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J. of Modern African Studies, o, (iooi), pp. jo61o.

# iooi Cambridge University Press


DOI: 1o.1o1\Sooiii8Xoiooo68 Printed in the United Kingdom
Shop windows and smoke-filled
rooms: governance and the
re-politicisation of Tanzania
Tim Kelsall*
.ns 1n.1
In the 1oos politics in Tanzania was substantially a bureaucratic aair.
Since the 1o8os, however, economic liberalisation, multiparty democracy
and governance reforms have on the one hand introduced measures con-
ducive to building a legal-rational bureaucracy and a liberal civil society,
and on the other accelerated political struggle for economic resources
through personalised regional networks. Paraphrasing Emmanuel Terray,
the rst trend is described in this article as the manufacture of air-
conditioned politics, the second as the growth of veranda politics. The
article argues that donor reforms are not leading in a straight line to liberal
governance, but neither is civil society simply being colonised by patri-
monial networks. Rather, both air-conditioned politics and veranda
politics are advancing simultaneously, inundating a previously bureaucratised
political sphere. The dual character of this re-politicisation makes the fate
of governance reforms exceedingly dicult to predict.
r x1noii1r ox
[The people we see,] the Permanent Secretaries, those people who speak the
language of good governance, those who can talk the talk even if they dont
walk the walk, are like a shop-window what is put on public display. But of
course the real decisions are made behind the shop-window, in the smoke-
lled rooms of the CCM."
This is an article about the politics of the governance agenda in
Tanzania. Governance, as a project in its broadest sense, attempts to
introduce a series of political, economic, and administrative reforms
into Africa with the ambition of improving the continents dismal
record of development. It rests on the idea that at the heart of Africas
development crisis lies a crisis of the state. It is believed that personalised
* Lecturer in African Politics, University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne. The author wishes to thank
The Nueld Foundation, which provided a small grant for research in Tanzania between June
and September ioo1. He also thanks Geir Sundet, Graham Harrison, Sara Rich and two
anonymous referees for comments on the paper, the limitations of which are all his own.
jo8 1r x iiis .ii
and clientelistic African states need to be transformed into legal-
rational Weberian states with liberal polities and market economies.
Emmanuel Terray has used the metaphor, the politics of the veranda
to describe the patrimonial share-outs that characterised the rickety
and personalistic structures of Africas pre-reform polities. In the
donors view, the politics of the veranda must be replaced by the
politics of the air-conditioner. The air-conditioner, which signies a
modern administration governed by a modern constitution that
empowers liberal institutions, is presently a mere fac: ade, screening the
outside world from the humidity of patrimonial politics. The intention
of governance is to extend air-conditioned politics out onto the
veranda itself. The aim is to cool the political temperature with the
manufactured breeze of liberal democracy, ecient administration,
and benign capitalism (Terray 1o86: 8, cited in OBrien 1oo1: 1j1i;
World Bank 1o8o, 1oo).#
The interesting thing about Tanzania from this perspective, is that
prior to the period of economic and political liberalisation, politics out
on the veranda was not very hot. Pace Goran Hyden (1o8) arguably
Tanzanias most inuential scholar political clientelism was not
especially debilitating. Politics was so centralised under the dominance
of a socialist-style single party, that the struggle for preferments rarely,
if ever, disturbed its outward tranquillity.$ Pretenders to power were
unable to call upon the idioms of class, ethnicity or even religion to
rouse popular movements in their support. Factional conict among
the political elite was present yet muted. On-stage politics was largely
snued out. Importantly, the number of air-conditioned oces in
Tanzania was also, undoubtedly, rather few.
Yet this is beginning to change. The advent of structural adjustment
and multiparty politics appears to have encouraged the rapid
construction of a political veranda, as indigenous elites, in a liberalised
climate, throw up structures on which to pursue their interests.
Meanwhile, the increasing number of donors advising on civil service
reform and the proliferation of governmental and non-governmental
benefactors seeking NGOs to fund, has begun the building of an ersatz,
air-conditioned civil society. Together, these trends amount not to the
displacement of patrimonial politics by civil politics, nor to the triumph
of good government over misrule.% Rather, both types of politics are
advancing simultaneously, re-politicising, in the process, a previously
bureaucratised political sphere.& In this sense, the situation may not be
as cynically straightforward as the quotation which opens this
article andwhichbears astrikingresemblance toTerrays metaphor
s nov wr xiows .xi s xoii- ir iiii nooxs joo
might seem to suggest. At risk of overextending the image: the rooms
are getting smokier, while some shop dummies are acquiring a life of
their own. The aim of this article, then, is to illustrate these trends, and
to outline some of their contradictory eects.
oiir i voir 1r s
Transforming Tanzania into a market economy with a legal-rational
administration and a liberal polity involves action by external countries
on a broad range of fronts. Tanzania has received donor support for
reforms to its political system and changes to its political society (see
below), as well as reforms to its public service. Ideally, the political
changes are expected to act as a support to the economic reform
process, in addition to being intrinsically desirable (Moore 1oo). Both
economic reform and an eective democratic politics require a new
type of public service. The civil service in Tanzania has been slimmed
down, it is somewhat better paid, and attempts are underway to make
it more professional and more ecient (Harrison ioo1; Temu &
Due iooo; Therkilsden iooo). To this end, an array of projects and
programmes reaches into every sector of Tanzanian public life.
Therkilsden (iooo), for example, has identied at least twenty-one
dierent donor-funded programmes that involve public sector reform.
They include structural adjustment reforms, road sector reform,
banking sector reform, agricultural sector reform, land sector reform,
and tax reform. The centrepiece of the reforms has been the Civil
Service Reform, now referred to as the Public Sector Reform
Programme (PSRP).
