Does contemporary scientific research negate the actuality of a transcendental Self or Subject?

By Tim Matthews David Hume (A Treatise of Human Nature) looked for it and found only a bundle of perceptions. In the twenty first century, John Gray (Straw Dogs) has resigned himself to the view that it is an illusion or an epiphenomenon. It, of course, is what we commonly call self. The phenomenal self In support of Grays view, modern cognitive psychology - itself heavily influenced by neuroscientific research and Humean empiricism - has, it would seem, provided the heretofore lacking proof of this previously speculative assumption, as it claims to have provided evidence of the correlation between a human brains neural activity, on the one hand, and the individual humans experience of conscious states on the other. And thats not all. It also claims to have produced experimental evidence of the illusory nature of free will. It is alleged that free will, or volition, is a similar illusion and of the nature of an a posteriori claim made by the analyzing egoic consciousness associated with our cognitive faculties, which convinces itself after the fact that an entity called me separate from the bodily processes it commands is making decisions, when in fact it is the body as a physiological organism which is merely responding to a given stimulus (Susan Blackmore, a prolific writer in the field, provides an example of this line of enquiry and theory in her book, Consciousness: a very short introduction). While this view is, in its overall conception, likely as old as human philosophical speculation itself, the detailed picture of neurophysiology and Darwinian evolutionary theory it inculcates in its defense lends it an air of authority which is apparently lacking in the purely philosophical views of self; and purely subjective, a priori knowledge of the ontological certainty of the self - the kind all truly religious or mystical perspectives assure us is the only kind of knowledge there really is, as it transcends speculative interpretation is relegated to the realms of illusion, wishful thinking, or outright delusion. This view, then, states quite clearly that anything we may regard as pertaining to self is to be found in mans total physiology, and since science and empiricism in general are concerned only with the measurable and the evident as such measurements are defined within the terms set out by the scientific method, we must conclude that man comprises nothing more than we can measure or find empiric evidence
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for and includes, consequently, no metaphysical or transcendental being or reality whatsoever. But is this view as objective as it frequently claims to be? Is it not possible that it is in part a reaction to centuries of abstract and abstruse theological speculation itself responsible for many divisive and destructive religiosities and also a misconceived methodology; a case of mistaken identity; a misappropriation of an otherwise highly effective investigative tool? The noumenal self I am neither the body, nor the sense organs, nor the ego, nor the mind, nor the intellect, for I am within all these; I am the eternal inmost witnessing consciousness, the witness of these changing phenomena (Adi Shankara Sarva Vedanta Siddhanta) The above quotation is a very clear statement, made by one of Indias most thorough and logically astute mystics, on the nature of the empiric (phenomenal) self versus the transcendent (noumenal) self. If we take the view that anything pertaining to the body or the contents of ones mind and this would include even the minutiae of neuronal activity and every experienceable cognitive state necessarily pertains to the empiric self, and anything which can be said to be aware of the empiric self pertains to the transcendent self (or witness), then the argument made by modern empiricism takes on a different colouring. Inherent in the scientific method is the measurement of objective phenomena and it seems absurd to imagine that there could be anything else, since, from the human perspective (the only one we have, let it be remembered, even if the human is making objective measurements using sophisticated technological tools), observable phenomena are necessarily objects for consciousness in some sense to presume otherwise is purely speculative and absolutely unscientific. Now, since neuroscientific research has begun to get acquainted with regions of the human brain which were previously inaccessible, it has found that a very large portion of what we are here referring to as the empiric self, with all its rich affective, cognitive and conative experiences (and so not merely sensory), can be seen literally manifesting as measurable areas of activity within the brain itself. Such is the premise behind the notion of neural correlates. So, if the total personality requires no explanation for its origin beyond that which we can clearly identify empirically and without recourse to metaphysical speculation, then it would appear that what we
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commonly refer to as self is thus accounted for. But is it? Is the self an objective phenomenon? Or is the assumption that it can or even must - be seen or measured in order to have ontological validity the root of the problem? If we are to pose any serious opposition to this view, I believe we must look elsewhere for some insight. If the self is not to be regarded as an objective phenomenon (or an epiphenomenon, or a conglomeration of disunited perceptions) then how, we might ask and indeed philosophers from time immemorial have been asking can we possibly gain any knowledge of its actuality? As Immanuel Kant so ably and conclusively demonstrated, in response to Humes logical and methodical treatise, metaphysical knowledge cannot be attained through ordinary sense perception or conceptual cognition. However, by the same token, metaphysical reality must necessarily transcend physical reality, so the fact of its being unknowable to the senses does not preclude its actuality. Now, following on