AIR WAR COLLEGE AIR UNIVERSITY REPORT NO. 3437 & GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY WASHINGTON, D.C.

THE LIMITS OF MILITARY ADVOCACY By Robert L. McDaniel Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry

A Research Thesis Submitted To The Faculty Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama May 1967 Air War College Research Report Summary A Research Thesis Submitted To The Faculty George Washington University In Support Of A Degree In Master Of Science International Affairs

McDaniel - ii ABSTAINER This research report represents the views of the author and does not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the faculty of the Air War College or the Department of the Air Force. This document is the property of the United States Government and is not to be reproduced in whole or in part without permission of the Commandant, Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.

McDaniel - iii ABSTAINER This research report represents the views of the author and does not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the faculty of George Washington University.

McDaniel - iv AIR WAR COLLGE RESEARCH REPORT SUMMARY NO. 3437 Title: The Limits of Military Advocacy Author: Robert L. McDaniel, Lieutenant Colonel, and Infantry The author reviews the transition of civil-military relations to its present relationship involving intimate participation by the military in the formulation of national security policy. The foundations of loyalty, allegiance, and discipline are examined as they related to the advocacy of military imperatives in the processes of government. The cases of Generals MacArthur and Maxwell Taylor are examined for illustrative factors related to the subject. Relevant considerations are reviewed but finite conclusions are not established.

McDaniel - v GEORGE WASHINGTON RESEARCH REPORT SUMMARY Title: The Limits of Military Advocacy Author: Robert L. McDaniel The author reviews the transition of civil-military relations to its present relationship involving intimate participation by the military in the formulation of national security policy. The foundations of loyalty, allegiance, and discipline are examined as they related to the advocacy of military imperatives in the processes of government. The cases of Generals MacArthur and Maxwell Taylor are examined for illustrative factors related to the subject. Relevant considerations are reviewed but finite conclusions are not established.

McDaniel - vi TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTAINER .......................................................................................................................... ii ABSTAINER ......................................................................................................................... iii AIR WAR COLLGE RESEARCH REPORT SUMMARY ..................................................iv NO. 3437 ................................................................................................................................iv GEORGE WASHINGTON RESEARCH REPORT SUMMARY ................................................. v CHAPTER I ............................................................................................................................. 1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 1 CHAPTER II ........................................................................................................................... 5 Civil-Military Relations In Transition ................................................................................. 5 Pre-Professional Relations................................................................................................... 6 The Rise of Military Profession .......................................................................................... 6 The Military Ethic ............................................................................................................... 7 The Ethic of Non-Involvement ............................................................................................ 9 The Militarys New Role ................................................................................................... 11 A Military Role in Decision Processes .............................................................................. 13 Modern Concerns of Civil Control .................................................................................... 14 The Challenge to Military Professionalism ....................................................................... 15 CHAPTER III ................................................................................................................................ 17 Fidelity and the Soldiers Oath .......................................................................................... 17 Origin of Loyalty ............................................................................................................... 18 Diffusion of Command Structures..................................................................................... 19 Assistant Secretaries in Command .................................................................................... 23 Other Authorities in Contention ........................................................................................ 25 CHAPTER IV ................................................................................................................................ 28 To The Limits Of Propriety ............................................................................................... 28 Considerations of Military Discipline ............................................................................... 28 The MacArthur Case ......................................................................................................... 29 Divergent Positions ........................................................................................................... 30 Military and Partisan Alignments ...................................................................................... 35

McDaniel - vii
The Supremacy of the Executives ..................................................................................... 36 CHAPTER V ................................................................................................................................. 38 Advocacy and Effectiveness.............................................................................................. 38 Cohesion in the Term ........................................................................................................ 39 The Case of General Taylor .............................................................................................. 41 Retirement and Resignation .............................................................................................. 42 Effectiveness of Advocacy ................................................................................................ 43 Two Sides to Advocacy ..................................................................................................... 45 CHAPTER VI ................................................................................................................................ 47 Summary............................................................................................................................ 47 Recommendations ............................................................................................................. 52 NOTES .......................................................................................................................................... 53 Notes On Chapter I ............................................................................................................ 53 Notes On Chapter II........................................................................................................... 54 Notes On Chapter III ......................................................................................................... 59 Notes On Chapter IV ......................................................................................................... 61 Notes On Chapter V .......................................................................................................... 64 Notes On Chapter VI ......................................................................................................... 67 BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................................... 69

McDaniel - 1 CHAPTER I Introduction

If you believe the soldiers, nothing is safe.1

This line from Lady Cecils oft-quoted parable could well be matched by another something like If you believe the soldiers masters, they know not of what they speak. Such is the widely publicized dichotomy between our military and civilian defense leaders. In most other countries, such public controversy on major defense issues would portend a military coup detat or a major purge without question. Even in this country, the issues become confused between the traditions of civil control of the military and a very real concern for national security. Military responsiveness to civilian authority is one of the most universally accepted tenets of our governmental structure. It is unchallenged today and has so remained since the founding of our nation. However, despite the universal acceptance of the principle of civil control over the military, the applications of the principle are widely misunderstood and have been the basis for much controversy. Because the subject is of such direct concern to the military, it is perhaps logical that president Kennedy could say, In fact, the military seem to appreciate the problem of maintaining civilian control of the military better than some civilians.2 The subject of civil military relations has been subjected to scholarly inquiry since the days of the earliest philosophers. However, it is only in fairly recent times that scholars have attempted theoretical formulations and empirical researches in an effort to bring scientifically viable modes of analysis to a topic that has long been treated in philosophic and emotional terms. As with other areas of political science, these efforts have failed to develop scientifically consistent theories that withstand rigorous analysis or rational examination. Studies in civil-military relations have not resulted in the development of efficient techniques of quantification, abstraction, or substantiation

McDaniel - 2 comparable to the predictive sciences. This is unfortunate since such a development could provide the basis for clearer public understanding of some of the controversy apparent today. Within the scope of this paper, the blurred guidelines of the theories of civilmilitary relations cannot be resolved. Much dependence has been placed on other such efforts. Although it is always tempting to select those portions of contrasting findings that support a particular view, every effort has made to avoid this temptation. Contrasting views have been included when they are pertinent. Perhaps most important, this study will not attempt to defend or denigrate the actions of any individual nor will it attempt to justify or support civil-military conflict in any way. That such conflicts exist is apparent to every knowledgeable person; the factors that make such conflicts inevitable are basic to this study. Throughout the defense establishment, there is a broad range of relationships between military officers and civilian employees of the government. By and large, these relationships are not related to the concept of civil authority over the military. The command or supervisory relationships between civilian and military members within or below the Departments provide a unique set of problems and leadership demands which are imprecisely regulated by dual military and civil service regulations but are not within the scope of this study. The traditional concept of a military hierarchy subordinate to responsible civilian authority necessarily involves deliberation of common problems by both civilian and military officials. The conflicts, which inevitably develop from these deliberations, can have ultimate resolution only by the President in his role as Commander in Chief. However, the magnitude of defense considerations is so great and their content so technically complex that the President can seldom make personal decisions on most defense matters but merely confirms the judgment of trusted assistants or the Congress. For this reason, most significant decisions related to defense matters are, in actuality, established by officials other than the President. Since many of these decisions

McDaniel - 3 have wide ranging implications as to national security, involved major resource expenditures, and select from competing alternatives, it is logical that serious professional differences will develop among those individuals considering these problems. Although many of these differences fall within or between the Military Departments, only those conflicts in which a military official acting for his Department finds himself in conflict with decision formulating civilian officials will be examined herein. The view that civil supremacy is assured by the constitutional provision making a civilian President the Commander in Chief is too narrow. Clearly, the President has the power, authority, responsibility and prerogative to command military officials to the will of the nation. It is not a personal prerogative arising from divine imperatives but a prerogative arising from the people as manifested by the Constitution. Within a more restricted scope, every federal military and civilian officer is empowered with the same authority and adheres to the same oath.3 These facts are undisputed and are in no way a part of the problems to be examined in this study. The Stennis Committee has indicated the magnitude of the potential conflicts between civil and military leaders by comparing the number of officials in each category. It reported that there are over 12,000 civilian officials of the grade GS-15 and above and that approximately 4,000 of these are in the Department of Defense as compared to 1,250 generals and admirals.4 This does not imply that even a major portion of these senior civilians comprise civil authority over the military but many are in supervisory or review positions which develop contending views against military imperatives advocated by senior military leaders. This study will examine the transition of civil-military relations to its present condition whereby national security policy is inseparably interrelated with military, economic, political, and ideological considerations and whereby military imperatives require political involvements that would have once been considered inviolable. Recognizing that this condition generates inevitable conflicts between civilian and

McDaniel - 4 military officials, the limits to which military leaders must advocate their judgment to insure that they are understood and weighed in the national policy process will the be examined.

McDaniel - 5 CHAPTER II Civil-Military Relations In Transition

Military power is the most useful of servants but the most terrible of masters.1
This quotation from Thomas Carlyle characterizes the dual theme, which has been recurrent in theorizations on civil-military relations since the days of the earliest philosophers. Initially, the dominating theme was the recognition that national survival is sustained by force of arms, that law unsupported by the sword is meaningless, and that relations between states are regulated by relative military power.2 Concurrent with the appearance of liberal thought, the evilness of militarism as a threat to social liberties appeared as a collateral theme.3 The pragmatic response to the first has been the universal retention of standing armies by all nation states. The second theme has never been satisfactorily resolved universally. Efforts to resolve this second theme have been characterized by the virtually universal acceptance of the principle of civil authority over the military.4 However, wide acceptance of this fundamental principle has not prevented wide divergences in application, interpretation, and effectiveness. Traditionally the concept of civil control has been used by various groups, primarily civilian, to gain various self-serving ends. It has been used by legislatures to reduce executive powers, by executives to increase their power in relation to other groups, and by political parties against a particular form or trend of government.5 Used for various political purposes, the concept even has different meanings to any particular civilian group that the military is responsive to the desires of that particular group. Within democratic societies, it is broadly accepted that the concept of civilian control of the military establishment means military responsiveness to the policies and goals of the politically responsible government.6

McDaniel - 6 Pre-Professional Relations Prior to the nineteenth century, civil-military relations were characterized by the lack of clearly distinct civilian and military groups. Societies were fundamentally civilian and they assumed military roles as the occasion demanded. Highly militant societies, like the early Greek states, placed emphasis on extensive military training requirements could be satisfied by citizen-soldiers who bore arms only for a particular operation of war. The military sciences were not so complex that an acceptable expertise could not be acquired in a short training period. Generalship and statesmanship were considered somewhat synonymous. Standing forces were soldiered by mercenaries but led by statesmen; soldiers could serve in a military trade but a military profession was unknown.7 Under such a condition, civil-military relations were characterized by cohesion since the leaders of the military were also civilian. Militarism could exist but not in conflict with civil society but as a part of it. Civil leaders could take up the sword to perform a function of arms and often retained it as a means of rule. This condition did not fail to give ample cause for political fears of praetorionism or Cromwellism.8 In fact, the lack of a clear distinction between a military group and civilians fostered the use of military power for internal political purposes by civilian groups. Most often, civil council over the military was a problem of power relationships between civilian groups. The power of one group was significant only in relation to other groups.9 The concept of civil control was frequently expressed but the lack of a satisfactory identification of separate civilian and military ethics reduced the concept to little more than a slogan. The Rise of Military Profession The era of Napoleon Bonaparte and the increasing technology of warfare generated a military science of substance, which fosters the growth of a military profession. No longer was an aristocratic heritage or political expertise sufficient qualification for military command. The demand for military competence now required special schools and extensive training which led increasingly to the formation of a clearly

McDaniel - 7 identifiable and distinct military group with a unique set of values and ethics. The military profession gained identity, alongside the clerical and legal professions, as a body of men with special knowledge and ability in the conduct of war. No longer could an individual be identified with the military class and be expected to conform to a military ethic merely by strapping on a sword.10 Professor Huntington has examined the military profession in terms of expertise, responsibility, and corporateness, which, he states, are the characteristics of any learned profession. Expertise in an identifiable field of endeavor must include a unique body of knowledge, schools to teach it, and a means to acquire and catalogue new knowledge to be a mark of a profession. The second characteristic is responsibility to society, which involves a dedication to human progress through learning and a higher set of personal goals than individual reward. Under the characteristics, Huntington carries as a major thesis that a fundamental criterion for military professionalism is the rejection of any political activity in governmental affairs. Huntingtons third characteristic of professionalism is corporateness, which provides a common bond of loyalty and established standards of behavior and accomplishment. Based on these criteria Huntingtons thesis then relates the degree of military professionalism primarily with the degree of military involvement in political activities.11 Although this thesis is somewhat supported by Wheeler-Bennett,12 most other scholars recognize the compatibility of military professionalism and political involvement and assume that such will exist. It would appear more likely that lack of political activity is not necessarily a precondition of military professionalism so much as the restraint of political involvement consistent with a military ethic. Perhaps Huntingtons acceptance of Lasswells pejorative definition of the military profession as the management of violence has been reflected in his analysis.13 By these criteria of professionalism in the pre-World War II German and Japanese Officer Corps would be inconsistent with most findings. The Military Ethic With the appearance of a separate, identifiable military profession at the end of the

