Two Re Foundation Projects of Democracy in Contemporary French Philosophy, Castoriadis and Ranciere

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Two refoundation projects of democracy in contemporary French philosophy : Cornelius Castoriadis and Jacques Rancire
Gilles Labelle Philosophy Social Criticism 2001 27: 75 DOI: 10.1177/019145370102700404 The online version of this article can be found at: http://psc.sagepub.com/content/27/4/75
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Gilles Labelle
Two refoundation projects of democracy in contemporary French philosophy

Cornelius Castoriadis and Jacques Rancire
Abstract In this paper I examine two theories of democracy that can be found in contemporary French philosophy. Both Cornelius Castoriadis and Jacques Rancire offer a critique of modern democracy with the purpose of refounding it. The refoundation narratives they propose are both based on an account of the origins of democracy in ancient Greece. According to Castoriadis, ancient democracy is grounded in a magma of social imaginary signications in which autonomy is considered the correct response to Being dened as an insurmountable Chaos. On the contrary, modern democracy denes Being as a determinacy and consequently fails to grasp the notion of autonomy. According to Rancire, the origins of democracy are to be found in the invasion of the public space by those without a part who consequently have no title to govern. The problem with the domesticated modern democracy is that it denies the existence of Otherness; that is, of non-citizens excluded from the public space. Therefore it appears incapable of letting the dis-agreement manifest itself and consequently incapable of transforming the police order. After examining the meaning of both theories, I attempt to elucidate the difculties encountered by each author in the attainment of his goal, which is that of refounding modern democracy. Key words ancient democracy autonomy Castoriadis democracy dis-agreement foundational narratives modern democracy Rancire
PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL CRITICISM vol 27 no 4 pp. 75103

Copyright 2001 SAGE Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi) [0191-4537(200107)27:4;75103;017598]
PSC
76 Philosophy & Social Criticism 27 (4)

This article discusses the refoundation projects of two contemporary French philosophers, Cornelius Castoriadis and Jacques Rancire.1
Introduction
The trial of Socrates symbolizes the difcult relationship originally established between political philosophy and democracy. If, as does Leo Strauss, we dene the former essentially as an interrogation as to the best regime,2 we recognize how it can be opposed to the latter which is founded on a series of opinions or beliefs considered to be afrmations concerning the ability of the demos to govern. We will recall Socrates skepticism regarding Protagoras claim that Zeus had given the art of governing equally to all men.3 In the Republic, Plato goes even further, making of Socrates the proponent of a regime governed by philosophers as they alone are thought to have the ability to attain wisdom. At the same time, however, again in the Republic, Plato is forced to admit that only democracy allows philosophers to pursue their interrogation as to the nature of the best regime.4 The difcult and ambiguous relationship existing between philosophy and democracy has been maintained well into contemporary times. That certain modern political philosophers have been more favourable towards democratic principles, must not lead us to forget the somewhat conditional character of this assent. Again according to Leo Strauss, moderns did indeed accept the legitimacy of the right of citizens to govern but only inasmuch as universal education enabled them to become more like philosophers.5 In the 19th century, a philosopher as liberal as John Stuart Mill set out a series of restrictions and conditions to universal suffrage.6 The distinction between the mob (the ochlos of the ancients) and the People (in all of its splendour and nobility) kept for him its full meaning. The least that can be said is that in the 20th century, this distrust of democracy by philosophers has remained alive and well. No need to insist at length on this point since we need only recall to mind the attraction felt by many philosophers for non- or antidemocratic solutions such as the Conservative revolution, Nazism or various forms of Marxism-Leninism. In certain cases, democracy has been considered reprehensible in its very essence, while in others it has been understood as a mere illusion called upon to be overcome so that a future free of all forms of alienation may prevail.7 In the last thirty years, however, this landscape has been greatly modied. We can now say that the vast majority of philosophers interested in politics consider democracy to be an acceptable option or at least an unavoidable one. However, this apparent (quasi) unanimity must not blind us to what fundamentally divides the philosophers who
77 Labelle: Two refoundation projects of democracy

make democracy their object of study. To explain briey, we nd on one hand those who adopt an anti-foundationalist position. Proponents of this view believe that democracy need not be founded in order to ensure its continued existence. In other words, democracy does not need to rest on metaphysical principles which are inevitably expressed in great narratives and which they believe have become anachronistic in this disenchanted era.8 Democracy has reached a point where it no longer needs to evoke Natural Right, an idea of the Self or of Man, in order to be legitimate. It can therefore do without the traditional attempt to dig down to the philosophical foundation of democracy .9 We should therefore postulate the priority of democracy to philosophy.10 On the other hand, we nd philosophers who believe that democracy cannot rest merely on the pragmatic fact of its existence in order to ensure its survival. Consequently it cannot do away with foundational narratives (in other words, narratives which go beyond the settled habits and common sense11) in order to explicitly express that which needs to be shared in common by all citizens.12 As opposed to anti-foundationalists, foundationalists believe that foundational narratives do not necessarily have to draw on an arsenal of metaphysical principles (such as God, Nature or the Cosmos) in order to be set out, the challenge of modernity being precisely the elaboration of non-metaphysical narratives that can nonetheless be shared by all and used to found a stable political order.13 The conversion of contemporary philosophers to democracy is particularly noteworthy in the case of French philosophy. As we know, French philosophy remained quite resistant to democratic principles namely due to the strong presence of the Communist Party on the political scene and of what has been called structural Marxism of the 1960s and 1970s on the intellectual scene. Even though there still exist some French philosophers who are radical critics of democracy,14 the vast majority of those interested in politics have come to recognize its merits. Generally speaking, these philosophers rather than accepting the primacy of democracy over philosophy, side with foundationalists in that they have undertaken an exercise consisting in the identication of the foundations of democracy.15 More precisely, since their methodology often involves a critique of the dominant representations of democracy and a subsequent proposal of new representations, it is better in this case to speak of attempts at refounding democracy. What follows is an analysis of two such projects of refoundation present in contemporary French philosophy. Both Cornelius Castoriadis and Jacques Rancire defend a form of democracy that could be called radical, which they oppose to existing democratic regimes. In order to do so, both authors criticize the representations put forward by existing democratic regimes and go on to suggest what may be called narratives

of refoundation, which, in both cases, happen to be narratives about the origins (rcits des origines)16 in that they are based on the birth of democracy in ancient Greece (even though neither author attempts to simply oppose ancient democracy to the modern form17). The goal of this analysis is threefold. First, I will attempt to understand the meaning of the authors narratives about the origins which are meant to demonstrate the relevance and worthiness of radically refounding contemporary democracy. Second, I will try to understand the critique of existing democratic regimes suggested by both authors. And third, in so doing, I will show that both Castoriadis and Rancire end up acknowledging defeat, for in the end, they both conclude that it is difcult, not to say impossible, for their foundational narratives to replace the dominant representations found in contemporary democracy.
I Castoriadis: demos and Chaos

According to Castoriadis, Athenian democracy rests on a narrative about the origins which opposes autonomy18 with an insurmountable primal Being dened as Chaos. In this ensemble of representations, the demos appears as a form which does not have any bearing in Being and which is erected against formlessness otherwise known as the Abyss. Modern democratic regimes, on the other hand, rest on a series of narratives and representations that presuppose the demos to be the manifestation of reason in its effort to express the meaning of Being. Being thus appears as a determinacy rather than as Chaos. For Castoriadis, this is an illusion which is in part responsible for the current crisis of democracy, the most obvious symptoms of which are the apathy of citizens and the irrational and inequitable use of the planets resources. However, despite his harsh critique of modern democracy, Castoriadis does not suggest we turn away from it. Rather, he suggests that we refound it by returning to the principle of autonomy.
1 A narrative about the origins: autonomy, Chaos and Athenian democracy

