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THOMAS truculent It's...it's SENSE! MEPHISTO I know! I know! I know! I know what SENSE is! I know what sets a = b and a = a apart! THOMAS rolls eyes MEPHISTO I do! I do! I do! What sets them apart is they assert different things! THOMAS Assert different things? Sacr Leibniz! How can they? MEPHISTO If they do, they can. Right? THOMAS Right. MEPHISTO Well, they do. So they can. THOMAS sighs Look, a refers to a and b refers to b. Right? MEPHISTO Right.1 THOMAS And a is b. Right?
1
Mephisto is no Russellian.
MEPHISTO Right. THOMAS triumphant So a = b and a = a assert the same thing! MEPHISTO You didn't say "right". THOMAS reddens Right? MEPHISTO Wrong! MEPHISTO approaches Thomas You wanna know why? THOMAS retreats Why? MEPHISTO in Thomas's ear Because a and b are THOMAS mops ear Ew-w-w! Wcala!
complexes!!!
What Mephisto is getting at here is that complexes confer mutual consistency upon the (classically) irreconcilable theses (A-C): (A) "a" signifies a and "b" signifies b. (B) a = b (C) "a = a" and "a = b" assert different things.
THOMAS wary Did Frege or Russell say anything about complexes? David Lewis didn't. His meanings were functions! THOMAS intones Functions from functions from functions to functions from functions to functions...3 THOMAS agitated Frege Futures are taking off. My What You Always Wanted to Know About Sense But Were Afraid to Ask is hot off the press. And--wouldn't you know it!--along comes some pigeon-toed, circle-squaring anti-Frege, who... MEPHISTO inspects feet Pigeon-toed, yes. MEPHISTO eyes on Thomas Circle-squaring, no.
D. Lewis, "General Semantics," in Semantics of Natural Language, D. Davidson (ed.), D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1972, p. 180.
THOMAS with gusto True a = b says a = a So does b = b.4,5 That may seem fa-ahcical, But dahling, it's cla-ahsical. Hey! I don't mean maybe, It's righteous G. Frege.6 Sound inconvenient? Be glad it's not deviant! Bub! Don't make me rough it, Take your complex and...7 THOMAS remembers bet Now can I have my quarter?8
"[...] if a = b predicates the relation of identity between the referent of a and the referent of 'b', and if a = a states the relation of identity between the referent of a and the referent of a, then if a = b is true, this sentence predicates the same relation between the same pair of objects as a = a. The sentences therefore have the same truth and reference conditions." (P. Engel [1991], The Norm of Truth, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1991, p. 161) 5 The fact that x = y . . . is just the fact that x = x. (Nathan Salmon, Philosophia (Israel), vol. 17, no. 4 (December 1987), p. 58) 6 But what has happened to SENSE? Is Thomas on his way to becoming a direct referentialist? 7 Your confidential response is invited to the following Infernal Quiz in the Sociology of Knowledge: Question: To what might one attribute Thomas's attitude towards Mephisto? __ Mephisto is pigeon-toed. __ Mephisto spit in Thomas's ear. __ Mephisto is known not to referee. __ Mephisto doesnt say scope, function, intension, or model. __ Thomas has Influential Friends in High Places. __ Thomas doesn't brake for Logical Aliens. __ Thomas is into EXEGESIS & REHASH. __ Thomas knows that logic and semantics are ontology-free. __ Other (please specify)
4 8
Will Mephisto pay for Thomas's Sinn? Or will Mephisto give Thomas no quarter? See "The Paradox of Identity.