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February 21, 2011 5892 Shoreland Trail Orlando, Florida 32807 Gold Anti-Trust Action Committee, Inc.

c/o Chris Powell, Secretary/Treasurer 7 Villa Louisa Road Manchester, CT 06043-7541 Re: I need to get the enclosed material, including this and three other cover letters, to Reginald H. Howe indirectly, and believe I can trust GATA for that purpose; never would I e-mail him even a hint of this at the start. Dear Chris Powell: This is a cover letter to explain why you should be interested in the enclosed LETTER TO CLERK OF COURT and AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENSE. These related documents are meant to serve two objectiveslet me explain. Litigation aimed at compelling a return to a constitutional monetary system must begin with recognition of two facts as matters of law: (1) The Congressional mandate of 4 U.S.C.A., 72, which provides that, [a]ll offices attached to the seat of government shall be exercised in the District of Columbia, and not elsewhere, except as otherwise expressly provided by law, means that a federal Judicial Power decision pursuant to Article III of the Constitution for the United States of America can only be had in D.C.in nature, its a governmental action and elsewhere is obtained an administrative decision; it doesnt matter that Article III judges sit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, for example, when theyre sitting in an Article I court they are functioning as officers of the court; and, this leads into the two ways to view a complaint; (2) As a Fourteenth Amendment or federal citizenby presumption of law (disregarding the verification under penalty of perjury)you come as a complaintant in the nature of 28 U.S.C.A., 1746(2), which provides that, [i]f executed within the United States, its territories, possessions, or commonwealths: I declare (or certify, verify, or state) under

penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. . . , which admits an attachment to government; this is what Fourteenth Amendment or federal citizenship, STANDARD OIL COMPANY of NEW JERSEY v. UNITED STATES, 221 U.S. 1, 19, 31 S.Ct. 502, 55 L.Ed. 619 (1911) (The present litigation is between the Federal Government and certain of its citizens. The questions involved are solely the rights of these Federal citizens and the effect upon those rights of the Sherman Act, and whether these Federal citizens have violated the provisions of that act. . . . (Emphasis mine)) (Mr. D. T. Watson, also for appellants), and, MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the court. The Standard Oil Company of New Jersey and 33 other corporations, John D. Rockefeller, William Rockefeller and five other individual defendants prosecute this appeal to reverse a decree of the court below. . . . 221 U.S. 1, 30, does for you. ELK v. WILKINS, 112 U.S. 94, 101-102, 5 S.Ct. 41, 28 L.Ed. 643 (1884) (The persons declared to be citizens [in the Fourteenth Amendment] are all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof. The evident meaning of these last words is, not merely subject in some respect or degree to the jurisdiction of the United States, but completely subject to their political jurisdiction, and owing them direct and immediate allegiance. And the words relate to the time of birth in the one case, as they do to the time of naturalization in the other. Persons not thus subject to the jurisdiction of the United States at the time of birth cannot become so afterwards, except by being naturalized, either individually, as by proceedings under the naturalization acts, or collectively, as by the force of a treaty by which foreign territory is acquired. (Emphasis mine)); and, no one can become a citizen of a nation [or a State] without its consent. . . . Ibid., 112 U.S. 94, 103; the alternative is 28 U.S.C.A., 1746(1), and it provides that, [i]f executed without the United States: I declare (or certify, verify, or state) under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and

correct, and as a state citizen in contradistinction to a federal citizen, no attachment to government can be presumed. There isnt much case law to explain 28 U.S.C.A., 1746, and what does exist is misleading. The laws of the United States of America is the common law found in the several united States, and the laws of the United States is the 50 titles of statutory law together with any Federal Code of Regulations that implement them. In regard to (2), above, the complaintant must come as a state citizen pursuant to Article IV, 2, cl. 1 in contradistinction to a presumed federal citizen pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, 1. Case law says both citizenships exist. But, case law also indicates that state citizenship must be claimed as it is regarded as a choice of law decision. This doesnt change the fact that federal citizenship is fraudulent and deceitful; its a second class citizenship in more ways than one. Im working on the proof of fraud and deceit so none of that is in the enclosed documents, but Ive tried to show how it violates my right to Due Process of Law. Several of the original state constitutions provided that government officersconstitutional or ministerial in natureare the Peoples trustees and accountable as such in their Declaration of Rights; three states attempted to get that language inserted in the federal constitution: BEGIN LEGAL CITATION Footnote 9 is indicative of the law review articles source for the following contention: E. Popular Sovereignty and the Tenth Amendment At the time that [Thomas Tudor] Tucker spoke, the House was considering adding a statement of popular sovereignty to the Preamble to the Constitution.130 Tucker objected to this placement on the ground that the Preamble was not actually part of the Constitution and therefore not binding upon the government.131 Instead, Tucker wished to make the declaration a part of the official (and binding) Bill of Rights.132 Tuckers request echoed similar requests by a number of state conventions that had asked for the addition of an express statement of popular sovereignty. Virginia,133 North Carolina,134 and Rhode Island135 had each proposed adding a declaration to the effect that all power is naturally invested in, and consequently derived from, the people; the magistrates therefore are their trustees and agents,

and at all times amenable to them. Kurt T. Lash, THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF AN OMISSION: THE TENTH AMENDMENT, POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY, AND EXPRESSLY DELEGATED POWER, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1889, 1922-1923 (2008)
9

2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 362 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Phila., J.B. Lippincott Co. 2d ed. 1891) [hereinafter ELLIOTS DEBATES]. . . . . . .
116

See James Madison, Speech in Congress Proposing Constitutional Amendments (June 8, 1789), in JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 437, 444 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999).
. . .

130

See Madison, supra note 116, at 441. See Congressional Proceedings, DAILY ADVERTISER (New York, N.Y.), Aug. 15, 1789, at 2, reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 88, at 128, 128. See id. See 3 ELLIOTS DEBATES, supra note 9, at 657. See 4 id. at 243. See 1 id. at 334.

131

132

133

134

135

We, the delegates of the people of the state of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, duly elected and met in Convention, having maturely considered the Constitution for the United States of America, agreed to on the seventeenth day of September, in the year one thousand seven hundred and eighty-seven, by the Convention then assembled at Philadelphia, in the commonwealth of Pennsylvania, (a copy whereof precedes these presents,)

and having also seriously and deliberately considered the present situation of this state, do declare and make known, I. That there are certain natural rights of which men, when they form a social compact, cannot deprive or divest their posterity, among which are the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety. II. That all power is naturally vested in, and consequently derived from, the people; that magistrates, therefore, are their trustees and agents, and at all times amenable to them. III. That the powers of government may be reassumed by the people whensoever it shall become necessary to their happiness. That the rights of the states respectively to nominate and appoint all state officers, and every other power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by the said Constitution clearly delegated to the Congress of the United States, or to the departments of government thereof, remain to the people of the several states, or their respective state governments, to whom they may have granted the same; and that those clauses in the Constitution which declare that Congress shall not have or exercise certain powers, do not imply that Congress is entitled to any powers not given by the said Constitution; but such clauses are to be construed as exceptions to certain specified powers, or as inserted merely for greater caution. . . . [335] And the Convention do, in the name and behalf of the people of the state of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, enjoin it upon their senators and representative or representatives, which may be elected to represent this state in Congress, to exert all their influence, and use all reasonable means, to obtain a ratification of the following amendments to the said Constitution, in the manner prescribed therein; and in all laws to be passed by the Congress in the mean time, to conform to the spirit of the said amendments, as far as the Constitution will admit. Jonathan Elliot, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, in Five Volumes, Volume I (Second Edition), William S. Hein & Co., Inc.: Buffalo, New York, 1996, pp. 334-335.

Mr. WYTHE reported, from the committee appointed, such amendments to the proposed Constitution of government for the United States as were by them deemed necessary to be recommended to the consideration of the Congress which shall first assemble under the said Constitution, to be acted upon according to the mode prescribed in the 5th article thereof; and he read the same in his place, and afterwards delivered them in at the clerks table, where the same were again read, and are as follows: That there be a declaration or bill of rights asserting, and securing from encroachment, the essential and unalienable rights of the people, in some such manner as the following: 1st. That there are certain natural rights, of which men, when they form a social compact, cannot deprive or divest their posterity; among which are the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety. 2d. That all power is naturally invested in, and consequently derived from, the people; that magistrates therefore are their trustees and agents, at all times amenable to them. . . . Ibid., Volume III, p. 657.

