Revolutionary and Antirevolutionary Genocides: A Comparison of State Murders in Democratic Kampuchea, 1975 to 1979, and in Indonesia, 1965 to 1966

Author(s): Helen Fein Source: Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Oct., 1993), pp. 796-823 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/179183 Accessed: 10/03/2010 14:51
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Revolutionary and Antirevolutionary Genocides: A Comparison of State Murders in Democratic Kampuchea, 1975 to 1979, and in Indonesia, 1965 to 1966
HELEN FEIN Institutefor the Study of Genocide, New York Revolutionaryideologies of both the left and the right have led to genocide and mass murdersof unprecedented scope in this century.The surveyby Harff and Gurrshows that genocides and politicides-killings of people in groups targetedbecause of organizedpolitical opposition-between 1945 and 1980 may have caused in this same period over twice as many deaths than wars. Such state killings claimed up to 2.6 times the numberof lives lost in the aftermathof natural disasters between 1967 and 1986 (1987).' Similarly, Rummelarguesthatfour times as manypeople have been killed in democides, or state mass murders, of citizens in the twentieth century than have been killed in wars (1992). Harff and Gurr's survey shows that revolutionary(communist) and praetorian (military) regimes, in that order, are the most likely since 1945 to commit genocide and politicide (1988). In a study of genocide after 1945 in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East-regions in which the great majorityof genocides have occurred-I found that althoughboth communist and other states (most of which are military-ledregimes) have committed authoritarian genocide in the last forty years, when we take into account the number of states in each category, we find that communiststates (36 percent of which
I am grateful to Ben Kiernan(Yale University) for criticism and many helpful suggestions to improve earlier drafts of this essay and to Rhoda Howard(McMasterUniversity) for her early appraisal.Also I would like to thankKathy Kadanefor informationabouther researchand to an anonymous critic evaluating this article for ComparativeStudies for other suggestions. This research was supportedby a fellowship from the Social Science ResearchCouncil-MacArthur FoundationProgram in Peace and Security and was completed while I was a resident at the Affairsof Harvard University(1989Programfor Nonviolent Sanctions, Centerfor International 91). i This is my calculationbased on recompilingtheir figures to assess victims from each cause for the same period of time. Study of Society and History 0010-4175/93/4696-0596 $5.00 ? 1993 Society for Comparative

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committedgenocide), were 4.5 times more likely to have committedgenocide and politicide than other authoritarian states (8 percent of which committed (Fein 1993a). None of the eight stable democraciesin these regions genocide) were perpetrators. Rummel's survey of the twentiethcenturysimilarly shows that eight of ten of the most infamous killers were communist and fascist states (1992). The justificationsare, however, different.In communiststates, murdersare justified in the name of the revolution;while in anti-communiststates such murdersarejustified in termsof the need for homogeneityor ethnicpurityand as a defense againstrevolutionaries. This is not surprising.Arendtfirst related in genocide to the concept of totalitarianism her explanationof the origins of the Final Solution (1966). But the classic concepts of totalitarianism, communism, and fascism are ideal-types based on the experience of the inter-war years in Europe. Major communist states have evolved from the totalitarian archetype, and new types of states have emerged with many, but not all, characteristics communistand fascist totalitarian of states since WorldWarII: states; e.g., socialist states in underdeveloped regions;Islamic fundamentalist and, most recently, praetorianregimes based on right-wing authoritarianism; ethnic-basedauthoritarian states in the Balkans. Such states display many of the characteristicsof fascism and have generated similarly deadly effects. However, while totalitarianstates have been more likely to commit genocide than are other states, most cases of contemporary genocide since World War II were committed by authoritarian, totalitarian,states and are not not ascribableto ideology. Ten of thirteencases of genocide between 1945 and 1988 in the regions surveyed were relatedto ethnic stratification ratherthan The most common patternwas that a high level of ideology (Fein 1993a). political discriminationor exclusion of a suppressedethnoclass led to their rebellion which instigated the governing ethnoclass elite to respond with genocide (in half the cases) or other massacres or repression (in the other half). In orderto probe a more generaltheoryof genocide, we focus on two cases in which governments(or partsthereof) actually labelled as enemies a large from the perpetrapartof their citizens who were not otherwisedifferentiated tors by any ethnic, racial, religious, or nationalidentity.This shouldenableus to consider the usefulness of such a generalexplanationbeyond the aims and precipitantsof particularforms of genocide. The cases under considerationmay be labelled as ideological genocides.2
Ideological genocide is one of four types I distinguishfrom retributive,developmental,and despotic genocides: Similar divisions are made by Smith and Chalk and Jonassohn (Fein 1993b:28-29). Chalk and Jonassohndistinguish such state-sponsoredmassacres(as Cambodia) intended 1) "to implementa belief, ideology or theory"from genocides 2) "to eliminate a real or potential threat," or 3) "to acquire economic wealth" or 4) "to spread terror among real or potential enemies" (1990:29).
2

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Ideological genocides, perhaps a unique twentieth-centuryinnovation, are cases in which the state redefines society by eliminatingpeople in order to of correspondto its political formula, its representation itself, and to legitimate the state. The two cases of this type which have been most often studied and compared are the Holocaust and the Armenian genocide (Fein 1979; Melson 1992; Mazian 1990; Dekmajian1986; see also Fein 1993b:69-75). In fromthe perpetrators longstandboth cases, the victims were discriminated by ing religious and ethnic divisions. We may betterunderstand origin of ideological genocide and the generthe al determinantsof genocide, especially genocides not relatedto pre-existing ethnic discriminationand exclusion by focusing on two superficiallydissimilar cases which were justified by contraryideologies and goals: to implement a communist utopia and to counter a present or future rise to power of a communist party. We shall examine commonalities-and differencesbetween the two cases in the same region within related time periods: the murderof an estimated million communists in Indonesia (1965-66) and of about two million Cambodiansunderthe KhmerRouge (1975-79). But, some may ask, was either event actually a genocide? Did the United Nations Genocide Convention clearly apply to the mass murdersin either situation?The victims' deaths often were the direct or indirectresult of class status (in Cambodia) and political group identity (Parti Kommunis Indonesia, or the CommunistPartyin Indonesia),but neithersocial class nor political groups are specified under Article II of the United Nations' convention (UNGC), which defines genocide as "any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such . . ., including a) killing members of the group; b) causing serious bodily or mentalharmto membersof the group;c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions calculatedto bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; e) forcibly transferringchildren of the group to another group." However, many social scientists apply the concept of genocide to all nonviolent groups massacredby the state (see Fein 1993b:12-13). Some legal scholars have made chargesof genocide when regimes destroyeda significant portion of their populationon political grounds or intentionallydestroyed a national group in part. Such regimes include the KhmerRouge in Cambodia (Hannum and Hawk 1986:140-46) and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan (Reisman and Norchi 1988). My redefinition of genocide generalizes the characteristicsof protectedgroups but is otherwise consonantwith the terms to of the UNGC: "Genocide is sustainedpurposefulaction by a perpetrator destroy a collectivity directly or indirectly,throughinterdictionof physically of the biological and social reproduction groupmembers,sustainedregardless of the surrenderor lack of threat offered by the victim" (Fein 1993b:24).