Since it is through his critique of Marxism that Castoriadis comes to the problem of autonomy, we must rst attempt to elucidate his interpretation of Marxist thought before directly addressing the issue of the origins of ancient democracy. Marxism, according to the author, rests on an ontological postulate whereby Being is dened as a determinacy or a self-sufcient positivity that can be decomposed into its basic elements (the economy, the political, etc.) which can be organized or

mastered.19 But to the positivity and the self-sufciency of Being, Castoriadis opposes the idea that Being is instituted by social imaginary signications.20 What are we to make of this? Whereas it is commonly understood that reality and imaginary exist as opposites (the former being true, the latter illusionary), we must learn to think that Being has consistency only through the instituting imaginary (or the radical imaginary). Of course, admits Castoriadis, there exists a layer of ensemblistic-identitary logic of Being that can be apprehended from principles of identity and of non-contradiction and so on. There are, in sum, certain immanent properties of the being-thus of the world.21 We can say, for example, that everywhere and at all times, 1 1 1 3. However, even in a case so simple, an important restriction must be noted. In the Christian arithmetic 1 1 1 1 when referring to the mystery of the Holy Trinity.22 And he or she who replies that this type of mystery is merely illusionary, must be reminded that throughout the Middle Ages, Being was dened in a way that gave Christian arithmetic if not more importance than, certainly the same importance as, conventional arithmetic, the latter being in fact used only insofar as it did not contradict the former. It is the construction of cathedrals that imposed the use of complex architectural rules and not the opposite. In short, if there exists a stratum of ensemblistic-identitary logic of Being, common to all societies, they differ from one another in that each society is supported by a magma23 of imaginary signications that not only do not correspond to a pre-existing Being but actually institutes it.24 It must be noted, however, that although the imaginary institution of Being cannot be dened as rational per se (since that which is rational is in fact dened by it25), it also is not arbitrary. If, in fact, the institution of Being through imaginary signications appears, on the one hand, as an ex nihilo26 creation, thereby dened as practically limitless,27 it must, on the other hand, obtain support one way or another on the ensemblistic-identitary. It is through an analysis of the psyche that we can better understand the question at hand. As dreams demonstrate, the psychical monad ignores linear time, principles of identity and of non-contradiction, etc., and must therefore be considered mad, a-rational and afunctional.28 As the monads are unt for life,29 they can survive only if the forces that drive them are diverted towards and invested in external objects shared in common in such a way as to found their coexistence. So what are these objects that are the product of the instituting imaginary? Their diversity is almost innite: there were societies that focused on the celebration of the gods (primitive societies), others on expansion (Rome), on accumulation of wealth (modern England), on mass murder (Nazism), still others on the happiness of the individual (modern liberal democracies), etc. However, all

these objects around which societies have been founded must inevitably have one thing in common: they must mean something to the psyche. And even though the chosen objects may appear completely irrational to the outsider, they must actually correspond to something real. These objects cannot therefore be just anything.30 From what has been stated thus far ows the crucial idea, according to Castoriadis, that every society regardless of the magma of imaginary signications that founds it, is self-instituted (auto-institue).31 This does not mean that a society is its own master or that it makes itself in the same manner as, say, an artisan makes a table. In fact, the types of object that a society gives birth to and which aim at channelling the driving forces in order to found a living-together, rests not on an identiable subjectivity but on an instituting movement which, drawing from the imaginary, is at the foundation of the genesis of beings. This includes all subjectivity that could pretend to be its master (the same goes for all otherworldly entities Gods, Cosmos, Nature, etc. that could present themselves as inspiring it). As the self-institution does not correspond in any way, according to Castoriadis, to the sovereignty of humanity, humanity being merely the bearer of the imaginary, the place or the there where it manifests itself, this anonymous32 imaginary can thus be identied with the arkh understood as the Beginning and the principal organizer of all things.33 The irony is that this arkh fullls its role in an insurmountable an-archical fashion in that it engenders a multiplicity of virtually limitless objects and forms that allow for investment and attachment. Now, paradoxically, we must note that until the invention of democracy in ancient Greece, societies are self-instituted on the basis of a magma of signications that are ignorant of this basic principle; in other words, the product of the instituting imaginary is signications that either limit the imaginary or simply prevent it from manifesting itself. Through complex mechanisms, these societies, allying myths, rites and so on, rest in fact on a magma of signications that present them as hetero-determined, that is, as dependent on transcendent entities (Gods, the Cosmos, etc.). The source of Law, that is, the source of that which holds the world and society together, is believed to be otherworldly and therefore unreachable for humans. This means that society is organized in such a way that it must endlessly repeat the rules established once and for all at the very beginning.34 In breaking away from this schema, Castoriadis explains that Athenian democracy opens the door to the explicit self-institution of society.35 Surely, the demos dened by the exclusion of slaves, metics and women demonstrates the limits of this form of democracy. Notwithstanding these limits, however, it is important to point out that Athenian democracy is built upon a series of imaginary signications

that render possible, for the rst time, an innite interrogation as to the institution of Being and therefore a kind of permanent self-institution. We nd these signications rst elaborated in Hesiods account of the genesis of the world and of the genealogy of the Gods. If we follow Castoriadiss interpretation, at the beginning, there is for the author of the Theogony, only Chaos and the most total void.36 This conception, far from belonging solely to Hesiod, actually constitutes a kind of common idea found throughout the Greek world. Thus, for Anaximander, in the beginning is the apeiron, that is, the indenite or the indeterminate, which is another way of thinking Chaos.37 Yet, both the philosopher and the poet note that forms as particularized and determinate existence38 are forever rising up against the Chaos. According to Anaximander, these forms as products of the hubris (immoderation) considered as a manifestation of adikia (injustice), necessarily invite a return to dik (justice) identied here as the original Chaos.39 Born against Chaos, the forms are destined to return to Chaos and therefore perpetually need to be reinstituted in a never-ending movement. According to Castoriadis, it is on this magma of signications that the democratic polis is founded. This does not mean, however, that it directly refers to the narratives told by Hesiod or Anaximander since, as mentioned, we are dealing with a common set of beliefs. It is noteworthy, explains Castoriadis, that the laws voted by the Assembly of Athenian citizens always begin with the statement: It has pleased the Council and the People . . . (Edoxe te boul kai to demo . . . ). As this statement indicates, laws are in no way tied back to a transcendent force or to absolute knowledge. However, even if they are not anchored in the absolute, these laws are not relative. They are, in fact, all that can exist in a universe where gods are conceived in such a way that humans always nd themselves threatened by the mortality of all things, by a return to the original Abyss.40 Therefore humans are condemned to autonomy that is to raise forms or laws against Chaos in a context of total and constant uncertainty. Some sophists, when stipulating that the doxa is insurmountable and that all forms and all laws can be discussed and rediscussed by the demos, were the rst to point out that human beings master neither what is nor even what they do. But even though the instituting imaginary is in fact, according to Castoriadis, identied here with the arkh, that is, with the Beginning and with the originary principle always deploying itself in an an-archical manner, this does not mean that humanity is condemned to an asocial existence or to an inability to act in common. On the contrary, Athenian democracy demonstrates the viability of a common public space based on endless exchange which rests on the inability of human actors to actually arrive at denite answers to the questions being discussed. That is why Castoriadis explains that it can be assumed of the three questions later asked

