Anglo-Soviet Occupation of Iran in August 1941 Author(s): F. Eshraghi Source: Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Jan.

, 1984), pp. 27-52 Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4282976 Accessed: 11/08/2009 08:35
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Anglo-Soviet Occupation of Iran in August 1941

F. Eshraghi the Almost all studiesregarding occupationof Iranby the Allies in August 1941invariablyrefer to either the presenceof a large numberof Germans and their activitiesin Iranor the use of Iranas a supplyroute to send aid to the Soviet Union, or to both as the reasonsfor the occupation.'The most recentstudyby M. Rezunarguesthatthe threatfromthe Germansin Iranto and the Soviet Union wasthe realreasonfor the occupation the Sovietstook the initiativeon this issue.2In this articlea fulleraccountof the occupation, is whichoffersa newinterpretation, presented.Althoughthe questionof the factors supplyroute andof the presenceof Germansin Iranwere important influencingthe decisionby the Allies to occupyIran, there were two other more importantfactorsat that time. These were the securityof the British position in this area and the Britishdesire not to rebuffthe Soviets in their first approach,as an ally, for tangibleco-operation. The Germanattackon the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941introducedan entirelynew elementinto the situationandone whichaffectedBritishpolicy throughoutCentralAsia. The purpose of this article is to discuss firstly, British Governmentpolicy towardIran as it developed in the light of this reactiontowardsthe new situation,and secondlythe IranianGovernment's new Britishpolicy.
PART ONE

The ImmediateBritishAttitude In the firsttwo yearsof the warthe situationin Iranwasrelativelycalm. Iran decided to remain neutral in the war and this policy was welcomed by Britain.The Britishhad from the outbreakof war in September1939been concernedthat the Germansin Iran might endangerBritishinterests, for example by subversiveactivities, but they were not especially alarmed. the Largelybecauseof repeatedBritishwarnings IranianGovernmenttook all necessarymeasuresto ensurethat all foreigners,includingthe Germans The Britishseem to in Iran,wouldnot act againstIran'spolicyof neutrality. havebeen satisfiedwiththese measures.Onlyonce, duringthe Iraqiepisode in May 1941 did the Britishurge the Iraniansto expel a large numberof GermansfromIran.Thereis no evidenceto suggestthatthe Sovietswere at all concerned about the presenceof Germansin Iran before the German invasionof the Soviet Union. The Germanattackon the Soviet Union in June 1941 made the British take the presence of the German colony in Iran more seriously. British of policywas initiallyto try to persuadethe Iranians the possibledangersto Iranarisingfrom the existenceand activitiesof the Germancommunityin

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Iran and to attemptto induce the Iraniansto expel them from Iran. It was recognized that this policy had little chance of success. It was doubted whether the Iranianshad the courage to displease Germanyat that time becausegeneralopinionin Iran, according a reportwhichwas sent from to the BritishMilitaryAttache in Tehranon 25 June 1941,was that Germany would defeat the Soviet Union and take the Ukraineand Baku withintwo months and later would enter Iran.3It was therefore thought that the Iranians, for fear of possible German reprisal, could take no action to UnderdispleaseGermany.In the wordsof SirA. Cadogan,the Permanent Secretaryat the Foreign Office, 'the IranianGovernmentwill surely wait and see which way the cat jumps'.4 Nevertheless on 28 and 30 June 1941 Sir Reader Bullard, the British Minister in Tehran, and Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, respectivelytalkedto Ali Mansur,the Iranian PrimeMinister,andMohammadAli Moqaddam, Iranian the the Ministerin London,regarding German colony in Iran.The Iranians were unwilling take drasticactionagainstthe to Germansin Iranarguingthat they were all technicalexpertswhose services were most valuableto Iranand to send them all awaywouldhave a serious effect on Iran'sprosperity.5
Measures Considered by the British

As the nature of the Iranians'reply to the British approachhad been foreseen from the beginning,discussionsbegan in late June and earlyJuly 1941as to what actionshouldbe taken againstIran, if she refusedto expel the Germans. of On 27 June 1941L.S. Amery, the Secretary State for India, urgedthe Foreign Office to compel the Iranians,with Russiancooperation,to expel the Germans and even to allow the British to establish aerodromeson Iranianterritory.Ameryalso suggestedthatthe Britishshouldsend a really powerfulmissionto Tehran.Amery did not elaboratethis point. He probably had in mind that necessarypreparationsshould be made to meet a possible Germanyadvanceinto Iran if the Soviet Union was defeated.6 Bullard and General A. Wavell, the newly appointed C-in-C India, believed that Britain should not supply Iran with war material, such as untilthe situationon the Sovietfrontbecameclearerbecauseof the aircraft,7 possibilityof the seizure by Germanyin Iran of the war material.Bullard also believed that Britain should continue to insist on a strict policy of on neutrality the partof Iranbecausethismightbe of somevalueto Britainif the Germansreachedthe northernfrontierof Iran.8 On 7 July 1941Hugh Dalton, Ministerof EconomicWarfare,supported the suggestion of a joint diplomaticdemarchemade by Amery and connected that suggestionwith control of the means of transportin Iran. He for the thoughtthat Iranwouldbe practically only routeremaining supplies to the Soviet Union from the BritishEmpireand the United States, if the Vladivostock route was blocked. It was therefore prudent that a joint demarcheshould be made at Tehrandemandingthat Britainshould take control of road and rail transportin Southern Iran and the Soviets in NorthernIran.9

ANGLO-SOVIET OCCUPATION OF IRAN

29

in On 9 July 1941SirS. Cripps,the BritishAmbassador Moscow,who had discussedthat matterwith Stalinon 8 July, said that he believedthat Stalin the was rightin regarding fifthcolumnmenacein Iranas an urgentproblem which called for immediatevigorous action before the German advance towards the Caucasusrenderedeffective pressureimpossible. On 8 July Stalin, in a conversationwith Cripps, raised the question of Iran (and Afghanistan).Accordingto the Russianstherewerebetweena totalof 6,000 who were believedto be dangerousto Britain and 7,000 Germansin Iran."' and the Soviet Union's interests. Stalinfelt that it was urgentlynecessary that somethingshould be done about it. Stalinasked Crippswhat he suggested. Crippstold Stalinthat Britainwas awareof these dangersand had in alreadymaderepresentations Tehranaboutthem. Crippsthen saidthata by concerteddiplomaticd6marche Britainandthe Soviet Union mighthave some effect. With this Stalin agreed. Crippsthereforesuggestedto the ForeignOfficethatthe BritishGovernmentshouldencouragethe Sovietsto reinforcethe proposedjoint diplomaon tic demarcheby troop concentrations the Northernfrontierof Iran, and on thatBritain,in view of the difficulties the Sovietfront,andthe possibility mightnot in themselvescarrysufficientconviction, thatsuchconcentrations stage some sort of militarythreatin SouthernIran. should simultaneously The problem, Crippsthought, requiredimmediatevigorousaction before the Germanadvancetowardsthe Caucasusbecause, if Germanyreached Iran's frontier, effective pressureon the Iraniansmight be impossibleto apply and Germany,havinga powerfulfifth columnin Iran, could pose a very serious threat to Iran'spolicy of neutrality.To this end Crippsurged that because of the situationon the Russianfront the time factor was so importantthat Britaincould not affordto allow the Iraniansto delay, as it was supposed they would, unless sufficientlyfrightened.' The Eastern Departmentof the Foreign Office were in full agreement withotherswithregardto the need for the expulsionof the Germansin Iran. or But it was thoughtto be doubtfulthat a joint diplomaticrepresentation even joint economic pressurewould in fact achieve the desired result. to weretoo frightened believedthatthe Iranians The EasternDepartment take any actionwhichwoulddispleaseGermanyat thattime becauseof the the uncertaintyon the Russianfront. Furthermore, expulsionof the Gerof mansfromIranwouldmeanthe indefinitepostponement Iran'sindustrial programmeon which the Shah had set so much store. It was therefore and believedthatrepresentations economicpressurewerenot likelyto have much more effect than the representationswhich Bullard had already addressedto the Iraniangovernmenton this subject. As regards the suggestions put forwardby Amery and Dalton, it was unless Britain and the Soviet believed that they were quite impracticable would Government to wereprepared go to warwithIran.The Iranian Union not acceptsuch demandsbecausethey wouldconsiderit as an infringement of Iran'spolicyof neutrality.The EasternDepartmentwas againstmilitary action. Theirview was that to go to warwith Iranwas a matterfor military judgement, but to them Britishforces in Iraq and Syriawere inadequate, and it was quite on the cards that, if Britain got involved in any further

30

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adventurein Iran, which might not be immediatelysuccessful,trouble in it Iraqmightbe renewed.'2 Furthermore, was dangerousto assumethat the of Iranianarmycould be swept awayby the mere appearance a few British troops. As regardsCripps'sview, it was thought that an empty military threatwas dangerous,sincein those daysit was alltoo easyfor the emptiness of such threatsto be exposed, and when that was done the last stage was worse than the first. As far as the suggestionby Bullardand Wavell was concernedit was importantto maintainBritishinfluencein Iranbecauseit was hoped thatsuchinfluencemightdelayor preventthe passingof Iraninto the Axis orbit. In principle,however, the ForeignOffice was in favourof taking joint diplomaticand economic action with the cooperationof the Soviet Union againstIran (the questionof economicmeasuresis discussedbelow). The EasternDepartmentthoughtthatin spiteof the factthateconomicandother to pressureswere not likelyto be effectivein inducingthe Iranians expel all the GermansfromIran,they mightnevertheless achievesome usefulresult. For example, joint diplomaticpressure would probably be useful as a counter balance to Germanactivitiesin Iran. On 10July 1941A. Cadoganand0. Sargent,Deputy Under-Secretary of State at the ForeignOffice, agreedwith the EasternDepartmentregarding the joint diplomaticactionfor the followingfurtherreasons.It was thought that it was undesirableto rebuffthe Soviet Governmentwhen they came forwardwith a suggestionfor cooperationin a matterwhereboth countries' immediate aims were identical, and it was useful to demonstratein the in MiddleEast the fact thatBritainandthe SovietUnionwerecooperating a joint policy."3 The Possibilityof Joint Anglo-SovietAction As mentioned above Cripps and Stalin on 8 July discussedthe Iranian in situation.In the morningof 10July, IvanMaisky,the SovietAmbassador London,went to see Eden to discussthe positionof Iran(andAfghanistan). Maiskytold Eden thatStalinhadtouchedon the situationwhenspeakingto was concernedat the numberof Cripps.The SovietGovernment profoundly view it wasnecessaryto take immediGermansin Iran.In his Government's ate measuresjointly to prevent the furthergrowth of this danger. Eden repliedthat the BritishGovernmentsharedthis view with the Soviet Government. Britainwas quite ready to examinewhat furthersteps might be open to Britainand the Soviet Union to deal with the situation.Eden then had askedMaiskywhatactionthe Soviet Government in mind. Maiskysaid thatBritainandthe SovietUnion mightjointlysummonthe IranianGovernment to expel the Germansin Iranon the groundthatthey were a dangerto the Soviet Union and Britain.Eden agreedto considerthe suggestion,but he wishedto look a little furtherinto the matterfirst.It was neverwise, said Eden, to issue a threatunlessBritainandthe SovietUnion weredetermined beforehandon the actionto be taken if the threatfailed and unlessBritain andthe Soviet Union were surethatsuchactionwouldbe effective. Had the Soviet Governmentconsidered,asked Eden, what furtheraction mightbe said that they taken supposing,as Eden thoughtquitepossible,the Iranians