[A]nd the resolution of the committee of the whole house was then read, and ordered to be entered on the Journal. The resolution was accordingly read and entered, as follows, viz.: Resolved, That a declaration of rights, asserting and securing from encroachment the great principles of civil and religious liberty, and the unalienable rights of the people, together with amendments to the most ambiguous and exceptionable parts of the said Constitution of government, ought to be laid before Congress, and the convention of the states that shall or may be called for the purpose of amending the said Constitution, for their consideration, previous to the ratification of the Constitution aforesaid on the part of the state of North Carolina. [243] DECLARATION OF RIGHTS.

1. That there are certain natural rights, of which men, when they form a social compact, cannot deprive or divest their posterity, among which are the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.

2. That all power is naturally vested in, and consequently derived from, the people; that magistrates, therefore, are their trustees and agents, and at all times amenable to them. Ibid., Volume IV, p. 242-243. END OF LEGAL CITATION

Its hornbook law that a contract incorporates as reference existing law at the time of its inception, and the original state constitutions as well as the federal constitution are regarded as contracts; they are special contracts as compacts. BEGIN LEGAL CITATION

The federal and each of the original thirteen state constitutions were social compacts as they were adopted; and, social compacts are third party beneficiary contracts; the beneficiaries of these social compacts were state citizens pursuant to Article IV, 2 of the Constitution for the United States of America. ABDI HOSH ASHKIR v. UNITED STATES, 46 Fed.Cl. 438, 441 (2000) (The holding in REID v. COVERT, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) was based, in part, on viewing the Constitution as a social compact, embodying the consent of the governed to be governed and viewing those governed as the beneficiaries of that compact. 4 Id. at 5-7, 77 S.Ct. 1222. Under this contractarian view, the benefits of the compact flow to citizens wherever they are located. See UNITED STATES v. CURTISS-WRIGHT EXPORT CORP., 299 U.S. 304, 318, 57 S.Ct. 216, 81 L.Ed. 255 (1936) ([n]either the Constitution nor the laws passed in pursuance of it have any force in foreign territory unless in respect of our own citizens).5 Moreover, as illustrated by cases such as MATTHEWS v. DIAZ, 426 U.S. 67, 77, 96 S.Ct. 1883, 48 L.Ed.2d 478 (1976) and KWONG HAI CHEW v. COLDING, 344 U.S. 590, 59697, 73 S.Ct. 472, 97 L.Ed. 576 (1953), the benefits of the compact also redound to aliens residing within the territory of the United States, who are deemed to owe temporary allegiance to the United States and thereby are entitled to the reciprocal protections of the Constitution. See UNITED STATES v. BARONA, 56 F.3d 1087, 1093-94 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1092, 116 S.Ct. 813, 814, 133 L.Ed.2d 759 (1996).6 )

(n. 4: As Chief Justice Jay explained in 1793, [e]very state constitution is a compact made by and between the citizens of a state to govern themselves in a certain manner; and the constitution of the United States is likewise a compact made by the people of the United States to govern themselves as to general objects in a certain manner. CHISHOLM v. GEORGIA, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 471, 1 L.Ed. 440 (1793) (JAY, C.J., seriatim opinion). See generally, Anita L. Allen, Social Contract Theory in American Case Law, 51 Fla. L. Rev. 1 (1999).) (n. 5: See also WONG WING v. UNITED STATES, 163 U.S. 228, 238, 16 S.Ct. 977, 41 L.Ed. 140 (1896); TRANSPORTES AEROS MERCANTILES PANAMERICANOS, S.A. v. BOYATT, 562 F. Supp. 707, 709 (S.D.Fla. 1983).) (n. 6: Highlighting the importance of residency as a substantial connection, the Supreme Court has long drawn a distinction between the constitutional footing of aliens who are beyond the territorial limits of the United States and those residing either permanently or temporarily within our borders. For instance, while the Supreme Court has held that the Fifth Amendment protections, including that of due process, apply to a resident alien, KWONG HAI CHEW, 344 U.S. at 596, 73 S.Ct. 472, it has denied the same rights to an alien who has not entered the countrys borders, NISHIMURA EKIU v. UNITED STATES, 142 U.S. 651, 660, 12 S.Ct. 336, 35 L.Ed. 1146 (1892). See UNITED STATES v. VERDUGO-URQUIDEZ, 856 F.2d 1214, 1234-35 (9th Cir. 1988) (Wallace, J., dissenting), revd, 494 U.S. 259, 110 S.Ct. 1056, 108 L.Ed.2d 222 (1990). Summarizing cases like these, the Supreme Court, in JOHNSON v. EISENTRAGER, 339 U.S. 763, 771, 70 S.Ct. 936, 94 L.Ed. 1255 (1950), commented that in extending constitutional protections beyond citizenry, the Court has been at pains to point out that it was the aliens presence within its territorial jurisdiction that gave the Judiciary the power to act. See also PLYLER v. DOE, 457 U.S. 202, 212, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982); KWONG HAI CHEW, 344 U.S. at 596-97 n.5, 73 S.Ct. 472; CARLISLE v. UNITED STATES, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 147, 154-55, 21 L.Ed. 426 (1872). Similar sentiments date back at least to 1798, as a constant theme in the vigorous debates between the Jeffersonians and the Federalists over the Alien Act of 1798. See 8 Annals of Cong. 2012, 2019 (1798). See also Stephen J. DiGianfilippo, The Reach of the Constitution Beyond the Territory and People of the United States, 16 Suffolk Transnatl L. Rev. 117, 123-32 (1992).). END LEGAL CITATION

This brings us to two more essential facts of law to recognize: (3) Federal citizenship is the property of the federal government since its a creature thereof; state citizenship is derived from English subjectship and was regarded by the original states as trust property; with government officials regarded as trustees, there had to be trust property to administer, and legal interest lies in the state while beneficial interest lies in the individual that qualifies and claims state citizenship; and, all fundamental rights to be managed as trust property require state citizenship. WADSWORTH v. STATE of MONTANA, 275 Mont. 287, 911 P.2d 1165, 1171-1172 (Mont., 1996) ([W]e have held a right may be fundamental under Montanas constitution if the right is either found in the Declaration of Rights or is a right without which other constitutionally guaranteed rights would have little meaning. BUTTE COMMUNITY UNION v. LEWIS (1986), 219 Mont. 426, 430, 712 P.2d 1309, 1311-13. . . . (Emphasis mine) See GLOBE NEWSPAPER CO. v. SUPERIOR COURT for NORFOLK COUNTY (1982), 457 U.S. 596, 604, 102 S.Ct. 2613, 2618-19, 73 L.Ed.2d 248, 255 (First Amendment encompasses those rights that, while not specifically enumerated in the very terms of the Amendment, are nonetheless necessary to enjoyment of other First Amendment rights.).); thus, state citizenship is itself a fundamental right with beneficial interest therein unavailable. UNITED STATES v. UNITED MINE WORKERS of AMERICA, 330 U.S. 258, 376, 67 S.Ct. 677, 91 L.Ed. 884 (1947) (Mr. Justice RUTLEDGE, dissenting.) (When the assertion and securing of all other rights depends upon one, that one is the core of all. Here the right to know that it was a charge, and not a suit comprehended all other procedural rights in the trial and appellate courts. Without this, none could be asserted or maintained. The denial of that right, deferring it until the decision here is handed down, is in my opinion not only a denial of all. It is a violation both of the Constitution and of Rule 42(b).); natural born American citizens are unaware of their vested right to claim state citizenship.

(4) A federal citizen owes allegiance to government in his/her personal and political capacities, but a state citizen owes allegiance only in his/her personal capacity.

