PHIL1004 Fundamental Ideas In Philosophy: An Introduction Is dualist interactionism a tenable view to hold for the mind-body problem today?

Foong Yu Wen U4562916

Contents:
1.0 2.0 Introduction Page 3 Dualism Page 3 2.1 Descartes Substance Dualism as a tenable view Page 3 2.2 Other ontological arguments Page 3 2.2.1 Property Dualism Page 4 2.2.2 Strong Emergentism Page 4 2.2.3 Epiphenomenalism Page 4 2.2.4 Non-reductive Physicalism Page 4 2.2.5 Knowledge Argument against Physicalism Page 4 Monism as a tenable view Page 5 3.1 Behaviourism Page 5 3.2 Physicalism: Type-Identity Theory Page 6 Conclusion Page 6 References Page 7

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1.0

Introduction

In Descartes era where scientific advances were in its juvenile stages, the lacklustre evolution in physics led to minimal understanding of the workings of the human body. Much discussion was held relating to the mind-body problem, a general philosophic muse as first espoused by Rene Descartes. The problem involves the incapacity in deciphering the relationship between the mind and the brain, on the basis that conscious experiences of the physical body arise out of our brain igniting various stimuli through propositional attitudes. 2.0 Dualism

Dualism is a set of views about the relationship between mind (non-physical event) and body (physical event) or mind and brain and how they causal interact despite being radically different fundamental kinds of principle. In this section we will endeavour to decipher the relationship, or the lack thereof, between two substances that are of inherently different compositions, and how they are still relevant today, and how other theories of interactionism, or again the lack thereof, can contribute to the view of the mind-body problem. 2.1 Descartes Substance Dualism as a tenable view

Descartes was a strong proponent of substance dualism. Substance dualism can be argued as the mind existing as an independent substance and not as part of the domain of the physical brain. The conscious being, as explained by Descartes, will have a clear and distinctive idea that his mind is capable of thinking and is non-extended, while his body is spatially extendable but non-thinking. The setback is the ineffectiveness in correlating a physical and material brain, with the immateriality and unsubstantiated nature of our consciousness1, our mind, and our thought (Descartes, 1624). Descartes was clear to establish the relationship on other grounds, especially that of God being the almighty force that colludes mental and physical states. In Meditation VI, he put forth an argument: Whatever I can conceive clearly and distinctly, God can so create (Garber, 1998, 2003). 2.2 Other ontological arguments Other ontological arguments that try to explain dualist interactionism: Predicate

dualism and Property Dualism. 2.2.1 Property Dualism

Property dualism is the argument that the world is constituted of only one substance the physical kind but it exhibits two different kinds of properties: physical and mental. Mental phenomenon resides in the physical recesses of the brain construct, is non-consequential, but dualistic in nature. Some of the more important theories that are built upon dualism are strong emergentism, epiphenomenalism and non-reductive physicalism. 2.2.2 Strong Emergentism

Strong emergentism is the belief that when matter is arranged in an appropriate way will mental properties be formed. They are ontologically formed and are impossible to be explained by the physical substance they emerge from (David Chalmers, 1996). This idea though, has been less discussed in recent years. 2.2.3 Epiphenomenalism

Epiphenomenalism is a doctrine first adopted by Thomas Henry Huxley, with the theory that our physical states correlates and influences our mental states, but not vice versa, that mental phenomena as inert substances, have no causal effect and are incapable of translating into physical consequences (Guttenplan, 1995). 2.2.4 Non-reductive Physicalism

Non-reductive physicalism is the notion that our mental properties are of a different ontological class as that of physical properties, that mental states such as qualia are semantically immensurable since the phenomenon does not possess the same properties as that of physical states even when we can explain the phenomenon reductively (Walter and Heckmann, 2003). The view is that emotional experiences borne by individuals are subjectively different from one another because of the inability to effectively measure an emotion such as pain. 2.2.5 Knowledge argument against Physicalism

The knowledge argument against physicalism can be seen as an argument for the immateriality of the mind, and hence arguing for the feasibility of dualism. 4

The theory of physicalism is that the mind is part of the physical (material) world and thus defies dualism. One important argument for dualist interactionism today is the theory of qualia. Qualia the subjective qualities of conscious experience are the phenomenal mental states experienced by an individual without taking into account the problem of other minds. To put into perspective, Marys experience in a room of black and white will disenable her ability to experience colours. Yet she knows everything that there is to know about colours within the range of the physical and behavioural sciences. One day should Mary make it out of the room of black and white, she will freshly acquire the experience of colour to which would not have been explained by the physicalist picture the qualitative nature of colour (Jackson 1982). Qualia is the occurrence where the physical consequence is different for all conscious beings since it is immensurable, and that a physical knowledge about another being might yet highlight the lack of knowledge of experiences of that conscious being itself. 3.0 Monism as a tenable view

Yet, even with dualism taking the scene as a tangible explanation for the mind-body problem of today, the strongest arguments against dualist interactionism are those that champion monism. Monism comes in many forms, and the basic principle is that there is oneness in all subjects, regardless of what they attribute oneness to and how they measure it. It is defined as the basic truth as to how experience is understood. The main form of monism today is that of physicalism. Portions of physicalism that have fallen out of favour from philosophers today include that of behaviourism.

