marriage to a man who, because of some personality disorder or disturbance, cannot support a family; the foolish or ridiculous choice of a spouse by an otherwise perfectly normal person; marriage to a woman who refuses to cohabit with her husband or who refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also informed the Committee that they have found out in tribunal work that a lot of machismo among husbands are manifestations of their sociopathic personality anomaly, like inflicting physical violence upon their wives, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychological anomaly. . . . (Emphasis supplied) Clearly, by incorporating what is now Article 36 into the Family Code, the Revision Committee referred to above intended to add another ground to those already listed in the Civil Code as grounds for nullifying a marriage, thus expanding or liberalizing the same. Inherent in the inclusion of the provision on psychological incapacity was the understanding that every petition for declaration of nullity based on it should be treated on a case-to-case basis; hence, the absence of a definition and an enumeration of what constitutes psychological incapacity. Moreover, the Committee feared that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis . But the law requires that the same be existing at the time of marriage although it be manifested later.

Admittedly, the provision on psychological incapacity, just like any other provision of law, is open to abuse. To prevent this, "the court shall take order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed." 2 Moreover, the judge, in interpreting the provision on a case-to-case basis, must be guided by "experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provisions was taken from Canon Law." 3 The constitutional and statutory provisions on the family 4 will remain the lodestar which our society will hope to achieve ultimately. Therefore, the inclusion of Article 36 is not to be taken as an abandonment of the ideal which we all cherish. If at all, it is a recognition of the reality that some marriages, by reason of the incapacity of one of the contracting parties, fall short of this ideal; thus, the parties are constrained to find a way of putting an end to their union through some legally-accepted means. Any criticism directed at the way that judges have interpreted the provision since its enactment as to render it easier for unhappilymarried couples to separate is addressed, not to the wisdom of the lawmakers but to the manner by which some members of the Bench have implemented the provision. These are not interchangeable, each being separate and distinct from the other.
[#] Separate

Opinions

PADILLA, J., dissenting: It is difficult to dissent from a well-written and studied opinion as Mr. Justice Vitug's ponencia . But, after an extended reflection on the facts of this case, I cannot see my way clear into holding, as the majority do, that there is no ground for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and private respondent. To my mind, it is clear that private respondent has been shown to be psychologically incapacitated to comply with at least one essential marital obligation, i.e. that of living and cohabiting with her husband, herein petitioner. On the other hand, it has not been shown that petitioner does not deserve to live and cohabit with his wife, herein private respondent. There appears to be no disagreement that the term "psychological incapacity" defies precision in definition. But, as used in Article 36 of the Family Code as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage, the intent of the framers of the Code is evidently to expand and liberalize the grounds for nullifying a marriage, as well pointed out by Madam Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero in her separate opinion in this case. While it is true that the board term "psychological incapacity" can open the doors to abuse by couples who may wish to have an easy way out of their marriage, there are, however, enough safeguards against this contingency, among which, is the intervention by the State, through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence. In their case at bench, it has been abundantly established that private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos exhibits specific behavior which, to my mind, shows that she is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital obligations, to writ:

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a. It took her seven (7) months after she left for the United States to call up her husband. b. Julia promised to return home after her job contract expired in July 1989, but she never did and neither is there any showing that she informed her husband (herein petitioner) of her whereabouts in the U.S.A. c. When petitioner went to the United States on a mission for the Philippine Army, he exerted efforts to "touch base" with Julia; there were no similar efforts on the part of Julia; there were no similar efforts on the part of Julia to do the same. d. When petitioner filed this suit, more than five (5) years had elapsed, without Julia indicating her plans to rejoin the petitioner or her whereabouts. e. When petitioner filed this case in the trial court, Julia, in her answer, claimed that it is the former who has been irresponsible and incompetent. f. During the trial, Julia waived her right to appear and submit evidence. A spouse's obligation to live and cohabit with his/her partner in marriage is a basic ground rule in marriage, unless there are overpowering compelling reasons such as, for instance, an incurable contagious disease on the part of a spouse or cruelty of one partner, bordering on insanity. There may also be instances when, for economic and practical reasons, husband and wife have to live separately, but the marital bond between the spouses always remains. Mutual love and respect for each other would, in such cases, compel the absent spouse to at least have regular contracts with the other to inform the latter of his/her condition and whereabouts. In the present case, it is apparent that private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos has no intention of cohabiting with petitioner, her husband, or maintaining contact with him. In fact, her acts eloquently show that she does not want her husband to know of her whereabouts and neither has she any intention of living and cohabiting with him. To me there appears to be, on the part of private respondent, an unmistakeable indication of psychological incapacity to comply with her essential marital obligations, although these indications were made manifest after the celebration of the marriage. It would be a great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a much too restrictive interpretation of the law and compel the petitioner to continue to be married to a wife who for purposes of fulfilling her marital duties has, for all practical purposes, ceased to exist. Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the Court makes today. Is it not, in effect directly or indirectly, facilitating the transformation of petitioner into a "habitual tryster" or one forced to maintain illicit relations with another woman or women with emerging problems of illegitimate children, simply because he is denied by private respondent, his wife, the companionship and conjugal love which he has sought from her and to which he is legally entitled? I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a sanction for absolute divorce but I submit that we should not constrict it to non-recognition of its evident purpose and thus deny to one like petitioner, an opportunity to turn a new leaf in his life by declaring his marriage a nullity by reason of his wife's psychological incapacity to perform an essential marital obligation.

