G.R. No. L-61873 October 3l, 1984 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ELIAS BORROMEO, defendant-appellant.

RELOVA, J.:+.wph!1 Appeal from the decision of the then Circuit Criminal Court, Fourteenth Judicial District, CebuBohol (now Regional Trial Court), finding accused Elias Borromeo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties of the law; to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Susana Taborada-Borromeo, in the sum of P12,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs. Records show that at high noon of July 3, 1981, the four-year old niece of Elias and Susana Borromeo reported to Matilde Taborada, mother of Susana, that Susana was shouting frantically for help because Elias was killing her. The 71-year old Matilde Taborada told the child to go to Geronimo Taborada, her son, who was then working in their mango plantation. Upon hearing the report of the child, Geronimo informed his father and together they went to Susana's hut. The windows and the door were closed and Geronimo could only peep through the bamboo slats at the wall where he saw Susana lying down, motionless, apparently dead beside her one-month old child who was crying. Elias Borromeo was lying near Susana still holding on to a bloody kitchen bolo. Susana's father called for the Mabolo police and, after a few minutes, police officer Fernando C. Abella and three policemen arrived. The peace officers shouted and ordered Elias to open the door. Elias answered calmly that he would smoke first before he would open the door. When he did, the peace officers found Susana already dead, her intestine having spilled out of her abdomen. A small kitchen bolo was at her side. When questioned, the accused Elias Borromeo could only mumble incoherent words. Dr. Jesus Serna, police medico-legal officer, submitted his necropsy report (Exhibits "A" & "B") which states that the cause of death was "stab wounds, multiple chest, abdomen, left supraclavicular region and left shoulder." There were five (5) incised wounds and six (6) stab wounds on the deceased. In his brief, accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred (1) in holding as it did that appellant and Susana Taborada (the deceased) were legally and validly married in a church wedding ceremony, when the officiating priest testified otherwise and there was no marriage contract executed on the occasion or later on; hence, the accused could only be liable for homicide; (2) in failing to appreciate in favor of appellant the mitigating circumstances of provocation or obfuscation and voluntary surrender, without any aggravating circumstance to offset the same; and, (3) in convicting appellant of the crime of parricide and in imposing upon him the penultimate penalty of reclusion perpetua. Appellant in his brief, page 9, concurs with "the trial court's finding to the effect that he killed Susana Taborada (the deceased) without legal justification" The main issue raised by him is that he and Susana were not legally married and therefore the crime committed is not parricide, but homicide. Other than the stand of appellant's counsel against the existence of marriage in order to

lessen or mitigate the penalty imposable upon his client, accused Elias Borromeo himself admitted that the deceased-victim was his legitimate wife. Hereunder is his testimony on this point: t.hqw
Q Please state your name, age and other personal circumstances? A ELIAS BORROMEO, 40 years old, married, farmer, resident of Putingbato, Babag Cebu City.

The COURT: t.hqw

Q You say you are married, who is your wife? A Susana Taborada. Q When did you get married with Susana Taborada? A I forgot. Q Where did you get married? A Near the RCPI station in Babag. Q There is a church there? A There is a chapel. Q Were you married by a priest or a minister? A By a priest. Q Who is this priest? A Father Binghay of Guadalupe. Q Do you have any children with Susana Taborada? A We have one. Q How old is the child? A I already forgot, I have been here for quite a long time already. (pp. 4-5, tsn., December 12, 1981 hearing)

There is no better proof of marriage than the admission of the accused of the existence of such marriage. (Tolentino vs. Paras, 122 SCRA 525). Person living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in constant violation of decency and law. (Son Cui vs. Guepangco, 22 Phil. 216) The presumption in favor of matrimony is one of the strongest known in law. The law presumes morality, and not immorality; marriage, and not concubinage: legitimacy, and not bastardy. There is the presumption that persons living together as husband and wife are married to each other. The reason for this presumption of marriage is well stated in Perido vs. Perido, 63 SCRA 97, thus: t.hqw
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legal matrimony. ...

And, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists in the registry of marriage does not invalidate said marriage, as long as in the celebration thereof, all requisites for its validity are present. The forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate to the registry is not one of said requisites. (Pugeda vs. Trias, 4 SCRA 849). Anent the second and third assigned errors, suffice it to say that the penalty for parricide is reclusion perpetua to death. (Article 246, Revised Penal Code) Paragraph 3, Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, provides that where the law prescribed a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties and the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstances, with no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied. Thus, assuming the presence of the mitigating circumstances of provocation or obfuscation and

voluntary surrender, without any aggravating circumstance to offset the same, the penalty is still reclusion perpetua. WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that the indemnity of P12,000.00 is increased to P30,000.00. With costs. SO ORDERED.1wph1.t

A.M. No. MTJ-94-963 July 14, 1995 MARILOU NAMA MORENO, complainant, vs. JUDGE JOSE C. BERNABE, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 72, Pasig, Metro Manila, respondent. KAPUNAN, J.: The responsibility of a Judge is indeed heavy. As the incarnation of law and justice, it is his sworn duty to lead by example, to be the example. But how can he inspire the people to live by the law if he himself fails to do so? Marilou Nama Moreno filed this complaint against Judge Jose C. Bernabe of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 72, Pasig, Metro Manila for grave misconduct and gross ignorance of the law. Complainant alleges that on October 4, 1993, she and Marcelo Moreno were married before respondent Judge Bernabe. She avers that Respondent Judge assured her that the marriage contract will be released ten (10) days after October 4, 1993. Complainant then visited the office of the Respondent Judge on October 15, 1993 only to find out that she could not get the marriage contract because the Office of the Local Civil Registrar failed to issue a marriage license. She claims that Respondent Judge connived with the relatives of Marcelo Moreno to deceive her. 1 In his comment, 2 Respondent denied that he conspired with the relatives of Marcelo Moreno to solemnize the marriage for the purpose of deceiving the complainant. Respondent contends: 1. That the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig has actually prepared the marriage license but it was not released due to the subsequent objection of the father of Marcelo Moreno; 2. That he did not violate the law nor did he have the slightest intention to violate the law when he, in good faith, solemnized the marriage, as he was moved only by a desire to help a begging and pleading complainant who wanted some kind of assurance or security due to her pregnant condition; 3. That in order to pacify complainant, Marcelo Moreno requested him to perform the marriage ceremony, with the express assurance that "the marriage license was definitely forthcoming since the necessary documents were complete;" 3 4. That the contracting parties were not known to him; and 5. That both parties, particularly the complainant, were fully apprised of the effects of a

marriage performed without the required marriage license. In a Resolution dated August 10, 1994, we referred this matter for investigation, report and recommendation to Executive Judge Martin Villarama, Jr., of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 156. In his Memorandum of October 11, 1994, Judge Villarama, Jr. recommended the dismissal of the complaint against Respondent for failure of complainant to appear on any of the scheduled hearings and on the basis of a "Sinumpaang Salaysay" 4 executed on behalf of complainant who has left for Singapore by her elder sister Sherlita N. Bendanillo expressly withdrawing her complaint against Respondent. Judge Villarama, however, also recommended that the Respondent be issued a stern warning "in view of the fact on record that he indeed solemnized a marriage without the requisite marriage license. . . ." 5 On November 7, 1994, we referred the aforementioned Memorandum to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation. In its Memorandum dated January 17, 1995, the Office of the Court Administrator stated:
Careful study of the records reveal that indeed respondent Judge displayed his ignorance of the law when he solemnized the marriage without a marriage license. As a judge, he is presumed to be aware of the existence of Article 3(2) of the Family Code of the Philippines (E.O. 209, as amended by E.O. 227), which provides that one of the formal requisites of a marriage is a valid marriage license. Absence of said requisite will make the marriage void from the beginning (Article 35 [3], the Family Code of the Philippines). Judges are enjoined to show more than just a cursory acquaintance of the law and other established rules. 6