The sheer volume of programmes in Tanzania, and their association
with dierent donors, has generated what Therkilsden (iooo: 6)
terms a syndrome of reformitis , in which lack of coordination,
duplication, and excessive reporting requirements themselves act as an
obstacle to improving services. An indication is that the Tanzanian
public service typically produces i,oo quarterly reports a year for
external donors, and is visited by 1,ooo donor missions .' Partly in
recognition of this problem, and partly in response to international
developments such as the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative,
vigorous attempts are now underway to streamline the reform process.
Four major policy planning initiatives can be identied. The most
general of these is Vision ioij. Vision ioij is a Government of
Tanzania document that broadly outlines Tanzanias hopes for the
6oo 1r x iiis .ii
future. It is a response to a perception that development policy since
the mid-1o8os has suered from a lack of direction, its excessive short-
termism resulting in a long-term drift. What kind of society will have
been created by Tanzanians in the year ioij? it asks. What is
envisioned is that the society Tanzanians will be living in by then
will be a substantially developed one with a high quality of livelihood
is the heroic answer (United Republic of Tanzania [URT] ioooa: i).
It envisages wide-ranging institutional reforms with the aim of
unleashing the power of the market and the private sector, striking
a balance between the state and other institutions , and promoting
democratic and popular participation. Good Governance, it
declares, must permeate the modalities of social organisation (ibid. :
i).
A second long-term vision is the National Poverty Eradication
Strategy (NPES), published in 1oo, which addresses objectives for
poverty eradication up to the year io1o. The Tanzania Assistance
Strategy (TAS) outlines the medium-term role of the international
donor community in facilitating and nancing the implementation of
Vision ioij.( Finally, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP)
formulated in the context of HIPC is a medium-term (-year)
strategy of poverty reduction consonant with NPES. These initiatives,
it should be noted, are contingent on other policy reforms, undertaken
in accordance with IMF and World Bank programmes to secure
macroeconomic stability and economic eciency, namely the Poverty
Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), as well as the Programmatic
Structural Adjustment Credit (PSAC-1) (United Republic of Tanzania
iooob). One such reformis the privatisation process, currently overseen
by the Presidential Parastatal Sector Reform Commission (PPSRC).
The initiatives also depend upon sector-specic strategies developed by
other donors. For instance, the PRSP is closely linked to the Local
Government Reform Programme (LGRP).)
In general, administrative reform embodies both hard and soft
components. Hard components involve the insertion of new tech-
nologies of surveillance and control into the administration. Soft
components, such as training and workshops, are targeted at personnel
(Harrison ioo1: 66j6). For instance, a range of measures has been
introduced with the aim of attaching new and sophisticated strings to
the public purse. They address the amount of money the government
spends, and the uses to which it is put. On the hard side, the Ministry
of Finance has acquired the ability to monitor the spending of other
Ministries. A cash-budgeting system is in operation, as is a Medium
s nov wr xiows .xi s xoii- ir iiii nooxs 6o1
Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF), which relies on tracking
expenditure by means of the Platinum System computer software
package. Other reforms are legally empowered by the Public
Procurement and Public Finance Act (ioo1) (ibid.).* On the soft side,
Ministry ocials receive training in a modern management canon.
Meanwhile, much of the money owing into the Ministry comes via the
Tanzania Revenue Authority, to which tax collection has been farmed
out. The TRA oers high quality training and relatively high salaries
to its sta, who are subject to an incentives regime in which they can
be disciplined or dismissed with relative ease. The aim is to improve
eciency and reduce corruption (ibid. ; Temu & Due iooo: oo). Such
measures, which are jointly intended to alter the psychology of
Tanzanian civil servants, will be extended to the society as a whole.
Vision ioij urges that, high priority must be given to education and
continuous learning, and speaks of eective transformation of the
mindset and culture (URT ioooa: 1). Programmes in this vein,
apolitically termed capacity-building by donors, aim to press the
subjectivity of Tanzanians into a liberal-developmental mould.
Technical solutions, and political-cultural solutions, are inscribed each
within the other. The interventions are techno-cultural, or to use a
Foucauldian term, bio-political."!
Reform also involves intervention in political society. In 1ooi, with
donor support, Tanzania began a transition to a multiparty system.
Elections were held in 1ooj and iooo. The ruling CCM party was
returned to power with large majorities on both occasions, although it
faced a sti challenge in some areas. The impact of a liberalised
political system of which the small strength of opposition parties in
Parliament is not a good indicator, and the nature of which appears to
be hidden to many economists is discussed below. Other develop-
ments have occurred in the sphere of civil society. In contemporary
donor discourse, civil society is assigned a key role in transforming
political culture (Diamond 1oo; Hyden 1oo). Vision ioij also
acknowledges the importance of civic organisations (URT ioooa: i),
and recognises the need to empower the people and catalyse their
democratic and popular participation (ibid. : i). However, as recently
as four years ago, the prospect that Tanzanian civil society might play
this role appeared poor. It was harassed by government, riddled with
corruption, divided by in-ghting, and was institutionally weak. The
present author wrote at the time (Kelsall ioo1: 18):
It seems then that Tanzanias tiny NGO sector is some way from playing the
role ascribed to it under the Governance Agenda. It is squeezed between a
6oi 1r x iiis .ii
state with an equivocal agenda, a rural society which operates along dierent
principles, and is itself composed of an insecure and often opportunistic middle
class.
While this judgement remains largely accurate, there are some signs
that an elite stratum of civil society is now beginning to emerge, the
impact of which on national policy is not insignicant. A large part of
the change can be attributed to the HIPC initiative and the
international civil society mobilisation by which it was preceded. The
promise of debt relief operationalised in HIPC has been a lodestar
for the Tanzanian government. Often in the teeth of internal criticism,
it has done almost everything in its power to earn the forgiveness of
external creditors. Of late, this has extended to a more accommodating
attitude to civil society. Part of the catalyst for this new attitude has
been the PRSP.
The drafting of The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper a pre-
requisite for inclusion in the HIPC initiative began in October 1ooo.
