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In the 1o!os politics in Tanzania was substantially a bureaucratic affair. Since the 1o8os governance reforms have introduced measures conduced to building a legal-rational bureaucracy and a liberal civil society. Both'air-conditioned' politics and'veranda' politics are advancing simultaneously, inundating a previously bureaucratic political sphere.
In the 1o!os politics in Tanzania was substantially a bureaucratic affair. Since the 1o8os governance reforms have introduced measures conduced to building a legal-rational bureaucracy and a liberal civil society. Both'air-conditioned' politics and'veranda' politics are advancing simultaneously, inundating a previously bureaucratic political sphere.
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In the 1o!os politics in Tanzania was substantially a bureaucratic affair. Since the 1o8os governance reforms have introduced measures conduced to building a legal-rational bureaucracy and a liberal civil society. Both'air-conditioned' politics and'veranda' politics are advancing simultaneously, inundating a previously bureaucratic political sphere.
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Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
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Descărcați ca PDF, TXT sau citiți online pe Scribd
J. of Modern African Studies, o, (iooi), pp. jo61o.
# iooi Cambridge University Press
DOI: 1o.1o1\Sooiii8Xoiooo68 Printed in the United Kingdom Shop windows and smoke-filled rooms: governance and the re-politicisation of Tanzania Tim Kelsall* .ns 1n.1 In the 1oos politics in Tanzania was substantially a bureaucratic aair. Since the 1o8os, however, economic liberalisation, multiparty democracy and governance reforms have on the one hand introduced measures con- ducive to building a legal-rational bureaucracy and a liberal civil society, and on the other accelerated political struggle for economic resources through personalised regional networks. Paraphrasing Emmanuel Terray, the rst trend is described in this article as the manufacture of air- conditioned politics, the second as the growth of veranda politics. The article argues that donor reforms are not leading in a straight line to liberal governance, but neither is civil society simply being colonised by patri- monial networks. Rather, both air-conditioned politics and veranda politics are advancing simultaneously, inundating a previously bureaucratised political sphere. The dual character of this re-politicisation makes the fate of governance reforms exceedingly dicult to predict. r x1noii1r ox [The people we see,] the Permanent Secretaries, those people who speak the language of good governance, those who can talk the talk even if they dont walk the walk, are like a shop-window what is put on public display. But of course the real decisions are made behind the shop-window, in the smoke- lled rooms of the CCM." This is an article about the politics of the governance agenda in Tanzania. Governance, as a project in its broadest sense, attempts to introduce a series of political, economic, and administrative reforms into Africa with the ambition of improving the continents dismal record of development. It rests on the idea that at the heart of Africas development crisis lies a crisis of the state. It is believed that personalised * Lecturer in African Politics, University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne. The author wishes to thank The Nueld Foundation, which provided a small grant for research in Tanzania between June and September ioo1. He also thanks Geir Sundet, Graham Harrison, Sara Rich and two anonymous referees for comments on the paper, the limitations of which are all his own. jo8 1r x iiis .ii and clientelistic African states need to be transformed into legal- rational Weberian states with liberal polities and market economies. Emmanuel Terray has used the metaphor, the politics of the veranda to describe the patrimonial share-outs that characterised the rickety and personalistic structures of Africas pre-reform polities. In the donors view, the politics of the veranda must be replaced by the politics of the air-conditioner. The air-conditioner, which signies a modern administration governed by a modern constitution that empowers liberal institutions, is presently a mere fac: ade, screening the outside world from the humidity of patrimonial politics. The intention of governance is to extend air-conditioned politics out onto the veranda itself. The aim is to cool the political temperature with the manufactured breeze of liberal democracy, ecient administration, and benign capitalism (Terray 1o86: 8, cited in OBrien 1oo1: 1j1i; World Bank 1o8o, 1oo).# The interesting thing about Tanzania from this perspective, is that prior to the period of economic and political liberalisation, politics out on the veranda was not very hot. Pace Goran Hyden (1o8) arguably Tanzanias most inuential scholar political clientelism was not especially debilitating. Politics was so centralised under the dominance of a socialist-style single party, that the struggle for preferments rarely, if ever, disturbed its outward tranquillity.$ Pretenders to power were unable to call upon the idioms of class, ethnicity or even religion to rouse popular movements in their support. Factional conict among the political elite was present yet muted. On-stage politics was largely snued out. Importantly, the number of air-conditioned oces in Tanzania was also, undoubtedly, rather few. Yet this is beginning to change. The advent of structural adjustment and multiparty politics appears to have encouraged the rapid construction of a political veranda, as indigenous elites, in a liberalised climate, throw up structures on which to pursue their interests. Meanwhile, the increasing number of donors advising on civil service reform and the proliferation of governmental and non-governmental benefactors seeking NGOs to fund, has begun the building of an ersatz, air-conditioned civil society. Together, these trends amount not to the displacement of patrimonial politics by civil politics, nor to the triumph of good government over misrule.% Rather, both types of politics are advancing simultaneously, re-politicising, in the process, a previously bureaucratised political sphere.