What kind of compact was a constitution of one of the original 13 states? Every state of the several united States of America was brought into the Union on the same footing as those of the original thirteen, ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD v. ILLINOIS, 146 U.S. 387, 434, 13 S.Ct. 110, 36 L.Ed. 1018 (1892) (The State of Illinois was admitted into the union in 1818 on an equal footing with the original states in all respects. Such was one of the conditions of the cession from Virginia of the territory northwest of the Ohio River, out of which the state was formed. But the equality prescribed would have existed if it had not been thus stipulated. There can be no distinction between the several states of the union in the character of the jurisdiction, sovereignty, and dominion which they may possess and exercise over persons and subjects within their respective limits.); BAKER v. CARR, 369 U.S. 186, 226 n. 53, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962) (On the other hand, the implication of the Guaranty Clause in a case concerning congressional action does not always preclude judicial action. It has been held that the clause gives Congress no power to impose restrictions upon a States admission which would undercut the constitutional mandate that the States be on an equal footing. COYLE v. SMITH, 221 U.S. 559, 31 S.Ct. 688, 55 L.Ed. 853 [(1911)]. And in TEXAS v. WHITE, 7 Wall. 700, 19 L.Ed. 227, although Congress had determined that the States government was not republican in form, the States standing to bring an original action in this Court was sustained.), and so it would seem that a description of the Massachusetts compact would do for any and all: MUNN v. ILLINOIS, 94 U.S. 113, 124, 24 L.Ed. 77 (1876) ([T]hrough their State constitutions, or other forms of social compact, [the original states] undertook to give practical effect to such as they deemed necessary for the common good and the security of life and property. . . . A body politic, as aptly defined in the preamble of the Constitution of Massachusetts, is a social compact by which the whole people covenants with each citizen, and each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common good. (Emphasis mine)). This mutual promise sets up the states Sovereignty in the citizenry in their collective capacity in their common law jurisdiction with

their elected and appointed government officials exercising sovereignty in their representative capacity from within their political jurisdiction governed by their statutory jurisdiction and the common law as trustees of the people. William Franklin Fratcher, ed., SCOTT ON TRUSTS, 4th Edition, Little, Brown and Company, 1987, Volume I, 17: METHODS OF CREATING A TRUST: 17.3: Promise in trust (A trust can be created not only where the owner of property declares himself trustee of it or where he transfers it to another in trust, but also where a promisee is made by one person to another as trustee. In such a case the promise holds in trust his rights as promise. . . . Where the promise is binding, however, because consideration is given for the promise . . . the promisee becomes trustee of his right to enforce the promise if the parties so intended. (Citations omitted)); and, the promise of allegiance in the citizens personal capacity is consideration for the promise of protection from the citizenry in their collective capacity, and vice versa. A prospective state citizen must offer to pledge his/her allegiance in covenant to demand that the State, in its representative capacity, pledge the protection of the state citizens collectively in covenant, in return. Catherine M. A. McCauliff, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, Volume 8: Conditions, 30.12: Promise and Condition Distinguished, p. 26 (The word covenant has come to be not much more than a synonym of promise, although once its only proper meaning may have been a formal promise under seal. Whether a covenant is a formal promise, or an informal promise, or both, it is not itself a condition of the duty of the covenantee to keep his return promise or covenant. But the performance of a covenant, or other promise, may be such a condition, either express or constructive.); Ibid., p. 27, n. 48 omitted (The first step, therefore, in interpreting an expression in a contract, with respect to condition as opposed to promise, is to ask oneself the question: Was this expression intended to be an assurance by one party to the other that some performance by the first would be rendered in the future and that the other could rely upon it? If the answer is yes, we have found the expression to be a promise that the specified performance will take place. The alternative question to be asked is:

Was this expression intended to make the duty of one party conditional and dependent upon some performance by the other (or on some other fact or event)? If the answer to this question is yes, we have found that the specified performance is a condition of duty, but we have not found that anyone has promised that the performance will take place. It is not difficult to draw the logical distinction between a promise that a specified performance will be rendered, and a provision that makes a specified performance a condition of the legal duty of a party who promises to render another performance. The first creates a legal duty in the promisor; the second limits and postpones a promisors duty. Often the contracting parties do not make this logical distinction and as a result word their agreements so as to make interpretation difficult. When that is the case, the court is free to give the contract the construction that appears to be the most reasonable and just.); American government officersparticularly state attorneys general had a fiduciary duty to ensure that the existing state of circumstancesthat of state citizens covenanting in their individual capacities with state citizens in their collective capacities, and vice versawhich allowed sovereignty to lie in the people and the continuance of their fundamental rights or civil liberties to be held in trust with legal interest in the State and beneficial interest in each individual state citizen endured. Halsbury, THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (Third Edition), Volume 11, Deeds and Other Instruments, BUTTERWORTH & CO. (PUBLISHERS) LTD., London, England, 1955, 713: Implied covenant for continuance of business, etc. & footnote (f) (A similar question arises where an arrangement is entered into which can only take effect by the continuance of a certain existing state of circumstances. There is then an implied engagement on the part of that party upon whom this continuance depends that he will do nothing of his own motion to put an end to the state of circumstances in question (f)....) (footnote (f): STIRLING v. MAITLAND (1864), 5 B. & S. 841, at p. 852, per COCKBURN, C.J.). All Florida Constitutions subsequent to the original state constitution of 1838 ignoring the Confederate state constitution of 1861that in effect destroyed the obligations of the contract between individual citizens and the citizens in their collective capacity by omitting 1 of the Declaration of Rights of the 1838 FLORIDA CONSTITUTION are void. GRAY v. MOSS, 115 Fla. 701, 156 So. 262, 265-266 (1934) ( The prohibition

in the Constitution of the United States against the passage of *266* laws impairing the obligation of contracts applies to the Constitution, as well as the laws, of each State. NEW ORLEANS GAS-LIGHT CO. v. LOUISIANA LIGHT CO., 115 U.S. 650, headnote 4, 6 S.Ct. 252, 29 L.Ed. 516. See also 12 C.J. 988. See FORCHEIMER v. HOLLY, 14 Fla. 239; CANOVA v. STATE ex rel. BRADFORD COUNTY COMRS, 18 Fla. 512.); and the covenant set up by the compact clause of the FLORIDA CONSTITUTION of 1838, Declaration of Rights, 1, where the state citizen pledges his/her allegiance in their individual capacity as consideration for the citizens protection pledged in their collective capacity and vice versa which involves the mutual promise of a covenant, is impaired within the meaning of UNITED STATES TRUST COMPANY of NEW YORK v. NEW JERSEY, 431 U.S. 1, 15, 97 S.Ct. 1505, 52 L.Ed.2d 92 (1977), rehearing denied, 431 U.S. 975, 97 S.Ct. 2942 (1977) (HOME BUILDING & LOAN ASSN. v. BLAISDELL, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), is regarded as the leading case in the modern era of Contract Clause interpretation.), and HOME BLDG. & LOAN ASS'N v. BLAISDELL, 290 U.S. 398, 429-430, 54 S.Ct. 231, 78 L.Ed. 413 (1934) (The obligation of a contract is the law which binds the parties to perform their agreement. STURGES v. CROWNINSHIELD, 4 Wheat. 122, 197; STORY, op. cit., 1378. This Court has said that the laws which subsist at the time and place of the making of a contract, and where it [290 U.S. 398, 430] is to be performed, enter into and form a part of it, as if they were expressly referred to or incorporated in its terms. This principle embraces alike those which affect its validity, construction, discharge, and enforcement. . . . Nothing can be more material to the obligation than the means of enforcement. . . . The ideas of validity and remedy are inseparable, and both are parts of the obligation, which is guaranteed by the Constitution against invasion. Von HOFFMAN v. CITY of QUINCY, 4 Wall. 535, 550, 552. See, also, WALKER v. WHITEHEAD, 16 Wall. 314, 317. But this broad language cannot be taken without qualification. Chief Justice Marshall pointed out the distinction between obligation and remedy. STURGES v. CROWNINSHIELD, supra, 4 Wheat. 200. Said he: The distinction between the obligation of a contract, and the remedy given by the legislature to enforce that obligation, has been taken at the bar, and exists in the nature of things. Without impairing the obligation of the contract, the remedy may certainly be modified as the wisdom of the nation shall direct. And in Von HOFFMAN v. CITY of QUINCY, supra, 4 Wall. 553, 554, the general statement above quoted was limited by the further