It was steered by a committee of twelve ministers, together with the
governor of the Bank of Tanzania and a technical committee
comprising experts from several ministries. From an early stage, the
formulation of the policy involved inputs from civil society organisa-
tions. For example, an interim PRSP, completed in January iooo, was
discussed at a consultative technical meeting that included stake-
holders from civil society. Fifty-three representatives from NGOs were
also invited to discussions at zonal workshops around the country.
NGOs were also present at a National Workshop in which an initial
draft was debated. The nished paper acknowledges the concern of
stakeholders with issues of governance, accountability and trans-
parency, cultural phenomena and attitudes to gender: the bread and
butter of Tanzanias urbane NGO sector (URT iooob).
A key component of PRSP is the development and monitoring of
new poverty indicators. This aspect of the strategy, designed to make
Tanzanian society more legible, entails the introduction of institutional
innovations to allow the government, paraphrasing James Scott
(1oo8), to see like a state :
Capacity-building is needed at all levels. For the data collecting agencies,
there is a need to strengthen existing data collecting mechanisms. Line
ministries will need support to enhance their routine surveillance and
administrative data systems. The National Bureau of Statistics will need extra
support Local government, civil society organisations and research institutions
will need support to build their capacity to implement the participatory
poverty assessments. (URT iooob: ji, my emphasis)
s nov wr xiows .xi s xoii- ir iiii nooxs 6o
The scope of capacity-building interventions required, is, according to
the Paper, vast .
A number of NGOs in Tanzania have begun to organise themselves
to take advantage of this opportunity. In 1oo8, in the context of Jubilee
iooo, representatives from international NGOs in Tanzania, and some
indigenous NGOs, formed an NGO network called the Tanzania
Coalition on Debt and Development (TCDD). TCDD has around
sixty member organisations. Its intention was to raise international and
domestic awareness and to lobby for debt cancellation. The network
has been re-activated in the context of PRSP. It has a number of broad
aims, which include lobbying for a total cancellation of debt, raising
awareness about the PRGF (and agitating for a consultative role for
civil society in PRGF negotiations), and monitoring governments
progress in poverty reduction in accordance with PRSP. More
specically, it aims to monitor the extent to which debt payment
cancellation under HIPC is translated into concrete improvements in
living standards. To this end, it is beginning to develop a strategy for
tracking government expenditure. Focusing on health and education,
the aim is to match budgetary allocations at a national level with
disbursements through district councils at local level. It will begin by
tracking expenditure in two District Councils. In order to do this, it
intends to draw on the expertise of local research foundations and the
resources of external donors. A meeting to discuss the strategy revealed
that the capacity of the network was at present extremely thin,
insucient, in fact, to play this limited monitoring role. Member
attitudes, lack of resources, and relations with donors also attenuated
its capacity: We are the civil society people! the Chair exclaimed at
one point, We need to start changing ourselves ! ""
Initiatives such as that being pursued by TCDD are able to build on
the experience of other Tanzanian NGO networks. FEMACT, for
example, is a network of thirty organisations and NGOs concerned
with womens issues. Hakiardhi marshals a number of NGOs involved
with the issue of land. TANGO an umbrella NGO recently staged
Tanzanias rst national NGO\Civil Society Forum, its theme being
Collaboration and Participation for Transformation. The number of
registered NGOs in the country has increased from81 in 1ooj to more
than i,oo in iooo (URT: ioooc). Tanzanian newspapers detail
reports, workshops and press conferences by NGOs on a daily basis.
Prominent are groups such as the Tanzania Gender Networking
Programme (TGNP), the Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC),
Lawyers Environmental Action Team (LEAT), and Journalists
6o 1r x iiis .ii
Environmental Association of Tanzania (JET). All of these NGOs
have close links to donors and tend to articulate a broadly liberal
political philosophy which emphasises democracy, human rights,
gender equality, sustainable development, and respect for the rule of
law.
In 1oo, this author commented that, It is far from clear that this
kind of workshopocracy has a signicant impact on the lives of
ordinary, in particular, rural, Tanzanians (Kelsall ioo1: 1o). And
that scepticism remains. However, what is clearer is that civil society
has made its impact felt at a national level in certain pieces of
legislation. The Land Act, for example, is claimed by NGOs to contain
groundbreaking provisions that allow the inheritance of land by
women. The Sexual Oences Special Provisions Act contains a
remarkably progressive denition of sexual harassment, which is
informed by womens specic experience in Tanzania. Clause 16oa:
Cruelty to Children, outlaws female genital mutilation. The extent to
which this legislation is enforceable remains open to question. The
Land Act appears to have been drafted in such a way as to
institutionalise inertia. It seems unlikely that the sweeping provisions of
the Sexual Oences Act will be used, except perhaps in politically
expedient circumstances. As one observer said to me, These are very
much Dar and Dodoma Acts, lobbied for by interest groups here, and
they will probably do hardly anything to help the people in the rural
areas who need them most. There have, however, been some
prosecutions under Clause 16oa."#
In sum, there are indications that with donor backing, civil society
is a sector which sections of government are neither keen nor able to
ignore. In 1ooo, for example, several NGO representatives were
arrested by an order-conscious police force after demonstrating against
debt outside a World Bank meeting. The president later defended in
public the right of civil society to peaceful protest. But opinion on the
NGOsector is far fromuniform. In the wake of the TANGOconference
referred to above, The Express newspaper launched a scathing attack on
NGOs."$ Then in November, the president of the Lawyers En-
vironmental Action Team, Rugemeleza Nshala, together with Tanza-
nia Labour Party leader Augustine Mrema, were arrested and charged
with sedition after pressing for an investigation into the forced eviction
of artisanal miners fromgold mines at Bulyanhulu in 1oo6. In addition,
civil society continues to wait with bated breath for the governments
NGOBill, the nal formof which, after ve years of consultation, is still
not public.
