Expressway Tunnel Fire Case Analysis : Effective Safety Improvement Planning

Nam Goo Kim Deputy manager, Korea Expressway Corporation Seongnam city Gyung-gi Province 82-2-2230-4523, 82-2-2230-4304, ng1217@ex.co.kr Jongwook Jo Assistant manager, Korea Expressway Corporation Seongnam city Gyung-gi Province 82-2-2230-4526, 82-2-2230-4304, joejo@ex.co.kr

ABSTRACT
The risk of tunnel fire accident is one of the most important safety issues for user and authority of road. To find more effective way of improving facilities and counter-fire procedures, in-depth survey was done for quantitative and qualitative characteristics of tunnel fire cases. From the survey results, we can analyze its statistics and draw significant implications which give more reasonable and economic way of improvement. Consequently, KEC keeps improving tunnel safety under three strategic themes - a) Public relations for accident prevention b) Facilities improvement c) Intensified response procedure - with several implementation plans for future improvement.

INTRODUCTION
BACKGROUND
Korea Expressway Corporation (KEC) is operating 3,496km of expressway and 280 tunnels - consist of 555 tubes, total length is 413km - in South Korea as of Jan. 2010. Road tunnel fire accidents show distinctive characteristics due to the spacial constraints. Most tunnel fires occur from vehicles which travel through tunnel and most fires include fuel and chemical materials (mostly toxic when burning). Radiant heat from ceiling and wall will increase temperature inside tunnel, so the maximum temperature can be over 1,200 at 100MW fire case. Additionally, fire smoke can easily spread and cover whole area inside tunnel due to the buoyancy effect by fire heat and cooling effect by tunnel ceiling and inflow air, which cause people inside tunnel lost exit and suffocated to death. Therefore, the potential and historical risk of tunnel fire is one of the most important safety issues to users and road authorities. 1

TUNNEL FIRE CASES IN OTHER COUNTRIES

Tunnel fire can occur in any countries and any length of tunnels. tunnels worldwide are presented in Appendix-I. Serious fire cases in road

PURPOSE
All the facilities inside tunnel have its own purposes, and they also combined to safety system as a whole before and after accident. To find more effective way of improving facilities and counter-fire procedures, in-depth survey has done targeting branch office managers and operators of tunnel. The survey is to collect data for quantitative and qualitative characteristics of tunnel fire cases, so we can analyze its statistics as to draw significant implications which gives more reasonable and economic way of improvement.

SCOPE & METHODOLOGY

The survey was done in Feb. 2009 and the target period is between 2004 and 2008. Total number of targeted tunnels is 232, and the composition by length is as follows. over 1km : 43 tunnels (19%) from 0.5km to 1km : 89 tunnels (38%) below 0.5km : 100 tunnels (43%) The items of the survey were categorized into 6 fields by its nature. Accident Statistics Total Accident Accident inside tunnel Tunnel fire accident Response Detection time Arrival time Environmental condition Length of tunnel Route comparison Seasonal, Weather Time, Day Facilities Detecting devices Useful Facilities Table 1. Categories of survey Detailed items of survey are as follows. (See. Appendix A.) a. Tunnel name b. Length(m) c. Route d. Date e. Season f. Time g. Day of week h. Vehicle classification i. Temperature() j. Weather k. Detection method l. Detection time m, n, o. Time elapsed(min) for detection, arrival time(KEC), arrival time(fire brigade) p. Fire lasting time(min) q. Fire size(MW) 2 Fire related Cause of fire Fire size Lasting time Damage Suspension time Damage to facilities Casualties

r. Time elapsed(min) : for recovery, partial shut-out, full shut-out s. Cause of fire t. Ignition location v. Damage amount(KRW) w. Facilities used : extinguisher, hydrant, jet-fans, Fire engine

SURVEY RESULT ANALYSIS

Statistical and qualitative analysis was carried based on the result of the survey. Major results() and implications() are as follows. Detailed survey and analysis results are attached at the end of the paper.