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Using this definition, both the Indonesianand Cambodiancases are instances of genocide. Other scholars consider the Indonesian case an instance of "genocidal massacre"(Kuper 1981) or a mixture of politicide and genocide (Harff and Gurr 1987). To begin, I developed in 1982 an open-endedexplanationaimedto cover all types of genocide and specified a variety of precipitants.Genocide is of defined outside theuniverse of or thecalculated of murder a segment all of a group in the the perpetrator a government, elite, staffor crowdrepresenting perpetrator by to to perceived be causedor impeded the victim. by response a crisisor opportunity to of of Crisesandopportunities be a result war,challenges thestructure dominamay or and breakdown social revolution economicdeveloption, the threatof internal
ment. . . . Motives may be ideological, economic, and/or political. . . . Genocides,

to or or as are othermurders, may be premeditated an ad hoc response a problem (Fein 1993b:36-37). opportunity We can simplify and unpack the elements of this explanation(indicatedby italics) so that we may later evaluate how well they fit the cases considered: 1) Moral exclusion. The victim, defined outside the universeof obligation of the perpetrator also Fein 1979:ch. 1), is thus excludedon the basis of a (see religious doctrine or ideology; 2) Legitimacy problem. Pre-existing legitimacy and solidarity problems lead to the acceptanceof ideologies justifying the dominationof one group; 3) Blaming the victim. A crisis or opportunityemerges which either is caused by or attributedto the victim or leads people to view the victim as inhibiting national or economic improvementor expansion;and 4) Patrons' tolerance. Because of the lack of checks by great powers and other patrons, genocide comes to be viewed as cost-free, makingit a rational calculation in terms of costs and benefits. Further, I sought to answer the following questions without precluding discoveries in the course of study which might enrich the explanation.How does ideology incorporatepreexisting prejudices, as well as religious and national sentiments? How do social structuresand religious and political cultures provide justifications for people to murder their fellow-citizens? What preceding conditions lead to murderouselites assuming power? Before comparingcases, I shall briefly summarizebothcases, includingthe rise events which precededthe perpetrators' to power and facts which have led scholars to make a prima facie case for genocide.
THE BACKGROUND OF THE GENOCIDES

Indonesia By the late summer of 1965, both Indonesians and foreigners reported a growing public mood of high tension. "Foreignobserversin Indonesiaat this time were struck by the atmosphereof crisis, bordering on hysteria, that

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prevailed" (Mortimer 1974:387; see also Hughes 1967:12-16; Crouch 1988:94-96). The tension was the result of both extraordinary events and everydaydifficulties. Prices had continued to rise. Inflationhad increasedby 100 percent each year between 1961 and 1964 (Hefner 1990:201). Xenophobiawas stirred by mass mobilization against enemies of the state: Malaysia without and suspect plotterswithin the state. Rumoursalso magnified fears generatedby the illness and possible impendingdeath of PresidentSukaro. Sukaro's charismaticpresence both legitimated his Guided Democracy and was the force joining disparateand rival elements of the nationalcoalition: The PKI, the communistparty(which had gained much popularsupport in the late 1950s), the military,and the Muslim and nationalistorganizations were allegedly united by a series of verbal formulas-Pantjasila or the Five Magic Charmsof the Revolution-the 1945 constitution, socialism, guided democracy, guided economy, and Indonesianpersonality(Crouch 1988:4344). In the last six years (1959-65), Sukaro had begun to lean increasingly toward China and had legitimated the political alliance with the PKI, the leading party in terms of members(an estimatedthree million) and membership in allied organizations(over twenty million) but not in terms of political (Mortimer1974:364-67). representation His death was expected to dissolve the adhesion of the coalition and to precipitate a bid for power by one side. Partisansof all sides in Jakarta expected a coup by either the militaryor the PKI in the late summerof 1965. Not only did nothing work, but belief in the legitimacy of Sukaro's plan for Guided Democracy, which attemptedto eliminate party competition, was fading. The myth of the revolution,which identifiedmembersof the military as the foundersof the Indonesianstate, was increasinglystretchedby conflicting group interestsand ends. Further,the state was near bankruptcy. Foreign policy interventions, such as the Malaysian war (which the military had originally opposed) and Sukaro's bid to head a new coalition outside the United Nations of the new emerging forces were used to stir domestic xenounifiedIndonesians phobic and nationalistsentiment.Mass ralliestemporarily collective excitement. by arousing The militaryviewed with concern Sukamo'splans for a Fifth Force, which would give workersand peasantssmall arms, thus challengingthe military's monopoly of force. In addition, the United States considered whether it should stop its aid. Its policy planners viewed Sukamo as antagonisticto Americaninterestsbecause he had closed down the United States Information Agency library in Jakartain February1965-and provocativebecause officially instigatedcrowds had attackedthe BritishEmbassy.These policy planners also consideredthe most effective means of counteracting increasing the influence of communists in Indonesia(Bunnell 1990). Althoughthere was no revolutionin 1965 in Indonesia,one could say there

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was an antirevolutionarypurge (such as occurred in the Vendee after the French revolution) or a counter-revolution. effect (I am not arguingthat "In this was consciously intended), the state allied with the rurallandownersto bring about a counterrevolution-ensuring that the process of concentration of land-holdings and capitalizationof farming would not be obstructedby reformistmovements"(Robison 1981:133). It is true, as Hefner (1990) argues, that there were multiplebases of cleavand age and regional variationsbetween perpetrators victims. AlthoughI hold a Weberianbias (as does Hefner), this is compatiblewith a class-basedexplanation (or power or status-group explanation)when thatbest fits the facts of a specific case. Just on the grounds of theoretic plausibility, Robison's interpretationaccounts for one majoroutcome: If one looks at which Indonesians benefited from the repressionof the communistparty,such repressionappears rational from a class-oriented point of view. However, the United States' interest-as conceived by its strategistsand officials at the time-was also a winner, indicating that the massacre and purge could also be considered rationalfrom the point of view of a world power. The massacres,the seedbed for the counter-revolution,reoriented class relations in Indonesia, assured continuing military domination by removing communist and populist challengers, and reversedIndonesia'srole in the Cold Waralignmentof states. So their consequences or function was counterrevolutionary irrespectiveof the absence of a revolution. Like many functional explanations, this does not account for the variety of motives of the participantsat the time or the differencesbetween their self-understanding then and their subsequentexplanations (which are sparse because of the suppressionof discussion of these events). The counter-revolutionemerged from the military countercoup (termed Gestok) which was a response to the military coup (termed Gestapu) of of September30, 1965, which led to the murders six generalsby those leading the coup and, accordingto rumour,the mutilationof their bodies. In Central Java, troops loyal to the coup leaderstook commandof five of seven infantry battalionsand local revolutionary committees were established. Two officers were abductedand killed by the rebels there (Crouch 1988:100-1). However, the first coup (October1, 1965) was, accordingto the declaration of its leaders, a reactionor counter-coup an anticipated to coup by the Council of Generals instigated by the United States' Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Analysts do not agree as to which partywas primarilyresponsiblefor staging the coup and recruitingperformersor dupes. The leading candidate for staging the coup is the PKI, which usedjunior armyofficers as dupes with or without the encouragementor complicity of PresidentSukamo (Brackman 1969; CIA 1968). Althoughgovernmentsandjournalistsin the west generally accept this theory,scholarsof Indonesianaffairsaredividedover the complete of explanationand attribution responsibilityfor these events. Otherversions

