Graduate Russia From IPP - Affirmative

Matthew Hamilton, Scott Alford and Josh Kreifels
Graduate Russia From IPP | Affirmative

Table of Contents 1. Openers..................................................................................................................................................4 1.1 Money cannot always buy security.................................................................................................4 2. Program Information..............................................................................................................................5 2.1 IPP -X-.............................................................................................................................................5 2.2 NCI..................................................................................................................................................5 2.3 RTI...................................................................................................................................................5 2.4 NCI and IPP Combined...................................................................................................................6 2.5 What IPP Does.................................................................................................................................6 2.6 What IPP Does(easier-to-understand version).................................................................................7 2.7 Closed Nuclear Cities Map..............................................................................................................8 3. Nuclear Cities Initiative.........................................................................................................................9 3.1 NCI Ended in 2005..........................................................................................................................9 3.2 NCI Was Underfunded(That is why they merged it with IPP)........................................................9 3.3 Funding(1999-2005 Request)........................................................................................................10 4. Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention.................................................................................................11 A) General...........................................................................................................................................11 4.1 The Origin of the IPP Program......................................................................................................11 4.2 U.S. Aided Russia..........................................................................................................................12 4.3 IPP History ...................................................................................................................................12 4.4 The GAO Report and Criticism for the IPP Program From 1999.................................................13 4.5 IPP Funding...................................................................................................................................13 B) Original Goal 1: Economy.............................................................................................................14 C) Original Goal 2: Soviet Scientists..................................................................................................14 4.7 Purpose of IPP Was for Creating Work and Reducing Size of Nuclear Complex.........................14 5. Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention.....................................................................................15 5.1 What GIPP is.................................................................................................................................15 5.2 GIPP Program Objective...............................................................................................................15 5.3 Components of the GIPP Program................................................................................................16 6. General Advocacy................................................................................................................................16 A) No Exit Strategy.............................................................................................................................16 6.1 Exit Strategy Needed -X-..............................................................................................................16 6.2 IPP Isn't Needed, and Goals Have Shifted -X-..............................................................................17 6.3 No Exit Strategy For IPP(6.4 is better).........................................................................................17 6.4 DOE Needs an Exit Strategy For IPP(1AC).................................................................................18 6.5 Sketchy Program Goal =/= Exit Strategy -X-...............................................................................18 6.6 The Government Accountability Office Recommends Phasing Out IPP (GOOD).......................19 6.7 It's Time to End IPP (1AC)............................................................................................................19 6.9 Many Participants no Longer See a Need For IPP (1st Good; 2nd Caution; 3rd Caution)...........21 6.10 The IPP Has Accomplished its Mission and no Longer Serves a Helpful Purpose (6.4 Better). 21 6.11 Reevaluate IPP and Create a Clear Exit Strategy (ADVOCACY)..............................................22 6.12 No Criteria, or Want to Develop an Exit Strategy by the DOE (6.4 Better)...............................22 1 / 71
6.13 State Will Fund GTR After 2012 if There Are Still Threats........................................................23 7. Significance..........................................................................................................................................23 7.1 Increased Proliferation Threat With New Scientists (GOOD)......................................................23 8. Reasons to Eliminate/Graduate............................................................................................................24 A) General...........................................................................................................................................24 8.1 Laundry List of Problems(GAO)..................................................................................................24 8.2 An Overview of IPP Problems; Proliferation, Mismanagement, and Failed Mission -X-............24 B) Young Scientists.............................................................................................................................25 8.3 Significant Amount of New Scientists (GOOD)...........................................................................25 8.4 DOE Does Not Meet its Own Guidelines on New Scientists (8.5 better).....................................26 8.5 IPP Funding Scientists That Don't Even Have Any Nuclear Know How.....................................26 8.6 US Funding Goes Toward Recruiting Young Scientists (GOOD)................................................27 8.7 Scientists Are a Limited Threat in Russia -X-...............................................................................27 8.8 No Congressional Authorization to Fund Non-Soviet-Era Scientists...........................................28 8.9 Study: Many Scientists Involved in IPP With no WMD Experience (Find better).......................28 8.10 WMD Experience Requirement Not Met....................................................................................29 C) Economy.........................................................................................................................................29 8.11 Russia the Best Economic Performer Among the 4 Largest Developing Nations (Use later)....29 8.12 Russia is Economically Stable -X- (8.13 better).........................................................................30 8.13 Economy Doing Great (GOOD)..................................................................................................30 8.14 Russia's Economic Situation Has Improved Dramatically (Use 8.13).......................................31 D) Weapons Institutes Funded.............................................................................................................31 8.15 Weapons-Related Work at IPP Institutes (GOOD)......................................................................31 8.16 US is Paying a Russian Institute That is Making Iran Control Room Equipment -X-................32 8.17 USDOE is Subsidizing Russian Institutes That Contribute to Iran's Nuclear Program (GOOD) .............................................................................................................................................................32 8.18 IPP Subsidizing Iranian Reactor (GOOD)..................................................................................32 8.19 Threatens Future U.S.-Russia Nuclear Collaboration (8.17 is better).........................................33 8.20 US is Hypocritical.......................................................................................................................33 8.21 Russia Openly Supporting Iran Through IPP -X-.......................................................................34 8.22 Through IPP, We Are Both Directly and Indirectly Funding Our Worst Enemies in Iran -X-....34 8.23 IPP is Undermining Non Proliferation Goals While Accomplishing Little of Value -X-...........34 8.24 Two Institutes Funding Iran.........................................................................................................35 8.25 Two Key Lawmakers Report IPP Funds Helping Iran................................................................35 8.26 Funds Used For Iran(Contrary to what the DOE and DOS have said).......................................35 8.27 Specific Use of Funds to Iran......................................................................................................36 8.28 Iranian Reactor IS a Proliferation Risk.......................................................................................36 E) Relations.........................................................................................................................................37 8.24 Donor-Recipient Approach Not Desirable to Russia Anymore (GOOD)...................................37 8.25 A Constructive Relationship Will Greatly Help the US..............................................................37 8.26 Russia no Longer Needs the Help of the U.S. (GOOD)..............................................................37 8.27 Foreign Employment Invitations Never Get Past the FSB (GOOD)..........................................38 8.28 Russia Doesn't Like How it's Being Run -X-..............................................................................38 8.29 Russia Wary of U.S. Access to it's Sensitive Nuclear Programs -X-..........................................38 8.30 Lack of Cooperation on Russia's Part -X-...................................................................................39 2 / 71
8.31 Already 6.4 --............................................................................................................................39 8.32 Already 6.9--.............................................................................................................................39 F) Mismanagement..............................................................................................................................40 8.33 Overstated Success......................................................................................................................40 8.34 Laundry List of Management Issues...........................................................................................40 8.35 Performance Measures Outdated.................................................................................................41 8.36 DOE Staff Lacking in This Area.................................................................................................41 8.37 Organizational Interests Have Greatly Hurt IPP (Try to Avoid).................................................42 8.38 GAO Has Identified Management Issues That Need to be Fixed...............................................42 8.39 DOE Has Overstated the Success of IPP.....................................................................................43 8.40 DOE Poor Oversight Has Lead to Mismanagement ..................................................................43 8.41 The DOE Has Failed to Demonstrate the Success of IPP and Relies on Good Faith Reports 44 8.42 Inaccurate Findings/Results -X-..................................................................................................44 G) Shift in Program Goals...................................................................................................................45 8.43 When IPP Changed its Course -X-..............................................................................................45 8.44 Change Came Without Congressional Authorization (GOOD)..................................................46 8.45 IPP Objective Changed to One the Program Was Not Built For -X-..........................................46 H) IPP Expansion................................................................................................................................47 8.46 IPP Expansion Came Without a Congressional Mandate (GOOD)............................................47 8.47 DOE Not Applying Funding Caps to Expansion.........................................................................47 8.48 DOE Suspending Aspects of IPP For the Sake of Expansion.....................................................47 8.49 IPP Expansion Was DOE's Way of Justifying the Program's Existence......................................48 8.50 DOE is Expanding IPP Beyond its Authority and Need to Retain IPPs Relevance -X-............48 I) The International Science and Technology Center..........................................................................49 8.51 Russia Closing It's Leg of ITSC..................................................................................................49 8.52 Russia Doesn't Need it Anymore.................................................................................................49 8.52 Russia Doesn't Want These Programs.........................................................................................50 8.53 Beneficial Technologies Came About Because of This Program................................................50 8.54 Russia Doesn't Need or Want Aid Anymore................................................................................51 8.55 ISTC Funding Sources(Different than IPP)................................................................................51 8.56 Russia Saw the Security Risks of Scientists From Different Countries Working Together........52 8.57 Benefits May Have Been Outweighed by Funded Weapons Institutes.......................................52 8.58 Russia Still Wary of U.S. Cooperation and Intentions................................................................53 J) Other................................................................................................................................................53 8.5 Survey of Scientists That Would Consider Working For a Rogue Nation - X-.............................53 8.5 IPP Can't Learn, Because it Does Not Track Consequences of Projects.......................................54 8.5 Russia Isn't Pitching in, and it Should (GOOD)............................................................................55 9. AT: Lack of Funding Reason for Problems..........................................................................................56 9.1 Funding Has Carried Over in the Past...........................................................................................56 9.2 Unspent Funds Carry Over From Year to Year..............................................................................56 10. IPP Solvency......................................................................................................................................57 10.1 Laundry List of DOS Graduation Criteria (Don't read entire card)............................................57 10.2 Graduated Institutes Are Still Being Funded by IPP...............................................................58 11. AT: Nuclear Cooperation Extended 7 Years.......................................................................................58 11.1 Only MPC&A Extension.............................................................................................................58 3 / 71
12. IPP 's Progress....................................................................................................................................59 12.1 50,000-60,000 Scientists to Redirect...........................................................................................59 12.2 Redirected Over 2,800 Scientists as of 2007...............................................................................59 12.3 10,000 Employed in the Whole Program....................................................................................59 12.4 Goal to Employ 17,000 ..............................................................................................................60 13. Taxes...................................................................................................................................................60 13.1 IPP Used to Pay Russian Taxes...................................................................................................60 13.2 IPP is a Commodity and Shouldn't be Taxed..............................................................................61 13.3 Scientists' Salaries Significantly Cut Because of Tax.................................................................61 13.4 As of 2000 IPP is Exempt From These Taxes.............................................................................62 14. Russia is Motivated............................................................................................................................62 14.1 Russia Finding Jobs For Excess Workers....................................................................................62 14.2 Russia Destroyed Huge Amounts of Old Chemical Weapons (GOOD).....................................63 14.3 Russia Destroying Chemical Weapons in Phases Since 2003 (GOOD)......................................63 14.4 Russia's Budget for Chemical Weapon Destruction...................................................................64 14.5 Russia Realizes Threat Posed by Old Weapons..........................................................................64 14.6 Demand For Researchers Outstrips Supply.................................................................................64 14.7 Russia Investing Millions to Hire Ex-Soviet Scientists..............................................................65 14.8 Russian Initiatives Remove Need For IPP Funding....................................................................65 14.9 Economy is Doing Fine, and Russia is Investing........................................................................65 15. Mandate Backup................................................................................................................................66 15.1 Failure to Prioritize Institutes With Strong Proliferation Threats...............................................66 16. Source Defense..................................................................................................................................67 16.1 Methodology of GAO Study is Good..........................................................................................67 16.2 DOE is Incorrect in Questioning the GAO Study's Methodology..............................................67 16.3 DOE Mis-Characterizes the Nature of the GAO Study..............................................................68 Credentials/Info........................................................................................................................................68
1. Openers
1.1 Money cannot always buy security Sharon Weinberger (Sharon Weinberger is a national security writer focusing on science and technology issues and a 2011 Alicia Patterson Foundation Fellow, reporting on "War 2.0," the Pentagon investment in social network analysis. She is also a regular contributor on national security for AOL News. Prior to her career in journalism, Weinberger worked as a defense analyst for System Planning Corporation (SPC), a research organization focused on national security. While at SPC, Weinberger wrote reports and policy analysis for the Pentagon on subjects ranging from arms export policy to the Department of Defense laboratory system. She also co-authored Toward a Fortress Europe, a study published in 2000 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies.), January 14th, 2008, "Report: U.S. Money Helps Recruit Weapons Scientists in Russia, Ukraine," Wired.com, http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2008/01/report-us-money/ [SA] If youre worried about nuclear terrorism, it makes sense, at face value, to support nonproliferation programs, particularly those that target the former Soviet Union. The problem, however, is that money cant always buy you security. 4 / 71
2. Program Information
2.1 IPP -XEmbassy of the United States, Moscow-Russia, U.S. Department of Energy, U.S. Department of Energy Programs, http://moscow.usembassy.gov/doeprograms.html [MH] Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP): The Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) program seeks to redirect former Soviet weapons scientists towards peaceful, sustainable commercial pursuits. Through cooperative projects between former Soviet/New Independent States (NIS) weapons scientists, the U.S. National Laboratories, and U.S. industry, IPP strives to stabilize institutes, personnel and technology formerly dedicated to developing and manufacturing weapons of mass destruction. Begun in 1994, the IPP program has matured from initially funding mostly research and development projects to focusing on commercially viable projects. These projects identify technologies that have market potential for profit to both the U.S. and NIS participants. 2.2 NCI Embassy of the United States, Moscow-Russia, U.S. Department of Energy, U.S. Department of Energy Programs, http://moscow.usembassy.gov/doeprograms.html [MH] Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI): The Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI) is a nonproliferation partnership between the United States and Russia that aids in the planned downsizing of the Russian nuclear weapons complex. NCI helps to remove functions and equipment from the weapons complex, reduce the physical footprint, and create sustainable, alternative non-weapons work leading to the irreversible, transparent downsizing of the weapons complex. NCI continues to accomplish this mission by focusing on selected key strategies: developing physical and business infrastructure, helping establish sustainable enterprises, and introducing economic diversification models. 2.3 RTI Embassy of the United States, Moscow-Russia, U.S. Department of Energy, U.S. Department of Energy Programs, http://moscow.usembassy.gov/doeprograms.html [MH] RUSSIAN TRANSITION INITIATIVES (RTI) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24) The mission of the Russian Transition Initiatives (RTI) is to counter the proliferation and terrorism threat posed by "brain drain" from the weapons complex of the former Soviet Union, to which Russia is the primary heir. Neither states of proliferation concern nor sub-national groups, such as terrorist organizations, are able to pursue a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program entirely on their own. They need fuel cycle technologies in order to get fissile materials (or they need to buy or steal fissile materials), weapons design information and weapons assembly expertise. The Russian nuclear weapons complex, which is vastly oversized, decrepit, and starving for resources is still dangerously capable of 5 / 71
performing its core functions, and is an obvious source for these inputs. The RTI program is comprised of two parts: the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) and the Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI). Both programs work together to address the threat that the Russian and non-Russian NIS weapons complex poses as a potential source of WMD materials, technology and expertise. 2.4 NCI and IPP Combined Elena Sokova, CNS Research Associate, NTI(Site info at end of brief), Russia: The Nuclear Cities Initiative, Page last updated 2 February 2005, http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/forasst/doe/closcity.htm [MH] However, the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act for FY 2002, passed by the US Congress and signed by President Bush on 12 November 2001, significantly increased funding over the amount originally sought. The Act combined NCI and IPP funding under the Russian Transition Initiatives budget item and provided $42 million for the programs. The US Department of Energy integrated the management of both programs. The Act also gave DOE the flexibility to allocate funding between the two programs. The Russian Transition Initiatives received an additional $15 million in the post-September 11 FY2002 emergency supplemental appropriation package. Combined FY 2002 allocations for the NCI totaled $21 million. In its FY 2003 request, the DOE has asked for $39.334 million for the Russian Transition Initiatives, including $16.748 million for the NCI. 2.5 What IPP Does Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Energy and Commerce House of Representatives, 100th Congress, First Session, January 23, 2008, COMBATING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGYS INITIATIVES FOR PROLIFERATION PREVENTION (IPP) PROGRAM, Serial No. 11082, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_house_hearings&docid=f:47234.pdf [MH] [STATEMENT OF HON. GENE GREEN:] One such DOE program, the Initiatives for Proliferation Program, or the IPP program, was created to reduce the threat that scientists with expertise of weapons of mass destruction might provide that expertise to states or terrorists to threaten the U.S. or our allies. It aims to achieve this by focusing on the twin goals of creating nonmilitary work and long-term job creation for weapons scientists in Russia and other former Soviet Union countries.
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2.6 What IPP Does(easier-to-understand version) Idaho National Laboratory[In operation since 1949, INL is a science-based, applied engineering national laboratory dedicated to supporting the U.S. Department of Energy's missions in nuclear and energy research, science, and national defense.], No date given, The Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention Program, http://www.inl.gov/research/global-initiatives-proliferationprevention/ [MH] Since 1992, the program has helped scientists, engineers and researchers from the countries of the former Soviet Union convert their knowledge away from nuclear, chemical and biological weapons production, and into peaceful and commercially viable alternative technologies. Technologies developed under this program include breast cancer identification software and land mine detection products. In 2005, the program was extended to include the countries of Libya and Iraq.
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2.7 Closed Nuclear Cities Map NTI(Site info at end of brief), Russia: Closed Nuclear Cities Map, http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/weafacl/nukcity.htm [MH]
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3. Nuclear Cities Initiative

3.1 NCI Ended in 2005 World at Risk, the Report of the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism, Bob Graham[Chairman], Jim Talent[Vice-Chairman], Graham Allison, Robin Cleveland, Steve Rademaker, Tim Roemer, Wendy Sherman, Henry Sokolski, Rich Verma(AUTHOR BIO'S AT END OF BRIEF), First Vintage Books Edition: December 2008, ISBN: 978-0-307-47326-4, http://www.scribd.com/doc/51562067/WMD-Report [MH] The Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) Program and the Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI), which implemented DOE's scientist engagement efforts (the programs were brought under common management in 2002; NCI projects in Russia's closed nuclear cities ended in 2005, and the program was not renewed).
3.2 NCI Was Underfunded(That is why they merged it with IPP) Elena Sokova, CNS Research Associate, NTI(Site info at end of brief), Russia: The Nuclear Cities Initiative, Page last updated 2 February 2005, http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/forasst/doe/closcity.htm [MH]
In 2000 and 2001, the NCI continued to be limited under US law to Sarov, Snezhinsk, and Zheleznogorsk and to two serial warhead assembly and disassembly facilities--Avangard in Sarov and Start in Zarechnyy; Russia, however, rejected NCI efforts to begin work at the latter, requiring that the program first demonstrate success at the Avangard facility. For FY 2001, $26.6 million was appropriated for the Nuclear Cities Initiative in the US budget,[11] including $10 million to facilitate the closure of the Avangard and Start warhead production plants. However, the US Congress made the availability of $10 million for closure of warhead production facilities conditional on DOE's completing an agreement with the Russian government under which Russia would agree to close some of its facilities engaged in weapons assembly and disassembly in exchange for receiving assistance under the NCI. As of October 2001, that agreement had not been completed.