McDaniel - 8 nineteenth century, civil-military relations assumed a new context; the military profession and another new profession of statesmanship developed separately, each with its own set of values and ethics.14 A separate, identifiable group connotes a unique set of identifiable values and ethics or at least a characteristic philosophy which directs the behavior of the group. Much has been written of the military mind15 and a consideration of published thought on this subject reveals meaningful characteristics. H.L. Menchen speaks with some consensus when he says, The military career tends to slow down the mind but it may be that the thing works the other way - that it does not usually attract men who are excessively intellectual . . . .16 the quality and ability of the military mind are generally compared unfavorably to the intelligence, scope, and imagination of other learned professions by scholars who have published on this subject.17 It is likely that the hierarchal structure of military organization has tended to reward adherence to established viewpoints and confirmed routines. Intellectual superiority is not directly related to successful performance in a military career.18 Promotion and other career incentives are based more on leadership qualities, dynamic action, and performance than on intellectual excellence.19 However meaningful this view may be, it is not distinctively a military quality when compared with other professions. Nevertheless, a disparity in intellectual capacity between the military and other groups can provide a significant divisive factor when communication or mutual considerations are required.20 Huntington finds a basis to describe the characteristics or attributes of the military mind as disciplined, rigid, logical, and scientific; it is not flexible, tolerant, intuitive, or emotional.21 If we add Arthur M. Schlessingers characteristics of innocence, conservatism, and narrowness, the consensus of scholarly opinion would perhaps be more complete.22 By a intricate analysis of the military ethic, Huntington concludes that the military ethic is pessimistic, collectivist, militaristic, pacifist, and instrumentalist in its view of the military profession. In short, he believes it is realistic and conservative.23 Gene M. Lyons24, Walter Millis, 25 Harold Lasswell, 26 and Bernard Brodie27 are among

McDaniel - 9 the scholars who would agree that actions of the military as a group could be expected to be guided by these characteristics. Clearly, these qualities could not predict the action of individual military officers in any particular situation but could be useful only in examining the behavior of the military as a group. Despite this fact, individual actions by members of a group will be influenced by the ethic of the group, especially when the group manifests strong corporateness or cohesion. The Ethic of Non-Involvement The appearance of a professional officer in the major Western nations during the nineteenth century resulted in a new concept of civil-military relations essentially unknown previously. This resulted in a virtual withdrawal of the military from society into a monastic, rigidly oriented structure quite isolated from societal influences. A basic tenet of this new relationship was an absolute avoidance of any participation in affairs of state or governmental decisions. Under this relationship, the military performed as a tool, functioning solely at the will of the currently legitimate political authority. This is termed objective civil control by Huntington and, by his thesis, the only form of civilmilitary relationship compatible with high military professionalism.28 Historically, it was the German military who supported this form of relationship and fostered noninvolvement as a tenet of the military code. The officer corps of other Western powers followed this pattern. The military educational system was narrowly oriented and restricted to the management of violence. Perhaps this relationship was best expressed by French Minister of War, Boulanger, who said . . . .the Army has no right to judge. It has only to obey.29 The military disciples of this concept were von Moltke, von Schlieffen, and von Seekt in Germany, and their gospel was followed by military leaders in each of the major Western nations.30 In this country, Sherman, Mahan, Elihu Root, Peyton Marsh, and Pershing were instrumental in establishing the concept of political non-involvement firmly in the American military ethic. Only in Japan, of the worlds major military powers, was the code not made a firm part of the military ethic.32

McDaniel - 10 If, as argued by some scholars, the essence of civilian control is a clear distinction between political and military responsibilities and the institutional subordination of the latter to the former, civilian control was clearly strengthened by the new relationship.33 There could be no usurpation of power by a cloistered army, unknowledgeable in affairs of state, indifferent to societal values and beliefs, unable to articulate with the power elite, and dedicated to serve the security of the state only in terms rigidly prescribed by the political authority. If traditional fears of military power stem from the Cromwellian legend of a man on horseback, if society feared Praetorian selection of political rulers, the new military relationship provided the solution, at least for the civilian group currently in power. For a military profession newly emergent, searching for a meaningful ethic, the new concept provided a refuge, a haven from an imprecise political arena, a cocoon in which the military art could be practiced in its purest form. Further if the military profession had generated a realistic, unyielding, conservative set of values and beliefs, how could these be compatible with the idealistic, progressive, and radical ethic embraced by a liberally oriented society? Clearly, a complete cleavage or separation of these two groups provided the simplest and most decisive assurance of civilian control and freedom from conflict. This separation was complete with separate educational philosophies, different personal goals, separate judiciaries, and even separated communities where the military could develop uncontaminated by civilian society.34 Under such a concept of civil-military relations and military professionalism, World War I was fought and never has such a senseless war been so tragically conducted. Far from displaying the military excellence attributed to the newly established military professionalism, the independent military hierarchies collected their heritage and with it the right to conduct the war essentially free of political involvement. The results were an abominable slaughter, a senseless strategy based on mutual attrition, a violation of every tactical principle codified by Clausewitz and other military scholars. The military profession had clearly failed its first major test.35 From this disaster, an ideological split appeared within the military communities.

McDaniel - 11 In Germany, the unbeaten military adopted the heritage of Dolchstoss, the political stab in the back. A politically indifferent von Seekt gave way to a nationally conscious Beck.36 In the United States, the military heritage from World War I was increased reliance on technological quantitative superiority and dependence on mass-produced conscription forces.37 The military ethic of non-involvement was challenged as military leaders such as MacArthur and Marshall expressed their views on national security issues before Congressional and other public forums.38 In Britain and especially France, military groups also experienced similar deviation from the strict ethic of indifference to political and societal goals.39 Within the military profession, the issue had profound effects. The haven had been cast aside and the military found itself largely unprepared and now only partly unwilling to seize or accept a broker role in national security planning. The question of civil control was raised anew and a suitable definition or measure of control was sought in vain. The Militarys New Role The total nature of World War II and the personalities involved coupled with the explosive technological growth of the means of warfare completed the trend and the military ethic was absolved of its haven from broad responsibilities in national security policy. In fact, the very growth of the expression national security policy implies a broad integration of narrow and previously separate military, foreign, economic, technological, industrial, and other essentially domestic considerations. Except for Ridgeway, not a single U.S. military leader of stature since World War II has adhered strictly to the ethic of pure political non-involvement.40 Every President since World War II has acknowledged that the officer corps has a broad responsibility at the councils of government. In 1961, Eisenhower told the Stennis Subcommittee that: The new role of the military requires that it be geared continually to the broadest American goals, i.e., societal goals . . .. Military problems are woven intimately into the fabric of national decision making . . . In

McDaniel - 12 these times military considerations and economic, political, and ideological consideration are interrelated to such a degree as to make an arbitrary dividing line between the military and the nonmilitary increasingly unrealistic . . ..41 Kennedy42 and Johnson43 have said essentially the same thing and Kennedy went so far as to advise the 1961 graduating class as the United States Naval Academy to ignore any advice to mix politics in their naval careers.44 If this new concept is truly a fact, and it is essentially unchallenged, where lies the fundamental concept of civil authority over the military? Clearly, the distinction between military and non-military responsibilities cannot be defined in such a manner as to clearly subordinate one over the other. Witness the fatuous effort of Lasswell whereby the defined the distinction thusly: An arena is military when the expectation of violence is high; civil when the expectation of violence is low.45 Does this mean that civil-military relations have returned to the pre-professional concept or that civilian control has suffered the fate of consensus and therefore achieved acceptability at the price of being meaningless, as proposed by some scholars? This is not likely, as scholars, politicians, and the military alike still frequently stress the continued need for civil control and means of assuring it. Congressional deliberations related to defense structure reorganizations and other military matters constantly demonstrate keen Congressional awareness and sensitivity to the principle of civil supremacy over the military. In sophisticated democracies like Britain and the United States, it is unlikely that the concern for the principle of civil control is a fear of a military coup detat. It is not probably that the citizens of Little Rock feared a military dictatorship when, they faced the bayonets of federal troops. The concern for civil control is real and meaningful but it does not reflect a citizenry fearful of facing the swords of a military behind whose shields they have sought security. It is more likely that the concern is more accurately expressed by Michael

McDaniel - 13 Howard as the dialectic between freedom and security.46 The conservative military ideology and the problems of assuring absolute security in the face of ever-expanding technological means of warfare generate never satisfied functional military imperatives. The real concern is more probable that the demands of military security will lead increasingly to the garrison-state described in theory by C. Wright Mills47 and Lasswell48 and in fiction by George Orwell.49 A Military Role in Decision Processes Since supremacy of civil over military authority has been accepted as a cardinal premise of our political faith, there must be a meaningful measure of the relationship and a means of ensuring that it exists. In 1953, President Eisenhower, proposing a new defense establishment reorganization, stated that, Basic decisions relating to military forces must be made by politically accountable civilian officials.50 It would seem that this would provide a more realistic definition of civil control than one attempting to separate pure military and purely civilian functions or responsibilities. This definition provides more than just military responsiveness to the policies of a politically responsible government. Further, it does not imply bureaucratic or political involvement in routine military affairs or the conduct of military operations, which has meant civil control to certain groups. If we can accept this definition, we can then examine the decision making processes of government, using the various methodologies of political scientists. The extent to which basic decisions relating to military affairs are made by civilians would then be a measure of relative civil and military authority. The methodologies of examining state decision making processes are highly developed but necessarily imprecise and not subject to ready quantification.51 Harold D. Lasswell has related the functions of decision-making to seven separate phases; these are the acquisition of intelligence, recommendation (promotion), prescription, invocation, application, appraisal, and termination.52 He contends that the military dominates the phases of acquisition of intelligence, invocation, and application, and plays a major role in the others. This methodology and others have difficulty in distinguishing between the

McDaniel - 14 complex role of decision-maker and advisor (or assistant). This complex subject is extensively examined, perhaps inadequately, elsewhere and is clearly not within the scope of this study. Suffice it to say that in national security policy formulation, military officers are integrated into the decision-making structure at every level and an evaluation of their advisory role and its influence is a difficult task. Modern Concerns of Civil Control Means of ensuring civil control are not subject to simple resolution. Virtually every governmental structure invokes both constitutional and institutional measures of ensuring civil over military authority. Nearly every military coup detat of modern times has overthrown a civil government clearly protected by constitutional assurances against such an event. This is not surprising since political scientists cannot even agree on what constitutional provisions constitute assurance of civil control. Contrast the view of Alfred Vagts that the central feature of the [U.S.] Constitution . . .. was the establishment of civilian control in government over the military branches,53 with that to Huntington that the United States Constitution, despite the widespread belief to the contrary, does not provide for civilian control.? 54 A Congressional subcommittee55 recently studied the applications of civil control over the military. This committee conflicting report both that . . .. one of the truly great bulwarks of our system of government is the principle of civilian control of the military through the executive branch of the Government of which the military is a part,56 and that . . .. ultimate control of the military resides in that branch of the Government closest to the people the Congress . . ..57 Clearly, the concept of civil control is not maintained solely by constitutional provisions any more than is a functioning democracy, and to believe otherwise would be extremely nave. An institutional structure that clearly kept the military isolated from the decision processes would accomplish civilian control if the structure could be maintained. However, such an institutional structure would deny the decision-making process the professional input of the military. This condition could not exist in todays national

McDaniel - 15 security environment for the same reasons that the military ethic of non-involvement in affairs of state passed from the scene. Today, the military is increasingly drawn into the spheres of counsel and processes of decision. This new role is not a resurgence of the pre-professional concept of the statesman-soldier serving alternately with scepter or sword as the occasion demands. This is a new role demanding new recognition and new democratic theory. Perhaps more important, this new role demands more sophisticated military professionalism. The Challenge to Military Professionalism Time magazine, February 5, 1965, labeled the Joint Chiefs of Staff as Thinkers and managers Replace the Heroes and questioned whether the growing intellectualism might not undermine the militarys ability to fulfill its primary role. This is not the same as Huntingtons thesis that political participation is not consistent with professionalism58 but more a concern that an emphasis on intellectual excellence will result in a selection process that may leave the military with the thinkers when doers are required. It is not contended that intellectualism is not compatible with activism and dynamic leadership but that emphasis for one over the other will result in the emergence of the favored characteristic. Clearly, the military needs leaders who are activists, and leadership selection has traditionally been based on excellence in this trait. The traditional military ethic of noninvolvement in non-military affairs and a conservative commitment to optimum security have resulted in a resistance to defense innovations and a reluctance to depend on nonmilitary initiatives in national security strategy. The requirements for broader perspective is widely recognized within the military but full acceptance of the compatibility of intellectualism with more functional professionalism has not been achieved.59 Recent evolutions in military educational systems and philosophies have reflected awareness of this requirement. Starting at the service academies and extending up through the full range of professional education, increasing emphasis can be found on intellectual development.60 It can be hoped that this emphasis will not result in a degradation of other

McDaniel - 16 soldierly qualities of which heroes are made. The challenge is clearly on the military officer corps. If it is to play an expanding role in the formulation of national security policy (and it cannot escape it), military professional must be capable of articulating in the affairs of state. Individual intellects and creative talents cannot be constantly suppressed in an environment of immutable service doctrine. Intellectual excellence must be recognized as a pre-condition to full professional competence and not an inconsequential trapping. Assignments, promotions, school selections, and other career incentives must be awarded consistently to recognize these requirements. Simple policy statements or other such encouragements will not suffice unless substantive motivational actions accompany the policies.