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view the coup either as a revolt by lower-level officers because of unresolved grievances within the army (Anderson and McVey 1971), or a plan by a double agent to trigger the destructionof the PKI, or a coup initiated by President Sukaro. Another, more prudent, resolution is to conclude there was no one motive but a confluence of motives joining the army rebels, the PKI, and Sukarno to instigate and supportthe coup (Hughes 1967:114-5; Crouch 1988:101-22). Indeed, which act was the coup and which the counter-coupdepends on whose political reading one accepts. The publicly perceived role of the PKI and the Gestok response to popular demands for vengeance (Hughes 1967:133-8) resultedin a violent social and political upheaval,leading to the delegitimationof PresidentSukaro and his replacementby GeneralSuharto in 1966, the restructuring the political system, and the reorientationof of patternsof authorityand obedience in Indonesia. The mass killing of alleged and suspected communistswas authorizedby which took effecthe new army leadershipunderGeneral Suhartoin Jakarta tive control of the armyaway from PresidentSukarno.In general, PKI activists were on the defensive or in hiding. Only one area(aroundthe city of Solo) reportedcounter-reprisals the PKI, in which governmentreportsestimate by that 200 to 369 anticommunist party leaders were killed (Crouch 1988:150). The organizedslaughter,when directlyled by the army,was combinedwith a sifting process in which PKI passive supporterswere detainedin camps and jails. The estimated number of people killed ranges from 78,000 to 2,000,000, althoughmost are from 500,000 to 1,000,000 (Crouch 1988:155; Hughes 1967:185;Cribb 1990:7-12). Howeveran official, thoughneverpublished, Indonesiangovernmentstudy confirmedthe latter figure. evidence Theonly serious to killedon thebasisof direct the attempt calculate number for was a surveyconducted Command the by [Operational apparently KOPKAMTIB in Restoration Security Order] of and graduates" 1966andmade using150"university selectively availableto various Westernjournalistsand academics. This report . . . concluded that aroundone million people died, 800,000 of them in Central

andEastJava,100,000eachin BaliandSumatra. reported The scopeof theinvestigabut tionsuggests it wasa genuine that reliable to figures, its conclusions attempt obtain cannotbe accepted withanycertainty (Cribb1990:8). Cribb observes the potentialityfor many causes of overreporting; e.g, aggregates of local reportsmay count the same bodies floating down the river severaltimes. However, what is notableaboutthe study is its lack of denialor shame. Clearly, the survey body did not anticipatecensure. And there was scarcely any censure in the West. Americanofficials made their supportfor the generals clear after the coup and startof the massacres,both verballyand with material aid. Robert F. Kennedy was the only dissident (Bunnell 1990:59-60). However, little was known of the actualrole of the United States in these

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events until recently. The United States had almost decided to stop its aid when Sukarno turned toward China, employed mob violence, and stirred up anti-Americanand anti-Britishsentimentin the name of anticolonialism. The then-Ambassador Indonesiafor the United States, HowardJones, had to in 1964 verbally tested the readiness of the generals to "crackdown on the PKI" in event of a PKI bid for power, and the military clearly understood the interestof the United States in eliminatingthe PKI (Brands 1989:793-4, 802-6). Yet Jones stood for a more accommodatingposturetoward Sukarno than did his successor, Marshall Green, appointed Ambassador in June 1965, after AmbassadorEllsworthBunker'sreportconcludedthat the United States should continue efforts to work with Sukarno but recommended a reduced presence by the United States in Indonesia to reduce Indonesian targeting of American programs and facilities (Jones 1971:361-7; Green 1990:12-14). State Department reveals a continuedinterestin the victory correspondence of the Indonesiangenerals led by Suhartoover the PKI because State Department officials viewed it as a threatto the United States in Southeast Asia. Although AmbassadorGreen dwells on his government'sinitial ignoranceof the plans of the Indonesian military, officials of the United States offered encouragementin eliminatingthe PKI, did not indicateany limits to killing of civilians, and provided covert aid to the Suhartocoalition (Kolko 1988:17881; Green 1990:67-69). Green says that the "only military assistance we providedof a so-called 'covert' naturewas some walkie-talkieequipmentand medicines"-but Kolko implies that small armswere "dubbed'medicines' to prevent embarrassingrevelations"(Green 1990:69; Kolko 1988:181). A strategic consideration, as Ambassador Green stresses, was that the United States not be openly involved in the operationsof the generals, for it would underminethe chances of their success. His wire to the United States State Departmentstates that the "main reason" for caution is "thatwe will handicap the Army if our support shows" (Green's wire to the US State Department,October 14, 1965, cited in Green 1990:68). The United States had been considerablyembarrassedby evidence of CIA aid (most visible in the form of a pilot plummeting from the sky) in a regional revolt led by a Muslim party in Sumatra in 1958 which had damaged American standing among anti-communistforces, including the military (Jones 1971:129-46; Kolko 1988:175). But there was evidence in 1965 of the United States'sintentto eliminatethe PKI and to sanction the massacres. Kathy Kadane, a journalist, uncovered admissions that a staff memberof the United Statesembassy turnedover a list of up to 5,000 PKI leaders to the military and that AmbassadorGreen had approvedthis list, thus instigating and legitimatingtheir murderand that of other alleged communists (Kadane 1990). Embassy officials checked off the names of persons killed on their copy of the list after getting such news by

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radiotransceivers(the aforementioned walkie-talkiesperhaps)suppliedby the United States, Kadane says. Brandsrejects the "mythof Americanresponsibility" (1989:806) but notes that on December 1, 1965, a delegationfrom GeneralSuharto'sheadquarters "askedthe ambassadorhow much it was worthto the United States to see the PKI smashed." However, "the Johnsonadministration refused to put a price on the Communist'sheads" (Brands 1989:806, 803). tag Bunnell, surveying American tactical responses in Indonesiaprior to the coup, remarksthat although in consistent restraint responding the substance US overtpolicywas one of largely of on role for to a however, premature anyanalyst render finaljudgement theCIA's in the activities bothbeforeandafterthe coup, October coupplot, or in otherclandestine in Communists thefall of of half the massacre about a million alleged including tragic 1965(1990:30). The "low-posture" contactswith the armywhich, policy aimed at maintaining officials of the United States noted, was likely to respondviolently to the PKI in time. "Thereis also strongcircumstantial evidence thatthe CIA contributed to the highly effective army media campaign to demonize the PKI as the of perpetrators the bloody abortivecoup" (Bunnell 1990:59). Both the formerDefense Secretary,RobertMcNamara (Brands 1989:804and formerchief of the CIA, William Colby (Kadane1990), have claimed 5), credit for the Indonesian military's anticommunistorientationat that time. in Colby, who related the elimination of the PKI infrastructure Indonesiato the Phoenix programin South Vietnam, did not recall who constructedthe Indonesian lists (compiled as part of an intelligence operation)but did not deny the possibility that the CIA might have don, so (Kadane 1990). It appearsthatthe last word has not been said on this. We mustawait the release of many more documents and their analysis for that. The New Order,a regime which has suppressedboth mass nonviolentand violent expression, began with mass killings which often relied on local antagonismsdividing killers and victims (Cribb1990:23-28). In Java,massacres were often organized(with the license of the generals)by militantMuslim organizationsready to kill on signal. The army delegated the killing in East Java mainly to the "black-shirted youth [Ansor] of the NahdatulUlama (Moslem Teachers' Party), who killed with fanatical relish" (Hughes 1967:154). Ansor called their action a jihad or holy war and the Muslim Muhammadiyah,a modernistorganization,"issued afatwah referringto the exterminationof the PKI as a religious duty." Proclaiming their end the establishmentof a Muslim state, Ansor also began killing nationalistparty opponents active in anti-Muslimreligious organizations(Hefner 1990:21011). But nationalist party members (who also participatedin the killings) tended to disagree with Ansor's version of Islam.
to President Sukaro's often provocative and hostile "marchto the left" . . . It is,