According to estimates based on Minatom information, $10 million is only one-tenth of the amount needed to complete closure of these plants and create 10,000 civilian jobs for the workforce that will be freed up.[12]
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3.3 Funding(1999-2005 Request) Elena Sokova, CNS Research Associate, NTI(Site info at end of brief), Russia: The Nuclear Cities Initiative, Page last updated 2 February 2005, http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/forasst/doe/closcity.htm [MH]
Table I: Nuclear Cities Initiative Funding Fiscal Year FY1999 FY2000 FY2001 FY2002 Funding $15 million[10] $7.5 million[14] $26.616 million[11] Initial: $42 million for the Russian Transition Initiatives (the NCI and the IPP combined)[19] Supplemental: $15 million from the FY2002 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations[20] Total: $57 million for the Russian Transition Initiatives (the NCI and the IPP combined) FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 Request including $21 million for the NCI[21]
$16.639 million for NCI [22] $16.564 million for NCI [22] $41 million for the Russian Transition Initiatives (the NCI and the IPP combined) [22]
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4. Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention

A) General 4.1 The Origin of the IPP Program The Government Accountability Office (The GAO exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. NUCLEARNONPROLIFERATION DOEs Program to Assist Weapons Scientists in Russia and Other Countries Needs to Be Reassesse" Report to the Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives; December 2007, www.gao.gov/new.items/d08189.pdf [SA] During the decades before its dissolution, the Soviet Union produced a cadre of scientists and engineers whose knowledge and expertise would be invaluable to countries or terrorist groups trying to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD). After the Soviet Unions collapse in 1991, many of these scientists suffered significant cuts in pay or lost their government supported work. The United States and other countries were concerned that these scientists would sell their expertise to terrorists or countries of concern, such as Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. To address this potential proliferation concern, the Department of Energy (DOE) established the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) program in 1994. 1 The objectives of the IPP program, which is implemented by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), 2 are to (1) in the short term, engage weapons scientists and scientific research and development institutes located in Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Union in nonmilitary work by supplementing their existing salaries and (2) in the long term, create sustainable, private sector jobs for former weapons scientists.
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4.2 U.S. Aided Russia Sharon Weiner (PhD, political science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; writes about the intersection of organizational politics and U.S. national security policy. Her research on U.S. nonproliferation policy has also appeared in International Security, Political Science Quarterly, The Nonproliferation Review, as well as other journals) "Organizational interest, nuclear weapons scientists, and nonproliferation" December 22, 2009 business.highbeam.com/4436/article-1G1216848515/organizational-interest-nuclear-weapons-scientists In the early 1990s, the disintegration of the Soviet Union led to concerns about proliferation, including fears about the spread of nuclear weapons expertise. The splintering of the Soviet nuclear complex, poor security protocols in the newly independent states, and pending layoffs of nuclear weapons workers combined with dismal economic conditions to reinforce fears that former Soviet nuclear weapons experts would sell their skills for money. In the United States, the response was the creation of several programs to fight proliferation by providing income to former Soviet nuclear weapons workers. Two such efforts were located in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). Both focused on a two-pronged response: improve experts' living standards in the short term and re-direct them to non-weapons jobs in the future. One program, the Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI), initially succeeded by providing much-needed business training, infrastructure, and community improvements in Russia's core nuclear weapons institutes. 4.3 IPP History Amy F. Woolf ( Congressional Research Service- Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy) "Nonproliferation and Threat ReductionAssistance: U.S. Programs in the Former Soviet Union", February 4, 2010, www.nti.org/e_research/source_docs/us/congress/congressional_research_service/15.pdf [SA] The Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) Program began in 1994. IPP has matched U.S. weapons labs and U.S. industry with Russian scientists and engineers in cooperative research projects with high commercial potential. DOE claims that this focus on commercialization will help make the projects self-sustaining in the long term. The IPP program received $35 million in the FY1994 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, before its funding moved to the Department of Energy. This initial funding helped establish nearly 200 research projects by 1995. Between FY1996 and FY2003, IAP received an additional $194 million. In FY2004, the Bush Administration requested around $23 million for projects funded through IPP, as a part of the overall request of $39.3 million for the Russian Transition Initiative. Congress approved this request.
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4.4 The GAO Report and Criticism for the IPP Program From 1999 Amy F. Woolf ( Congressional Research Service- Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy) "Nonproliferation and Threat ReductionAssistance: U.S. Programs in the Former Soviet Union" February 4, 2010, www.nti.org/e_research/source_docs/us/congress/congressional_research_service/15.pdf [SA] The IPP program was the subject of review and criticism in a GAO study released in February 1999. The report noted that nearly half of the funds appropriated for the IAP program had been spent at the U.S. nuclear weapons labs and that, after subtracting the taxes, fees, and other charges removed by Russian officials, the Russian institutes had received only around one-third of the funds. The report also questioned DOEs oversight of the programs, noting that program officials did not always know how many scientists were receiving IAP funding. The report noted that the projects had not yet produced any commercial successes. DOE responded by stating that IAP had temporarily employed thousands of scientists in around 170 institutes. DOE also stated that the program did not subsidize scientists who were performing weapons-related work. Nevertheless, in FY2000, Congress reduced the Clinton Administrations request for funding for the IAP program from $30 million to $25 million and specified that no more than 35% of the funds be spent at the U.S. labs. It also mandated that the United States negotiate agreements with Russia to ensure that funds provided under this program are not subject to taxes in Russia. Furthermore, it requested that the Secretary of Energy review IAP programs for their commercialization potential. 4.5 IPP Funding Daniel Arnaudo (joined the Arms Control Association in December 2006. Before graduating from Emory University in 2005 with a bachelors degree in International Studies, he interned at the Carter Center, covering non-proliferation issues and the Middle East for its Conflict Resolution Program. He has also worked as a consultant to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, NASA Goddard Space Flight Center and the Center on International Cooperation at New York University.) Arms Control TodayArms Control Association "GAO Report Chides Energy Department Program" March 2008 www.armscontrol.org/print/2763 [SA] Finally, it calls on the department to improve and streamline its review processes for paying former Soviet weapons scientists and to implement long-delayed programs so that the $30 million in unspent funds already allocated to the program could be expended. In February, the Bush administration requested $24 million for the IPP in fiscal year 2009 after Congress appropriated it $31 million for the current fiscal year. Now lawmakers await answers on the program from the Energy Department. The report recommends that the department conduct a comprehensive reassessment to guide Congress in determining whether it should continue funding the IPP in its current form. If lawmakers decide to do so, the GAO further advises that the United States should share more of the costs with Russia, which is now less in need of assistance due to a stronger economy and more likely to become an equal partner for similar projects in future.
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Matthew Hamilton, Scott Alford and Josh Kreifels B) Original Goal 1: Economy
4.6 DOE Focuses IPP on Projects With Good Commercialization Amy F. Woolf (Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy), February 4th, 2010, "Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance: U. S. Programs in the Former Soviet Union," Congressional Research Service, Page 38-39, http://books.google.com/books? hl=en&lr=&id=2pfetz3QVfYC&oi=fnd&pg=PA1&dq=%22initiatives+for+proliferation+prevention %22+program&ots=efU7BpxZVj&sig=Tb4qvxWoe_dMaWJweSVa-L8O22Y#v=onepage&q= %22initiatives%20for%20proliferation%20prevention%22&f=false [SA] IPP has matched U.S. weapons labs and U.S. industry with Russian scientists and engineers in cooperative research projects with "high commercialization potential." DOE claims that this program will help make the projects self-sustaining in the long term. C) Original Goal 2: Soviet Scientists 4.7 Purpose of IPP Was for Creating Work and Reducing Size of Nuclear Complex Amy F. Woolf (Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy), February 4th, 2010, "Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance: U. S. Programs in the Former Soviet Union," Congressional Research Service, Page 38-39, http://books.google.com/books? hl=en&lr=&id=2pfetz3QVfYC&oi=fnd&pg=PA1&dq=%22initiatives+for+proliferation+prevention %22+program&ots=efU7BpxZVj&sig=Tb4qvxWoe_dMaWJweSVa-L8O22Y#v=onepage&q= %22initiatives%20for%20proliferation%20prevention%22&f=false [SA] According to the DOE, [IPP was] these programs were designed to help Russia reduce the size of its nuclear weapons complex, by removing functions and equipment, and to create "sustainable nonweapons-related work" for scientists through technology projects that have "commercially-viable market opportunities."
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5. Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention

5.1 What GIPP is The Y- 12 National Security Complex[is a premier manufacturing facility dedicated to making our nation and the world a safer place. Operated by B&W Y- 12 for the National Nuclear Security Administration, Y- 12 plays a vital role in the Department of Energys Nuclear Security Enterprise.], Global Initiatives for Proliferation prevention (GIPP), http://www.y12.doe.gov/missions/nonproliferation/inp/gipp/ [MH] Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (GIPP) (previously known as the Russian Transition Initiatives) provides program management and technical assessment activities for Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) and the Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI). The Defense Nuclear Nonproliferations GIPP program in the National Nuclear Security Administration keeps the worlds most dangerous technologies out of the hands of the worlds most dangerous people and allows us to secure our nation and the globe. GIPP projects range from creating new drugs to combat tuberculosis, influenza, hepatitis and tickborne encephalitis to the production of an advanced battery for vehicle use and the creation of a technology park. 5.2 GIPP Program Objective Brookhaven National Laboratory Nonproliferation and National Security Programs (Office of science at the USDOE), Modified June 4, 2010, "Project and Program Offices: US DOE GIPP Program,"http://www.bnl.gov/nns/project_offices.asp [SA] This area includes the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention Program (GIPP) and the U.S. Department of State (DOS) International Science and Technology Centers. The key objectiveof these programs is to support nonproliferation in the area of nuclear, biological and chemical Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) by providing assistance in establishing sustainable non-weapon related jobs for the scientists and engineers in the Newly Independent States (NIS) of the former Soviet Union, as well as Iraq and Libya, who possess current or prior, direct or indirect WMD experience.
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5.3 Components of the GIPP Program Brookhaven National Laboratory Nonproliferation and National Security Programs (Office of science at the USDOE), Modified June 4, 2010, "Project and Program Offices: US DOE GIPP Program,"http://www.bnl.gov/nns/project_offices.asp [SA] The two main components of this [GIPP] program are the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) and Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI). The IPP program includes activities in Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Belarus, Armenia, and Uzbekistan. It operates by promoting joint research and development between three entities: the NIS institute (or a company created using its former employees), a national laboratory, and a U.S. Company. The U.S. Company participates through a Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) with the national laboratory by matching the DOE contribution by its own funds-in-kind, expertise, and technologies. The NIS institute has a direct contract with the national laboratory.
6. General Advocacy
A) No Exit Strategy 6.1 Exit Strategy Needed -XWorld at Risk, the Report of the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism, Bob Graham[Chairman], Jim Talent[Vice-Chairman], Graham Allison, Robin Cleveland, Steve Rademaker, Tim Roemer, Wendy Sherman, Henry Sokolski, Rich Verma(AUTHOR BIO'S AT END OF BRIEF), First Vintage Books Edition: December 2008, ISBN: 978-0-307-47326-4, http://www.scribd.com/doc/51562067/WMD-Report [MH] The Baker-Cutler report noted that the IPP suffered from years of inconsistent funding from Congress, and that metrics such as the number of actual weapons scientists engaged in commercial jobs, were difficult to document. The report emphasized that careful attention should be given to defining critera for success and developing an exit strategy for the program.
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6.2 IPP Isn't Needed, and Goals Have Shifted -XTestimony Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Every and Commerce, House of Representatives, Government Accountability Office, Statement of Robert A. Robinson[Managing Director Natural Resources and Environment], DOE Needs to Reassess Its Program to Assist Weapons Scientists in Russia and Other Countries, January 23, 3008, GAO-08434T, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi? dbname=110_house_hearings&docid=f:47234.pdf [MH] DOE has yet to develop criteria for phasing-out the IPP program in Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Union. Russian government officials, representatives of Russian and Ukrainian institutes, and individuals at the U.S. companies raised questions about the continuing need for the IPP program, particularly in Russia, whose economy has improved in recent years. Meanwhile, DOE is departing from the program's traditional focus on Russia and other former Soviet states to engage scientists in new countries, such as Iraq and Libya, and to fund projects that support GNEP. 6.3 No Exit Strategy For IPP(6.4 is better) World at Risk, the Report of the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism, Bob Graham[Chairman], Jim Talent[Vice-Chairman], Graham Allison, Robin Cleveland, Steve Rademaker, Tim Roemer, Wendy Sherman, Henry Sokolski, Rich Verma(AUTHOR BIO'S AT END OF BRIEF), First Vintage Books Edition: December 2008, ISBN: 978-0-307-47326-4, http://www.scribd.com/doc/51562067/WMD-Report [MH]
The record on the development of exit strategies is mixed. The fundamental mission in Russiato secure nuclear materials there and transfer responsibility for maintaining nuclear security upgrades to Russiahas a clear end date mandated by Congress (2013), and it appears that this deadline will be met. Other programs, such as efforts to facilitate the shut down of Russias plutonium producing reactors, are also on track to complete their work. However, programs such
as DOEs efforts to engage nuclear scientists in civilian pursuits do not have clearly defined end points, although they have changed their approach to address threats as they are evolving. Nonetheless, the
scientist engagement program would do well to further refine its definition of success and to ensure that its long-term objectives are commensurate with threat projections.
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6.4 DOE Needs an Exit Strategy For IPP(1AC) The Government Accountability Office (The GAO exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions.) NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION: DOEs Program to Assist Weapons Scientists in Russia and Other Countries Needs to Be Reassesse" Report to the Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives; December 2007 www.gao.gov/new.items/d08189.pdf [SA] DOE has not developed an exit strategy for the IPP program, even though officials from the Russian government, Russian and Ukrainian institutes, and U.S. companies raised questions about the continuing need for the program. Importantly, a senior Russian Atomic Energy Agency official told GAO that the IPP program is no longer relevant because Russias economy is strong and its scientists no longer pose a proliferation risk. DOE has not developed criteria to determine when scientists, institutes, or countries should graduate from the program. In contrast, the Department of State (State), which
supports a similar program to assist Soviet-era weapons scientists, has assessed participating institutes and developed a strategy to graduate certain institutes from its program. Instead of finding ways to phase out the IPP program, DOE has recently expanded the program to include new countries and areas. Specifically, in 2004, DOE began providing assistance to scientists in Iraq and Libya. In addition, the IPP program is working with DOEs Office of Nuclear Energy to develop projects that support the Global Nuclear Energy Partnershipa DOE-led international effort to expand the use of civilian nuclear power.
6.5 Sketchy Program Goal =/= Exit Strategy -XMR. ROBERT A ROBINSON; MANAGING DIRECTOR; GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE FDCH Congressional Testimony, "COMBATING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION" 01/23/2008 research.cincinnatilibrary.org:2052/ehost/detail?hid=119&sid=a8115ead-a203-4307-a6d4fee011462d89%40sessionmgr111&vid=4&bdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCxjcGlkJmN1c3R pZD1jaW5jeSZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU%3d#db=tth&AN=32Y1987222496 [SA] DOE has not developed an exit strategy for the IPP program, and it is unclear when the department expects the program to have completed its mission. DOE officials told us in September 2007 that they do not believe that the program needs an exit strategy. However, they acknowledged that the program`s long-term goal of employing 17,000 WMD scientists in Russia and other countries does not represent an exit strategy. DOE has not developed criteria to determine when scientists, institutes, or countries should be ``graduated`` from the IPP program, and DOE officials believe that there is a continued need to engage Russian scientists. In contrast, State has assessed institutes and developed a strategy using a range of factors, such as the institute`s ability to pay salaries regularly and to attract external funding to graduate certain institutes from its Science Centers program.
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6.6 The Government Accountability Office Recommends Phasing Out IPP (GOOD) The Government Accountability Office (The GAO exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. NUCLEARNONPROLIFERATION DOEs Program to Assist Weapons Scientists in Russia and Other Countries Needs to Be Reassesse" Report to the Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives; December 2007, www.gao.gov/new.items/d08189.pdf [SA] In our view, the purpose and need for the IPP program must be reassessed. We believe that DOE has failed to clearly articulate the current threat posed by WMD scientists in Russia and other countries and has not adjusted the IPP program to account for the changed economic landscape in the region and improved conditions at many of the institutes involved in the program. Instead, DOE has continued to emphasize a broad strategy of engagement with foreign scientists and institutes, much as it did more than a decade ago, and it has not developed comprehensive plans for focusing on the most at-risk individuals and institutes or for developing an endgame for the program. We believe that DOEs inability to establish a clear exit strategy for the IPP program has contributed to a perception among foreign recipients that the program is essentially open-ended, represents an indefinite commitment of U.S. support, and serves as a useful marketing tool to attract and retain young scientists who might otherwise emigrate to the United States or other western countries. 6.7 It's Time to End IPP (1AC) Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Energy and Commerce House of Representatives, 100th Congress, First Session, January 23, 2008, COMBATING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGYS INITIATIVES FOR PROLIFERATION PREVENTION (IPP) PROGRAM, Serial No. 11082, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_house_hearings&docid=f:47234.pdf [MH] [OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. DINGELL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN:] The Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program, IPP, had at its inception a noble purpose. It must be noted that the central goal of this program was to provide proper incentives to the scientists who would be helped by it so that they would direct their expertise in peaceful ventures in partnership with private U.S. companies rather than to work for rogue states or terrorist groups, a matter of great importance then and of great importance now. This is certainly an innovative and useful approach today as it was then, and it was useful in preventing the spread of nuclear technologies then and now. Since that time, however, the landscape has changed dramatically. Russia is now thriving. It is the largest oil producer in the world. It is the second largest oil exporter after OPEC. Its economy is booming. Unemployment is declining rapidly there. In short, given Russias economic turnaround, it appears that the time has come for the IPP program to show Congress how it works, how it is justified, what it is doing and whether or not it has an exit strategy that would be useful in terms of our other policy questions and its own concerns. 19 / 71
Moreover, there is a serious question as to how effective the program has been. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) notes that an audit sample found that more than half of the scientists funded by the IPP program may not have had any weapons-related experience. In addition, the Department of Energys assertions that the program has created thousands of long- term private-sector jobs for former scientists cannot be objectively verified. This underscores the basic question of whether the IPP program is funding the right people and perhaps whether it can be made to work at all. It is also curious to observe that it just might be that this is a program which is funding competition for our own industry using our taxpayers monies.