& In this sense, the situation may not be as cynically straightforward as the quotation which opens this article andwhichbears astrikingresemblance toTerrays metaphor s nov wr xiows .xi s xoii- ir iiii nooxs joo might seem to suggest. At risk of overextending the image: the rooms are getting smokier, while some shop dummies are acquiring a life of their own. The aim of this article, then, is to illustrate these trends, and to outline some of their contradictory eects. oiir i voir 1r s Transforming Tanzania into a market economy with a legal-rational administration and a liberal polity involves action by external countries on a broad range of fronts. Tanzania has received donor support for reforms to its political system and changes to its political society (see below), as well as reforms to its public service. Ideally, the political changes are expected to act as a support to the economic reform process, in addition to being intrinsically desirable (Moore 1oo). Both economic reform and an eective democratic politics require a new type of public service. The civil service in Tanzania has been slimmed down, it is somewhat better paid, and attempts are underway to make it more professional and more ecient (Harrison ioo1; Temu & Due iooo; Therkilsden iooo). To this end, an array of projects and programmes reaches into every sector of Tanzanian public life. Therkilsden (iooo), for example, has identied at least twenty-one dierent donor-funded programmes that involve public sector reform. They include structural adjustment reforms, road sector reform, banking sector reform, agricultural sector reform, land sector reform, and tax reform. The centrepiece of the reforms has been the Civil Service Reform, now referred to as the Public Sector Reform Programme (PSRP). The sheer volume of programmes in Tanzania, and their association with dierent donors, has generated what Therkilsden (iooo: 6) terms a syndrome of reformitis , in which lack of coordination, duplication, and excessive reporting requirements themselves act as an obstacle to improving services. An indication is that the Tanzanian public service typically produces i,oo quarterly reports a year for external donors, and is visited by 1,ooo donor missions .' Partly in recognition of this problem, and partly in response to international developments such as the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative, vigorous attempts are now underway to streamline the reform process. Four major policy planning initiatives can be identied. The most general of these is Vision ioij. Vision ioij is a Government of Tanzania document that broadly outlines Tanzanias hopes for the 6oo 1r x iiis .ii future. It is a response to a perception that development policy since the mid-1o8os has suered from a lack of direction, its excessive short- termism resulting in a long-term drift. What kind of society will have been created by Tanzanians in the year ioij? it asks. What is envisioned is that the society Tanzanians will be living in by then will be a substantially developed one with a high quality of livelihood is the heroic answer (United Republic of Tanzania [URT] ioooa: i). It envisages wide-ranging institutional reforms with the aim of unleashing the power of the market and the private sector, striking a balance between the state and other institutions , and promoting democratic and popular participation. Good Governance, it declares, must permeate the modalities of social organisation (ibid. : i). A second long-term vision is the National Poverty Eradication Strategy (NPES), published in 1oo, which addresses objectives for poverty eradication up to the year io1o. The Tanzania Assistance Strategy (TAS) outlines the medium-term role of the international donor community in facilitating and nancing the implementation of Vision ioij.( Finally, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) formulated in the context of HIPC is a medium-term (-year) strategy of poverty reduction consonant with NPES. These initiatives, it should be noted, are contingent on other policy reforms, undertaken in accordance with IMF and World Bank programmes to secure macroeconomic stability and economic eciency, namely the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), as well as the Programmatic Structural Adjustment Credit (PSAC-1) (United Republic of Tanzania iooob). One such reformis the privatisation process, currently overseen by the Presidential Parastatal Sector Reform Commission (PPSRC). The initiatives also depend upon sector-specic strategies developed by other donors. For instance, the PRSP is closely linked to the Local Government Reform Programme (LGRP).) In general, administrative reform embodies both hard and soft components. Hard components involve the insertion of new tech- nologies of surveillance and control into the administration. Soft components, such as training and workshops, are targeted at personnel (Harrison ioo1: 66j6). For instance, a range of measures has been introduced with the aim of attaching new and sophisticated strings to the public purse. They address the amount of money the government spends, and the uses to which it is put. On the hard side, the Ministry of Finance has acquired the ability to monitor the spending of other Ministries. A cash-budgeting system is in operation, as is a Medium s nov wr xiows .xi s xoii- ir iiii nooxs 6o1 Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF), which relies on tracking expenditure by means of the Platinum System computer software package. Other reforms are legally empowered by the Public Procurement and Public Finance Act (ioo1) (ibid.).* On the soft side, Ministry ocials receive training in a modern management canon. Meanwhile, much of the money owing into the Ministry comes via the Tanzania Revenue Authority, to which tax collection has been farmed out. The TRA oers high quality training and relatively high salaries to its sta, who are subject to an incentives regime in which they can be disciplined or dismissed with relative ease. The aim is to improve eciency and reduce corruption (ibid. ; Temu & Due iooo: oo). Such measures, which are jointly intended to alter the psychology of Tanzanian civil servants, will be extended to the society as a whole. Vision ioij urges that, high priority must be given to education and continuous learning, and speaks of eective transformation of the mindset and culture (URT ioooa: 1). Programmes in this vein, apolitically termed capacity-building by donors, aim to press the subjectivity of Tanzanians into a liberal-developmental mould. Technical solutions, and political-cultural solutions, are inscribed each within the other. The interventions are techno-cultural, or to use a Foucauldian term, bio-political."