by Kant: What can I know?, What ought I to do? and What am I allowed to hope?, the Athenians not only would have refused to answer the last of these but would even have denied its merit.41 The reign of the demos indicates that there is nothing to hope for since everything that lasts merely represents a temporary victory over death which will not fail to rear its head once again thereby calling upon humans to forever rise up against it. However, it should not be deduced from this that the entire polis enthusiastically took part in this magma of signications. In fact, postSocratic philosophy is erected against the conception of the existence of a dialectical movement without synthesis where the forms incessantly rise up against Chaos in a endless battle. And even though Platonic philosophy is born of the polis, that is, from the interrogation generated by democracy, its goal from the onset is the elaboration of a magma of signications that would end this impossible battle between form and formlessness and replace Chaos with the cosmos.42 Following this logic, everything and everyone, including the demos, would have its rightful place assigned by the philosopher as the only legitimate bearer of wisdom. According to Castoriadis, Platos theological philosophy cleared the way for Aristotelian thought which introduced and perpetuated in Western thought, the idea of forms founded in Nature or in God rather than in the imaginary.43 Of course, however, Platonic and post-Platonic philosophy cannot be held solely responsible for the ultimate demise of Athenian democracy. As Castoriadis points out, the demos in the 4th century is simply not what it was during the era of Pericles. It is easily seduced by demagogues and is incapable of defending the City against the ambitions of Philip of Macedon. We could be tempted to explain that the demise of democracy is due to the exhaustion felt by the Athenians following the Peloponnesian War. Although this is in fact an important factor, in the nal analysis it cannot explain the fall of Athenian democracy. For it must be understood that the demos neither is a group possessing a positive existence nor is it a self-constituted subjectivity. As a form born of the imaginary, it is the there whereby a magma of signications organized around the Chaos, the Abyss, autonomy, etc., and expressed in the narratives of Hesiod, Anaximander and some sophists manifested itself and was welcomed and received. In other words, for Castoriadis, the demos is not rst and foremost an entity with a positive existence to which would come to be added the legislative and interrogative activities: it is this activity due to its welcoming an imaginary which it does not master. Thus, the existence of the demos does not depend on itself or on anyone else since, as we explained, it depends on an anonymous imaginary which no one owns or masters. Therefore, in the end, the analyst can merely note the presence or absence of the demos at any

given moment in history. As indicated by the title of a book dedicated to May 1968, and to which Castoriadis contributed, the reign of the demos in Athens and in all of history thereafter is a kind of breach44 whose appearance or disappearance is unpredictable by any one actor since it emerges as the there where the instituting imaginary is manifesting itself in an an-archical manner. It is this breach rst opened in Athens that put humans face to face for the rst time with Chaos making them realize that they do not have access to the Absolute. In the end, the defeat of the demos will give way to the determinacy or to theological philosophy and to the rule of monarchies and empires. It is only two thousand years later, states Castoriadis, with the modern notions of critique, emancipation and democracy, etc., that this breach is reopened, albeit much more timidly.
2 The crisis of modern democracy

The fact that the agents of modern revolutions call upon memories of antiquity should not be surprising. On the one hand, modern revolutionaries hesitantly rediscover the virtues of direct democracy (councils, popular organizations, etc.). On the other, the inuence of philosophical currents stemming from the Renaissance and from the Enlightenment renders once again possible the idea of autonomy in a world where God is considered either non-existent or as manifesting Himself in natural laws which have to be interpreted in uncertainty. Once the revolutionary movements give way to bourgeois oligarchy, which identies emancipation with the ownership of private property, the working-class movement borrows and radicalizes the idea of revolution by proclaiming that there is no God and no Saviour. As Hegel had foreseen through his exploration of the masterslave dialectic before relentlessly reinscribing his discovery into the order of determinacy, the modern slave or worker, being forced to transform nature, has the possibility to grasp the idea that history is nothing more than an ensemble of forms that humans make emerge without certainty as to their value. For this reason, human activity must be self-limiting,45 that is, it must always include the possibility of being able to reconsider the forms it generates. However, Castoriadis insists on the fact that the conception of autonomy in modern times is not quite as radical as that which was invented by the Greeks. Neither the philosophers of the Enlightenment nor the Hegelian-Marxists identify Chaos with the Beginning; on the contrary, they postulate the existence of a cosmos which has been lost but which we must and should rediscover. Whether we postulate as in modern Natural Right that humans are by nature free and equal, each possessing reason, or as in Marx that history contains a reason which

up until now has been hidden from view and which the proletariat can rediscover given their particular position in society, the fact remains, that in the end, moderns are still in the world of determinacy. This is what allows them to associate the demos (or the proletariat in the case of Marxism) not with the hubristic effort to rise up against Chaos and death but rather with the new embodiment of reason in lieu of the philosopher; generally speaking, it then becomes possible to associate and even equate the reign of the demos with that of reason. Consequently Castoriadis considers modern emancipation movements ambiguous and even contradictory: for how can they posit both a form of autonomy (humans being the only ones who can give themselves laws) and a limitation of autonomy by reason which is transcendent because it corresponds to the determinacy of Being?46 This ambiguity or contradiction stems from denying the fact that there are no ultimate metaphysical foundational principles of Being, a denial which was rst found in the thought of Plato and Aristotle when they abandoned the pre-Socratic teachings and which led to the institution of theological philosophy as a way of taming Chaos. Castoriadis therefore explains that if the demos or proletariat is indeed the embodiment of reason in history, this means (as it did for Plato when he opposed the true and false philosophers) that we can oppose the intrinsic mission of which it is the bearer to its empirical existence. In this manner, modern political emancipation movements can be said to be fundamentally schizoid in that they divide the very root of their ultimate legitimizing principle, that is, the demos (or the proletariat). Castoriadis stipulates that the current era and in particular the current state of democracy can be understood in terms of these contradictions generated by this form of schizoidism. The fate of the socialist project with its original dream of surpassing modern democracy and of also fullling the latters (unkept) promises, can be understood in that light. According to Castoriadis, the fall of the Berlin Wall is in fact the result of the development of what was probably the rst cynical society in history.47 The entire evolution of Soviet-like political regimes can be understood as the result of the distance between the promises made by the regime and its reality; in other words, between the proclaimed rule by the proletariat and the actual control by the party as the one, true representative of the proletariats historical mission. At a certain stage of its development, the Soviet regime produces a type of individual corresponding to itself; that is, a schizoid individual, one who formally adheres to the principles of socialism on the one hand but who is also profoundly aware that institutionalized lies, brute force48 and generalized irrationality reign supreme.49 When this internal psychic cleavage reaches its peak (Brezhnevs car collection, etc.) it nally becomes obvious that the

regime, which once seemed the most stable, in fact turns out to be the most fragile.50 Whereas Castoriadis deems the situation to be slightly less catastrophic for the so-called triumphant liberal democratic regimes, he nonetheless believes these societies to be structured on much the same schizoid principle that led to the fall of totalitarian regimes. Just like the totalitarian regime, democracy has also produced an individual in its own image. If in theory citizens are sovereign, in fact their sovereignty is limited, as previously noted by Rousseau, to choosing, at regular intervals, a restricted number of seemingly competent representatives who, once in power, decide as to everything without restraint since supposedly more knowledgeable than the citizens themselves regarding the nature of their needs.51 Citizens are formally sovereign yet in reality are expected to be disinterested in politics, expected rather to focus simply on their private existence52 and enjoy the small pleasures of life which are, as rst noted by Plato, virtually endless in number.53 The modern identication of Being with determinacy rather than with Chaos sustains a conception of reason as essentially instrumental and which consequently constitutes a techno-science whose aim is to seek out and master the resources of the planet (even at the risk of eliminating them) in order to make them available for immediate consumption.54 The reign of reason which is meant to correspond to the reign of the demos can then ultimately be dened as an era of insignicance meaning that all things potentially become values which are equivalent to one another.55 It is an era during which occurs a major anthropological mutation, during which appears nothing less than a new variety of human beings zapping . . . from one pleasure . . . to another, without memory or project56 and blindly trusting politicians, scientists and technicians as they alone can provide the products capable of satisfying their every whim. In the end, such a logic shows a society which is incapable of and unconcerned with producing individuals that are interested in the fate of their own society even though this interest is crucial to its continued survival.57 It is as if the denition of Being as a determinacy goes hand in hand with the fantasy of eternal life.
3 Refounding democracy through a return to autonomy?