s nov wr xiows .xi s xoii- ir iiii nooxs 6oj
If we extract fromthis story only the trends that are positive from the
perspective of Governance, we might anticipate that Tanzanian
development will be increasingly governed in a liberal, legal-rational
mode. Policy will be publicly debated by a plurality of interest groups,
and the government will discharge its commitments in an ecient,
publicly accountable way, assisted in this endeavour by better-
coordinated external assistance. The aw in this expectation aside
from its inversion of the power relations between government and
donors is that the ineciencies in the state which the above-discussed
reforms are designed to address are not only due to lack of donor
coordination and to civil service incapacity. Another reason for poor
governance is that the government often has conicting political
priorities (Harrison ioo1; Temu & Due iooo; Therkilsden iooo). The
reforms do not take place in an air-conditioned, administrative bubble,
isolated from the political atmosphere. Some of them threaten to
undermine the interests of signicant sections of Tanzanias political
elite. Where they do this, they tend to be resisted or subverted. The
governments consistent reluctance to reduce expenditure on teachers
salaries is a case in point. The reason is that teachers are key gures in
local elections (Therkilsden iooo: 6o). Another very clear example is
the halting pace of local government reform."% The arena of local
government, as we shall see below, is of critical importance to the
interests of the political elite. One way of explaining this, guratively
speaking, is to point out that behind the air-conditioned oces that
resound to the argot of NPM- and civil-society speak, there stands a
veranda of shady deals and clientelist politics. As well as a shop
window in the words of our donor there are smoke-lled rooms.
voir 1r s ox 1ni \in.xi.
When President Benjamin Mkapa came to power in October 1ooj, his
Third Phase government began with strong reformist credentials. It
seemed serious about the introduction of air-conditioned politics.
During its rst year, a new Cabinet was appointed that excluded many
of the political heavyweights of the previous regime. In addition, a
number of initiatives an Ethics Secretariat , a Prevention of
Corruption Bureau, and a Presidential Commission on Corruption
were strengthened or begun with the aim of ghting corruption. But
its seriousness has not, in the view of some critics, been sustained. It
soon became clear, for example, that none of the really big sh would
6o6 1r x iiis .ii
be netted by the anti-corruption initiatives. In fact, there are
indications that they fairly rapidly began to re-assert their inuence. A
clear sign of the latter development was the resignation of Professor
Simon Mbilinyi, the minister for nance, in a tax-exemption scandal.
Although trumpeted at the time as a sign of increased transparency and
accountability in Tanzania, it quickly became clear that Mbilinyi, a
committed reformer with a reputation for competence, had been tted
up by members of the old guard ousted from Cabinet.
The old guard includes the people of whom Julius Nyerere spoke
when he said that Tanzania stinks of corruption. They are known to
be rich, having amassed private fortunes during the era of President
Mwinyi (see below). While much of the corruption in that period
appeared to be of a market-based rather than a clientelistic nature, at
least one of the old guard is known to have a personal and nancial
inuence that permeates the party."& President Mkapa, it seems, would
have found it dicult to secure the presidential re-nomination in iooo
without him. Moreover, in a context of multiparty democracy, the
party nds these individuals useful in securing re-election. Thus the
old guard has continued to exercise inuence behind the scenes
throughout the Third Phase government, and more recently some of its
members have found their way back into Cabinet. While the presidents
own integrity is rarely called into question, the stance of several
members of the government with respect to reform is now ambiguous."'
Many MPs are unhappy with the government, and their unhappiness
is increasingly expressed through regional blocs. The conjunctural
explanation for this begins with the fact that representatives from the
South feel that it is the turn of their relatively underdeveloped region
to benet from a period in oce. President Mkapa, after all, is a
southerner from Mtwara Region. Many observers expected that on
accession to power he would steer increased resources in the direction
of the South. Consistent with this, a massive development scheme
encompassing coal, iron, port development, and a rail extension is
planned for the area, although it will not be completed during Mkapas
ten year term. In addition, Professor Mbilinyi was a close friend and
home-mate of Mkapa."( However, following his resignation, he was
replaced by a northerner: Daniel Yona from Kilimanjaro Region,
another friend of Mkapa and home-mate of Mkapas wife. The fact
that Mbilinyi was thrown away in this manner, is rumoured to have
lost the president support among some of his closest allies from the
South. Mkapa is said to be extremely intolerant of personal criticism,
and two prominent Southern Highland MPs, with comparatively clean
s nov wr xiows .xi s xoii- ir iiii nooxs 6o
reputations, were dropped from the Cabinet in iooo. Members of the
old guard replaced them. Yona, meanwhile, was replaced by Basil
Mramba, an even closer home-mate of Mama Mkapa.")
As a result, a group of MPs from the South, centred on the Southern
Highlands, is vocal in its condemnation of the Mkapa government."*
They resent the fact that northerners, through the suspected inuence
of Mama Mkapa, continue to hold key positions of power, and are
critical of the return to inuence of politicians with a reputation for
corruption. The increased visibility of the southern bloc has acted in
part as a spur to the consolidation of other blocs. Particularly vocal has
been a group of MPs from the Lake Zone, which in August ioo1
threatened to delay the Finance Bill if its constituencies were not
granted royalties from international mining activities.#! The threat
never materialised, and it is rumoured that the MPs were privately
persuaded to drop their action. The northern bloc is rather more
amorphous, but is occasionally mentioned, while the Coast has long
been associated with Islam.#"
One individual about whom Parliamentarians are particularly
unhappy is Iddi Simba, minister for trade and industries. He is a
Muslim, and an in-law of Daniel Yona, who is close, as noted earlier,
to the Mkapas. He gained popularity as a spokesman for indigenous
interests, advocating joint-ownership arrangements between foreign
and African capital. He is known to be rich by Tanzanian standards,
and to be politically ambitious. All of these reasons have been advanced
to explain his seat in Cabinet. But particularly important is the idea
that the CCM needs his money, and that of people like him, in order
to contest elections. Indeed, in the iooo general election, he was a
member of Mkapas campaign team. In August ioo1, in what seemed
to be a classic rent-seeking scam, a storm of speculation surrounded
alleged improprieties in the handling of sugar import licences by his
Ministry, as well as in the divestiture of NASACO, the national
shipping company. In the face of strident calls for his resignation Simba
refused to quit. Parliamentarians then demanded a probe into the issue,
but were persuaded by CCM heavyweights to make it a government,
rather than a parliamentary investigation. The probe, when it
eventually reported, stopped short of condemning Simba personally.