I therefore vote to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE the marriage between petitioner Leouel Santos and private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos VOID on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code. ROMERO, J., concurring: I agree under the circumstances of the case, petitioner is not entitled to have his marriage declared a nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of private respondent. However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Civil Code Revision Committee of the UP Law Center, I wish to add some observations. The letter 1 dated April 15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the Family Law and Civil Code Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the background of the inclusion of the present Article 36 in the Family Code. During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought of including a chapter on absolute divorce in the draft of a new Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been tasked by the IBP and the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact, some members of the Committee were in favor of a nofault divorce between the spouses after a number of years of separation, legal or de-facto . Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to prepare a proposal for an action for dissolution of marriage and the effects thereof based on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of separation between the spouses, with or without a judicial decree of legal separation, and (b) whenever a married person would have obtained a decree of absolute divorce in another country. Actually, such a proposal is one for absolute divorce but called by another name. Later, even the Civil Code Revision Committee took time to discuss the proposal of Justice Reyes on this matter. Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee and Family Law Committee started holding joint meetings on the preparation of the draft of the New Family Code, they agreed and formulated the definition of marriage as "a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by law." With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional concept of marriage of the Filipino people as a permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon which the family and society are founded, and also realizing the strong opposition that any provision on absolute divorce would encounter from the Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of our citizenry to whom the great majority of our people belong, the two Committees in their joint meetings did not pursue the idea of absolute divorce and instead opted for an action for judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage based on grounds available in the Canon Law. It was thought that such an action would not only be an acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve the nagging problem of church annulments of marriages on grounds not recognized by the civil law of the State . Justice Reyes was thus requested to again prepare a draft of provisions on such action for celebration of invalidity of marriage. Still later, to avoid the overlapping of provisions on void marriages as found in the present Civil Code and those proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law, the two Committees now working as a Joint Committee in the preparation of a New Family Code

Other cases

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decided to consolidate the present provisions on void marriages with the proposals of Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of an additional kind of void marriage in the enumeration of void marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit : "(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration." as well as the following implementing provisions: "Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or pleaded only on the basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage void, without prejudice to the provision of Article 34." "Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe." xxx xxx xxx It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today may already dissolved or annulled on the grounds proposed by the Joint Committee on declaration of nullity as well as annulment of marriages, thus rendering an absolute divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a conference with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo University as well as another meeting with Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint Committee was informed that since Vatican II, the Catholic Church has been declaring marriages null and void on the ground of "lack of due discretion" for causes that, in other jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for divorce, like teenage or premature marriages; marriage to a man who, because of some personality disorder or disturbance, cannot support a family; the foolish or ridiculous choice of a spouse by an otherwise perfectly normal person; marriage to a woman who refuses to cohabit with her husband or who refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also informed the Committee that they have found out in tribunal work that a lot of machismo among husbands are manifestations of their sociopathic personality anomaly, like inflicting physical violence upon their wives, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychological anomaly. . . . (Emphasis supplied) Clearly, by incorporating what is now Article 36 into the Family Code, the Revision Committee referred to above intended to add another ground to those already listed in the Civil Code as grounds for nullifying a marriage, thus expanding or liberalizing the same. Inherent in the inclusion of the provision on psychological incapacity was the understanding that every petition for declaration of nullity based on it should be treated on a case-to-case basis; hence, the absence of a definition and an enumeration of what constitutes psychological incapacity. Moreover, the Committee feared that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis . But the law requires that the same be existing at the time of marriage although it be manifested later. Admittedly, the provision on psychological incapacity, just like any other provision of law, is open to abuse. To prevent this, "the court shall take order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed." 2 Moreover, the judge, in interpreting the provision on a case-to-case basis, must be guided by "experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given

persuasive effect since the provisions was taken from Canon Law." 3 The constitutional and statutory provisions on the family 4 will remain the lodestar which our society will hope to achieve ultimately. Therefore, the inclusion of Article 36 is not to be taken as an abandonment of the ideal which we all cherish. If at all, it is a recognition of the reality that some marriages, by reason of the incapacity of one of the contracting parties, fall short of this ideal; thus, the parties are constrained to find a way of putting an end to their union through some legally-accepted means. Any criticism directed at the way that judges have interpreted the provision since its enactment as to render it easier for unhappilymarried couples to separate is addressed, not to the wisdom of the lawmakers but to the manner by which some members of the Bench have implemented the provision. These are not interchangeable, each being separate and distinct from the other.

Other cases

Page 44