observation that it is competent for the States to change the form of the remedy, or to modify it otherwise, as they may see fit, provided no substantial right secured by the contract is thereby impaired. . . .), and [t]he obligations of a contract are impaired by a law which renders them invalid, or releases or extinguishes them 9 (STURGES v. CROWNINSHIELD, supra, 4 Wheat. 197, 198) and impairment, as above noted, has been predicated of laws which without destroying contracts derogate from substantial contractual rights. 10 (nn. 9 & 10 omitted) Ibid., 290 U.S. 398, 431, in that without this compact as a covenant the sovereignty of Florida citizens in their collective capacity is not setup and the subsequent political jurisdiction of the State of Florida is not brought into existence to exercise said sovereignty in its representative capacity with respect to Florida citizens in their collective capacity; a contract is impaired, in the context of Article I, 10 of the Florida Constitution, when a contract is made worse or is diminished in . . . excellence or strength. LAWNWOOD MEDICAL CENTER, INC. v. SEEGER, 959 So.2d 1222, 1224 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (The right to contract is one of the most sacrosanct rights guaranteed by our fundamental law. CHILES v. UNITED FACULTY of FLORIDA, 615 So.2d 671 (Fla. 1993). In Florida, this right is protected through article I, section 10 of our state constitution: No bill of attainder, ex post facto law or law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed. An impairment occurs, in the context of this provision, when a contract is made worse or is diminished in quantity, value, excellence or strength. POMPONIO v. CLARIDGE of POMPANO CONDOMINIUM, INC., 378 So.2d 774 (Fla. 1979).); the construction of 19 of the FLORIDA CONSTITUTION of 1838, Declaration of Rights should be substantially the same. As Judge D. Arthur Kelsey makes clear, STONEY v. FRANKLIN, 54 Va.Cir. 591, 2001 Va.Cir.LEXIS 84, 44 U.C.C.Rep.Serv.2d (Callaghan) 1211 (2001) (The debate draws us back to first principles. The economic loss rule exists, in large part, to guard one of the last hilltops on the boundary between tort and contract. John L. Costello, Virginia Remedies 21-5(f), at 862 (2d ed. 1999). Tort law involves public policy concerns over safety, both to persons and property, that carry with them the non-consensual imposition of duties. A manufacturer may choose to build a product and sell it. But whether the manufacturer agrees to or not, he must use reasonable care or be held responsible if his product injures either persons or property. Tort law imposes duties upon the otherwise unwilling. That is, no consent-

of-the-governed concepts apply to tortfeasors. On the other hand, contract law involves an entirely different set of principles. Contract law itself imposes few, if any, duties in the first instance. As a general rule, contractual duties stem only from the consensual dealings of the parties. Based upon the expressed (or, in the case of implied warranties, the presumed) intention of the parties, contract law merely recognizesrather than imposeslegal duties and permits the parties wide latitude to limit their liability and to disclaim implied warranties when the protected interests are purely economic.), when the State of Florida omits our compact clause from the first provision of our Declaration of Rights, we are deprived of the fundamental right to give our consent to be governedthe consent of the governedfirst found in the Declaration of Independence; this may explain why STONEY v. FRANKLIN failed to be reported in S.E.2d (2001). Nowhere in the first Florida Constitutionnor any state constitution in effect at the adoption of the Constitution for the United States of Americais it stipulated that a citizen must proffer proof of anything to obtain the opportunity to create constitutional government by compact as a covenant which is the consent of the governed. HEPBURN and DUNDAS v. AULD, 1 Cranch (5 U.S.) 321, 331, 2 L.Ed. 122, 125 (1803) (The only question in this case is, whether Hepburn and Dundas had a right to insist on this previous condition; and it is admitted that this question depends entirely on the agreement of the 27th of September, 1799. That an acquittance should be signed, sealed and delivered before the act itself was performed, which entitled the party to such acquittance, is a mode of proceeding very unusual, and which certainly could only be rendered indispensable by express stipulation. There is in this case no such express stipulation. . . . If we inspect those covenants which relate to the deed of assignment of Grahams contract, we find no stipulation respecting a release of any sort.). When an individual is subject to the political jurisdiction, FISHER v. MASTERS, 83 P.2d 212, 217, 59 Idaho 366 (1938) (In KNIGHT v. TRIGG, 16 Idaho 256, 100 P. 1060, this court said [page 1062]: The holding of elections is peculiarly and wholly a matter within the management and control of the political department of government. The word political, as used in this connection, has no reference to partisanship or political

parties but rather to the control, management and operation of government.); LOCKHEED AIRCRAFT CORP. v. SUPERIOR COURT of L. A. COUNTY, 171 P.2d 21, 24, 28 Cal.2d 481, 166 A.L.R. 701 (1946) ([T]he interference proscribed by the statute is interference with political activities or affiliations, and the test is not membership in or activities connected with any particular group or organization, but whether those activities are related to or connected with the orderly conduct of government and the peaceful organization, regulation and administration of the government.); AKIO KUWAHARA v. ACHESON, 96 F.Supp. 38, 41 (S.D.Cal. 1951) (In Websters New International Dictionary (Unabridged), second edition, 1949, . . . the word political is defined as follows: Of or pertaining to polity, or politics, or the conduct of government, referring in the widest application to the judicial, executive, and legislative branches; of or pertaining to, or incidental to, the exercise of the functions vested in those charged with the conduct of government; relating to the management of affairs of state. . . . ); DE-ANNEXATION of CERTAIN REAL PROPERTY, 102 P.3d 120, 127-128, 2004 OK 60 (Okla. 2004), rehearing denied, (In sum, for governmental action *128* to be political there must be (a) an issue of governing coupled with (b) a mandatory and final resolution by nonjudicial means. (Emphasis in original)), the individual has waived his/her rights secured by the Constitution for the United States of America in return for rights granted by the Constitution of the United States; this individual is internal to government which acts in the nature of a charitable corporation where the administration of government is of primary concern. Where the Florida Supreme Court has decided that A charity, in the legal sense, may be more fully defined as a gift, to be applied consistently with existing laws, for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, . . . lessening the burdens of government. It is immaterial whether the purpose is called charitable in the gift itself, if it is so described as to show that it is charitable in its nature. JACKSON v. PHILLIPS, 14 Allen (Mass.) 539, 556. (Emphasis mine) JORDAN v. LANDIS, Attorney General on Behalf of State, 128 Fla. 604, 175 So. 241, 246 (1937), it would seem to me that the Court could see the State of Florida as acting in the nature of a charitable corporation for the purpose of administering the fundamental rights of individuals.

When the United States Supreme Court reviews the constitutional rights of a member of our military, it demonstrates that matters of government administration come first. PARKER v. LEVY, 417 U.S. 733, 750-752, 94 S.Ct. 2547, 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974) ([W]hile legal proceedings actually brought before a court-martial are prosecuted in the name of the Government, and the accused has the right to demand that he be proceeded against in this manner before any sanctions may be imposed upon him, a range of minor sanctions for lesser infractions are often imposed administratively. Forfeiture of pay, reduction in rank, and even dismissal from the service bring to mind the law of labor-management relations as much as the civilian criminal law. In short, the Uniform Code of Military Justice regulates a far broader range of the conduct of military personnel than a typical state criminal code regulates of the conduct of civilians; but at the same time the enforcement of that Code in the area of minor offenses [417 U.S. 733, 751] is often by sanctions which are more akin to administrative or civil sanctions than to civilian criminal ones. The availability of these lesser sanctions is not surprising in view of the different relationship of the Government to members of the military. It is not only that of lawgiver to citizen, but also that of employer to employee. Indeed, unlike the civilian situation, the Government is often employer, landlord, provisioner, and lawgiver rolled into one. That relationship also reflects the different purposes of the two communities. As we observed in In re GRIMLEY, 137 U.S., at 153, the military is the executive arm whose law is that of obedience. While members of the military community enjoy many of the same rights and bear many of the same burdens as do members of the civilian community, within the military community there is simply not the same autonomy as there is in the larger civilian community. The military establishment is subject to the control of the civilian Commander in Chief and the civilian departmental heads under him, and its function is to carry out the policies made by those civilian superiors. Perhaps because of the broader sweep of the Uniform Code, the military makes an effort to advise its personnel of the contents of the Uniform Code, rather than depending on the ancient doctrine that everyone is presumed to know the law. Article 137 of the Uniform Code, 10 U.S.C. 937, requires that the provisions of the Code be carefully explained to each enlisted member at the time of his entrance on active duty, or within six days thereafter and that they be explained again after he has completed six months of active