However, it did not restore the condence of the CCM parliamentary
caucus, and in November Simba resigned, to the chagrin, it is
rumoured, of the president.##
Whether these protesting MPs would be any less corrupt were they
themselves in power is open to question. Parliamentary ructions and re-
6o8 1r x iiis .ii
alignments are imbricated in complex ways with long-term structural
changes in Tanzanian society. These changes increase the pressure to
engage in corruption. In fact, there is reason to think that the old
bureaucratic-centralist pattern of politics is being replaced by an
increasingly patrimonial system. If this is the case, the threat of regional
or religious instability, itself liable to be exacerbated by succession
crises, presents the possibility of serious reversals in the linear direction
of reform.
Crucial to understanding this upsurge of veranda politics, and the
consequent re-politicisation of Tanzanian public life, is an appreciation
of the formation and dissolution of the single party state. The period
1o6 to 1o6 witnessed the consolidation of the Tanzanian state under
Mwalimu Julius Nyereres leadership. Trade unions, cooperatives,
women the civil society groups that sped the nationalist movement
to power were all co-opted and transformed into organs of the ruling
party. Opposition parties were banned or harassed out of existence,
deant leaders were exiled or jailed. District councils, and nally
primary cooperative societies, were also abolished. Political expression
outside the channels of Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM), the single party,
was stied (Bienen 1oo; Coulson 1o8i; Gibbon 1ooo; Havnevik 1oo;
Pratt 1o6; Sterkenberg & van Velzen 1o).
That said, few organised groups seemed to want to express views
outside the party. The major instances of focused repression against
the Ruvuma Development Association in 1o6o, and against militant
workers in 1o1 were directed, indeed, at groups which followed
party policy with a little too much enthusiasm (Coulson 1o8i).#$
Political quiescence among the rest of the population owed a great deal
to the fact that the government, an expanded parastatal sector, and a
revamped cooperative sector, oered employment to national and local
elites. National elites, domiciled in Dar es Salaam, Dodoma and
regional capitals, had only to speak the language of ujamaa socialism
and provide indications that they were making vigorous attempts to
implement its policies.#% Local elites, at district level and below, could
aord to be much less ideologically compliant, and often ran local
councils and cooperatives much as they had been run in the late
colonial period. Crucially, the connections between national and local
elites were weak. Key national positions were dispensed by the centre,
either at Ministry level or by the National Executive Committee
(NEC) of the CCM. National gures subject to local election, such as
regional party chairmen and members of Parliament, were subject to
s nov wr xiows .xi s xoii- ir iiii nooxs 6oo
central screening. Thus for the national elite, cultivation of a local
clientele was less important than securing central approval (Bienen
1oo; Finucane 1o; Ingle 1oi; Kelsall ioooa, iooob; Samo 1o).
In terms of managing communal conict, Nyerere staed his
Cabinet with individuals who were either ideologically committed or
personally very loyal to him. He also made gestures in the direction of
regional and religious balancing. Regional cleavages were not,
however, particularly dicult to manage, since the parastatal sector
served as a sucient reservoir of patronage with which to satiate the
educated elite of Tanzanias various regions (Hyden 1o8; Okema
1oo6; Pratt 1o, 1o6; Van Donge & Liviga 1o86). This did not,
however, restrain communal and regional inequalities completely.
There was a perception that religious disparities were growing, since
employment at high levels in the parastatal sector necessitated
educational qualications, held disproportionately by Christians.
There was also a feeling that the North beneted more than the less-
educated South. But these perceptions were never translated into
explosive political capital.
The system did not satisfy everyone. Oscar Kambona, a key gure
in the nationalist movement, went into exile in 1o6, and two coup
plots were subsequently linked to him. In other cases, leaders and
societal sections gave public recognition to the governments ideology
of ujamaa, while working in private to undermine it. Meanwhile a
proportion of the peasantry was herded into planned villages and
subjected to enforced agricultural regulations familiar fromthe colonial
era. But those with most to lose under this system found it most dicult
to organise, and any eorts to do so were likely to be spotted by an
ecient intelligence service (Boesen 1oo; Clie 1oo1; Hyden 1o8o;
Kelsall iooob; McHenry 1oo; Okema 1oo6; von Freyhold 1oo). In
consequence, Tanzania remained a model of stability.
By the late 1oos the conditions for this stability were beginning to
unravel. Unfavourable external conditions combined with policy
mistakes shook the Tanzanian economy, and the formal planning
system never very ecient in the rst place began to feel the strain.
The 1oo war with Uganda proved the nal straw, and brought the
economy to the brink of collapse. Informal clientelist arrangements
frequently lled the gap, and then proved impossible to eradicate
(Bryceson 1ooo; Svendsen 1o86). By the early 1o8os, formal sector
salaries were insucient to meet living expenses. Short-lived attempts
were made to revive the socialist economy, but only a small section of
61o 1r x iiis .ii
the ujamaa elite were believers. The fortunes of the state and the elite it
sheltered became increasingly wedded to those of private, or quasi-
private, capital (Campbell & Stein 1ooi; Tripp 1oo).