6.8 Russia Doesn't Need or Want it Anymore (GOOD) Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Energy and Commerce House of Representatives, 100th Congress, First Session, January 23, 2008, COMBATING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGYS INITIATIVES FOR PROLIFERATION PREVENTION (IPP) PROGRAM, Serial No. 11082, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_house_hearings&docid=f:47234.pdf [MH] [STATEMENT OF RICHARD ROBINSON, MANAGING DIRECTOR, NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE:]
There are many details that emerge from our analysis of this program, Mr. Chairman, and I want to use my 5 minutes to lay out a few commonsense observations about the program that led us to our conclusion that the program needs to be fundamentally reassessed. I am focusing my remarks here because while DOE largely agreed with our recommendations, it disagreed with us on this issue. At the outset I want to say and mirror the comments that many of you have made that there is no doubt that the program has served a very useful purpose in helping us get through a dangerous period of high proliferation risk coinciding with the dissolution of the former Soviet Union. The program helped former Soviet- era
weapons scientists through a period when they had either lost their jobs or suffered significant cuts in pay that could have led them to sell their knowledge to other countries or terrorist groups trying to develop weapons of mass destruction. Now, however, 14 years and $300 million later, the circumstances that led to the programs creation have dramatically changed, most notably, greatly improved economic conditions, particularly in Russia where 80 percent of the programs projects have been directed. With $100 barrel oil feeding the thriving Russian economy, the threat that former weapons scientists will need to sell their knowledge outside their country appears to be significantly lessened. These economic conditions also raise questions about whether the Russian government could take on greater
responsibility in this area. There are probably pockets of vulnerably at certain weapons institutes but these could be identified during the reassessment we called for. Our discussions at numerous institutes across Russia and
Ukraine and with a senior Russian atomic energy agency official confirm the view that the program may no longer be relevant to todays realities. Many officials told us, in fact, that their bigger fear is that the
scientists will emigrate to the United States and WesternEurope and not to countries of proliferation concern
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6.9 Many Participants no Longer See a Need For IPP (1st Good; 2nd Caution; 3rd Caution) Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Every and Commerce, House of Representatives, Government Accountability Office, Statement of Robert A. Robinson[Managing Director Natural Resources and Environment], DOE Needs to Reassess Its Program to Assist Weapons Scientists in Russia and Other Countries, January 23, 3008, GAO-08434T, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi? dbname=110_house_hearings&docid=f:47234.pdf [MH] Officials from the Russian government, representatives of Russian and Ukrainian institutes, and individuals at U.S. companies raised questions about the continuing need for the IPP program. Specifically: A senior Russian Atomic Energy Agency official told us in July 2007 that the IPP program is no longer relevant because Russia's economy is strong and its scientists no longer pose a proliferation risk. Officials from 10 of the 22 Russian and Ukrainian institutes we interviewed told us that they do not see scientists at their institutes as a proliferation risk. Russian and Ukrainian officials at 14 of the 22 institutes we visited told us that salaries are regularly being paid, funding from the government and other sources has increased, and there is little danger of scientists migrating to countries of concern. Representatives of 5 of the 14 U.S. companies we interviewed told us that, due to Russia's increased economic prosperity, the IPP program is no longer relevant as a nonproliferation program in that country.
6.10 The IPP Has Accomplished its Mission and no Longer Serves a Helpful Purpose (6.4 Better) Amy F. Woolf ( Congressional Research Service- Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy) "Nonproliferation and Threat ReductionAssistance: U.S. Programs in the Former Soviet Union" February 4, 2010 www.nti.org/e_research/source_docs/us/congress/congressional_research_service/15.pdf [SA]
The IPP Program was once again the subject of a critical GAO report in late 2007.104 This report noted that DOE had overstated the number of scientists receiving support from this program by counting both weapons and non-weapons scientists in its totals. It also argues that DOE has overstated the number of long-term private sector jobs created as a result of this program, mostly because it does not have an independent way to confirm the reported number. Further, DOE
does not have an exist strategy for the program, or a way to graduate institutes once they are self sustaining or no longer pose a proliferation threat. This report has raised, anew, questions about the current value and future worthiness of the program. DOE reports that the IPP program engaged 13,000 scientists,
engineers, and technicians between FY1994 and FY2002, with 6,700 of them working on projects in 2002. At the end of 2002, IPP had 176 projects ongoing at 56 institutes in Russia, with 64 of these projects at facilities in the closed nuclear cities. IPP also had 14 projects at six institutes in Kazakhstan, and 13 projects at nine institutes in Ukraine. It has also been reported that 13 projects have become commercial ventures, and that the program has created 850 high tech jobs in Russia. Furthermore, the IPP program has received around $125 million in private sector matching funds.
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6.11 Reevaluate IPP and Create a Clear Exit Strategy (ADVOCACY) MR. ROBERT A ROBINSON; MANAGING DIRECTOR; GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE FDCH Congressional Testimony, "COMBATING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION" 01/23/2008 research.cincinnatilibrary.org:2052/ehost/detail?hid=119&sid=a8115ead-a203-4307-a6d4fee011462d89%40sessionmgr111&vid=4&bdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCxjcGlkJmN1c3Rp ZD1jaW5jeSZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU%3d#db=tth&AN=32Y1987222496 We recommended, among other things, that DOE comprehensively reassess the IPP program to help the Congress determine whether to continue to fund it. We believe this reassessment should include, at a minimum, a thorough analysis of the proliferation risk posed by weapons scientists in Russia and other countries, a well-defined prioritization strategy to effectively target the scientists and institutes of highest proliferation concern, more accurate reporting of program accomplishments, and a clear exit strategy for the program. 6.12 No Criteria, or Want to Develop an Exit Strategy by the DOE (6.4 Better) MR. ROBERT A ROBINSON; MANAGING DIRECTOR; GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE FDCH Congressional Testimony, "COMBATING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION" 01/23/2008 research.cincinnatilibrary.org:2052/ehost/detail?hid=119&sid=a8115ead-a203-4307-a6d4fee011462d89%40sessionmgr111&vid=4&bdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCxjcGlkJmN1c3Rp ZD1jaW5jeSZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU%3d#db=tth&AN=32Y1987222496 [SA] DOE has not developed an exit strategy for the IPP program, and it is unclear when the department expects the program to have completed its mission. DOE officials told us in September 2007 that they do not believe that the program needs an exit strategy. However, they acknowledged that the program`s long-term goal of employing 17,000 WMD scientists in Russia and other countries does not represent an exit strategy. DOE has not developed criteria to determine when scientists, institutes, or countries should be ``graduated`` from the IPP program, and DOE officials believe that there is a continued need to engage Russian scientists. In contrast, State has assessed institutes and developed a strategy using a range of factors, such as the institute`s ability to pay salaries regularly and to attract external funding to graduate certain institutes from its Science Centers program.
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6.13 State Will Fund GTR After 2012 if There Are Still Threats Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Energy and Commerce House of Representatives, 100th Congress, First Session, January 23, 2008, COMBATING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGYS INITIATIVES FOR PROLIFERATION PREVENTION (IPP) PROGRAM, Serial No. 11082, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_house_hearings&docid=f:47234.pdf [MH] [RICHARD STRATFORD, ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND NONPROLIFERATION, RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS FROM HON. BART STUPAK:] States Global Threat Reduction programs (GTR) are threat driven and worldwide. Thus, if State reaches 2012 and has graduated all the priority institutes on our Science Centers Program list, but there are still proliferation threats from FSU former WMD institutes or WMD experts, State will continue to engage scientists in the FSU. It may be the case that in 2012, the threat in the FSU may not still exist,
and State would then use these funds to engage scientists at risk elsewhere; however, that is years away. For now, State plans to focus on engaging institutes that face the most important proliferation risks and to also focus on graduating institutes to financial self-sustainability
7. Significance
7.1 Increased Proliferation Threat With New Scientists (GOOD) Hon. Bennie Thompson [Representative in Congress from the State of Mississippi], COMBATING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGYS INITIATIVES FOR PROLIFERATION PREVENTION (IPP) PROGRAM, HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION, JANUARY 23, 2008, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg47234/pdf/CHRG110hhrg47234.pdf [Ethos] All experts agree that the gravest threat to our country, because of the drastic consequences, is a nuclear weapon. The best way to stop this threat is to secure nuclear material at its source: No nuclear weapons material, no nuclear weapon. Secondly, terrorist organizations and rogue states are less likely to have the wherewithal to build a nuclear weapon than more developed nations. That would lead them to recruit former weapons scientists who are out of a job. That is why programs like IPP are important, but also why they need to focus on scientists with weapons experience. Terrorists or rogue states would have no need to recruit scientists with no weapon-related experience.
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8. Reasons to Eliminate/Graduate
A) General 8.1 Laundry List of Problems(GAO) Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Energy and Commerce House of Representatives, 100th Congress, First Session, January 23, 2008, COMBATING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGYS INITIATIVES FOR PROLIFERATION PREVENTION (IPP) PROGRAM, Serial No. 11082, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_house_hearings&docid=f:47234.pdf [MH] [OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BART STUPAK, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN:]
In response, Congress modified the program capping the spending at the national laboratories to 35 percent and required the Energy Secretary to review projects for commercial potential and terminate those which are not likely to achieve their intended commercial objective. Today we will hear the results of a new 15- month GAO follow-up audit. It appears it is even more critical than their 1999 review. For example, GAO found that 54 percent of those hired on IPP
projects it audited did not claim experience with weapons of mass destruction, the key goal of the IPP program. GAO also found that despite the fact that the State Department has graduated 17 institutes from their proliferation program because they determined that these institutes were self-sustaining, the DOE has continued to front 35 projects in Russia and the Ukraine at those 17 institutes. The GAO investigation questioned whether the IPP program may actually be contributing to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction since its funds have been used to recruit and retain new scientists who are too young to have worked on Soviet-era weapons of mass destruction programs. At the same time, GAO also noted that some of the former weapons institutes being assisted by IPP are enjoying newfound
prosperity. One has a marble-lined foyer with an art collection thanks to a gift from a former scientist. This begs the question of whether the institutes need U.S. funding to sustain employment for their scientists.
8.2 An Overview of IPP Problems; Proliferation, Mismanagement, and Failed Mission -XSharon Weiner (PhD, political science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; writes about the intersection of organizational politics and U.S. national security policy. Her research on U.S. nonproliferation policy has also appeared in International Security, Political Science Quarterly, The Nonproliferation Review, as well as other journals) "Organizational interest, nuclear weapons scientists, and nonproliferation" December 22, 2009, business.highbeam.com/4436/article-1G1216848515/organizational-interest-nuclear-weapons-scientists [SA] The other program, Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP), engaged thousands of nuclear experts in short-term research contracts, at times providing their only income. Both programs, however, failed to find new jobs for weapons experts. I argue that this combination of success and failure can best be explained by organizational interest. More specifically, both NCI and IPP rely heavily on project managers from the U.S. national laboratories, including Los Alamos, Livermore, and Sandia, which focus on U.S. nuclear weapons research and development. I argue that organizational interest drove these labs to pursue cooperative ventures in the former Soviet nuclear complex, even in the face of serious political, security, and other impediments. But organizational 24 / 71
interest also proved their undoing. The U.S. labs enjoy considerable autonomy within DOE. This decentralized power structure eventually resulted in programs that could not document their results or coordinate their activities and that have inadvertently contributed to Russia's and perhaps also Iran's nuclear weapons capabilities. B) Young Scientists 8.3 Significant Amount of New Scientists (GOOD) Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Energy and Commerce House of Representatives, 100th Congress, First Session, January 23, 2008, COMBATING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGYS INITIATIVES FOR PROLIFERATION PREVENTION (IPP) PROGRAM, Serial No. 11082, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_house_hearings&docid=f:47234.pdf [MH] [STATEMENT OF RICHARD ROBINSON, MANAGING DIRECTOR, NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE:]
Our analysis of the programs operations provide further support, we believe, for the need for fundamental program reassessment. Over half of the scientists being funded at the 97 projects we reviewed did not claim any
weapon-related experience in the documentation we reviewed. Instead of being used to support former Soviet-era weapons scientists, the authorized design of the program, funding is now being used to attract, recruit and retain younger scientists that were too young to have had this experience. In this way, we may actually be helping sustain the continued operation of institute activities or, at a minimum, help the institutes develop technical capabilities that we ultimately may have to compete against. Ultimately, and importantly, DOE has not updated its metrics to judge the extent to which the
program is actually reducing proliferation risk, and this is where we want to make sure the energy is concentrated here today, or adjust priorities so that funds can be targeted to the areas of highest need.
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8.4 DOE Does Not Meet its Own Guidelines on New Scientists (8.5 better) Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Every and Commerce, House of Representatives, Government Accountability Office, Statement of Robert A. Robinson[Managing Director Natural Resources and Environment], DOE Needs to Reassess Its Program to Assist Weapons Scientists in Russia and Other Countries, January 23, 3008, GAO-08434T, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi? dbname=110_house_hearings&docid=f:47234.pdf [MH] A Major goal of the IPP program is to engage former Soviet weapons scientists, engineers, and technicians, and DOE claims to have supplemented the incomes of over 16,770 of these individuals since the program's inception. However, this number is misleading because this figure includes both personnel with WMD experience and those without any WMD experience, according to DOE officials. We reviewed the payment records of 97 IPP projects, for which information was available and complete, and found that 54 percent, or 3,472, of the 6,453 participants in these projects did not claim to possess any WMD experience in the declarations they made concerning their backgrounds. We also found that DOE is not complying with a requirement of its own guidance for the IPP program that is, each IPP project must have a minimum of 60 percent of the project's participants possessing WMDrelevant experience prior to 1991 (i.e., Soviet-era WMD experience). We found that 60 percent or 58, of the 97 projects for which we had complete payment information did not meet this requirement. 8.5 IPP Funding Scientists That Don't Even Have Any Nuclear Know How Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Energy and Commerce House of Representatives, 100th Congress, First Session, January 23, 2008, COMBATING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGYS INITIATIVES FOR PROLIFERATION PREVENTION (IPP) PROGRAM, Serial No. 11082, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_house_hearings&docid=f:47234.pdf [MH] [OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. DINGELL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN:]
Since that time, however, the landscape has changed dramatically. Russia is now thriving. It is the largest oil producer in the world. It is the second largest oil exporter after OPEC. Its economy is booming. Unemployment is declining rapidly there. In short, given Russias economic turnaround, it appears that the time has come for the IPP program to show Congress how it works, how it is justified, what it is doing and whether or not it has an exit strategy that would be useful in terms of our other policy questions and its own concerns. Moreover, there is a serious question as to how effective the
program has been. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) notes that an audit sample found that more than half of the scientists funded by the IPP program may not have had any weapons-related experience. In addition, the Department of Energys assertions that the program has created thousands of long- term
private-sector jobs for former scientists cannot be objectively verified. This underscores the basic question of whether the IPP program is funding the right people and perhaps whether it can be made to work at all. It is also curious to observe that it just might be that this is a program which is funding competition for our own industry using our taxpayers monies.
Impact: Undermines the whole purpose of IPP.
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8.6 US Funding Goes Toward Recruiting Young Scientists (GOOD) Sharon Weinberger (Sharon Weinberger is a national security writer focusing on science and technology issues and a 2011 Alicia Patterson Foundation Fellow, reporting on "War 2.0," the Pentagon investment in social network analysis. She is also a regular contributor on national security for AOL News. Prior to her career in journalism, Weinberger worked as a defense analyst for System Planning Corporation (SPC), a research organization focused on national security. While at SPC, Weinberger wrote reports and policy analysis for the Pentagon on subjects ranging from arms export policy to the Department of Defense laboratory system. She also co-authored Toward a Fortress Europe, a study published in 2000 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies.), January 14th, 2008, "Report: U.S. Money Helps Recruit Weapons Scientists in Russia, Ukraine," (brackets added) Wired.com, http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2008/01/report-us-money/ [SA] Nothing illustrates this dilemma better than a new report by the Government Accountability Office. The GAO says that no[t] only does the Department of Energy overstate success in one of its key nonproliferation programs, but perhaps even more troubling, U.S. funding, intended to ensure that Soviet-era weapons scientists dont end up working for rogue states, is actually being used to recruit young scientists to work at weapons facilities: Impact: If we truly wanted to work on "NON-PROLIFERATION"...then we would NOT be hiring any new scientists. 8.7 Scientists Are a Limited Threat in Russia -XThe Government Accountability Office (The GAO exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. NUCLEARNONPROLIFERATION DOEs Program to Assist Weapons Scientists in Russia and Other Countries Needs to Be Reassesse" Report to the Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives; December 2007, www.gao.gov/new.items/d08189.pdf [SA] Officials from 10 of the 22 Russian and Ukrainian institutes we interviewed told us that they do not see themselves or scientists at their institutes as a proliferation risk. Russian and Ukrainian officials at 14 of the 22 institutes we visited told us that salaries are regularly being paid, funding from the government and other sources has increased, and there is little danger of scientists migrating to countries of concern. However, many of these officials said that they are concerned about scientists emigrating to the United States and Western Europe, and that IPP program funds help them to retain key personnel. Furthermore, many of these officials noted that he program was particularly helpful during the difficult financial period in the late 1990s.
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8.8 No Congressional Authorization to Fund Non-Soviet-Era Scientists By Robert Zarate (Research Fellow Nonproliferation Policy Education Center) "How Should the United States and Russia Collaborate to Reduce Future Nuclear Threats and Proliferation Dangers?" April 19, 2009 (Updated April 22, 2009) http://www.npolicy.org/article_file/20090419-ZarateNTRN_0_310111_0607.pdf [SA] But some nuclear assistance programs, in need of new objectives and activities, have raised Congressional objections for going beyond their legislative mandates. A report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in late2007 identified serious problems in the DoEs implementation of certain Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation projects in Russia. GAO found that funds for the DoEs Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) were being used to train a new generation of Russian nuclea r scientists, even though Congress had authorized funds to help provide jobs only for former Soviet nuclear scientists.2 A key issue is whether the U.S. and Russia can identify new large-scale, longterm and capital-intensive NTR/N projects in the former Soviet Union that would be useful.(2) 8.9 Study: Many Scientists Involved in IPP With no WMD Experience (Find better) The Government Accountability Office (The GAO exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. NUCLEARNONPROLIFERATION DOEs Program to Assist Weapons Scientists in Russia and Other Countries Needs to Be Reassesse" Report to the Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives; December 2007, www.gao.gov/new.items/d08189.pdf [SA] Finally, many IPP project participants that DOE supports are too young to have supported the Soviet Unions WMD programs. Officials at 10 of the 22 Russian and Ukrainian institutes we interviewed said that IPP program funds have allowed their institutes to recruit, hire, and retain younger scientists. We found that 15 percent, or 972, of the 6,453 participants in the payment records of the 97 projects we reviewed were born in 1970 or later and, therefore, were unlikely to have contributed to Soviet-era WMD efforts. This group of younger participants received approximately 14 percent, or about $3.6 million, of $25.1 million paid to project participants in the 97 projects we reviewed. While DOE guidance for the IPP program does not specifically prohibit participation of younger scientists in IPP projects, DOE has not clearly stated the proliferation risk posed by younger scientists and the extent to which they should be a focus of the IPP program. The absence of a clear policy on this matter has contributed to confusion and lack of consensus among national laboratory officials involved in the program about the extent to which younger scientists, rather than older, more experienced WMD experts, should be involved in IPP projects.