ACCIDENT STATISTICS
Main purpose of this category is to find out the statistical differences of accident occurrence between expressway and other artery road then to draw implications. Expressway accidents for 2004 2009 Year Total 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 Total Accident 13,704 2,449 2,550 2,583 2,880 3,242 Tunnel Accident(incl. fire) 303 51 65 50 75 62 Tunnel Fire Accident 30 9 10 4 5 2

Table 2. Expressway accidents data Annual number of vehicle accident in expressway has declined during last 10 years. - Year 2008 : 4.67 accidents/100 million vehicle km - Average of last 10 years : 6.43 accident/100 million vehicle km Compared to the tunnel accident rate of total domestic road, expressway tunnel accident rate is much lower(4.8%), however the tunnel fire rate(during surveyed years) is as twice as that of other artery road during last 10 years.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITION
Environmental conditions, such as length of tunnels, weather, and so on are very important ingredients to be surveyed to find out if tunnel fire accidents are negatively influenced by any specific conditions. Length of tunnel : 17 out of 30 tunnel fire occurred in 1km+ tunnels, however 1km+ tunnels are only 19% out of total expressway tunnels in South Korea. 3

 Route : 43% tunnel fire occurred in 3(route #45,#50,#55) out of 13 specific route which have more tunnels and accident rate than total average.
total Tunnel rate by length Accidents/100mil.veh.km 6.88% 4.67 Route#45 9.02% 5.09 Routh#55 6.92% 5.65

Table 3.

Accident for Specific route in 2008

Season and weather : 33% tunnel fire occurred from June to August and 80% on clear days. Time and day : 30% tunnel fire occurred from noon to 15:00 and all of them caused by breakdown of vehicle. 37% occurred on Saturday and Sunday compared to 30% out of total accidents occurred on weekend.

FIRE RELATED
One of the main issues which directly affect the design criteria is fire related survey results. Cause, size and lasting time of real fire accident is also of important information for later experimental settings. Cause of fire : 22 out of 30 tunnel fires caused by vehicle faults(6 by collision) - By vehicle type : 9 fires from buses and HGV and none of them caused by collision - Ignition point : 90% from the engine room where hard to reach by extinguisher and/or water hydrants Fire size(Peak fire Heat-Release Rate) : Average 6.3MW(Max. 50MW) - By vehicle type : 14.9MW for buses and HGV Referred to NFPA502. Table A.10.5.1 Fire data for Typical Vehicle , watching the height and shape of fire from video clips provided by CCTVs and investigate damages by tunnel fire afterward KEC estimates fire size approximately. Fire lasting time : Average 27 min. (Max. 65min.) - Lasting time at under 1km tunnels where water hydrants are not installed(fire extinguishers only) is 4~5 min. longer than average.

RESPONSE
Time to arrival against fire in tunnel is very important to minimize damage from fire. To set an appropriate goal for arrival time improvement by conduction fire drills, you need to know real conditions arrival time - for each tunnel. Detection time : delaying time from the ignition to recognition by tunnels operators(and/or KEC) which is identified by investigating video clips - Average time : 130sec. (Min. Immediately / Max. 780sec.) 4

 Detection time at tunnels managed by TOC(Tunnel Operating Centre every 1km+ tunnel has TOC in S.Korea) is a minute shorter than other tunnels and 7 out of 16 fires recognized by TOC immediately. Average arrival time to the tunnel fire - KEC : 8.7 min. (where TOC : 6.2 min.) - Fire brigade : 18.6 min.

FACILITIES
We can easily found the result that which facilities are more effective to detect and extinguish fire in tunnels. Detecting devices : 64% of fires are detected by CCTV and 23% are informed by passengers Even though fire detected by Automatic fire detector and/or from the passengers call, KEC still need CCTV to confirm the state of fire in tunnels. Useful facilities such as Jet fans , water hydrants(fire extinguishers) and VMS : Every 1km+ tunnels in S.Korea has jet fans, water hydrants(fire extinguishers) and VMS - Jet fans and VMS(LCS) : 100% operated by TOC - Water hydrants : operated 13 out of 16 by TOC - Fire extinguishers : sprayed 11 out of 14 by passengers and KEC staff.