ANGLO-SOVIET OCCUPATION OF IRAN

31

could not dispense with the Germanswho were of importanceto Iran? Maiskyagreed as to the importanceof clearingtheir mindscompletelyon the matterbeforethey took the firststep. He suggestedthateffectiveeconodid mic actionmightbe open to Britainandthe Soviet Union if the Iranians not respond to their summons. After some furtherdiscussionin whichSir H. Seymour,the Head of the Eastern Department,took part, it was agreed that the British and Soviet in shouldexaminethe situationurgently,considering particuGovernments lar what effective action was at their disposal in the event of an Iranian refusal, and that Eden and Maisky would meet again in the very near 1 future. In the afternoonof 10 JulyEden informedthe WarCabinetabout the situation. The War Cabinet took no decision, but expressed general of agreementwith the desirability eliminatingGermaninfluencein Iran.15 Fromthis time (10 July)until19July,the dayon whichthe Britishandthe Soviet Governments presentedtheirNotes to the IranianGovernment,the Allied Governments were preparing formandcontextof theirNotes as the well as consideringwhat further actions were to be taken if the joint did representations not achieve the desired result.'6 On 11 July the MiddleEast Ministerial Committee,with Eden as Chairwith man, held a meetingto discussthe situation.FromEden'sconversation Maiskyit is clearthathe was not hopefulthat Anglo-Sovietrepresentations and even economicpressurewouldinducethe Iraniansto expel largenumbersof GermansfromIran(thisviewwasalsosharedby Bullard).Therefore it was necessary to consider what further action should be taken if the the demandwas refused.Withthisin mindEdeninformed Committeeof his the withMaiskyregarding situation.Edenthensuggestedthat, conversation whichhadbeen started withthe virtualcompletionof the Syriancampaign,'7 on 8 June 1941,the forcesat the disposalof the Britishmightbe sufficientfor possible militaryaction to be taken in the event of Iranianrefusalof their demands. There is the question of how Eden knew that British forces would be availableafter the completionof the Syriancampaign.The only available evidenceis thaton July11 1941the WarCabinetinformedCadoganthatthe for Chiefsof Staffhad been considering the lastfew dayshow Britaincould withthe Soviet Union to strengthen take advantageof her new relationship her positionnot only in Iran, but also in the FarEast andAfghanistan.The Chiefs of Staff realized that this was primarilya matter for the Foreign Office, but there were such considerablemilitaryimplicationsthat they thoughtit right to let the Foreign Office have their views.'8This evidence suggeststhat the Chiefsof Staffhad probablyconsideredmilitaryactionin the area if requiredand that Eden must have known about their views. In the course of discussionin the Committeea numberof points were made. The principalpoints were as follows: (1) it would be undesirableto take drasticactionin Iranif the expulsionof the Germanscouldbe attained actionwasopen to Britain by other means,but the questionof whatmilitary in Iranshouldbe consideredby the Chiefsof Staff;(2) in the Note a formal declaration should be made by Britain and the Soviet Union that the independenceof Iranwouldbe maintained.Eden was askedto lay stressin

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MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

his conversation with Maiskyon the importance sucha declaration to of and discourageany tendency on the part of the Russiansto press for drastic action if their aims could be secured by other means.'9 Meanwhile,Crippsandalso the IndianGovernment protestedagainstthe Committee's decision." Cripps still advocated more drastic and quicker action against Iran. His main argumentwas that gradual pressure was inadequatebecause the time factorwas so important,since in a few weeks the Soviet Union might no longer be in a positionto threatenIran at all.' Bullard supportedthe Foreign Office's approachabout the Germansin Iran. At the same time he proposedtryingto influencethe Shah himself againstthe Germans.Bullardsuggestedthatthe BritishGovernment should write a personal letter to thc Shah statingthat the Germansin Iran were working against the Shah and his regime. This would arouse the Shah's suspicionsand would do as muchgood as threats.22 There is no evidence of the ForeignOffice'sview regarding suggestion.One possibleexplanathis tion is thatit wasrefusedbecauseBullardinformedthe ForeignOfficeof this suggestion on 11 July and the Foreign Office had already begun coordinatingtheir approachwith the Russiansand did not wish to rebuffthe Russians. On 14 July, Maiskytold Eden that the Soviet Governmenthad agreed withthe BritishGovernment's viewthattheyshouldfirsttrya jointdiplomatic approachand then consider,if need be, the possibilityof followingit up with economicpressure.The Soviet Government also agreedwiththe form and content of the Note.23 On 19 July 1941, however, Bullard and Andre Smirnov, the Soviet Ambassadorin Tehran, presentedtheir respectiveGovernments' Notes to the IranianGovernmentand asked for a reply as soon as possible. In the Note it was explainedthat the Allied Governmentsadvocatedthe maintenanceof Iran'sindependenceandfreedomandit was in the interestsof Iran as well as of Britainand the Soviet Union to expel the Germancolony from Iran.24 The Possibilityof Economic Measures The applicationof economic pressureon Iran was first proposed by the Governmentof India on 6 July 1941. On 9 July the Ministerof Economic Warfare,Hugh Dalton, thoughtthat the proposalwould be practicalfrom an economicpointof view, butthatit shouldbe playedwithgreatdetermination and some skill. He explainedthe economicweaponswithwhichBritain couldbringpressureon Iran,in particular withregard importsinto Iranof to commoditiessuch as sugar, wheat, lorriesand tyres, tea and cement. Dalton'sconclusionwas that Iranwouldprobably haveto tightenher belt in any case, because,owingto shippingdifficulties,she couldnot obtainher full requirementsfrom overseas. That formed a weaknessin the policy of inducementbecauseBritainwouldneverbe in a positionto meet all of Iran's the requirements. however,Britainabandoned policyof inducementshe If, couldsqueezeIranveryhardindeedso longas the SovietUnion assistedher, becausethe Soviet Union was a tradepartnerof Iranand controlledone of Iran'straderoutesto Europe.But Iranalsohadcertaincardsto play, suchas

ANGLO-SOVIET OCCUPATION OF IRAN

33

oil and transittrafficto the Soviet Union. As regardsoil Dalton said that if the Shah was annoyed he would interefere with the Anglo-IranianOil Company.As far as transittrafficwas concernedIranwas a possibleroute for supplies to the Soviet Union. It was difficult, said Dalton, to bring economicpressureto bearon Iranby stoppingherown supplies,whileat the for as same time proposingto use her territory a channelof communication other goods to the Soviet Union.' On 19 July 1941 Bullard and Smirnovexplained their views on what economic measurescould be taken againstIran. Bullardthoughtthat Britain could create difficultieson furtherconversionof sterlinginto dollars, withold shippingfrom Iran's ports, and refuse to supply goods urgently needed by Iran. Smirnovbelieved that the Soviet Union could refuse to allow the shipmentof Germangoods consignedto Iranwhichwere lyingat Baku. The Soviet Union could also refuse to returnto Iran goods in the Soviet Union whichwere on their way to Germanybut had not been paid for, and refuse to sell goods urgentlyneeded in Iran. But Bullardthought that Iranwould not agree to send awaya largenumberof Germansin Iran even if economic sanctionswere appliedbecause the sanctionswould not affect Iran for some time.26 of The ForeignOffice, the Ministry EconomicWarfare,the United Kingthe Corporation, IndiaOffice,andthe PetroleumDepartdom Commercial of ment also believedthatthe application economicsanctionswas not likely or to have any earlyeffect on the Iranians thatit wouldinducethemto expel the Germansfrom Iran. On the contrary,said the EasternDepartment,it any wouldbe a longtimebeforeeconomicsanctionsproduced effectbecause Iran was normallyself-sufficientin foodstuffs except for sugar, tea and coffee, and the crop alreadyharvestedwouldbe enoughfor a considerable time. Furthermore,in any threatto impose economicsanctionson Iran it was vital to bear in miindthe effect on Britishoil supplies. Exportsfrom betweenfive andeightmilliontons Abadanhadfallen, butwerestillrunning per annum.The Abadansupplieswere absolutelyessentialto Britainunder war conditions. Any economic pressurethereforewould have to take the form of preventingIran'simportsand exportsother than oil, while the oil of exportscontinued.The Shahwaswell awareof the importance Iranianoil to Britain,and it was thoughtthatthe Shahwouldnot willinglyacquiescein were: (1) that an economic such an arrangement.Furtherconsiderations routeto the Soviet Union blockadewouldprobablyclose the Trans-Iranian wouldprobablybe throwninto - for whatit was worth;(2) that the Iranians the armsof Germany.The EasternDepartment(H. Seymour)came to the conclusionthat economic pressure,withoutthe backingof a force in Iraq oilfields,wouldbe a futileexercise.As Eden sufficientto protectthe Iranian aheadof our military strengthor we put it 'we mustnot move diplomatically should court disaster'.27 The MilitaryMeasures By the last week of July 1941it was agreedthat economicpressureon Iran wouldbe too slow in its operationand wouldnot for some monthsproduce to sufficientinconvenienceto oblige the Iranians expel the Germans.At the