It recommended that Respondent be held liable for misconduct for solemnizing a marriage without a marriage license and that the appropriate administrative sanctions be imposed against him. 7 We concur with the findings and recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator. Respondent, by his own admission 8 that he solemnized the marriage between complainant and Marcelo Moreno without the required marriage license, has dismally failed to live up to his commitment to be the "embodiment of competence, integrity and independence" 9 and to his promise to be "faithful to the law." 10 Respondent cannot hide behind his claim of good faith and Christian motives which, at most, would serve only to mitigate his liability but not exonerate him completely. Good intentions could never justify violation of the law. Must we always repeat our reminder in Uy v. Dizon Capulong that
11

and several other cases

12

. . . the judge is the visible representation of law and justice from whom the people draw their will and awareness to obey the law. For the judge to return that regard, the latter must be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for the others to follow. The judge should be studiously careful to avoid even the slightest infraction of the law. To fulfill this mission, the judge should keep abreast of the law, the rulings and doctrines of this Court. If the judge is already aware of them, the latter should not deliberately refrain from applying them; otherwise such omission can never be excused. And have we not frequently stressed that: . . .judges should endeavor to maintain at all times the confidence and high respect accorded to

those who wield the gavel of justice. Circular No. 13, dated July 1, 1987, enjoins judges "to conduct themselves strictly in accordance with the mandate of existing laws and the Code of Judicial Conduct that they be exemplars in their communities and the living personification of justice and the Rule of Law. . . . 13

A case in point, a definite precedent and a clear basis in determining the liability of Respondent in the instant case is Cosca, et al. v. Palaypayon, Jr., et a1. 14 where Judge Palaypayon, Jr. was duly fined and sternly warned for, among others, solemnizing marriages without licenses. We declared:
. . . the conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. His conduct, at all times, must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum but, above all else, must be beyond suspicion. Every employee should be an example of integrity, uprightness and honesty. Integrity in a judicial office is more than a virtue, it is a necessity. It applies, without qualification as to rank or position, from the judge to the least of its personnel, they being standard-bearers of the exacting norms of ethics and morality imposed upon a Court of justice. On the charge regarding illegal marriages the Family Code pertinently provides that the formal requisites of marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for therein. Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab initio and that, while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those affected by the illegal marriages, and what we are providing for herein pertains to the administrative liability of respondents, all without prejudice to their criminal responsibility. The Revised Penal Code provides that "[p]riests or ministers of any religious denomination or sect, or civil authorities who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the Marriage Law." This is of course, within the province of the prosecutorial agencies of the Government.

Finally, on the alleged withdrawal of the complaint against Respondent, we reiterate our ruling in Imbing v. Tiongson: 15
The fact that complainant has lost interest in prosecuting the administrative case against herein respondent judge will not necessarily warrant a dismissal thereof. Once charges have been filed, the Supreme Court may not be divested of its jurisdiction to investigate and ascertain the truth of the matter alleged in the complaint. The Court has an interest in the conduct of members of the Judiciary and in improving the delivery of justice to the people, and its efforts in that direction may not be derailed by the complainant's desistance from further prosecuting the case he or she initiated. To condition administrative actions upon the will of every complainant, who may, for one reason or another, condone a detestable act, is to strip this Court of its supervisory power to discipline erring members of the Judiciary. Definitely, personal interests are not material or controlling. What is involved here is a matter of public interest considering that respondent is no ordinary citizen but an officer of the court whose personal behavior not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Respondent is hereby ordered to pay a fine of P10,000.00 and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 103047 September 2, 1994 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND ANGELINA M. CASTRO, respondents. Parungao, Abesamis, Eleazar & Pulgar Law Offices for private respondent. PUNO, J.: The case at bench originated from a petition filed by private respondent Angelina M. Castro in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage to Edwin F. Cardenas. 1 As ground therefor, Castro claims that no marriage license was ever issued to them prior to the solemnization of their marriage. Despite notice, defendant Edwin F. Cardenas failed to file his answer. Consequently, he was declared in default. Trial proceeded in his absence. The controlling facts are undisputed: On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay City. The marriage was celebrated without the knowledge of Castro's parents. Defendant Cardenas personally attended to the processing of the documents required for the celebration of the marriage, including the procurement of the marriage, license. In fact, the marriage contract itself states that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued in the name of the contracting parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila. The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the marriage was unknown to Castro's parents. Thus, it was only in March 1971, when Castro discovered she was pregnant, that the couple decided to live together. However, their cohabitation lasted only for four (4) months. Thereafter, the couple parted ways. On October 19, 1971, Castro gave birth. The baby was adopted by Castro's brother, with the consent of Cardenas. The baby is now in the United States. Desiring to follow her daughter, Castro wanted to put in order her marital status before leaving for the States. She thus consulted a lawyer, Atty. Frumencio E. Pulgar, regarding the possible annulment of her marriage. Through her lawyer's efforts, they discovered that there was no marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to the celebration of their marriage. As proof, Angelina Castro offered in evidence a certification from the Civil Register of Pasig, Metro Manila. It reads:
February 20, 1987 TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: This is to certify that the names EDWIN F. CARDENAS and ANGELINA M. CASTRO who were allegedly married in the Pasay City Court on June 21, 1970 under an alleged (s)upportive marriage license no. 3196182 allegedly issued in the municipality on June 20, 1970 cannot be located as said license no. 3196182 does not appear from our records. Issued upon request of Mr. Ed Atanacio. (Sgd) CENONA D. QUINTOS

