UNITED NATIONS ASSOCIATION OF SERBIA

BELGRADE INTERNATIONAL MODEL UNITED NATIONS 2007 THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SIXTH COMMITTEE
THEME: STRENGTHENING THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS-REFORM OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM: A HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE

United Nations reform without Security Council reform would not only be incomplete, it would not function. The Security Council today reflects the global power structure of 1945, when most of todays nations were still under colonial rule. Global transformation signalized the necessity for the structural changes in the Security Council, the worlds chief guarantor of peace and security. However, sixty years have passed and it is evident that the power constellation of 1945 does not fit the current equation of power and economic relations in the world. With the Charter having been amended in 1965, the Council saw its first and only expansionincreasing the number of its non-permanent seats from six to ten. From that day, the Council has a total of 15 members, which has made it a more legitimate and more efficient body. It is likely that adding the new permanent and non-permanent seats would bring more legitimacy to the Council. On the other hand, making the Council more efficient requires a different kind of reform. Today, the Council remains host to a number of special interests and under dealing-conflicts between its permanent five veto-wielding members, which often represent their own interestssimultaneously neglecting huge crises and immense human sufferings. Therefore, strengthening the role of the UNby creating a more responsible, more transparent and more efficient Council remains the matter of utmost importance to be discussed in the Sixth Committee.

II THE REFORM PROGRESS SO FAR

Reform of the Security Council has been on the UN agenda for more than 15 years. The first calls for its reform came in the early 1990s, with the end of the Cold War and the Councils controversial activities (Iraq, Rwanda). In 1993, the General Assembly has established an open-ended working group (considers all aspects of this reform), which started formulating proposals on the subject in 1994. The Millennium Declaration expressed determination to intensify the efforts towards a comprehensive reform of the SC, while the 2005 World Summit

unequivocally supported an early reform and recommended that the Council continues to adapt its working methods. During the year 2006, the Councils Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions has been working on reform of the Councils working methods, with several, but still modest changes as a result. On the other side, so far concrete proposals for the reform have been given by: The Secretary Generals High level Panel - Model A and Model B (or the Blue Model) Model A ~ 6 new permanent seats, without veto + 3 new two-year term nonpermanent seats Model B ~ no new permanent seats, new category of 8 four-year renewable seats and one new two-year non-permanent (and non-renewable) seat Group 4/3 Brazil, Germany, India and Japan 10 new members: 6 permanent (Brazil, Germany, India, Japan and two seats for Africa), without veto + 4 non-permanent Ezulwini Consensus African Union 11 new members: 6 permanent with veto (2 for Africa, 2 for Asia, one for Latin America and one for Western Europe) + 5 non-permanent (including 2 African states) United for Consensus Group 12 members - the Green Model 10 new non-permanent states, eligible for re-election (chosen on a rotating basis by regional groups, including 3 new seats for Africa, 3 for Asia, 2 for Latin America, one for Western Europe and one new seat for Eastern Europe); it also calls for restraint in the use of the veto by the current permanent members Japan 6 new members: permanent seats for countries that receive 2/3 majority vote + non-permanent seats for those that receive simple majority Petite 5 S-5 Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore and Switzerland A proposal on reforming the Security Councils working methods (including limiting the use of the veto in cases of genocide and serious human rights violations, further consultations between members and non-members, other reforms to increase transparency and accountability) Unlike the 60th Session, during which numerous resolutions were discussed, but without a broad consensus on any, in the current Session no resolutions have been tabled, in regard on any aspects of the reform. This can be construed as a positive, as well as a negative indication of the possibility of an agreement. As expected, and evident in the proposals for the reform, the greatest supporters of the reform are primarily states from underrepresented regions (Latin America, Asia and Africa). After a period of inaction, the G-4 countries, lead by India, are in the process of defining a new strategy to insist on the expansion of the Security Council. Indias Permanent Representative Nirupam Sen in his remarks said that the G-4 countries are not dogmatic about exact solutions and stressed the Security Council is reaching the end of its shelf life. The G-4 plans to meet to discuss ways of widening the debate, just after the African Union summit meeting at the end of January, as this issue is expected to be on its agenda. On the other hand, the African Union is the largest single regional block in the UN that is not represented on a permanent basis in the Security Council. Although