DAMAGES
Damages by fire in tunnels are the most important and direct reason to invest for fire protection facilities in tunnels. Quantitative analysis of damages will good to be used for financial analysis at the early stage of tunnel construction plan. Suspension of traffic : Average 2hours (Max. 20hours) - Full close of tunnel : 20 out 30 fires brought full close of tunnel and average time is 86min. - Full close of tunnel for 20 hours due to the fire after explosion of missile propellant on 1st Nov. 2005 at Dalsung2 tunnel(with no fatality). Damage amount(KRW) : 16 out of 30 fires brought damage to facilities and structures in tunnel and total amount is KRW 1.4 billion No damages for 10 out of 16 fires in 1km+ tunnels, however 10 out of 14 tunnels under 1km are damaged more severely ( KRW 114 mil. > KRW 41 mil.)

SUMMARY OF USEFUL HYPOTHESES FROM THE IMPLICATIONS OF SURVEY RESULTS

It will be very helpful to extract some hypothesis from the implications of survey results for tunnel fire cases so that we can draw strategies and plans for future improvement. 5

i ii iii iv v vi vii

Accidents in expressway are lower than artery road but tunnel fire rate is much higher. The longer the tunnels, the more fires are occurred. Some specific routes which have more tunnels and higher accident rate have more tunnel fires. The hotter weather such as summer, clear afternoon brings more tunnel fires by vehicle breakdown and they are the most common causes of tunnel fires. Shorter tunnels which have less fire protection facilities are damaged more severely. Tunnels with TOC, arrival time to begin the initial fire fighting is much shorter than fire brigade and fire drill can shorten the arrival time for both TOC and fire brigade. CCTV is the best facilities to detect and confirm the fires in tunnel.

CONCLUSION
STRATEGIC ISSUES
From the hypothesis above KEC set up 3 strategic themes by its characteristics to achieve effective and reasonable goals of fire safety in tunnels I Public relations for accident prevention II Facilities improvement III Intensified response procedure

IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR FUTURE IMPROVEMENT

Followings are the practical improvements matching above 3 strategic themes and hypothesis from implications of survey results. I-iv. To reduce the number and fatality of accidents in tunnels, KEC set up intensive public relations period in summer which is the most frequent season of fire in the tunnel. VMS(Variable messaging sign), posters and traffic broadcasting channel are used for PR. To show passengers of expressway, visual materials like pictures and movie clips of fire accident are displayed at the service area. II-i. KEC established Standard for fire protection in expressway tunnels in Year 2009 and it has higher criteria for some specific facilities such as smoke extraction system, water hydrant, etc than National standard. II-ii. Refer to the Standard for fire protection in expressway tunnels in Year 2009, 1km+ tunnels are supposed to be built with 20 kind of facilities while shorter tunnels have 6~13. 6

II-v. For mid-length tunnels with high risk which have the length less than 1km, facilities improvement plan is in progress including smoke exhaust system, hydrant, fire detector, CCTV, etc. II-iii. And the priority of implementation is based on the tunnel fire cases analysis. II-vii. KEC is refurbishing all the tunnels without CCTVs since Year 2007 and all the tunnels will have CCTVs by Year 2012. II-vi. Since KEC has done fire drills for every 1km+ tunnels from 2004 in cooperation with fire brigade, arrival time of fire brigade has been getting shorter. - Year 2009 : 13.6 min.(Avg. 5 years : 18.6min.) And for software improvement, manuals of post-accident procedure are updated and fire drills with other organizations like fire brigade, police are intensified.