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Chinese Indonesians became a special target in some areas, supposedly because of the Chinese Embassy'sdisrespectfor the murdered generals. However, one must also consider as contributingfactors the history of hostility towardoverseas Chinese, typically a minorityin the middle, in southeastAsia and the role in the Malayan insurgencyof some Chinese insurgentswho had moved into Indonesia (Cribb 1990:24-25). The army tried to suppress the unauthorizedkilling (Crouch 1988:146, 149, 153-4; Hefner 1990:212-3). The government'sestimateof one million victims indicatesthat, had all the victims been communists(which they were not), one out of two (the government's estimate) or one out of three (the PKI's estimate)membersof the PKI were slain (Cribb 1990:41). Either number is more than enough to create enduringterroramong other membersof the PKI and other Indonesians. How did this occur so rapidly? By all accounts, the generals relied on exploiting the bittercleavages within and amongvillages: between lowlanders and highlanders,orthodoxand other Muslims, landownersand peasants, and between parties. Some see these lines of cleavage as reinforcing,with more orthodox Muslim santri (apt to be landlords)in conflict with less orthodox abangan peasants; such scholars maintainthat class conflicts are blurredby the concentrationon culturaland ethnic differentiation (Kahn 1982; Robison 1982). Hefner maintainsthat these multiple bases of cleavage are not reducible on any one axis: Religious and partycleavages can be independent can or reinforceexisting class cleavages (1990). It would help to resolve this controversy if we had more data on demographicand religious identitiesby class. Although the PKI drew support from members of many classes, it had waged a militant campaign for ruralsupportin late 1963 that elicited violent responses: Pressured partby poorpeasants by the economic in hurt decline,butalso hopingto seize themoment fromits political the the to rivals,including military, PKIresponded thenational crisisby trying expand rural to its base. ... Inearly1964PKI-organized launched "unilateral . actions" . . seizingthe landof largelandowners and peasants in of and The stagingdemonstrations support squatters sharecroppers. initiatives provokedstrongreactions the partof landlords Muslimpartysupporters. on and Rural violencequicklyescalated new heights .... Muslimpartyleaderssaw the camto to and it on paignas a directchallenge theirauthority, thuscharacterizedas anassault Islam ratherthan an economicstruggle.Anti-Muslim outbursts severalwellin PKI to publicized actionslent credence theircharges (Hefner1990:201-2). The PKI, as well as theirantagonists,demonizedthe opposition. Brackman assertsthat Aidit, head of the PKI, chargedhis audiencein differentspeeches in Septemberto "operateon the cancer of society"-the "capitalistbureauand crats, economic adventurers corruptors" (which includedthe generals)and to move: "Dare, act, and move againstthe devils of the cities, that is, the high and mighty, thieves and corruptors" (1969:63-64). Similarly,Mortimer (who is, unlike Brackman,sympatheticto the aims of the PKI)remarkson the violent language used by the PKI in 1965 (1974:377-80, 387).

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The immediate reaction to the killings of the generals and the PKI newspapereditorialapprovingthe rebels' aim was the gatheringof massive crowds to vent rage against communists. This rage was furtherexpanded by the funerals staged for the generals and the infant daughterof one who had been killed by her father's attemptedcaptors. "A carefully orchestrated campaign of disinformation"about the deaths of the generals, involving pornographic and sadistic orgies by members of a left-wing women's organization,"portray[ed] the party, which had previously enjoyed an enviable reputationfor chastity and incorruptibility,as a hotbed of immorality"(Cribb 1990:28). However, it is not clear whetherthe Indonesiangenerals orderedthe killings to implement an ideology and to execute a preconceived plan or they reacted spontaneouslyto what they perceivedas a communistcoup within the army which had led to the murderof six generals (some rumouredto have been killed in a ritualmannerby a PKI-organized crowd). Cribbviews ideomotives as secondary:"for the most part the perceived need to kill logical arose out of a sense of self-interest and self-defense, and was in no way dictated by a formal ideological world view" (Cribb 1990:15). Some generals had consideredan attackon the PKI in responseto a violent challenge by the PKI (Brands 1989). Their ideology may have rationalized their need for reprisalsand also protectedtheir futurerole in the Indonesian political economy as managersof statecapitalism,expandingtheirmanagerial role under Sukaro (describedby Crouch 1988:344-5). The goal of the generals to eliminate the PKI can also be seen against the backgroundof a defeated communistrevolt in 1948. This led the generals to anticipate both an immediate threatto their lives and a long-rangethreatto their status and power, impelling them to view the killings as a case of Them or Us. Despite the alternative hypotheses about the September 30 [1965] evidence supportingthe generals' infercoup, there is enough circumstantial ence that this was an aborted communist coup to make their perception a plausible one (Brackman 1969; CIA 1968; Cribb 1990:6-7; Hughes 1967). The massacres were a preconditionfor and physical expressionof the new dictum: anticommunism(heretofore stigmatized by President Sukaro) became the prescribedorthodoxyof the day and communistswere to be cast out or killed. Society had to be reconstructedto correspondto the new basis of solidarity. Are we then looking at a primarilyretributivegenocide intended by the army not only to revenge the deaths to membersof their class but to forestall threatsto their futurehegemony?What makes this an ideological genocide or a mixed case is not just the scale of the murdersbut the use of the communist of threatto justify a new design of state and society, the repudiation the past, and the creation of a new state myth. However, the generals knew that they could turnto the United States as a patron, so their act was a calculatedone. Indeed, the United States was help-

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ing them in their annihilationcampaign. In making a rationalassessment of their future, the generals had to take into account the likelihood that they would get away with mass murderand the probabilitythattheirstatewould be viable and stable, if they cooperatedwith Americaninterests.These interests also reinforcedthe officers' own economic interestsas membersof the managerial stratabased on state enterprises(Crouch 1988:39-44). The army leaders turnedto the United States as a patronafter rejectingthe Chinese model and China's influence, thus negating Sukarno'spolicy. The in governmentformallybannedthe communistpartyandrelatedorganizations 1966 (after the army had ordered its elimination). The newly reconstituted state (formally based on restorationof the 1945 constitution)supplantedSustate karno's Guided Democracy with Suharto'sNew Order,an authoritarian based on capitalist development. This was accompaniedby mass detention (withoutchargeor trial)of 750,000, who were banishedto remotecamps for a of decade or more afterthese events. Severalhundred these were still detained in 1982 (Amnesty International 1983:38). Twenty-fiveyears later, "thousands of former 'PKI' prisonerswere requiredto reportregularlyto local military authoritiesand suffered officially sanctioneddiscriminationin employment, and political and other fields" (Amnesty International1990:121). Cambodia In Cambodia, the victory of the insurgent Khmer Rouge (hereafter KR), which triggered a radical, annihilatoryversion of communism, was largely made possible by the unanticipated consequences of events startingwith the incursionby Vietnamand the United States intervention,expandingthe Indochina war. For a narrativeaccount of these years (from 1965 to 1975), I rely principallyon Shawcross(1979, 1984) and Becker (1986) and for the internal development of the Khmer Rouge on Kieran (1985). The destabilizationof Cambodia began during the Indochina war in the in 1960s, afterthe North Vietnameseretreatedinto sanctuaries Cambodiaand after the United States escalated the IndochinaWar.The incentives to widescale smuggling of rice by Khmers to Vietnam (sold to both sides) also underminedthe Cambodianstate economy by depriving it of tax revenues (Kiernan 1992). Prince Sihanoukfirst tried to appeasethe North Vietnamese and later agreed to the secret bombings by the United States of Vietcong sanctuariesin Cambodiawhile he publicly protestedAmericanincursionsto the United Nations (Haas 1991:15; Shawcross 1979:70, 390). Sihanouk's policies led to military and political unrest and the Lon Nol coup in 1970. Sihanoukreactedto his depositionby formallyjoining a KR coalition created by China. The US bombing, which killed an estimated 50,000 to 150,000 Cambodians (Kiernan 1989:32), led to additional gains for the KR because the bombing drove the Vietnamese furtherinside Cambodiaand radicallydislo-