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8.10 WMD Experience Requirement Not Met The Government Accountability Office (The GAO exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. NUCLEARNONPROLIFERATION DOEs Program to Assist Weapons Scientists in Russia and Other Countries Needs to Be Reassesse" Report to the Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives; December 2007, www.gao.gov/new.items/d08189.pdf [SA] A major goal of the IPP program is to engage former Soviet weapons scientists, engineers, and technicians, and DOE claims to have supplemented the incomes of over 16,770 of these individuals since the programs inception. However, this number is misleading because DOE officials told us that this figure includes both personnel with WMD experience and those without any WMD experience. We reviewed the payment records of 97 IPP projects, for which information was available and complete, and found that 54 percent, or 3,472, of the 6,453 participants in these projects did not claim to possess any WMD experience in the declarations they made concerning their backgrounds. Moreover, project participants who did not claim any WMD experience received 40 percent, or approximately $10.1 million, of the $25.1 million paid to personnel on these projects. For example, in 1 project to develop a high-power accelerator that was funded for $1 million, 88 percent, or 66, of the75 participants who have received payments did not claim any previous weapons-related experience. On a project-byproject basis, we also found that DOE is not complying with a requirement of its own guidance for the IPP programthat is, each IPP project must have a minimum of 60 percent of the projects participants possessing WMD-relevant experience prior to 1991 (i.e., Soviet-era WMD experience). According to our analysis of the payment records of 97 projects for which information was available and complete, we found that 60 percent, or 58, of the 97 projects did not meet this requirement. C) Economy 8.11 Russia the Best Economic Performer Among the 4 Largest Developing Nations (Use later) Shiyin Chen [Shiyin is a Singapore correspondent, reporter, and staff writer for Bloomberg News], `Worst Is Over' for Russia as Economy Rebounds, Templeton's Zhilyaev Says, published by the Bloomberg News Service, August 12, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-13/-worst-isover-for-russia-as-economy-rebounds-templeton-s-zhilyaev-says.html [SA] Russias 30-stock Micex Index has gained 0.4 percent this year, compared with a 1.3 percent decline in the MSCI Emerging Markets Index. The gauge more than doubled last year, making Russia the best performer among the four largest developing nations including Brazil, China and India.
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8.12 Russia is Economically Stable -X- (8.13 better) The Government Accountability Office (The GAO exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. NUCLEARNONPROLIFERATION DOEs Program to Assist Weapons Scientists in Russia and Other Countries Needs to Be Reassesse" Report to the Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives; December 2007, ww.gao.gov/new.items/d08189.pdf [SA] Representatives of 5 of the 14 U.S. companies we interviewed told us that, due to Russias increased economic prosperity, the IPP program is no longer relevant as a nonproliferation program in that country. Some of these company officials believe that the program should be reassessed to determine if it is still needed. In economic terms, Russia has advanced significantly since the IPP program was created in 1994. Some of the measures of Russias economic strength include the following: massive gold and currency reserves, including more than $113 billion in astabilization fund a dramatic decrease in the amount of foreign debtfrom about 96 percent of Russias gross domestic product in 1999 to about 5 percent in April2007; and rapid growth in gross domestic productaveraging about 6 percent per year from 1998 to 2006.In addition, the president of Russia recently pledged to invest substantial government resources in key industry sectors, including nuclear energy, nano technology, and aerospace technologies and aircraft production. Many of the Russian institutes involved in the IPP program could benefit substantially under these planned economic development initiatives, undercutting the need for future IPP program support 8.13 Economy Doing Great (GOOD) Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Every and Commerce, House of Representatives, Government Accountability Office, Statement of Robert A. Robinson[Managing Director Natural Resources and Environment], DOE Needs to Reassess Its Program to Assist Weapons Scientists in Russia and Other Countries, January 23, 3008, GAO-08434T, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi? dbname=110_house_hearings&docid=f:47234.pdf [MH] In economic terms, Russia has advanced significantly since the IPP program was created in 1994. Some of the measures of Russia's economic strength include massive gold and currency reserves, a dramatic decrease in the amount of foreign debt, and rapid growth in gross domestic product. In addition, the president of Russia recently pledged to invest substantial resources in key industry sectors, including nuclear energy, nanotechnology, and aerospace technologies. Many Russian institutes involved in the IPP program could benefit from these initiatives, undercutting the need for future DOE support.
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8.14 Russia's Economic Situation Has Improved Dramatically (Use 8.13) MR. ROBERT A ROBINSON; MANAGING DIRECTOR; GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE FDCH Congressional Testimony, "COMBATING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION" 01/23/2008 research.cincinnatilibrary.org:2052/ehost/detail?hid=119&sid=a8115ead-a203-4307-a6d4fee011462d89%40sessionmgr111&vid=4&bdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCxjcGlkJmN1c3Rp ZD1jaW5jeSZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU%3d#db=tth&AN=32Y1987222496 [SA] -- Representatives of 5 of the 14 U.S. companies we interviewed told us that, due to Russia`s increased economic prosperity, the IPP program is no longer relevant as a nonproliferation program in that country. In economic terms, Russia has advanced significantly since the IPP program was created in 1994. Some of the measures of Russia`s economic strength include massive gold and currency reserves, a dramatic decrease in the amount of foreign debt, and rapid growth in gross domestic product. In addition, the president of Russia recently pledged to invest substantial resources in key industry sectors, including nuclear energy, nanotechnology, and aerospace technologies. Many Russian institutes involved in the IPP program could benefit from these initiatives, undercutting the need for future DOE support. In another sign of economic improvement, many of the institutes we visited in Russia and Ukraine appeared to be in better physical condition and more financially stable, especially when compared with their condition during our previous review of the IPP program. In particular, at one institute in Russia where during our 1998 visit we observed a deteriorated infrastructure and facilities we toured a newly refurbished building that featured state-of-the-art equipment. Russian officials told us that the overall financial condition of the institute has improved markedly because of increased funding from the government as well as funds from DOE. D) Weapons Institutes Funded 8.15 Weapons-Related Work at IPP Institutes (GOOD) Gene Aloise [Gene is the Director of the Natural Resources and Environment branch at the Government Accountability Office], Report to the Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOEs Program to Assist Weapons Scientists in Russia and Other Countries Needs to Be Reassessed, published by the Government Accountability Office, December 2007, (GAO-08-189) [Brackets added for clarification] [SA]
DOE misstates the number of institutes that we included in our fieldwork in Russia and Ukraine. The correct number is 22. Regarding DOEs comment, our draft report clearly stated that DOE policy does not require IPP project participants reemployed in peaceful activities to cut ties to their home institute. However, more than one [IPP] institute we
visited stated that they are still involved in some weapons-related work, and many institutes remain involved in research and technology development that could be applied to WMD or delivery systems for WMD. We do not believe it is possible for DOE to verify the full extent and intended purpose of all activities at the institutes where the IPP program is engaged. Moreover, we believe that DOE misrepresents the
IPP programs accomplishments by counting individuals who have been reemployed in private sector jobs but also are employed by their institutes and, therefore, may still be involved in weapons-related activities. In our view, the reemployment of former weapons scientists into new long-term, private sector jobsone of the primary metrics DOE uses to measure progress of the IPP programimplies that these individuals have terminated their previous employment at the institutes and are dedicated solely to peaceful commercial activities outside of their institutes.
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8.16 US is Paying a Russian Institute That is Making Iran Control Room Equipment -XMATTHEW L. WALD (Matthew L. Wald covers transportation for The New York Timess Washington bureau, specializing in aviation and highway safety. He also writes about various environmental and energy issues.),February 7th, 2008, "U.S.-Backed Russian Institutes Help Iran Build Reactor," New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/07/washington/07nuke.html? _r=2&ref=world&oref=slogin [SA] The United States pays for a variety of projects at numerous institutes in Russia and other former Soviet countries. For example, at the Scientific Research Institute of Measuring Systems in Nizhny Novgorod, which is making control room equipment for Bushehr, the United States is paying $1.15 million for a project for radar mapping of geological structures, which could be used to locate underground mineral deposits. 8.17 USDOE is Subsidizing Russian Institutes That Contribute to Iran's Nuclear Program (GOOD) MATTHEW L. WALD (Matthew L. Wald covers transportation for The New York Timess Washington bureau, specializing in aviation and highway safety. He also writes about various environmental and energy issues.),February 7th, 2008, "U.S.-Backed Russian Institutes Help Iran Build Reactor," New York Times,http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/07/washington/07nuke.html? _r=2&ref=world&oref=slogin [SA] The Energy Department is subsidizing two Russian nuclear institutes that are building important parts of a reactor in Iran whose construction the United States spent years trying to stop, according to a House committee. The institutes, both in Nizhny Novgorod, gave American officials copies of sales presentations that listed the Bushehr reactor, which Russia has agreed to fuel, as one of their projects. One institute is providing control systems, including control room equipment, and the other, hundreds of pumps and ventilation fans. The Energy Department is subsidizing the institutes under the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention, a program set up in 1994, after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The program was intended to prevent newly impoverished scientists and their institutions from selling expertise to states or terrorist groups that want nuclear weapons. 8.18 IPP Subsidizing Iranian Reactor (GOOD) Globe & Mail [Toronto, Canada] "U.S. subsidizing Russian institutes helping Iran." Feb 7. 2008: A17. Gale Opposing Viewpoints In Context. Web. 29 Mar. 2011. research.cincinnatilibrary.org:2315/ic/ovic/NewsDetailsPage/NewsDetailsWindow? displayGroupName=News&prodId=OVIC&action=e&windowstate=normal&catId=&documentId=GA LE|A174319766&mode=view [SA] The U.S. Energy Department is subsidizing two Russian nuclear institutes that are building important parts of a reactor in Iran whose construction the United States spent years trying to stop, according to a House committee .The department is subsidizing the institutes under the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention, a program set up in 1994 after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 32 / 71
8.19 Threatens Future U.S.-Russia Nuclear Collaboration (8.17 is better) By Robert Zarate (Research Fellow Nonproliferation Policy Education Center) "How Should the United States and Russia Collaborate to Reduce Future Nuclear Threats and Proliferation Dangers?" April 19, 2009 (Updated April 22, 2009) http://www.npolicy.org/article_file/20090419-ZarateNTRN_0_310111_0607.pdf [SA] Russias longstanding relations with Iran and other states of proliferation concern may create obstacles to continuing the current approach to U.S.-Russian NTR[ Nuclear Threat Reduction]/N. For example, the House Energy and Commerce Committee found in 2008 that the DoEs Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention had funded projects at Russian nuclear institutes, and that these institutes had assisted Irans nuclear programa program that remains in noncompliance with resolutions from the U.N. Security Council and the Board of Governors of the International Atomic EnergyAgency (IAEA).
Moreover, when President George W. Bush submitted for Congressional approval a framework agreement to allow broad U.S.-Russian civil nuclear cooperationa pact that President Obama is now deciding whether to resubmitlawmakers raised loud objections, citing Russias on going nuclear, ballistic missile, and advanced conventional military assistance to Iran.9 Indeed, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) publicly assessed that
individual Russian entities continue to provide assistance to Irans ballistic missile programs and that Russia-entity assistance has helped Iran move toward self-sufficiency in the production of ballistic missiles.10Moreover, because President Bush could not issue a determination pursuant to Section 6(b) of the Iran, North
Korea and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA) with respect to Russian proliferation activities to Iran, North Korea or Syria,11 Congress was forced to pass, and President Bush to sign, a new law to sustain U.S.-Russian space cooperation.12
More recently, The New York Times reported the IAEA is investigating whether a Russian scientist had helped Iran to conduct experiments related to detonating nuclear bombs.13 Concern thus persists in Congress over Russia-Iranian assistanceconcern that casts clouds over U.S.-Russian nuclear collaborations future 8.20 US is Hypocritical MATTHEW L. WALD (Matthew L. Wald covers transportation for The New York Timess Washington bureau, specializing in aviation and highway safety. He also writes about various environmental and energy issues.),February 7th, 2008, "U.S.-Backed Russian Institutes Help Iran Build Reactor," New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/07/washington/07nuke.html? _r=2&ref=world&oref=slogin [SA] Mr. Dingell [chairman of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce] said, Only this administration would complain about proliferation in Iran, as part of President Bushs axis of evil, and then finance it with American taxpayer dollars. Mr. Stupak [chairman of that committees Oversight and Investigations subcommittee] called it schizophrenic foreign policy." "We should not be doing business with institutes that help promote Irans nuclear ambitions, he said.
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8.21 Russia Openly Supporting Iran Through IPP -XRosalie Westenskow (The Dalles, Ore. (UPI)) "Analysis: Proliferation program effective?" Feb 4, 2008 www.spacewar.com/reports/Analysis_Proliferation_program_effective_999.html [SA]
IPP officials said at last week's hearing they're looking into approaching the topic with Russian leaders but have not done so yet.
Other concerns about the program are more worrisome. Russian leaders have openly provided Iran's nuclear power development program with support and information, raising the question of whether IPP may actually be aiding proliferation. At last week's hearing, Robert Stratford, acting deputy assistant secretary at the Bureau of International Security, confirmed this may be a possibility. "You could argue that if you give Russia a dollar, that frees up a dollar that goes elsewhere, whether that's a scientists going to Iran or whatever," Stratford said. 8.22 Through IPP, We Are Both Directly and Indirectly Funding Our Worst Enemies in Iran -XRosalie Westenskow (The Dalles, Ore. (UPI)) "Analysis: Proliferation program effective?" Feb 4, 2008 www.spacewar.com/reports/Analysis_Proliferation_program_effective_999.html [SA]
IPP officials said at last week's hearing they're looking into approaching the topic with Russian leaders but have not done so yet.
Other concerns about the program are more worrisome. Russian leaders have openly provided Iran's nuclear power development program with support and information, raising the question of whether IPP may actually be aiding proliferation. At last week's hearing, Robert Stratford, acting deputy assistant secretary at the Bureau of International Security, confirmed this may be a possibility. "You could argue that if you give Russia a dollar, that frees up a dollar that goes elsewhere, whether that's a scientists going to Iran or whatever," Stratford said. 8.23 IPP is Undermining Non Proliferation Goals While Accomplishing Little of Value -XSharon Weiner (PhD, political science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; writes about the intersection of organizational politics and U.S. national security policy. Her research on U.S. nonproliferation policy has also appeared in International Security, Political Science Quarterly, The Nonproliferation Review, as well as other journals) "Organizational interest, nuclear weapons scientists, and nonproliferation" December 22, 2009, business.highbeam.com/4436/article-1G1216848515/organizational-interest-nuclear-weapons-scientists [SA]
Ultimately, organizational interest led to different outcomes for each program. NCI attempted to rein in the U.S. labs by centralizing power in a small headquarters office. The result was an absence of support within DOE that, I argue, significantly contributed to the program's termination in 2006. IPP, on the other hand, let the labs continue to
dominate its activities. The result has been projects that do little to further the program's nonproliferation goals and that have undermined its support in the United States by exacerbating underlying political tensions about whether such cooperation is a subsidy for Russia's own defense efforts. As case studies, IPP and NCI provide three insights into the impact of organizational interest on policy: such
interests can dominate even widely-shared goals about important national security interests, how organizational interest can both further and hinder U.S. national security objectives, and the need to consider the expression of organizational interest within the context of broader political debates.
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8.24 Two Institutes Funding Iran Committee on Energy and Commerce, Rep. John D. Dingell, Chairman,110th Newsroom, February 5, 2008, Department of Energy Program Funds Russian Nuclear Work in Iran, http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/index.php?q=archive/110th-congress/department-ofenergy-program-funds-russian-nuclear-work-in-iran [MH] [Brackets added] Washington, DC A highly touted Department of Energy (DOE) nonproliferation program[IPP], which is intended to keep Soviet-era scientists from migrating to rogue states following the collapse of the Soviet Union, has been funding Russian research institutes that support nuclear projects in Iran, two key lawmakers said today in a letter to Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman. 8.25 Two Key Lawmakers Report IPP Funds Helping Iran Committee on Energy and Commerce, Rep. John D. Dingell, Chairman,110th Newsroom, February 5, 2008, Department of Energy Program Funds Russian Nuclear Work in Iran, http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/index.php?q=archive/110th-congress/department-ofenergy-program-funds-russian-nuclear-work-in-iran [MH] Reps. John D. Dingell (D-MI), Chairman of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and Bart Stupak (D-MI), Chairman of the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, wrote Bodman regarding the Department of Energys Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention Program (IPP). The letter from Stupak and Dingell notes that two IPP-funded institutes in Russia have performed work on the Buhsher nuclear reactor in Iran. The revelations come the day before Bodman is expected to testify before the Committee on Energy and Commerce on the Department of Energys Fiscal Year 2009 Budget. 8.26 Funds Used For Iran(Contrary to what the DOE and DOS have said) Committee on Energy and Commerce, Rep. John D. Dingell, Chairman,110th Newsroom, February 5, 2008, Department of Energy Program Funds Russian Nuclear Work in Iran, http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/index.php?q=archive/110th-congress/department-ofenergy-program-funds-russian-nuclear-work-in-iran [MH] [Brackets added] During our hearing in January, Department of Energy and State Department witnesses told me they didnt know if the United States is funding projects at institutes that are also doing work for the Iranian nuclear program, [(D-MI)Representative Ben]Stupak said. We now know that they are. I find it to be a rather schizophrenic foreign policy position for the Bush Administration to label Iran part of the axis of evil but then send millions of U.S. tax dollars intended for non-proliferation programs to Russian institutes that are doing work on Irans nuclear program. I look forward to hearing the Energy and State Departments justifications for such a policy.
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8.27 Specific Use of Funds to Iran Committee on Energy and Commerce, Rep. John D. Dingell, Chairman,110th Newsroom, February 5, 2008, Department of Energy Program Funds Russian Nuclear Work in Iran, http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/index.php?q=archive/110th-congress/department-ofenergy-program-funds-russian-nuclear-work-in-iran [MH] [Brackets added] [MI Rep. John D.]Dingell and [MI Rep. Ben]Stupaks letter references Russian-origin documents that describe the activities of two IPP-funded institutes that are involved with Irans nuclear program, the Scientific Research Institute of Measuring Systems (NIIIS) and the Federal Scientific Research Institute of Nuclear Machine Building (OKBM). One presentation by NIIIS describes the institutes work on automated nuclear reactor control systems for Buhsher and other plants. NIIIS receives $2.65 million in projects from the Department of Energys IPP. A presentation by OKBM, which has built seven heavy-water reactors, describes work at Buhsher reactor installing hundreds of circulation pumps and ventilation equipment. The Department of Energy has approved a 3-year $1.037 million jointly funded project to develop submersible pumps for integral water reactors as part of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). OKBM has received a second project worth $1 million from IPP on radioactive medical waste management. 8.28 Iranian Reactor IS a Proliferation Risk Committee on Energy and Commerce, Rep. John D. Dingell, Chairman,110th Newsroom, February 5, 2008, Department of Energy Program Funds Russian Nuclear Work in Iran, http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/index.php?q=archive/110th-congress/department-ofenergy-program-funds-russian-nuclear-work-in-iran [MH] [Brackets added] The letter from [MI Rep. John D.]Dingell and [MI Rep. Ben]Stupak continues by noting that DOEs funding of Russian institutes working on the Buhsher reactor could potentially enable the transfer of technology that could be used not only for reactors, but for nuclear proliferation purposes. Further, ongoing civilian nuclear work could allow a country to move to the edge of nuclear weapons capability, situating itself only months away from nuclear weapons production once the country decides to proliferate.