1o86 saw the signing of an agreement with the IMF and the next ten
years witnessed exchange devaluation, liberalisation of internal and
external trade, withdrawal of government support to the cooperative
movement, privatisation of numerous parastatal companies, and an
increasingly open attitude toward foreign investment. President Ali
Hassan Mwinyi a Zanzibari presided over the changes (Campbell
& Stein 1ooi). He is widely perceived to have gone some way to
redressing religious imbalance by promoting Muslims in his govern-
ment.#& Generally speaking, economic liberalisation increased the
desire and ability of members of the political elite to enrich themselves.
The early prots were made in import-export trade, in which coastal
peoples and Zanzibaris with links to India and the Middle East,
together with Tanzanian Asians, were well represented. Other lucrative
areas were to be found in land grabbing, urban real estate, and the
exploitation of tax loopholes. Divestiture of parastatals also introduced
a spoils character into Tanzanian politics, as politicians positioned
themselves to receive kickbacks or to become part-owners of the newly
privatised companies. Other, less fortunate members of the national
elite, found themselves retrenched and sent home to the village. As we
shall see, it is this development, which has served to de-structure social
class in Tanzania, that threatens to make regional politics much more
dicult to manage (Campbell & Stein 1ooi; Chachage 1ooj; Gibbon
1ooj; Kaiser 1oo6; Kiondo 1o8o, 1ooj; Maliyamkono & Bagachwa
1ooo; Temu & Due iooo).
Prior to the mid-1o8os, national and local elites secured their
reproduction as elites through a mixture of patronage and privileged
access to state education, which in turn provided continued access to
the state (Samo 1o, 1o8o). The state has shrunk and so is no longer
sucient to act as a vehicle for reproducing the elite in toto. A section,
as outlined above, uses the state for private enrichment ; another section
has entered private business or semi-retirement in local areas. Peasants,
for their part, used to secure their reproduction through access to land.
In heavily populated areas, there is no longer sucient land through
which to do this. Instead, both retrenched elites and ordinary peasants
attempt to sustain their children by providing themaccess to secondary
education, which is believed essential to success in business. This
increased demand for secondary education is frequently satised by
s nov wr xiows .xi s xoii- ir iiii nooxs 611
means of local, tribal trust funds, which provide money for, among
other things, the building of schools (Gibbon 1ooo; Kelsall ioooa).
District councils are also expanding their educational provision, partly
through harambee eorts.
Typically, trust funds are managed by local elites, some of whom are
the aforementioned retrenchees. They tend to maintain links with those
national elites who remain in the capital. National elites maintain ties
with local districts for patriotic, familial or sentimental reasons, and
because some of the richest resources minerals, cash crops, sheries,
tourism are to be found there. In consequence, national elites
patronise local trust funds as well as other types of NGO. The political
section of the national elite patronises local trust funds because in a
context of political liberalisation, local support is important to securing
national power, and local elections are becoming much more
competitive (Gibbon 1ooo; Kelsall ioooa). The funds, which nance
education yet also call on the symbolic presence of traditional leaders,
are useful as platforms on which to build a local reputation, and as
bases from which to direct struggle. Meanwhile, local elites educate
their children through the funds, build local prestige in them, and
sometimes embezzle their nances. Thus local and national elites are
linked, more closely than ever before, by a skein of reciprocities, the
ideology to which is localism (Gibbon 1ooo; Kelsall ioooa, iooob;
Kiondo 1ooj).
For the political elite, this type of clientelism, based on gaining oce
in a competitive election, acts as an incentive to corruption. For some
years, the buying of drinks and food, and the giving of gifts and money,
has played a part in election campaigns in Tanzania. Such practices
were outlawed and sometimes gave rise to allegations of corruption
(Munishi & Mtengeti-Migiro 1ooo). At the rst multiparty election in
1ooj these allegations were very extensive, and they led to over a
hundred election petitions (URT 1oo). In iooo an amendment to the
election law was passed which gave ocial recognition to the need, in
the local parlance, to buy electorates. It permitted the provision of
hospitality by candidates during campaigns. The government
granted incumbent MPs a gratuity of between TShs 1j and ij million
at the end of their parliamentary terms in iooo. In eect it was a
campaign fund with which to ght the next election. But many MPs
with whom this author spoke spent much more than this amount
during the campaign and in the preceding ve years. One claimed to
have ploughed TShs j million of his own money into community
61i 1r x iiis .ii
projects. This was in addition to money and organisational support
that came from the party itself.#'
In many constituencies in iooo, elections at CCM primary and at
parliamentary level had a desperate quality to them. Reports of money,
intimidation and dirty tricks were the norm. The desperation stems on
the one hand from the desire of local party cadres to eat , at a time
when formal party funding has been scaled down, together with the
hunger of a rural electorate that has failed, in most cases, to see
signicant gains from structural adjustment. On the other, it arises
fromthe appetite of politicians, who perceive that the share out of spoils
in natural resources and parastatals cannot go on indenitely.
With money an important determinant of electoral popularity,
politicians need somehow to acquire it. Some money may come from
legitimate business activities or private savings, or from constituency
backers. But there is also a temptation to make money through
straddling the political and economic spheres, in a variety of practices
which shade from outright embezzlement through bribe-taking to
crony capitalism. Membership of the government, by providing access
to the interface with international donors and with capitalists, presents
a fast track to these opportunities. Put schematically, an MP may gain
access to the government by several routes : through merit, through
close relations with the president, through representing a regional bloc
or ethnic group, or through making a nuisance of him or herself (for
example by asking embarrassing questions of ministers). Even if not
invited into government, an MP may be awarded some other
emolument if he or she makes enough noise. It is easier to make a noise
as part of a group, and this is one of the reasons why regional groupings
are becoming more prominent in Tanzanian politics. Together, these
factors make regional blocs increasingly focal as points of political
mobilisation.#(
In sum, a large part of veranda politics consists in local elites,
operating out of ethnic trust funds, NGOs and district councils,
cultivating strong personal ties, and exchanging favours with national
elites, including national politicians. National politicians, for their part,
increasingly group themselves into regional blocs, with the aim of
securing the attentions of government. Students of African politics will
be entirely familiar with this scenario, since it animates the politics of
many states in the region. It is also the case that in many African states,
national politicians act as ethnic big-men, able to harness local
discontent or mobilise local support in the interests of securing
patronage pay-os (Berman 1oo8). It remains to be seen whether the
s nov wr xiows .xi s xoii- ir iiii nooxs 61
fact that in Tanzania, regional blocs are more recent inventions than
local ethnicities, will serve to mollify the types of political mobilisation
their leaders can call forth.