As Castoriadis explains, the fact that liberal democracies ritualistically evoke the principle of the autonomy of individuals cannot let us forget that they are actually built upon an imaginary of determinacy which denies the very possibility of autonomy understood as the explicit selfinstitution of society. For this would involve the difcult task of renewing or refounding democracy confronted with uncertainty, with full awareness of the nite and limited nature of the institutions created

by humans which they oppose to Chaos in a never-ending way. So how can we refound democracy? If the diagnosis proposed by the author seems without appeal, the manner in which he sees the possibility of revitalizing the imaginary in order to resuscitate autonomy is most problematical, to say the least. Castoriadis is the rst to admit that it is now quite difcult to envisage the possibility of renewing autonomy, so strong is the hold on society of the imaginary of determinacy which renders everything available for immediate consumption.58 The working-class movement once integrated into bourgeois society, the new social movements (in particular those of women and youth), even if they did transform contemporary society, were unable, even in May 1968, to generate autonomous institutions capable of lasting over time. Moreover, this pessimism is reinforced by what we must admit appears as a dominant trend throughout history, that of heteronomy and determinacy predominating over autonomy. Except for Athenian democracy and for certain brief and limited episodes in modern times (revolutions, radical social movements such as May 1968), heteronomy has reigned supreme throughout most of human history. For that reason, Castoriadis explains that we are not entirely wrong in dening the human as somewhat of a religious animal in the sense of an animal that desires believing and heteronomy,59 just as he or she is a lazy animal60 in preferring pleasure and consumption over effort and production. In this manner, the imaginary of moderns, however questionable it may appear in that it reduces Being to a potentially marketable stock and by the same token discourages citizens from concerning themselves with public affairs, plays such a crucial role in todays society that it becomes difcult to envisage how Castoriadiss refoundation project can compete with it. How imperative can the Athenian narrative about the origins of democracy or the imaginary of autonomy and Chaos appear in a society whose very founding principles are totally opposed to this imaginary? Is it coincidental that the working-class movement, which had borrowed from the modern struggles for emancipation their most noble aspects, has left behind only garbage whereas at least the Roman Empire had left ruins?61 In sum, although Castoriadis is vehemently opposed to the notion of the end of history,62 this does not prevent him from actually conceptualizing contemporary society as a system which is practically closed in upon itself. When faced with this pessimistic outlook, we are left with the impression that nothing less than a miracle is required for humanity to turn itself towards autonomy once again. Even though Castoriadis does not make use of this theological vocabulary, it is not quite clear whether or not this is in fact his point of view. For there is, according to him, no cause or motive for societys welcoming into its midst the imaginary

of Chaos, of form, etc.; in other words, nothing in Being is predisposed towards autonomy, which simply has no metaphysical ground or foundation63 and is therefore neither necessary (as this would be contradictory) nor rational (since rationality is, as we stated, dened by the instituting movement itself). Autonomy, and the demos which is its bearer, are therefore a kind of lightning in the grey sky of heteronomy that nothing foreshadows or announces. For that reason, Castoriadiss critique of democratic regimes, even if quite harsh, ends in nothing more than a wait-and-see attitude feeding itself on faith in the return of autonomy and of the demos understood as incessant legislative and interrogative activity. This faith, in the end, seems to consecrate the failure of an attempt at refounding democracy which is incapable of providing alternate representations around which existing democratic regimes could be effectively reorganized.
II Jacques Rancire: the demos against the police

Rancire, as Castoriadis, reects upon the meaning of democracy through the prism of a narrative about the origins anchored in Athens. This similarity, however, should not blind us to the originality of his thought. According to Rancire, democracy emerges from a dis-agreement (msentente) between the demos, which denes itself as having no part in the polis (le demos est sans-part) and against which a wrong (tort) has been committed, and the police order, which always rests on a certain calculation of individuals. This conceptual framework brings to light the paradox on which modern democracy is founded: its all-encompassing will, its rejection of inequality and discrimination that aims at righting all wrongs and clearing up all disagreements, actually makes more visible the fact that entire segments of the population remain irreducibly excluded from the prevailing consensus. Moreover, it also points towards the need to go against the general trend, to oppose it with dissensus.
1 A narrative about the origins: the demos, calculation and the police
According to Rancire, it is important rst to look into the historical origins of the demos. Solons reforms in Athens (594 BCE), which forbids enslavement for debt, lead to the appearance in the City of a mass of the poor that cannot be reduced to bondage and that are unsuited to make laws or to command64 since they do not have the qualication to govern (granted either through birth, or through wealth or excellence). This lack of title to govern will not prevent the poor (Cleisthenes reform of

508507 BCE helping) from expressing an incredible and shocking claim: that of equally governing the City. The demos, according to Rancire, is therefore, at rst, the expression of a sort of scandal65 according to those who see themselves as the only legitimate rulers, a scandal because those without title are meddling in public affairs rather than doing that for which they were meant: simply serving and obeying. Political philosophy is for Rancire the most explicit attempt to express this initial scandal since it is through it that the meaning of the demos activity and the foundations of democracy appear most clearly.66 We will recall that Platos work is a downright weapon against the demos since it stipulates that only the philosophers (rather than the aristocrats or the merchants) have the right to rule the City. In place of the arithmetical equality on which democracy is based, which denes all citizens as equally competent and therefore equally able to govern (hence the drawing of magistrates and the privilege granted to all citizens to participate in the Assembly), Plato wishes to substitute another, more legitimate type of calculation based on geometric equality67 according to which each individual is assigned the activity best suited to him by nature. In place of the disorganized rule of the demos, the anarchic self-regulation of the many by majority decision68 that involves major decision-making on crucial matters by demagogues and various factions of incompetent and frivolous people, Plato wishes to substitute an order which assigns to each being an appropriate place according to a calculation as to their rightful share and which in turn maintains a natural police order.69 Therefore, according to Rancire, to refound70 the public space, we must rst calculate; that is, count each individual. This cannot be a mere enumeration though, as this would mean an order based on arithmetical-democratic equality. On the contrary it consists in an evaluation by virtue of an appropriate measuring device of the worth, the share and the titles of each individual. All cities (at least non-democratic cities) therefore rest on a particular method of calculating, judging and assigning a place to every individual and in so doing, refer to a particular narrative which renders legitimate the tool used to calculate. Consequently, Platos just City, by referring to a denition of philosophy which, as we know, uses mythological narratives in its elaboration, borrows a criterion allowing for the evaluation of each individuals ability to govern by judging the respective distance from the Good and from the Ideas. To the stormy seas associated with democracy,71 which an-archically counts individuals without assigning them a place for lack of a real measuring tool,72 Plato opposes the terra rma of the arkh, that is, of the original principle from which must be reorganized the public space73 so as to allow the philosopher to philosophize and to govern, the warrior to defend the City and the other to work and serve.

According to Rancire even though Aristotle criticizes Platos ideal City,74 the fact remains that he is nonetheless just as disturbed by the demos scandalous claim to govern. Aristotle as opposed to Plato, however, believes that the demos is an element with which one must come to terms.75 We can therefore consider him to be a realist and the rst in a long lineage (not the least famous of which is Tocqueville) of defenders of a form of democracy capable of domesticating the untamed demos (la sauvagerie du demos). As was the case for Plato, Aristotle must also rst count. But as Rancire notes, Aristotles count will take place twice. The rst measuring tool used by Aristotle is nature. First, nature allows the distinction between humans and animals: the former is endowed with speech (logos) while the latter only with a voice (phn). So while an animal merely indicates with sounds its pleasure or its pain, humans have a notion of good and evil, of justice and injustice, etc.76 Nature then allows us to make a second distinction, this time between those who cultivate the virtues discoverable through speech (goodness, justice, etc.) and those who do not. It is thereby by nature that certain individuals the most virtuous have the ability to rule. However, beyond this initial distinction, Aristotle notes that many cities count individuals a second time: indeed many constitutions distinguish between those who own riches and those who do not. If there are cases where this second type of tabulation cancels the rst, that is where wealth rather than virtue determines the ability to rule, many constitutions merge both measuring tools and dene the rich as the most virtuous given the leisure time needed to develop virtues which only wealth can grant. Although this may appear logical for Aristotle,77 he nonetheless recognizes that the exclusion of the demos from civic life can create conicts which may threaten the very existence of the City. For Aristotle, in order to found a stable constitutional order, the second calculation must be somewhat modied: rather than merely counting and assigning individuals according to wealth, a second count must aim at redistributing wealth. Although this will not eliminate socio-economic disparities, it will nonetheless lead the poor to adopt a logic of interests which has the dual advantage of moderating them and of keeping them away from the agora by tying them to their land.78 In other words, through a clever redistribution of wealth, the demos can be kept on the shores of politics and therefore away from the centre of political life. At this centre of politics, we must not nd the wealthy as this may arouse the envy of the demos hence leading to conict. It is preferable to put in its place the middle class, that is, the class that best represents moderation between the very rich and the very poor.79 As opposed to Plato, the good regime for Aristotle must then avoid a direct confrontation with the demos seeking rather to tame or neutralize it.