REFERENCES
[1] Korea Expressway Corporation(2008) A study on the improvement of disaster prevention systems in middle-scale road tunnel. [2] Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs(2008) Underground fire & environment research. [3] NFPA 502(2008) : standard for road tunnels, bridges and other limited access highways. [4] PIARC(2005) : Fire and Smoke Control in Road Tunnels

Appendix A : Tunnel fire cases in other countries

Year 1949 1968 1975 tunnel Holland L = 2.550 m Moorfleet L = 243 m Guadarrama L = 3.330 m B6 L = 430 m Velsen L = 770 m Nihonzaka L = 2.045 m Kajiwara L = 740 m Caldecott L = 1.028 m Frjus L = 12.868 m Felbertauern L = 5.130 m Gotthard L = 16.321 m Gumefens L = 340 m Serra Ripoli L = 442 m Gotthard L = 16.321 m Pfnder L = 6.719 m Isola delle Femmine L = 150 m Place and country New York USA Hamburg Germany Guadarrama Spain Paris France Velsen Netherlands Shizuoka Japan Japan Oakland USA Modane France-Italy Austria Goeschenen Switzerland Bern Switzerland Bologna Italy Goeschenen Switzerland Austria Vehicles at origin of fire 1 lorry loaded with 11 t of carbon bisulfur 1 lorry trailer (14 t of polyethene bags) 1 lorry loaded with tanks of pine resin 1 lorry loaded with 16 t of polyester in bundles 2 lorries + 4 cars 4 lorries + 2 cars 1 truck (4 t) with 3.600 l paint in 200 cans + 1 truck (10 t) 1 lorry + 1 coach + 1 car 33.000 l of petrol 1 lorry loaded with plastic materials 1 bus 1 lorry loaded with rolls of plastic 1 lorry 1 car + 1 lorry loaded with rolls of paper 1 lorry + trailer loaded with bikes wrapped in carton and plastic 1 lorry + 1 van + 1 car 1 tanker with liquid gas + 1 little bus

- quote from reference [4] (PIARC report)

Probable cause load falling of lorry brakes jamming unknown Duration of fire 4h 1 .5h 2 h 45 mn people 66 injured smoke inhalation none none 12 slight injured smoke inhalation 5 dead 5 injured 7 dead 2 injured 1 dead 2 h 40 mn 1 h 50 mn 1 h 30 mn 24 mn 2h 2 h 30 mn 2h 7 dead 2 injured none none none 2 dead 4 dead + injured none 3 dead (by crash) 5 dead (by fire) 20 injured Consequences on vehicle 10 lorries 13 cars 1 trailer 1 lorry tunnel

serious damage for 200m serious damage for 34 m serious damage for 210m

1976

unknown

1h

1 lorry 2 lorries 4 cars 127 lorries 46 cars 1 truck (4 t) 1 truck (10 t) 3lorries+4cars + 1 coach 1 lorry 1 bus 1 lorry 2 lorries 1 van 4 lorries 11 cars 1 lorry + trailer 1 lorry 1 van 1 car 1 tanker 1 bus 18 cars

damage for 150 m

1978 1979 1980 1982 1983 1984 1984 1987 1993 1994

front-back collision front-back collision collision with side wall and overturning front-back collision gear box breaking blocking brakes fire in engine mass collision on slippery road vehicle out of control and collision friction wheel/ loading bridge collision wet road collision of a bus with a tanker (stopped because of a previous collision), explosion

1 h 20 mn 4 days

serious damage for 30 m serious damage for 1.100m damage for 280 m serious damage for 580m serious damage for 200m damage to ceiling and equipment for 100 m serious damage for 30 m slight damage serious damage to lining serious damage to ceiling, pavement and equipmentfor 50 m, tunnel closed for 2.5 days serious damage to ceiling and equipment, tunnel closed for 2.5 days damages to the tunnel lining and lighting equipment