McDaniel - 17 CHAPTER III Fidelity and the Soldiers Oath

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA . . . .Reposing special trust and confidence in the patriotism, valor, fidelity, and abilities . . . .1
By these words, commissions are bestowed upon selected United States citizens appointing them officers in one of the Armed Services of our country. No word better epitomizes the nature of the duties expected of these citizens than the word fidelity, connoting faithful devotion to ones obligations, an unqualified allegiance to sacrosanct vows. Further, no word better characterizes the demonstrated performance of the United States professional military officers in the service of his country. Fidelity clearly prescribes the concept of loyalty and discipline, which must characterize the relationship between civilian and military leaders in the governmental hierarchy. Loyalty derives its source from The Oath of Allegiance. I, ________, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help me God.2 This most fundamental source of guidance for the military professional also provides the source of serious internal controversy and dissension. Domestic enemies of the Constitution are not all clearly identifiable as such nor could there be unanimity among

McDaniel - 18 our leaders as to what constitutes an adequate defense against such a threat. Even when potential foreign enemies are clearly identified, the selection of a proper course of defense has been the major divisive factor between our military and civilian leadership and had led to the public controversies and dissensions, which have generated this study. Origin of Loyalty How much simpler were the oaths of the Knights who swore absolute fealty and to their sovereign. Devoid of responsibility or concern for broader affairs of state, the Knight had but to obey the whims of his superior in a clearly delineated hierarchal structure leading to the source of loyalty and authority in the personage of the sovereign.3 The initial code of the military professionals which sought isolation from affairs of state and decried political involvement was probably a reversion to the greatly more simplified concepts of the Knights code of loyalty. A more modern example of the unsuitability of such a concept was the example of the German Army after the rise of Hitler. Previously bound by an oath of allegiance to the Weimar Constitution, military officers under Hitler were required to accept a personal oath of loyalty to Der Fuhrer.4 Although this requirement had deeply profound effects on the Wehrmacht officer corps, it was not inconsistent with well-established ethics of noninvolvement which was still manifested by the leadership of the Army Chief of Staff, General von Seekt. This oath later provided a major basis for vacillation and indecisive action by many German generals when their participation in the several plots to overthrow Hitler was solicited.5 Paradoxically, some liberal writers have cited this example of the failure of the German Army to stop Hitler as a basis for a warning against a military role in American politics.6 It would be difficult to visualize how any action by the German Army to depose Hitler could have been consistent with the concept of civil authority over the military. That Hitler destroyed the German nation as then constituted is clear but that the act was not supported by the German people and therefore more in the nature of an act of self-destruction is less well established. In the United States concept of government, the Constitution is derived from the people and loyalty and

McDaniel - 19 allegiance to the Constitution thus becomes allegiance to the nation as manifested by the people. That these fundamental facts are basically undisputed makes application of the concept in the processes of government no less subject to contention. The so-called divided power from which much of the strength of our government derives is also the source of much of the misunderstanding, especially as concerns civil-military relations. In accordance with the concept of divided powers, the Constitution divides authority over the military between the President and the Congress. It is the view of some scholars that this divided authority makes civilian control difficult to realize in practice since the military has access to advocacy of both the executive and the legislature.7 The relative powers of the executive and the legislature with regard to the military are adequately covered elsewhere8 and need not be reviewed here. Suffice it to say that the President, in his roles as Commander in Chief, exerts absolute command authority over the military establishment with which there can be no dispute by members of the officer corps. Diffusion of Command Structures It is below the level of the President that authoritative relationships become diffused. Not surprisingly, it is the civilian authorities immediately below the President who seem to generate the conflict with the military of most significant consequence and the ones with whom this study is most concerned. It is at this level that national security policies on which our national survival depends are frequently evolved. Policy disputes at this level are subject to final resolution only by the personal decision of the President; once that decision is rendered, further pursuance of the matter by the military establishment cannot be within the code of acceptable disciplinary standards. Below the level of the President and within the Executive Branch, the lines of authority are determined both by statue and by the less distinct outlines of permissive practice. The Vice President, by tradition, has been little involved in civil-military relationships and, for that reason, his legal position related to the military has never been clearly defined and is not a remunerative area for study under current considerations.

McDaniel - 20 The position of the Secretary of Defense and his authority are established by law and practice and, not surprisingly, provide the focus of the most significant conflicts of the civil leadership with military officers. The authority of the Secretary has evolved over the years but a review beyond his current position is not essential to this study. Perhaps the most significant view of the authority and position of the Secretary of Defense are found in a legal opinion rendered by the Department of Defense General Counsel. This opinion found that . . . .the Secretary of Defense is thus made the Commander in Chiefs deputy in all matters relating to the Department . . .. the Secretary of Defense is the highest military officer of the Department.9 This would appear an extreme view quite removed from the traditional concept of the traditional role of political secretaries. Further, it would appear it is a significant extension of the language of the law, which reads that the Secretary of Defense will be the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the Department of Defense.10 Note that the former view places the Secretary of Defense firmly in the hierarchal command channel, possessing the powers of deputy to act for the President, and even removing the Secretary from the less rigidly oriented disciplines of civilian distinction to be proclaimed the highest military officer. The language of the law implies the more traditional view of a Secretary assisting the President in his function of command primarily by attention of administrative, logistical, and fiscal matters related to the Department. The latter view would also seem reinforced by other provisions which made the Joint Chiefs of Staff the Presidents principal military advisors and which insure direct access to the President by member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.11 It might initially appear that the General Counsels opinion in this instance was extreme and does not properly reflect the will of the Congress. If so, any Secretary functioning on the basis of this opinion might generate serious questions of assumptive authority and such has actually been the case. However, the Congress had occasion to review this opinion in 1958 during subsequently hearings related to Defense Department organization and endorsed the opinion by publishing it as an appendix to an amended

McDaniel - 21 version of the basic National Security Act of 1947.12 By this act, the Congress confirmed the General Counsels view of the power and authority of the Secretary of Defense and provided a fundamental and previously non-existent barrier between the military and their Commander in Chief. For the purpose of this study, the finding that the Secretary of Defense (and hence presumably his deputies and the service secretaries also) is a military officer, will not place these individuals on the military side of the civil-military dichotomy being examined. In fact, the implications and meaning of this particular finding are not clear to this author and this study will accept the more conventional view of a civilian secretariat as opposed to a uniformed military. It has been argued that access to the President by members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is ensured by law and such is the statutory fact.13. In recognition of this, official public notice has pointedly been made in recent years of a specific meeting between the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President prior to each annual submission of the Presidents defense program to the Congress in order that the views of the Joint Chiefs can be heard.14 This ritual is a far cry from a defense program prepared by the military on which the President renders decisions with the assistance of his Secretary. This process places the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the position of appealing to the President, over the authority of their immediate superior, the decisions already made for the President by his deputy, the Secretary of Defense. The net result has been reduced communication between the military and their Commander in Chief and the dilution of military advice to the President. Although this structure was directed by the Congress as a means of management, it has been variously viewed as a means of controlling authoritarian-minded and arrogant military brass15 by democracy-minded civilians and as undue silencing of the military whereby the Secretary of Defense now seems to have the last word even when the uniformed professional establishment is unanimously opposed to his views.16 Another, and somewhat offsetting result has been the professionalization of the Secretariat by the integration of military officers, by the use of professional civil servants,

McDaniel - 22 and by the long-term retention of qualified political appointees. The attitude with which the Joint Chiefs of Staff have accepted this role of the Secretary was illustrated by General Taylor, when he said, We had our day in court, argued our case, and we lost and as far as I am concerned, that settled it . . . .He [presumably, the President] acted within his authority.17 This process has led to the general acceptance that annual Department of Defense programs do not enjoy the inviolability of Presidential decisions and are thus subject to subsequent debate by the military before the Congress and other forums. Contrast this practice with the previously accepted norm expressed by one officer: I think when the Budget has once been approved by the President and transmitted to Congress, it is his budget estimate and the office or official of the War Department would have any right to come up here and attempt to get a single dollar more than is contained in that estimate.18 Before the Congress, further debate is encouraged by the provision of the National Security Act of 1949 permitting a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to express his individual views directly to Congress on his own initiative.19 These factors have been the source of most of the major conflicts between the members of the Joint Chief of Staff and the Secretary of Defense in recent years. The public nature of these debates has caused wide misunderstanding of the relation to civil authority over the military.20 The Service Secretaries, as presently constituted, generally serve as spokesmen for their respective Service and there have been virtually no published controversies between a service secretary and military officers. Since the Service Secretaries are appointed by the same authority and have the same allegiance as the Secretary of Defense, it might be expected that they would be involved in the same or similar controversies. The close relationships of the Service Secretaries to the decision processes within the Services as well as the requirement for secretarial approval of programs prior to official advocacy would seem to lead to serious divisions and judgmental differences leading to inevitable disputes. Such has not appeared to be the case and the reasons are probably related to the nature of he working relationship between the Service Secretaries and the departmental

McDaniel - 23 military staffs.21 Although this phenomenon is interesting, the very fact that few civilmilitary conflicts have appeared in print in this relationship exclude the area from further examination as part of this study. Assistant Secretaries in Command The position and roles of the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the seven Assistant Secretaries of Defense have provided the basis of much controversy with military officers. These individuals are empowered to act for the Secretary of Defense within specified constraints and thus wield strong influence in the policy formulation and decision process. As the principal advisors to the Secretary of Defense, the Assistant Secretaries normally coordinate the decision papers on which the Secretary of Defense or the President may act. In those instances where the decision is not rendered by an Assistant Secretary acting for the Secretary of Defense, his actions in preparing and presenting the decision documents provide him a powerful leverage in influencing the decision against other protagonists. The functional areas of responsibility of the Assistant Secretaries correspond to comparable areas in each service under the supervision of a deputy chief of staff or comparable staff officer. By this system, programs and policies being implemented by the Services are supervised by a functionally assigned military staff officer at Service Department level and further supervised by the Assistant Secretary of Defense assigned responsibility in that functional area. For example, service research and development programs and administered under the supervision of a specific staff officer, in the case of the Army, the Chief of Research and Development. As a member of the Army General Staff operating under the responsibility of the Army Chief of Staff, the Chief of Research and Development receives his direction and guidance from the Army Chief of Staff, who must approve his programs. In practice, the Chief of Staff accepts the technical advice and judgment of the Chief of Research and Development programs as long as they fall within general guidance provided. However, such is not the case at the level of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. At this level, the Director of Defense Research and

McDaniel - 24 Engineering (one of the seven Assistant Secretaries of Defense) maintains a large technically qualified staff to provide detailed review, supervision, and decision judgments related to service programs. This results in frequent judgmental differences between the Chief of Research and Development and the Director of Defense Research and Engineering and their respective staffs. The superior hierarchal position and role of the Director of Defense research and Engineering provide him a weighted advantage in any judgmental differences.22 The same relationship exists in each of the other functional areas (installations and logistics, comptroller, public affairs, legal, etc.) between the Assistant Defense Secretaries and corresponding service staff officers. There are assistant service secretaries in many of these functional areas but the evidence indicates that they tend to side with their corresponding service member and support his views rather than develop contending positions. It may be that the service staff officers work more closely with and hence conform to the judgments of the corresponding assistant service secretary thus preventing disputes. It appears to be more likely that the assistant service secretaries tend to develop their judgments on the same information used by the service officer, since the assistant service secretaries do not maintain large technical staffs.23 The resulting relationship presents a situation whereby assistant defense secretaries exert direct decision authority over the functions of military officers who are ostensibly under authority of their chief of staff. It is often considered that that authority of the assistant defense secretaries is essentially negative in that it is exerted by disapprovals of service recommended programs generally by the withholding of funds. This is not the actual case since the assistant defense secretaries often make known what they will approve and thereby influence the services to submit programs which meet the desires of the appropriate assistant defense secretary. In addition, positive instructions are often provided on various programs either orally or in writing.24 Appeals from such decisions or instructions have been the basis for much of the dichotomy between our senior military officers and the civilian leadership. A review of public contentions

McDaniel - 25 between various service chiefs of staff and the Secretary of Defense discloses that many of these disputes are based on similar contentions between officers and civilians at a subordinate level. It could be argued that this relationship between service officers and assistant defense secretaries does not constitute a problem of the classical civil-military relationship since the position of the Assistant Defense Secretaries within the Department associates them with the military in the classical sense. This may be true but it is not essential to this study; the fact that the relationship has generated disputes properly considered by this study is enough. Other Authorities in Contention Although the relationships discussed above constitute the basis for virtually all the disputes between senior military officers and their civilian leaders which have come to public attention, there are three other examples which are relevant and therefore worthy of brief mention. One example is the 1952 dispute between General Arthur Trudeau, and Allen Dulles, Director, Central Intelligence Agency. The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency is given broad coordinating and advisory responsibilities, which could logically conflict with policies or judgments of other governmental intelligence activities, including those of the military services. It was reported that such a dispute between General Trudeau and Mr. Dulles occurred and was resolved by the reassignment of General Trudeau to an overseas post.25 Whether the resolution of this dispute was made in favor of Dulles because of his superior hierarchal position in the intelligence field or for other reasons is not clear from the information publicly available. What is more important to this study is that the relationship of the Central Intelligence Agency Director and the service intelligence chiefs is such that judgmental differences are certain to arise and any resulting disputes will presumptively be resolved in favor of the civilian disputant for very much the same reasons discussed above in the case of the Secretary of Defense and his assistants.