! Reform also involves intervention in political society. In 1ooi, with donor support, Tanzania began a transition to a multiparty system. Elections were held in 1ooj and iooo. The ruling CCM party was returned to power with large majorities on both occasions, although it faced a sti challenge in some areas. The impact of a liberalised political system of which the small strength of opposition parties in Parliament is not a good indicator, and the nature of which appears to be hidden to many economists is discussed below. Other develop- ments have occurred in the sphere of civil society. In contemporary donor discourse, civil society is assigned a key role in transforming political culture (Diamond 1oo; Hyden 1oo). Vision ioij also acknowledges the importance of civic organisations (URT ioooa: i), and recognises the need to empower the people and catalyse their democratic and popular participation (ibid. : i). However, as recently as four years ago, the prospect that Tanzanian civil society might play this role appeared poor. It was harassed by government, riddled with corruption, divided by in-ghting, and was institutionally weak. The present author wrote at the time (Kelsall ioo1: 18): It seems then that Tanzanias tiny NGO sector is some way from playing the role ascribed to it under the Governance Agenda. It is squeezed between a 6oi 1r x iiis .ii state with an equivocal agenda, a rural society which operates along dierent principles, and is itself composed of an insecure and often opportunistic middle class. While this judgement remains largely accurate, there are some signs that an elite stratum of civil society is now beginning to emerge, the impact of which on national policy is not insignicant. A large part of the change can be attributed to the HIPC initiative and the international civil society mobilisation by which it was preceded. The promise of debt relief operationalised in HIPC has been a lodestar for the Tanzanian government. Often in the teeth of internal criticism, it has done almost everything in its power to earn the forgiveness of external creditors. Of late, this has extended to a more accommodating attitude to civil society. Part of the catalyst for this new attitude has been the PRSP. The drafting of The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper a pre- requisite for inclusion in the HIPC initiative began in October 1ooo. It was steered by a committee of twelve ministers, together with the governor of the Bank of Tanzania and a technical committee comprising experts from several ministries. From an early stage, the formulation of the policy involved inputs from civil society organisa- tions. For example, an interim PRSP, completed in January iooo, was discussed at a consultative technical meeting that included stake- holders from civil society. Fifty-three representatives from NGOs were also invited to discussions at zonal workshops around the country. NGOs were also present at a National Workshop in which an initial draft was debated. The nished paper acknowledges the concern of stakeholders with issues of governance, accountability and trans- parency, cultural phenomena and attitudes to gender: the bread and butter of Tanzanias urbane NGO sector (URT iooob). A key component of PRSP is the development and monitoring of new poverty indicators. This aspect of the strategy, designed to make Tanzanian society more legible, entails the introduction of institutional innovations to allow the government, paraphrasing James Scott (1oo8), to see like a state : Capacity-building is needed at all levels. For the data collecting agencies, there is a need to strengthen existing data collecting mechanisms. Line ministries will need support to enhance their routine surveillance and administrative data systems. The National Bureau of Statistics will need extra support Local government, civil society organisations and research institutions will need support to build their capacity to implement the participatory poverty assessments. (URT iooob: ji, my emphasis) s nov wr xiows .xi s xoii- ir iiii nooxs 6o The scope of capacity-building interventions required, is, according to the Paper, vast . A number of NGOs in Tanzania have begun to organise themselves to take advantage of this opportunity. In 1oo8, in the context of Jubilee iooo, representatives from international NGOs in Tanzania, and some indigenous NGOs, formed an NGO network called the Tanzania Coalition on Debt and Development (TCDD). TCDD has around sixty member organisations. Its intention was to raise international and domestic awareness and to lobby for debt cancellation. The network has been re-activated in the context of PRSP. It has a number of broad aims, which include lobbying for a total cancellation of debt, raising awareness about the PRGF (and agitating for a consultative role for civil society in PRGF negotiations), and monitoring governments progress in poverty reduction in accordance with PRSP. More specically, it aims to monitor the extent to which debt payment cancellation under HIPC is translated into concrete improvements in living standards. To this end, it is beginning to develop a strategy for tracking government expenditure. Focusing on health and education, the aim is to match budgetary allocations at a national level with disbursements through district councils at local level. It will begin by tracking expenditure in two District Councils. In order to do this, it intends to draw on the expertise of local research foundations and the resources of external donors. A meeting to discuss the strategy revealed that the capacity of the network was at present extremely thin, insucient, in fact, to play this limited monitoring role. Member attitudes, lack of resources, and relations with donors also attenuated its capacity: We are the civil society people! the Chair exclaimed at one point, We need to start changing ourselves ! "" Initiatives such as that being pursued by TCDD are able to build on the experience of other Tanzanian NGO networks. FEMACT, for example, is a network of thirty organisations and NGOs concerned with womens issues. Hakiardhi marshals a number of NGOs involved with the issue of land. TANGO an umbrella NGO recently staged Tanzanias rst national NGO\Civil Society Forum, its theme being Collaboration and Participation for Transformation. The number of registered NGOs in the country has increased from81 in 1ooj to more than i,oo in iooo (URT: ioooc). Tanzanian newspapers detail reports, workshops and press conferences by NGOs on a daily basis. Prominent are groups such as the Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP), the Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC), Lawyers Environmental Action Team (LEAT), and Journalists 6o 1r x iiis .ii Environmental Association of Tanzania (JET). All of these NGOs have close links to donors and tend to articulate a broadly liberal political philosophy which emphasises democracy, human rights, gender equality, sustainable development, and respect for the rule of law. In 1oo, this author commented that, It is far from clear that this kind of workshopocracy has a signicant impact on the lives of ordinary, in particular, rural, Tanzanians (Kelsall ioo1: 1o). And that scepticism remains. However, what is clearer is that civil society has made its impact felt at a national level in certain pieces of legislation. The Land Act, for example, is claimed by NGOs to contain groundbreaking provisions that allow the inheritance of land by women. The Sexual Oences Special Provisions Act contains a remarkably progressive denition of sexual harassment, which is informed by womens specic experience in Tanzania. Clause 16oa: Cruelty to Children, outlaws female genital mutilation. The extent to which this legislation is enforceable remains open to question. The Land Act appears to have been drafted in such a way as to institutionalise inertia. It seems unlikely that the sweeping provisions of the Sexual Oences Act will be used, except perhaps in politically expedient circumstances. As one observer said to me, These are very much Dar and Dodoma Acts, lobbied for by interest groups here, and they will probably do hardly anything to help the people in the rural areas who need them most. There have, however, been some prosecutions under Clause 16oa."