Hence if this kind of calculation is more effective because it is more realistic, it nonetheless involves an uncounted remainder. All calculations are in fact miscounts, emphasizes Rancire, at least from the viewpoint of those who reject the validity of the measuring instrument used. For example, on the one hand the philosopher believes that the proximity to the world of Ideas should determine the political order. But the demos, as Plato notes, does not understand philosophy80 and so cannot recognize the merits of this order. It is also true that if we rank individuals according to wealth, or even according to wealth and virtue where wealth is redistributed, wealth still remains unevenly shared between rich and poor, inevitably leading the poor to question the validity of allowing the rich to govern. Regardless of the instrument used, it can be deemed legitimate only if all groups speak the same language as those who defend it. To all individuals who do not hear or understand this language, the instrument is seen as doing them wrong81 since it leaves them without any part82 in society. We must not conclude, however, that for Rancire history is merely a verbal match where misunderstandings are expressed in an endless and repetitive cycle.83 If languages are numerous, expressing a wrong suffered by one group can also be an invitation for the recognition of this wrong. In other words, expressing a wrong can be an occasion to enrich the language which can be thrown off-centre from its reference point, the measuring instrument. In short, according to Rancire, if those who have the right to govern are accustomed to speaking either to assert that right or to deny it to others who are forced to listen quietly, the expression of a wrong constitutes an opportunity for the reversal of these roles, where those who usually speak are quiet because those who in theory have nothing to say are speaking. This communication, which has no basis other than the fact that it occurs, in other words this communication that nothing at all guarantees thus explaining its rarity throughout history presupposes the arithmetical equality of all languages. This inevitably contradicts the geometric order to which all dominant languages refer and which stipulates that some possess the gift of speech (logos) while others, not unlike animals, are limited to phn. To be heard, those without a part need to engage in an open struggle and it is only at that precise moment that the cries of one group become worthy of attention by the other, which suddenly deciphers these sounds as a language, albeit different from its own. So although it cannot be said that history is limited to struggle and conict, it also cannot be asserted that it is based only on language considered to be the bearer of a consensual agreement.84 For those who do not take part in society to be heard, both struggle and language must be combined simultaneously.

A rst example of this rarely occurring combination is found in Roman history as reported by Livy.85 The episode in question is known as the secession of the plebeians. The plebs, outraged by patrician domination, go to the Aventine (494 BCE). A patrician delegate attempts to convince them to return to their rightful place in the City. According to the patricians, it goes without saying that all notion of negotiating with the plebs is out of the question. The plebs anger is seen as nothing more than life itself,86 that is, as a form of suffering that all animals express when exhausted or mistreated, their cries and grunts having nothing to do with language or its associated virtues. Therefore at rst there exists between the plebs and the patricians, a dis-agreement given that the patricians are deaf to anything their interlocutors may have to say. So how do the plebs nally manage to be heard? Their strength lies in their ability to avoid a demonstration of strength that is direct confrontation with the patricians, as this would be construed as further proof of their animality due to their inability to use language. They then act as if they are engaged in a dialogue with the patricians, as if they are acting together on a common stage.87 This common stage does not exist prior to the plebs beginning to speak; it emerges from the midst of the words being spoken and the tales being told.88 In sum, the use of ction coupled with might, renders the plebs quite similar to the patricians. They are similar to such an extent that the patricians, troubled by the plebs seamless imitation and by the fact that they must use rhetoric to negotiate with them but how can one negotiate with animals?89 nally accept the institution of the tribunes of the plebs. Even though this institution does not suppress existing inequalities, far from it, it nonetheless extends citizenship to those who had thus far been excluded from the public space, by recognizing their access to language, an occurrence that would have been impossible prior to the revolt. The disagreement has therefore been somewhat diminished, those who were without any part in society now having a small part to play.
2 The domesticated modern democracy

According to Rancire the proletariat is the name given to those without a part in modern society. When Blanqui the revolutionary is asked by a judge to state his profession and answers, Proletarian, he is rebuffed. According to the judge, the concept of a proletarian has no meaning for one who is a citizen and who therefore can legitimately govern.90 The proletarian is therefore invisible and inaudible or at least not more visible or audible than an animal. If the working class is considered dangerous, as was often said at that time, it is because, just like animals, workers may, if exhausted or mistreated, begin to groan

(philanthropy being able to offer some relief) or grunt (requiring police intervention). We are again faced with a dis-agreement since the proletariat, for its part, believes it can speak. As Marx states, the proletariat is the dissolution of all classes91 in that the right to speak it claims to have, presupposes an arithmetical equality, thereby weakening the hierarchy established between the classes by the dominant measuring instrument which assigns worth by virtue not of wisdom but of wealth. Like the plebs, the proletariat using words that disturb to tell its story, attempts to gain (and nally succeeds in gaining) the attention of those who, up until that point, did not listen. Following a relentless struggle that lasts throughout the 19th century, the proletariat nally gains access to the civic space. However, the proletarians, as the plebs before them, disrupt but do not destroy the police order. The difference between patricians and plebs is not erased after the conict any more than that between the plebs and the slaves or in modernity that between the capitalists, the proletarians and, for example, women (who obtained access to citizenship much later than the male members of the working class). In other words, Rancire notes that geometric equality, although it is modied, is always maintained despite disturbances to the police order, even though the struggle of those without any part in society tends towards the destruction of it in order to refound it as an order based on genuine arithmetical equality. These struggles represent but a eeting moment rather than a new lasting order: the subjectivation resulting from the righting of a wrong is threatened and eventually transformed into an identication thus reinscribing the subject within the police order as was the case when the proletariat began seeing itself as producers and wage-earners.92 It is as if struggles for arithmetical equality always invite the rehabilitation of an order based on a new geometric calculation; it is as if an-archy always irresistibly solicits the need for an arkh. In the 19th century, this means that domesticated democracy as dened by Aristotle and later prophesied by Tocqueville, has won over a more radical form of which the sans-culottes and revolutionary workers were the proponents. Paradoxically, the taming of modern democracy occurs by way of a narrative recognizing the merits of arithmetical equality. For Tocqueville, beyond differences in social conditions, all individuals share in a common humanity through democracy.93 However, this logic of equality, although undermining the institutions, nonetheless leads each individual to the awareness of the importance of the Self thus encouraging in each what Tocqueville calls a passion for material well-being. Even more enticing than the land, to which Aristotle had wanted to tie the poor in order to keep them on the shores of politics, this modern notion of interests gives way to a stupendous scene where the majority of self-governing citizens turn away from public affairs and towards the

various meaningless pleasures. Worst yet, even while equality is proclaimed high and low, obvious socio-economic disparities persist, disparities that citizens consider to be a normal consequence of a regime that leaves them free to pursue their own interests. In that light, we understand how Tocqueville (as opposed to liberal thinkers literally panic-stricken at the thought of the privileged few being threatened by the principle of equality) concludes that modern democracies mean the end of great revolutions rather than the era of anarchy. Democracy does not lead to class warfare but allows for the deployment of gentle customs (moeurs douces) and the appeasement of social conict. In Tocquevilles view, it is nothing less than a genuine miracle, a work of Providence.94 According to Rancire, the all-encompassing democracy in which we are immersed at the present time is the end-product of what was predicted by Tocqueville. For the rst time in the history of humanity, regimes that are both democratic and liberal rest upon a series of representations which deny the very legitimacy of any type of discrimination or exclusion. As proof we nd the ever-growing recognition of the rights and integration into the socio-political order of a multitude of minority groups. Paradoxically, however, this will-to-include comes at the expense of new forms of exclusion. To better understand this dynamic we must begin by stipulating that the concept of inclusion based on equality, denies the very existence of any uncounted or wrongly counted individuals by an unfair measuring instrument. De jure equality is proclaimed high and low thus encompassing all individuals. If some are still excluded this is but a temporary condition to be resolved in the future.95 Prior to the existence of this all-encompassing democratic system, those excluded from society could try to have their voices heard: outside of the public sphere they could express themselves thus disturbing the police order. But in the case of contemporary democracy, those excluded cannot hope to publicly express a wrong committed against them since doing so simply means repeating the prevailing view which recognizes and deplores exclusion. This all-encompassing democracy is in a way a consensual democracy. It is a case where Sameness reigns supreme and where Otherness, previously embodied in those without a part, is denied since everyone is already included in a political order that refuses the idea that anything can exist outside of it. Obviously, however, this does not prevent the fact that exclusion does indeed persist beyond the politics and measures aimed at eliminating it. For the more society denes itself as consensual and all-encompassing and the more it sees itself as one, the more it makes appear otherness96 but an otherness existing as a simple fact belonging to a reality that can never have access to its own symbolic order of discourse. Otherness is therefore a reality that tends to be