34

MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

discussionbetweenEden andMaiskyon 19Julyit wasacceptedthatmilitary actionseemed necessaryif the Iraniansrefusedto expel the Germansfrom Iran.2S As earlyas 11July 1941the Chiefsof Staffhadbeen askedto considerthe withthe Sovietsin Iranin the event of desirability joint actionin conjunction refusingto expel the Germans.On 18Julythe Chiefsof Staff, of the Iranians after examiningthe situationfrom a militarypoint of view, came to the army to conclusionthatIranwasin no position,militarily, resist.The Iranian consistedof nine divisions,only two of which, located at Tehran,could be NavyandAir Forcewere consideredmoderatelyefficient.Both the Iranian negligible." hectic day in the developmentof the situation. 28 July was a particularly Early in the morningMaiskycalled to see Eden to discussthe situationin
Iran. Maisky told Eden that the Soviet Government were now willing to take

partwith the Britishin any militaryplansthat mightbe necessaryto secure the expulsionof the Germansfrom Iran. The Soviet Governmenthad also agreed with what they understoodto be the British view of the proper of timetable.First, the concentration troops, then the presentationof their demands,and, in the thirdplace, if the demandswererefused,perhapssome military action. The Soviet Governmentalso proposed to add a second demand, that is, right of free transitfor Russiantroops and war material across Iran. Eden replied that the second demand might be difficult to harmonizewith the first. The Allied Governments'insistenceto Iran that the Germansshould be evicted was based on the need for Iranto observe scrupulousneutrality.It mightbe a little difficultin the same breathto tell the Iraniansthat they should give the Soviet Union and, perhaps,British facilitieswhichwere difficultto reconcilewith neutrality.Maiskyadmitted the force of this point, but said that perhaps good argumentcould be presentedon the analogyof Swedenwhich, thoughnominallymaintaining her neutrality,had in fact given Germanyimportanttransitfacilities for Germantroops. Eden agreed to considerthe second demand.3' Later in the morningthe Chiefs of Staff Committeeheld a meeting to as discusspossiblemilitary operationin Iran,withEdenpresiding chairman. withMaiskyearlierin the Eden informedthe Committeeof his conversation morning. After a full discussionregardingpolitical and militaryarrangeobject shouldbe to bringpressureon ments it was agreedthat the primary Iranto evictthe Germans,if possiblewithoutthe use of force. If the Iranians should be made on or about 12th of refused, then joint representations August 1941, demandingthe expulsionof the Germans,by which time a force of approximatelyone and a half divisions from the Middle East in Commandshouldbe concentrated Iraqandreadyto operate.Britainand the Soviet Union should be preparedfor the threat of occupationof the oilfields area in the south and Russianactionfrom the north. If the above evictedthe Germansfrom Iran pressureprovedsuccessfuland the Iranians the Britishshould then considerdemandingroad and rail facilitiesfor the Russiansand, if necessary,the Britishin Iran.It seems that the Committee agreed with Eden's view regardingthe second demand.3' In the afternoonof 28 July,Eden, at a WarCabinetmeeting,informedthe

ANGLO-SOVIET OCCUPATION OF IRAN

35

War Cabinetof the decisionsmade by the Chiefsof Staff Committee.The War Cabinetapprovedthem.32 the same afternoonthe EasternDepartIn ment, afterreceivingthe news of the Chiefsof StaffCommittee'sdecisions, to prepareda reportregarding situation,presumably be consideredby the Eden. The reportshows that the EasternDepartmentwas opposed to the action contemplatedin Iran. In it the EasternDepartmentexaminedthe likelycauseof events andtheirconsequences.It wassaidin the reportthatit looked certainthat requisiteforces for taking a strong line in Iran would shortlybe available.The plan envisagedby the Chiefsof Staffwas that the Britishandthe Russiansshouldassembleforcesandthentell the Shahto get rid of the Germansin Iran.The Shahwould not like this, but would either give in under protest or would temporise, in which case the two powers a wouldproceedto military action.Britainhadno interestin promoting state of confusionin Iran.If military actiontook place, it seemedthattherewould be an unoccupiedarea betweenthe zones occupiedby the Allies. If enemy areathe consequences the for agentswere free to intriguein thisunoccupied Allies mightbe veryserious.In anycase, sucha state of affairswouldput an end to any prospectof gettingtradethroughon the Trans-Iranian Railway. The Eastern Departmentbelieved that the British Governmentshould now considerafreshwhatBritishreal aimsin Iranwere andhow far the use of force would advancethem. To the EasternDepartmentthe most important aim in Iranfor Britainwas the securityof the oilfields, and, after this, came the Britishdesire to open up the Trans-Iranian route to Russiaand, generally, to show that Britainwas preparedto cooperatewith the Soviet Union in this part of the world. The other fact which the British should reckonwithwas thatthey couldnot expectthemselvesto occupyanypartof Iran or obtain special priviligesthere withoutthe Russianstaking similar steps. The Eastern Departmentthen raisedthe followingquestion: Wouldit not be best, when we are in a positionto talk stronglyto the Iranians,to come out into the open and say franklythatwe mustlook after the oilfields for the durationof the war, and (if we and the Russiansfeel equal to the task) take special steps to ensure that the railwayfunctions in accordancewith our requirements(the Soviet Governmentmakingsimilardemands)? Even if the Allied powers did this, they could keep up pressureabout the Germansin Iran, but it would be a mistaketo make the presence of the Germans in Iran the main issue between the British and the Iranians. demandfor the right to station Finally, it was said that a straightforward from the point of view of world troops in Iran had obvious disadvantages resemblance,for example,to the recent opinion. It bore an uncomfortable Japaneseaction in Indo-China.But, it was at least more honest, and might in be easier to explainto Britishsympathisers the worldas a whole, than if Britaingot involvedin an attackon Iranover the questionof the German colony. Everyonewould assumethat if the Britishwent into Iranthey were going to protectthe oilfields.The Britishmightjust as well say so and make the best they could of it.

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In the eveningof 28 Julythis reportwas discussedby Eden andthe Chiefs No of Staff and its conclusionrejected.33 reasonswere given but one likely explanationis that the Chiefs of Staff and Eden (and even Sargent and Cadogan)felt that the mere fact of cooperationwith the Russianson this question and the securityof Britishposition in this area were at that time more importantthan any other Britishaimsin Iran.It shouldbe noted that Bullard'ssuggestionof 11 July, that is, that the BritishGovernmentshould write personally to the Shah regardingthe Germans in Iran was also rejected. Immediatelyfollowingthe occupationthe Chiefsof Staff in consultation with Churchilldrew up new extensive militarydemands which were considerednecessaryto secure the Britishposition in this area. The were stronglyinfluencedby the situationin the Chiefsof Staffand Churchill Russianfront, expecting an imminentSoviet collapse, which was a grave possibilityin the summerof 1941.They desiredto makenecessarypreparaThe tions to protectthe oilfields againsta possibleGermanbreakthrough. insistextensive Britishdemandsfollowingthe occupation,and Churchill's ence on these demands,despite the oppositionof the EasternDepartment and Bullard,are clear indicationsof whatthe Chiefsof Staff and Churchill thoughtof the situation.They wantedBritainto take directcontrolof the oilfield areas.34 On 30 July 1941 the War Office informedGeneral A. Wavell, C-in-C Wavellwas also asked India, of the Chiefsof Staff Committee'sdecisions.35 for to make the necessarypreparations militaryoperationby 12 August.6 By the firstweek of Augustit had alreadybeen decidedthatthe Britishand shouldpresentidenticalNotes to the IranianGovthe Soviet Governments fromIranandthen, if the the ernmentdemanding expulsionof the Germans was refused, occupy the south and the northof Iran respectively. demand On 4 August, at 11.30a.m., a meetingwas heldwithSirJohnAnderson,the to as LordPresidentof the Council,37 chairman discussthe militaryarrangeto ments and the form and the context of the representations the Iranian Government. the As regardsthe form and context of the representations Committee generallyagreedthat the approachto be made to the IranianGovernment should be on a firm but friendlybasis. In fact the Committeeconsiderably reduced the demandsto be made on Iran. The militaryauthoritieswere of anxiousfor the employmentof the minimum force and were particularly averse to the immobilizationof large bodies of troops which would be needed if the occupationof the whole of Iran were to be undertaken.38 It was thought importantthat the Soviet Union should be discouraged from gratifyingany (apparentlypermanent)ambitionthey might have of occupyingNorthernIran. It should be explainedto the Russiansthat the intentions in Iran were limited to ensuringthat the IranianGovernment exercised their neutral rights without detrimentto Allied interests. The a Committeethen asked Eden to preparefor theirconsideration draftNote to be presentedto Iranon the followinglines: (a) the BritishGovernment regardedthe continuedpresenceof Germantechniciansand others in Iran wish to see as a dangerto their rightsand interests;they would accordingly the whole Germancommunityremoved;(b) the BritishGovernmentreal-

ANGLO-SOVIET OCCUPATION OF IRAN

37

ized that the removal of the whole Germancommunityat once might be impracticable,but they had to insist on: (1) the expulsionof any German nationals whose presence was unexplained, or who were employed in potentiallydangerousoccupations,for example, the Posts and Telegraph Department;(2) vigorousstepsshouldbe takento keep undersurveillance, and restrictthe movementsof, those Germannationalswhose retention might be for the time being essential to Iranianindustry;(3) no further admissionof Germannationalsinto Iran;and (4) the IranianGovernment of should provide a list giving full particulars those Germanswhom they wished to retain. (The BritishGovernmentexpected this list to be kept as small as possible and not exceedingone-fifthof the total number.) transitfacilitiesit was agreedthat,providedthe questionof the As regards expulsion of the Germanswas settled, the way would be cleared for the presentationof demandsfor these facilities.The Swedishprecedent(Maisky's point) could be used as an example. Finally,the Committeewere informedthat LordHankey, Chancellorof the Duchyof Lancaster,hadsuggestedthatit mightbe possibleto securethe servicesof Britishtechniciansto replacethose Germantechniciansin Iran whom the Britishwishedto see removed.In addition,it wouldbe desirable in to considerofferingto the Shah:(a) an inducement the formof doubling for existingoil royalties;and (b) specificcompensation the replacementof the Germantechnicians Shahhad been requiredto expel. The Committhe tee took no decision regardingthese suggestions.i It seems that the packageof politicalaction representeda considerable reductionon the demandscontemplatedearlier, that is, in late June and early July. Some of the German technicianscould be retained and the departureof others phased. Also, Reza Shah was to be offered financial inducement.The new package,that is, the AndersonCommittee'srecommendations, suggests that either more modest demands were thought or for consumption, thattherewas a genuinewish appropriate international and hope to avoidmilitary occupationcouldhave been occupation.Military avoided if all the Allied demands were met. But the expulsion of the Germans from Iran was to be only one of the eventual demands. The Russianshad alreadyraised the question of transitfacilities. The British Chiefs of Staff had talked about the securityof the Britishposition in this area. Althoughthe Chiefsof Staffdid not elaborateon this pointbefore the occupation, as mentioned above, immediatelyafter the occupation, they facilitiesin Iranto meet the threatof a possible demandedextensivemilitary in Germanbreakthrough the south of the USSR. On 30 August 1941, five operationhadbegun,the Chiefsof Staffclearlystated daysafterthe military Britishaim in Iranwas fromtheirpointof view the that the most important By securityof the oilfields.4') earlyAugustthe positionseemsto have been to demandthe expulsionof the Germansfrom Iran, but not to advancethis demandin such a manneras to makeit likelythat Iranwouldagreeto meet a the demand.Bullardandthe EasternDepartment's suggestionsregarding bold and direct approach to Reza Shah to persuade him to expel the Germanshad been rejected.As will be seen Iranseemsto have expectedan raise ultimatumbut never receivedsuch a document.These circumstances