# In sum, there are indications that with donor backing, civil society is a sector which sections of government are neither keen nor able to ignore. In 1ooo, for example, several NGO representatives were arrested by an order-conscious police force after demonstrating against debt outside a World Bank meeting. The president later defended in public the right of civil society to peaceful protest. But opinion on the NGOsector is far fromuniform. In the wake of the TANGOconference referred to above, The Express newspaper launched a scathing attack on NGOs."$ Then in November, the president of the Lawyers En- vironmental Action Team, Rugemeleza Nshala, together with Tanza- nia Labour Party leader Augustine Mrema, were arrested and charged with sedition after pressing for an investigation into the forced eviction of artisanal miners fromgold mines at Bulyanhulu in 1oo6. In addition, civil society continues to wait with bated breath for the governments NGOBill, the nal formof which, after ve years of consultation, is still not public. s nov wr xiows .xi s xoii- ir iiii nooxs 6oj If we extract fromthis story only the trends that are positive from the perspective of Governance, we might anticipate that Tanzanian development will be increasingly governed in a liberal, legal-rational mode. Policy will be publicly debated by a plurality of interest groups, and the government will discharge its commitments in an ecient, publicly accountable way, assisted in this endeavour by better- coordinated external assistance. The aw in this expectation aside from its inversion of the power relations between government and donors is that the ineciencies in the state which the above-discussed reforms are designed to address are not only due to lack of donor coordination and to civil service incapacity. Another reason for poor governance is that the government often has conicting political priorities (Harrison ioo1; Temu & Due iooo; Therkilsden iooo). The reforms do not take place in an air-conditioned, administrative bubble, isolated from the political atmosphere. Some of them threaten to undermine the interests of signicant sections of Tanzanias political elite. Where they do this, they tend to be resisted or subverted. The governments consistent reluctance to reduce expenditure on teachers salaries is a case in point. The reason is that teachers are key gures in local elections (Therkilsden iooo: 6o). Another very clear example is the halting pace of local government reform."% The arena of local government, as we shall see below, is of critical importance to the interests of the political elite. One way of explaining this, guratively speaking, is to point out that behind the air-conditioned oces that resound to the argot of NPM- and civil-society speak, there stands a veranda of shady deals and clientelist politics. As well as a shop window in the words of our donor there are smoke-lled rooms. voir 1r s ox 1ni \in.xi. When President Benjamin Mkapa came to power in October 1ooj, his Third Phase government began with strong reformist credentials. It seemed serious about the introduction of air-conditioned politics. During its rst year, a new Cabinet was appointed that excluded many of the political heavyweights of the previous regime. In addition, a number of initiatives an Ethics Secretariat , a Prevention of Corruption Bureau, and a Presidential Commission on Corruption were strengthened or begun with the aim of ghting corruption. But its seriousness has not, in the view of some critics, been sustained. It soon became clear, for example, that none of the really big sh would 6o6 1r x iiis .ii be netted by the anti-corruption initiatives. In fact, there are indications that they fairly rapidly began to re-assert their inuence. A clear sign of the latter development was the resignation of Professor Simon Mbilinyi, the minister for nance, in a tax-exemption scandal. Although trumpeted at the time as a sign of increased transparency and accountability in Tanzania, it quickly became clear that Mbilinyi, a committed reformer with a reputation for competence, had been tted up by members of the old guard ousted from Cabinet. The old guard includes the people of whom Julius Nyerere spoke when he said that Tanzania stinks of corruption. They are known to be rich, having amassed private fortunes during the era of President Mwinyi (see below). While much of the corruption in that period appeared to be of a market-based rather than a clientelistic nature, at least one of the old guard is known to have a personal and nancial inuence that permeates the party."& President Mkapa, it seems, would have found it dicult to secure the presidential re-nomination in iooo without him. Moreover, in a context of multiparty democracy, the party nds these individuals useful in securing re-election. Thus the old guard has continued to exercise inuence behind the scenes throughout the Third Phase government, and more recently some of its members have found their way back into Cabinet. While the presidents own integrity is rarely called into question, the stance of several members of the government with respect to reform is now ambiguous."' Many MPs are unhappy with the government, and their unhappiness is increasingly expressed through regional blocs. The conjunctural explanation for this begins with the fact that representatives from the South feel that it is the turn of their relatively underdeveloped region to benet from a period in oce. President Mkapa, after all, is a southerner from Mtwara Region. Many observers expected that on accession to power he would steer increased resources in the direction of the South. Consistent with this, a massive development scheme encompassing coal, iron, port development, and a rail extension is planned for the area, although it will not be completed during Mkapas ten year term. In addition, Professor Mbilinyi was a close friend and home-mate of Mkapa."( However, following his resignation, he was replaced by a northerner: Daniel Yona from Kilimanjaro Region, another friend of Mkapa and home-mate of Mkapas wife. The fact that Mbilinyi was thrown away in this manner, is rumoured to have lost the president support among some of his closest allies from the South. Mkapa is said to be extremely intolerant of personal criticism, and two prominent Southern Highland MPs, with comparatively clean s nov wr xiows .xi s xoii- ir iiii nooxs 6o reputations, were dropped from the Cabinet in iooo. Members of the old guard replaced them. Yona, meanwhile, was replaced by Basil Mramba, an even closer home-mate of Mama Mkapa.") As a result, a group of MPs from the South, centred on the Southern Highlands, is vocal in its condemnation of the Mkapa government."