duty. . . . Thus the numerically largest component of the services, the enlisted personnel, who might be expected to be a good deal less familiar with the Uniform Code than commissioned officers, are required by its terms [417 U.S. 733, 752] to receive instructions in its provisions. Article 137 further provides that a complete text of the Code and of the regulations prescribed by the President shall be made available to any person on active duty, upon his request, for his personal examination. With these very significant differences between military law and civilian law and between the military community and the civilian community in mind, we turn to appellees challenges to the constitutionality of Arts. 133 and 134.), yet, in military court-martials you are guilty until proven innocent, with the burden on you doing so, while a private citizen is innocent until proven guilty, with the burden on the government to show guilt. The parties to the compact as a covenant contract within the common law jurisdiction, and the presumption must be that all their activity is within that jurisdiction unless it can be proved that they have done something to attach themselves to government. As long as the individual has no attachments, the common law is supreme to legislative enactmentfederal and state. HeinONLINE, 1 James Kent COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 419-420, (1826)HeinONLINE, 1 James Kent COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 419-420, (1826) (MUNICIPAL law is a rule of civil conduct, prescribed by the supreme power in a state. It is composed of written and unwritten, or statute and common law. Statute law is the express written will of the legislature, rendered authentic by certain prescribed forms and solemnities. It is a principle in the English law, that an act of parliament, delivered in clear and intelligible terms, cannot be questioned, or its authority controlled in any court of justice. It is, says Sir William Blackstone, the exercise of the highest authority that the kingdom acknowledges upon earth. When it is said in the books, that a statute contrary to natural equity and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, is void, the cases are understood to mean, that the courts are to give the statute a reasonable construction. They will not readily presume, out of respect and duty to the lawgiver, that any very unjust or absurd consequence was within the contemplation of the law. But if it should happen to be too direct and palpable in its direction to admit of but one construction, there is no doubt in the English law, as to the

binding efficacy of the statute. The will of the legislature is the supreme law of the land, and demands irresistible obedience.a But while we admit this conclusion of the English law, we cannot but, admire the intrepidity and powerful sense of justice which led Lord Coke, when chief justice of the K. B., to declare, as he did in Doctor Bonhams Case,b that the common law doth control acts of parliament, and adjudges them void when against common right and reason. The same sense of justice and freedom of opinion, led Lord Chief Justice Hobart, in Day v. Savagec to insist that an act of parliament made against natural equity, as to make a man judge in his own case, was void; and induced Lord Chief Justice Holt to say, in the case of the City of London v. Wood,d that the observation of Lord Coke was not extravagant, but was a very reasonable and true saying. Perhaps what Lord Coke said in his reports, on this point, may have been one of the many things that King James alluded to, when he said, that in Cokes Reports there were many dangerous conceits of his own uttered for law, to the prejudice of the crown, parliament, and subjects.e The principle in the English government, that the parliament is omnipotent, does not prevail in the United States.) (a: 1 Blacks. Com. 91, 160, 185. Christians note to 1 Blacks. Com, 41.) (b: 8 Co. 118.) (c: Hob. 87.) (d: 12. Mod. 687.) (e: Bacons Works, vol. 6. p. 128.). When the private state citizen enters into conduct that attaches him/her to government, statutes are supreme. CULLEN v. SEABOARD AIR LINE R. CO., 63 Fla. 122, 58 So. 182, 183 (1912) ( A statute will not be construed as taking away a common-law right existing at the date of its enactment, unless that result is imperatively required that is to say, unless it be found that the pre-existing right is so repugnant to the statute that the survival of such right would in effect deprive the subsequent statute of its efficacy; in other words, render its provisions nugatory. TEXAS & PAC. RY. v. ABILENE COTTON OIL CO., 204 U.S. 426, 27 Sup.Ct. 350, 51 L.Ed. 553, 9 Ann.Cas. 1075.), rehearing denied; In re LEVYS ESTATE, 141 So.2d 803, 805 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1962) (A statute will not be held to have changed well settled common law principles by implication, unless the implication of change is clear or necessary to give full force to express provisions of the statute and the public policy thus established. DUDLEY v.

HARRISON, McCREADY & CO., 1937, 127 Fla. 687, 173 So. 820, reh. den., 128 Fla. 338, 174 So. 729. A statute will not be construed as taking away common law rights unless the pre-existing right is repugnant to the statute. CULLEN v. SEABOARD AIRLINE RY. CO., 1912, 63 Fla. 122, 58 So. 182.), rehearing denied; MUNN v. ILLINOIS, 94 U.S. 113, 134, 24 L.Ed. 77 (1876) (A person has no property, no vested interest, in any rule of the common law. That is only one of the forms of municipal law, and is no more sacred than any other. Rights of property which have been created by the common law cannot be taken away without due process; but the law itself, as a rule of conduct, may be changed at the will, or even at the whim, of the legislature, unless prevented by constitutional limitations. Indeed, the great office of statutes is to remedy defects in the common law as they are developed, and to adapt it to the changes of time and circumstances.). In other words, a federal citizen which must be subject to the political jurisdiction of the United States, finds himself/herself restrained in the use of fundamental rights, the Court says there must be a compelling state interest to justify it. COASTAL FLORIDA POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC. v. WILLIAMS, 838 So. 2d 543, 550-551 (Fla. 2003) (There is also no assertion here that the State has a compelling interest in depriving deputy sheriffs of the right to collective bargaining. Indeed, as noted above, all police officers and many deputy sheriffs have been exercising such rights throughout Florida for some time. The most recent case in which this Court has reviewed a statutory restriction on a public employees right to collective bargaining was in CHILES v. STATE EMPLOYEES ATTORNEYS GUILD, 734 So.2d 1030, 1033 (Fla. 1999), wherein we struck down a statutory attempt to deny collective bargaining rights to lawyers employed by government.); NORTH FLORIDA WOMENS HEALTH AND COUNSELING SERVICES, INC. v. STATE, 866 So.2d 612, 625 n. 16 (Fla. 2003) (Under strict scrutiny, which applies inter alia to certain classifications and fundamental rights, a court must review the legislation to ensure that it furthers a compelling State interest through the least intrusive means. The legislation is presumptively unconstitutional. The standard of proof is as follows: the State must prove that the legislation furthers a compelling State interest through the least intrusive means. See generally In re T.W., 551 So.2d 1186, 1193 (Fla. 1989).); Ibid., 866 So.2d 612, 635 & n. 50 ([I]t is settled in Florida that each of the personal liberties enumerated in the Declaration of Rights is a fundamental right. See generally TRAYLOR v. STATE, 596 So.2d 957 (Fla. 1992).), and for private state citizens with no

proven attachments, there is no compelling state interest to consider. ENTICK v. CARRINGTON, 19 Howells State Trials 1029, 1070 (K.B., 1765) (When the Licensing Act expired at the close of king Charles 2s reign, the twelve judges were assembled at the kings command, to discover whether the press might not be as effectually restrained by the common law, as it had been by that statute.), and, the answer was no: Can the twelve judges extrajudicially make a thing law to bind the kingdom by a declaration, that such is their opinion? I say no. It is a matter of impeachment for any judge to affirm it. There must be an antecedent principle or authority, from whence this opinion may be fairly collected; otherwise the opinion is null, and nothing but ignorance can excuse the judge that subscribed it. Out of this doctrine sprang the famous general search warrant that was condemned by the House of Commons; and it was not unreasonable to suppose, that the form of it was settled by the twelve judges that subscribed the opinion. Ibid., 19 Howells State Trials 1029, 1071; and, today the United States Supreme Court regards a compelling state interest as a constitutionally permissible reason to restrain a fundamental right, but only in the statutory jurisdiction controlling the political jurisdiction is this found, and the common law jurisdiction has no such explanation given that state necessity can be seen as synonymous with compelling state interest; [a]nd with respect to the argument of state necessity, or a distinction that has been aimed at between state offenses and others, the common law does not understand that kind of reasoning, nor do our books take notice of any such distinctions. Ibid., at 1073. A federal common law decision needs be had to harmonize the following state constitutional provisions: The Constitution of Virginia, June 29, 1776, Bill of Rights, 2 provides, [t]hat all power is vested in, and consequently derived from, the people; that magistrates are their trustees and servants, and at all times amenable to them; and, the Constitution of Pennsylvania, September 28, 1776, A Declaration of the Rights of the Inhabitants of the Commonwealth or State of Pennsylvania, 4 provides, [t]hat all power being originally inherent in, and consequently derived from, the people; therefore all officers of government, whether legislative or executive, are their trustees and servants, and at all times accountable to them; and, the Constitution of Vermont, July 4, 1786, A Declaration of the Rights of the Inhabitants of the State of Vermont, 6 provides, [t]hat all power being originally inherent in, and