1995

1h

1996

Italy (Sicilia)

unknown

Appendix B. Detailed items of survey 1. Year 2004 ~ 2008

Time elapsed (Min.) Tunnel name Length (m) Route No. Date Season Time Day Vehicle type Temp () weather Detection method Detection time detection Maseong Juklyoung Munkyoungseajea Juklyoung Munkyoungseajea Jangseong2 Yusipnyeong Changwon1 Muan2 Yongdam Wachon Honam Jungwon Wachon Tongyeong2 Honam Gimhea Gwangam Dabu Deagwallyeong5 Yeonggwang2 Suncheon1 Geumdea1 Sangju Gwangmyeong Dalseong2 Munkyoungseajea Dunnea Gwanggyo Changwon1 1,450 4,600 2,635 4,600 2,635 1,253 3,170 2,566 320 853 2,992 740 988 2,992 1,628 740 690 752 1,075 1,209 590 430 324 1,685 912 993 2,645 3,300 522 2,566 50 55 45 55 45 253 35 10 15 15 20 25 45 20 35 25 10 100 55 50 15 25 55 45 110 451 45 50 50 10 2008.11.27 2008.10.11 2008. 9. 7 2008. 8. 6 2008. 7. 6 2008. 6.18 2008. 4.16 2008. 3.31 2008. 3.13 2007.12.13 2007.10.28 2007.10.10 2007. 9. 2 2007. 6. 5 2007. 6. 5 2007. 6. 2 2007. 5.21 2007. 5. 4 2007. 1 20 2006.10.16 2006. 8.27 2006. 7. 8 2006. 1.29 2005.12. 1 2005.11.14 2005.11. 1 2005. 8. 5 2005. 4. 16 2004. 7.22 2004. 2. 4 autumn autumn autumn summer summer summer spring spring spring winter autumn autumn autumn summer summer summer spring spring winter autumn summer summer winter winter autumn autumn summer spring summer winter 12:38 6:47 17:05 13:46 20:05 16:28 15:16 10:58 12:47 13:10 12:52 21:18 16:25 9:50 5:33 11:50 15:20 0:05 7:35 20:00 18:05 14:38 7:45 13:40 22:45 14:20 12:00 4:30 18:10 5:40 TUR SAT SUN WEN SUN WEN WEN MON TUR TUR SUN WEN SUN TUE TUE SAT MON FRI SAT MON SUN SAT SUN TUR MON TUE FRI SAT TUR WEN HGV passenger car passenger car passenger car passenger car passenger car passenger car HGV passenger car passenger car passenger car passenger car van,passenger car HGV HGV HGV,van,passenger car2 van passenger car bus passenger car van,passenger car HGV passenger car passenger car HGV HGV van,passenger car passenger car HGV passenger car 4 9.7 22.6 25 29 22.6 12.7 9.4 11.3 5 9.2 16.4 20 24.4 19 20.1 18.4 15 -2 14 24.8 23 -1.1 3 4 7 28.6 12 27 1.8 rain clear clear clear clear rain clear clear cloud clear clear clear rain cloud clear clear clear clear clear clear clear rain clear clear clear clear clear clear clear clear CCTV CCTV CCTV CCTV CCTV Detector Patrol(KEC) CCTV Customer informed Customer informed CCTV Customer informed CCTV CCTV Detector Customer informed Customer informed CCTV CCTV CCTV Customer informed Customer informed CCTV CCTV CCTV CCTV CCTV Detector CCTV CCTV 12:39 6:47 17:05 13:46 20:05 16:35 15:17 10:58 13:00 13:15 12:53 21:18 16:25 9:51 5:40 11:53 15:20 0:07 7:35 20:03 18:10 14:40 7:48 13:43 22:45 14:20 12:00 4:35 18:10 5:43 1 0 0 0 0 7 1 0 13 5 1 0 0 1 7 3 0 2 0 3 5 2 3 3 0 0 0 5 0 3 Arrival (KEC) 4 2 11 2 11 12 1 10 3 10 4 37 15 5 5 20 17 7 3 14 10 5 10 2 7 2 5 8 9 10 Arrival (F.B) 17 26 21 25 28 25 27 16 4 10 30 40 30 12 15 25 10 10 20 16 30 15 15 15 13 10 20 9 N/A 25 Fire lasting time Fire size (MW) Time elapsed (Min.) cause recovery 30 40 46 39 30 31 26 68 43 142 22 55 45 79 807 290 45 30 100 18 60 52 13 34 25 1179 25 24 60 30 Partial shut-out 30 0 38 0 0 5 26 18 20 120 10 22 20 57 0 170 45 30 50 18 60 25 10 7 25 0 0 24 60 30 Full shut-out 0 40 8 39 30 26 0 50 23 22 12 33 25 22 807 120 0 0 50 0 0 27 3 27 0 1179 25 0 0 Breakdown Breakdown Breakdown Breakdown Breakdown Collision Breakdown Breakdown Breakdown Breakdown Breakdown Breakdown Collision Breakdown Cargo Collision Breakdown Collision Breakdown Breakdown Breakdown Breakdown Breakdown Breakdown Breakdown Breakdown Breakdown Collision Cargo Collision engine engine tire engine engine engine engine engine engine engine engine engine engine engine Cargo engine engine engine engine engine engine engine engine engine engine engine engine engine Cargo engine ignition Damage amount