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nor the possibility,whichcanneitherbe confirmed deniedfromthe available documents,that the demandfor the expulsionof the Germanswas no more than a convenient pretext and that from the beginningBritainhad other objectives in mind in Iran. This possibilityreceives some supportfrom a talkedaboutthe securityof lettersent to Stalinon 31 AugustwhenChurchill the oilfields and transitfacilities, and did not mentionthe questionof the Furthersupportfor the theory is providedby the expulsionof Germans.4' demands of the Chiefs of Staff. Therefore, the Anderson Committee's decisionto reducethe politicaldemandsmayhave been eitherdesignednot was to force Reza Shahto give in (the approach to be on a firmand friendly consumption.42 basis, not an ultimatum)or for international In the afternoonof the same day (4 August) Eden, on the basis of the Committee's decision, discussedthe situation with Maisky. Maisky told Eden that he hadjust receiveda telegramfromMoscowin whichthe Soviet the Governmentagreedwiththe procedure Britishhadsuggestedon 28July. Eden told Maisky that Britain and the Soviet Union should use every precautionto ensurethat their attitudeto Irandid not arousememoriesin MaiskyassuredEden the Middle East of Anglo-Russianpolicy of 1907."thatthe onlyobjectwasmilitary,not political,thatis, to get the Germansout and to obtain the rightof transit.In his reply, Eden said that it was very had difficultat thattime to raisethe questionof transitbecauseGermany for a long time past desiredrightsof transitthroughTurkey.' Thathad applied If especiallyat the time of the Iraqirebellionand of the fightingin Syria.45 Britainand the Soviet Union were to demandsuchrightsthroughIranthat might increasethe difficultyfor Turkeyin refusingthe same rightto Germany. Britainand the Soviet Union shouldbearin mindthe possibleeffect on Turkey of that step. Eden's reference to Turkey in regard to the basedon a warning sent by SirHugh questionof transitin Iranwasprobably the Knatchbull-Hugessen, British Ambassadorin Ankara, on 3 August. Hugessen arguedthat any demandson Iranfor passageof troops and war materialwould inevitablyinfluencethe situationin Turkey,possiblynot to the Allied benefit. The Turkswould in consequenceof the Allied action in Iranbe at once subjectedby the Germansto demandsfor transitof troops, etc., throughTurkey.47 took place in On the same day (4 August)at 5.00 p.m. furtherdiscussions the War Cabinet meeting regardingthe situation. The War Cabinet was informedof the latest developments.Eden and Anderson supportedthe financialconcession suggested by Lord Hankey. It was decided that the subjectshouldbe discussedbetweenEdenandSirJohnSimon,the Chancellor of the Exchequer.4' The WarCabinetthen decidedthat they shouldtell the Iraniansthat the British Government were prepared to replace the German technicians whose expulsiontheywere askingfor. Finally,it wasdecidedthatthe British diplomaticaction approachshouldbe timedto coincidewithcorresponding action,suchas an advanceinto Northern by the Russiansandthatno further Iranshould be taken by the Russiansexcept in agreementwith the British actioncouldnot achievethe afterit had becomeclearthatpurelydiplomatic desired results.49

ANGLO-SOVIET OCCUPATION OF IRAN

39

was preparedby 7 August 1941. It was The text of the memorandum explainedin the text that Britainfully acceptedand endorsedthe Iranian Government'spolicy of neutralityand she had no designs against Iran's political independence, but this neutralpolicy had also been pursued by other countrieswhichhad since been attackedor overrunby Germany.The continuedby sayingthat with the developmentof the war a memorandum seriousdangerboth to Iranianandto Britishinterestshadbecomemanifest. Although as long ago as January 1941 the British Government had repeatedlyexpressedapprehensionabout the numberof Germansin Iran, the Iranianshad failed to realize the urgencyof the problemand had done Britainrepeated nothingto deal with the problem.In these circumstances, that to Iran,in the most formalandemphaticmanner,her recommendation the Germansin Iran should be requiredto leave the countrywithout any furtherdelay. It was then said that the date of the departureof the German colony shouldbe fixed, andthat no moreGermannationalsshouldbe permittedto arrive in Iran. The IranianGovernmentcould, if they wished, retain a development, numberof the Germanswho were essentialfor the industrial but the numbershouldnot exceed more than one-fifthof the total number system andthey shouldnot be employedon workconnectedwiththe Iranian for of communications, example,railway,roads,telephone,etc. Finally,the The Germanswho were to be retainedshouldbe understrictsurveillance.5" Soviet Governmentagreed with the text, but suggested two alterations. First,the four-fifthreductionin the numberof Germansshouldbe madeby shouldbe made the end of August. Second, the replyto the memorandum The withinthreedaysafterit hadbeen represented. Britishwanteda replyas soon as possible.5' On 8 August the Defence Committee (Operations)held a meeting to of discussthe Sovietsuggestions.L.S. Amery(Secretary Statefor India)said the Iranians might find it difficult to give an assurancethat the whole reductionaskedfor wouldbe completedby the end of August. He proposed reduction by to askfor a drasticreduction the end of Augustanda four-fifths by the middleof September.It was then decidedthat Bullardshouldorally was reduction made that tell the Iranians Britainwouldbe contentif a drastic by 31st of August and the whole reductioneffected by 15 September1941. As regardsthe second Sovietsuggestionit was thoughtthatthereshouldnot be a time limitfor the Iranianreply,becauseit was not desirableto give the the memorandum characterof an ultimatum.52 Eden informed Maisky of these decisions. As regards the time limit Maiskysaid that this differencewas not significantbecausein no circumstwith anceswouldthe SovietUnion take militaryactionexceptin conformity Britain. As regardsthe second suggestionMaiskyagreed with the British On Governmentview.53 16 August 1941, however, the British and Soviet representatives in Tehran presented similar Notes to the Iranian Government.5 On 18 and 19August 1941Eden andMaisky,beforereceivingthe Iranian reply,discussedthe situationanddecidedthatactionshouldbe startedon 23 August, if the Iranianreplywas consideredto be negative.Meanwhile,the

40

MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

British were preparinga Note which was to be presented, in the event of Iran's reply being clearly negative, on the morningof the joint entry of British and Soviet troops into Iran.55 On 20 August the Iranianreplywas receivedandwas deemed unsatisfactory. Warningorders were issued to the British troops, and all was in readinessfor an advanceinto Iranon 23 August,buton 22 Augustthe Soviet Governmentinformed the British Governmentthat they were not completely ready. As it had been decided that the action should be taken simultaneouslyby Britain and the Soviet Union, the date for crossingthe Iranianfrontierwas postponed until 25 August 1941.56 In the earlymorningof 25 AugustBritishandSovietforcesfromthe South and the North of Iranrespectivelyenteredthe countryand simultaneously Notes to Ali Bullardand Smirnovin Tehranpresentedtheir Governments' Mansur,the IranianPrime Minister.In the Britishtext it was stated that Britainhad frequentlydrawnthe attentionof the Iraniansto the need to expel the Germans in Iran. It was, as in the previous representations, explainedthat the dangerconstitutedby the Germanswho were workingin had Iran,threatenedIranianas well as Britishinterests.But the Iranians not In the replyto those representations. those circumstances given satisfactory British Government were obliged to take appropriateaction to protect Britain'svital interestsandto deal withthe threatarisingfromthe potential activities of the Germans in Iran. In the text Britain assured Iran that militarymeasureswould not outlast the existing emergencyas they were directedagainstthe Axis Powers.Finally,Iranwas assuredthat Britainhad no designs directed against the independence of Iran or her territorial integrity. As regardsthe Soviet text the Soviet Governmentbased their action on Thereis no evidencethatthe Russianshadtold the British the 1921Treaty.57 that this would be the case, but it is probablethat they had mentionedit to the British. The Soviet text consistedof five parts: relationsfrom1918. The firstpartdealt with the historyof Soviet-Iranian The second part remindedIran of Article 6 of the 1921Treaty, whichhad in given the Soviet Union the rightto stationher troopson Iranianterritory case there appearedthe dangerthatthe Iranian territory mightbe used by a thirdpoweras a jumping-off groundagainstthe SovietUnion. The thirdpart explained in detail the activitiesof variousGermanagents at that time in Iran. The fourthpartremindedthe IranianGovernmentof the three warnings, 26 June, 19July,and 16August1941,givenby the SovietGovernment, in connectionwith the Germanactivitiesin Iranandexpressedregretat the failure of the Iraniansto pay sufficientattentionto those warningson the part of the Soviet Union. Therefore the Soviet Governmenthad been compelledto bringinto playthe termsof the 1921Treaty.And the fifthpart reassuredthe Iraniansthat the Soviet Union had no designs against the political independence and territorialintegrity of Iran and promised to withdrawthe Soviet troops from Iran as soon as the dangercaused by the Germanactivitiesin Iran, a dangernot only to the Soviet Union but also to Iran herself, was removed.58

ANGLO-SOVIET OCCUPATION OF IRAN PART TWO

41

The Iranian Government's Reaction to the Anglo-Soviet Representations Regarding their Demands