reduced to an object to be identied, dened and circumscribed in order to conjure up the unassimilable oddness it represents. The cleavage we nd between a perfectly integrated society and its monstrous and unanalysable otherness allows for the proliferation of neo-liberal and populist rhetoric which states that if the immigrant, the homeless or the unemployed remain unassimilated into society, it is simply by choice, in other words it is due to their refusal to be included. Those excluded are therefore condemned to either repeat societys dominant discourse or remain silent (the latter case being compatible with a temptation to withdraw within their own community and even resort to violence). The more it attempts to include, the more this tamed form of democracy ends up creating ghettos and insurmountable barriers between its citizens. The perversity of this system is that it creates a police order all the while radically promoting its prohibition.
3 Refounding democracy on the basis of dis-agreement?

What are our options when faced with the police order which excludes the very possibility of recognizing the existence of those excluded? We nd in Rancire, as we could expect, prescriptions concerning the need to oppose dis-agreement or dissensus to the consensus and the need to oppose the symbolic discourses generated by Otherness to a reality which is supposed to rest upon itself without any symbolic mediation.97 Faced with the all-encompassing order, we must hope that the excluded will once again express the wrong done to them. But what we need to ask is what this watchword (if we may) actually means. If, as opposed to Castoriadis, Rancire considers the excluded, the demos, as potentially emerging in every situation where there is a wrong and therefore not as a kind of miracle, the fact remains that democracy is for him all-encompassing to the point where it appears completely closed upon itself. When we understand that the consensual logic succeeds in eliminating societys ability to accept Otherness,98 succeeds also at eliminating the possibility of giving Otherness a symbolic representation, then how can we again call upon the excluded to oppose the police order? What is the point of encouraging this ctional exercise consisting in the construction and appearance of another world in the current one99 in a society which is dened by the fact that it is closed in upon itself and by the very fact deaf to the Other, always immediately seen as a grimacing stranger? It is not just that, as for Castoriadis, the actions of the demos and of those without any part in society go against the very logic of existing democratic regimes leading us to doubt the possibility of ever being able to refound democracy. More tragically, according to Rancire the representations on which modern democracies are founded and which stem from two

fathers of political realism, Aristotle and Tocqueville, have the explicit goal of domesticating the demos and of suppressing its very right to speech by actually giving it to them.100 Is the way of revitalizing modern democracy then not based on a sort of faith in the return of the demos, of those denied their fair part for Rancire just as was the case for Castoriadis? If so, are we not faced with the recognition that such a refoundation project can only lead to failure because of its inability to become a reality?
Conclusion
In what preceded, I have attempted to elucidate the meaning of the thought on democracy of two contemporary French philosophers, Cornelius Castoriadis and Jacques Rancire. In both cases my rst aim was to question their interpretation of democracy as conceived through their narratives about the origins of the democratic imaginary in Athens. My second aim was to identify the tensions and contradictions as they saw them in todays representations of democracy; and my third, to evaluate the meaning and validity of their respective refoundation projects. In both of these cases it seems that refounding democracy is based on an act of faith in the abilities and virtues of the demos. This leads us to conclude that both projects constitute a failure since both seem unable to participate in reality. What can we make of these failed attempts? Philippe Raynaud claims that in the years following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent collapse of Soviet-type regimes, we saw in France the proliferation of a philosophical extreme left (extrme gauche philosophique) whose proclaimed aim is to propose a radical critique of the representations on which rests modern democracy but whose only strategic goal is to have radical thought recognized in society.101 This philosophical extreme left would be the expression of real contradictions found in modern democracy and perhaps even of an authentic aporia.102 On the one hand, democracy appears to be a kind of insurmountable horizon of modern times unless we wish to go back on the notion of the consensus of individuals of which democracy seems to be the ultimate expression; on the other hand, it also generates through its very existence the need for a world posterior to the bourgeois and Capital order where could subsist a genuine human community.103 However, either this community would reveal itself to be a form of advanced liberal democracy fortied by several radical institutions or elements,104 or it would be called upon to exist as a mere utopia.105 We could be tempted, and perhaps even justied in the light of the conclusions drawn here, to give reason to Raynaud or at least to place

Castoriadis and Rancire in the utopian extreme left philosophical current (since the refoundation projects they suggest seem incapable of replacing the dominant representations found in existing democracies) and at the same time in the radical-liberal current (in that their thought could perhaps lead to practical changes by encouraging a higher level of militancy without all the while bringing us outside the liberal democratic framework). However, such a conclusion should not necessarily lead us to accept Raynauds all-encompassing interpretation. To conclude that all refoundation projects stemming from the philosophical left wing are condemned either to failure or to be eventually reincluded in liberalism, as Fukuyamas theory suggests, is not an option since there are no exhaustive ndings that allow us to draw such a conclusion.106 Recent historical works having shown that the marriage between modern democracy and liberal theory is in no way natural,107 we are prevented from assuming that democracy could not, at some point in time, be refounded on non-liberal accounts, even if they are not those proposed by Castoriadis and Rancire. Department of Political Science, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Canada
PSC
Notes
I wish to thank Daniel Tanguay and Chedly Belkhodja for their comments on an earlier version of this text. I also wish to thank Nancy Renault for the translation. 1 Existing translations have been used whenever possible and citations of them follow the original French references. Otherwise, the translations are the responsibility of the author. 2 Leo Strauss, What is Political Philosophy, in What is Political Philosophy? And Other Essays (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1959), p. 34. 3 Plato, Protagoras, 319b23a. 4 Plato, Republic, 557cd. 5 Strauss, What is Political Philosophy, p. 37 and Leo Strauss, Thoughts on Machiavelli (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1958), p. 296. See also Georges Burdeau, La dmocratie (Paris: Seuil, 1966), pp. 23f. In this manner, moderns seek nothing less than to establish a regime based on wisdom that ancients had held as utopian. See Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 139. 6 See C. B. MacPherson, Life and Times of Liberal Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 50f. 7 To mention only two authors: we can associate Heidegger with the rst position; this was still so in 1966, as is indicated in Only a God Can Save