Senior Civil Registry Officer

Castro testified that she did not go to the civil registrar of Pasig on or before June 24, 1970 in order to apply for a license. Neither did she sign any application therefor. She affixed her signature only on the marriage contract on June 24, 1970 in Pasay City. The trial court denied the petition. 2 It held that the above certification was inadequate to establish the alleged non-issuance of a marriage license prior to the celebration of the marriage between the parties. It ruled that the "inability of the certifying official to locate the marriage license is not conclusive to show that there was no marriage license issued." Unsatisfied with the decision, Castro appealed to respondent appellate court. She insisted that the certification from the local civil registrar sufficiently established the absence of a marriage license. As stated earlier, respondent appellate court reversed the Decision of the trial court. 3 It declared the marriage between the contracting parties null and void and directed the Civil Registrar of Pasig to cancel the subject marriage contract. Hence this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines urges that respondent appellate court erred when it ruled that the certification issued by the civil registrar that marriage license no. 3196182 was not in their record adequately proved that no such license was ever issued. Petitioner also faults the respondent court for relying on the self-serving and uncorroborated testimony of private respondent Castro that she had no part in the procurement of the subject marriage license. Petitioner thus insists that the certification and the uncorroborated testimony of private respondent are insufficient to overthrow the legal presumption regarding the validity of a marriage. Petitioner also points that in declaring the marriage between the parties as null and void, respondent appellate court disregarded the presumption that the solemnizing officer, Judge Pablo M. Malvar, regularly performed his duties when he attested in the marriage contract that marriage license no. 3196182 was duly presented to him before the solemnization of the subject marriage. The issues, being interrelated, shall be discussed jointly. The core issue presented by the case at bench is whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent are sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to the celebration of the marriage of private respondent to Edwin F. Cardenas. We affirm the impugned Decision. At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing marital relations was the New Civil Code. The law 4 provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage license first issued by a local civil registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a license would render the marriage void ab initio. 5 Petitioner posits that the certification of the local civil registrar of due search and inability to find a record or entry to the effect that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued to the parties is not adequate to prove its non-issuance. We hold otherwise. The presentation of such certification in court is sanctioned by Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, viz.:

Sec. 29. Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an officer having custody of an official record or by his deputy, that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry.

