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Overview
Roberts Kincaid
Summary: Roberts
Realism regarding laws Laws are mathematically, but not nomologically contingent 3 types of laws
Hedged regularity: when A happens, B happens, unless there is interference Meaning of 'interference':
We cannot give a definition of interference, but can determine when some C is interference
Comments on Roberts
[Laws should be] robust, in the sense that they do not depend on contingent details of particular systems or objects, and they would not be upset by changes in the actual circumstances that are physically possible.
Summary: Kincaid
Both in social and in physical science we use qualitative relationships and non-experimental results (theoretical physics) Laws can be dependent on factors from within the system, also in physical science (biology) Laws can be 'byproducts' meaning that they are relying on underlying causal factors (chemistry)
Either we are in a position to predict of a certain cause whether it would be 'interference' Or we can determine by research whether it is a relevant factor Example: law of supply and demand: add factor of substitutes and complements to prevent over-idealisation / limit data to specific products
And even if, persons can be constrained by factors of the system (combined behaviour of individuals)
Comments on Kincaid
Nomological laws shouldn't have a specific status Questionable whether argument against idealisation works
See e.g. the discussion regarding rationality in the economic debate Is psychology suddenly no social science anymore?
Can Kincaid distinguish genuine causes from epipphenomena? (coffee causes lung cancer)
Roberts mechanical causation and higher status for laws vs Kincaid's 'paradigm' account of laws, with laws being the same as any other claims
Is it necessary for a law that we can predict beforehand whether an event E is an interference?
- We can determine whether - Possiblity of idealisation / a factor will be relevant in all over-generalisation imaginary cases
Questions
Are laws necessary for explanation? Is the inability to determine interference beforehand just a problem of the social sciences?