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cated and disorganized rural life, leading to an estimated two million displaced peasantsin the cities (Shawcross 1979:174-6; Haas 1991:16). Malnutrition, inflation, and the corruptionof the militaryled to furthermisery and demoralizationamong the refugees. Such effects were neithercalculated for saw Camnor compensatedfor by the United States, whose administration bodia as a "sideshow"in the Indochinawar (Shawcross 1979). Kieran observes that "althoughit was indigenous, Pol Pot's revolutionwould not have won power without US economic and military destabilisation of Cambodia. . . . This was probably the most important single factor in Pol Pot's

rise" (Kieran 1993a:1). and Not only outside forces but also the opportunistic short-sighted political decisions of Cambodians,foremostof whom was Prince Sihanouk,the focus of traditional loyalty in Cambodia, enabled the KR to come to power. Sihanouk'sstrategyof aligning himself nominallyto the KR afterthe Lon Nol coup served to legitimate the KR and to diminish resistanceto it. The KR, who had been repressed and denied rights to compete politically under Sihanouk, bided its time and toleratedhim. Its victory was also hastenedby the brutality,military ineptitude, and magical thinkingof Lon Nol. Becker relates both the magical thinking and the cruelty of the KR to the Khmer past and to a tradition of cruelty and total despotism dating from Angkor: world to retreated aninner and worldwasbecoming Theouter unmanageable, Khmers solace of spiritsand animism,an exotic realmwherespells and amulets provided
against incomprehensiblecatastrophes .... When the victorious revolutionariesof

Penhsaidtheywerevery"black" the Pol Pot arrived, city peopleof Phnom people; citizensof the city andthese"black" peoplechose as theirvictimsthe "jadewhite" (Becker1986:85). The "blacks," including the Khmer Loeu, highlandtribalpeople, historically used by princes out of power to attackthe center, were recruitedby the KR during their years in the jungle (Becker 1986:121-3). Marxistsfrom an educatedmiddle class backgroundin Cambodia,the membersof the KR had extended their rural supportduring these years in which they governed the local populationin a draconianway, sustainingthem throughenforced agriculturalcollectives. Despite-or because of-their urbanorigins and foreign (Parisian) education, the KR rejected the influence of foreigners in food, clothing, hair styles, and music and sought purification from foreign contamination. Both the KR and the Lon Nol governmentwere hostile to the Vietnamese forces and displaced their anger on local Vietnamese Khmer, who were mostly urbanclerks and skilled workers.AlthoughVietnamwas the traditional hegemonic power in the region, relationswith the Vietnamesein Cambodia had usually been pacific. The Lon Nol government interned 30,000 Vietnamese Cambodians,jailed "7,000 of them undersuspicion of treason,"and

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secretly executed 800 in 1970 (Becker 1986:139-40). Jackson reportsthat "thousandsof Vietnamese residents were slaughtered"(1989:72); Ponchaud (1978) and Thion (1987) also reportpogroms in the Lon Nol period. Kiernan reports earlier massacres of local Vietnamese and Muslim Cham in 1949 (1985:71, 74-75). The KR hostility to the Vietnamese Communists was reinforcedby the by experienceof being used and subordinated them in pursuitof theirnational goals (Jackson 1989:41; Becker 1986:93-94). Between 1973 and 1975, the KR became radicalizedas an indirectconsequenceof United Statesbombardand ment, leading to the diminished influence of Vietnamese-trained moderate leaders (Kiernan 1985:390-4). After 1970, the KR began to kill returning KR cadres who had spent a decade involuntarilyin Vietnam. One survivor, Hem Samin, recalledthat"therewas nothingbut insults . .. -.talk aboutthe God-damned Vietnamese in Khmer skin" (Becker 1986:192). The border conflict with Vietnam, escalated by the KR after their victory to a full-scale war, led ultimately to the fall of the KR in 1979. rule without law, When the KR came to power, they imposed totalitarian expelling the urban population (including the sick and the hospitalized) of Phnom Penh peremptorilyand imposed a secret government (based on the military and the cooperatives) throughoutthe ruralareas. People were both terrorized and atomized as the family, neighborhoodgroups, villages and associations were subject to "sociological dissolution . . . khchatkhchay os roling which is translated'scatterthem out of sight' or 'scatterthem to the last one'" (Hawk 1988:137). By destroyingany independenteconomy, eliminating the marketplaceand money, and by virtuallyannullingkinship solidarity and preventing new groups from forming, the KR destroyed any basis for opposition. It spoke of the ruling elite as Angkar (usually translatedas "the organization"),invoking parentalauthority:"Since Angkaris the 'dad-mom' of the people, it hence has the responsibilityto determinewho is partof the family and who is not" (Ponchaud 1989:165)." Quinn observes that in order createthe"newsocialist to man" inhabit newsociety,Pol Potsought to his to stripaway the cultural, religious,and social infrastructures whichtraditional upon Khmer themwitha newsocialist order based total on societywasbasedandto replace to and of self acquiescence the "organization" (Angkar) subjugation theindividual to the collectivegood. The new collectivefarmsservedas the maininstrument for this a rasa culture achieving goal. Theyrepresentedtabula uponwhichthenewKhmer wasto be imprinted. Similar theChinese to Cultural Revolution's to campaign destroy the"Four Olds". . . thisprocess several had distinct all at elements, aimed destroying
the institutionsand organizationsof the ancien regime (1989:190-1).

Becker comparesthe political economy of the KR and the brutalityof their implementationto similar periods of early communism in both the Soviet Union and China (Becker 1986:196-202). Similarly,Jacksonnotes that "the goals sought by the KR were far from unique. In fact, these goals mirrorthe

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thinking of the radicals surroundingMao Zedong during the Great Leap Forwardand the CulturalRevolution"(Jackson 1989:38). The Indonesianmassacresof 1965, noted by Pol Pot in China, were also a precedent of mass annihilation. The massacres then showed him the vulroad (as nerability of a communist party which had taken a constitutionalist well as later, perhaps, the possibility of changing a society radically by annihilation).The massacresalso showed the KR thatthey were dependenton Sihanouk, who used the Indonesianslaughteras "a reminderto you and not a threat"(Kiernan 1985:222, 235, quote on 252). The KR's drive to create a new society, purifiedracially and ethnically,is ascribed by Becker both to communism and to native fascism. They were moved, she says, both by "fearof racialextinctionand a corollarybelief in its [Khmer] cultural if not racial superiority"(1986:16). Fascism, she asserts, was the goal of both Lon Nol and Saloth Sar (Pol Pot), the formerviewing salvationin the past and the latterin the future."Bothleadersalso encouraged fascism's by-products-racism and xenophobia"(1986:136). The KR's fear of group extinction can be traced both to the deaths and disorganizationin the preceding decade before their rule and the historical subjugationof the Khmerkingdom by its neighbors. The KR's reiterationof
blood themes in song and speeches-"The red, red blood . . . The sublime

blood" (and so forth) in the national anthem (Jackson 1989:72-73)resembles the Nazi emphasison blood, which also has been relatedto a fear of group extinction (Weinstein 1980). The KR also spilled blood withouthesitationor qualms, killing both minorities and a large number of members of the majority group. The KR destroyed, throughsecret killings and torture, as well as enforced hunger and slave labor leading to starvationand untreateddiseases, the Buddhistpriesthood and ethnic minorities-the Cham and Vietnamese-and the Khmer in the eastern zone who were educatedand open to foreign influence. Hannum shows how both killings and such indirectmeans of producingdeath against the Khmer national group constitute acts of genocide underthe Convention because they were committedwith intent to destroy the Khmernation in the name of purification:Under Article 2 of the UNGC, proscribedacts include killings; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberatelyinflicting on the groupconditionsof life calculatedto bringabout its physical destructionin whole or in part (Hannum 1989:86-93). Kiernan's (1993b) estimates of the death tolls under Pol Pot show the disparate effects of KR policies on different ethnic groups: 100 percent of Vietnamese, 50 percent of Chinese, 40 percent of Lao, and 36 percent of Cham in Cambodia are believed to have died. Among the Khmer, Kieran estimates that 25 percentof urbanKhmerforced to migrateto the countryside died as contrastedto 15 percent of the Khmerpreviously living there. Total estimates of the dead tend to be aroundtwo or three million, or 21 percentto

