Maria del Rosario Mariategui vs. CA G.R. No. 57062, Jan.

24, 1992 FACTS: This is a case for partition of several pieces of land belonging to Lupo Mariategui, who died without a will. During his lifetime, Lupo contracted three (3) marriages. The first wife died, so he contracted a second marriage. The second wife also passed away so he contracted a third marriage. The third wife also preceded Lupo in death. The issue in this case arose because at the time of his death, Lupo left certain properties which he acquired when he was still unmarried. Later, Lupos descendants by his first and second marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated unto themselves a certain lot of the Muntinglupa Estate and title was issued. Now, Lupos children by his third marriage filed a complaint with the lower court, contending that since they were co-heirs of Lupos estate they were deprived of their respective shares in the lot mentioned. In answer, the other party said that the complaint was not really for annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition but for recognition of natural children. The lower court ruled in favor of Lupos heirs from the first and second marriage. Thus, the case was elevated to the CA, where they raised the issue of their parents lawful marriage and their legitimacy as children. CA ruled that all the heirs of Lupo were entitled to equal shares in the estate. Hence, this petition. ISSUES: y Whether or not the action for partition has prescribed y Whether or not the private respondents are entitled to successional rights over the said lot HELD: The case is really one for partition. The question of the status of the private respondents was raised only collaterally to assert their rights in the estate of the deceased. Existence of the Marriage Lupo and Felipa were alleged to have been lawfully married in or about 1930. This fact is based on the declaration communicated by Lupo to his son who testified that when his father was still living, he was able to mention to him that he and his mother were able to get married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig, Rizal. The spouses deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the community to be such. Although no marriage certificate was introduced to this effect, no evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all the requisites for its validity are present. Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as husband and wife, have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life. Courts look upon the presumption of marriage with great favor as it is founded on the following rationale: The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans towards legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to that case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the

common order of society and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. So much so that once a man and a woman have lived as husband and wife and such relationship is not denied nor contradicted, the presumption of their being married must be admitted as a fact. Filiation Evidence on record proves the legitimate filiation of the private respondents. Jacintos birth certificate was a record of birth referred to in Article 172 of the Code. Again, no evidence which tends to disprove facts contained therein was adduced before the lower court. In the case of the two other private respondents, Julian and Paulina, they may not have presented in evidence any of the documents required by Article 172 but they continuously enjoyed the status of children of Lupo in the same manner as their brother Jacinto. Prescription of Action for Partition In view of the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that private respondents are legitimate children and heirs of Lupo and therefore, the time limitation prescribed in Article 285 for filing an action for recognition is inapplicable to this case. Corollarily, prescription does not run against private respondents with respect to the filing of the action for partition so long as the heirs for whose benefit prescription is invoked, have not expressly or impliedly repudiated the co-ownership. In other words, prescription of an action for partition does not lie except when the co-ownership is properly repudiated by the co-owner. Petition dismissed. Leoncia Balogbog vs. CA G.R. No. 83598, March 7, 1997 y y Presumption of marriage Although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, the failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place.

FACTS: This is an action for partition brought by Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog against Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog. Ramonito and Generoso claimed that they were the legitimate children of Catalina and Gavino, the elder brother of Leoncia and Gaudioso. Gavino died in 1935, predeceasing their parents, the grandparents of Ramonito and Generoso. Ramonito and Generoso presented witnesses: one, the mayor of Asturias from 1928 to 1934, another, who was a family friend, and Catalina herself. For its part, defendants denied knowing Ramonito and Generoso and claimed that Gavino died single and without issue. As proof of this, they presented certificates showing that there was no record in the Register of both the marriage between Gavino and Catalina and the birth of Ramonito. The lower court rendered judgment in favor of Ramonito and Generoso. CA affirmed, holding that private respondents failed to overcome the legal presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are in fact married, that a child is presumed to be legitimate, and that things happen according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life. Hence this petition. ISSUE: y Whether or not the presumption of marriage applies y Whether or not Ramonito and Generoso were legitimate children of Gavino