consequently derived from the people; therefore, all officers of government, whether legislative or executive, are their trustees and servants, and at all times, in a legal way, accountable to them; and, the Constitution of Maryland, November 11, 1776, A Declaration of Rights, &C, 4 provides, in part, [t]hat all persons invested with the legislative or executive powers of government are the trustees of the public, and, as such, accountable for their conduct; and, the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (1780), Part the First: A Declaration of the Rights of the Inhabitants of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Article V provides that, [a]ll power residing originally in the people, and being derived from them, the several magistrates and officers of government, vested with authority, whether legislative, executive, or judicial, are their substitutes and agents, and are at all times accountable to them; and the jurisdictional predicate for this request for relief, at a minimum, is found within the meaning of UNITED STATES v. STANDARD OIL CO., 332 U.S. 301, 307, 67 S.Ct. 1604, 1608 (1947) (arguing that federal common law covered matters vitally affecting interests, powers and relations of the Federal Government [that] require uniform national disposition rather than diversified state rulings and that ERIE was not intended to have the purpose or effect for broadening state power over matters essentially of federal character or for determining whether issues are of that nature); BIVENS v. SIX UNKNOWN FED. NARC. AGENTS, 403 U.S. 388, 407, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed. 2d 619 (1971) ([I]t must also be recognized that the Bill of Rights is particularly intended to vindicate the interests of the individual in the face of the popular will as expressed in legislative majorities; at the very least, it strikes me as no more appropriate to await express congressional authorization of traditional judicial relief with regard to these legal interests than with respect to interests protected by federal statutes.) (HARLAN, J., concurring); PRIEBE & SONS, INC. v. UNITED STATES, 332 U.S. 407, 411, 68 S.Ct. 123, 92 L.Ed. 32 (1947) (applying federal common law to the construction of a federal government contract and stating that it is customary, where Congress has not adopted a different standard, to apply to the construction of government contracts the principles of general contract law. UNITED STATES v. STANDARD RICE CO., 323 U.S. 106, 111, 147, 147, and cases cited.). When the covenants on either side form the entire consideration for each other, neither party can sue without alleging that he has or is ready and willing to perform it. Halsbury, THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (Third

Edition), Volume 11, Deeds and Other Instruments, BUTTERWORTH & CO. (PUBLISHERS) LTD., London, England, 1955, 729: Rules regarding nature of contract & footnote (e) (1. If the covenants on either side form the entire consideration for each other, they are mutually dependent; each is a condition precedent, and neither party can sue without alleging that he has performed his covenant, or that he is ready and willing to perform it (e).) (footnote (e): This is the fourth rule in the notes to PORDAGE v. COLE (1669), 1 Wms. Saund. 319 l, at p. 320 e; 4. Where the mutual covenants go to the whole consideration on both sides, they are mutual conditions and performance must be averred (see OXFORD v. PROVAND (1868), L. R. 2 P. C. 135, at p. 156). Accordingly, where a vendor had so changed the property by cutting down timber that he could not properly perform his covenant, he could not sue for the purchase-money (DUKE of St. ALBANS v. SHORE (1789), 1 Hy. Bl. 270). . . .); the first thing we need do to setup our damage suit is file petitions for Florida state citizenship which simultaneously repudiates the federal nature of citizenship and any attachment to political jurisdiction with the Florida attorney general using the same general form we used to file Michael L. Hodges NOTICE OF LIABILITY in the Orange County Recorderthe details of which are alluded to in Louis Farrakhans letter. Declarations of Domicile and Allegiance must be incorporated as references in these petitions for state citizenship. SMITH and ARMISTEAD v. CROOM[2], 7 Fla. 180, 185-186 (1857) ([T]he law of citizenship, as it is known in America [ ] is found in American decisions. This citizenship I understand as equivalent to domicil, when applied to an American born or a foreigner naturalized. To be a citizen of a State, says Judge Story, a man must have his domicil in the State. If a man has his domicil in a State, to which he has removed from another State, he is a citizen of the former. In CASE v. CLARK, 5 Mason C. C. Rep. 70, Story, J., says: It appears to me clear that there is no sufficient proof that the plaintiff is a citizen of Massachusetts. To effect that purpose, it should be established that there as a bona fide change of domicil; there must be a bona fide intention of removal, and a real change of domicil.

In the same case he shows that a removal for business or pleasure, a sojoun, does not make a citizen. This was a question of forensic character a question as to the right to sue in the Federal Court; and in this case, as in question of the right to sue as a citizen of a State has been put upon the question of whether the person was or was not domiciled in the State for all purposes, and the rules as to domicil laid down in the same way as in succession cases, and the cases as to succession referred to. In Storys COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION, Vol. 3, pp. 564, 565, in treating of that clause of the Constitution which gives jurisdiction to the Federal Court, between citizens of one State and citizens of another State, he explains the meaning of the word citizen as there used. He says: Are all persons born within a State to be always deemed citizens of that State, notwithstanding any change of domicil, or does their citizenship change with their change of domicil? The answer to this enquiry is equally plain and satisfactory. The Constitution having declar- *186* ed that citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States, every person who is a citizen of one State and removes into another, with the intention of taking up his residence and inhabitancy there, becomes ipso facto a citizen of the State where he resides, and he then ceases to be a citizen of the State from which he has removed his residence. In general it may be said that a removal from one State into another, animo manendi, or with a design of becoming an inhabitant, constitutes a change of domicil, and of course a change of citizenship. Here we have emphatically declared, that as to the right to sue in the Federal Court, domicil and citizenship are synonymous. (Emphasis mine)). Long before the Fourteenth Amendment came into existence, a preponderance of our courts considered American citizens to be attached to the political jurisdiction of government as owing allegiance to it; the older of only two U.S. Supreme Court cases that define the meaning of subject to the jurisdiction of the United States cites an 1805 Massachusetts case for the proposition that a citizen must be born in the common law jurisdiction of the country wherein he/she is born to be a citizen thereof, and then, his/her allegiance is due the political jurisdiction. UNITED STATES v. WONG KIM ARK, 169 U.S. 649, 663-664, 18 S.Ct. 456, 42 L.Ed. 890 (1898) (The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, speaking by Mr. Justice (afterwards Chief Justice) Sewall, early held that the determination of the question whether a man was a citizen or an alien was to be governed

altogether by the principles of the common law, and that it was established, with few exceptions, that a man, born within the jurisdiction of the common law, is a citizen of the country wherein he is born. By this circumstance of his birth, he is subjected to the duty of allegiance which is claimed and enforced by the sovereign of his native land; and becomes reciprocally entitled to the protection of that sovereign, and to the other rights and advantages which are included in the term citizenship. GARDNER v. WARD, (1805) 2 Mass. 244, note. And again: The doctrine of the common law is, that every man born within its jurisdiction is a subject of the sovereign of the country where he is born; and allegiance is not personal to the sovereign in the extent that has been contended for; it is due to him in his political capacity of sovereign of the territory where the person owing the allegiance was born. KILHAM v. WARD, (1806) 2 Mass. 236, 265. It may here be observed that in a recent English case Lord Coleridge expressed the opinion of the Queens Bench Division that the statutes of 4 Geo. II, (1731) c. 21, and 13 Geo. III, (1773) c. 21, (hereinafter referred to,) clearly recognize that to the King in his politic, and not in his personal capacity, is the allegiance of his subjects due. ISAACSON v. DURANT, 17 Q.B.D. 54, 65. The Supreme Court of North Carolina, speaking by Mr. Justice Gaston, said: Before our Revolution, all free persons born within the dominions of the King of Great Britain, whatever their color or complexion, were native-born British subjects; those born out of his allegiance were aliens. Upon the Revolution, no other change took place in the law of North Carolina, than was consequent upon the transition from a colony dependent on an European King to a free and sovereign State; British subjects in North Carolina became North Carolina freemen; and all free persons born within the State are born citizens of the State. The term citizen, as understood in our law, is precisely analogous to the term subject in the common law, and the change of phrase has entirely resulted from the change of government. The sovereignty has been transferred from one man to the collective body of the people; and he who before was a subject of the king is now a citizen of the State. STATE v. MANUEL, (1838) 4 Dev. & Bat. 20, 24-26. (Emphasis mine)), yet it does observe that the Kings prerogativesovereigntyhas been transferred to the collective body of the people. BIGNELL v. CUMMINS, 69 Mont. 294, 222 P. 797, 799 (1923) (The word prerogative implies sovereign right.