the AU is accused of blocking the reforms by demanding the veto right, it argues that without the veto they will just be a second category of permanent member, perpetuating inequality. The issue of veto has become a major obstacle to the change of this unit, and the answer remains to be seen. In the light of these facts, so far, the only conclusion offered is that main questions on the Security Councils reform, as well as the UNs, are still open and eligible for debate.

III ASPECTS OF REFOM

So far, none of proposals gained enough support to be considered for an agreement. Security Council reform demands changes in the UN Charter, which commands a very high degree of support in the international community: a twothirds majority in the General Assembly and in the Security Council, including the five permanent members of SC, which is not easy attainable. Although all states agree the Security Council should be expanded, there are certain disagreements over the way it should be done. Should we increase the number of permanent or only the non-permanent seats? More permanent seats would make the Council more legitimate and representative of today's world, and it would increase the involvement in decision-making of those who contribute most to the United Nations. But, on the other hand, it would make the Council more inflexible and inefficient. It is, also, very hard to reach a compromise over new permanent members of the Council, because each candidate for the permanent seat faces the resistance of its regional rivals. In what way would enlargement affect the Councils efficiency, and could it be counterproductive vis--vis strengthening the role of the UN? Former U.S. Permanent Representative in the UN, John R. Bolton said the Councils current size is effective for managing discussions and debates, and he stressed that expansion of the Security Council must result in at least maintaining, if not increasing, its effectiveness. Having this in mind, what would be the ideal number of Security Council seats, to make it both representative and efficient? Proposals regarding the veto power range from: keeping the veto only for the current five permanent SC members, extending it to the new member-states, limiting its use, to its complete abolishment. Some countries want the veto be extended to new permanent members, so they would be equal to the current permanent members. But many countries oppose the veto extension, because the permanent members, through their veto and veto-threat (so called hidden veto), have prevented the Council from acting on important matters of peace and security. More veto-wielding SC members would mean excluding even more issues for debate and it could, also, block future reform of the Council. Because of that, there are, also, proposals for complete abolishment of the veto or for limitation of its use in cases of genocide and crimes against humanity. How attainable are the proposals for the veto-restriction, and especially, for its elimination, when this cannot be done without the Charter revision, which itself is subject to the veto process? How to persuade the Permanent Five to renounce this power? Security Council reform proposals include also proposals for SC working methods' reform: regular (instead of provisional) Rules of Procedure, more public meetings, more consultations with non-members, more institutionalized presidency of the Council, and other steps to make the Council more transparent and accountable. There is, also, the need to delineate the responsabilities of the Council in order to avoid an overlap with purview of the GA or other UN organs. Besides, an enhanced dialogue between the General Assembly and the Council is needed to make the Council more accountable to a broader UN plenum. A better

communication would only make these two principal organs of the UN more powerful and more relevant. SC working methods reform is easier to attain because there is no need for the Charter to be ammended and the reform could be implemented by a decision of the Council itself. Even though, the Permanent Five often oppose procedural changes that limit their privileges. Some countries want the reform of working methods be simultaneous with expansion, because, as Representative of Germany, Thomas Matussek, said, working methods reform could not be effectively implemented, if we do not achieve structural reform. However, other countries feel that addressing working methods and expansion in separate, but parallel processes, could achieve better results in both areas.