Us: Der Speigels Interview with Martin Heiddeger, in Richard Wolin (ed.) The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), p. 104. And we can associate Maurice Merleau-Ponty with the second, at least until 1950; see Humanism and Terror, trans. John ONeill (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1969). Richard Rorty, The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in Merrill D. Peterson and Robert C. Vaughan (eds) The Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom: Its Evolution and Consequences in American History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 2712. The critique of great narratives refers to Jean-Franois Lyotard, La condition postmoderne. Rapport sur le savoir (Paris: Minuit, 1979); English-language edn, The Postmodern Condition: Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984). Rorty, The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, p. 264. ibid., p. 270. ibid., pp. 266, 270. This denition is inspired by Ralph Hancock, Calvin et la raison rvle, La pense politique 2 (1994): 21619. See also, from the same author, Calvin and the Foundations of Modern Politics (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 1989), and Fethi Benslama, Une ction troublante. De lorigine en partage (La Tour dAigues: d. de lAube, 1994). The denition ultimately comes from the Aristotelian conception of the City understood as a community based on sharing: For it is peculiar to man as compared to the other animals that he alone has a perception of good and bad and just and unjust and other things [of this sort]; and partnership in these things is what makes a household and a City. See Politics, 1253a12; English-language edn, trans. Cairnes Lord (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1985), p. 37. Which was, for example, Hannah Arendts endeavour: it is because metaphysical foundations have become impossible that we must think foundation as the sharing of a common account of an inaugural moment. See her On Revolution (New York, the Viking Press, 1965), pp. 195f. See also John Seerys commentary: Castles in the Air: an Essay on Political Foundations, Political Theory 27 (4 August 1999): 472f. In this manner, Rortys hypothesis, that in this disenchanted era we have a choice only between a set of settled social habits and the anachronistic grandiose theological or philosophical discourses (If one feels a need for such legitimations [based on extrapolitical grounding] one will want either a religious or a philosophical preface to politics: The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, p. 264), seems much too narrow a view. See, for example, Alain Badiou, Lthique: Essai sur la conscience du Mal (Paris: Hatier, 1994) and Abrg de mtapolitique (Paris: Seuil, 1998) p. 37. Except perhaps in the case of Vincent Descombes: see Philosophie du jugement politique, La pense politique 2 (1994): 13157, particularly 1557. See also the position defended by Nicolas Tenzer, Philosophie politique (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1994), pp. 713. As Benslama explains (see Une ction troublante, passim), in a certain way
9 10 11 12
13
14 15
16

all foundational and refoundation narratives, whether they refer or not to metaphysical principles, can be said to be narratives about the origins or about a Beginning (in order to convey the immediate proximity we nd in French between rcit de (re)fondation and rcit des origines we prefer to use the expression narratives about the origins instead of account of the origins which could seem more appropriate). In both the cases that are of interest here, the foundational or refoundation narratives of democracy have the particularity of resting on a narrative about the origins that is allegedly historical (that is, empirical or real). As does Moses I. Finley, Democracy Ancient and Modern (London: Hogarth Press, 1985). To avoid all confusion, let us immediately clarify that this concept has nothing to do with the Kantian denition of autonomy. See Cornelius Castoriadis, La polis grecque et la cration de la dmocratie, in Domaines de lhomme: Les carrefours du labyrinthe, Vol. II (Paris: Seuil, 1986), p. 38, p. 303; English-language edn, The Greek Polis and the Creation of Democracy, in David Ames Curtis (ed. and trans.) The Castoriadis Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), p. 286. In this manner, Marxism borrows the ontology implicit in capitalistic logic, which explains that reality is an organizable positivity that can be quantied and transformed into merchandise. See Cornelius Castoriadis, Linstitution imaginaire de la socit (Paris: Seuil, 1975), pp. 56f.; English-language edn, The Imaginary Institution of Society, trans. Kathleen Blamey (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987), pp. 41f). And see Cornelius Castoriadis, La question de lhistoire du mouvement ouvrier, in his Lexprience du mouvement ouvrier, Vol. 1, Comment lutter (Paris: Union gnrale dditions, 1974), pp. 41f.; English-language edn, The Question of the Workers Movement, in Castoriadis, Political and Social Writings, Vol. 3, 19611979: Recommencing the Revolution: from Socialism to the Autonomous Society, trans. David Ames Curtis (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), p. 171. Castoriadis, Linstitution imaginaire de la socit, pp. 190f. (The Imaginary Institution of Society, pp. 135f.); and Cornelius Castoriadis, Introduction, in his La socit bureaucratique, Vol. 1, Les rapports de production en Russie (Paris: Union gnrale dditions, 1973), pp. 51f.; English-language edn, General Introduction, in Castoriadis, Political and Social Writings. Vol. 1, 19461955: From the Critique of Bureaucracy to the Positive Content of Socialism, trans. David Ames Curtis (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), pp. 29f. Cornelius Castoriadis, Pouvoir, politique, autonomie, Revue de mtaphysique et de morale 1 (1988): 84; English-language edn, Powers, Politics, Autonomy, in Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy, trans. David Ames Curtis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 147. Cornelius Castoriadis, Fait et faire, in Giovanni Busino (ed.) Pour une philosophie militante de la dmocratie. Autonomie et autotransformation de la socit, Revue europenne des sciences sociales XXVII (86) (1989): 482; English-language edn, Done and To Be Done, in Curtis, The Castoriadis Reader, pp. 3867.
17 18
19
20
21
22

23 Castoriadis, Linstitution imaginaire de la socit, p. 457 (The Imaginary Institution of Society, p. 340). 24 ibid., pp. 204f. (ibid., pp. 146f.). 25 ibid., pp. 224f. (ibid., pp. 160f.); Castoriadis, Introduction, p. 53 (General Introduction, p. 31). 26 Castoriadis, Linstitution imaginaire de la socit, p. 7 (The Imaginary Institution of Society, p. 3); and Castoriadis, Fait et faire, p. 466 (Done and To Be Done, p. 370). 27 Castoriadis, Pouvoir, politique, autonomie, p. 100 (Powers, Politics, Autonomy, p. 170). 28 Cornelius Castoriadis, Socialisme et socit autonome, in Le Contenu du socialisme (Paris: Union gnrale dditions, 1979), p. 13; English-language edn, Socialism and Autonomous Society, in Political and Social Writings, Vol. 3, p. 315. 29 ibid., p. 12 (ibid., p. 315). 30 In other words: if we can institute an entire society by making it turn to gods that no one has ever seen, we cannot, for example, institute a society that would aim at levitating the entire population: the imaginary instituting principle inevitably has a limit, which stems from the immutable rules of the ensemblistic identitary. 31 Castoriadis, Introduction, pp. 534 (General Introduction, p. 31). 32 Castoriadis, Pouvoir, politique, autonomie, p. 81 (Powers, Politics, Autonomy, p. 143). 33 Including, as we will see, Chaos, which is a primary reality only by virtue of the instituting imaginary. 34 Cornelius Castoriadis, Institution de la socit et religion, in Domaines de lhomme 371f.; English-language edn, Institution of Religion and Society, in World in Fragments: Writings on Politics, Society, Psychoanalysis and the Imagination, trans. David Ames Curtis (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), pp. 311f. 35 I must point out that what follows is not a discussion as to Castoriadiss interpretation of Athenian democracy but simply an attempt to understand its meaning. I am not unaware that this interpretation can be considered most unorthodox. 36 Castoriadis, La polis grecque et la cration de la dmocratie, p. 284 (The Greek Polis and the Creation of Democracy, p. 273). He refers here to Hesiods Theogony, 116: The rst power to come into Being was Chaos, trans. R. M. Frazer (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1983), p. 30. 37 Castoriadis, La polis grecque et la cration de la dmocratie, p. 285 (The Greek Polis and the Creation of Democracy, p. 273). He refers here to Anaximanders fragment B1. See the various interpretations of this fragment as summarized by Jean Brun, Les prsocratiques (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1968), pp. 18f. 38 Castoriadis, La polis grecque et la cration de la dmocratie, p. 285 (The Greek Polis and the Creation of Democracy, p. 273). 39 ibid., p. 285 (ibid., pp. 2734). 40 ibid., p. 284 (ibid., p. 273).