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Matthew Hamilton, Scott Alford and Josh Kreifels E) Relations
8.24 Donor-Recipient Approach Not Desirable to Russia Anymore (GOOD) By Robert Zarate (Research Fellow Nonproliferation Policy Education Center) "How Should the United States and Russia Collaborate to Reduce Future Nuclear Threats and Proliferation Dangers?" April 19, 2009 (Updated April 22, 2009) http://www.npolicy.org/article_file/20090419-ZarateNTRN_0_310111_0607.pdf [SA] To the extent that there still is NTR/N work in the former Soviet Union, Moscow wants to end the current donor-recipient approach to nuclear collaboration. The U.S. began these programs after the Cold War
because, at the time, Russia and other former Soviet republics could not afford by themselves to secure, stabilize and shrink the Soviet-era nuclear weapons complex. Indeed, Moscow wanted Americas nuclear assistance. Circumstances have changed. First, the Russian government earned hundreds of billions from oil and gas exports over the last
few yearswealth that now erodes one key justification for the current approach to nuclear collaboration. Second, the notion of donor-recipient assistance does not accord with Russias renewed image of itself as a geopolitical co-equal to the U.S. 3 Indeed, Russian government officials privately
say that Russia is now more than capable of taking care of nuclear arsenal security and stability issues by itself.
8.25 A Constructive Relationship Will Greatly Help the US The Commission on U.S. Policy towards Russia, The Right Direction for U.S. Policy toward Russia, March 2009, The Commission on U.S. Policy toward Russia is a joint project of The Nixon Center and the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, a research center within Harvard Universitys John F. Kennedy School of Government, http://www.nixoncenter.org/RussiaReport09.pdf [SA] A constructive relationship with Russia will directly influence the United States ability to advance effectively vital national-security interests in nonproliferation, counterterrorism, and energy security, and to deal with many specific challenges such as Iran or European security. 8.26 Russia no Longer Needs the Help of the U.S. (GOOD) By Fred Weir and Mark Clayton, Christian Science Monitor[is an international news organization that delivers thoughtful, global coverage via its website, weekly magazine, daily news briefing, email newsletters, and mobile site.], September 20, 2006, US-Russia Effort to Contain Nuclear Experts Fades, http://216.119.87.134/Projects/WMD%20Expertise%20Redirection %20Project/920200684541AM.html [MH] Not everyone agrees the program is still needed. Valentin Ivanov, a member of the Russian parliament's energy committee, says that while there's still plenty of room for US-Russian cooperation on nuclear disarmament, the problems of the closed cities are a "domestic matter" that Moscow now has the means to address. "We thank the US for its help, which was greatly needed in the 1990s," he says. "But this is a new time, Russia has a budget surplus now, and [US help] is not necessary anymore."
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8.27 Foreign Employment Invitations Never Get Past the FSB (GOOD) By Fred Weir and Mark Clayton, Christian Science Monitor[is an international news organization that delivers thoughtful, global coverage via its website, weekly magazine, daily news briefing, email newsletters, and mobile site.], September 20, 2006, US-Russia Effort to Contain Nuclear Experts Fades, http://216.119.87.134/Projects/WMD%20Expertise%20Redirection %20Project/920200684541AM.html [MH] [Brackets added] However, it's doubtful that any atomic experts could illegally leave Russia now, Pshakhin says. "A lot of nuclear scientists are still underemployed, but things are a bit better," he says. "Nuclear scientists are under very strong monitoring. We are not allowed to move freely. Any attempt by a foreign power to recruit Russian scientists would immediately come to the attention of the FSB[Federal Security Service]." 8.28 Russia Doesn't Like How it's Being Run -XBy Fred Weir and Mark Clayton, Christian Science Monitor[is an international news organization that delivers thoughtful, global coverage via its website, weekly magazine, daily news briefing, email newsletters, and mobile site.], September 20, 2006, US-Russia Effort to Contain Nuclear Experts Fades, http://216.119.87.134/Projects/WMD%20Expertise%20Redirection %20Project/920200684541AM.html [MH] Even before the legal dispute, Moscow complained that NCI budgets in the $20 million range were too low, that much of the money was being spent in the US, and that highly qualified scientists were being re-trained to do low-level jobs like computer programmer and paramedic. 8.29 Russia Wary of U.S. Access to it's Sensitive Nuclear Programs -XBy Fred Weir and Mark Clayton, Christian Science Monitor[is an international news organization that delivers thoughtful, global coverage via its website, weekly magazine, daily news briefing, email newsletters, and mobile site.], September 20, 2006, US-Russia Effort to Contain Nuclear Experts Fades, http://216.119.87.134/Projects/WMD%20Expertise%20Redirection %20Project/920200684541AM.html [MH] A stronger Russian economy and growing wariness of US access to sensitive nuclear programs has dampened Moscow's enthusiasm for the Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI) program, as has a three-year wrangle with Washington over legal liability issues, observers say.
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8.30 Lack of Cooperation on Russia's Part -XHearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Energy and Commerce House of Representatives, 100th Congress, First Session, January 23, 2008, COMBATING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGYS INITIATIVES FOR PROLIFERATION PREVENTION (IPP) PROGRAM, Serial No. 11082, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_house_hearings&docid=f:47234.pdf [MH] [OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. DINGELL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN:] I must voice my own skepticism about the efficacy of the IPP program. It is hard to imagine that todays Russian leaders would allow our Energy Department to employ their top weapons scientists. Indeed, DOEs senior officials informed the committee staff that the Russians would never let us anywhere near anyone they really care about. The deputy director of the IPP program concurred in that assessment. 8.31 Already 6.4 -The Government Accountability Office (The GAO exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. NUCLEARNONPROLIFERATION DOEs Program to Assist Weapons Scientists in Russia and Other Countries Needs to Be Reassesse" Report to the Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives; December 2007, www.gao.gov/new.items/d08189.pdf [SA] Russian government officials, representatives of Russian and Ukrainian institutes, and individuals at U.S. companies raised questions about the continuing need for the IPP program, particularly in Russia, whose economy has improved in recent years. However, DOE has yet to develop criteria for phasing-out the IPP program in Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Union. Meanwhile, DOE is departing from the programs traditional focus on Russia and other former Soviet states to engage scientists in new countries, such as Iraq and Libya, and to fund projects that support a DOE-led initiative on nuclear energy, called the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP).
8.32 Already 6.9-Gene Aloise [Gene is the Director of the Natural Resources and Environment branch at the Government Accountability Office], Report to the Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOEs Program to Assist Weapons Scientists in Russia and Other Countries Needs to Be Reassessed, published by the Government Accountability Office, December 2007, (GAO-08-189 [SA] DOE has mischaracterized our findings and our process for evaluating the continued need for the program. As we pointed out in our draft report, officials at 10 of the 22 Russian and Ukrainian institutes we visited stated that they did not believe they or the other scientists at their institutes posed a proliferation risk, while officials at 14 of the 22 institutes also attested to the financial stability of their facilities. Moreover, a senior Russian Atomic Energy Agency official told us, in the presence of IPP program officials, in July 2007that the [IPP] program is no longer relevant. DOE asserted that we did not include endorsements of the program in our draft report. However, we do state that many officials at the Russian and Ukrainian institutes we visited noted that the program was especially helpful during the period of financial distress in the late 1990s.
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Matthew Hamilton, Scott Alford and Josh Kreifels F) Mismanagement
8.33 Overstated Success Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Every and Commerce, House of Representatives, Government Accountability Office, Statement of Robert A. Robinson[Managing Director Natural Resources and Environment], DOE Needs to Reassess Its Program to Assist Weapons Scientists in Russia and Other Countries, January 23, 3008, GAO-08434T, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi? dbname=110_house_hearings&docid=f:47234.pdf [MH] DOE has not accurately portrayed the IPP program's progress in the number of WMD scientists receiving DOE support and the number of long-term, private sector jobs created. Many of the scientists in Russia and other countries that DOE has paid through its IPP program did not claim to have WMD experience. Furthermore, DOE's process for substantiating the weapons backgrounds of IPP project participants has several weaknesses. In addition, DOE has overstated the rate at which weapons scientists have been employed in long-term, private sector jobs because it does not independently verify the data it receives on the number of jobs created, relies on estimates of job creation, and includes in its count a large number of part-time jobs that were created. Finally, DOE has not revised the IPP program's performance metrics, which are based on a 1991 assessment of the threat posed by former Soviet weapons scientists. 8.34 Laundry List of Management Issues The Government Accountability Office (The GAO exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. NUCLEARNONPROLIFERATION DOEs Program to Assist Weapons Scientists in Russia and Other Countries Needs to Be Reassesse" Report to the Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives; December 2007, www.gao.gov/new.items/d08189.pdf [SA] Beyond reassessing the continuing need for the IPP program, a number of management problems are negatively affecting the program. Specifically: The fact that DOE has paid many scientists who claimed no WMD expertise is particularly troubling and, in our view, undermines the IPP programs credibility as a nonproliferation program. The lack of documentation of DOEs review of IPP project participants also raises concerns. DOE does not have reliable data on the commercialization results of IPP projects or a clear definition of what constitutes a commercially successful IPP project, preventing it from providing the Congress with a more accurate assessment of the programs results and purported benefits.
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8.35 Performance Measures Outdated The Government Accountability Office (The GAO exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. NUCLEARNONPROLIFERATION DOEs Program to Assist Weapons Scientists in Russia and Other Countries Needs to Be Reassesse" Report to the Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives; December 2007, www.gao.gov/new.items/d08189.pdf [SA] The IPP programs long-term performance targets do not accurately reflect the size and nature of the threat the program is intended to address because DOE is basing the programs performance measures on outdated information. DOE has established 2 long-term performance targets for the IPP program to engage 17,000 weapons scientists annually by 2015 in either IPP grants or in private sector jobs resulting from IPP projects, and to create private sector jobs for 11,000 weapons scientists by 2019.However, DOE bases these targets on a 16-year-old, 1991 National Academy of Sciences (NAS) assessment that had estimated approximately 60,000 at-risk WMD experts in Russia and other countries in the former Soviet Union. DOE derived 17,000 scientists as its share of the total target population by subtracting from the NAS estimate the number of WMD scientists engaged by other U.S. government and international WMD scientist assistance programs (such as States Science Centers program)and making assumptions about attrition rates in the former Soviet WMD workforce. 8.36 DOE Staff Lacking in This Area Frederick Rick Kellett[s experience over the past decade as the Regional Director of a management consulting operation focused on local entrepreneurs in Central Asia and more recently as the Executive Vice President of Byelocorp Scientific, Inc. (BSI) makes him uniquely suited to direct this initiative. BSI is one of the few western companies to have successfully utilized former Soviet weapons research and manufacturing capabilities to create commercially viable civilian enterprises. One effort brought together a team of Belarusian and American scientists and engineers to develop a revolutionary optics finishing technology, which is now being used by every major optics manufacturer in the world. The other restructured a Kazakhstani weapons factory to produce large industrial process equipment for the regions growing oil business. Importantly, the latter also became the key supplier of equipment and packaging for spent nuclear fuel during the shutdown of the BN-350 reactor under a DoE nonproliferation initiative. Rick joined the Center in late 2005 as a Senior Business Fellow with the Cooperative Nonproliferation Program.], The Henry L. Stimson Center[is a nonprofit, nonpartisan institution devoted to enhancing international peace and security through a unique combination of rigorous analysis and outreach.], March 2007, USIC and the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention: A Survey of Companies Doing Business in the Former Soviet Union, Report No. 6, http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/USICPhaseI.pdf [MH] While DoE has overall management responsibility, it does not appear to play a very direct or active role in program implementation. This may be due to the original program design, but is probably also a result of a relatively small headquarters staff facing daily demands that are more political in nature. 41 / 71
8.37 Organizational Interests Have Greatly Hurt IPP (Try to Avoid) Sharon Weiner (PhD, political science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; writes about the intersection of organizational politics and U.S. national security policy. Her research on U.S. nonproliferation policy has also appeared in International Security, Political Science Quarterly, The Nonproliferation Review, as well as other journals) "Organizational interest, nuclear weapons scientists, and nonproliferation" December 22, 2009, business.highbeam.com/4436/article-1G1216848515/organizational-interest-nuclear-weapons-scientists [SA] The other program, Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP), engaged thousands of nuclear experts in short-term research contracts, at times providing their only income. Both programs, however, failed to find new jobs for weapons experts. I argue that this combination of success and failure can best be explained by organizational interest. More specifically, both NCI and IPP rely heavily on project managers from the U.S. national laboratories, including Los Alamos, Livermore, and Sandia, which focus on U.S. nuclear weapons research and development. I argue that organizational interest drove these labs to pursue cooperative ventures in the former Soviet nuclear complex, even in the face of serious political, security, and other impediments. But organizational interest also proved their undoing. The U.S. labs enjoy considerable autonomy within DOE. This decentralized power structure eventually resulted in programs that could not document their results or coordinate their activities and that have inadvertently contributed to Russia's and perhaps also Iran's nuclear weapons capabilities. 8.38 GAO Has Identified Management Issues That Need to be Fixed Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Energy and Commerce House of Representatives, 100th Congress, First Session, January 23, 2008, COMBATING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGYS INITIATIVES FOR PROLIFERATION PREVENTION (IPP) PROGRAM, Serial No. 11082, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_house_hearings&docid=f:47234.pdf [MH] [OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN SHIMKUS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS:] If we decide to continue the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program into the future, DOE must first demonstrate that it has corrected serious management problems identified by GAO. If DOE demonstrates that the program is salvageable, the second step would be to get a cost-share commitment from the Russian government before we initiate any new Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program projects at Russian institutes.
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8.39 DOE Has Overstated the Success of IPP MR. ROBERT A ROBINSON; MANAGING DIRECTOR; GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE FDCH Congressional Testimony, "COMBATING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION" 01/23/2008 research.cincinnatilibrary.org:2052/ehost/detail?hid=119&sid=a8115ead-a203-4307-a6d4fee011462d89%40sessionmgr111&vid=4&bdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCxjcGlkJmN1c3R pZD1jaW5jeSZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU%3d#db=tth&AN=32Y1987222496 [SA] DOE has overstated the number of WMD scientists receiving DOE support and the number of longterm, private sector jobs created. First, according to our analysis of 97 IPP projects involving about 6,450 scientists for whom we had complete payment information, more than half of the scientists paid by the program never claimed to have WMD experience. Furthermore, according to officials at 10 nuclear and biological institutes in Russia and Ukraine, IPP program funds help them attract, recruit, and retain younger scientists and contribute to the continued operation of their facilities. This is contrary to the original intent of the program, which was to reduce the proliferation risk posed by Soviet-era weapons scientists. For example, about 972 of the scientists paid for work on these 97 projects were born in 1970 or later, making them too young to have contributed to Soviet-era WMD efforts. Second, although DOE asserts that through April 2007, the IPP program had helped create 2,790 long-term, private sector jobs in Russia and other countries, we were unable to substantiate the existence of many of these jobs in our review of the projects DOE considers to be commercial successes. 8.40 DOE Poor Oversight Has Lead to Mismanagement MR. ROBERT A ROBINSON; MANAGING DIRECTOR; GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE FDCH Congressional Testimony, "COMBATING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION" 01/23/2008 research.cincinnatilibrary.org:2052/ehost/detail?hid=119&sid=a8115ead-a203-4307-a6d4fee011462d89%40sessionmgr111&vid=4&bdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCxjcGlkJmN1c3R pZD1jaW5jeSZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU%3d#db=tth&AN=32Y1987222496 [SA] The limited information DOE obtains about IPP project participants and the limitations in DOE`s review of the backgrounds of these individuals leave the IPP program vulnerable to potential misallocation of funds. We found several instances that call into question DOE`s ability to adequately evaluate IPP project participants` backgrounds before the projects are approved and funded. For example, a National Renewable Energy Laboratory official told us he was confident that a Russian institute involved in a $250,000 IPP project to monitor microorganisms under environmental stress was supporting Soviet- era biological weapons scientists. However, during our visit to the institute in July 2007, the Russian project leader told us that neither he nor his institute was ever involved in biological weapons research. As a result of this meeting, DOE canceled this project on July 31, 2007. DOE`s cancellation letter stated that the information provided during our visit led to this action.
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8.41 The DOE Has Failed to Demonstrate the Success of IPP and Relies on Good Faith Reports MR. ROBERT A ROBINSON; MANAGING DIRECTOR; GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE FDCH Congressional Testimony, "COMBATING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION" 01/23/2008 research.cincinnatilibrary.org:2052/ehost/detail?hid=119&sid=a8115ead-a203-4307-a6d4fee011462d89%40sessionmgr111&vid=4&bdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCxjcGlkJmN1c3R pZD1jaW5jeSZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU%3d#db=tth&AN=32Y1987222496 [SA] DOE relies on ``good-faith`` reporting and does not independently verify employment data it receives. Finally, DOE officials stated that the IPP program metrics are not sufficient to judge the program`s progress in reducing proliferation risks. However, DOE has not updated its metrics or set priorities for the program on the basis of a country-by-country and institute-by-institute evaluation of proliferation risks. 8.42 Inaccurate Findings/Results -XMR. ROBERT A ROBINSON; MANAGING DIRECTOR; GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE FDCH Congressional Testimony, "COMBATING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION" 01/23/2008 research.cincinnatilibrary.org:2052/ehost/detail?hid=119&sid=a8115ead-a203-4307-a6d4fee011462d89%40sessionmgr111&vid=4&bdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCxjcGlkJmN1c3R pZD1jaW5jeSZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU%3d#db=tth&AN=32Y1987222496 [SA] DOE Has Overstated the Number of Jobs Created By the IPP Program. Although a senior DOE official described commercialization as the ``flagship`` of the IPP program, we found that the program`s commercialization achievements have been overstated and are misleading. In its most recent annual report for the IPP program, DOE indicated that 50 projects had evolved to support 32 commercially successful activities. DOE reported that these 32 commercial successes had helped create or support 2,790 new private sector jobs for former weapon scientists in Russia and other countries. In reviewing these projects, we identified several factors that raise concerns over the validity of the IPP program`s reported commercial success and the numbers of scientists employed in private sector jobs. Forexample: -- The annual survey instrument that the U.S. Industry Coalition distributes to collect information on job creation and other commercial successes of IPP projects relies on ``good-faith`` responses from U.S. industry partners and foreign institutes, which are not audited by DOE or the U.S. Industry Coalition. In 9 of the 32 cases, we found that DOE based its job creation claims on estimates or other assumptions. Forexample, an official from a large U.S. company told us that the number of jobs it reported to have helped create was his own rough estimate. -- We could not substantiate many of the jobs reported to have been created in our interviews with the U.S. companies and officials at the Russian and Ukrainian institutes where these commercial activities were reportedly developed. For example, officials from a U.S. company we interviewed claimed that 250 jobs at two institutes in Russia had been created, on the basis of two separate IPP projects. However, during our visit to the Scientific Research Institute of Measuring Systems in Russia to discuss one of these projects, we were told that the project is still under way, manufacturing of the product has not started, and none of the scientists have been reemployed in commercial production of the technology. The IPP program`s long-term performance targets do not accurately reflect the size and nature of the 44 / 71
threat the program is intended to address because DOE is basing the program`s performance measures on outdated information. DOE has established two long- term performance targets for the IPP program to engage 17,000 weapons scientists annually by 2015 in either IPP grants or in private sector jobs resulting from IPP projects, and to create private sector jobs for 11,000 weapons scientists by 2019. However, DOE bases these targets on a 16-year-old, 1991 National Academy of Sciences (NAS) assessment that had estimated approximately 60,000 at-risk WMD experts in Russia and other countries in the former Soviet Union. G) Shift in Program Goals 8.43 When IPP Changed its Course -XSharon Weiner (PhD, political science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; writes about the intersection of organizational politics and U.S. national security policy. Her research on U.S. nonproliferation policy has also appeared in International Security, Political Science Quarterly, The Nonproliferation Review, as well as other journals) "Organizational interest, nuclear weapons scientists, and nonproliferation" December 22, 2009, business.highbeam.com/4436/article-1G1216848515/organizational-interest-nuclear-weapons-scientists [SA] Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) IPP got its start in the early 1990s. As the Soviet Union entered
its final days, the United States began negotiations with Russia and various European governments to create the science centers. Legislative authorization for the Russian center, however, was held up as part of a broader power struggle between the Russian Duma and President Boris Yeltsin. Due to the dismal economic conditions in Russia's core nuclear weapons facilities, this delay was cause for concern. As a stop-gap measure, experts from the U.S. nuclear weapons complex proposed that they pay their Russian counterparts to take part in short-term research contracts. In 1992, Pete Dominici, the New Mexico senator whose state is home to the U.S. nuclear weapons research and design institutes of Los Alamos and Sandia, introduced legislation to fund what would become the IPP program.