It is important to stress that regionalism and clientelism are not
intrinsically pathological practices. In fact, they may bring a greater
degree of political inuence to rural areas than the old system
delivered. However, it is also important to note that they inscribe a
potential for corruption and instability, and that they sit uneasily with
the impersonal, universalising imperatives of Governance. Over the
past two years, for example, Tanzania has witnessed clashes between
pastoralists and agriculturalists that have left scores dead in Morogoro
Region, violent clashes between clans in Musoma over the farming of
marijuana, Islamic riots on the streets of Dar es Salaam, and
widespread unrest in mining areas in Musoma, Shinyanga and Arusha.
All of these eruptions are entangled with the changing structure of an
economy undergoing marketisation, and the changing shape of
struggles for wealth and inuence, as the political elite pursues the
spoils of liberalised development.#)
In Tanzania the increasingly visible regional blocs have not yet
congealed into coherent collective actors and their dissolution is quite
conceivable. At present, they are partially cross-cut, partially over-
lapped, by religious identication, anal relations, and personal
friendships dating from secondary school, university, and time spent in
the army or in the ruling partys Youth League (Mmuya 1oo8). The
story surrounding Professor Mbilinyi, for example, indicates some of
this complexity. Individuals also have dierent ideological leanings
some purportedly cleaving to the philosophy of the late president,
others to a notion of social democracy, and others being ardent
supporters of a liberal economy. In the wider CCM party, other
factions are sectorally distributed: youth wingers, the bureaucratic
elite, the political faction (Mmuya 1oo8: 66).#* Thus inscribed
within individuals is a situational geometry of identication, making it
extremely dicult to predict which way a particular individual will act
or vote from one occasion to the next. It is because of this that
speculation over who will be the next president is currently rife in
Tanzania, with the main contenders already shaping up for the
competition ahead.$!
Whoever the next president is, the recent appearance of regional
blocs increases the potential for centrifugal politics. It is too soon to say
what scope he or she will have to resist this tendency, or what desire to
encourage it. Elsewhere in Africa, such forces have typically been
61 1r x iiis .ii
neutralised by allowing regional big-men the opportunity to devour,
greedily, the national pie (Medard 1o8i: 18i). The eect of this is
usually to erode the states economic foundation. The big question for
the apostles of Governance is whether air-conditioned politics will
have developed to a level that will allow it to present a credible
alternative to this dead-end solution.

In the post-independence era, public life in Tanzania was substantially
de-politicised and bureaucratised. This did not imply the eradication of
public debate or political clientelism, but both these phenomena were
tightly contained within the organs of a socialist party-state. Entry into
and promotion within this machine depended on a variety of factors
such as ideological uency and personal loyalty to the president.
Communal and nepotistic considerations were not entirely absent, but
considerations of competence were arguably paramount. In addition,
the party and state had well-established rules, procedures and political
organs that were not, at a national level, routinely outed. The
development administration, for example, actually tried to implement
development plans. The state at a local level was less robust, but its
inuence was more than nugatory. In other words, the state was
institutionalised to a signicant degree. It was much more than the
expression of Julius Nyereres redoubtable personality.
Recent changes have begun to transform this situation. On the one
hand, political clientelism has broken the bonds of the state, and now
draws on a combination of state and non-state resources. In addition,
its rewards are more competitively fought for, and show signs of
enlisting communal and regional identities in their pursuit. On the
other hand, the state itself is currently subject to numerous techno-
cultural programmes that attempt to replace corrupt and clientelistic
practices with legal-rational ones. In addition, public debate of a
liberal type is on the increase thanks to an invigorated press and a
donor-driven civil society of professional NGOs. There is little evidence
to suggest that this civil society is edging out or transforming clientelism,
in the way that proponents of governance would hope for.$" But
neither is it the case, pace Chabal and Daloz (1ooo), that civil society
is simply colonised by patrimonial logics. What we are witnessing is the
replacement of bureaucracy by competitive politics : re-politicisation in
a dual key.
s nov wr xiows .xi s xoii- ir iiii nooxs 61j
Nor is it necessarily the case that one of these registers will eventually
overwhelm the other. Neighbouring states such as Kenya and Uganda
have for years experienced a politics that is both more liberal and more
patrimonial than that in Tanzania. The two types of politics are
capable of co-habiting, especially when one normally patrimonial-
ism is the dominant partner. Given that liberal politics tends to be
centred on the capital, and clientelistic politics stretches between centre
and periphery, it is tempting to invoke Mamdanis (1oo6) idea of the
bifurcated state to describe this. The notion certainly has a supercial
plausibility. But it is simply not the case that either the local chief for
there are none or the district or regional commissioner, act as quite
the obstacles to democratic politics that Mamdani seems to imply.
Neither of course does democratising the state entail the erosion of
clientelism; in fact it might imply just the opposite.