The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such other relevant data. 6 The certification of "due search and inability to find" issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of "due search and inability to find" sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage license no. 3196182 to the contracting parties. The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her testimony in support of her petition is, in itself, not a ground to deny her petition. The failure to offer any other witness to corroborate her testimony is mainly due to the peculiar circumstances of the case. It will be remembered that the subject marriage was a civil ceremony performed by a judge of a city court. The subject marriage is one of those commonly known as a "secret marriage" a legally nonexistent phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of either or both of the contracting parties. The records show that the marriage between Castro and Cardenas was initially unknown to the parents of the former. Surely, the fact that only private respondent Castro testified during the trial cannot be held against her. Her husband, Edwin F. Cardenas, was duly served with notice of the proceedings and a copy of the petition. Despite receipt thereof, he chose to ignore the same. For failure to answer, he was properly declared in default. Private respondent cannot be faulted for her husband's lack of interest to participate in the proceedings. There was absolutely no evidence on record to show that there was collusion between private respondent and her husband Cardenas. It is noteworthy to mention that the finding of the appellate court that the marriage between the contracting parties is null and void for lack of a marriage license does not discount the fact that indeed, a spurious marriage license, purporting to be issued by the civil registrar of Pasig, may have been presented by Cardenas to the solemnizing officer. In fine, we hold that, under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage license. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED there being no showing of any reversible error committed by respondent appellate court. SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390 April 11, 2002 (Formerly IPI No. 01-1049-MTJ) MERCEDITA MATA ARAES, petitioner, vs. JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO, respondent. PUNO, J.: Petitioner Mercedita Mata Araes charges respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law via a sworn Letter-Complaint dated 23 May 2001. Respondent is the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. Petitioner alleges that on 17 February 2000, respondent judge solemnized her marriage to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction. They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her husband passed away. However, since the marriage was a nullity, petitioner's right to inherit the "vast properties" left by Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy.1wphi1.nt Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge for his illegal acts and unethical misrepresentations which allegedly caused her so much hardships, embarrassment and sufferings. On 28 May 2001, the case was referred by the Office of the Chief Justice to then Acting Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepao for appropriate action. On 8 June 2001, the Office of the Court Administrator required respondent judge to comment. In his Comment dated 5 July 2001, respondent judge averred that he was requested by a certain Juan Arroyo on 15 February 2000 to solemnize the marriage of the parties on 17 February 2000. Having been assured that all the documents to the marriage were complete, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. However, on 17 February 2000, Arroyo informed him that Orobia had a difficulty walking and could not stand the rigors of travelling to Balatan which is located almost 25 kilometers from his residence in Nabua. Arroyo then requested if respondent judge could solemnize the marriage in Nabua, to which request he acceded. Respondent judge further avers that before he started the ceremony, he carefully examined the documents submitted to him by petitioner. When he discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite marriage license, he refused to solemnize the marriage and suggested its resetting to another date. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human compassion. He also feared that if he reset the wedding, it might aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who just suffered from a stroke. After the solemnization, he reiterated the necessity for the marriage license and admonished the parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured respondent judge that they would give the license to him in the afternoon of that same day. When they failed to comply, respondent judge followed it up with Arroyo but the latter only gave him the same reassurance that the marriage license would be delivered to his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. Respondent judge vigorously denies that he told the contracting parties that their marriage is valid despite the absence of a marriage license. He attributes the hardships and embarrassment suffered by the petitioner as due to her own fault and negligence. On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance dated 28 August 2001 with the Office of the Court Administrator. She attested that respondent judge initially refused to solemnize her

marriage due to the want of a duly issued marriage license and that it was because of her prodding and reassurances that he eventually solemnized the same. She confessed that she filed this administrative case out of rage. However, after reading the Comment filed by respondent judge, she realized her own shortcomings and is now bothered by her conscience. Reviewing the records of the case, it appears that petitioner and Orobia filed their Application for Marriage License on 5 January 2000. It was stamped in this Application that the marriage license shall be issued on 17 January 2000. However, neither petitioner nor Orobia claimed it. It also appears that the Office of the Civil Registrar General issued a Certification that it has no record of such marriage that allegedly took place on 17 February 2000. Likewise, the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur issued another Certification dated 7 May 2001 that it cannot issue a true copy of the Marriage Contract of the parties since it has no record of their marriage. On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought the assistance of respondent judge so the latter could communicate with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur for the issuance of her marriage license. Respondent judge wrote the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur. In a letter dated 9 May 2001, a Clerk of said office, Grace T. Escobal, informed respondent judge that their office cannot issue the marriage license due to the failure of Orobia to submit the Death Certificate of his previous spouse. The Office of the Court Administrator, in its Report and Recommendation dated 15 November 2000, found the respondent judge guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued marriage license and for doing so outside his territorial jurisdiction. A fine of P5,000.00 was recommended to be imposed on respondent judge. We agree. Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P. 129, the authority of the regional trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court.1wphi1.nt The case at bar is not without precedent. In Navarro vs. Domagtoy,1 respondent judge held office and had jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. However, he solemnized a wedding at his residence in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte which did not fall within the jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos. We held that: "A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinance to marry the faithful is authorized to do so only within the area or diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability."2 (Emphasis supplied.) In said case, we suspended respondent judge for six (6) months on the ground that his act of solemnizing a marriage outside his jurisdiction constitutes gross ignorance of the law. We further held that: "The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and