Initially, IPP was driven by the desire to help Russian scientists cope with impending poverty and also to get more insight into the problems faced by the Russian nuclear weapons complex. The need to provide income to critical nuclear weapons workers as quickly as possible led the program to concentrate on funding short-term collaborative research projects. As the program became more established, it changed course. IPP continued to provide short-term research contracts. In the longer term, however, the goal became to work with U.S.-based businesses to create permanent non-weapons jobs for former Soviet workers. (1) These job creation efforts required the participation of businesses that were
willing to match U.S. government contributions to the project. The goal was to validate a technology, research service, or product and, in the process, create a relationship between the businesses and the former Soviet workers that would lead to sustainable re-employment for the latter. This long-term strategy also helped satisfy U.S. domestic political concerns that all cooperative work with Russia have an exit strategy and, where possible, use U.S. goods and services.
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8.44 Change Came Without Congressional Authorization (GOOD) By Robert Zarate (Research Fellow Nonproliferation Policy Education Center) "How Should the United States and Russia Collaborate to Reduce Future Nuclear Threats and Proliferation Dangers?" April 19, 2009 (Updated April 22, 2009) http://www.npolicy.org/article_file/20090419-ZarateNTRN_0_310111_0607.pdf [SA] The extent to which some of DoEs NTR/N programs have met or are nearing their goals is illustrated further by the Government Accountability Offices 2007 report on Initiative for Proliferation Prevention activities in Russia. As mentioned above, Congress had authorized DoE funds for IPP to help provide jobs exclusively for former-Soviet nuclear scientists, but GAO found that IPP funds were going beyond their legislative mandates, and being used also to train a new generation of Russian nuclear scientists who had never worked for the U.S.S.R. GAO thus recommended that the DoE develop metrics to graduate Russian institutes from IPP funding 8.45 IPP Objective Changed to One the Program Was Not Built For -XFrederick Rick Kellett[s experience over the past decade as the Regional Director of a management consulting operation focused on local entrepreneurs in Central Asia and more recently as the Executive Vice President of Byelocorp Scientific, Inc. (BSI) makes him uniquely suited to direct this initiative. BSI is one of the few western companies to have successfully utilized former Soviet weapons research and manufacturing capabilities to create commercially viable civilian enterprises. One effort brought together a team of Belarusian and American scientists and engineers to develop a revolutionary optics finishing technology, which is now being used by every major optics manufacturer in the world. The other restructured a Kazakhstani weapons factory to produce large industrial process equipment for the regions growing oil business. Importantly, the latter also became the key supplier of equipment and packaging for spent nuclear fuel during the shutdown of the BN-350 reactor under a DoE nonproliferation initiative. Rick joined the Center in late 2005 as a Senior Business Fellow with the Cooperative Nonproliferation Program.], The Henry L. Stimson Center[is a nonprofit, nonpartisan institution devoted to enhancing international peace and security through a unique combination of rigorous analysis and outreach.], March 2007, USIC and the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention: A Survey of Companies Doing Business in the Former Soviet Union, Report No. 6, http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/USICPhaseI.pdf [MH] Unfortunately, from this respondents point of view, the program lacks a clear definition of success. Program goals still vary from Lab to Lab. Some are more interested in the research in its own right or the relationships they have developed with scientists at the FSU institutes, while others are much more focused on commercialization and a few put the highest priority on creating sustainable employment. Overall, the program has drifted into a more commercially focused objective, but it has not been modified to support this change. This means that it does not benefit as much as it might from the innovations and insights of the various participants and is less successful at achieving its ultimate mission.
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Matthew Hamilton, Scott Alford and Josh Kreifels H) IPP Expansion
8.46 IPP Expansion Came Without a Congressional Mandate (GOOD) Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Every and Commerce, House of Representatives, Government Accountability Office, Statement of Robert A. Robinson[Managing Director Natural Resources and Environment], DOE Needs to Reassess Its Program to Assist Weapons Scientists in Russia and Other Countries, January 23, 3008, GAO-08434T, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi? dbname=110_house_hearings&docid=f:47234.pdf [MH] DOE has expanded the IPP program's efforts into these new areas without a clear mandate from the Congress and has suspended parts of its IPP program guidance for implementing projects in these new areas. Specifically: Although DOE briefed the Congress on its plans, DOE officials told us that they began efforts in Iraq and Libya without explicit congressional authorization to expand the program outside of the former Soviet Union. In contrast, other U.S. nonproliferation programs, such as the Department of
Defense's Cooperative Threat Reduction program, sought and received explicit congressional authorization before expanding their activities of the former Soviet Union.
8.47 DOE Not Applying Funding Caps to Expansion Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Every and Commerce, House of Representatives, Government Accountability Office, Statement of Robert A. Robinson[Managing Director Natural Resources and Environment], DOE Needs to Reassess Its Program to Assist Weapons Scientists in Russia and Other Countries, January 23, 3008, GAO-08434T, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi? dbname=110_house_hearings&docid=f:47234.pdf [MH] In Libya, DOE is deviating from IPP program guidance and its standard practice of limiting the amount of IPP program funds spent at DOE's national laboratories for project oversight to not more than 35 percent of total expenditures.
8.48 DOE Suspending Aspects of IPP For the Sake of Expansion Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Every and Commerce, House of Representatives, Government Accountability Office, Statement of Robert A. Robinson[Managing Director Natural Resources and Environment], DOE Needs to Reassess Its Program to Assist Weapons Scientists in Russia and Other Countries, January 23, 3008, GAO-08434T, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi? dbname=110_house_hearings&docid=f:47234.pdf [MH] Regarding efforts to support GNEP, DOE has suspended part of the IPP program's guidance that requires a U.S. industry partner's participation, which is intended to ensure IPP projects' commercial potential. 47 / 71
8.49 IPP Expansion Was DOE's Way of Justifying the Program's Existence Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Every and Commerce, House of Representatives, Government Accountability Office, Statement of Robert A. Robinson[Managing Director Natural Resources and Environment], DOE Needs to Reassess Its Program to Assist Weapons Scientists in Russia and Other Countries, January 23, 3008, GAO-08434T, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi? dbname=110_house_hearings&docid=f:47234.pdf [MH] DOE recently expanded its scientist assistance efforts on two fronts: DOE began providing assistance to scientists in Iraq and Libya, and, through the IPP program, is working to develop IPP projects that support GNEP. These new directions represents a significant departure from the IPP program's traditional focus on the former Soviet Union. According to a senior DOE official, the expansion of the program's scope was undertaken as a way to maintain its relevance as a nonproliferation program. Impact: DOE itself realized the irrelevance of IPP in Russia, and needed to move onto other countries in order to justify IPP in our current day and age. 8.50 DOE is Expanding IPP Beyond its Authority and Need to Retain IPPs Relevance -XMR. ROBERT A ROBINSON; MANAGING DIRECTOR; GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE FDCH Congressional Testimony, "COMBATING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION" 01/23/2008 research.cincinnatilibrary.org:2052/ehost/detail?hid=119&sid=a8115ead-a203-4307-a6d4fee011462d89%40sessionmgr111&vid=4&bdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCxjcGlkJmN1c3R pZD1jaW5jeSZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU%3d#db=tth&AN=32Y1987222496 [SA] Furthermore, DOE has recently expanded the program to include new countries and areas. According to a senior DOE official, this expansion was undertaken as a way to maintain the IPP program`s relevance as a nonproliferation program. Specifically, DOE recently began providing assistance to scientists in Iraq and Libya and, through the IPP program, is working to develop projects that support the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) a DOE-led international effort to expand the use of civilian nuclear power. DOE expanded the program`s efforts without a clear mandate from the Congress and suspended parts of its IPP program guidance for projects in these new areas.
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Matthew Hamilton, Scott Alford and Josh Kreifels I) The International Science and Technology Center
8.51 Russia Closing It's Leg of ITSC Douglas Birch, Associated Press[ is the essential global news network, delivering fast, unbiased news from every corner of the world to all media platforms and formats. On any given day, more than half the worlds population sees news from the AP. Founded in 1846, the AP today is one of the largest and most trusted sources of independent newsgathering. The AP considers itself to be the backbone of the worlds information system, serving thousands of daily newspaper, radio, television, and online customers with coverage in text, photos, graphics, audio and video.], April 20, 2011, Russia abandons $1B Western aid to weapons program, http://hosted2.ap.org/APDEFAULT/3d281c11a96b4ad082fe88aa0db04305/Article_2011-04-20-USRussia-Weapons%20Aid/id-565d8b7405c94f01a6854e263cb5e04d [MH] WASHINGTON (AP) Russia is pulling out of a program that poured $1 billion from the U.S. government and other foreign donors into the research labs that built the Soviet Union's vast arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. Officials with the International Science and Technology Center are negotiating to close the Moscow headquarters of the organization, which was formed in 1994, three years after the Soviet Union collapsed. The center gave tens of thousands of experts in nuclear, chemical and biological warfare the chance to engage in civilian research and work with colleagues from the U.S. and other nations that once stood on the other side of the Iron Curtain. The program helped pay the salaries of Russian weapons scientists who otherwise might have sold their services to rogue regimes or terrorists after the Cold War, but it long outlived the crisis that inspired its creation. Russia came to regard the intergovernmental program as obsolete as the country's economy surged over the past decade. 8.52 Russia Doesn't Need it Anymore Douglas Birch, Associated Press[ is the essential global news network, delivering fast, unbiased news from every corner of the world to all media platforms and formats. On any given day, more than half the worlds population sees news from the AP. Founded in 1846, the AP today is one of the largest and most trusted sources of independent newsgathering. The AP considers itself to be the backbone of the worlds information system, serving thousands of daily newspaper, radio, television, and online customers with coverage in text, photos, graphics, audio and video.], April 20, 2011, Russia abandons $1B Western aid to weapons program, http://hosted2.ap.org/APDEFAULT/3d281c11a96b4ad082fe88aa0db04305/Article_2011-04-20-USRussia-Weapons%20Aid/id-565d8b7405c94f01a6854e263cb5e04d [MH] Russia's U.S. ambassador, Sergey Kislyak, who negotiated the establishment of the center, told The Associated Press that his country no longer needs it. "The mission has been accomplished," he said. "It is a little bit outdated."
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8.52 Russia Doesn't Want These Programs Douglas Birch, Associated Press[ is the essential global news network, delivering fast, unbiased news from every corner of the world to all media platforms and formats. On any given day, more than half the worlds population sees news from the AP. Founded in 1846, the AP today is one of the largest and most trusted sources of independent newsgathering. The AP considers itself to be the backbone of the worlds information system, serving thousands of daily newspaper, radio, television, and online customers with coverage in text, photos, graphics, audio and video.], April 20, 2011, Russia abandons $1B Western aid to weapons program, http://hosted2.ap.org/APDEFAULT/3d281c11a96b4ad082fe88aa0db04305/Article_2011-04-20-USRussia-Weapons%20Aid/id-565d8b7405c94f01a6854e263cb5e04d [MH] Foreign aid programs helped keep Russia afloat as it lurched from crisis to crisis in the 1990s. But the Kremlin has been phasing these programs out in recent years, saying in effect it no longer needs to be treated as a charity case. 8.53 Beneficial Technologies Came About Because of This Program Douglas Birch, Associated Press[ is the essential global news network, delivering fast, unbiased news from every corner of the world to all media platforms and formats. On any given day, more than half the worlds population sees news from the AP. Founded in 1846, the AP today is one of the largest and most trusted sources of independent newsgathering. The AP considers itself to be the backbone of the worlds information system, serving thousands of daily newspaper, radio, television, and online customers with coverage in text, photos, graphics, audio and video.], April 20, 2011, Russia abandons $1B Western aid to weapons program, http://hosted2.ap.org/APDEFAULT/3d281c11a96b4ad082fe88aa0db04305/Article_2011-04-20-USRussia-Weapons%20Aid/id-565d8b7405c94f01a6854e263cb5e04d [MH] [Brackets added] [The International Science and Technology Center's director, Adriaan]Van der Meer said the center will continue working in Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus and several Central Asian states, where it runs about $95 million worth of projects. Over the past 17 years, the center has tracked space debris, developed fusion power, searched for vaccines against deadly diseases like Ebola and much more. Impact: And Russia STILL didn't want it.
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8.54 Russia Doesn't Need or Want Aid Anymore Douglas Birch, Associated Press[ is the essential global news network, delivering fast, unbiased news from every corner of the world to all media platforms and formats. On any given day, more than half the worlds population sees news from the AP. Founded in 1846, the AP today is one of the largest and most trusted sources of independent newsgathering. The AP considers itself to be the backbone of the worlds information system, serving thousands of daily newspaper, radio, television, and online customers with coverage in text, photos, graphics, audio and video.], April 20, 2011, Russia abandons $1B Western aid to weapons program, http://hosted2.ap.org/APDEFAULT/3d281c11a96b4ad082fe88aa0db04305/Article_2011-04-20-USRussia-Weapons%20Aid/id-565d8b7405c94f01a6854e263cb5e04d [MH] Today Russia pumps more oil than Saudi Arabia, holds almost $500 billion in currency reserves and by one measure has the world's seventh-largest economy. Increasingly, the Russian government has regarded foreign aid as an embarrassing reminder of its past dependence on aid. But some arms control experts said Russia's decision may also have been motivated by security concerns. 8.55 ISTC Funding Sources(Different than IPP) Douglas Birch, Associated Press[ is the essential global news network, delivering fast, unbiased news from every corner of the world to all media platforms and formats. On any given day, more than half the worlds population sees news from the AP. Founded in 1846, the AP today is one of the largest and most trusted sources of independent newsgathering. The AP considers itself to be the backbone of the worlds information system, serving thousands of daily newspaper, radio, television, and online customers with coverage in text, photos, graphics, audio and video.], April 20, 2011, Russia abandons $1B Western aid to weapons program, http://hosted2.ap.org/APDEFAULT/3d281c11a96b4ad082fe88aa0db04305/Article_2011-04-20-USRussia-Weapons%20Aid/id-565d8b7405c94f01a6854e263cb5e04d [MH] The U.S. contributes about one-third of the money for the center's projects, van der Meer said, while the European Union pays for another third, and Canada, Norway, Japan and South Korea the rest.
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8.56 Russia Saw the Security Risks of Scientists From Different Countries Working Together Douglas Birch, Associated Press[ is the essential global news network, delivering fast, unbiased news from every corner of the world to all media platforms and formats. On any given day, more than half the worlds population sees news from the AP. Founded in 1846, the AP today is one of the largest and most trusted sources of independent newsgathering. The AP considers itself to be the backbone of the worlds information system, serving thousands of daily newspaper, radio, television, and online customers with coverage in text, photos, graphics, audio and video.], April 20, 2011, Russia abandons $1B Western aid to weapons program, http://hosted2.ap.org/APDEFAULT/3d281c11a96b4ad082fe88aa0db04305/Article_2011-04-20-USRussia-Weapons%20Aid/id-565d8b7405c94f01a6854e263cb5e04d [MH] Today Russia pumps more oil than Saudi Arabia, holds almost $500 billion in currency reserves and by one measure has the world's seventh-largest economy. Increasingly, the Russian government has regarded foreign aid as an embarrassing reminder of its past dependence on aid. But some arms control experts said Russia's decision may also have been motivated by security concerns. Retired U.S. Army Brig. Gen. Kevin Ryan, executive director for research at the Belfer Center, said that both Russia's Federal Security Service and the FBI have long worried that Russian and U.S. weapons scientists working together on peaceful projects might inadvertently spill state secrets. "That's the risk for everybody, but they consider it a higher risk than we do," Ryan said. 8.57 Benefits May Have Been Outweighed by Funded Weapons Institutes Douglas Birch, Associated Press[ is the essential global news network, delivering fast, unbiased news from every corner of the world to all media platforms and formats. On any given day, more than half the worlds population sees news from the AP. Founded in 1846, the AP today is one of the largest and most trusted sources of independent newsgathering. The AP considers itself to be the backbone of the worlds information system, serving thousands of daily newspaper, radio, television, and online customers with coverage in text, photos, graphics, audio and video.], April 20, 2011, Russia abandons $1B Western aid to weapons program, http://hosted2.ap.org/APDEFAULT/3d281c11a96b4ad082fe88aa0db04305/Article_2011-04-20-USRussia-Weapons%20Aid/id-565d8b7405c94f01a6854e263cb5e04d [MH] Henry Sokolski, who once served as the Pentagon's deputy for nonproliferation policy and is now director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, a Washington-based nonprofit, said the International Science and Technology Center leaves a mixed legacy. "Whatever good it might have done to deflect weapons activities, it probably undid by supporting these institutes, which are weapons institutes," he said. Impact: The same logic can be applied to IPP seeing that they are two very similar programs.
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8.58 Russia Still Wary of U.S. Cooperation and Intentions Douglas Birch, Associated Press[ is the essential global news network, delivering fast, unbiased news from every corner of the world to all media platforms and formats. On any given day, more than half the worlds population sees news from the AP. Founded in 1846, the AP today is one of the largest and most trusted sources of independent newsgathering. The AP considers itself to be the backbone of the worlds information system, serving thousands of daily newspaper, radio, television, and online customers with coverage in text, photos, graphics, audio and video.], April 20, 2011, Russia abandons $1B Western aid to weapons program, http://hosted2.ap.org/APDEFAULT/3d281c11a96b4ad082fe88aa0db04305/Article_2011-04-20-USRussia-Weapons%20Aid/id-565d8b7405c94f01a6854e263cb5e04d [MH] Under the Obama administration's reset of ties with Russia, Moscow has agreed to let the U.S. ship military supplies to Afghanistan through its territory, supported tough new U.N. sanctions against Iran and signed the New START treaty reducing the ceiling on both countries' nuclear arsenals. Despite these improvements, U.S. intelligence officials say Russia remains wary of U.S. intentions. "Russian military programs are driven largely by Moscow's perception that the United States and NATO are Russia's principal strategic challenges and greatest potential threat," James Clapper, director of national intelligence, told Congress in March. J) Other 8.5 Survey of Scientists That Would Consider Working For a Rogue Nation - XBy Fred Weir and Mark Clayton, Christian Science Monitor[is an international news organization that delivers thoughtful, global coverage via its website, weekly magazine, daily news briefing, email newsletters, and mobile site.], September 20, 2006, US-Russia Effort to Contain Nuclear Experts Fades, http://216.119.87.134/Projects/WMD%20Expertise%20Redirection %20Project/920200684541AM.html [MH] [Brackets added] A study last year[2005] by the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology surveyed the attitudes of 602 Russian nuclear, biological, and chemical WMD scientists. The study found that the mean income for such scientists was about $110 a month, and that 21 percent were willing to move to a "rogue nation" to work. As for the impact of assistance programs like NCI, the survey found 12 percent of those with grant funding would consider work in a rogue state, versus 28 percent without funding.