ATTORNEY GENERAL v. CITY of EAU CLAIRE, 37 Wis. 400, 443. The expressions are synonymous. With respect to the governmental problems of a free people either expression is apt only when it is used to mean the inherent and paramount power of the people. Expressive of this is section 1 of article 3 of the Constitution:
All political power is vested in and derived from the people; all government of right originates with the people; is founded upon their will only, and is instituted solely for the good of the whole.

The sovereignty of the people is expressed by the Constitution, by statute, or by law expressly recognized by statute. Of course it is carried out under the Constitution by the three departments of the government. Article 4, 1.). The fact that the courts have recognized that each state constitution and the federal constitution is a compact, ABDI HOSH ASHKIR v. UNITED STATES, 46 Fed.Cl. 438, 441 (2000), supra; PEAVY-WILSON LUMBER CO. v. BREVARD COUNTY, 159 Fla. 311, 31 So.2d 483, 487 (1947) ([C]onstitutional law [ ] was promulgated as a compact, by all in the first instance, to shield minorities from majorities.), and that a constitution may be construed two ways: (1) in light of legislative enactments, and (2) as a contract, OGDEN v. SAUNDERS, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 277, 6 L.Ed. 606, 628 (1827) (If ever contemporaneous exposition, and the clear understanding of the contracting parties, or of the legislating power (it is no matter in which light it be considered), could be resorted to as the means of expounding an instrument, the continuing and unimpaired existence of this power in the states ought never to have been controverted.), is incompatible with the idea that the people of the political jurisdiction are one of the contracting parties. If the contracting parties were as they presumethe citizens in their individual capacity and the citizens in their collective capacity of the political jurisdictionthere would not be two ways to construe because in light of legislative enactment is from the point of view of the political jurisdiction. If everyone is attached to the political jurisdiction, who are they representing? If government can be seen as acting in the nature of a charitable corporation in the administration of its businessparticularly in the administration of fundamental rights (civil liberties), it could never be a trustee to anyone internal to its administration. It would seem that the U.S. Supreme Court is waiting for an American citizen to claim the right to state citizenship. WHEELER v. SMITH, 50 U.S.

(9 How.) 55, 78, 13 L.Ed. 44 (1850) (When this country achieved its independence, the prerogatives of the crown devolved upon the people of the States. And this power still remains with them, except so far as they have delegated a portion of it to the Federal government. The sovereign will is made known to us by legislative enactment. And to this we must look in our judicial action, instead of the prerogatives of the crown. The State, as a sovereign, is the parens patriae.). It should be eye-opening with respect to the foregoing to contrast Floridas view that a state constitution is a limitation on governmental powers in contradistinction to a grant a power, SAVAGE v. BOARD of PUBLIC INSTRUCTION of HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, 101 Fla. 1362, 133 So. 341, 344 (1931) (The Constitution of this state is not a grant of power to the Legislature, but a limitation only upon legislative power, and unless legislation be clearly contrary to some express or necessarily implied prohibition found in the Constitution, the courts are without authority to declare legislative acts invalid. The Legislature may exercise any lawmaking power that is not forbidden by organic law. STATE v. BRYAN, 50 Fla. 293, 39 So. 929; JORDAN v. DUVAL COUNTY, 68 Fla. 48, 66 So. 298; STONE v. STATE, 71 Fla. 514, 71 So. 634.), and that this is a generally accepted doctrine, BOARD of PUBLIC INSTRUCTION for POLK COUNTY, FLORIDA v. GILLESPIE, 81 F.2d 586, 589 (CA5, Fla. 1936) (It is the generally accepted doctrine of constitutional law that the powers of state Legislatures are not conferred by, or to be found in, their constitutions; they are inherent. That Legislatures look to constitutions not as the source of, but for limitations upon, their powers. It is the generally accepted doctrine that exerted legislative powers may not be stricken down upon general ideas of propriety or justice, or of the force and effect of natural law, but only by pointing to a constitutional limitation upon the power. LYTLE v. HALFF, 75 Tex. 128, 132, 12 S.W. 610; HARRIS COUNTY v. STEWART, 91 Tex. 143, 41 S.W. 650; BROWN v. CITY of GALVESTON, 97 Tex. 1, 75 S.W. 488. The Florida courts have announced the same doctrine in COTTON v. COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, 6 Fla. 610 [(1856)]; SAVAGE v. BOARD of PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, 101 Fla. 1362, 133 So. 341; STATE ex rel. MOODIE v. BRYAN, 50 Fla. 293, 39 So. 929; HARRY E. PRETTYMAN v. FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMM., 92 Fla. 515, 109 So. 442; JORDAN v. DUVAL COUNTY, 68 Fla. 48, 66 So. 298.); In re APPORTIONMENT LAW SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION NO. 1305, 1972 REGULAR SESSION, 263 So.2d 797, 805 (1972) (It is well settled that the state Constitution is not a grant of

power but a limitation upon power. Unless legislation duly passed be clearly contrary to some express or implied prohibition contained in the Constitution, the courts have no authority to pronounce it invalid HARRY E. PRETTYMAN, INC. v. FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, 92 Fla. 515, 109 So. 442 (1926); STATE ex rel. JONES v. WISEHEART, 245 So.2d 849 (Fla. 1971).), supplemented, 279 So.2d 14, supplemented, 281 So.2d 484. Compare this to the most satisfying case I have found explaining the true nature of state constitutional governmental purpose, WHITTINGTON v. POLK, 1 H. & J. 236, 1802 WL 349 (Md.Gen.). After the Revolutionary War, the Maryland General Court succeeded the Provincial Court, and the Court of Appeals succeeded the Colonial Court of Appeals and was given authority to hear appeals from the General Court, the Court of Chancery and the Court of Admiralty. See Md. Const. of 1776, 56.6 (n. 6: The General Court was abolished by constitutional amendment in 1805.)), so WHITTINGTON v. POLK was heard in a lower court. The bill of rights and form of government compose the constitution of Maryland, and is a compact made by the people of Maryland among themselves, through the agency of a convention selected and appointed for that important purpose. This compact is founded on the principle that the people being the source of power, all government of right originates from them. In this compact the people have distributed the powers of government in such manner as they thought would best conduce to the promotion of the general happiness; and for the attainment of that all important object have, among other provisions, judiciously deposited the legislative, judicial and executive, in separate and distinct hands, subjecting the functionaries of these powers to such limitations and restrictions as they thought fit to prescribe. The legislature, being the creature of the constitution, and acting within a circumscribed sphere, is not omnipotent, and cannot rightfully exercise any power, but that which is derived from that instrument. The constitution having set certain limits or land marks to the power of the legislature, whenever they exceed them they act without authority, and such acts are mere nullities, not being done in pursuance of power delegated to them: Hence the necessity of *243* some power under the

constitution to restrict the acts of the legislature within the limits defined by the constitution. The power of determining finally on the validity of the acts of the legislature cannot reside with the legislature, because such power would defeat and render nugatory, all the limitations and restrictions on the authority of the legislature, contained in the bill of rights and form of government, and they would establish a despotism, and subvert that great principle of the constitution, which declares that the powers of making, judging, and executing the law, shall be separate and distinct from each other. This power cannot be exercised by the people at large, or in their collective capacity, because they cannot interfere according to their own compact, unless by elections, and in such manner as the constitution has prescribed, and because there is no other mode ascertained by which they can express their will. (Emphasis mine) WHITTINGTON v. POLK, 1 H. & J. 236, 242-243 (1802); the court asserts that the state constitution is like the federal constitution in that the powers of government are delegated and the compact clause of the state constitutions bill of rights involves the citizens individually and the citizens collectively as parties setting up the citizens collectively as the sovereignty and bringing into existence the political jurisdiction where sovereignty is exercised in a representative capacityunhindered. The interference of the people by elections cannot be considered as the proper and only check and a suitable remedy, because in the interval of time, between the elections of the members who compose the different legislatures, the law may have had its full operation, and the evil arising from it become irremediable; nor is it probable that the elections will be made with the view to afford redress in such particular *244* case, and if they were, and the law should be repealed, it would not be an adequate remedy. Ibid., 1 H. & J. 236, 243-244. It is the office and province of the court to decide all questions of law which are judicially brought before them, according to the established mode of proceeding, and to determine whether an act of the legislature, which assumes the appearance of a law, and is clothed with the garb of authority, is made pursuant to the power vested by the constitution in the legislature; for if it is not the result or emanation of authority derived from the