from this, we could argue, with the pragmatist, that it is for all practical purposes irrelevant, then, whether or not there is a metaphysical reality to speak of, since we have no way of determining its actuality for ourselves. Or we could conclude, with the materialist, that this apparent fact would indicate that there is no possibility of a metaphysical reality, since it relies solely on hypothesis and extrapolation for the possibility of its existence. And this, it would seem, (excepting unquestioning religious belief), covers the preponderant bulk of the Western view of metaphysics, albeit in an extremely crude and simplified sense. These two positions, however, fail to take seriously or to refute finally the real source of metaphysical philosophies, perhaps because it is easier and less risky to dismiss it. This source is, of course, the testimony of the mystic. It is quite clear - to anyone who takes the time to investigate for themselves - that there are more than enough similarities, across far too disparate and alien cultures and individuals, for the differences in accounts of mystical experience to cause one to discredit them as being purely subjective or fantastic in their nature. This is a point which it would take some time to clarify, but since it has been clarified elsewhere in some detail (notably in Dr. Buckes 1901 title, Cosmic Consciousness), it will not be entered into here. Suffice it to say that the correlations are many and profound. The main concern here is with the actuality of a transcendent self and the inclusion of the mystics testimony as a credible source of insight. Unless I am to answer every charge of delusion, exaggeration, misinterpretation, subjectivism, extrapolation, psychosis, neurosis or outright fantasy, I must ask that the reader accept the view that there are cases of mystical experience which are authentic and honestly reported, however one may choose to interpret the consequences of such a view. Any other charge is,
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frankly, speculative. The mystic states that knowledge of a transcendent actuality is possible and not only possible, but indubitable: For the first time, the word substance has become really intelligible to me. I turn again to Spinozas Ethics and read the third definition of the first part: I understand SUBSTANCE to be that which is in itself and is conceived through itself. Many times I have struggled to give this definition an intelligible meaning, but never quite successfully. But now it stands out clearly and I know just exactly what it means. Heretofore, I tried to relate the notion of substance to objects, even though in a subtle sense. But this is an error. No object, whatsoever, is in itself and conceived through itself. I am that SELF and Recognize that I am that SELF, and now I Realize what Substance is. Substance is not other than Myself. But this Substance is just precisely that which cannot be predicated of ponderable matter, nor of objects of the senses or of thought. (Franklin Merrell-Wolff Experience and Philosophy SUNY Press 1994, p68) The clear assertion here is that knowledge of a transcendent self is not only indubitable, but is quite other than any formal knowledge related to an objective existence. And this is precisely the point which seems to have escaped the attention of so many materialists: knowledge of the self is not knowledge of some objective existence or other, but is knowledge or knowing itself. It is not the kind of knowledge which is brought about by the relationship between the object known and the subject who knows. Knowledge of the self can only be attained through knowing the self as the self through the self. If I look for myself out there even if out there is in the most intimate contents of my thoughts I am looking to have some experience or other which I can identify as being myself. But implicit in the nature of experience is one who is having the experience. There is still the relationship of a subjective knowing here of an objective existence there. So how the devil is one supposed to find that which is not a thing which can be found? And if it isnt an objective existence, what is it? Further, I realized that pure subjective consciousness without an object must appear to the relative consciousness to have objects. Hence Recognition did not, of itself, imply a new experiential content in consciousness. I saw that genuine
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Recognition is simply a realization of Nothing, but a Nothing that is absolutely substantial and identical with the SELF. This was the final turn of the Key that opened the Door. I found myself at once identical with the Voidness, Darkness, and Silence, but realized them as utter, though ineffable, Fullness, in the sense of Substantiality, Light, in the sense of Illumination, and Sound, in the sense of pure formless Meaning and Value. The deepening of consciousness that followed at once is simply inconceivable and quite beyond the possibility of adequate representation. (Franklin Merrell-Wolff Experience and Philosophy p263) Beyond self This final quotation raises more questions than it can answer. And this is as it should be, for we are now dealing with the possibility of a transcendent reality which is not only actual, but is accessible to human consciousness; indeed, is the very ground of human consciousness. And from this already vertiginous viewpoint, we can look further upward into another apparent Void - toward that groundless ground from whence even the transcendent self derives is being: the realm of The Godhead of Meister Eckhart, the Nothing of Jacob Behmen, the High Indifference of Franklin Merrell-Wolff, the Shunyata of Nagarjuna, the Tao of Lao Tzu, the One of Plotinus, and so on. But the journey upward treads a steep, narrow and rarely travelled path; a path many Western philosophers and scientists deny the existence of; a path many willing travellers rarely glimpse. And who, ever, can point to the summit and say with certainty that it is the summit.

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