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8.5 IPP Can't Learn, Because it Does Not Track Consequences of Projects Frederick Rick Kellett[s experience over the past decade as the Regional Director of a management consulting operation focused on local entrepreneurs in Central Asia and more recently as the Executive Vice President of Byelocorp Scientific, Inc. (BSI) makes him uniquely suited to direct this initiative. BSI is one of the few western companies to have successfully utilized former Soviet weapons research and manufacturing capabilities to create commercially viable civilian enterprises. One effort brought together a team of Belarusian and American scientists and engineers to develop a revolutionary optics finishing technology, which is now being used by every major optics manufacturer in the world. The other restructured a Kazakhstani weapons factory to produce large industrial process equipment for the regions growing oil business. Importantly, the latter also became the key supplier of equipment and packaging for spent nuclear fuel during the shutdown of the BN-350 reactor under a DoE nonproliferation initiative. Rick joined the Center in late 2005 as a Senior Business Fellow with the Cooperative Nonproliferation Program.], The Henry L. Stimson Center[is a nonprofit, nonpartisan institution devoted to enhancing international peace and security through a unique combination of rigorous analysis and outreach.], March 2007, USIC and the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention: A Survey of Companies Doing Business in the Former Soviet Union, Report No. 6, http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/USICPhaseI.pdf [MH] [Brackets added] The last two sentences are not contradictory but arise from the respondents experience with projects that did not result in commercialization, but which did ultimately lead to sustainable employment that the scientists involved created for themselves as a result of the lessons they learned and connections they made. His point is that it is important to have both a clear definition of success as well as a real measure of it relative to program goals. Because IPP does not track the consequences of projects in the FSU it misses opportunities to learn more lessons and better assess the results and overall value of the program.
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8.5 Russia Isn't Pitching in, and it Should (GOOD) Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Energy and Commerce House of Representatives, 100th Congress, First Session, January 23, 2008, COMBATING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGYS INITIATIVES FOR PROLIFERATION PREVENTION (IPP) PROGRAM, Serial No. 11082, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_house_hearings&docid=f:47234.pdf [MH] [OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN SHIMKUS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS:] Who is the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program intended to benefit and why isnt Russia participating? Does Russia share the same concerns about the threat of terrorism and non-proliferation concerns? If they do, then it is time for them to contribute some money to help solve the nonproliferation threat. Where is the United States return on investment? In coordination with the Energy Information Administration Committee, Minority staff has calculated that over just the past 3 years the United States has imported 150 million barrels of oil from Russia at a total of $8.68 billion and we have imported 49 billion barrels of fuel oil at a total price of $2.35 billion. This $11 billion in wealth transferred from the United States to Russia is enormous and it is one of the reasons Russia is running a budget surplus. Clearly Russia can afford to participate in the IPP program. In light of Russias growing wealth, I think it is clear the Russian government could step up to the plate and help address the proliferation threat posed by its own scientists. If we decide to continue the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program into the future, DOE must first demonstrate that it has corrected serious management problems identified by GAO. If DOE demonstrates that the program is salvageable, the second step would be to get a cost-share commitment from the Russian government before we initiate any new Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program projects at Russian institutes.
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9. AT: Lack of Funding Reason for Problems

9.1 Funding Has Carried Over in the Past Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Every and Commerce, House of Representatives, Government Accountability Office, Statement of Robert A. Robinson[Managing Director Natural Resources and Environment], DOE Needs to Reassess Its Program to Assist Weapons Scientists in Russia and Other Countries, January 23, 3008, GAO-08434T, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi? dbname=110_house_hearings&docid=f:47234.pdf [MH] Since fiscal year 1994, DOE has spent about $309 million to implement the IPP program but has annually carried over large balances of unspent program funds. Specifically, in every fiscal year from 1998 through 2007, DOE carried over unspent funds in excess of the amount that the Congress provided for the program in those fiscal years. For example, as of September 2007, DOE had carried over about $30 million in unspent funds $2 million more than the $28 million that the Congress had appropriated for the IPP program in fiscal year 2007. In fact, for 3 fiscal years 2003 through 2005 the amount of unspent funds was more than double the amount that Congress appropriated for the program in those fiscal years, although the total amount of unspent funds has been declining since its peak in 2003. 9.2 Unspent Funds Carry Over From Year to Year MR. ROBERT A ROBINSON; MANAGING DIRECTOR; GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE FDCH Congressional Testimony, "COMBATING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION" 01/23/2008 research.cincinnatilibrary.org:2052/ehost/detail?hid=119&sid=a8115ead-a203-4307-a6d4fee011462d89%40sessionmgr111&vid=4&bdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCxjcGlkJmN1c3R pZD1jaW5jeSZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU%3d#db=tth&AN=32Y1987222496 [SA] Regarding its management of IPP program funding, DOE has carried over unspent funds in excess of the amount that the Congress provided for the IPP program in every fiscal year since 1998. Two main factors have contributed to this recurring problem: (1) lengthy and multilayered review and approval processes by DOE and its contractors for paying former Soviet weapons scientists for IPP-related work and (2) long delays in implementing some IPP projects. DOE officials told us they are attempting to improve the program`s financial oversight by developing a new program management system
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10. IPP Solvency

10.1 Laundry List of DOS Graduation Criteria (Don't read entire card) Richard Stratford [the Director of the Office of Nuclear Energy Affairs in the Bureau of Nonproliferation, U. S. Department of State; U.S. Head of Delegation to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the NSGs Dual-Use Regime, and to the NPT Exporters Committee; J.D.], COMBATING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGYS INITIATIVES FOR PROLIFERATION PREVENTION (IPP) PROGRAM, HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION, JANUARY 23, 2008, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg47234/pdf/CHRG110hhrg47234.pdf [Ethos] Question: What criteria does the Department of State use in selecting and graduating institutes from the program? Answer: Institutes are selected to be on the priority list for graduation based on an interagency review process. We started our graduation process with a list of 200 institutes which we believe need to become financially self-sustainable in order to decrease proliferation risk associated with financial instability. The U.S. considers and balances a variety of factors relating to an institutes potential for financial self-sustainability. Examples of the types of factors utilized by the U.S. in making a determination about where an institute should fall in the graduation continuum are: Ability to secure grant funding from international, non-Science Centers sources, Possession of equipment/training/international certifications required to secure outside funding or, alternatively, the ability to meet such requirements through short-term, intensive training or equipment provision, Staff ability to write competitive grant proposals for international funding bodies, Ability to publish in international scientific journals, Ability to develop a financial plan for long-term sustainability, Ability to pay staff salaries regularly from host Government or outside (non- Science Centers) funding sources, Capability of leveraging current or past Science Centers funding to increase host Government interest and investment in the institute, Ability of institute to provide international access and conduct business in an open, transparent manner, Ability to engage in contract research and/or commercial production (Note: For many research institutes in the former Soviet Union, the Department of State does not expect commercial success to be the most viable self-sustainability solution.), Understanding of intellectual property concerns/requirements, Designation of staff to handle intellectual property issues for the institute as appropriate, Number of international patents/capability of filing records of invention. Additional factors that may be taken into account when determining an institutes graduation status: Number of former weapons experts still employed at the institute, Security/location of materials at an institute that could be vulnerable to rogue state/terrorist use, Proximity of an institute to a region with terrorist activity.
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Matthew Hamilton, Scott Alford and Josh Kreifels 10.2 Graduated Institutes Are Still Being Funded by IPP
Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Every and Commerce, House of Representatives, Government Accountability Office, Statement of Robert A. Robinson[Managing Director
Natural Resources and Environment], DOE Needs to Reassess Its Program to Assist Weapons Scientists in Russia and Other Countries, January 23, 3008, GAO-08-434T, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_house_hearings&docid=f:47234.pdf [MH]
DOE has not developed criteria to determine when scientists, institutes, or countries should be graduated from the IPP program, and DOE officials believe that there is a continued need to engage Russian Scientists. In contrast, State has assessed institutes and developed a strategy using a range of factors, such as the institutes ability to pay salaries regularly and to attract external funding to graduate certain institutes from its Science Centers program. We found that DOE is
currently supporting 35 IPP projects at 17 Russian and Ukrainian Institutes that State considers to already be graduated from its Science Center program and, therefore, no longer in need of U.S. assistance.
11. AT: Nuclear Cooperation Extended 7 Years

11.1 Only MPC&A Extension National Nuclear Security Administration[Established by Congress in 2000, NNSA is a semi-autonomous agency
within the U.S. Department of Energy responsible for enhancing national security through the military application of nuclear science in the nations national security enterprise. NNSA maintains and enhances the safety, security, reliability, and performance of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile without nuclear testing; reduces the global danger from weapons of mass destruction; provides the U.S. Navy with safe and effective nuclear propulsion; and responds to nuclear and radiological emergencies in the U.S. and abroad.], March 24, 2011, U.S., Russia Agree to Extend Nuclear
Security Cooperation, http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/pressreleases/rost32411 [MH] WASHINGTON, D.C. Deputy Secretary of Energy Daniel Poneman today announced the signing of an agreement to extend nuclear security cooperation between the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the Federal Environmental, Industrial and Nuclear Supervision Service of Russia (Rostechnadzor) for an additional seven years.
Speaking at the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Washington, Deputy Secretary Poneman announced the agreement, which will allow NNSA to continue work with Rostechnadzor to enhance its nuclear security regulations and inspection and training capabilities. The extension of this agreement, originally signed in 1995, is an important part of the strong bilateral partnership in implementing the nuclear security agenda outlined by President Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. The United States and Russia remain committed partners in improving global nuclear security, combating weapons proliferation, and preventing dangerous nuclear equipment and materials from falling into the wrong hands," Deputy Secretary of Energy Daniel Poneman. This agreement, and NNSAs ongoing work in Russia, are vital to reducing international nuclear threats and implementing President Obama's ambitious nuclear security agenda.
As the Russian nuclear regulatory authority for the Russian Federation, Rostechnadzor is responsible for oversight of nuclear material protection, control and accounting (MPC&A) operations at Russian nuclear facilities. Since 1995 NNSA and Rostechnadzor have worked to strengthen Russias nuclear security regulations
and to enhance Rostechnadzors MPC&A inspection and training capabilities.
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12. IPP 's Progress

12.1 50,000-60,000 Scientists to Redirect The Stimson Center[is a nonprofit, nonpartisan institution devoted to enhancing international peace and security through a unique combination of rigorous analysis and outreach.], Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP), Last updated June 1, 2007, http://www.stimson.org/initiatives-forproliferation-prevention-ipp-/ [MH] Estimates of the Soviet nuclear workforce ranged from 50,000 to 60,000. Most of those individuals needed new work and better pay after the Soviet Union crumbled. 12.2 Redirected Over 2,800 Scientists as of 2007 The Stimson Center[is a nonprofit, nonpartisan institution devoted to enhancing international peace and security through a unique combination of rigorous analysis and outreach.], Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP), Last updated June 1, 2007, http://www.stimson.org/initiatives-forproliferation-prevention-ipp-/ [MH] [Brackets added] Working for twelve years[as of 2007], IPP has redirected over 2,800 weapons scientists into sustainable, peaceful employment. 12.3 10,000 Employed in the Whole Program Philip H. Hemberger [Research Associate, Los Alamos National Laboratory], The Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention Program: Goals, Projects, and Opportunities, published by the Los Alamos National Laboratory, 2001, (LA-UR-01-5645), http://www.osti.gov/bridge/product.biblio.jsp? osti_id=975804 [JS] "To date, the IPP program has engaged over 10,000 experts in the areas of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and missile development at more than 170 institutes in Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus.
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12.4 Goal to Employ 17,000 MR. ROBERT A ROBINSON; MANAGING DIRECTOR; GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE FDCH Congressional Testimony, "COMBATING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION" 01/23/2008 research.cincinnatilibrary.org:2052/ehost/detail?hid=119&sid=a8115ead-a203-4307-a6d4fee011462d89%40sessionmgr111&vid=4&bdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCxjcGlkJmN1c3R pZD1jaW5jeSZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU%3d#db=tth&AN=32Y1987222496 [SA] DOE has not developed an exit strategy for the IPP program, and it is unclear when the department expects the program to have completed its mission. DOE officials told us in September 2007 that they do not believe that the program needs an exit strategy. However, they acknowledged that the program`s long-term goal of employing 17,000 WMD scientists in Russia and other countries does not represent an exit strategy. DOE has not developed criteria to determine when scientists, institutes, or countries should be ``graduated`` from the IPP program, and DOE officials believe that there is a continued need to engage Russian scientists. In contrast, State has assessed institutes and developed a strategy using a range of factors, such as the institute`s ability to pay salaries regularly and to attract external funding to graduate certain institutes from its Science Centers program.
13. Taxes
13.1 IPP Used to Pay Russian Taxes Government Accountability Office, National Security and International Affairs Division, The Honorable Pat Roberts, Chairman, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, Committee on Armed Servies, United States Senate April 28, 2000, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Some U.S. Assistance to Redirect Russian Scientists Taxed by Russia, B-285198, http://archive.gao.gov/f0302/163559.pdf [MH] Some of the assistance provided to support the two key U.S. nonproliferation programs[NCI and the Cooperative Grants Program] that fund collaborative research projects involving former Soviet weapons scientists has been used directly and indirectly to pay Russian taxes. For example, the Science Center and at least one Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention funded institute paid directly valueadded taxes on equipment purchased in Russia, while the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program paid taxes indirectly through payroll and income taxes on its project participants. According to a 1998 Department of Energy report, a survey of Russian institutes that received Initiatives for Proliferation prevention projects funds from the Sandia National Laboratories indicated that as much as one-half to three-quarters of U.S. assistance received by the Russian institutes were used to pay various payroll and income taxes. Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program officials could not provide quantifiable data on the total amount of taxes paid by Russian institutes that have received their assistance; however, they have taken corrective action to eliminate the payment of income and payroll taxes. The Energy Department contracted with a U.S.-based tax-exempt organization to provide direct tax-free payments to participating Russian scientists and other staff in November 1999.
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13.2 IPP is a Commodity and Shouldn't be Taxed Government Accountability Office, National Security and International Affairs Division, The Honorable Pat Roberts, Chairman, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, Committee on Armed Servies, United States Senate April 28, 2000, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Some U.S. Assistance to Redirect Russian Scientists Taxed by Russia, B-285198, http://archive.gao.gov/f0302/163559.pdf [MH] The Department of Energys Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program assistance has been used to supplement Russian scientists salaries, which have sometimes been subject to Russian income and payroll taxes. While a 1992 bilateral agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation states that commodities, supplies, or property provided or utilized in connection with the U.S. assistance programs should be tax free, it does not specifically address the issue of income or payroll taxes for Russian citizens receiving U.S. assistance. Nonetheless, Energy and State Department officials told us that they view the assistance funds provided to the former Soviet weapons scientists as a commodity that should be exempt from taxes. 13.3 Scientists' Salaries Significantly Cut Because of Tax Government Accountability Office, National Security and International Affairs Division, The Honorable Pat Roberts, Chairman, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, Committee on Armed Servies, United States Senate April 28, 2000, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Some U.S. Assistance to Redirect Russian Scientists Taxed by Russia, B-285198, http://archive.gao.gov/f0302/163559.pdf [MH] During 1994-99. the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program provided contracts to former Soviet institutes rather than to the individual scientists, with the understanding that the Institutes would produce specified deliverables such as hardware, software, data, or reports and pay their scientists. A 1998 Energy Department report referred to a survey by Sandia National Laboratories of institutes that received assistance for Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention research projects. In April 2000, the author of the report told us that the taxation information included in the report was based on responses from three institutes-- Sarov (formerly Arzamas16), Snezhinsk (formerly Chelyabinsk-70), and the Kurchatov Institute. She added that these institutes were key Russian nuclear facilities that receive a large portion of the program funds. These institutes indicated that income taxes and payroll deductions, such as pension and medical fund costs, consumed as much as 53 to 76 percent of the funds intended for the scientists salaries. The institutes did not provide quantifiable data on the total amount of taxes paid.
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13.4 As of 2000 IPP is Exempt From These Taxes Government Accountability Office, National Security and International Affairs Division, The Honorable Pat Roberts, Chairman, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, Committee on Armed Servies, United States Senate April 28, 2000, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Some U.S. Assistance to Redirect Russian Scientists Taxed by Russia, B-285198, http://archive.gao.gov/f0302/163559.pdf [MH] To address taxation of the Initiative for Proliferation Prevention programs assistance, Congress included a provision in the fiscal year 2000 National Defense Authorization Act that prohibits the Energy Department from using Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program funds to pay taxes or customs duties levied by the Russian government. In November 1999, following this
legislation, Energy Department officials contracted with the U.S. Civilian Research and Development Foundation, a U.S. nonprofit organization, to provide tax-exempt payments directly into the Russian project participants bank accounts. The Russian Ministry of Finance and the State Tax Service have recognized the Foundation as a charitable organization that may provide tax-exempt assistance to Russian entities. The Foundation conducted a pilot project at the State Research Institute of Virology and Biotechnology (Vector) in Koltsovo, Russia, which was completed in November 1999. During the pilot, the Foundation provided tax-free payments to about 50 Vector staff participating in an Initiative for Proliferation Prevention project. During our December 1999 visit to Koltsovo, we interviewed several of the project participants, who reported that they had received their payment free of taxes, which increased their take home pay by as much as 40 percent. The scientists noted, however, that they had to go to the bank in Novosibirsk (about 18 miles away) to receive the money and redeposit it into their personal accounts. Department of Energy and Foundation officials told us that they ultimately plan to establish individual bank accounts for all participants. We did not assess the Foundations work at other institutes and therefore cannot comment as to whether the taxation issue has been effectively resolved for all institutes receiving Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program assistance.
14. Russia is Motivated

14.1 Russia Finding Jobs For Excess Workers Sharon Weiner, PhD in Political Science, Published in the Political Science Quarterly, Organizational interest, nuclear weapons scientists, and nonproliferation, December 2009, http://business.highbeam.com/4436/article-1G1-216848515/organizational-interest-nuclear-weaponsscientists [JK] Over time, Russian concerns about nuclear tourism became increasingly difficult to assuage because of the lack of job creation. The Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy and several key weapons institutes were committed to finding civilian jobs for excess workers. NCI, in particular, promised some 30,000 jobs in Russia's nuclear cities. (41) Although less than 2,000 total were created in the cities of Sarov, Snezhinsk, and Zheleznogorsk, the program proposed expanding to other cities. IPP, too, continued to ask for access to facilities, even though its efforts resulted in less than 3,000 jobs over more than a decade of collaboration.