As has alreadybeen mentionedin Part One, in late June 1941the British Governmentexpressedtheirconcernaboutthe numberof Germansin Iran, but received no satisfactoryreply from the IranianGovernment. On 26 June the Soviet Government,only four days afterthe German Armies had crossed the Soviet's frontier,also served notice on Iran that the Germansin Iran that they were in possessionof information were preparinga coup d'etat. It was also reportedthat the following fortnightBritainandRussiaexertedsome pressureto forcethe departure of some of the Germansin Iran.59 In the absence of sufficientevidence it is difficultto elaborateupon the demands.It policytowardsthe Allied Governments' IranianGovernment's seems, accordingto the availabledocuments,that the Iraniansintendedto resistthe Allied Governments'demandsas far and as long as they possibly couldand, at the sametime, to makesome concessionsto the Allies in order, on the one hand, to satisfyGermany,and on the other, to lessen the Allied Governments'pressureor to delay a possible Britishattackand gain time war became clearer. until the outcome of the Russo-German One wayof lookingat thispolicyis thatis wasthe bestpossiblepolicyto be pursuedbecauseat that time it was by no meansclearwhatthe outcomeof war the Russo-German would be. If Germanydefeated the Soviet Union, policy in Iran'ssituationwouldthen dependon the GermanGovernment's this area. On 9 July 1941the GermanMinisterin Tehran,E. Ettel, told the that demonstrated she had Iranian PrimeMinisterthatGermany sufficiently was determinedto avoid, as far as possible, an extensionof the war. At the same time Ettel made it plain to Mansurthat any feeble, tacit consent to a
British attack would make the worst possible impression in Berlin."' Ettel did

not elaboratewhat Germanywould do in that case. As will be seen, Gerand many, duringthis period,pursueda policyof encouragement intimidation in order to persuadeIran to continue its policy of neutrality. Against this backgroundit was then decided that Iran should resist the Allied Governments'pressureas long as she could. If she was attackedby Britainor the Soviet Union or by both and if, later on, Germanydefeated the Soviet Union and reachedIran'sfrontier,Iranwouldtell Germanythat to she hadhad to submitto force. It maybe interesting note thatat thattime a theory was developed in the EasternDepartmentof the ForeignOffice that the Iraniansneverintendedto put up morethana show of resistanceto Britishdemands,in orderto convincethe Germansthat they had to submit to force.6' there is anotherpossibilitywhichseems In additionto these speculations to be more likely, namely,that Reza Shah, as the ultimatedecision-maker, believed that was looking at the situationratherdifferently.He apparently to superior the SovietUnion andwoulddefeatherin Germanywas militarily the very near future. It is also quite possible that the Shah believed that

42

MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

Germanycould be a betterally thanBritain.Thereforethe Allied demands should be resistedby all possible meansas long as possibleuntil Germany came to help Iran.This attitude,as will be seen, was not sharedby some of the Shah's Ministers. Iran'simmediatereactiontowardsAllied demandswas extensivemilitary flow of reportsthat Britainwould measuresbecausetherewas an increasing expelled.Troopsin attackIranif the Germansin Iranwere not immediately the provinces of Azarbaijanand Kermanshahwere consequently reinwherethe concessionsof forced. The Shahalso gave ordersthat Khuzistan, Abadan,was to be Oil the Anglo-Iranian Companywere located,including were theretroopreinforcements defendedwithall possiblemeans.Further fore dispatchedto that province."2 went the diplomaticsteps Hand in hand with the militarypreparations Reza Shah ordered to be taken with the British Government, which, throughthe IranianMinisterin London, Moqaddam,and simultaneously throughBullardin Teheranwereinformed,thatconsistentwithIran'spolicy of neutrality,Iranwould turn against'the aggressor'.In the event of any Britishattack,the Iranianswouldappealto Germanyfor aid and enter the side. The same appliedin the event of a Russianattack, waron Germany's wouldrequest just as, in the oppositecase of a Germanattack,the Iranians aid from Britain.This statementwould accountfor the Britishbelief that Iran would not accept an ultimatum. told Ettel thathe believedthatthe Meanwhilethe IranianPrimeMinister of defencepreparaBritish,who didnot remainunaware the seriousmilitary tions of Iran,wouldnot riskan attackon Iranin view of the clearpositionof mightnot the IranianGovernment,of whichtheyhadbeen notified.Mansur have believed this in the preciseway in whichhe phrasedit to the German Minister,but he and other Iraniansmight also have believed that Britain wouldnot take militaryactionagainstIranbecauseit wouldendangerIran's to also independenceandit was contrary Britishinterests.Mansur told Ettel that if Iran was attackedthe Iranianarmy, despite its weakness in some modernweapons, would fight for every squaremetre of Iraniansoil. Then the Iranianswould approachthe Germanswith a requestfor help.63 On 19 July 1941, only one week after the signing of the Anglo-Soviet Agreement for Mutual Assistance against Germany,the British and the Soviet Governmentspresentedtheir formalNotes to the IranianGovernment demandingthe expulsionof the Germancolony from Iran. In their indicatedthat they were consciousof the Germandanger replythe Iranians andwere alreadytryingto reducethe numberof Germansin Irangradually, but at the same time they arguedthattherewere no groundsthatthey could advance for such action; it would be contraryto neutrality,and it would Iranwas a sovereignindepenembroil them with Germany.Furthermore given dentstate, which,in its development,hadto makeuse of the assistance by foreign citizens. Among those were Germanswho, like all aliens, were to krnown the Iranianauthoritiesand, like all aliens,were underthe surveillanceof the police. SinceIranneeded those aliens,the IranianGovernment of was not in a position to give considerationto the recommendation the British Government.'

ANGLO-SOVIET OCCUPATION OF IRAN

43

Pursuing this policy, the Iranians, after the Allied Governments' Notes, took certain measures to reduce further the number of Germans in Iran. On 22 July 1941 Mansur told Bullard that they were refusing to prolong any German contract of engagement and residence permits of other Germans, and would be glad to send away any Germans whose conduct was suspect or who could be replaced by Iranians. Mansur then tried to obtain Britain's support for Iran's policy regarding the Allied demands. He told Bullard (and Bullard agreed that there was truth in the statement) that Iran had resisted great pressure from the Axis during the hostilities in Iraq in May 1941 and Iran was entitled to Britain's thanks for that. He also promised to give Bullard figures of the Germans' departure in confidence. At the end Mansur repeated Iran's position and said to Bullard that to order a large portion of the Germans to leave within a short time could be based on no criterion that would appear reasonable, that it would be contrary to neutrality and that it would bring Iran into conflict with Germany."' Two days later (24 July) Javad Ameri, the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, told Bullard that further steps had been taken to speed up the expulsion of Germans and that police supervision had already been doubled. One commission had been set up to examine the residence permits of all Germans. Another commission had been set up to look into the question of contracts just about completed. In every case where it was possible to dispense with the services of German experts, this would be done as soon as possible.'" Three days later, on 27 July, Mansur made another attempt to explain the difficulties that Iran was facing in meeting the Allied demands. Mansur told Bullard that Britain should realize Iran's position and not make affairs worse by trying to hurry Iran. Such demands were prejudicial to Iran's sovereignty and would involve Iran in trouble with Germany which he thought would be injurious to British as well as to Iranian interests. Mansur finally gave Bullard the details of Germans leaving Iran. Six Germans, whose residence permits had expired, were ordered to leave. A group was formed to take over the radio station so that two other Germans could leave. Three more Germans were about to leave and about ten more would leave in about ten days. Bullard's reply to both Ameri and Mansur (on 24 and 27 July respectively) was that the British and the Soviet Governments demanded that the number of Germans should be rapidly reduced by 80 per cent and the measures which had been taken seemed to be merely likely to cause delay. Britain and the Soviet Union wanted immediate action." Meanwhile, the Iranian Government also tried through various channels, that is, the press, discussion with the British Ambassadors in Moscow, Ankara, etc., to explain their point of view. For example, on 1 August 1941 the Iranian Ambassador in Moscow, Mohammad Sa'ed told the British Ambassador, Stafford Cripps, that his Government was doing its best to diminish the number of Germans as quickly as it could. The Soviet Government had also been informed accordingly. Cripps told Sa'ed that this was rather a vague policy, and Iran should give an actual timetable indicating the number of Germans who would remain in Iran."8

44

MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

In the firsttwo weeks of August1941the Iranians continuedto pursuethe same policy. On 3, 8 and 14 AugustAmeriagaintalkedto Bullard.He went over the groundwhichhad alreadybeen coveredseveraltimes. Ameri gave Bullardthe numberof Germanswithexpiredpermitswho had been told to leave, but Bullardrepeatedthatthe Germansshouldleave immediately and wanted a timetablefor that. In the courseof one of these conversations(3 August) Ameri asked Bullardthree timeswhetherthe Britishhad any aims other thanthe expulsionof the Germans fromIran.Bullarddeniedanysuch aims, but Ameri was right about the Soviet Union's aims regardingthe transitfacilities.The Iraniansprobablysuspectedthat the Allies had other demandsin mind becausethe Russianshad alreadyasked the Iraniansfor transitof war materialthroughIran and it had been refused.69 Meanwhile,Germanydid everything possibleto encourageIranto resist British and Soviet pressure.The GermanForeign Minister,Ribbentrop, instructedEttel to see the Shahandto give a personalmessagefromHitler. The message was as follows: Germanyhas observedwith satisfactionthat, in accordancewith the directivesof the Shah,the Iranian Government resolvedto continue is its presentpolicyof neutrality to defendIran'ssovereigntyagainst and all attemptsto encroachupon it. It has faith that the wisdom of the Shahwill find waysandmeansto safeguard,in future,his sovereignty over the entire territoryof the IranianState against any encroachments from the outside, until the presentperiodwill have passed, in whichthe powersat warwith Germanyare tryingto bringpressureto bear upon the decision of the IranianGovernment. The Reich Governmentbelieves that this periodcan only be of short duration.In theirstruggleagainstthe SovietUnion ArmedForcesthe German troops, as the Shah is aware, have penetratedfar into the Ukraine and in their victoriousadvancehave now reachedthe area north of the Crimeanpeninsula. The Reich Governmentis firmly resolvedto occupyfurtherterritories the SovietUnion in the course of of this autumn,a scheme whichwill be facilitatedby the now plainly perceptibleebbingof Russianpowersof resistance.Any attemptsof the Britishperhapsto set up a new front againstus (Germany)in the Caucasusare doomedto failurefromthe outset, becauseof the superiority of Germantroops. The Reich Governmenttrustthat until this briefperiodof dangerwillhavepassedawaythe Shahwillresistwithall meansat his disposalanysuchattempton the partof the British,which would carrythe devastationof war also into Iranianterritory.7" On 6 Augustthe GermanGovernment,in additionto the earlierencouragement, warned the Iraniansthat the expulsion of German travellersand act residentsfrom Iranwouldbe regardedas an unfriendly andwouldforce the German Governmentto break off diplomaticrelationswith Iran. of However, untilthe secondAllied representation 16 AugustReza Shah generallyseemed to havesupposedthathe couldfinda middlewayby which he could eliminate enough Germans to satisfy the British, without the officials Germansnoticingit or at leastobjectingto hisactions.SomeIranian