* They resent the fact that northerners, through the suspected inuence of Mama Mkapa, continue to hold key positions of power, and are critical of the return to inuence of politicians with a reputation for corruption. The increased visibility of the southern bloc has acted in part as a spur to the consolidation of other blocs. Particularly vocal has been a group of MPs from the Lake Zone, which in August ioo1 threatened to delay the Finance Bill if its constituencies were not granted royalties from international mining activities.#! The threat never materialised, and it is rumoured that the MPs were privately persuaded to drop their action. The northern bloc is rather more amorphous, but is occasionally mentioned, while the Coast has long been associated with Islam.#" One individual about whom Parliamentarians are particularly unhappy is Iddi Simba, minister for trade and industries. He is a Muslim, and an in-law of Daniel Yona, who is close, as noted earlier, to the Mkapas. He gained popularity as a spokesman for indigenous interests, advocating joint-ownership arrangements between foreign and African capital. He is known to be rich by Tanzanian standards, and to be politically ambitious. All of these reasons have been advanced to explain his seat in Cabinet. But particularly important is the idea that the CCM needs his money, and that of people like him, in order to contest elections. Indeed, in the iooo general election, he was a member of Mkapas campaign team. In August ioo1, in what seemed to be a classic rent-seeking scam, a storm of speculation surrounded alleged improprieties in the handling of sugar import licences by his Ministry, as well as in the divestiture of NASACO, the national shipping company. In the face of strident calls for his resignation Simba refused to quit. Parliamentarians then demanded a probe into the issue, but were persuaded by CCM heavyweights to make it a government, rather than a parliamentary investigation. The probe, when it eventually reported, stopped short of condemning Simba personally. However, it did not restore the condence of the CCM parliamentary caucus, and in November Simba resigned, to the chagrin, it is rumoured, of the president.## Whether these protesting MPs would be any less corrupt were they themselves in power is open to question. Parliamentary ructions and re- 6o8 1r x iiis .ii alignments are imbricated in complex ways with long-term structural changes in Tanzanian society. These changes increase the pressure to engage in corruption. In fact, there is reason to think that the old bureaucratic-centralist pattern of politics is being replaced by an increasingly patrimonial system. If this is the case, the threat of regional or religious instability, itself liable to be exacerbated by succession crises, presents the possibility of serious reversals in the linear direction of reform. Crucial to understanding this upsurge of veranda politics, and the consequent re-politicisation of Tanzanian public life, is an appreciation of the formation and dissolution of the single party state. The period 1o6 to 1o6 witnessed the consolidation of the Tanzanian state under Mwalimu Julius Nyereres leadership. Trade unions, cooperatives, women the civil society groups that sped the nationalist movement to power were all co-opted and transformed into organs of the ruling party. Opposition parties were banned or harassed out of existence, deant leaders were exiled or jailed. District councils, and nally primary cooperative societies, were also abolished. Political expression outside the channels of Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM), the single party, was stied (Bienen 1oo; Coulson 1o8i; Gibbon 1ooo; Havnevik 1oo; Pratt 1o6; Sterkenberg & van Velzen 1o). That said, few organised groups seemed to want to express views outside the party. The major instances of focused repression against the Ruvuma Development Association in 1o6o, and against militant workers in 1o1 were directed, indeed, at groups which followed party policy with a little too much enthusiasm (Coulson 1o8i).#$ Political quiescence among the rest of the population owed a great deal to the fact that the government, an expanded parastatal sector, and a revamped cooperative sector, oered employment to national and local elites. National elites, domiciled in Dar es Salaam, Dodoma and regional capitals, had only to speak the language of ujamaa socialism and provide indications that they were making vigorous attempts to implement its policies.#% Local elites, at district level and below, could aord to be much less ideologically compliant, and often ran local councils and cooperatives much as they had been run in the late colonial period. Crucially, the connections between national and local elites were weak. Key national positions were dispensed by the centre, either at Ministry level or by the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the CCM. National gures subject to local election, such as regional party chairmen and members of Parliament, were subject to s nov wr xiows .xi s xoii- ir iiii nooxs 6oo central screening. Thus for the national elite, cultivation of a local clientele was less important than securing central approval (Bienen 1oo; Finucane 1o; Ingle 1oi; Kelsall ioooa, iooob; Samo 1o). In terms of managing communal conict, Nyerere staed his Cabinet with individuals who were either ideologically committed or personally very loyal to him. He also made gestures in the direction of regional and religious balancing. Regional cleavages were not, however, particularly dicult to manage, since the parastatal sector served as a sucient reservoir of patronage with which to satiate the educated elite of Tanzanias various regions (Hyden 1o8; Okema 1oo6; Pratt 1o, 1o6; Van Donge & Liviga 1o86). This did not, however, restrain communal and regional inequalities completely. There was a perception that religious disparities were growing, since employment at high levels in the parastatal sector necessitated educational qualications, held disproportionately by Christians. There was also a feeling that the North beneted more than the less- educated South. But these perceptions were never translated into explosive political capital. The system did not satisfy everyone. Oscar Kambona, a key gure in the nationalist movement, went into exile in 1o6, and two coup plots were subsequently linked to him. In other cases, leaders and societal sections gave public recognition to the governments ideology of ujamaa, while working in private to undermine it. Meanwhile a proportion of the peasantry was herded into planned villages and subjected to enforced agricultural regulations familiar fromthe colonial era. But those with most to lose under this system found it most dicult to organise, and any eorts to do so were likely to be spotted by an ecient intelligence service (Boesen 1oo; Clie 1oo1; Hyden 1o8o; Kelsall iooob; McHenry 1oo; Okema 1oo6; von Freyhold 1oo). In consequence, Tanzania remained a model of stability. By the late 1oos the conditions for this stability were beginning to unravel. Unfavourable external conditions combined with policy mistakes shook the Tanzanian economy, and the formal planning system never very ecient in the rst place began to feel the strain. The 1oo war with Uganda proved the nal straw, and brought the economy to the brink of collapse. Informal clientelist arrangements frequently lled the gap, and then proved impossible to eradicate (Bryceson 1ooo; Svendsen 1o86). By the early 1o8os, formal sector salaries were insucient to meet living expenses. Short-lived attempts were made to revive the socialist economy, but only a small section of 61o 1r x iiis .ii the ujamaa elite were believers. The fortunes of the state and the elite it sheltered became increasingly wedded to those of private, or quasi- private, capital (Campbell & Stein 1ooi; Tripp 1oo). 