HELD: The SC found no reversible error committed by the CA. Petitioner contends that the marriage of Gavino and Catalina should be proven in accordance of Arts. 53 and 54 of the Civil Code of 1889 (only by a certified copy of the memorandum in the Civil Registry) since the marriage was celebrated when such law was in effect. But the SC noted that Arts. 42 to 107 of the Civil Code of 1889 of Spain did not take effect, having been suspended by the Governor General of the Philippines shortly after the extension of that code to this country. Consequently, Arts. 53 and 54 never came into force. Since this case was brought in the lower court in 1968, the existence of the marriage must be determined in accordance with the present Civil Code, which repealed the provisions of the former Civil Code, except as they related to vested rights, and the rules on evidence. Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting themselves as husband and wife are legally married. This presumption may be rebutted only by cogent proof to the contrary. Evidence consisting of the testimonies of witnesses was held competent to prove the marriage. Indeed, although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, the failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place. Other evidence may be presented to prove marriage. Rationale for the presumption The law favors the validity of marriage, because the State is interested in the preservation of the family and the sanctity of the family is a matter of constitutional concern. Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee: The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always presume marriage. Legitimacy of Children The SC held that the fact that there was no record of birth in the Civil Registry does not mean that Ramonito and Generoso were not legitimate children. Their legitimacy was proved by testimony of witnesses, including Catalina, the mother herself. Moreover, there was submitted an official transcript of an investigation before the Police Investigation Committee of Balamban, Cebu, wherein Gaudioso himself admitted that Ramonito is his nephew. The Court held this admission of relationship as admissible against Gaudioso as a reliable declaration against interest. Decision affirmed. Silverio vs Republic

This is a digest of Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio vs. Republic(G.R. No. 174689, 22 October 2007), wherein the petitioner sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed fromRommel Jacinto to Mely, and his sex from male to female, after having undergone sex reassignment surgery. Facts: The petitioner alleged that his name was registered as Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio in his birth certificate, while his sex was registered as male. He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. He also underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from Rommel Jacinto to Mely, and his sex from male to female. The petition was granted by trial court, but was reversed by the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court affirmed the CA. A persons first name cannot be changed on the ground of sex reassignment The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification. A change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes. Article 376 of the Civil Code provides that: No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority. This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of RA 9048 provides: SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations. In other words, the petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done, and not with the trial court. It was an improper remedy because the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice him at all. RA 9048 now governs the change of first name, providing for the following grounds (Sec. 4) for which change of first name may be allowed: (1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or (3) The change will avoid confusion. Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name. Petitioners basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter ones legal capacity or civil status. RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioners first name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest. No law allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex reassignment. Article 412 of the Civil Code provides that: No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order. Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a clerical or typographical error is: Clerical or typographical error refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or records:

Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code. ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register. ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register: (1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name. The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur after birth. However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment. To correct simply means to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from while to change means to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute. The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary. Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as births, marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of name). These acts, events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly. Morigo Vs. People Facts: Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were then boardmates for a lengthy period of time until they part ways and lost contact. After many years, Lucio was surprised to receive a card from Lucia, all the way from Singapore. They maintained constant communication and became sweethearts. They married each other at Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Bohol by merely signing a marriage contract by themselves and without solemnization. Thereafter, Lucia went back to Canada. She soon filed a petition for divorce with the Ontario Court and was granted. Lucio remarried with Maria Jececha Lumbago. Only afterwards did he file for a declaration of nullity before the trial court on the ground of the absence of a marriage ceremony in his first marriage. Notwithstanding, he was charged and convicted of bigamy. In herein criminal case, trial court discounted petitioners claim that his first marriage to Lucia was null and void ab initio and ruled that want of a valid marriage ceremony is not a defense in a charge of bigamy. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, since in the civil case, the trial court ruled his first marriage void ab initio due to the want of marriage ceremony, in accordance with Articles 3 and 4 of the Family Code. However, CA affirmed the decision of trial court in his criminal case. Issue: Whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and if so, whether his defense was good and valid. Held: Yes. Supreme Court granted his petition and is acquitted from bigamy. The requisites of bigamy are (1) the offender has been legally married; (2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead;

(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and (4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first. In the instant case, Lucio and Lucia were not legally married.

Moreno vs Bernabe Facts: Marilou Nama Moreno and Marcelo Moreno were married before the respondent Judge Jose Bernabe on October 4, 1993 but did not process the papers for the marriage contract. The complainant at that time was pregnant and begged to the judge to have her and her husband to be married by him. The complainant then filed a complaint allegedly for deceiving her that the marriage is valid. Issue: Whether or not that a Judge who held a wedding without issuing a marriage contract should be held liable even if the complaint had expressly withdrawn by the complainant. Ruling: Even with the withdrawal of the complainant against the respondent the Supreme Court insisted that it should still be dealt with accordingly as the accused was a member of the judiciary and a conduct of a higher level were expected. The judge displayed ignorance of the law which is unacceptable for his position and is therefore fined with 10, 000.00 pesos and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of a similar act should be punished severely.