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31 percentof all Cambodiansin 1975, dependingon various estimatesof the population then (Hannum and Hawk 1986:122-9; Hannum 1989; Kieran 1993; Rummel 1992). Whatis sociologically about genocide theKhmer theKRis how the of significant by theKRdivided Khmer classesby labelling, the into who live discriminating might and whocouldbe destroyed: for "candidates" fullrights,"depospeoplewith"fullrights," itees"(without old rights); people(withthe KR before1975) and new people;the and people andenemiesof thepeople [Hannum Hawk1986:23-24,65-66]. Those who wereto be eliminated werestigmatized sub-human, as themfromthe excluding universe obligation effectively anypre-existing of as as divisionof reliperpetrator's the usedphysical gion or race. . . . Wherepeopleweretransferred, KR sometimes the signs-blue andgreenscarves-to distinguish victimsto be killedin muchthe same way the Germans used the yellow star [Kieran 1991] (Fein 1993b:77-78). In these efforts, the KR secured some supportfrom membersof the lowest classes and of many tribal people, whose status was exalted in the new invertedclass pyramid;the lowest were now the highest and the highest the lowest (Becker 1986:122-3; Ponchaud 1989:157-67). The people with "full rights"were compensatedwith a share in the power to decide the fate of the rightless, rather than material goods. The victims, despite their numbers, could not organize resistance because of the pervasiveness of fear: the new people feared the old (more loyal to the KR); and parentsfeared their children, socialized by the KR to regard them as corruptand treacherous, as enemies (Quinn 1989:191-3, 203). Democratic Kampucheahad disconnecteditself from the world economy, from world communications,and from reliance on foreign patronsby choice of the KR leadership.It not only rejectedforeign aid, with an exception for about "20,000 PRC advisors [who] were in Cambodiaby 1978 to provide technical assistance" (Haas 1991, 21), but also rejected humanitarian donations by nongovernmental organizations.The KR rationalewas derived from a theory of economic autarchy,rejecting"artificialmodernization" Camand bodia's dependenceon the world market,maintainingthat "international inteof gration . . . is the root cause of underdevelopment the Khmereconomy,"a conclusion reached by Khieu Samphanin his doctoral dissertationin 1959 (Jackson 1989:74-75). However, Becker observes that Khieu Samphanproposed both agriculturalreform and nationally controlled industrialization (1986:79) ratherthan autarchy.One may view the KR economic theory as a crude deduction of implications from dependency theory. Similarly to the latterschool, Wallerstein(1974), ascribesthe states' position in the periphery, often called "underdevelopment," their place in the world-systemof divito sion of labor. No foreign power appearedto have the will to impose any sanctionsagainst the KR. China was responsible for brokeringthe KR alliance with Prince Sihanouk and loyally supportingthe KR until 1991, using Cambodia as a

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FEIN

Pol counterto Vietnam. Thus, China, supporting Pot, andthe USSR, supportwhich backeda factionof the KR thathad been mislabelledproing Vietnam, Vietnamese (a self-fulfilling prophecy), reinforced and acted out their antagonism. Zhou Enlai was reported to have cautioned KR leaders in 1975 against radialutopianattemptsto impose communismabruptly, these had failed in as China (Jackson 1989:63). Becker reportsthe testimony of a senior Chinese diplomat to the effect that China, aware as early as 1976 of the purges and violence of the KR, decided not to protest(1986:286-7). Vickery maintains that neitherChina nor the Soviet Union mandatedthe KR's policies; neither could they have stoppedthem (1986:21-24). However, he overlooks how the PRC benefited from the policies of the KR and validatedthem. Chinademandedin 1977 thatthe KR publicly "declarethemselvescommunists, unveil Pol Pot as the leader of the party and the country,and begin to counteract the bloodcurdling stories being told by refugees who had fled Democratic Kampucheainto Thailand"(Becker 1986:313). Haas cites PRC Prime MinisterHuang Hua, who in 1977 "gave PhomhPenh a green light to conduct purges and to make war on Vietnam"(1991:23). China actively collaboratedin the third Indochinawar. The downfall of the KR ultimatelyresultedfrom the Vietnamese invasion in 1979. Had the Pol Pot regime not both attackedVietnamand begun a purge within the KR for suspects with pro-Vietnamsympathies, creating a selffulfilling prophecy-that they would go over to the Vietnameseside for selfpreservation-it might have preventedthe Vietnamese invasion and the regime might still be in place today. Paradoxically,despite the KR defeat, the KR are still players today. Their right to participatein the new governmentof Cambodiahas been legitimated by the peace plan negotiatedby the permanentmembersof the UN Security Council, thanksto the greatpowers' protectionof client states and armiesand the alliances among them. During the negotiating process, the KR sucof cessfully lobbied for the abandonment charges against them. "The years 1988-91 saw a progressive eliminationof diplomaticcriticism of the 197579 Cambodiangenocide" (Kiernan1992:20). The Perm-5plan stipulatesthat the KR will participatein the sovereign body of Cambodia, the Supreme National Council. It could enable the KR to returnto power by electoral subversion, terrorand physical intimidationin coalition, intra-governmental the the countrysideor on the battlefield. "Through Perm-5Plan, the international community has thrust responsibility for the Khmer Rouge onto the Cambodianpeople. The country faces several more years of living dangerously" (Kiernan 1992:23).
COMPARISON AND DISCUSSION

Indonesia and Cambodiadiffer greatly in age, size, potentialpower or powerlessness in relationshipto their neighbors,and history.Cambodiais histori-

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cally prone to be dependentbecause of its size, location; and the superpower and regional powers in the neighborhood.Indonesia, the largest country in southeastAsia, is situatedin a strategicgeopolitical position and prone to be hegemonic because of its size, population, and location. In terms of social structureand problems, there were few similaritiesbetween Cambodiaand Indonesia. Cambodianpre-war(pre-1970) society was characterized little stratification by (Vickery 1986:52), an ample food supply, and "a general ethic of fundamental (Ebihara1989:21). Indoegalitarianism" nesia before 1965 was characterized high populationpressure, high landby lessness, ruralpoverty, and malnutrition (Palmier 1985:16-19; Hefner 1990: 113-22). Similarly,their societies differin associationalform andpolitical and ethnic culture. In Cambodia, there were few intermediateassociations between the family or village and the head of state. In Indonesia,therewere manyassociations. Both cultures are diverse, but Indonesia, a much more diverse aggregate of many islands and peoples, is indeed a model of the plural society. Preceding both genocides, however, both societies experienced multiple crises. The most importantpolitical crisis was the fracturingof authority, which stemmed from the inability of these governmentsto command and control the militaryand the inabilityof the militaryto controlthe territoryof the nation. The coming to power of military leaders in the name of the revolution or for the defense against the revolution was facilitated in both cases by the ineptitudeof charismaticleaders, Sukarnoand Sihanouk, who tilted toward China, and the ineptitudeof Lon Nol, who was backed by the United States. But Chinacould not restoreSukarno'spower and nevertriedto restorethe power of Sihanouk.Nor could the United States save the regime of Lon Nol. Review of Theory and Cases Genocide is viewed theoreticallyherein as a strategythat ruling elites use to resolve real solidarityand legitimacy conflicts or challenges to their interests against victims decreed outside their universe of obligation in situations in which a crisis or opportunityis caused by or blamed on the victim (or the victim impedes taking advantageof an opportunity)and the perpetrators believe thatthey can get away with it. I shall illustratethe elementsof the theory in reviewing both cases. These include legitimacy problems, moralexclusion (of the victims), blaming the victim and patrons'tolerance.
LEGITIMACY PROBLEMS.