ANGLO-SOVIET OCCUPATION OF IRAN

45

such as the Prime Minister and the Acting Foreign Minister apparently now knewaboutthe concenrealizedthe futilityof suchpolicy.The Iranians frontieroppositeBasra. trationof Britishtroopsat Fao andnearthe Iranian On or about 12 August Mansurand Ameri stronglyfelt that the Allies seriouslyintendedto impose theirwill, if necessaryby force, but no one in Teheran presumablydared to emphasizethis point to the obstinate and (16 On furiousShah.7' the day of the second representations August) Manfrom sur and Ameri tried to dissuadethe Britishand Soviet Ambassadors leaving their memoranda.The conversations,whichlasted one and a half hours, covered groundwhich had alreadybeen covered many times.72 still The IranianGovernmentapparently intendedto try to keep Britain and the Soviet Union in play as long as possible, until the outcome of the strugglebecame clearer. In the week that followed the German-Russian presentation of the Notes of 16 August the German armies had made considerablegainsin SouthernRussiaand were seriouslythreateningboth OdessaandKiev. The Germansin Tehranwere boastingthatthey wouldbe acrossthe Dnieper in early September.The Black Sea fleet and the Luftappearat Batumto cut off the Russians'comwaffewould simultaneously municationsif they invadednorthernIran, and if only the Iranianswould standfirmfor a few weeks, the Germanforceswould be in Tehranto help source (in Bullard's them. Bullard also learned, from an unimpeachable view) who had it from the Italian Ministerin Tehran, that Mansurhad assuredEttel that Iran would not accept the Britishdemands.73 As Allied pressurebecamemoreevidentandIran'sintentionto resistthe Allied demandsmore apparent,the Iranianscontinuedto claim that the Germansin Iran were under surveillance,and that they should cause the Allies no concern. On 17 and 18 August Ameri talked to Bullard and Smirnov.Ameri, in his conversationwith Smirnov,tried to persuadethe the and to Soviet Ambassador withdraw memorandum continuethe discussions orally. Perhapsthis was an attemptto detachthe Soviet Union from Britain, but Smirnovrefused. In the conversationwith Bullard,Ameri tried to gain the supportof the British. He gave to Bullardthe numbersof Germanswho had left Iran in three weeks. He also promisedBullardthat if the Britishwaited a week or two they wouldsee even greaterresults.He finallysaidthatthe demandwas againstIran'ssovereigntyand also the publicitywas bad. It would-weaken the Iran,andsurelyBritaindidnot wanta weakIranremembering resultsof
that during the First World War.74

madea rathervaguestatement In the meantimethe IranianGovernment that the countrywould be defendedagainstaggressionfrom any quarter.75 At the same time troopmovementswere reportedby the BritishConsulsin On Shirazand Isfahan.76 21 August it seems that the Iraniansintendedto declare war if attacked because the newly appointed British Military Attache in Teheran, Major General A.K. Fraser, reported that further troops had moved to the South of Iran and considerablequantities of explosives had also been sent by train to engineer units in Khuzistan.77 Another piece of evidence was Qawam-ul-Mulk's statementthat if Britain and Russia attacked Iran, the IranianGovernmentwould declarewar on

46

MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

both of them and would requireall British and Russiansubjectsto leave Iran. This statement was not the Iranian Government'sofficial view, because the Qawam had no official post at that time, but he was a wellknownstatesmanand close friendof Reza Shah. Bullardbelieved that the statement probably represented correctly the intention of the Iranian Governmentat that time.78 Finally,on 20 August,the Shahtold the cadetsof the Military Academyat theirpassing-out paradethatin view of the criticalsituationtheircustomary leave wascancelledandthey shouldbe readyfor everysacrifice.7" Nevertheless it is still possible that the Iranianscould have been bluffing. On 21 August the BritishMilitaryAttache in Tehranreportedthat the situation wasunchanged he believedthatthe Iranians and werestillplayingfor time.8' On 20 Augustthe IranianGovernment handedover a writtenreplyto the BritishGovernment.It was statedthatthe IranianGovernment glad at was the declarationby the British Governmentof its intention to maintain friendly relations and confirmationof Iran's policy of neutrality.Entry, residence, etc. of foreigners was strictly controlled, and there were no reasonsto be anxiousaboutthe foreignresidentsin Iran,since nothinghad occurredto justifythem. The IranianGovernment surethat the British was Government,bearingIran'spolicyof neutrality mind,wouldrefrain in from raisingany questionwhichmightprejudiceit. It was, therefore,with regret that, in the memorandum 16 August, the IranianGovernmentobserved of mattersincompatiblewith these considerations. was then explainedthat It to perfect mutualunderstanding IranianGovernmenthad taken meathe sures to send away those foreignerswho were no longer requiredor who couldbe replacedby Iranians. Finally,it wasstatedthatthe IranianGovernmentwas readyto carryout anyplanthatit mightconsidernecessaryfor the safetyof Iranandthe protectionof the legitimaterightsof theirneighbours, but at the same time it could not acceptanyproposalwhatsoeverwhichwas contraryto Iran'spolicy of neutralityor Iran'srightsof sovereignty.8" The British Governmentconsideredthis reply, as Pink (the Eastern Depart2 ment) put it, 'satisfactorily unsatisfactory'. As the concentration Britishtroopshadbeen completedby the original of date of 12 Augustan orderwas issuedto the troopsto invadeIranat dawn, 25 August 1941.On thatdaythe BritishandSoviettroopsenteredIranfrom the South and the North of the countryrespectively.On the same day at 10.00 a.m. Bullardand Smirnovwere receivedby Reza Shahat his request. The Shah said that if the only objectivewas the eliminationof Germans,'I am ready to send away all Germanswithin one week, if the hostility is ceased'.BullardandSmirnov promisedto conveythe Shah'senquiryto their respective Governments, but it was felt that 'performancemust follow promises'andthe BritishandSoviet troopscontinuedthe advancethey had startedearly in the morning.83
CONCLUSION

The occupationof Iranwasa directresultof the Germanattackon the Soviet Union. The German attack on the Soviet Union changedBritain'spolicy towardsthis region. In regardto Iran the presence of Germansand their

ANGLO-SOVIET OCCUPATION OF IRAN

47

activitiesin Iransuddenlybecamethe most prominentissue in the relations between Iran and the new Allies (Britainand the Soviet Union). This new situationeventuallyled to the occupationof Iran.The Allied Governments claimedthat the presenceof a largenumberof Germansin Iranwas a threat to their interestsand contraryto Iran'spolicy of neutrality.In the firsttwo yearsof the warBritainand the Soviet Union had not been very concerned about the presenceof the Germansin Iran. E.P. Elwell-Suttoncomments: 'No doubt matterswould have gone no furtherif it had not been for the .4 Germaninvasionof Russiaon 22 June 1941' The conclusionof this article is that although the question of the supply route and of the presence of Germansin Iran were considered important,two other more important factors at that time influencedthe decisionto occupyIran. Britishaims in concernedin the BritishGovernIranvarieddependingon the individuals ment. The mostimportant Britishaimin Iranat thattime wasthe securityof the Britishpositionin thisregion,especiallyof the oilfieldsof Iranand Iraq, a view held by the BritishChiefsof Staff and stronglysupportedby Churwere stronglyinfluencedby the war chill. The Chiefsof Staffand Churchill situationin the Soviet Union, expectingan imminentSovietcollapse,which was a grave possibilityin the summerof 1941, and they desired to make necessarypreparationsto protect the oilfields againsta possible German followThe extensiveBritishmilitarydemandsimmediately breakthrough. insistenceon these demands,despitethe ing the occupation,andChurchill's oppositionof the EasternDepartmentand Bullard,are clearindicationsof whatthe Chiefsof StaffandChurchill thoughtof the situationrightfromthe beginning. The Eastern Department and Bullard opposed the demands arguingthat they were contraryto the declaredBritishpolicytowardsIran, namelythat the only objective in Iranwas the expulsionof the Germans.85 Another importantfactorinfluencingBritishpolicy towardsIran at that time wasthe view of the seniormenin the ForeignOffice, namely,Cadogan, Sargent,and Cripps(almostcertainly)supportedby Eden that it was undewitha suggestionfor sirableto rebuffthe Russianswhen they cameforward cooperationbetween the new Allies (Britainand the Soviet Union) and it was useful to demonstrateto the worldthe fact that Britainand the Soviet Union were cooperatingin a joint policy. The questionof the supplyroutewas not consideredas the firstpriorityat that time because if the Soviet Union collapsedthere would be no need to send aid to the Soviet Union via Iranor any otherroute. The Chiefsof Staff did not revealtheirreal intentionsin Iran,that is, the securityof the British positionin thisarea, untilafterthe occupation,exceptonce, whenin general termsthey told Cadoganon 11 July 1941that it was desirableto strengthen the Britishpositionin this region. The EasternDepartmentand Bullarddo not seem to have known about the Chiefs of Staff's view. The Eastern Department,like the Iranians,the Turksand the Americans,only guessed that the expulsion of Germans from Iran was not the only British objective.' Bullard'ssuggestion(a sensibleone if its only objectivewas the expulsionof Germans)was ignored. He suggestedthat sendinga personal letter to Reza Shah makingit clearthat the Allies wantedIranto expel the Germanswould do as much good as a threat. The EasternDepartment's