McDaniel - 26 The frequent and complex relationships between the United States ambassador and senior military officers serving in the same foreign country provide a fertile area of potential dispute because of widely variant responsibilities and orientation. This relationship has recently been greatly clarified by the issuance of Presidential instructions which delineated both responsibilities as well as procedures for resolution of differences.26 Although these instructions should be helpful in preventing normal judgmental differences from becoming contentious disputes, it does not assure that such will not happen. Public airing of any such disputes could not be allowed to continue in all probability because of diplomatic considerations and one of the disputants would assuredly be removed from the arena. Here again, the presumption would favor the civilian disputant for hierarchal and other reasons quite apart from the classical concept of civil authority over the military. The relationships discussed above have all involved civilian members of the executive branch of government. The corporate nature of the relationships between the military departments and the Congress has presented extensive personal dissension between military officers and members of the Congress. However, there have been instances where officers, apparently performing within the approval of their military superiors, have been charged with failure to conform to the will of Congress. A good example is the case of General Alfred B. Denniston and construction of an airfield at Ft. Lee, Virginia. By the use of troop engineer labor and construction materials procured for other programs, the budgetary limit approved by Congress for construction of an airstrip was considerably exceeded in 1958 and 1959. At a subsequent hearing by the House Government Operations Committee, the authority of Congress was shown to have been clearly flaunted with the resultant reprimand and relief of General Denniston. The fact that the airfield was built with the clear knowledge of General Dennistons military superiors did not relieve him from a not clearly defined obligation to conform to the authority of Congress.27

McDaniel - 27 These various relationships provide a fragile basis for the disciplinary context by which an officer must conduct his obligations. Although the Soldiers Oath may designate the Constitution as the ultimate authority, fidelity more clearly describes the standards by which an officer must guide his conduct of duty.

McDaniel - 28 CHAPTER IV To The Limits Of Propriety

To sin by silence when they should protest makes cowards of men.1

The requirement for discipline is perhaps the most basic and universal tenet of military training and organization. Certainly, no other virtue is more impressed upon soldiers from their first moment of service.2 The expectation of habitual, immediate, and unchallenged obedience to the requirements of ones military superiors is without parallel in any other part of society.3 Although the basis for severe standards of discipline in the military are founded in the rigorous demands of the battlefield, these standards extend through every endeavor of the profession and provide an unyielding criterion upon which military virtues can be used. Considerations of Military Discipline As severe as these standards may be, there are clearly limits to obedience. For example, a soldier cannot obey an order, which is not within his capability to perform, even though he might be expected to try at the cost of his life on the battlefield. Military laws demand obedience only to legal orders of superiors and professional standards of service mitigate against the issuance of capricious or arbitrary impositions.4 The limits of obedience can seldom condone failure to comply with military orders based on differences in judgment as to the best course of action or to consequences. A subordinate may encounter circumstances, which are unknown to his superior, which might clearly warrant a different course of action other than that which is directed. When there is no opportunity for consultation in such circumstances, the proper course of the subordinate would be to follow the course which he believes his superior would direct if he knew the full situation.5 This is a delicate course to follow and cannot justify noncompliance based on a different view of the same situation or a rationalized decision based on the perspective of the subordinate. Judgmental differences are and must be

McDaniel - 29 resolved on the presumption of greater competence and knowledge of the superior. Similarly, orders must be presumed to be legal and a subordinate basing disobedience on the illegality of orders must be prepared to defend against that presumption at his jeopardy.6 Finally, orders may be challenged on grounds of higher loyalty or morality. Such challengers must tread lightly at their peril for again the presumption is with the superior and subordinates claiming higher loyalty or moral grounds for disobedience are on dangerous and not clearly defined grounds. Clearly, military orders cannot be an excuse for fundamental disloyalties in violation of a soldiers oath. It has also been held that military orders cannot excuse genocide, wanton murder, or other fundamentally immoral crimes. These are extreme cases and a soldier will rarely be justified in imposing his conscience against compliance with military orders.7 The MacArthur Case The MacArthur Controversy provides an interesting case for studying the divisiveness of subordinate loyalties and the limits to which an officer should advocate his views against contending views of his civilian superiors. This controversy is both timely and pertinent since it involved basic differences in the conduct of a limited war not unlike the differences found in this country today as regards the Vietnam situation. Then, as now, the basic contention was between one group who pressed for more severe military measures against another group proposing restraint as a basis for settlement.9 Then, as now, there was no challenge to the concept of civilian supremacy over the military.10 However, the nature of the controversy was largely misunderstood and it provides many areas illuminative to this study. In the words of General George C. Marshall, Secretary of Defense at the time of MacArtuhurs relief, the MacArthur controversy was caused by . . . .a local theater commander publicly expressing his displeasure and his disagreement with the foreign policy of the United States.11 This statement is accurate but highly simplified and does not explain why this disagreement became a cause clbre, whereas public disagreement

McDaniel - 30 by other military officers with other national policies is the frequent subject of journalistic reportage without major controversy. It is, perhaps, fundamental to this case to make clear at the outset that the controversy did not involve a direct conflict of authority between General MacArthur and President Truman as has been widely proclaimed. The dichotomy that ensued was between General MacArthur and the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and, perhaps more overriding, between factions of the political community. It is true that the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense were the Presidents surrogates and acted for him in the dichotomy; however, it is also true that the president permitted the dichotomy to continue only partially constrained up to a point and that once he personally spoke, his authority was unchallenged.12 The historical events of the MacArthur controversy have been extensively recorded and interpreted, the most comprehensive coverage being the hearings of the Joint Committee on Armed Services and Foreign Relations of he United States Senate.13 This study cannot recount all of the historical events involved but must be content with examining the disparate positions assumed by the contending factions and the aspects of the resulting controversy which are pertinent herein. Divergent Positions The position of the Administration, with Secretary Dean Acheson as its most persistent spokesman, was basically one of restraint and limited objectives.14 That of the MacArthur faction was one of a firm line and forceful action against larger objectives. More fundamentally, the divergence was between those who feared that strong action at this circumstance might precipitate a world war and those who believed that a firm stand was necessary to prevent an escalation of the war via the pattern of the Rhineland, Anschluss, and Sudetenland events. Note that the fundamental loyalties of both factions were consistent with their common allegiance. More specifically, MacArthur espoused strong support of Chiang Kai-shek, inclusion of Formosa within our containment shield, use of Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea, blockage of the China coast, aerial attack of targets beyond the Korean borders, and stronger military efforts within Korea. In short,

McDaniel - 31 he believed that a direct confrontation with communism at this circumstance was needed and that the trend of relative strategic-nuclear strengths of the United States versus the Soviet Union favored bolder action by the United States.16 The Administration opposed each of these measures, at least initially, and supported limited (as opposed to general) application of the Truman Doctrine, close coordination with our allies, and a negotiated settlement in Korea based on limited force application.17 The opening rounds of the controversy first sounded as the result of a visit by General MacArthur to Formosa on July 31, 1950.18 Upon return from this trip, MacArthur issued from Tokyo, a statement emphasizing the military nature of his talks with Chiang and praised the Nationalist leader whose determination to resist Communist domination arouses my sincere admiration. His determination parallels the common interest and purpose of Americans, that all people in the Pacific should be free not slaves.19 Chiang promptly followed with a similar statement expressing confidence in the . . .. Sino-American military cooperation . . . .in the common fight against totalitarianism in Asia and . . .. the menace of communism.20 In only January of the same year, the Administration had excluded Formosa (as well as Korea) from the mantle of United States protection and the MacArthur-Chiang announcements brought consternation both in Washington and abroad. A Presidential commitment to neutralize the island of Formosa with the Seventh Fleet shortly after the United Nations Forces intervention was promised to extend no longer than the Korean conflict. The MacArthur announcement implied a more extensive commitment.21 The President immediately sent Averall Harriman to brief the General on the basic conflict of interest between Chiang and the United States. Chiangs goal was to return to the mainland and this goal would be furthered by a full-scale war between the United States and the Communist regime. MacArthur assured Harriman of his support of the Presidents policies, but Harriman was reportedly unconvinced.22 This initial friction did not entail a fundamental policy split with the Administration. Washington had responded to Chiangs offer of troop support in Korea

McDaniel - 32 with a note deferring final decision until after General MacArthur could confer with Nationalist authorities regarding the defense of Formosa. This note plus expression of concern by the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the situation in Formosa led to the trip and could logically have lead the General into assuming that the Korean intervention negated the earlier policy excluding Formosa from our line on containment.23 Subsequently, a message prepared by General MacArthur for delivery to the Veterans of Foreign Wars annual encampment of August 28, 1950, was immediately seized upon by the Administration. This message was considered inconsistent with the limited obligation which the President had made to end the defense of Formosa with the restoration of the status quo in Korea.24 Although flamboyantly worded, the message does not appear to this reviewer to be incompatible with the Administrations policies at the time but efforts by the General to convince the Administration that his message supported the Presidents policies fell on unreceptive ears.25 In his memoirs, Truman later stated that he considered firing MacArthur at the time of this incident but such appears to be unlikely.26 A subsequent conference at Wake Island between the General and the President on October 15, 1950, was marked by cordiality and goodwill. At the conclusion of the Wake Island conference, President Truman stated: . . .. Ive never had a more satisfactory conference since Ive been President, and claimed a very complete unanimity of views.27 At this stage, it appears that there were divergences but that they were below the level of the President and most probably focused at the Department of State. Two events then occurred, and though they were separate and unconnected, their effects soon combined into an issue, which irreconcilably divided the President and the General. The first of these was the Republican success at the mid-term election in November with the attendant assumption of Republican leadership by Senator Robert Taft. The Administrations party suffered heavy losses in that election and Senator Taft credited Republican gains to opposition to Democratic policies. Senator Taft had never associated bi-partisanship in foreign affairs as me-tooism and believed that the

McDaniel - 33 opposition had a strong part in establishing a national role. He interpreted the returns of the mid-term election an indicative that the electorate had listened attentively to those who attributed the loss of China and other gains of communism to appeasement by the Administration and most specifically by Secretary Acheson. He attributed Deweys 1948 defeat largely to a me-too campaign and his alignment with internationalists. Setting his sights on the next Presidential election, the Taft led Republican wing strongly opposed to Democratic policies in general and specifically against softness toward communism.28 In November also, the Red Chinese intervened in Korea and the entire character of the war was changed decisively. From insured victory, United Nations forces were sent reeling before the Chinese onslaught; the ability even to remain in Korea was doubtful. Perhaps most important to this study, MacArthur accepted the Chinese intervention as a total China commitment and immediately urged bombing north of the Yalu, blockage of Chinas coast, and removal of the constraints placed upon the Nationalist Chinese.29 The Joint Chiefs of staff received MacArthurs proposals with mixed views and failed to provide the President with firm recommendations concerning them.30 Under pressure from our allies and the State Department, the President refused each of these requests. Moreover, it soon became apparent that the Administration was prepared to accept a settlement based on the 38th parallel rather than a Korea-wide settlement consistent with the still standing United Nations resolution.31 That MacArthur chafed under these constraints was no secret. MacArthurs impatience with these restrictions of limited war was shared by a large segment of the American people. Kennan has aptly described Americas approach to international affairs as legalistic-moralistic and illustrates how this approach generates an attitude of righteousness toward war. This leads to a dedication, a crusading in war, a desire to have done with, a tendency toward total commitment.32 Consistent with Tafts tactics of opposition to Administration policies, the Taft-led Republican party quickly seized the issue and rose to the support of our embattled troops fighting with

McDaniel - 34 one hand tied behind their backs.33 Not unnaturally, the President viewed this tact as support of MacArthur against the Administration and, by transposition, as support of a hostile political faction by MacArthur. The remaining events pertinent to this study unfolded quickly MacArthur defended his military reverses following the Chinese intervention by attributing Chinese successes in part to the military restrictions placed upon him.34 The Administration countered on December 6, 1950, by issuing directives requiring oversees officials, including military commanders . . . .to clear all but routine statements . . .. and to refrain from direct communication on limited or foreign policy with newspapers, magazines, or other publicity media . . ..35 Both the House of Representatives and the Senate passed resolutions in January demanding that the United Nations declare the Chinese Communist authorities as aggressor . . ..36 and a definite effort toward a settlement based on the 38th parallel was initiated, largely by R. Clement Atlee, the British Prime Minister.37 In February, 1951, the United Nations found Communist China guilty of aggression by a vote of forty-four to seven.38 MacArthur followed this action by proposing an aggressive and expanded military program to unify Korea which had been a United States goal since the Cairo Conference in 1943 and United nations goal since 1948. This program was rejected by the Administration but found strong supporters in the Congress.39 The final act of the drama was initiated by a reply from MacArthur in late March to a letter from Congressman Joseph W. Martin, minority leader of the House of Representatives. In this reply, MacArthur supported his well-known position by declaring . . . .that if we lose the war to communism in Asia the fall of Europe is inevitable . . . .There is no substitute for victory. Martin released this letter on April 5, 1951.40 This act coupled with parallel press aggravations exceeded the limits of what the President was prepared to accept. At 1:00 A.M. on April 11, 1951, an official announcement was made by the White House dismissing MacArthur.41 The General returned to the United States amid great public ovation and on April 19, 1951, presented a stirring address to a joint