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14.2 Russia Destroyed Huge Amounts of Old Chemical Weapons (GOOD) UPI[Since 1907, United Press International (UPI) has been a leading provider of critical information to media outlets, businesses, governments and researchers worldwide. UPI is a global operation with offices in Beirut, Hong Kong, London, Santiago, Seoul and Tokyo. Our headquarters is located in downtown Washington, DC, surrounded by major international policy-making governmental and nongovernmental organizations.], September 22, 2010, Russia destroys chemical weapons stockpiles, http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2010/09/22/Russia-destroys-chemical-weaponsstockpiles/UPI-19201285175654/ [MH] MOSCOW, Sept. 22 (UPI) -- The Russian Federation has destroyed 19,300 tons of Soviet-era chemical weapons stockpiles. Minpromtorg head Viktor Kholstov presented a report on the ongoing chemical weapons elimination program to a meeting of the Federation Council Committee on Defense and Security, Komsomol'skaia Pravda reported. Kholstov told committee members that the destroyed weapons represent 48.3 percent of Russia's remaining existing stockpiles, adding, "It means that we fully complied with the third stage of target dates for the destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons. The main source of financing for the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles -- is the federal budget." 14.3 Russia Destroying Chemical Weapons in Phases Since 2003 (GOOD) UPI[Since 1907, United Press International (UPI) has been a leading provider of critical information to media outlets, businesses, governments and researchers worldwide. UPI is a global operation with offices in Beirut, Hong Kong, London, Santiago, Seoul and Tokyo. Our headquarters is located in downtown Washington, DC, surrounded by major international policy-making governmental and nongovernmental organizations.], September 22, 2010, Russia destroys chemical weapons stockpiles, http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2010/09/22/Russia-destroys-chemical-weaponsstockpiles/UPI-19201285175654/ [MH] [Brackets added] [Minpromtorg head Viktor]Kholstov said that when the first stage of the destruction was completed April 29, 2003, the amount of destroyed ammunition was 400 tons, with an additional 8,000 tons eliminated up to April 2007. Under the third phase of the program, 18,000 tons, or 45 percent of all remaining stocks were to be destroyed.
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14.4 Russia's Budget for Chemical Weapon Destruction UPI[Since 1907, United Press International (UPI) has been a leading provider of critical information to media outlets, businesses, governments and researchers worldwide. UPI is a global operation with offices in Beirut, Hong Kong, London, Santiago, Seoul and Tokyo. Our headquarters is located in downtown Washington, DC, surrounded by major international policy-making governmental and nongovernmental organizations.], September 22, 2010, Russia destroys chemical weapons stockpiles, http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2010/09/22/Russia-destroys-chemical-weaponsstockpiles/UPI-19201285175654/ [MH] [Brackets added] In the current year[2010] the Russian government has budgeted $645 million for the destruction of the weaponry. 14.5 Russia Realizes Threat Posed by Old Weapons Reuters[the worlds leading source of intelligent information for businesses and professionals.], Russia says terrorists seeking nuclear materials, June 2, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/06/02/us-russia-security-nuclear-idUSTRE6512RQ20100602 [MH] [Brackets added] (Reuters) - The chief of Russia's state security service said on Wednesday that terrorists were seeking access to nuclear materials across the former Soviet Union, Russian news agencies reported. Alexander Bortnikov, the chief of the FSB, the main successor to the Soviet-era KGB, gave no further details about the attempts or which groups had sought the materials. "We have information which indicates that terrorists are continuing to attempt to get access to nuclear materials (and) biological and chemical components," he was quoted as saying by Interfax and ItarTass. "We are paying constant attention to this issue," [Alexander]Bortnikov[, the chief of the FSB] said, referring to concerns that terrorists could get their hands on nuclear materials. 14.6 Demand For Researchers Outstrips Supply Mario Cervantes, (Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry at the OECD Observer), Crisis, what crisis?, 2003, at http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/1160/Scientists_and_engineers.html [JK] Yet, as business and governments invest in research and development (R&D), demand for researchers in areas such as information technology (IT) and biotechnology continues to expand. The number of researchers in OECD countries rose from 2.4 million in 1990 to 3.4 million in 2000, a 42% increase, and demand is still expanding the EU estimates it will need 700,000 new researchers to meet its commitment to increase investment in R&D to 3% of GDP by 2010. The US National Science Foundation projects that some 2.2 million new jobs in science and engineering will be created over 2000-2010, especially in computer-related occupations. In Japan the University Council predicted in 1998 that demand for masters students would exceed supply by 2010.
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14.7 Russia Investing Millions to Hire Ex-Soviet Scientists Quirin Schiermeier & Konstantin Severinov, Nature News, Russia woos lost scientists, June 2010, http://www.nature.com/news/2010/100616/full/465858a.html [JK] Once a scientific powerhouse, Russia is still struggling to rebuild a research system shattered by the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the decade of economic hardship that followed. To speed up the recovery, the Russian government recently announced a 90-billion-rouble (US$2.8 billion) programme aimed at strengthening universities and getting high-profile expatriate researchers to return to Russia (see Nature 464, 1257; 2010). And a conference next week in St Petersburg will gather representatives of Russia's scientific diaspora to discuss how migrs can help to restore Russian science to its former glory. In an exclusive interview, Nature spoke to Andrei Fursenko, the minister of education and science of the Russian Federation, about how he hopes to bring the diaspora back home and boost the international standing of Russian science. 14.8 Russian Initiatives Remove Need For IPP Funding The Government Accountability Office Study, DOEs Program to Assist Weapons Scientists in Russia and Other Countries Needs to Be Reassessed, December 2007, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08189.pdf [JK] In addition, the president of Russia recently pledged to invest substantial government resources in key industry sectors, including nuclear energy, nanotechnology, and aerospace technologies and aircraft production. Many of the Russian institutes involved in the IPP program could benefit substantially under these planned economic development initiatives, undercutting the need for future IPP program support. In fact, officials at many of the Russian institutes with whom we spoke told us that they hope to receive increased government funding from these new presidential initiatives. 14.9 Economy is Doing Fine, and Russia is Investing Sharon Weiner, PhD in Political Science, Seminar given at the American University, School of International Service, Controlling the Proliferation of Nuclear Knowledge from the Former Soviet Union, April 2006, http://web.mit.edu/ssp/seminars/wed_archives06spring/Weiner.htm [JK]
Russia 's partial economic recovery must also be considered. US
programs were initially justified by the dire state of Russia 's economy. Like most Russian citizens, nuclear experts received very low salaries and, at times, this money was delayed for months at a time. Today, however, the salaries of weapons experts are delivered on time and are two to three times the Russian average. Russia 's GDP is growing 3-9% annually, and the government is making significant investments in its weapons complex. As Russia becomes more able to fund its own job creation programs, American politicians skeptical about these programs will argue that Russia can pay its own way. The United States is likely to seek a renegotiation of the burden for these proliferation efforts including increased cost sharing and more liberal access to sensitive Russian facilities. Russia, however, does not place the same emphasis on proliferation or terrorism as does the United States. Moreover, it remembers its former status as great power and the third-class treatment it sometimes received after the Cold War. This combination of factors makes the future of these programs, and their successful adaptation, a difficult proposition. 65 / 71
15. Mandate Backup

15.1 Failure to Prioritize Institutes With Strong Proliferation Threats JOHN SHIMKUS, REPRESENTATIVE from Illinois, Testamony at the Congressional Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, COMBATING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S INITIATIVES FOR PROLIFERATION PREVENTION (IPP) PROGRAM, Janurary 2008, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi? dbname=110_house_hearings&docid=f:47234.wais [JK] Furthermore, GAO has informed us that DOE has even funded scientists at Russian institutes who pose no proliferation threat or risk and who have no technical background in weapons of mass destruction. More importantly, DOE has overlooked several critical opportunities to reduce proliferation risk. For instance, the State Department has provided us with a list of 18 critical high-risk Russian institutes where brain drain is a threat. The committee Minority staff compared the State Department's high-priority list with a list of Russian institutes DOE is currently funding. Only three of the 18 highest priority Russian institutes identified by the State Department are currently funded through DOE's IPP program. GAO's report shows that DOE has not focused its resources on the highest risk institutes in Russian. Only last year, 13 years since the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program was created, did DOE finally begin to develop a risk prioritization system for targeting scientists at the Russian institutes. GAO will also testify that there is poor coordination between DOE and similar non-proliferation programs at the Department of State, Department of Agriculture, and I guess there are also programs with the Department of Defense and Health and Human Services. With such an apparent duplication of effort and failure to coordinate, we should examine whether these programs could or should be consolidated. Congress appropriated $30 million for the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program in 2008 in the Omnibus Bill, and of course, there is no specific line item but the original budget request was around $21 to $22 million. There is an overall increase. We have questions on how we are spending the money to begin with. The question is, why increase portions of that?
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16. Source Defense

16.1 Methodology of GAO Study is Good The Government Accountability Office Study, DOEs Program to Assist Weapons Scientists in Russia and Other Countries Needs to Be Reassessed, December 2007, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08189.pdf [JK] To address these objectives, we examined 207 of the 929 IPP projects. We selected this judgmental sample of draft, active, inactive, and completed projects on the basis of a variety of factors, such as geographic distribution, representation of all participating national laboratories, and project costs. Of the 207 projects in our sample, we received or were able to reconstruct information on payments to project participants for 97 projects. We interviewed key officials and analyzed documentation, such as program guidance, project proposals, and financial information, from DOE and its contractors at the Argonne, Brookhaven, Idaho, Lawrence Berkeley, Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, Oak Ridge, National Renewable Energy, Pacific Northwest, Sandia, and Savannah River National Laboratories; the Kansas City Plant; and Defense and State. We interviewed officials from 15 Russian and 7 Ukrainian institutes that participate in the IPP program. We also spoke with officials from the Federal Agency for Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation, which oversees institutes involved in Russias nuclear weapons program. Furthermore, we interviewed officials from 14 U.S. companies that participate in the IPP program to better understand their perspective on the programs benefits and its implementation. In addition, we analyzed cost and budgetary information from DOE, DOEs national laboratories, CRDF, ISTC, and STCU. We interviewed knowledgeable officials on the reliability of these data, including issues such as data entry, access, quality control procedures, and the accuracy and completeness of the data. We determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this review. Appendix I provides more details on our scope and methodology, and appendix II provides more detailed information on the institutes that we visited in Russia and Ukraine. We conducted our review from October 2006 through December 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 16.2 DOE is Incorrect in Questioning the GAO Study's Methodology The Government Accountability Office Study, DOEs Program to Assist Weapons Scientists in Russia and Other Countries Needs to Be Reassessed, December 2007, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08189.pdf [JK] DOE is incorrect in its assertions that we failed to acknowledge actions it was undertaking during the course of our review, and that our report does not provide a balanced critique of the IPP program. Our report acknowledges actions DOE is taking to improve program management, such as the development of a new program and financial management system. Our review identified numerous problems and raised concerns about the IPP programs scope, implementation, and performance that we believe should be addressed by DOE as part of a reassessment of the IPP program.
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16.3 DOE Mis-Characterizes the Nature of the GAO Study The Government Accountability Office Study, DOEs Program to Assist Weapons Scientists in Russia and Other Countries Needs to Be Reassessed, December 2007, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08189.pdf [JK] DOE has incorrectly characterized how we collected information and conducted our analysis of the participants on IPP projects. Contrary to DOEs assertion, we did not base our analysis of this issue on responses to questions we posed directly to officials at Russian and Ukrainian institutes. We used data and statements provided directly by DOE program officials to determine the total number of former Soviet weapons scientists, engineers, and technicians the program has engaged since its inception. Regarding the level and number of WMD experts involved in individual IPP projects, as explained in the scope and methodology section of our draft report, we used a number of methods for assessing these totals, including analyzing data provided by project managers at the national laboratories; reviewing payment records provided by CRDF, ISTC, and STCU; and assessing the reliability of data we received.
Credentials/Info
-Commissioner Biographies Senator Bob Graham, Commission Chairman, is a former twoterm governor of Florida and served for 18 years in the United States Senate. This is combined with 12 years in the Florida legislature for a total of 38 years of public service. In the Senate, he served on the Select Committee on Intelligence including eighteen months as chairman in 20012002. During this time, he served as cochairman of the joint House-Senate inquiry of the events surrounding the September 11th attacks. Following the release of the Joint Inquirys final report in July 2003, Senator Graham steadfastly advocated reform of the intelligence community and sponsored legislation to bring about needed changes. Based on these experiences, he authored Intelligence Matters. After retiring from the Senate in 2004, Senator Graham served for a year as a senior fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government. His primary focus was on civic education and intelligence. While there, he commenced research and writing a book, to be published early 2009, entitled America, The Owners Manual. He has established a Center for Public Service at the University of Florida and the University of Miami, which primarily focuses on participatory citizenship, homeland security and the Americas. He received his bachelors degree from the University of Florida and his law degree from Harvard Law School. 68 / 71
Senator Jim Talent, Commission Vice-Chairman, was elected at the age of 28 to the Missouri House of Representatives, where he served for eight years, beginning in 1984. At the age of 32, Senator Talent was unanimously chosen by his colleagues to be the Minority Leader, the highest-ranking Republican leadership position in the Missouri House. He served in that capacity until 1992, when he was elected to Congress to represent Missouris Second District; he served in the House until 2001. While in the House, Senator Talent served for eight years on the House Armed Services Committee. In 2002, Missourians elected Talent to the United States Senate, where he served until 2007. During that time, he served as the Chairman of the Armed Services Seapower Subcommittee. Currently, Senator Talent serves as a Distinguished Fellow at the Washington, D.C.based Heritage Foundation, where he specializes in military readiness issues and welfare reform. Senator Talent received his bachelors degree from Washington University in St. Louis, where he received the Arnold J. Lien Prize as the most outstanding undergraduate in political science. He graduated Order of the Coif from the University of Chicago Law School in 1981 and clerked for Judge Richard Posner of the United States Court of Appeals from 1982 through 1983. Graham Allison is Douglas Dillon Professor of Government and Director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvards John F. Kennedy School of Government. Dr. Allisons most recent book, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, is now in its third printing and was selected by the New York Times as one of the 100 most notable books of 2004. From 1977 to 1989, Dr. Allison served as Dean of the Kennedy School. Under his leadership, a small, undefined program grew twentyfold to become a major professional school of public policy and government. From 1985 to 1987, Dr. Allison served as Special Advisor to the Secretary of Defense; from 1993 to 1994, as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy and Plans. He has the sole distinction of having twice been awarded the Defense Departments highest civilian award, the Distinguished Public Service Medal, first by Secretary Casper Weinberger and then by Secretary William Perry. Dr. Allison has authored or co-authored 20 books and hundreds of articles. He has been a member of the Secretary of Defenses Defense Policy Board for Secretaries Weinberger, Carlucci, Cheney, Aspin, Perry, and Cohen. He was a founding member of the Trilateral Commission, was a Director of the Council on Foreign Relations, and has been a member of many public committees and commissions. He was educated at Davidson College, and he earned a B.A. In history at Harvard College; B.A. and M.A. degrees in philosophy, politics, and economics at Oxford University; and his Ph.D. at Harvard University. Robin Cleveland currently serves as a Principal with Olivet Consulting LLC. Previously, she has served as the Counselor to the President of the World Bank, Associate Director at the White House Office of Management and Budget, and in a variety of key positions with Senator Mitch McConnell on the Senate Intelligence Committee, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Senate Appropriations Committee. Ms. Cleveland co-led efforts to develop two presidential initiatives, the Millennium Challenge Corporation and the Presidents Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, undertakings that reflect her experience linking policy, performance, and resource management. Ms. Cleveland graduated from Wesleyan University with honors. Stephen G. Rademaker became Senior Counsel to BGR Holding LLC in January 2007. He continues 69 / 71
to serve as the U.S. representative on the UN Secretary Generals Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, a position he has held since 2003. Mr. Rademaker came to BGR Holding from the staff of Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist, where he served as Policy Director for National Security Affairs and Senior Counsel. In 2002, Mr. Rademaker was confirmed by the Senate as an Assistant Secretary of State, and from then until 2006 he headed at various times three bureaus of the Department of State, including the Bureau of Arms Control and the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation. He directed nonproliferation policy toward Iran and North Korea, as well as the Proliferation Security Initiative. Immediately prior to joining the Department of State, Rademaker was Chief Counsel to the Select Committee on Homeland Security of the U.S. House of Representatives, where he was responsible for drafting the legislation that created the Department of Homeland Security. Mr. Rademaker has also held positions on the staff of the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives, including Deputy Staff Director and Chief Counsel. From 1992 to 1993, Mr. Rademaker served as General Counsel of the Peace Corps. He returned briefly to the agency in 2000 2001 as the Bush-Cheney transitions Director of Transition for the Peace Corps. Mr. Rademaker received three degrees from the University of Virginia: a B.A. with Highest Distinction in 1981, a J.D. in 1984, and an M.A. in foreign affairs in 1985. While at the University of Virginia he was made a member of Phi Beta Kappa and the Order of the Coif. Congressman Timothy J. Roemer served in the U.S. House from 1991 to 2003. After the attacks of September 11, Mr. Roemer used his position on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence to support the work of a joint congressional inquiry into the attacks. Mr. Roemer also was the key sponsor of legislation to establish the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, better known as the 9/11 Commission. He went on to serve as a member of the 9/11 Commission. Since leaving Congress in 2003, Mr. Roemer has continued to work on developing ways to strengthen national security as President of the Center for National Policy and as a Distinguished Scholar at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University. Prior to his elected service, Mr. Roemer served on the staffs of Representative John Brademas of Indiana (19781979) and Senator Dennis DeConcini of Arizona (19851989). He holds a Ph.D. in American government from the University of Notre Dame. Mr. Roemer also earned his M.A. from Notre Dame and received his B.A. from the University of California, San Diego. Wendy R. Sherman is a Principal of The Albright Group LLC, a global strategy firm, and of Albright Capital Management LLC, an investment advisory firm focused on emerging markets. During the Clinton administration, Ambassador Sherman served as Counselor and chief troubleshooter for the State Department, as well as Special Advisor to President Clinton and Policy Coordinator on North Korea.
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-NTI is a place of common ground where people with different ideological views are working together to close the gap between the global threats from nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and the global response. Co-chaired by former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn and philanthropist and CNN founder Ted Turner, NTI is governed by an expert and influential Board of Directors with members from the United States, Russia, Japan, India, Pakistan, China, Jordan, Sweden, France and the United Kingdom. Board members include a former U.S. Secretary of Defense, members of the legislative branches of government from the United States, France, Russia and the United Kingdom; a member of the Jordanian royal family; a Nobel prize winning economist; a world renowned nuclear physicist; the former commander of U.S. nuclear strategic forces and other top experts in international security issues. The foundation's activities are directed by NTI Co-Chairman Sam Nunn and NTI President and Chief Operating Officer Joan Rohlfing. (Taken from the About NTI page)
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Graduate Russia From IPP - Affirmative

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Graduate Russia From IPP - Affirmative

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Matthew Hamilton, Scott Alford and Josh Kreifels