8 25 11 25 24 14 12 25 20 24 13 33 40 15 57 120 20 15 58 20 40 30 10 13 10 65 18 15 40 30

1 1 1 1 3 3 1 5 1 3 1 3 2 5 50 28 3 3 20 2 4 5 1 1 5 20 5 2 10 1

C C B B C B C B C B C A B A A A C C A C B B A A C A B B B C

2. Year 2009
Time elapsed (Min.) Tunnel name Length (m) Route No. Date Season Time Day Vehicle type Temp () weather Detection method Detection time detection Jungwon Jongcheon Golyeong4 Juklyoung Tongyeong2 Dabu Dujeong Munui2 Munsusan Dabu Cheonggye Hwanggan 988 825 505 4,600 1628 1,075 630 219 3,820 1,075 450 623 45 15 45 55 35 55 45 30 253 55 100 1 2009.10.16 2009.10.10 2009.10.03 2009.9.25 2009.8.23 2009.8.23 2009.8.3 2009.6.4 2009.5.30 2009.5.28 2009.3.14 2009.1.22 autumn autumn autumn autumn summer summer summer summer spring spring spring winter 18:45 09:33 17:57 05:40 00:40 12:00 11:40 20:12 16:46 12:17 17:20 10:15 WEN SAT SAT WEN SAT SUN MON TUR SAT WEN SAT TUR passenger car van passenger car passenger car passenger car van HGV passenger car passenger car HGV passenger car passenger car 8.9 15 17.7 19 18.9 23.4 30.5 20.4 18.3 19.2 4.0 3.0 cloud clear clear clear clear clear cloud clear clear clear clear clear Customer informed Customer informed Customer informed CCTV CCTV CCTV Patrol(KEC) CCTV CCTV CCTV Customer informed Patrol(KEC) 18:50 09:33 18:00 05:40 00:40 12:00 11:40 20:12 16:48 12:17 17:25 10:15 5 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 5 0 Arrival (KEC) 25 7 11 3 0 5 3 3 18 1 12 10 Arrival (F.B) 18 17 18 16 10 11 15 10 18 5 15 10 Fire lasting time Fire size (MW) Time elapsed (Min.) cause recovery 27 82 53 10 40 30 30 18 49 25 170 15 Partial shut-out 27 0 20 0 40 12 20 0 8 7 40 15 Full shut-out 0 82 33 10 0 18 10 18 41 18 130 0 Breakdown Breakdown Breakdown Collision Collision Breakdown Breakdown Breakdown Collision Cargo Collision Breakdown Engine Engine Engine Engine Engine Engine Engine Breaks Engine Cargo Engine Engine ignition Damage amount

27 67 28 17 25 13 25 23 28 6 41 10

1 5 1 1 2.5 1 1 1 3 5 3 1

C C C C D C D D D D B C

10

3. Important graphs a. Tunnel fire rate b. Tunnel fire by the length c. Tunnel fires by route#

d. Environment condition - Season

e. Environmental condition by time

f. Damages (By KRW)

11