McDaniel - 35 meeting of Congress.42 On May 3 Senator Richard Russell began hearings before a meeting of the Joint Committee on Armed Services and Foreign Relations relating to General MacArthurs dismissal.43 Military and Partisan Alignments During this period, Walter Lippman wrote We now see the beginnings of an altogether intolerable thing in a republic namely a schism within the armed forces between the general of the Democratic Party and the generals of the Republican party.44 This was in reference to public statements by General Omar M. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in support of Administration views on Korea as opposed to those of MacArthur. Tafts attack of General Bradleys statements as partisan involvement had truly given rise to the apparent conditions, which Walter Lippman addressed. But were these conditions real or apparent? Partisan political involvement by military personnel is especially prohibited by the Hatch Act45 and both Generals Bradley and MacArthur would have been liable to prosecution in Federal courts if the conditions actually existed. The evidence seems to indicate that the schism grew not from previously established party affinities but from independently developed judgments with which the two political parties quickly assumed alignment. In the case of General Bradley, it was logical that his views corresponded to those of the Administration. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he participated in the Administrations national security policy formulation process and properly associated himself with the policy. If his judgments had evolved substantially differently from those of the Administration, he would still have been obliged to support the Administrations policy but his position in the councils of government would have soon become untenable and he, like MacArthur, would have to be removed. MacArthurs case was different; his position had no basis in traditional platforms of the Republican Party nor did he participate directly in the formulation of positions of the Republican Party. In fact, MacArthurs position of wider commitments in support of Korea and the Nationalist Chinese was somewhat inconsistent with the mid-western

McDaniel - 36 Republican traditions with which Taft as identified. Taft chose to ignore this inconsistency in favor of grasping at virtually any issue to which the Administration was committed.46 These considerations would tend to support the view that the positions of both MacArthur and Bradley were derived from basic judgmental differences, generating from different perspectives of the same problem. That these divergent issues become the basis for partisan politics and factionalism was not because Bradley and MacArthur supported the Democratic or Republican Party by espousing these views but because the fundamental divergence was exploited by positivism, primarily by the Taft-led Republicans. The Supremacy of the Executives This study cannot establish whether MacArthurs actions were proper and legal nor is that its purpose. It is highly unlikely that any court would have found him in violation of the Hatch Act nor have Trumans subsequent comments regarding insubordination even been supported. The Senate Hearings could find no evidence of violation of instructions except possibly the failure to clear all policy statements before the December 1950 directive.47 Even in this case, it appeared that the statements he failed to clear were to members of Congress in response to specific queries. Since direct communication by members of the military with Congress is specifically authorized by statute, this act could not alone have supported judicial actions. That he exceeded the proper limits of advocacy, at least in the eyes of President Truman, is clear. The wide public acclaim and strong Congressional support which MacArthur received following his relief indicate that the Presidents view was not widely shared.48 There was no dispute that the President acted within his authority and MacArthur himself said the the authority of the President to assign officers is complete and absolute. He does not have to give any reasons therefore . . ..49 The limits of advocacy were ill-defined for MacArthur and they are no less indistinct today. In fact, except for General Mathew Ridgeway, who was MacArthurs immediate successor, each of the military commanders in Korea following MacArthur

McDaniel - 37 voiced irritation over the constraints of limited war and the acceptance of goals less than a military victory.50 Many other issues since Korea have witnessed similar instances whereby senior officers have pressured for military imperatives contrary to Administration views. That none since MacArthur have received the summary treatment, which he did, might not indicate that they more clearly perceived the limits of advocacy. Trumans actions were perhaps more determined by Trumans personality and his weak political position than by the actual actions of MacArthur. Officers at the highest levels have an obligation both to support clearly established national decisions and to advocate their judgments in accordance with their allegiance in the formulation of national security policy. When these two obligations became clearly inconsistent or when a clear decision is rendered against their judgment, the obligation is then to conform or if unable to do so in conscience, then they must leave the military service.

McDaniel - 38 CHAPTER V Advocacy and Effectiveness

My dear Secretary, I write to suggest that you request and advise all officers of the service whether active or retired, to refrain from public comment of any kind upon the military or political situation on the other side of the water . . . .It seems to me highly unwise and improper. President Wilson in letter To Secretary of War Garrison, August 19141
In a perceptive editorial, 2 Thomas R. Phillips, military affairs commentator for the St. Louis Post Dispatch, deplores coercive efforts to assure conformance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in support of administration policies. He states that prospective appointees are interviewed and informed that they must support administration policies or be replaced and cites the example of General Lauris Norstad as having declined an appointment offered under this intimidation. He further charges that the then current administration (Eisenhowers) has impaired the integrity of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by replacing all of them in the early part of his administration. In Phillips view, such action places the Joint Chiefs of Staff in an intolerable position, more aligned with the support of partisan political policies than with a professional approach toward national security. He cites Senator Tafts earlier charges of partisan political involvement by General Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the MacArthur controversy, and argues that President Eisenhowers action in replacing all of the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff tends to confirm Tafts charges. Phillips concern is a valid one and fundamental to the American concept of civilian control and to this study. However, Phillips thesis is too narrow and fails to

McDaniel - 39 identify that fragile division between the obligation to speak and the obligation to support superior authority. Phillips view would appear to be supported by the Eisenhower successor, President Kennedy, who said in his State of the Union message that . . .. this Administration recognizes the value of daring dissent that we greet healthy controversy as the hallmark of health change . . ..3 Despite this statement, President Kennedy did not fail to remove Admiral George Anderson from his post as Chief of Naval Operations when the extent of his controversy exceeded certain limits.4 In the preceding chapter; it was shown that President Truman also accepted voices of dissent from his military leaders but only up to a point. In fact, this practice has become accepted as the norm if we can judge from recent practice. Cohesion in the Term Perhaps one could ask Mr. Phillips why an administration should expect loyalty from subordinates are clearly selected with the expectation of supporting the Executive; the effectiveness of any administration necessarily depends on this support. Appointed civilian leaders in government are drawn from a broad background of society unconstrained by a specific heritage of obedience or hierarchal loyalties. Nevertheless, history has shown that they have welded their programs to the will of their administration or, when this could not be done, they have terminated their positions with scarcely a murmur. The reasons for this broad support are diverse but not really unexpected. Very often these individuals are supporting policies which they have either personally developed or became associated with in the development process and which only subsequently or concurrently became administration policies. If not that, they frequently join an administration whose policies are well established and which are in consonance with their personal convictions.5 Even though these civilian leaders adhere to the same oath and hence the same basic loyalties as military officers, their commitment is normally less than the lifetime service of professional soldiers. It might be said that their tenure, and hence their obligation, is restricted to the tenure of the administration in which they are serving. As a result, their imperatives are

McDaniel - 40 less intense and, perhaps, their view of security is less confined to the life or death absoluteness of the soldiers battlefield experiences. Further, the role of the appointive official seldom requires a unique expertise which sets him apart from his superiors or which might provide a divergent perspective of a commonly viewed problem. Whatever may be the reasons; the wide and continuous controversies within the political arena are seldom manifested by open or prolonged disputes within the civilian leadership of an administration comparable to the dissensions so frequently reported between senior military and civilian leaders. Broad support of administration policies is not restricted to limited tenure appointive officials. Career civil service officers and foreign service officers have demonstrated a consistent disposition to adapt to widely variant changes in policies between administrations with little friction.6 These officers are prohibited from partisan political involvement by the Hatch Act but no less so than their military brethren.7 Further, their bureaucratic positions are, like the military, largely advisory with most major policy decisions being reserved for politically responsible, appointive positions. It would appear that these conditions would generate some of the same controversy as have appeared between military and civilian leaders of the various administrations. Clearly such dissensions have appeared but their intensity and controversy have been virtually insignificant. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to establish whether they have been less frequent than has been the military experience. The more limited public stature and responsibilities of professional civil servants as compared to the most senior military officers probably account for the relative lack of public controversy. It is unlikely that President Eisenhower, assuming that Phillips comments are accurate, ever found a prospective appointee who disagreed with the Commander in Chiefs view to be inconsistent with the hierarchal disciplinary concepts on which our military structure is ordered. It is equally unlikely that the President would have required pledges to refrain from advocacy or forthrightness in judgmental differences not yet developed. That Eisenhowers Administration or his policies were not immune to the

McDaniel - 41 differences with which we are concerned was illustrated by General Ridgeways temperate but positive opposition within the administration and before the public form of Congressional hearings.8 Nevertheless, it should be the presumption that all senior leaders will support their administration and the presumption must be even stronger for support by senior military officers when their Commander in Chief has clearly set the course. The Case of General Taylor General Maxwell D. Taylor served tours on the Joint Chiefs of Staff under both the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations. His experience provides a remunerative study as he aligned himself with a military policy clearly opposed to that of the Eisenhower Administration but consistent with that of the subsequent Kennedy Administration. Perhaps most significant, General Taylors advocacy of military policies opposed by the administration of one political party and consistent with those of the other party have not resulted in charged of partisan involvement such as characterized the MacArthur controversy.9 General Taylor was appointed to the post of Chief of Staff, United States Army, in June 1955, following distinguished service as a combat commander in Europe and Commander of United Nations Forces in Korea.10 General Taylor had had long professional associations with his predecessor, General Ridgeway, and it is clear that his views were essentially the same. General Ridgeway had been unsuccessful in gaining acceptance of his major concerns regarding modernization of the Army during his tour as Chief of Staff of the Army. General Taylor believed that General Ridgeways failures were largely attributable to a too aggressive advocacy, which lacked credence and articulation.11 He believed that the military posture had become so configured to the concept of massive retaliation that national security was being jeopardized by the lack of flexibility in meeting national challenges. He advocated a strong strategic missile offensive force, modernization of Army forces increased tactical and strategic mobility, increased nuclear

McDaniel - 42 and conventional tactical firepower, and a defensive missile system.12 General Taylor predicted increasingly aggressive conduct from the Sino-Soviet powers as the nuclear forces of each side increased and the threshold for nuclear war became higher.13 Before the Congress, he initially supported the overall level of the Presidents defense budget but opposed the allocations within the budget and the seemingly arbitrary manner in which they were established.14 As a level budget ceiling and increasing tactical equipment obsolescence generated larger funding deficiencies, he pressured for a greater overall defense budget.15 He chafed at what he considered to be narrow views of his colleagues on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.16 He was especially irritated by the fund allocation procedures within the Defense Department which he felt had little correlation to a rational national strategy.17 An incident in which each of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were pressured into signing a vaguely worded statement implying that they approved of the FY61 budget when in fact they had reservations particularly irked Taylor.18 In March 1959, Taylor testified before the Senate that the Western powers could fight and win a non-nuclear war in Europe. This statement was widely interpreted as undercutting a recent Presidential pledge that Berlin rights would be defended by the threat of massive nuclear force.19 An article which General Taylor had written for Foreign Affairs magazine supporting a doctrine of flexible response was denied administration clearance for publication as being inconsistent with approved policy.20 These incidents plus the increasing awareness that his efforts to modernize the Army were continually unsuccessful, generated increasing frustrations. In his words, Theres one thing I could do for the cause. I could withdraw one obsolescent general and that I propose to do.21 With that, General Taylor disassociated himself from the administration by retirement in June 1959. Retirement and Resignation The status of military retirement into which General Taylor entered is defined by law and custom. By law, retired military officers retain their allegiance to their oath and remain within the full jurisdiction of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.22 They remain

McDaniel - 43 subject to the authority of he Commander in Chief, including the authority of recall to full active duty.23 By custom, military justice procedure are seldom applied to retired officers and they remain virtually free of personal constraints and impositions unless they are recalled or otherwise employed by the government.24 Such has not always been the case. President Wilson created a considerable stir by issuing instructions prohibiting certain public statements by retired officers aimed at retired Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, the celebrated naval stategist.25 More recently, retired officers have been unconstrained in their public speeches and writing and current Department of Defense instructions prescribing clearance requirements specifically exempt retired personnel.26 Officers have recourse to a more complete and positive disassociation from Executive authority than retirement; that is, resignation. By resignation, an officer severs all military ties and obligations and is constrained only by the loyalties and obligations of any other private citizen.27 This more severe course is seldom resorted to by officers for the purpose of advocacy against official policies. In the course of this study, only a single instance was found in which an officer could be said to have resigned in opposition to an established policy.28 Resignation involves the loss of the proceeds of a lifetime in retirement pay. However, it is unlikely that this modest factor would have deterred our examples of MacArthur and Taylor, from resigning if the cause of their advocacies would have been furthered by doing so. Effectiveness of Advocacy The precedents of permissive practice freed Taylor from constraints of openly advocating his thesis. The views which he had proposed without success as Chief of Staff were expounded forcefully and effectively in his book The Uncertain Trumpet, published in December 1959.29 This book, together with a collateral thesis developed by the Council of Foreign Relations and published in Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy by Henry Kissinger were to have substantial effects on the formulation of national security policies in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations.30