Shared role between the General Assembly and the Security Council in maintaining world peace New trends and the progressive development of international lawThe responsibility to protect
Given the recent history of military conflicts in the Balkans and elsewhere during the 1990s, and especially in the wake of the events of September 11, 2001, the United Nations has been facing a great deal of problemsespecially in reaction to the challenges to international peace. The 1999 NATO intervention in Serbia constituted a precedent through bypassing the Security Council as the solely guarantor of peace and security, and thus being in violation of the UN Charter. Furthermore, the actions of the United States in Granada, Panama and more recently in Afghanistan and Iraq raise questions about the progressive development of international law in this area. Strictly abiding to the norms of international law (e.g. the enforcement action sanctioned by the SC) the military interventions mentioned above would have been judged a violation of national sovereignty and an egregious affront to international law. Quite the opposite, these events were seen as the cornerstone of new international law doctrine in the eyes of some of the great powers led by the United states and the United Kingdom. In connection to this, the United Nations has somewhat reluctantly accepted NATOs role in the Balkans and the ECOWAS police action in West Africa (regional organizations may be given a mandate, according to the Charter). In addition, regional responses to civil and cross-border conflict were judged useful, less costly, and more efficient than some UN peacekeeping ventures. Henceforth, it is of utmost importance for the Sixth Committee to discuss the issues of progressive development of international law, best explained on the example of the NATO intervention in Serbia. This came to be known as the cornerstone of the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine1. If introduced, what Basic principles of Responsibility to Protect are: 1) State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies within the state itself; 2) If a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect. The foundations of the responsibility to protect, as a guiding principle for the international community of states lie in: 1) obligations inherent in the concept of sovereignty; 2) the SC has the responsibility under Article 24 of the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security; 3) special legal obligations under human rights and human protection declaration 4) the developing practice of states, regional organizations and the Security Council itself (See: The Responsibility to Protect, International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001).
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effect would the progressive development of international law have on the guiding principles of the UN Charter? In case of collision, how could it be overcome? Given the reality of international relations, the United Nations needs structural as well as procedural reform. Moreover, the most likely occasions for the use of a ready enforcement capability would be UN intervention to suppress violent internal civil wars or to prevent gross violations of human rights (such as mass killings in Cambodia during the 1970s). Another use would be as in the case of Somalia in the 1990s, to combat international chaos that threatened widespread death and suffering to civilian populations. However, we still have a problem here. What is to be done in a situation when there is an immediate crisis with immense human sufferings, and the Security Council is unable to act? It is clear that the international community must act, but there must be strong principles of action and a majority of nations adhering to them. However, one must bear in mind the Councils duty to guard world peace and security, and still serve as a more accountable and more transparent body. In connection to the latter, the General Assembly ought to keep the systemic balance and watch over the continuing metamorphosis of collective security. To 1. 2. 3. reiterate, the Sixth Committee will have to address several questions: Expansion of the Security Council What to do with the Veto (power)? Working methods reform and New trends and the progressive development of international lawThe responsibility to protect

IV PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

At the end of the day, we are exposed to a number of questions and perplexities vis--vis the outcome and effects of the much desired Councils reshuffle. Apart from the proposals A and B for its expansion, other proposals on the table are everything but neutral. Conversely, they follow the national interests of their submitters. How does that affect the attempt to create a general climate of consensus-building in the arena of global politics? Yet another in the series of dilemmas concerns the enlarged-Councils endurance. How long will it last? Since its last and only expansion, forty-one years have passed. Moreover, the way the UN affect the behaviour of its members is loosing on its weight, which one can easily notice on the cases of Sudan, Iran and the North Korea. Therefore, the world is in need of a stronger, more democratic, more legitimate and more flexible United Nations. Given that the world is still tailored to serve primarily the sovereign states, it is the states that must forge the political consensus over Security Council reform. The reform is a political matter of global importance. However, the belief remains that the newest initiatives, which came out in the wake of the 2005 Summit, will lead to a swift Councils reform--as an inherent part of the UN reform as a whole. It will be up to you to answer some of these questions, adding up to a proposal that will be acceptable for as many states as possible.