1o86 saw the signing of an agreement with the IMF and the next ten years witnessed exchange devaluation, liberalisation of internal and external trade, withdrawal of government support to the cooperative movement, privatisation of numerous parastatal companies, and an increasingly open attitude toward foreign investment. President Ali Hassan Mwinyi a Zanzibari presided over the changes (Campbell & Stein 1ooi). He is widely perceived to have gone some way to redressing religious imbalance by promoting Muslims in his govern- ment.#& Generally speaking, economic liberalisation increased the desire and ability of members of the political elite to enrich themselves. The early prots were made in import-export trade, in which coastal peoples and Zanzibaris with links to India and the Middle East, together with Tanzanian Asians, were well represented. Other lucrative areas were to be found in land grabbing, urban real estate, and the exploitation of tax loopholes. Divestiture of parastatals also introduced a spoils character into Tanzanian politics, as politicians positioned themselves to receive kickbacks or to become part-owners of the newly privatised companies. Other, less fortunate members of the national elite, found themselves retrenched and sent home to the village. As we shall see, it is this development, which has served to de-structure social class in Tanzania, that threatens to make regional politics much more dicult to manage (Campbell & Stein 1ooi; Chachage 1ooj; Gibbon 1ooj; Kaiser 1oo6; Kiondo 1o8o, 1ooj; Maliyamkono & Bagachwa 1ooo; Temu & Due iooo). Prior to the mid-1o8os, national and local elites secured their reproduction as elites through a mixture of patronage and privileged access to state education, which in turn provided continued access to the state (Samo 1o, 1o8o). The state has shrunk and so is no longer sucient to act as a vehicle for reproducing the elite in toto. A section, as outlined above, uses the state for private enrichment ; another section has entered private business or semi-retirement in local areas. Peasants, for their part, used to secure their reproduction through access to land. In heavily populated areas, there is no longer sucient land through which to do this. Instead, both retrenched elites and ordinary peasants attempt to sustain their children by providing themaccess to secondary education, which is believed essential to success in business. This increased demand for secondary education is frequently satised by s nov wr xiows .xi s xoii- ir iiii nooxs 611 means of local, tribal trust funds, which provide money for, among other things, the building of schools (Gibbon 1ooo; Kelsall ioooa). District councils are also expanding their educational provision, partly through harambee eorts. Typically, trust funds are managed by local elites, some of whom are the aforementioned retrenchees. They tend to maintain links with those national elites who remain in the capital. National elites maintain ties with local districts for patriotic, familial or sentimental reasons, and because some of the richest resources minerals, cash crops, sheries, tourism are to be found there. In consequence, national elites patronise local trust funds as well as other types of NGO. The political section of the national elite patronises local trust funds because in a context of political liberalisation, local support is important to securing national power, and local elections are becoming much more competitive (Gibbon 1ooo; Kelsall ioooa). The funds, which nance education yet also call on the symbolic presence of traditional leaders, are useful as platforms on which to build a local reputation, and as bases from which to direct struggle. Meanwhile, local elites educate their children through the funds, build local prestige in them, and sometimes embezzle their nances. Thus local and national elites are linked, more closely than ever before, by a skein of reciprocities, the ideology to which is localism (Gibbon 1ooo; Kelsall ioooa, iooob; Kiondo 1ooj). For the political elite, this type of clientelism, based on gaining oce in a competitive election, acts as an incentive to corruption. For some years, the buying of drinks and food, and the giving of gifts and money, has played a part in election campaigns in Tanzania. Such practices were outlawed and sometimes gave rise to allegations of corruption (Munishi & Mtengeti-Migiro 1ooo). At the rst multiparty election in 1ooj these allegations were very extensive, and they led to over a hundred election petitions (URT 1oo). In iooo an amendment to the election law was passed which gave ocial recognition to the need, in the local parlance, to buy electorates. It permitted the provision of hospitality by candidates during campaigns. The government granted incumbent MPs a gratuity of between TShs 1j and ij million at the end of their parliamentary terms in iooo. In eect it was a campaign fund with which to ght the next election. But many MPs with whom this author spoke spent much more than this amount during the campaign and in the preceding ve years. One claimed to have ploughed TShs j million of his own money into community 61i 1r x iiis .ii projects. This was in addition to money and organisational support that came from the party itself.#' In many constituencies in iooo, elections at CCM primary and at parliamentary level had a desperate quality to them. Reports of money, intimidation and dirty tricks were the norm. The desperation stems on the one hand from the desire of local party cadres to eat , at a time when formal party funding has been scaled down, together with the hunger of a rural electorate that has failed, in most cases, to see signicant gains from structural adjustment. On the other, it arises fromthe appetite of politicians, who perceive that the share out of spoils in natural resources and parastatals cannot go on indenitely. With money an important determinant of electoral popularity, politicians need somehow to acquire it. Some money may come from legitimate business activities or private savings, or from constituency backers. But there is also a temptation to make money through straddling the political and economic spheres, in a variety of practices which shade from outright embezzlement through bribe-taking to crony capitalism. Membership of the government, by providing access to the interface with international donors and with capitalists, presents a fast track to these opportunities. Put schematically, an MP may gain access to the government by several routes : through merit, through close relations with the president, through representing a regional bloc or ethnic group, or through making a nuisance of him or herself (for example by asking embarrassing questions of ministers). Even if not invited into government, an MP may be awarded some other emolument if he or she makes enough noise. It is easier to make a noise as part of a group, and this is one of the reasons why regional groupings are becoming more prominent in Tanzanian politics. Together, these factors make regional blocs increasingly focal as points of political mobilisation.