McDaniel - 44 Early in his administration, President Kennedy used General Taylor as a special assistant to review intelligence, paramilitary, and guerrilla warfare activities, and it was reported that the President was highly impressed with Taylors intellectualism, logic, and articulation.31 In this role, General Taylor provided professional advice quite separate from the structural mechanisms of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Defense Department. As such, he represented no service or corporate body and it can be expected that his views were at substantial variance from members such as General Lemnitzer and General Lemay, who had spoken forcefully against Taylors views in the past.32 If we can judge Taylors effectiveness by the degree with which his ideas were adapted by the Administration, he must be given high marks. Major changes were made in the defense posture and budgetary procedures in line with the thesis of The Uncertain Trumpet.33 These changes and the related increase in defense spending generated little partisan political controversy, perhaps because of renewed threats against Berlin by Khrushchev and increasing involvements in Vietnam. In 1962, General Taylor was recalled to active duty to serve as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.34 Wide implementation of General Taylors views throughout the Defense Department coupled with quietly effective operating techniques provided a close rapport with the Secretary of Defense and other senior civilian members of the administration. Taylor was known to have been dissatisfied with the operating procedures of the Joint Chiefs of staff and had even proposed a single Defense Chief of Staff as a means of providing a unified set of military recommendations to the civil decision authorities.35 General Taylor soon took measures to strengthen the office of the Chairman by obtaining authorization for a Special Assistant with the grade of lieutenant general, which caused some concern in Congress and elsewhere over his powers.36 As far as can be determined, General Taylor adhered scrupulously to the statutory powers of the Chairman. However, he adapted a procedure, which accorded his views increased importance over the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on certain subjects on which the service chiefs were not agreed. General Taylor transmitted the

McDaniel - 45 considerations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under a cover letter, which contained the Chairmans views and recommendations. This treatment afforded increased attention to the views of the Chairman as any reviewing official would logically read these concisely worded views initially and might not bother with the often lengthy, sometimes imprecise basic paper which contained the frequently split views of the three service chiefs and the Commandant of the Marine Corps.37 This procedure, assisted by the close relationship General Taylor maintained with the Secretary of Defense, resulted in the approval of the Chairmans recommendations more frequently than was appreciated by at least one dissenting service chief.38 General Taylors tenure as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was terminated by the President in 1964, and he was appointed as the Ambassador to South Vietnam, where he continued to play a major role as advisor to the administration.39 His assignment as Ambassador was terminated in 1965 and he reverted to his earlier role of special assistant to the President, this time to President Johnson.40 Two Sides to Advocacy The circumstances and personalities which have permitted General Taylor to assume such close involvement with the policies of one administration and against the administration of another without political controversy are diffuse but are basic to this study. Arthur Schlesinger contends that the military traditions of the United States comprise two divergent strains which he labels, for convenience, the roundheads and the cavaliers.40 As roundheads, he would classify George Washington, Zachery Taylor, Ulysses S. Grant, William T. Sherman, John J. Pershing, George Marshall, Omar Bradley, and Maxwell Taylor. Lighthorse Harry Lee, Winfield Scott, George B. McClellan, JEB Stuart, George Patton, Arleigh Burke, Curtis LeMay, and Douglas MacArthur would be labeled cavaliers. He characterizes the roundhead as realistic, austere, laconic, businesslike, modest, grim, and empirical. The roundheads credo is understatement; they regard war as hell. The cavaliers are romantic, rhetorical, extravagant, self-congratulatory, self-righteous, and mystical; their credo is overstatement. Roundheads would agree that war is hell but

McDaniel - 46 would also imply that it is the most thrilling and significant of human experiences. Schlesinger continues that because the roundhead has no mystique of war, he is willing to suppose that patriotism can take a variety of forms that even a pacifist and anarchist, like Thoreau, for example, might be a patriot. Because the cavalier has such a mystique, he tends to suppose that patriotism can take only one form, his own. The cavalier tends to award himself the unique franchise and the perpetual monopoly on what is patriotic; he is inclined to believe that those that dont respond to his own clichs are, at the least, less patriotic and, more probably, disloyal.41 Clearly both of Schlesingers types include great military leadership. This study has briefly examined the relationships of a general of each of Schlesingers types with their civilian leaders and has found the results as diverse as Schlesingers characterizations. It would be unfair to say that the MacArthur controversy was inevitable because MacArthur was a cavalier or that Taylors successes were ordained because he was realistic, austere, laconic . . .. Grim, and empirical. Such a simplification fails to account for an intemperate Truman or the circumstances of the demise of the Dulles strategy, both of which played a major role in the cases reviewed. Still, it would be difficult to visualize the same chain of events occurring if Taylor had commanded in Korea under Truman or if MacArthur were admitted to the sensitive coterie of Kennedys intellectuals. Perhaps the new role of the military in the councils of state calls for roundheads and if this be true, it is heartening to find the list well represented by great warriors.

McDaniel - 47 CHAPTER VI Summary

While I look to the Chiefs to present the military factor without reserve or hesitation, I regard them to be more than military men and expect their help in fitting military requirements into the overall context of any situation, recognizing that the most difficult problem in government is to combine all assets in a unified, effective pattern. President Kennedy to JCS April 19611
These instructions by President Kennedy clearly reflect the position of the military in the current machinery of the United States national security affairs. The imperatives of total war, the unending twilight of the cold war, and the exigencies of living in a Damocles Ian world have placed severe demands on our national decision processes and these demands have resulted in a transformation of our traditional concept of civilmilitary relations. Within the fundamental tenet of civil control over the military, civilmilitary relations have evolved through three distinct phases within the United States. Our nations earliest days experienced a period of citizen-soldiers, the minutemen concept and a society which contained distinct military elements was rejected as foreign to American concepts of freedom and democracy.2 The expressions of our founding fathers provide abundant evidence that a standing army was to be viewed with distrust and as consistent with their views of liberty. Even still, they displayed the realistic wisdom to provide constitutional instructions on which both our military structure and the ensuing civil-military relations find their origin.3 This concept of citizen-solider did not result in the appearance of separately identifiable military and civil groups which could develop contending views as to national interests and events.4 The concept of civil

McDaniel - 48 control over the military was known but dichotomies relating to national security affairs were essentially among civilians with common ethics but often different judgmental views.5 Increasing technology and involvement in the more all-encompassing wars of the nineteenth century led to the rise of military professionalism encompassing a distinct set of knowledge and an ethic increasingly divergent from civil society.6 Led primarily by European military scholars, the military ethic developed a concept of non-involvement in the affairs of state, and indifference to political ideals.7 This ethic held the military to be an unthinking instrument to be yielded by statesmen according to national interests. This ethic held firmly in the military ideology and all major Western powers through World War II has been viewed with suspicion, apprehension, and misunderstanding by both military and civil elements of our society.8 Clearly, such a concept resulted in tranquil civil-military relations employed by both groups. The notion of civil control could not be challenged by a silent, politically indifferent army, standing subserviently by to act at the statesmans will. The military had no cause for advocacy in national affairs for which they were not responsible. But still, the new totality of wars and the lethality of modern weapons outmoded this previously satisfying concept. The violence of nuclear weapons and the breeding of cold war strategies have welded military politics inseparable from national policies and required intimate participation by the military in national security policy processes.9 This new role of the military has been greeted with foreboding by both parties and has resulted in an often hesitant and, frequently, a not fully satisfactory performance. Not unnaturally, this new role has resulted in judgmental differences, which have been resolved with considerable misunderstanding and stress of civil-military relationships. A common loyalty and oath have provided a basis for resolution which, though seemingly adequate, have often been widely misinterpreted.10 Advocacy of military views has produced allegations of insubordination, partisan political involvement, and challenge of military authority.11 Less than forceful support of military imperatives in the councils of government challenges professional conscience and basic allegiance.

McDaniel - 49 General MacArthurs concern with meeting the Communist challenge directly and forcefully as opposed to the more restrained concepts of Secretary Acheson, speaking for the administration, provide a classic example of how a common allegiance can lead to divergent views and resultant contention. Richard Rovere and Schlessinger have presented the MacArthur controversy as a direct challenge of the Presidents authority.12 The comprehensive and rational hearings subsequently conducted under Senator Russells chairmanship have refuted that allegation but have left the basic issues underlying the controversy unresolved.13 Subsequent to his relief, General MacArthur raised a critical issue when he expressed concern over the . . .. Concept that members of our armed forces owe primary allegiance or loyalty to those who temporarily exercise the authority of the Executive Branch . . .. rather than to the country and its Constitution which they are sworn to defend . . . .14 Clearly, that concept is not a valid one as it connotes a reversion to the early military allegiances to monarchs or the Wehrmacht oath to Hitler. However, George W. Brown has effectively argued that the idea that the military should be independent of shifts of partisan politics is a reputable one.15 This idea stems from the proper concept of the military as a servant of the nation rather than the instrument of any political party. However, it would be a most dangerous step for a military officer to seek some focus of his allegiance other than that manifested by the legally constituted authority of the Commander in Chief. If his view of allegiance and his conscience are not consistent with the Executive, the officer must withdraw and, if his conscience so dictates, continue to press his resolve from outside the military establishment. Presidents have demonstrated judicious caution in the restraint of military advocacy and it is often the military who put defense policy to the test of political accountability by exposing the bases for decisions to congressional and public inquiry.16 This concept is similar to the tradition of bipartisanship in foreign affairs whereby a consensus is reached by a comparable process. The example of General Maxwell Taylor illustrates that military advocacy can be consistent with the policies of one political party and against the policies of the other

McDaniel - 50 party without the controversy associated with partisan political involvement. It would be difficult to define meaningful limits tot he extent of legitimate advocacy from an examination of the MacArthur and Taylor examples. It must be assumed that MacArthur exceeded proper limits (at least in the view of his Commander in Chief) from the resultant controversy whereas Taylor did not. An examination of the published actions taken by each of them could give credence to a finding that Taylors actions were more in contention with his administration (Eisenhowers) than MacArthurs. If this were true, the reason why MacArthur generated controversy and Taylor did not cannot be determined from any absolute, quantitative measure of their actions. More than likely, the different reactions of the administrations to their contending military advocates were determined largely by the relatively different political environments and personalities of the respective administrations and the existence of a war. Clearly, value judgments by MacArthur and Taylor as to the proper limits of advocacy were key to the issue. That MacArthur misjudged these limits and did not deliberately exceed them as a provocation, as contended by Rovere and Schlesinger, seems the most likely.17 Senator J. William Fulbright has contended that: There is little in the education, training, or experience of most military officers to equip them with the balance of judgment of necessary to put their own ultimate solutions those with which their education, training, and experience are concerned into proper perspective in the Presidents total strategy for the nuclear age. . . . .18 This is a serious charge and, if true, would hold that the military is not prepared for their new role and therefore should be excluded from it. It is unlikely that Mr. Fulbright intended to exclude our senior military leaders from the charge although the language most military officers might recognize excluding them. It would be hard to develop a standard of education, training, and experience, which could have wide

McDaniel - 51 agreement as essential to participate in the development of strategy for the nuclear age. Our most senior military leaders survive a rigid selection process and emerge from a highly competitive environment which give high attention to the education, training, and experience to which Mr. Fulbright finds wanting. Our senior political leaders also emerge from a highly competitive environment and are held responsible for their actions, as are the military. However, the selection process, which determines our political leadership heavily, favors those with domestic and local involvements and their responsibility through their formative years is often to a narrow electorate. Certainly, if the actions of MacArthur and Taylor were found deficient, it was not because of inadequacies in their education, training, and experience by other factors. It is likely that an examination of these qualifications of other senior officers at the national level would disclose a relatively high level of qualification. There has been another voice raised over military participation in the councils of government, which is not related to the militarys competency. Scholars of the school of Lasswell19, Mills20, and Vagts21 contend that a continued high state of armament and concern for security will lead to the dominance of world politics by military considerations and hence the garrison-state. This school views military advocacies not as a challenge to civil authority but as an expression of legitimate military prerogatives for national support of over-riding security considerations. Professor Janowitz stated it well; The targets of military persuasion are no longer merely the leader of opposing nations in wartime. The targets have become total populations, not only of unfriendly states, but of Allies, neutrals, and of ones own nation as well.22 The result, they fear, will be the evolvement of a political structure whose concern for national security jeopardizes personal liberties. It would be impossible to establish effective structural or constitutional guaranties against such a process and it must be hoped that a politically sensitive electorate, a fully responsible political government, and a properly responsive military can assure against these concerns.