constitution, it is not law, and cannot influence the judgment of the court in the decision of the question before them. The oath of a judge is that he will do equal right and justice according to the law of this state, in every case in which he shall act as judge. To do right and justice according to the law, the judge must determine what the law is, which necessarily involves in it the right of examining the constitution, (which is the supreme or paramount law, and under which the legislature derive the only authority they are invested with, of making laws,) and considering whether the act passed is made pursuant to the constitution, and that trust and authority which is delegated thereby to the legislative body. . . . The legislature are the trustees of the people, and, as such, can only move within those lines which the constitution has defined as the boundaries of their authority, and if they should incautiously, or unadvisedly transcend those limits, the constitution has placed the judiciary as the barrier or safeguard to resist the oppression, and redress the injuries which might accrue from such inadvertent, or unintentional infringements of the constitution. Ibid., 1 H. & J. 236, 244-245. It is also observable, that the courts cannot take judicial cognizance of any act repugnant to the constitution, unless the question is judicially brought before them, and then it is fully discussed by counsel learned in the law, and the court decide on mature consideration. Ibid., 1 H. & J. 236, 245. Thus, within the meaning of WHITTINGTON v. POLK, 1 H. & J. 236 (1802), the constitutional purpose of Florida government has been misconstrued. Add to the above the fact that the English common law doctrine of a subjects perpetual allegiance did not conform to the States entitlement to remodel their form of government according to the necessities or policy of the people, so the American common law doctrine of contracting allegiance came into being. INGLIS v. TRUSTEES of the SAILORS SNUG HARBOUR in the CITY of NEW YORK, 28 U.S. 99, 157-161 & n. (a), 7 L. Ed. 617 (1830) (The case of the separation of the United States from Great Britain, is perhaps not strictly brought within any of the descriptions already referred to; and it has been treated on many occasions, both at the bar and on the bench, as a case sui generis. Before the revolution, all the

colonies constituted a part of the dominions of the king of Great Britain, and all the colonists were natural born subjects, entitled to all the privileges of British born subjects, and capable of inheriting lands in any part of the British dominions, as owing a common allegiance to the British crown. But in each colony there was a separate and independent government established under the authority of the crown, though in subordination to it. In this posture of things the revo- *158* lution came; and the declaration of independence acting upon it, proclaimed the colonies free and independent states; treating them not as communities, in which all government was dissolved, and society was resolved into its first natural elements, but as organized states, having a present form of government, and entitled to remodel that form according to the necessities or policy of the people. The language of the declaration of independence is, that congress solemnly publish and declare, that these united colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and independent states; that they are absolved from all allegiance to the British crown; and that all political connexion between them and the state of Great Britain is and ought to be totally dissolved; and that as free and independent states, they have full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce, and do all other acts and things which independent states may of right do. It is plain that this instrument did not contemplate an entire dissolution of all government in the states; which would have led to a subversion of all civil and political rights, and a destruction of all laws. It treated the colonies as states, and simply absolved them from allegiance to the British crown, and all political connexion with Great Britain. The states so considered it: some of them proceeded to act and legislate before the adoption of any new constitution; some of them framed new constitutions; and some of them have continued to act under their old charters down to the present day. They treated the case as it was treated in England upon the abdication of James II and provided for it, by resorting to that ultimate sovereignty residing in the people, to provide for all cases not expressly provided for in their laws. Antecedent to the revolution, the inhabitants of the colonies, whether natives of the colonies, or of any other of the British dominions, owed no allegiance except to the British crown. There was not, according to the common law, any secondary or subordinate allegiance to the colony itself, or the government therein established, as contradistinguished from the general

allegiance to the British crown. When, therefore, the declaration of independence absolved all the states *159* from allegiance to the British crown, it was an act of one party only. It did not bind the British government, which was still at liberty to insist, and did insist upon the absolute nullity of the act, and claimed the allegiance of all the colonists as perpetual and obligatory. From this perplexing state of affairs, the necessary accompaniment of a civil war, it could not escape the notice of the eminent men of that day, that most distressing questions must arise; who were to be considered as constituting the American states, on one side, and the state of Great Britain on the other? The common law furnished no perfect guide, or rather admitted of different interpretations. If, on the one side, it was said, that all persons born within a colony owed a perpetual allegiance to that colony, whoever might be the sovereign, the answer was, that the common law admitted no right in any part of the subjects to change their allegiance without the consent of their sovereign, and that the usurpation of such authority was itself rebellion; for nemo potest exuere patriam, was the language of the common law. In respect to persons who were not natives, but inhabitants only, in a colony, at the time of the assertion of its independence, there was still less reason to claim their allegiance. If they were aliens, there was no pretence to say that they could be bound to permanent allegiance against their will. If they were born in England, or elsewhere in the British dominions, out of the colony, they were as little bound to permanent allegiance; because they inhabited, not as colonists, but as British subjects. In respect to both these cases, (i.e. foreigners and British subjects,) no colony, upon assuming to be an independent state, could, against their will, make them members of the state. It would be an exercise of authority not flowing from its rights as an independent state, and at war with the admitted rights of other nations, by the law of nations, to hold the allegiance of their own subjects. In order, therefore, to make such persons members of the state, there must be some overt act or consent on their own part, to assume a character; and then, and then only, could they be deemed, in respect to such colony, to determine their right of election. Under the peculiar circumstances of the revolution, the *160* general, I do not say the universal, principle adopted, was to consider all persons, whether natives or inhabitants, upon the occurrence of the revolution, entitled to make their choice, either to remain subjects of the British crown,

or to become members of the United States. This choice was necessarily to be made within a reasonable time. In some cases that time was pointed out by express acts of the legislature; and the fact of abiding within the state after it assumed independence, or after some other specific period, was declared to be an election to become a citizen. That was the course in Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. In other states, no special laws were passed; but each case was left to be decided upon its own circumstances, according to the voluntary acts and conduct of the party. That the general principle of such a right of electing to remain under the old, or to contract a new allegiance, was recognised, is apparent from the cases of the COMMONWEALTH vs. CHAPMAN, 1 Dall.Rep. 53; CAIGNET vs. PETTIT, 2 Dall.Rep. 234; MARTIN vs. THE COMMONWEALTH, 1 Mass.Rep. 347, 397; PALMER vs. DOWNER, 2 Mass.Rep. 179, note. S. C. Danes Abridg. Ch. 131, art. 7, sec. 4; KILHAM vs. WARD, 2 Mass.Rep. 236, and GARDNER vs. WARD, 2 Mass.Rep. 244, note; as explained and adopted in INHABITANTS of CUMMINGTON vs. INHABITANTS of SPRINFIELD, 2 Pick.Rep. 394, and note; INHABITANTS of MANCHESTER vs. INHABITANTS of BOSTON, 16 Mass.Rep. 230, and MILVAINE vs. COXES LESSEE, 4 Cranch, 209, 211 (a). But what is more directly in point: it is expressly declared and acted upon, by the supreme court of New York, in the case of JACKSON vs. WHITE, 20 Johns.Rep. 313. It appears to me that there is sound sense and public policy in this doctrine; and there is no pretence to say, that it is incompatible with the known law or general usages of nations. The case of AINSLIE vs. MARTIN, 9 Mass.Rep. 454, proceeds upon the opposite doctrine; but that case stands alone, and is incompatible with prior as well as subsequent decisions of the same court; and so it has been *161* treated by chancellor Kent, in his learned commentaries. 2 Kents Comm. 35, 52.) (n. (a): See also CHASE, J., in WARE vs. HYLTON, 3 Dall. 225, 1 Peterss Condens. Rep. 199; HEBRON vs. COLCHESTER, 5 Days Rep. 169.) (STORY, J., dissenting). Im sure I have read somewhere that you and Landis are certified to practice in the United States Supreme Court. Though, Congressional mandates dictate that we file in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia (after weve given Floridas Attorney General a chance to remedy things), I dont believe it will remain there long; I expect the Supreme Court to be the trial court operating under the Fed.R.Civ.Proc after the lower courts examine

the issues and certify the case as having questions of great public importance. We can discuss the possible advantage of coming pro se with you as advisors, but whether you sign on as the attorney of record or not, we would enter into the agreement you use representing clients for purposes of securing your remuneration and whatever other reasons you can think of. Lets talk about it. We look forward to hearing from you. And, thank you for your time and efforts in our behalf. Very Truly Yours,

J. Patrick Simpson 321-299-5773 (SU, MO, & TU are days off; otherwise my 12-hour driving shift precludes me from talking on my cell phone)

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