41 42 43 44 45 ibid., pp. 2834 (ibid., pp. 2723). ibid., p. 284 (ibid., p. 273). Castoriadis, Fait et faire, p. 468 (Done and To Be Done, p. 372). Edgar Morin, Claude Lefort and Cornelius Castoriadis, La brche. Suivi de vingt ans aprs (Brussels: Ed. Complexes, 1988). Imaginaire politique grec et moderne, in Roger-Pol Droit (ed.) Les Grecs, les Romains et nous: LAntiquit est-elle moderne? (Paris: Le Monde, 1991), p. 243; English-language edn, The Greek and the Modern Political Imaginary, trans. David Ames Curtis, Salmagundi 100 (Fall 1993): 112. Which is the meaning of Kantian autonomy: moral law ultimately nds its bearing in reason. Cornelius Castoriadis, Devant la guerre, Vol. 1, Les ralits (Paris: Fayard, 1981), p. 27. ibid., pp. 215f. Not the least paradoxical aspect of Soviet socialism is the fact that the reign of Marxist science completely disturbed the workings of an entire society. Cornelius Castoriadis, Le plus dur et le plus fragile des rgimes, in Domaines de lhomme, pp. 5664; English-language edn, The Toughest and the Most Fragile of Regimes, Telos 51 (Spring 1982): 18690. To such a degree that we are dealing with a liberal oligarchy; Cornelius Castoriadis, Quelle dmocratie?, in Figures du pensable: Les carrefours du labyrinthe, Vol. VI (Paris: Seuil, 1999), p. 154. Cornelius Castoriadis, La crise des socits occidentales, Politique internationale 15 (Spring 1982): 141, 144; English-language edn, The Crisis of Western Societies, in Curtis, The Castoriadis Reader, pp. 260, 262. See, for example, Republic, 561b. Daniel Cohn-Bendit and Cornelius Castoriadis, De lcologie lautonomie (Paris: Seuil, 1981); excerpts in From Ecology to Autonomy, in Curtis, The Castoriadis Reader, pp. 23952. Cornelius Castoriadis, La monte de linsigniance: Les carrefours du labyrinthe, Vol. IV (Paris: Seuil, 1996). Castoriadis, Fait et faire, p. 511 (Done and To Be Done, p. 415). Castoriadis, La crise des socits occidentales, passim (The Crisis of Western Societies, passim). Cornelius Castoriadis, Post-scriptum sur linsigniance: Entretiens avec Daniel Mermet (La Tour dAigues: d. de lAube, 1998), p. 13. ibid., p. 29. ibid., p. 36. Castoriadis borrows this denition from Leon Trotsky: Terrorism and Communism. A Reply to Karl Kautsky (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1961), p. 133. Castoriadis, Post-scriptum sur linsigniance, p. 31. Intervention in Bernard Lefort (ed.) De la n de lhistoire (Paris: d. du Flin, 1992), pp. 6271. Castoriadis, Introduction, p. 60 (General Introduction, p. 36); Castoriadis, Fait et faire, p. 489 (Done and To Be Done, p. 394). Jacques Rancire: Aux bords du politique (Paris: Osiris, 1990), p. 23; English-language edn, On The Shores of Politics, trans. Liz Heron (London: Verso, 1995), p. 13 (translation modied).
46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64

65 Jacques Rancire: Le dissensus citoyen, Carrefour XIX(2) (1997): 234. 66 It is a fact that with the possible exception of Progatoras speech in Platos dialogue of the same name and that of Otanes in Herodotus Histories (III, 80) none of the ancient authors speaks favorably of Athenian democracy. 67 Jacques Rancire, La msentente: Politique et philosophie (Paris: Galile, 1995), p. 24; English-language edn, Dis-agreement: Politics and Philosophy, trans. Julie Rose (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), p. 6. 68 Rancire, Aux bords du politique, p. 21 (On the Shores of Politics, p. 12). 69 This term was coined by Michel Foucault (see La msentente, p. 51; Disagreement, p. 28). 70 Rancire, Aux bords du politique, p. 22 (On the Shores of Politics, p. 12). 71 For example: Republic, 488a9a. 72 In democracy, it is the absence of foundations that in the end founds (Rancire, Le dissensus citoyen, p. 24). This is similar to Claude Leforts hypothesis: democracy is forever in search of its foundation; see his Permanence du thologico-politique?, in Essais sur le politique: XIXeXXe sicles (Paris: Seuil, 1986), p. 270. 73 Rancire, Aux bords du politique, p. 8 (On the Shores of Politics, p. 1). 74 See Politics, 1261a10f. 75 Rancire, Aux bords du politique, p. 25 (On the Shores of Politics, p. 15). 76 Politics, 1253a10f. 77 The excellent City should not grant citizenship to artisans: Politics, 1278a510. 78 Rancire, Aux bords du politique, pp. 258 (On the Shores of Politics, pp. 1518). 79 ibid., p. 23 (ibid., p. 14). Most of the contemporary theories in comparative politics that insist that a strong middle class leads to the emergence of democracy, stem from here. 80 [I]t is impossible . . . that a multitude be philosophic: Republic, 494a, trans. Alan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1968), p. 173. 81 Rancire, La msentente, pp. 43f. (Dis-agreement, pp. 21f.). 82 ibid., p. 34 (ibid., p. 14). 83 As may be concluded after reading Jean-Franois Lyotard, Le diffrend (Paris: Minuit, 1983); English-language edn, The Differend: Phrases in Dispute, trans. Georges Van Den Abbeele (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988). See Rancires critique of Lyotard: Aux bords du politique, pp. 745 (On the Shores of Politics, pp. 5860); and La msentente, pp. 7980 (Dis-agreement, p. 50). 84 See Rancires critique of Jrgen Habermas in La msentente, pp. 712 (Dis-agreement, p. 44) and in Le dissensus citoyen, pp. 301. 85 Rancire, La msentente, pp. 45f. (Dis-agreement, pp. 23f.). See Livy, II, 323. 86 Rancire, La msentente, p. 45 (Dis-agreement, p. 23). 87 ibid., pp. 46, 81 (ibid., pp. 24, 52). 88 Rancire, Le dissensus citoyen, p. 30. 89 Menenius Agrippa, sent to harangue the plebs, was an eloquent man [facundum virum], notes Livy (II, 32), trans. B. O. Foster (Cambridge,

MA: Harvard University Press, 1957 and London: Heinemann, 1957), p. 323. Rancire, La msentente, p. 62 (Dis-agreement, pp. 378); Rancire, Le dissensus citoyen, pp. 2930. Rancire, Le dissensus citoyen, p. 29. ibid., p. 32. Rancire, Aux bords du politique, pp. 30f. (On the Shores of Politics, pp. 20f.). ibid., pp. 312 (ibid., pp. 201). Jacques Rancire, Limmigr et la loi du consensus, Libration (12 July 1993): 6. Rancire, Le dissensus citoyen, pp. 334. Note that Otherness refers here to those without a part who potentially have access to the symbolic order; and that otherness refers to those being incapable of speaking for themselves and therefore, as we will see, considered by the rest of society more or less as absolute strangers. ibid., passim. Rancire, Limmigr et la loi du consensus, p. 6. Rancire, Le dissensus citoyen, p. 30. It might be useful to attempt to elucidate the evolution of the idea of free speech in democratic regimes. After having tolerated and recognized for the rst time in history the right to free speech, democratic regimes now constantly solicit their citizens through various consultations and social debates about anything and everything to the point where everyone must confess an opinion even if he or she does not have one. Far from being merely anecdotal, the fact that non-respondents are more and more categorized as respondents in surveys following sophisticated surveying techniques, demonstrates the insignicant character of public speech in an all-encompassing democracy which appears more and more as being based on deafness. Philippe Raynaud, Les nouvelles radicalits. De lextrme-gauche en philosophie, Le Dbat 105 (maiaot 1999): 901. ibid., p. 90. Franois Furet, Le pass dune illusion. Essai sur lide communiste au XXe sicle (Paris: Robert Laffont et Calmann-Lvy, 1995), as quoted in ibid., p. 92. The revolution has become the surest method for militants of concealing the intimate link that unites their egalitarian claimings . . . to the evolution of liberal democracy (Les nouvelles radicalits, p. 98; see also pp. 103, 110). ibid., p. 114. Raynaud refers mostly to Daniel Bensad, Pierre Bourdieu, tienne Balibar, Alain Badiou and Antonio Negri. He does not discuss Castoriadis or Rancire. He also does not mention Claude Lefort who has made a frequent apology for untamed democracy (la dmocratie sauvage); see, for example, his lments dune critique de la bureaucratie (Paris: Gallimard, 1979), p. 23. Also not discussed is Miguel Abensour; see his Dmocratie sauvage et Principe danarchie , Revue europenne des
90 91 92 93 94 95 96
97 98 99 100
101 102 103 104
105 106

sciences sociales XXXI(97) (1993): 22541 and La dmocratie contre ltat: Marx et le moment machiavlien (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1997). Nor is Chantal Mouffe; see her Le politique et ses enjeux: pour une dmocratie plurielle (Paris: La Dcouverte/MAUSS, 1994). 107 See J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975); or Quentin Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

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