McDaniel - 52 S.E. Finer has observed that the pressures of our American system compel the military to shout for its objectives and that this gives an impression of a vast military influence in government whereas it is evidence of only a vast amount of necessitated noise.23 This may be true but it is this necessitated noise which is so much misunderstood and has given rise to alarms over the failure of civilian control. It is clear that our system of government as we know it today encourages and may require this noise. Our political processes have not evolved from elegant theorizations and have survived the severe strains of history. Even still, this system reflects an advanced sophistication involving broadly diverse elements, not the least of which is the military. The Senate Specials Preparedness Committee, led by Senator Stennis in 1962, provided recommendations to guide civil-military relations which comprise a proper ending for this study24: Recommendations 1) That the traditional principle of military subordination to civil authority be given unwavering adherence and that it not be weakened in any particular. 2) That, within proper channels, freedom of expression and even dissent by military men during the decision making process on matters of military competence by both countenanced and encouraged. 3) That we continue to place strong reliance upon the dedication, skill, and competence of career military officers and upon the loyalty, judgment, selfrestraint, and self-imposed standards of proper conduct. 4) That, to avoid problems in the field of civil-military relations while at the same time maintaining inviolate the principle of civilian supremacy, alertness, clear thinking, mutual understanding and cooperation is required of the Congress, the executive department, and the military.

McDaniel - 53 NOTES Notes On Chapter I 1. Lady G. Cecil, quoted in Michael Howard, Soldiers and Governments, Eyre & Spottiswoods, 1957, p 192. 2. John F. Kennedy News Conference quoted in Washington Post, 25 January 1962, p. A8 3. United States Code, with Supplements 1958-1961, title 5, Section 16, Vol. I, Washington, GPO, 1961, p. 99. 4. Military Cold war Education and Speech Review Policies, Report by the Special Preparedness Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 87th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, GPO, 1962, p 12. Hereafter cited as Stennis Committee.

McDaniel - 54 Notes On Chapter II 1. Thomas Carlyle, as quoted in John Bartlett, ed., Familiar Quotations, Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1951, P. 78. 2. Alfred Vagts, A History of Militarism, New York, Greenwich Editions, Meridian Books, Inc., 1969, p. 75. 3. Ibid., pp. 76-77. 4. Elias Bent McKinley, Democracy and Military Power, New York, The Vanguard Press, 1934, pp. xx, xxi. 5. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, Cambridge, Mass., The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1945, p. 163. Hereafter cited as Huntington, S&S. 6. Morris Janowitz, The Professional Solider: A Socialism Political Portrait, Glencoe, Ill., The Free Press, 19??, pp 109-112. 7. Huntington, S&S, pp. 20-21. 8. Dale O. Smith, The Eagles Talon, Washington, Sparton Books, 1966, provides a discussion of the liberal concern over Praetorianism and Cromwellism, pp. 96-102, 115, 116. 9. Huntington, S&S, pp. 80-84. 10. Ibid., pp. 30-37. See also Earl Wavell, Soldiers and Soldiering, London, Alden Press, 1953, p. 42. 11. Huntington, S&S, pp. 80-87. Also see S.E. Finer, The Man on Horseback, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1962, p. 24, for a discussion of Huntingtons theme. 12. John W. Wheeler-Bennet, The Nemesis of Power: The German Army in Politics, 1918-1956, 2nd Edition, New York, St. Martins Press, 1964, p. 18. 13. Harold D. Lasswell as quoted in Huntington, S&S, p. 11. 14. Smith, op. S&S, pp. 63-69, 92-95.

McDaniel - 55 15. Walter Millis, Arms and the State, New York, The Twentieth Century, 1958, p. 21; Huntington, S&S, pp. 227-237. 16. H.L. Mencken, Mencken on the Military, The Mercury, Editorial, September 1929, p. 16. 17. John W. Masland and Laurence I. Radway, Soldiers and Scholars, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1957, pp. 13-14; Huntington, S&S, p. 59. 18. Ibid., p. 23; Janowitz, op. Cit., pp. 104-105. 19. Janowitz, op. cit., pp. 104-105. 20. The U.S. Military Mind, Fortune, Vol. XLV, February, 1952, p. 91. 21. Huntington, S&S, p. 60. 22. Arthur M. Schlessinger, Jr., Generals in Politics, The Reporter, Vol. VI, April 1, 1952, pp. 33-36. 23. Huntington, S&S, pp.79. 24. Gene M. Lyons and Lois Morton, Schools for Strategy; Education and Research in National Security Affairs, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1965, p. 52. 25. Walter Millis, Arms and Man, New York, G.P. Putnams Sons, 1956, p. ??. 26. Harold D. Lasswell, quoted in Samuel P. Huntington, ed., Changing Patterns of Military Politics, New York, The Free Press of Glencoe Inc., 1962, p. 46. 27. Bernard Brodie, National Security Policy and Economic Stability, New Haven Yale Institute of International Studies, 1950, p. 68. 28. Samuel P. Huntington, Civilian Control of the Military - - A Theoretical Statement, Political Behavior, Heinz Eulau and others, ed., Glencoe, Ill., The Free Press, 1956, p. 380. 29. Michael Howard, Soldiers and Governments, London, Eyre and Spottiswoods, 1957, p. 192. 30. Ibid., pp. 99-112

McDaniel - 56 31. Gordon B. Turner, A History of Military Affairs in Western Society Since the Eighteenth Century, New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1953, pp. 257266. 32. Vagts, op. cit., pp ??. 33. Huntington, S&S, pp. ??. 34. Turner, op. cit., pp. 469-471. 35. Gerald Lindsey McEntee, Military History of the World War, New York, Charles Scribners Sons, 1947, pp. 860-872. See also Winston Churchill, World Crisis, 1915, New York, Charles Scribners Sons, 1951, pp. 37-48. 36. Taylor, op. cit., pp. 34, 36. 37. Millis, op. cit., pp. 15-21. 38. Vagts, op. cit., pp. 474-476. 39. Turner, op. cit., pp. 469-470. 40. Huntington, S&S, pp. 4??. 41. Report by Special Preparedness Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 87th Congress, 2nd Session, Military Cold War Education and Speech Review Policies, Washington, 1962, p. 51. Hereafter cited as Stennis Committee. 42. John F. Kennedy quoted in Army Navy Air Force Journal and Register, Vol. KCIV, NO. 42, June 16, 1962, p. 14. 43. Lyndon B. Johnson, Convocation, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Washington, Pamphlet No. L65-2, August 21, 1964, pp 1-4. 44. John F. Kennedy quoted in Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. XXIV, No. 1, June 15, 1960, p. 27. 45. Harold D. Lasswell, National Security and Individual Freedom, First Edition, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1950, p. 252.

McDaniel - 57 46. Michael Howard, Soldiers and Governments, Bloomington, Ind., Indiana University Press, 1959, p. 136. 47. C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite, New York, Oxford University Press, 1956, pp. 127-14?, 195-196. 48. Harold D. Lasswell quoted in Huntington, Changing Patterns of Military Politics, op. cit., p. 51. 49. George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty ???, A Novel, New York, Harcourt, Brace & World, 1949, ?assim. 50. Quoted in Stennis Committee, p. ??9. 51. Jean M. Driscoll and Charles S. Hynemans, Methodology for Political Scientists, ? Eulau, Political Behavior, op. cit., p. 405, provides a comprehensive bibliography. 52. Harold D. Laswell quoted in Huntington, Changing Patterns of Military Politics, p. 60. 53. Vagts, op. cit., p. 102. 54. Huntington, S&S, p. 163. 55. Stennis Committee, pp. 3, 193. 56. Ibid., p. 23. 57. Ibid., p. 187. 58. Huntington, S&S, pp. 80-84, Wavell, ??????., p. 42. 59. Turner, op. cit., pp. 728-730. 60. Officer Education Study, Vol. I, Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations, Washington, GPO, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower), July 1966, p. 5. 61. Ibid., pp. 12-15. 62. Ibid., p. 69.

McDaniel - 58

63. Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr., The Democracy of Professionalism at the War Colleges, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 91, No. 3, March 1965, p. 34. 64. Quoted in Air University Review, July-August 1966, p. 34.

McDaniel - 59 Notes On Chapter III 1. National Military Establishment (???) Form No. 1A, 1 September 1948, Bureau of Engraving and Printing, Washington D.C. 2. United States Code, Title 5, Section 16, Washington, GPO, 1964, Vol. 1, p. 115. 3. Archibald P. Wavell, Soldiers and Soldiering, Cape, London, 1953, p. 36. 4. Walter Goerlitz, The German General Staff, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1953, p. 17. 5. Wheeler-Bennet, op. cit., p. 694. 6. Walter Millis and Harvey C. Mansfield, Arms and the State, New York, The Twentieth Century Fund, 1958, p. 168. 7. Huntington, S&S, p. 163. 8. Louis Smith, American Democracy and Military Power, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1951, is an example of several available references in the area. 9. Quoted in National Security Act of 1947, as amended, Public Law 253, 80th Congress, July 26, 1947, (61 Stat. 495), December 3, 1958, Washington, GPO, 1958, p. 49. 10. Ibid., p. 9 11. National Security Act of August 11, 1949 (63 Stat. 578), Sec. 202(c )(6), Washington, GPO, 1949, p. 168. 12. National Security Act of 1947, as amended, Appendix III, pp. 168-172. 13. United States Code, 1964 Edition, Vol. II, Title 10, Sec. 27, Washington, GPO, p. 124. 14. JCS Visit LBJ Ranch, Washington Pot, 24 October 1965, p. 6. 15. Clark R. Mollenhoff, The Pentagon, New York, G.P. Putnams Sons, 1967, p. 15. 16. Nathan F. Twining, Neither Liberty Nor Safety, New York, Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1966, p. ???.

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17. Maxwell D. Taylor, quoted by Baltimore Sun, 13 May 1957, from Meet the Press, 12 May 1957, p. 6. 18. Huntington, S&S, p. 414. 19. National Security Act of August 10, 1945, Sec. 202(c )(6), Washington, GPO, 1949. 20. Mills, op. cit., pp. 164-166. 21. Hanson Baldwin, The Pentagons Strange Ways, The New York Times, April 23, 1965, p. 37. 22. John B. Medaris, Countdown for Decision, New York, Putnam & Sons, 1960, p. 271. 23. Mills, op. cit., pp. 182-183. 24. James M. Gavin, War and Peace in the Space Age, New York, Harper, 1958, p. 63. 25. Army Intelligence Chief Reassigned, The Washington Post, 14 August 1952 26. Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations to the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, The Ambassador and the Problem of Coordination, 88th Congress, 1st Session, Document No. 36, September 13, 1963, Washington, GPO, 1963, pp. 149, 155. (Actions by both Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy are contained in this document.) 27. Airstrip Stirs Anger on Hill, Washington Star, 29 March 1962, p. 19.

McDaniel - 61 Notes On Chapter IV 1. Abraham Lincoln quoted in The MacArthur Controversy, Richard H. Rovere and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., New York, Farr, Strans and Giroux, 1965, p. 337. 2. The Armed Forces Officer, Department of Defense, Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950, p. 139. 3. Walter Millis, Arms and Men, New York, G.P, Putnams Sons, 1956, p. 109. 4. Digest of Opinions, The Judge Advocate General of the Armed Forces, Washington D.C. Volumes published biannually since 1952, Vol. 5, pp. 260-264. 5. Alfred T. Mahan, The military Rule of Obedience, Boston, Little Brown and Company, 1914, p. 283. 6. Digest of Opinions, Vo. 4, p. 224. 7. Robert K. Woetzel, The Nuremberg Trials in International Law, London, Stevens and Sons, 1960, p. 68. 8. The Armed Forces Officer, p. 8. 9. John W. Spainier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War, Cambridge, Mass., The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1959, p. 10. This fact is disputed by some authors who contend that MacArthur directly challenged Presidential leadership. The facts do not seem to support this view since MacArthur fully supported the Presidents authority and right to make all the basic decisions involved. That MacArthur did not agree with all of the decisions did not constitute a challenge to civil supremacy.Quoted in Spainer, op. cit., p. 10. 10. Hearings held on the Dismissal of General MacArthur and the Military Situation in the Far East, may 3-June 27, 1951, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, Joint Committee on Armed Services and Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, Vol. IV, Washington, GPO, 1951, p. 2743. Hereafter cited as MacArthur Hearings. 11. Ibid., Vols. I-IV. 12. Ibid., Vol. III, pp. 2114-2116. 13. Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 37-43.

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14. Ibid., Vol I, pp. 189, 193, 195. 15. Ibid., Vol. III, p. 2116. 16. Rovere and Schlesinger, op. cit., pp. 126, 128. 17. Quoted in Spanier, op. cit., p. 71. 18. Ibid. 19. Rovere and Schlesinger, op., cit., p. 131. 20. Ibid., p. 128. 21. Spainer, op. cit., pp. 72, 73. 22. Rovere and Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 131. 23. Spainer, op. cit., p. 73. 24. Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. II, Years of Trial and Hope, New York, Doubleday, 1956, pp. 325, 326. 25. Quoted in Spanier, op. cit., pp. 112-113. 26. Ibid., pp. 151-153. 27. MacArthur Hearings, Vol. 1, p. 832. 28. Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 1132, 1175-1176. 29. Spainer, op. cit., pp. 171-181. 30. George Kennan, American Diplomacy 1900-1950, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1951, pp. 83-89. 31. Spainer, op. cit., p. 156. 32. MacArthur Hearings, Vol. I, p. 624. 33. Spainer, op. cit., p. 15.