These arose from crises due to the collapse of governmentsand authority. These states folded in differentways-an implosion of power in Cambodia (allowing the KR to take power) and an explosion of power in Indonesia, reinforcedby the manipulationof collective rage. This led to the seizure of

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power by elites who were not elected democraticallyand who faced real and potential challenges to their legitimacy. Both the KR and the Indonesiangeneralsseem to have anticipated thatthey could be confrontedwith armedenemies within their country.Moreover,the KR feared they could not control Cambodiawithout terror.There were not enough communist cadres and army members until 1977 to even admit the state was controlled by the communistparty.Their fear of the United States was revived by the Mayaguez incident in 1975, when the United States attackedCambodiaagain, supposedlyto release a UnitedStatesmerchant ship which Cambodiahad seized and already agreed to let go. The collapse led to revolutionaryand antirevolutionary upheavals. The of both regimes, looked at retrospectively,perhaps appear more ideologies coherent now than they were at the time. Both the ideologies of the KR and of the generals may be viewed not only as justifications for an envisioned future society but also as responses to sensed disorder. These regimes created new orders based on an elite monopoly of power which atomized society completely in Cambodia and banned anti-state organization in Indonesia. Their ideological formulas and their resultantmurdersserved to resolve problems of legitimacy and solidarity.Genocide in Democratic Kampuchea resolved the problem of the lack of legitimacy of the KR government by eliminating people deemed potentially disloyal and unassimilable. The KR was creatinga new Khmerman, a constituencythatwould maintainthe KR in power. Similarly, by eliminatingPKI activists in Indonesia(among the hundreds of thousandsof victims), the generalseliminatedthe threatof mobilized class conflict underminingtraditionalhierarchyand instigatingopposition to their rule. In both societies, the recruitmentof killers paralleled the fault lines of social structure.In Cambodia, the "blacks",peasantsdisplaced by bombing and marginaltribalpeoples recruitedas partof the KR, were more likely to be the killers of the city people than were other city people or "whites." In Indonesia, class, religion, and ethnicity played a role in dividing, and sometimes reinforcing, allegiances and antagonisms.In Java, where an estimated four of five Indonesian victims were killed (Cribb 1990:8), parties in representingthe landlordsparticipated the killings, perhapsretaliatingfor earlier class conflicts between landlordsand peasantsorganizedby the PKI. Although religious differences among Muslims also reinforced class-based strife between landlordsand peasants, such differencesoften crosscut social class position. Muslim organizationsmay have misused religious authorityto call for exterminationof the PKI as a jihad or religious duty, but when they did so, they used this both as an instigatorand a legitimatingdevice. In other places, hostility by the dominant group towards ethnic minorities marked them disproportionately victims (Cribb 1990:23-28). as

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MORAL EXCLUSION

The victims in both cases were decreedoutside the universeof obligationof the perpetrator religious doctrine and ideology. Communism, which had by previously been viewed as compatible with the state ideology or Pantjasila was now demonized in Indonesia;Muslim organizationsalso labelled communists as atheists and infidels. However, the army eventually acted to limit these organizationsbecause their goal of creatingan Islamic state was not the army's. The minorities subject to slaughterbecause of group identity were largely viewed as foreigners. The victims in Cambodiawere largely other Khmerswho were defined by the KR as enemies, people without rights. The minorities who were annihilated were non-Khmer;the Vietnamese among them had previously been subject to discriminationand pogroms under several governments.
BLAMING THE VICTIM

The victims in both countries were judged (by the organizers of their massacre) as collectively guilty. The victims in Indonesia were blamed and held collectively guilty for a crime or outrage-the killing of the generals in 1965-that only a few could have perpetrated. Cambodia,the victims were In (for the most part) not accused of anythingother than being what they were: guilty by class, religious, and ethnic origin. They were viewed by the KR as enemies by definition or by blood-non-Khmer, new people, enemies of the people, creatureswithout rights.
PATRONS' TOLERANCE

The preceding crises and isolation of both states duringthe killings made these genocides largely invisible on the world scene. But they were visible to the patron-states: United States and China. The evidence does not prove the either that the United States instigated the massacres in Indonesia or that Chinainitiatedthe directand indirectslaughterby the KR. But the patronsdid collaborate with their clients, using them to reinforce their position in Asia. The United States supported continuation the Indonesianmassacresand the of legitimatedthem as a tool of state by supplyingthe Indonesianmilitarywith communicationequipmentand what was in effect a hit list. China tolerated the KR killings in Cambodia and authorizedthe purge of the alleged proVietnamese KR and the war with Vietnam. This last element of explanationimplies that the calculus of genocide is a rational one: Genocide can be expected to be cost-free because there are no sanctions or checks against it and external actors continue to support the This also suggests a deterrent(later discussed) by reversingthe perpetrator. response of the patronstates.

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and Preparation Genocide Vulnerability for Besides confirmingour hypotheses, the readermay ask whatwe have learned. First, there is the question of national vulnerability.Some of the causes of vulnerabilityin both cases are unrelatedto culturaland nationalcharacteristics. For example, both upheavalsalso may be relatedto the existing social unrestin both states which can be partlyattributed inflationand decline in to living standardsin both states. In Cambodia there was also the killing of civilian and enormous refugee flow resulting from Americanbombings between 1970 and 1975 which led not only to physical displacementbut to a prolonged sense of insecurityand fear. War is often the precursoror the precipitantor the consequence of genocide. All cases of genocide between 1945 and 1988 in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East occurredamong states at war at some time; from 14 percentto 29 of percent of warringstates in these regions also were perpetrators genocide 1993a:Table4). War leads to genocide for several reasons. First, it (Fein releases aggression. The losses from war lead to a sense of grievanceand may lead to revolutionary genocide-proneelites coming to power. Finally,war and enables the perpetrator mask the crime and to label the victim as enemy. In to his comparison of the Ottoman Empire's genocide against the Armenians duringWorldWarI and Nazi Germany'sgenocide of Jews and Gypsies during WorldWarII, Melson illustrateshow wars increasethe probabilitythat revolutionary elites will resort to genocide and observes the similarity to the origins of genocide in Cambodia(1992:16-20). In the case of Cambodia,the Indochinawar and its escalationby the United States clearly led to the KhmerRouge victory in 1975. Althoughtherewas an Indonesianinterventionin Malaysia precedingthe 1965 massacres, the presumed communist attempt influenced the perception of threat-and the opportunity-of the generals who organizedthe massacre. The perceptionby leaders in both Cambodiaand Indochinathat they were of The to threatened appeared reinforcetheircold rationality. architects the killing in both instanceswere said to be impelledby the fearof extinction.In Indonesia, the collectivity of the alleged perpetrator-communists being viewed as a collective actor-was said to be the aggressor,althoughthere is no way personalresponsibilityfor the coup and the alleged mutilationof the generals could be ascribedto two or three million people. Defendersof the army and believed they had no other choice: others also often say that the perpetrators Either they had to exterminatethe PKI or be exterminated(Green 1990:150; see also Brackman 1969:116-7; Hughes 1967:189; Cribb 1990:6-7, 123). In Cambodia, leaders of the KR authorizedthe slaughterof people who were unorganizedand had no abilityto attack,as well as the slaughterof army and government officers of the old regime and their families. The leaders