The above remarks notwithstanding, this co-habitation of the liberal
and the patrimonial is unlikely to remain stable, for the simple reason
that donors are vigorously promoting the former. They are applying
considerable nancial power to insert a range of new technologies into
African administrations with the intention of re-shaping them. While
there are indications that these initiatives are being accepted by some
key gures at the centre (those in the shop window), they are meeting
more serious resistance at local level, in part because of the continuing
importance of district councils to clientelist politics. And while donors
imagine that empowering the local population is the answer to
making local democracy work, this idea fails to appreciate the
diculties of this endeavour in the context of contemporary social
relations (Kelsall ioooa, iooob). Meanwhile, the progress of reform at
the centre is endangered, among other things, by uncertainty over the
identity of the next president. Among the favourites to win power in
iooj are individuals who thrive on corruption and who might not be
averse to inaming communal cleavages in the service of their own
private interests. Thus the future character of Tanzanian public life
remains dicult to predict. But one thing is certain: there is plenty to
play for, both in shop-windows and in smoke-lled rooms.
xo1is
1. Interview with aid donor (name withheld), Dar es Salaam, September ioo1.
i. The metaphor is liberally adapted from Terray (1o86), insofar as the air-conditioned state
of which he spoke presented a fac: ade of bureaucratic-authoritarianism, as opposed to liberal
constitutionalism, which is the form air-conditioned politics takes in contemporary Tanzania. In
addition, the politics of the share-out is just as much a politics of the scramble.
616 1r x iiis .ii
. Tanzania between roughly 1o6 and 1o8 ts well with Allens (1ooj) model of centralised-
bureaucratic politics. The model is descriptively very useful.
. The term patrimonialism is used loosely: it encompasses patron-clientelism, neo-
patrimonialism, and market corruption, phenomena that some authors prefer to separate. See, for
example, Medard (1o8i).
j. By re-politicisation I refer to a process with two key components : First, public issues
become open to debate and scrutiny within the public sphere of a private realm. Second, public
and private resources become subject to more intense and open competition. Some commentators
would doubtless argue that Tanzania has always been a politicised society. In my terms,
Tanzania of the 1o6os was ideologised, and in the 1oos, bureaucratised.
6. James Wolfensohn, quoted in Tanzanian Aairs 6j, JanuaryApril iooo, p. ij.
. These documents are often referred to in government and donor literature, but this author
has been unable to obtain copies.
8. It is too soon to say whether these broad planning initiatives, together with a Governance
Co-ordination Unit, will succeed in tidying up the tangled tendrils of governance, or will add
unhelpfully to their number.
o. Statement of Bilateral and Multilateral partners on Governance CG Meeting, Dar es
Salaam, 11 September ioo1.
1o. For a lucid, Deleuzean reading of bio-power, see Hardt & Negri (ioo1).
11. Authors observation, TCDD meeting, Dar es Salaam, June ioo1.
1i. Interview with aid donor, June ioo1; Court convicts circumcisors , Daily News 6..ioo1: i.
1. NGO congestion creates chaos , The Express i6..ioo1: 1.
1. Government reform programme up for review, Financial Times ioi6.6.ioo1: .
1j. Interviews, Dodoma and Dar es Salaam, June and July ioo1. On the dierence between
market and clientelistic corruption, see Medard (1o8i).
16. Interviews, Dar es Salaam and Dodoma, JuneSeptember ioo1.
1. Mbilinyi is from Ruvuma, which neighbours Mtwara.
18. Interviews, Dar es Salaam and Dodoma, JuneJuly ioo1.
1o. See for example, Budget ignores Southern zone and farmers , Financial Times ioi6.6.ioo1:
1&, in which it is reported that MPs slammed the government for ignoring the south.
io. MPs meet Minister over royalties , The Guardian (Dar es Salaam), 1..ioo1: 1.
i1. The South comprises the Regions of Mtwara, Ruvuma, Mbeya and Iringa, with Iringa
and Mbeya arguably forming a Southern Highlands sub-bloc; the North comprises Arusha
and Kilimanjaro Regions, possibly also including Lushoto District constituencies in Tanga
Region; the Coast refers to Lindi (also sometimes considered Southern), Pwani and coastal
Tanga, and also to some Dar es Salaam constituencies; the Lake Zone to Mara, Mwanza,
Shinyanga and Kagera.
ii. MP demands probe on sugar imports , Daily News i.8.ioo1: 1.
i. Although the RDA was, admittedly, outside TANUs control, it was in keeping with the
spirit of ujamaa.
i. By national elites, I refer, on the side of the government, to ministers, regional
commissioners, and to technical sta responsible to central ministries but stationed at regional
headquarters. On the side of the Party, I refer to regional party secretaries, regional party
chairmen, as well as holders of lesser party posts at regional level.
ij. Gjj a group of parliamentarians who in the early 1ooos advocated a reform of the Union
with Zanzibar can be read as the Christian reaction to this.
i6. Interviews, Dodoma, July ioo1.
i. It is also the case that MPs shut out of personal networks of power may raise a fuss in
Parliament, in order to be seen and heard to be doing something by their constituents.
i8. See for example: CCM entering era of acquisitors , The African (Dar es Salaam),
.o.ioo1: o; Government ocers own bhang farms , The Guardian i..ioo1: ; Printpak:
example of irresolute privatisation, The Guardian 1o.6.ioo1: o; Hell week for haven of peace,
Family Mirror .o.ioo1: ; Who is behind these clashes?, The East African o.o.ioo1: 1o;
AFGEM implicates Lowasa, Family Mirror, io..ioo1: 1; We need transparency in mining
industry, The Guardian 1.8.ioo1: 6.
io. CCM breaks into three groups , Family Mirror i6.6i..ioo1: 1&j.
o. Omars Death Derails Groupings , The East African o1j..ioo1: 1&i.
1. In fact some NGOs are formed merely to take advantage of donor money while others are
perverted by it (Cameron ioo1; Igoe 1ooo).
s nov wr xiows .xi s xoii- ir iiii nooxs 61
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Newspapers
The African (Dar es Salaam)
Daily News (Dar es Salaam)
The East African (Nairobi)
The Express (Dar es Salaam)
Family Mirror (Dar es Salaam)
Financial Times (Dar es Salaam)
The Guardian (Dar es Salaam)

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