3.1

Behaviourism

Behaviourism is the disposition of an individual as observed and explained by a third party, that mental states are not the interior state of mind as experienced by a conscious being. Behaviourism fails to recognise the existence of an interior mental life. Behaviourism however, fell out of grace since cognitivism rejected it for the problem of counter-intuitiveness as possibly experienced by a conscious being.

3.1

Physicalism: Type-Identity Theory

Type Identity Theory explains that if mental states are material and not behavioural, then mental states are correlated and possibly identical to brain states (Smart, 1956). Yet, the thesis of multiple realizability destabilizes the type-identity theory (Putnam 1967). As humans experience pain, so do animals, but the experience of pain between the two species are not compatibly similar, for it is highly unlikely that humans and animals have identical brain states, and thus the pain cannot be identical to a specific brain state. However, token-identity theory asserts that as a certain brain state is connected with only one mental state of a being, it is with absolute certainty that there is no correlation between types of mental states and types of brain states. 4.0 Conclusion

A dualist seeks to define the experience to which conscious beings may attain from physical realisations or embodiments: seeing blood and knowing that what he sees is the colour red, or listening to an excerpt of Beethovens Fifth Symphony and knowing in his memory who the composer is and probably recalling how the next part of the symphony sounds like. Monists, on the other hand, seek only to define the physical aspects of the subjects: blood as a form of liquid or the tapes and scores of Beethovens Fifth Symphony. Memories of physical embodiments make conscious beings speak of the things they experience see, smell, hear or touch and this is the view to which a dualist claims a monist may be grossly mistaken. The underlying assumption here is that both sides of the equation can and must be measurable and proven with evidence in modern science that a judgement can be right. However so, it is improper to suggest that we should negate our individual senses and ill-create a yardstick bound by subjectivity. May it be true, that our senses generate memories or experiences, but we have to acknowledge that primitive senses exist by nature and nurture, we are influenced by our surroundings, and this in turn contort our memories and leads us to conjure memories and images that may not have been from direct experiences. Primitive senses effect our behaviour and leads us to act in certain ways. A conscious being may think that he is able to submerge his fist into a cup of hot water for more than 15 seconds, but after realising that he can suffer a third degree burn after only a mere 5 seconds, he learns that hes not almighty and will refrain from acting recklessly again. This gives us the idea that, whatever is real or what exists, may it be physical theories or conjectures, have a causal effect upon physical 6

objects or events, especially primitive physical things. As of today, dualism seems to be the holding tenable view for the mind-body problem, but the evolution of scientific discoveries in the recent century is slowly invalidating preceding philosophical theories such as Descartes Cartesian theory, and the growth of science has been described as a movement that has evoked a greater clarity of thought for individuals (Agassi). With the passing of time, the evolution of science eventually nullifies much of previously accepted philosophical theories that are in fact, problematic in nature. 5.0 References Chalmers, David (1996). The Conscious Mind. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-511789-9. Descartes, Ren, (1596-1650): Dualism, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Garber, D. (1998, 2003). Descartes, Ren. In E. Craig (Ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: Routledge. Viewed May 01, 2011, <http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/DA026SECT8> Hart, W.D. (1996) "Dualism", in Samuel Guttenplan (org) A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Blackwell, Oxford, 265-7 Karl, Popper (1978). Three Worlds. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, <http://www.bengin.net/jbc/dokumente/guteDenker/popper80%20on %20human%20values.pdf> Kim, J. (1995). Honderich, Ted. ed. Problems in the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. M. Rosenthal, David, (2000): Materialism and the mind-body problem, Hackett Publishing Company Inc., United States of America.

McGinn, Colin, (1989): Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?, Vol. XEVIII, No. 391, Oxford University Press 1989

Robinson, Howard, (2009): Dualism, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Viewed 9 May, 2011, <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/dualism/>.

Putnam, Hilary (1967). "Psychological Predicates", in W. H. Capitan and D. D. Merrill, eds., Art, Mind and Religion (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

R. Wallace IV, Edwin, (1988): Mind-Body, Monistic Dual Aspect Interactionism, Vol. 176, No.1, Page 15, The Williams & Wilkins Co.

Schaffer, Jonathan, "Monism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Viewed 20 May 2011, <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/monism/>

Stoljar, Daniel (2005). "Physicalism". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2005 Edition). Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University. Viewed May 19, 2011, <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2005/entries/physicalism/>

Sven, Walter and Heinz-Dieter, Heckmann, (2003). Physicalism and Mental C Causation: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action, Imprint Academic

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