48

MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

the argumentregarding Germansin Iranwas also rejected.The simplefact was that the Chiefsof Staff and Churchill(and in a sense the WarCabinet) regardedthe securityof the Britishposition in this region as so vital that Britain must protect the area directly. Consideringthe evidence relatingto the period June-September1941 Britishaims in Iranwere as follows in orderof priority:the securityof the the Britishpositionin thisarea;a desirenot to rebuffthe Russians; expulsion of the Germans from Iran; and the question of the supply route." The questionof the supplyroute and the expulsionof the Germanswere interrelatedobjectivesin the sense that if aid was to be sent to the Soviet Union via Iran,the presenceof the Germansin Irancouldthreatenthe communication lines andthereforetheirexpulsionwasdesirableby bothBritainandthe Soviet Union. The expulsionof the Germansfrom Iranwas the only objectivein which therewas consensusamongthe British;the Germansin Irancouldendanger British interests there and the argumentfor their expulsion was also an acceptableone in relationto worldopinion. The Soviet objectiveswere the expulsion of Germans from Iran and the security of the supply route. Throughoutthis period the Soviet Union followed Britain and agreed to almost everythingthe Britishsuggested. that this Throughout periodIranmaintained Allied demandswereincompatible with her policy of neutrality.Irandid not want to submitto Allied demandsfearingthat it wouldoffend Germany.Iranchose a middleground policy to meet part of Allied demandswithoutoffendingGermany.At the same time Iran gave every indication that an attack on Iran would be that to resisted,butthispolicyseemsto havebeen introduced demonstrate if force. In late Iranyielded to Allied demandsit would be to overwhelming June and July 1941the Iraniansdo not seem to have taken Allied demands seriously.In earlyAugustthey suspectedthatthe expulsionof the Germans fromIranwas not the only Allied objective.On about12Augustthe Iranian PrimeMinisterrealizedthat if the demandswere not met the Allies would daredto put this point to indeed take drasticaction, but no one apparently Reza Shah. Reza Shahwouldhaveprobablyagreedto meet the demandsif, for example, he had received an ultimatumor if Bullard'ssuggestionhad been accepted by the British Government. shouldbe noted. He either As regardsReza Shahhimselftwo possibilities did not believe that Britain would take militaryaction against Iran, or the expected an ultimatumregarding demandswhichnever came. Indeed, Reza Shahtold Bullardand Smirnovon the day of the invasionthat he was preparedto expel all the GermansfromIranwithinone week if the hostiliReza ties were stopped.Mediationeffortswerediscouraged.88 Shahalso told L. Dreyfus, the AmericanMinisterin Tehran, on 6 September1941 that Britainand the Soviet Union could have satisfiedtheir desires by friendly
negotiation instead of the use of force.89This evidence cannot be conclusive

because it relates to a period after the invasionhad begun. Neverthelessit does suggest that if Britainand the Soviet Union had made their intention clearerby meansof a conventionalultimatumReza Shahmighthave given wouldhave madeit way. Certainlyto havegivenwayin those circumstances

ANGLO-SOVIET OCCUPATION OF IRAN

49

easier for him to explain the decision to Germany, whom he still thought might win the war. The failure to deliver an ultimatum, as mentioned above, does raise questions about British and Soviet policy." However this policy eventually proved unsuccessful and led to the occupation of Iran.

NOTES 1. Churchill,Winston S., The Second World War, Vol.111, The Grand Alliance (1950); Pahlavi,Mohammad Reza Shah, Mission for My Country (New York, 1960);Ramazani, of Rouhallah Iran'sForeignPolicy1941-1973(University Virginia,1975);Lenczowski, K.,
George, Russia and the West in Iran, 1918-1948 (Cornell University, 1949); ElwellSutton, E.P., Persian Oil: A Study in PowverPolitics (London, 1955); Tabari, Keyvan, Iran's Policies towards the United States during the Anglo-Russian Occupation, 1941-1946,

Ph.D. thesis, 1967,Columbia Ahmad,SovietForeign Policyin Iran University; Ghoreichi, 1917-1960,Ph.D. thesis, Universityof Colorado, 1965.
2. M. Rezun, The Soviet Union and Iran, Soviet policy in Iran from the beginning of the Pahlavi Dynasty until the Soviet Invasion in 1941 (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sigthoff and

Noordhoff,International publishers,BV, 1981). In his recentbook, Yair P. Hirschfeld Germanpolicyandthe Germans in presentsa view differentfromthatof Rezunregarding of in Iran.He arguesthatthe number Germans Iranwassmall;thatGermany wantedIran to remainneutral;and that Germanypursueda low profile policy in Iran and had no
ulterior objectives (Yair P. Hirschfeld, Deutschland und Iran in Speilfeld der Machte, Internationale Beziehungen unter Reza Schah, 1921-1941, 4 Schriftenreihe des Instituts fur

Deutsch Geschichte,UniversitatTel Aviv, Dusseldorf:Droste Verlag, 1980). 3. MilitaryAttache to the WarOffice, 25 June 1941- FO 371-27150-E3372/42/34. 4. FO's Minutes,23 June 1941- FO 371-27044-E3365/53/65. Bullardto FO, No.397, 1 July 5. FO to Bullard,27 June 1941- FO 371-27044-E3365/53/65; 1941- FO 371-27150-E3659/42/34; Edento Bullard, June1941 FO371-27150-E3514/ 30 42/34. 6. Govt. of Indiato Amery, No.3389, 6 July 1941, Minutes- FO 371-27044-E3690/53/65. 7. In late 1939Britainhad agreedto supply30 Hurricane aircraftto Iran. Bullard FO, No.397, 1July to 8. C-in-CIndiato WO, No.8344,28 June1941- L/P.S/12/551;
1941 - FO 371-27150-E3659/42/34.

9. Dalton to Amery, 7 July 1941- FO 371-27230-E3657/3444/34. 10. It was never ascertainedpreciselyhow many Germanswere in Iran at the time of the Germans werecaptured theBritishandsome60 werehanded Fourhundred by occupation. to to the Russians,P. Avery, Modern Iran, p.358; according anotherestimateafter the Persian Oil, 650 occupation Germanswere roundedup by the Allies. E.P. Elwell-Sutton, pp.104, 105. 11. Crippsto FO, No.757, 9 July 1941- FO 371-27230-E3707/3444/34. Vol.II, J.R.M. Butler,pp.460-463. 12. For the Iraqiepisodesee for exampleGrandStrategy, to telegram Amery,No.3389,6 July194113. Minutesof 9 and10July1941in Govt.of India's of FO 371-27044-E3690/53/65; Minutes 10Julyin Bullard's to telegram FO, No.397,1 July
1941 - FO 371-27150-E3659/42/34.

14. Eden to Cripps, 10 July 1941- FO 371-27230-E3751/3444/34. fromtheCabinet 15. CAB 65-19, WarCabinet68 (41)- 10July1941,or Extract conclusion,10
July 1941 - FO 371-27051-E3775/3551/65.

16. Britainandthe SovietUnionaccording an agreement to signedon 12July1941in Moscow became allies.

17. See C. Buckley, Five Ventures, 1939-45, The Second World War, A Short Military History Series.

18. WarCabinetto Cadogan, 11 July 1941- FO 371-27151-E3798/42/34. 19. WC, MiddleEast Ministerial Committee,11 July 1941- FO 371-27196-E3780/933/34. 20. Throughoutthis period the Governmentof India advocatedimmediateand vigorous economicandmilitary actionagainstIran.It wasargued if Germany of that tookpossession the Caucasus oilfieldsit wasof the utmostimportance eastwards that passagethrough Iran

50

MIDDLEEASTERN STUDIES

andAfghanistan shouldbe deniedto Germany thatthe potentialhostility thesetwo and of countriesshouldbe reducedto an effectiveminimum depriving by themof Germandirection and organising ability.10 to Govt. of India,25 June 1941- FO 371-27044-E3369/53/ 65; Govt. of India to 10, No. 3389, 6 July 1941- FO 371-27044-E3690/53/65). 21. Crippsto FO, 14 July 1941- FO 371-27230-E3844/3444/34.
22. Bullard to FO, 11 July 1941 - FO 371-27151-E3840/42/34. 23. Eden to Cripps, No.118, 14 July 1941 - FO 371-27230-E3856/3444/34. 24. FO to Bullard, No.382, 14 July 1941 - FO 371-27196-E3780/933/34; FO to Bullard, No.392, 16 July 1941 - FO 371-27230-E3844/3444/34. 25. Ministry of Economic Warfare to FO, 9 July 1941 - L/P.S/12/551; See also Anglo-Soviet blockade of Iran, 21 July 1941 - FO 371-27230-E4198/3444/34. 26. Bullard to FO, No.442, 19 July 1941 - Minutes - FO 371-27230-E4006/3444/34; Bullard to

FO, No.454, 22 July 1941- FO 371-27151-E4071/42/34; Bullardto FO, No.466, 25 July

1941 - FO 371-27151-E4155/42/34.

27. FO'sMinutes,21 July 1941- FO 371-27196-E4197/933/34; to Churchill, July1941 Eden 22 - FO 371-27230-4141/3444/34; FO's Minutes,24 July 1941- FO 371-27230-E4107/3444/
34.

28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37.

38.

39. 40. 41. 42.

Eden to Crippsand Bullard,19 July 1941- FO 371-27230-E3995/3444/34. WC, Chiefsof Staff Committee,18 July 1941- FO 371-27230-E4141/3444/34. Eden to Cripps,No.945, 1 August 1941- FO 371-27196-E4306/933/34. WC, Chiefs of Staff Committee,28 July 1941- FO 371-27196-E4277/933/34. WC, CAB 65-23-19, 75(41), 28 July 1941. FO's Minutes,28 July 1941- FO 371-27200-E4179/168/34. WO to C-in-CIndia, No. 87294, 31 August 1941- FO 371-27208-E5183/3326/34. On 18July 1941the Chiefsof Staffdecidedthatthe military operation shouldbe underthe commandof GeneralA. Wavellfrom Simla. WO to C-in-CIndia, 30 July 1941- FO 371-27196-E4295/933/34. On 1 August 1941 at a Meeting of the Defence Committee(Operations),Sir John of Andersonwas askedto presideover a Committee the Ministers concerned,to consider both politicaland military,for implementing policy of the British the the arrangements The membersof this Governmentin regard to Iran and to make recommendations. of Committeewere as follows:SirJohnAnderson,the LordPresident the Council,as the A. L.S. Amery,S/Sfor India,D. Murgesson, chairman, Eden, the ForeignSecretary, S/S for War,SirCharlesF.A. Portal,Chiefof the Air Staff,SirT. Phillips,Vice Chiefof Naval L.N. Kennedy, Staff, Sir H. Ismay, Office of the Ministerof Defence, Major-General for Chiefsof ImperialGeneralStaff, GeoffreyLloyd, Secretary Petroleum, representing of P.T. Monlieath,Under-Secretary State for India,SirH. Seymour,the ForeignOffice, Sir SydneyMuspratt,India Office. The Anderson Committee was informed that the forces available to support the contemplateddiplomaticdemarchewould consist of one division with two armoured fromthe MiddleEastCommand. fromIraqandone mechanized regiments cavalry brigade for Sucha force,it wasthought,wouldnot be adequate morethanthe effectiveoccupation of the oilfields area as far as Dezful. WC, Anderson'sCommittee,4 August 1941- FO 371-27231-E4478/3444/34. WO to C-in-CIndia, No.87294, 31 August 1941- FO 371-27208-E5183/3326/34. WC, CAB 65-23-19, 90th Conclusion(41), 29 August 1941. Accordingto M. Rezun, TheSovietUnionandIran,pp.311, 358, the presenceandactivities of a largenumberof Germansin Iranwas the realreasonfor the occupation.He also a werepreparing coupd'tat against contendsthatthe Russians believedthatthe Germans out Reza Shahto be carried in August1941by the Iranian army(p.353). As will be seen in the nextpart,on 26Junethe Russians a Government presented noteto the Iranian claiming they were in possessionof informationthat a coup d'etatwould soon be preparedby Germanagents againstReza Shah, but the Russiansgave no evidenceto supporttheir claims. Subsequently Russiansgave little prominence this allegedcoup or to the to the other possibilitymentionedby Rezun, that Bakumightbe sabotagedby Germanagents his is: fromIranian One operating Azarbaijan. reasonRezungivesto support argument 'by 1941the Germanshad considerable controlover the Iranianarmedforces'(p.354). It is true that many Iranianofficers were impressedby the Germanwar machineand had