#( In sum, a large part of veranda politics consists in local elites, operating out of ethnic trust funds, NGOs and district councils, cultivating strong personal ties, and exchanging favours with national elites, including national politicians. National politicians, for their part, increasingly group themselves into regional blocs, with the aim of securing the attentions of government. Students of African politics will be entirely familiar with this scenario, since it animates the politics of many states in the region. It is also the case that in many African states, national politicians act as ethnic big-men, able to harness local discontent or mobilise local support in the interests of securing patronage pay-os (Berman 1oo8). It remains to be seen whether the s nov wr xiows .xi s xoii- ir iiii nooxs 61 fact that in Tanzania, regional blocs are more recent inventions than local ethnicities, will serve to mollify the types of political mobilisation their leaders can call forth. It is important to stress that regionalism and clientelism are not intrinsically pathological practices. In fact, they may bring a greater degree of political inuence to rural areas than the old system delivered. However, it is also important to note that they inscribe a potential for corruption and instability, and that they sit uneasily with the impersonal, universalising imperatives of Governance. Over the past two years, for example, Tanzania has witnessed clashes between pastoralists and agriculturalists that have left scores dead in Morogoro Region, violent clashes between clans in Musoma over the farming of marijuana, Islamic riots on the streets of Dar es Salaam, and widespread unrest in mining areas in Musoma, Shinyanga and Arusha. All of these eruptions are entangled with the changing structure of an economy undergoing marketisation, and the changing shape of struggles for wealth and inuence, as the political elite pursues the spoils of liberalised development.#) In Tanzania the increasingly visible regional blocs have not yet congealed into coherent collective actors and their dissolution is quite conceivable. At present, they are partially cross-cut, partially over- lapped, by religious identication, anal relations, and personal friendships dating from secondary school, university, and time spent in the army or in the ruling partys Youth League (Mmuya 1oo8). The story surrounding Professor Mbilinyi, for example, indicates some of this complexity. Individuals also have dierent ideological leanings some purportedly cleaving to the philosophy of the late president, others to a notion of social democracy, and others being ardent supporters of a liberal economy. In the wider CCM party, other factions are sectorally distributed: youth wingers, the bureaucratic elite, the political faction (Mmuya 1oo8: 66).#* Thus inscribed within individuals is a situational geometry of identication, making it extremely dicult to predict which way a particular individual will act or vote from one occasion to the next. It is because of this that speculation over who will be the next president is currently rife in Tanzania, with the main contenders already shaping up for the competition ahead.$! Whoever the next president is, the recent appearance of regional blocs increases the potential for centrifugal politics. It is too soon to say what scope he or she will have to resist this tendency, or what desire to encourage it. Elsewhere in Africa, such forces have typically been 61 1r x iiis .ii neutralised by allowing regional big-men the opportunity to devour, greedily, the national pie (Medard 1o8i: 18i). The eect of this is usually to erode the states economic foundation. The big question for the apostles of Governance is whether air-conditioned politics will have developed to a level that will allow it to present a credible alternative to this dead-end solution.
In the post-independence era, public life in Tanzania was substantially de-politicised and bureaucratised. This did not imply the eradication of public debate or political clientelism, but both these phenomena were tightly contained within the organs of a socialist party-state. Entry into and promotion within this machine depended on a variety of factors such as ideological uency and personal loyalty to the president. Communal and nepotistic considerations were not entirely absent, but considerations of competence were arguably paramount. In addition, the party and state had well-established rules, procedures and political organs that were not, at a national level, routinely outed. The development administration, for example, actually tried to implement development plans. The state at a local level was less robust, but its inuence was more than nugatory. In other words, the state was institutionalised to a signicant degree. It was much more than the expression of Julius Nyereres redoubtable personality. Recent changes have begun to transform this situation. On the one hand, political clientelism has broken the bonds of the state, and now draws on a combination of state and non-state resources. In addition, its rewards are more competitively fought for, and show signs of enlisting communal and regional identities in their pursuit. On the other hand, the state itself is currently subject to numerous techno- cultural programmes that attempt to replace corrupt and clientelistic practices with legal-rational ones. In addition, public debate of a liberal type is on the increase thanks to an invigorated press and a donor-driven civil society of professional NGOs. There is little evidence to suggest that this civil society is edging out or transforming clientelism, in the way that proponents of governance would hope for.