competent in understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in the instant case. x x x While magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons."3 In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage. Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license. In People vs. Lara,4 we held that a marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.1wphi1.nt Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance filed by petitioner. This Court has consistently held in a catena of cases that the withdrawal of the complaint does not necessarily have the legal effect of exonerating respondent from disciplinary action. Otherwise, the prompt and fair administration of justice, as well as the discipline of court personnel, would be undermined.5 Disciplinary actions of this nature do not involve purely private or personal matters. They can not be made to depend upon the will of every complainant who may, for one reason or another, condone a detestable act. We cannot be bound by the unilateral act of a complainant in a matter which involves the Court's constitutional power to discipline judges. Otherwise, that power may be put to naught, undermine the trust character of a public office and impair the integrity and dignity of this Court as a disciplining authority.6 WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely. SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 July 19, 1996 RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant, vs. JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY, respondent. ROMERO, J.:p The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law. First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife. Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Respondent judge holds office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the respondent judge's residence in the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. In his letter-comment to the office of the Court Administrator, respondent judge avers that the office and name of the Municipal Mayor of Dapa have been used by someone else, who, as the mayor's "lackey," is overly concerned with his actuations both as judge and as a private person. The same person had earlier filed Administrative Matter No 94-980-MTC, which was dismissed for lack of merit on September 15, 1994, and Administrative Matter No. OCA-IPI95-16, "Antonio Adapon v. Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy," which is still pending. In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of having solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife, and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven years. 1 With respect to the second charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code which states that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;" and that article 8 thereof applies to the case in question. The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the pleadings submitted were considered sufficient for a resolution of the case. 2 Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of complainant have not been sufficiently proven, they will not be dwelt upon. The acts complained of and respondent judge's answer thereto will suffice and can be objectively assessed by themselves to prove the latter's malfeasance. The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga states that Tagadan's civil status is "separated." Despite this declaration, the wedding

ceremony was solemnized by respondent judge. He presented in evidence a joint affidavit by Maurecio A. Labado, Sr. and Eugenio Bullecer, subscribed and sworn to before Judge Demosthenes C. Duquilla, Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar. 3 The affidavit was not issued by the latter judge, as claimed by respondent judge, but merely acknowledged before him. In their affidavit, the affiants stated that they knew Gaspar Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida D. Pearanda in September 1983; that after thirteen years of cohabitation and having borne five children, Ida Pearanda left the conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon and that she has not returned nor been heard of for almost seven years, thereby giving rise to the presumption that she is already dead. In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit is sufficient proof of Ida Pearanda's presumptive death, and ample reason for him to proceed with the marriage ceremony. We do not agree. Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:
A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Articles 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient. For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (Emphasis added.)

There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact, the law is clear and simple. Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement which has been precisely incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent marriages where it is not proven that the previous marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in accordance with pertinent provisions of law. In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his first wife's presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida Pearanda. Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, " The following marriage shall be void from the beginning: (4) Those bigamous . . . marriages not falling under Article 41." The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside the court's jurisdiction, covered by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code, thus:
Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by : (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction; xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied.) Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place

designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.

Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justification for his having solemnized the marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his court's jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be held outside of the judge's chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in the remote place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario. 4 More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of the solemnizing officer." Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage. A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful, is authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability. 5 Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic principles of civil law. Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law. The legal principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention are elementary and uncomplicated, prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure to apply them is due to a lack of comprehension of the law. The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in instant case. 6 It is not too much to expect them to know and apply the law intelligently. 7 Otherwise, the system of justice rests on a shaky foundation indeed, compounded by the errors committed by those not learned in the law. While magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons. The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and void, there being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Pearanda.

The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to the Court, a sixmonth suspension and a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Considering that one of the marriages in question resulted in a bigamous union and therefore void, and the other lacked the necessary authority of respondent judge, the Court adopts said recommendation. Respondent is advised to be more circumspect in applying the law and to cultivate a deeper understanding of the law. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months and given a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Regalado, Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.