OCCUPATIONOF IRAN ANGLO-SOVIET

51

sympathytowardsGermany,but there is no evidenceto suggestthat the Germanshad it army.On the contrary, seemsthatuntilthe lastday controloverthe Iranian considerable Reza Shahhadcompletecontrolover the army.In connectionwith before the occupation this alleged coup d'etatRezun refers to the arrivalof AdmiralCanaris(German) (in Tehran)in August 1941 (p.367). But the documentto which he refers(Bullardto FO, does No.513, 9 August 1941, Minutes- FO 371-27200-E4541/1682/34) not confirmthis claimandthe ForeignOfficewasveryscepticalaboutthisstory.Thereis no evidencehow Iranclaimedthere many Germanswere in Iranin 1941. Estimatesvariedconsiderably. were about600 Germansin Iran;Britainclaimedtherewereabout2,000to 3,000, andthe no SovietUnion claimedtherewere5,000 to 7,000. After the occupation precisefigureof how manyGermanswere capturedby the Allies, or how manyescaped,was given (the in FifthColumnConspiracy Iran- FO 371-35069-XC/A/4320 SecurGermanOrganised MiddleEast, No. IIIA, DevelopmentsDown to the End of October1942). ity Summary by Rezun admitsthat the numberof Germansin Iranmighthave been exaggerated the rather,it was of the Russians,'butto the SovietGovernment number Germans irrelevant; wereemployedin the (p.358).It is truethatmanyGermans wasthe positiontheyoccupied' communications systembut Rezundoes not say exactlywhatpositionsthey occupiedand of and these positionswereto the stability the regime.Rezun's how important dangerous For example, he claims that the IranianGovernmentargumentsare unconvincing. numberof withoutthe knowledgeof Reza Shah- mighthave furnished'a considerable (p.358). naturalization papersandpassports' postswithIranian Germansin key industrial machineryand strict Bearing in mind Reza Shah'sdominationover the government's over all aliensuntilthe day of the occupation,Rezun'sclaimdoes not police supervision seem plausible. 43. In 1907BritainandRussiaagreedto divideIranintospheresof influence.The northwasto be the Russiansphere of influenceand the south the Britishsphereof influenceand a neutralarea in the middle. 44. For Turkey'spositionin the war see, for example,Annette B. Fox, ThePowerof Small States,Diplomacyin WorldWarII, pp.10-29. Series. 45. See C. Buckley, Five Ventures,TheSecond WorldWar,A ShortMilitary 46. Eden to Cripps,4 August 1941- FO 371-27231-E4423/3444/34. 47. Hugessento FO, No.1874, 3 August 1941- FO 371-27200-E4375/1682/34. 48. Simon,however,did not agreewiththe proposal.It wasthoughtthatthe cashinducement it currency waspaid,forthe purposeof the wouldbe of littlevalueto the Shah,in whatever materialswhichthe Shahrequired. 49. WC, CAB 65-23-19, (41) 77th Conclusion,Minutes5, 4 August 1941. 50. FO to Bullard,7 August 1941- FO 371-27205-E4538/3326/34. 51. Eden to Cripps,7 August 1941- FO 371-23231-E4524/3444/34. WC, 52. FO to Bullard,Nos.503 and 504, 10 August 1941- FO 371-27200-E4597/1682/34; Defence Committee(Operations),8 August 1941- FO 371-27231-E4609/3444/34. 53. Eden to Cripps,No.197, 14 August 1941- FO 371-27231-E4757/3444/34. 54. Bullardto FO, No.547, 16 August 1941- FO 371-27200-E4712/1682/34. Eden 55. Eden to Cripps,No.187, 13August1941- FO 371-27231-E4662/3444/34; to Cripps, Eden to Cripps,No.204, 19 No.203, 18 August 1941- FO 371-27205-E4813/3326/34; August 1941- FO 371-27232-E4984/3444/34. 56. Eden to Cripps,22 August 1941- FO 371-27232-E4984/3444/34. 57. Accordingto Article6 of the 1921Treatysignedby the SovietUnion and Iranthe Soviet forcesinto Iranor Unionhadthe rightto sendtroopsinto Iranif a thirdpowerintroduced actionagainstthe SovietUnion, if the of turnedthe territory Iraninto a base for military could not themselves IranianGovernmentaftera warningfromthe Soviet Government preventthat danger. 58. Notes to Iran, FO 371-27201-E4996/1682/34. Affairs, 1939-46, the MiddleEastin the War,p.133. 59. G. Kirk,Surveyof International 60. Documentson GermanForeignPolicy, 9 July 1941. See 61. Bullardto FO, No.735, 14September1941,Minutes- FO 371-27126-E5678/3326/34; also GeneralHassanArfa, Underthe Five Shahs,p.298. 62. Documentson GermanForeignPolicy, 9 July 1941,No.84, pp.103, 104. 63. Ibid.

52 64. 65. 66. 67. 68.

MIDDLEEASTERN STUDIES Bullardto FO, 21 July 1941- FO 371-27230-E4036/3444/34. Bullardto FO, No.454, 22 July 1941- FO 371-27151-E4071/42/34. Bullardto FO, No.461, 24 July 1941- FO 371-27151-E4135/42/34. Bullardto FO, No.475, 28 July 1941- FO 371-27151-E4244/42/34. Bullardto FO, No.483, 1 Crippsto FO, 2 August 1941- FO 371-27231-E4368/3444/34;
August 1941 - FO 371-27152-E4366/42/34.

Bullardto FO, 69. Bullardto FO, No.491, 3 August 1941- FO 371-27152-E4427/42/34; Bullard FO, No.539, to No.507, 8 August1941- FO 371- FO 371-27200-E4558/1682/34; 14 August 1941- FO 371-27200-E4693/1682/34.
70. Documents on German Foreign Policy, August 1941.

Bullardto FO, 71. Bullardto FO, No.511, 9 August 1941- FO 371-27197-E4569/933/34; ForeignRelationsof the United No.552, 16August1941- FO 371-27201-E4720/1682/34; States, 12 August 1941,Vol.111,p.395. Bullardto FO, 72. Bullardto FO, No.552, 16 August 1941- FO 371-27201-E4720/1682/34; No.558, 17 August 1941- FO 371-27201-E4747/1682/34. 73. Bullardto FO, No.574, 20 August 1941- FO 371-27201-E4860/1682/34. Bullardto FO, 74. Bullardto FO, No.558, 17 August 1941- FO 371-27201-E4747/1682/34; No.656, 19 August 1941- L/P.S/12/551. 75. Bullardto FO, No.511, 9 August 1941- FO 371-27197-E4569/933/34. PoliticalResident 76. Bullardto FO, No.516, 9 August1941- FO 371-27205-E4544/3326/34; in the PersianGulf to Basra, 18 August 1941- FO 371-27205-E4836/3326/34. 77. Military Attacheto WarOffice,No.1044,23 August1941 FO 371-27206-E4987/3326/34. 78. Bullardto FO, No.583, 22 August 1941- L/P.S/12/551. 79. Bullardto FO, No.579, 21 August 1941- FO 371-27152-E4933/42/34. Attacheto WarOffice,No.1036,21 August1941- FO 371-27206-E4987/3326/34; 80. Military
See also H. Arfa, Under the Five Shahs, p.298.

81. Bullardto FO, No.581, 21 August 1941FO 371-27201-E4927/1682/34. 82. Bullardto FO, Nos.580 and 581, 21 August 1941, Minutes,22 August 1941- FO 37127201-E4927/1682/34. Bullardto FO, 83. Bullardto FO, No.596, 25 August 1941- FO 371-27206-E5004/3326/34; No.598, 25 August 1941- FO 371-27206-E5005/3326/34.
84. E.P. Elwell-Sutton, Persian Oil: A Study in Power Politics, p.105.

85. Minutesin the Chiefs of Staff'stelegramto C-in-CIndia and MiddleEast, No.164, 2 Bullardto FO, No.637, 1 September September1941- FO 371-27211-E5395/3326/34; 1941- FO 371-27208-E5271/3326/34. to 86. Knatchbull-Hugessen FO, No.1905, 7 August 1941- FO 371-27205-E4483/3326/34; ForeignRelationsof the United States, 1941, Vol.111,pp.401, 402, 403. 87. For a furtherexaminationof the motives for the occupationsee Yair P. Hirschfeld,
Deutschland und Iran im Spielfeld der Machte, International Beziehungen unter Reza

viewson thissubjectin generalsupportthose Schah,1921-1941,pp.298-299.The author's advancedin this article. FO's 88. Ankarato FO, No.2093, 28 August 1941,Minutes- FO 371-27208-E5120/3326/34; Minutes,28 August 1941- FO 371-27208-E5143/3326/34. 89. ForeignRelationsof the United States, 1941,Vol.III, pp.454, 455. Reza Shah, MissionFor My Country, 90. See also Mohammad p.72.