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34. Ibid., p. 165. 35. Ibid., p. 166. 36. Ibid., p. 195. 37. Rovere and Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 170. 38. Quoted in Ibid., p. 171. 39. Ibid., p. 3. 40. MacArthur Hearings, Vol. IV, p. 2875. 41. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 9. 42. Rovere and Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 183. 43. United States Code, 1964 Edition, Vol. I, Sec. 118, Washington, GPO, 1964, pp. 155-156. 44. Spainer, op. cit., p. 272. 45. MacArthur Hearings, Vol. IV, p. 2875. 46. Rovere and Schlesinger, op. cit., pp. 3-17. 47. MacArthur Hearings, Vol. I, p. 197. 48. Spanier, op. cit., p. 275.

McDaniel - 64 Notes On Chapter V 1. Jack Raymond, Power at the Pentagon, New York, Harper & Row, 1964, p. 174. 2. Thomas R. Phillips, JCS Under Pressure, St. Louis Post Dispatch, January 6, 1960, p. 11. 3. John F. Kennedy quoted in Omaha World-Herald, May 13, 1963, p. 30. 4. The Vital Factor, Newsweek, Vol. LXII, No. 12, September 16, 1963, pp. 28, 31.5. 5. C. Wright Mills, The Power Elise, New York, Oxford University Press, 1956, pp. 231-236. 6. Ibid., pp. 237-241. 7. United States Code, 1964 Edition, Vol. I, Sec. 16, Title 5, Washington, GPO, 1965, p. 115.8. 8. Mathew B. Ridgeway, Soldiers: The Memoirs of Mathew B. Ridgeway, New York, Harper, 1956, pp. 328-333.9. 9. Douglas Cater, Power in Washington, New York, Random House, 1964, pp. 168172.10. 10. The Future Courses of Action in Vietnam, U.S. News & World Report, Vol. LX, No. 8, February 21, 1966, p. 21.11. 11. S. L. A. Marshall, A Soldier-Scholar Sounds the Trumpet, The Register and Defense Times, December 12, 1959, p. 21.12. 12. Biennial Report of the Chiefs of Staff, United States Army, 1 July 57-30 June 59, Army Information Digest, Vol. I, No., 8, August 1959, p. 46.13. 13. Maxwell D. Taylor in an address to the World Affairs at San Francisco, quoted in The New York Times, February 22, 1959, p. 37. 14. Chief of Staff Testifies, Army, Vol. 13, No. 3, May 1959, p. 15.

McDaniel - 65 15. Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1959, pp. 76-78. 16. Ibid., pp. 105-114.17. 17. Ibid., pp. 127-128.18. 18. Ibid,., pp. 72-73. 19. Army Chief Testifies on Berlin Defense, The New York Times, March 15, 1959, p. 3. 20. Taylor, op. Cit., pp. 181-197 21. Peter Edson, Army Chief Bids Press Farewell, quotes Taylor from speech before the National Press Club, Washington Daily News, June 26, 1959, p. 28.22. 22. United States Code, 1964 Edition, Vol. 2., Title 10, Sec. 802, Art. 2(4), Washington, GPO, 1965, p. 1153. 23. Ibid., Sec. 3504, p. 1378. 24. Retirees Still Eligible for Courts Martial, The Army Times, March 8, 1967, p. 14. 25. Raymond, op. Cit., p. 178. 26. Department of Defense Directive No. 5230.9, Clearance of Department of Defense Information, December 24, 1966, par. III, p. 1.27. 27. Digest of Opinions, The Judge Advocates General of the Armed Forces, Vol. 4, Washington, GPO, 1954-1955, p. 164.28. 28. The case of Maj. Gen. Edwin A. Walker provides an exceptional recent example of an officer who resigned from the service when he could not continue in conscience to serve as directed. In 1959, General Walker was placed in command of federal troops to enforce civil court orders related to school integration. He felt serious concern over the propriety of the use of federal troops against U.S. citizens in this domestic matter. Although he carried out his duties in this incident in an exemplary manner, he submitted his resignation immediately thereafter. He was persuaded to withdraw his resignation by Secretary of the Army William Brucker and reassigned to Germany. There subsequent and not wholly rational actions led

McDaniel - 66 to his final resignation. This case reviewed extensively by the Stennis Committee, pp. 1177-1405. Also see Raymond, op. Cit., p. 259. 29. Taylor, op. cit., pp. 248-259.30. 30. Ibid., p. 285.31. Taylor, op. cit., pp. 102-111.32.

31. Raymond, op. cit., pp. 259.33. 32. Ibid., p. 285.34. 33. Taylor, op. cit., pp. 176. 34. Taylor Reshuffles the JCS, Armed Forces Management, Vol. 9, No. 1, October 5, 1962, p. 36.36. a. This view is based on the personal experience of the author while assigned to duties related to the Joint Staff during the period and confirmed by Lt. Col. Richard A. Vogel, USAF, on the basis of his personal experience. 35. Curtis E. LeMay, Mission with LeMay; My Story, Garden City, New York, Doubleday, 1965, pp. 541-543 36. No Time Limit, Time, Vol. 84, No. 3, July 17, 1964, p. 30.39. 37. Behind Lodges Reappointment, Life, Vol. 59, No. 4, July 23, 1965, p. 32B.40. 38. Rovere and Schlesinger, op. Cit., p. 265.

McDaniel - 67 Notes On Chapter VI 1. Quoted in Maxwell D. Taylor, Military AdviceIts Use in Government,, Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. XXX, No. 11, March 15, 1964, p. 83. 2. Huntington, S&S, p. 161.3. 3. Howard, op. cit., pp. 169-175.4. 4. Huntington, S&S, pp. 28-30.5. 5. Millis, Arms and Men, p. 93.6. 6. Huntington, S&S, p. 10.7. 7. Ibid., pp. 55-58.8. 8. Ibid., pp. 289-312.9. 9. Janowitz, op. cit., pp. 63-81.10. 10. Finer, op. cit., pp. 141-144.11. 11. Howard, op. cit., p. 129.12. 12. Revere and Schlesinger, op. cit., p. xiv. 13. Views of the Joint Committee on Armed Services and Foreign Relations of the United States Senate Relating to Hearings Held on the Dismissal of General MacArthur and the Military Situation in the Far East, May 3-June 27, 1951, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, Document No. 69, Washington, GPO, 1951, pp. 35773580. 14. Rovere and Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 235. 15. George W. Brown, Generals and the PublicRecent Policymaking in Civil Military Relations, Lawrence, Kansas, University of Kansas, 1964, p. 10.16. Gene M. Lyons, The New Civil-Military Relations, The American Political Science Review, Vol. LV, No. 1, March 1961, p. 54. 16. Rovere and Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 129.18.

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17. Raymond, op. cit., p. 184. 18. Harold D. Lasswell has written extensively on the garrison-state concept. See, for example, The Garrison-State Hypothesis Today, 19. Changing Patterns of Military Politics, edited by Samuel P. Huntington, New York, The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1962, pp. 38-159. 20. Mills, op. cit., pp. 411-414.21. 21. Vagts, op. cit., pp. 345-371.22. 22. Janowitz quoted in Raymond, op. cit., p. 175.23. 23. Finer, op. cit., p. 144. 24. United States Senate, 87th Congress, 2nd Session, Report by Special Preparedness Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, Military Cold War Education and Speech Review Policies, Washington, GPO, 1962, p. 4.

McDaniel - 69 BIBLIOGRAPHY Baldwin, Hanson, The Pentagons Strange Ways, The New York Times, April 23, 1965. Brodie, Bernard, National Security Policy and Economic Stability, New Haven, Yale Institute of International Studies, 1950. Carlyle, Thomas, quoted in John Bartlett, Ltd., Familiar Quotations, Boston, Little Brown and Company, 1951. Cater, Douglas, Power in Washington, New York, Random House, 1964. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Directive, No. 5230.9, Clearance of Department of Defense Information, December 24, 1966. Department of Defense, The Armed Forces Officer, Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950. Digest of Opinions, The Judge Advocates General of the Armed Forces, Washington D.C., Volume ?? published biannually since 1952. Driscoll, Jean M. and Charles S. Hynemans, Political Behavior, Heinz Eulan, ed., Glencoe, Ill., The Free Press of Glencoe, 1956. Edson, Peter, Army Chief Bids Farewell, Washington Daily News, June 26, 1959. Finer, S.E., The Man on Horseback, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1962. Gavin, James M., War and Peace in the Space Age, New York, Harper, 1958. Goerlitz, Walter, The German General Staff, New York, Praeger, 1953. Howard, Michael, Soldiers and Governments, Bloomington, Ind., Indiana University Press, 1959. Huntington, Samuel P., Political Behavior, Heinz Eulan, ed., Glencoe, Ill., The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1956.-----------------, The Soldier and the State, Cambridge, Mass., The

McDaniel - 70 Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1959. Janowitz, Morris, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait, Glencoe, Ill., The Free Press, 1960. Johnson, Lyndon B., Address to the National War College, Ft. McNair, Washington D.C., March 1965. Katzenbach, Edward L., Jr., The Demotion of Professionalism at the War Colleges, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 91, No. 3, march 1965. Kennan, George, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1951. Kennedy, John F., Address to Graduating Class, United State Naval Academy, Annapolis, Md., 19611.---------------------, quoted in Maxwell D. Taylor, Military Adviceits Use in Government, Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. XXX, No. 11, March 15, 1964. Laswell, Harold D., Changing Patterns of Military Politics, Huntington, Samuel B., ed., New York, The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1962.--------------------, National Security and Individual Freedom, 1st ed., New York, McGrawHill, 1950. LeMay, Curtis E., Mission with LeMay: My Story, Garden City, New York, Doubleday, 1965. Lyons, Gene M. and Louis Morton, Symbols for Strategy; Education and Research in National Security Affairs, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1965. Mahan, Alfred T., The Military Rule of Obedience, Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1914. Marshall, S.L.A., A Soldier-Scholar Sounds the Trumpet, The Register and Defense Times, December 12, 1959. Masland, John W. and Laurence I. Runway, Soldiers and Scholars, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1957.

McDaniel - 71 McKinley, Silas Bent, Democracy and Military Power, New York, The Vanguard Press, 1924. Medaris, John B., Countdown for Decision, New York, G.P. Putnams Sons, 1960. Mencken, Mencken on the Military, The Mercury, September 1929. Mills, C. Wright, The Power Elite, New York, Oxford University Press, 1956. Millis, Walter, Arms and Men, New York, G.P.Putnams Sons, 1956.---------------, Arms and the State, New York, The Twentieth Century Fund, 1958. Mollenhoff, Clark R., The Pentagon, New York, G.P. Putnams Sons, 1967. National Security Act of August 10, 1949, 82nd Congress, 63 Stat., 578, Washington, GPO, 1949. National Security Act of 1947, as amended, Public Law 253, 80th Congress, July 26, 1947, 61 Stat. 495, Washington, GPO, 1958. Orwell, George, Nineteen Eighty-Four, A Novel, New York, Harcourt, Brace & World, 1949. Phillips, Thomas R., JCS Under Pressure, St. Louis Post Dispatch, January 6, 1960. Raymond, Jack, Power at the Pentagon, New York, Harper & Row, 1964. Ridgeway, Mathew B., Solider: The memoirs of Mathew B. Ridgeway, New York, Harper, 1956. Rovere, Richard H. and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The MacArthur Controversy, New York, Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1965. Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr., Generals in Politics, The Reporter, Vol. VI, April 1, 1952, pp. 33-36. Simms, William E., The Liberal; Challenge to the Military Profession, Air University Review, July-August 1966. Smith, Dale O., The Eagles talon, Washington, Sparton Books, 1966. Smith, Louis, American Democracy and Military Power, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1951.

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Spanier, John W., The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War, Cambridge, Mass., The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1959. Taylor, Maxwell D., Address to the World Affairs Council, The New York Times, February 22, 1959.------------------, The Uncertain Trumpet, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1959.-----------------, quoted by Baltimore Sun, may 13, 1957, from Meet the Press, May 12, 1957.The US Military Mind, Fortune, Vol. XLV, February, 1952. Turner, Gordon B., A History of Military Affairs in Western Society Since the Eighteenth Century, New York, Harcourt, Brace and World, 1953. Truman, Harry S., Memoirs, Vol. II, Years of Trial and Hope, New York, Doubleday, 1956. Twining, Nathan F., Neither Liberty Nor Safety, New York, Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1966. United States Army, Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff, United States Army, 1 July 57-30 June 59, Army Information Digest, Vol. I, No. 8, August 1959. United States Code, Vol. I, title 5, Sec. 16, Washington, D.C., GPO, 1964. United States Code, Vol. II, Title 10, Washington, D.C., GPO, 1964. United States Senate, Hearings on the Dismissal of General MacArthur and the Military Situation in the Far East, may 3-June 27, 1951, 82nd congress, 1st Session, Joint Committee on Armed Services and Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, Washington, GPO, 1951. United States Senate, Military Cold War Education and Speech Review Policies, Report by Special Preparedness Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 87th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, GPO, 1962. Vagts, Alfred, A History of Militarism, new York, Greenwich Editions, Meridian Books, Inc., 1959. Warell, Archibald, P., Soldiers and Soldiering, London, Cape, 1953. Wheeler-Bennet, John, The Nemesis of PowerThe German Army in Politics, 19181945, Second Edition, London, Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1964.

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Wietzel, Robert K., The Nuremberg Trials in International Law, London, Stevens and Sons, 1960.