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justified their methods by a theory similar to other communistutopianjustifications of imposed mass death in China and the Soviet Union. Becker (1986) implies that the fear of death, of national extinction, also instigated them to adapt theories which purportedto explain their helplessness by corruptionwithin, demandingpurification. Now one can view the alleged fears of the perpetrators a rationalization as for the murders-that is, it was us versus them-as I tend to do. Some psychological theoristsdo, however, focus on fear of deathas a primalmotor of genocide (Chary 1982; Lifton 1986; see critique in Fein 1993b:46-47). How the perpetrators killed is also relatedto their fears and their bases of In the case of Cambodia, there was little participation killing. in legitimacy. But in Indonesia there was much participationin killing of citizens in a polarized nation: Dissidents fled and hid in terror. Differencesbetween the organizationof killings in both states appearnot to have been solely a function of the ideology of the ruling elites but of their sources of power and supportinitially. The KR regime did not invite popular because it disdainednonviolentmeans of reinforcinglegitimacy participation and creating support. Rather,it organizeda monopoly of terror,fearingpeople who had no motive to murderon cue. Indeed, it did not publicly reveal who the Organizationgoverning them was for two years. It did not gather crowds and generallyabjuredthe strategyof inducingloyalty (to the partyand to a charismaticleader), governing by terrorinstead. Rather,it attemptedto control by atomizing society, preventingkin and largergroups from forming, after the forced urbandisplacementand breakupof families in the new communes. Genocide in Cambodiawas executed by a secret organizationwhose new class was rewardedwith some but limited authority. In Indonesiapriorto September1965, an increasinglyfragile coalition was held together by Sukamo's manipulation,backed by his charismaticpower over the electorateand the organizedstrengthof the PKI. If Sukamodied, the state would lack all forms of legitimacy (using the bases noted by Weber (1946:78-81): charismatic(based on Sukaro), traditional(discredited)and of legal (disdainedwith the renunciation liberaldemocracy).The New Order's destructionof mass class-based organizationsand proteststaught its citizens how to comply with new alacrity;they could not easily forget the terrorof 1965. In both cases, the readinessof leaders to kill in orderto create a new order is relatedto pre-existingnationaldefinitionsof enemies and characteristically tolerateduses of aggression, such as the state-sanctioned practiceof allowing crowd processions to riot and at times to torch buildings and to kill. State-manipulated prejudicesand sanctionedviolence led both the Indonesians and Cambodians to vent aggression against foreigners and attribute collective guilt to whole nations, ethnic groups, and parties. In totalitarian

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states, and under Sukarno's Guided Democracy (1957-65), large crowds were led and aroused by Sukaro to channel hatreds and on occasions to rampage against selected targets. Under Sukaro, mass rallies against imperialism and stereotypes of external enemies-the United States, Great Britain-and internalenemies were the norm. Enemies were to be destroyed, liquidated. Several writers (from differentpolitical perspectives)remarkon the tension and atmosphereof mass hysteriaof the last days. Aggression was externalized, with the army and nation mobilized to incorporateand defeat neighbors: West Irian, Malaysia. Despite their drasticallydifferentpotential for domination, Indonesia and Cambodia were alike in their ambiguous definition of nationalbordersand how this was used to justify aggression. The KR relied on this ambiguity about where theirstateended, evoking memoriesof an old "galacticstatewith no fixed borderline, whose influence extends as far as it can go without meeting a force of equal strength" to justify fighting Vietnam (Thion 1987:159). The Indonesiansbegan to assume theiridentitycoincided with the their peninsularrange(including3,000 islands),justifying wars to incorporate neighbors, negating claims to self-determination,and evoking popular supin port and participation aggression throughriots and rallies. Similarly,both societies were used to violence against groups who might be labelled as the enemy within. Both countriestoleratedperiodicpogromsagainstcitizens with whom they peacefully coexisted at other times. Pogromsare often precededby collective accusations.Such collective punishments rest on an underlyingbelief among many peoples in collective guilt which justifies collective punishmentor retribution(Fein 1977:ch. 1). Many learned this through the earlier repertoireof state-authorized aggression in and nationalist fervor pogroms and riots. Popular prejudices, chauvinism, especially helped to justify the killing of minorityvictims. The victims of local pogroms were minoritiesdrawn from more powerful neighbors with whom the state was, had been, or might be in conflict. In Cambodia, these are the Cambodiansof Vietnameseorigin; in Indonesia, the Indonesiansof Chinese origin. This provideda model for the eliminationof minorities and dissidents. Thus, the genocides might be seen in partas both an escalationof violence against a previouslymarkeddomestic enemy and a venting within the state of rage and aggression usually directed at a foreign power but transferredto of membersor sympathizers such foreignpowers. In Indonesia,PKI members and Chinese were assumed to identify with China and with revolutionary violence. In Cambodia,the KR targetedthe Vietnameseand othernon-Khmer minorities and Khmerof urbanand educatedclasses (most apt to have been influenced by foreign models), decreeing all foreign persons and influences were the enemy. There is also some evidence that culturaltraditionsin both

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cases have in the past justified collective punishmentsof families and groups (Cribb 1990:31-34; Ponchaud 1989:161-75).
POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Struggles within the state over legitimacy and solidaritytake many forms and have a range of outcomes. Although most genocides emerge from struggles between ethnic groups about dominationwithin the state, there are recurring cases of crises leading to revolutionaryregimes and genocide (Harff 1988; Melson 1992; Fein 1993a). The linkages are direct and indirect.The military, ratherthan the party, is the organizationmost likely to bring about such a revolution in the new states. The genocides in Cambodiaand Indonesia resulted from revolutionary counter-revolutionary and upheavalsemergingfrom military struggles ratherthan revolutionfrom below. Communism, the leading ideology since 1945 until the present, promised social change even as it authorizedkilling on the basis of class and politics, identifying dissidents as "enemies of the people." But upon closer examination, the xenophobic ideology of the KR regime resembles more an almost forgottenphenomenonof nationalsocialism, which Becker (1986) calls fascism. Such regimes themselves evoke the threatsthatdemandpurges, promoting paranoidmyths of persecutionor anticipatedpersecutionas a means of inciting solidarity (Fein 1991). What Asian communism, fascism, Sukaro's Guided Democracy, Lon Nol's authoritarianism, the succeedingNew Orderof the generals, have in and common is their disdain for liberal democracy,the limits of constitutionalism and rules, and the personalization enemies. Which formof authoritarianism of wins out depends on many contingencies. to Ideological choices and the decisions by the perpetrators eliminatetheir enemies are results not only of internalforces but of the plannedand unintended effects of interventionsby superpowers(and regional powers). When genocide and politicide (or state mass murder)are cost-free, as in Indonesia, they are likely to be repeated. Between 1975 and 1984, the Indonesianintervention in East Timor, classed by Harff and Gurr (1987) as genocide, is estimatedto have taken the lives of as many as 200,000, "abouta thirdof the pre-invasionpopulation"throughindiscriminatebombardment,famine, disease and extrajudicialexecutions (Amnesty International1985:6). The United States has supportedIndonesia since then uncritically,supplying arms despite mass killing and genocide in West Irian and East Timor. Chinahas continuedto armthe KR, which, many informedobserversbelieve, still has the capacity to come back in Cambodia, given the negotiatedtruce concluded with the participationof the permanentmembers of the Security Council. Thus, both superpowersdefend their clients consistently. To preventgenocide will requirenot only unmaskingthe perpetrators the in

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act but exposing and reorienting superpower policies, as well as pressing patrons to take responsibility not only for their own acts but also for the acts of the client states they help put in power, arm, and support. The readiness of major states (that is, the United States, China, Britain, France) to sanction conditions enabling the KR to return to power in Cambodia shows they have no interest in the consequences of their acts. Kuper asserted "that the sovereign territorial state claims, as an integral part of its sovereignty, the right to commit genocide, or engage in genocidal massacres, against peoples under its rule, and that the United Nations, for all practical purposes, defends this right" (1981:61). The patrons of such states have the means to change the contract of the sovereign territorial state with the international community and to intervene against and sanction insurgents and established armies which also perpetrate genocidal massacres. Were they to view genocidal massacres which propel hundreds of thousands to flee (such as, Bosnia-Herzegovina) as a violation as grave as that of states crossing international borders (such as, what Iraq did in Kuwait), they would do so.
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