$" But neither is it the case, pace Chabal and Daloz (1ooo), that civil society is simply colonised by patrimonial logics. What we are witnessing is the replacement of bureaucracy by competitive politics : re-politicisation in a dual key. s nov wr xiows .xi s xoii- ir iiii nooxs 61j Nor is it necessarily the case that one of these registers will eventually overwhelm the other. Neighbouring states such as Kenya and Uganda have for years experienced a politics that is both more liberal and more patrimonial than that in Tanzania. The two types of politics are capable of co-habiting, especially when one normally patrimonial- ism is the dominant partner. Given that liberal politics tends to be centred on the capital, and clientelistic politics stretches between centre and periphery, it is tempting to invoke Mamdanis (1oo6) idea of the bifurcated state to describe this. The notion certainly has a supercial plausibility. But it is simply not the case that either the local chief for there are none or the district or regional commissioner, act as quite the obstacles to democratic politics that Mamdani seems to imply. Neither of course does democratising the state entail the erosion of clientelism; in fact it might imply just the opposite. The above remarks notwithstanding, this co-habitation of the liberal and the patrimonial is unlikely to remain stable, for the simple reason that donors are vigorously promoting the former. They are applying considerable nancial power to insert a range of new technologies into African administrations with the intention of re-shaping them. While there are indications that these initiatives are being accepted by some key gures at the centre (those in the shop window), they are meeting more serious resistance at local level, in part because of the continuing importance of district councils to clientelist politics. And while donors imagine that empowering the local population is the answer to making local democracy work, this idea fails to appreciate the diculties of this endeavour in the context of contemporary social relations (Kelsall ioooa, iooob). Meanwhile, the progress of reform at the centre is endangered, among other things, by uncertainty over the identity of the next president. Among the favourites to win power in iooj are individuals who thrive on corruption and who might not be averse to inaming communal cleavages in the service of their own private interests. Thus the future character of Tanzanian public life remains dicult to predict. But one thing is certain: there is plenty to play for, both in shop-windows and in smoke-lled rooms. xo1is 1. Interview with aid donor (name withheld), Dar es Salaam, September ioo1. i. The metaphor is liberally adapted from Terray (1o86), insofar as the air-conditioned state of which he spoke presented a fac: ade of bureaucratic-authoritarianism, as opposed to liberal constitutionalism, which is the form air-conditioned politics takes in contemporary Tanzania. In addition, the politics of the share-out is just as much a politics of the scramble. 616 1r x iiis .ii . Tanzania between roughly 1o6 and 1o8 ts well with Allens (1ooj) model of centralised- bureaucratic politics. The model is descriptively very useful. . The term patrimonialism is used loosely: it encompasses patron-clientelism, neo- patrimonialism, and market corruption, phenomena that some authors prefer to separate. See, for example, Medard (1o8i). j. By re-politicisation I refer to a process with two key components : First, public issues become open to debate and scrutiny within the public sphere of a private realm. Second, public and private resources become subject to more intense and open competition. Some commentators would doubtless argue that Tanzania has always been a politicised society. In my terms, Tanzania of the 1o6os was ideologised, and in the 1oos, bureaucratised. 6. James Wolfensohn, quoted in Tanzanian Aairs 6j, JanuaryApril iooo, p. ij. . These documents are often referred to in government and donor literature, but this author has been unable to obtain copies. 8. It is too soon to say whether these broad planning initiatives, together with a Governance Co-ordination Unit, will succeed in tidying up the tangled tendrils of governance, or will add unhelpfully to their number. o. Statement of Bilateral and Multilateral partners on Governance CG Meeting, Dar es Salaam, 11 September ioo1. 1o. For a lucid, Deleuzean reading of bio-power, see Hardt & Negri (ioo1). 11. Authors observation, TCDD meeting, Dar es Salaam, June ioo1. 1i. Interview with aid donor, June ioo1; Court convicts circumcisors , Daily News 6..ioo1: i. 1. NGO congestion creates chaos , The Express i6..ioo1: 1. 1. Government reform programme up for review, Financial Times ioi6.6.ioo1: . 1j. Interviews, Dodoma and Dar es Salaam, June and July ioo1. On the dierence between market and clientelistic corruption, see Medard (1o8i). 16. Interviews, Dar es Salaam and Dodoma, JuneSeptember ioo1. 1. Mbilinyi is from Ruvuma, which neighbours Mtwara. 18. Interviews, Dar es Salaam and Dodoma, JuneJuly ioo1. 1o. See for example, Budget ignores Southern zone and farmers , Financial Times ioi6.6.ioo1: 1&, in which it is reported that MPs slammed the government for ignoring the south. io. MPs meet Minister over royalties , The Guardian (Dar es Salaam), 1..ioo1: 1. i1. The South comprises the Regions of Mtwara, Ruvuma, Mbeya and Iringa, with Iringa and Mbeya arguably forming a Southern Highlands sub-bloc; the North comprises Arusha and Kilimanjaro Regions, possibly also including Lushoto District constituencies in Tanga Region; the Coast refers to Lindi (also sometimes considered Southern), Pwani and coastal Tanga, and also to some Dar es Salaam constituencies; the Lake Zone to Mara, Mwanza, Shinyanga and Kagera. ii. MP demands probe on sugar imports , Daily News i.8.ioo1: 1. i. Although the RDA was, admittedly, outside TANUs control, it was in keeping with the spirit of ujamaa. i. By national elites, I refer, on the side of the government, to ministers, regional commissioners, and to technical sta responsible to central ministries but stationed at regional headquarters. On the side of the Party, I refer to regional party secretaries, regional party chairmen, as well as holders of lesser party posts at regional level. ij. Gjj a group of parliamentarians who in the early 1ooos advocated a reform of the Union with Zanzibar can be read as the Christian reaction to this. i6. Interviews, Dodoma, July ioo1. i. It is also the case that MPs shut out of personal networks of power may raise a fuss in Parliament, in order to be seen and heard to be doing something by their constituents. i8. See for example: CCM entering era of acquisitors , The African (Dar es Salaam), .o.ioo1: o; Government ocers own bhang farms , The Guardian i..ioo1: ; Printpak: example of irresolute privatisation, The Guardian 1o.6.ioo1: o; Hell week for haven of peace, Family Mirror .o.ioo1: ; Who is behind these clashes?, The East African o.o.ioo1: 1o; AFGEM implicates Lowasa, Family Mirror, io..ioo1: 1; We need transparency in mining industry, The Guardian 1.8.ioo1: 6. io. CCM breaks into three groups , Family Mirror i6.6i..ioo1: 1&j. o. Omars Death Derails Groupings , The East African o1j..ioo1: 1&i. 1. 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Newspapers The African (Dar es Salaam) Daily News (Dar es Salaam) The East African (Nairobi) The Express (Dar es Salaam) Family Mirror (Dar es Salaam) Financial Times (Dar es Salaam) The Guardian (Dar es Salaam)