No.

2010-11-B IN THE YOUTH AND GOVERNMENT SUPREME COURT

Frank Fletcher Appellant-Defendant

vs. People of the State of Illinois Appellee-Plaintiff

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Youth and Government Circuit of Illinois No. 2010-11-B Honorable Cheryl Fitzgerald Presiding Judge

BRIEF AND ARGUMENT FOR THE APPELLEE-PLAINTIFF

Anastasia Golovashkina Naperville, IL 60563 anastasiagolovashkina@yahoo.com Josie Dalton Naperville, IL 60563 josie.dalton@gmail.com

Attorneys for the Appellee-Plaintiff, the People of the State of Illinois

I. THE SEVEN 9 BY 12 COLOR PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN AT THE CRIME SCENE WERE PROPERLY AND FAIRLY ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE. A jury trial found defendant Frank Fletcher guilty of the first-degree murder of police officer Markus Kane. The defendant appealed the verdict based on the grounds that he had not been granted a fair trial. The first issue presented by the Appellant is the trial judges decision to overrule the defenses objection to admission into evidence of seven 9 by 12 color photographs depicting the crime scene. Trial Judge Fitzgerald allowed each side to present its arguments for or against the photographs admission. Defense counsel argued that the photographs were more prejudicial than probative, while prosecutors countered that the photographs were necessary for Officer Kelly to explain his theory of how the shooting took place. After hearing and carefully considering both sides arguments, the trial judge overruled the objection of defense counsel and admitted all seven photographs into evidence. On appeal, the Appellant contends that Judge Fitzgerald was incorrect to rescind this motion. The Appellee maintains that the trial judge did not err in overruling the defense counsels objection to the introduction of seven 9 by 12 color photographs of the crime scene into evidence. Both the Constitution of the United States of America and the Constitution of the State of Illinois affirm the trial judges ruling to admit the photographs in the case at bar. Amendment V of the Constitution of the United States of America states that, No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. Amendment VI further states, The accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district where in the crime shall have been committed. Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution of the State of Illinois further affirms, In criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in personand to have
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a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county in which the offense is alleged to have been committed. Although the State of Illinois has provided defendant Frank Fletcher with the full extent of these rights, Fletchers counsel argues that the trial courts admission into evidence of seven photographs of the crime scene undermined his constitutional right to a fair trial. All seven of the photographs were taken at the crime scene after the crime was committed, though only five of the photographs display blood. Four of the photographs were wide-angle shots taken from different directions, showing the open passenger door of the police car and the police cars location relative to the sidewalk, multi-lane intersection, other cars, and bus stop. The fifth photograph was a tighter shot through the open passenger door, showing Officer Kanes body in the drivers seat. The sixth photograph was a close-up shot of the bullet entry wound in Officer Kanes right temple, and the last shot showed the bullets exit wound in Officer Kanes left temple. The State maintains that these photographs were properly admitted into trial court evidence, were indispensible to Officer Kellys witness testimony, and in no way infringed upon the defendants right to a fair trial. The issue of prejudicial evidence exists to curb counselors from submitting exhibits that lack probative value but, instead, are intended to arouse jurors prejudicial emotions against the defendant and to provoke them to deliver a more severe verdict. Prejudicial exhibits can undermine a defendants right to the Constitution of the United States of Americas guaranteed receipt of trial by a fair and impartial jury, as the jurors resulting prejudice tends to inhibit them from being impartial in their judgment. This issue is especially complex concerning the admission of photographs into the evidence of a murder case, since photographs related to a murder are often gruesome or graphic in their

depictions. The general rule of law in Illinois concerning the admission of photographs into evidence states that, Where photographs are relevant to establish any fact in issue they are admissible in spite of the fact that they may be of a gruesome nature. People v. Henenberg. 55 Ill.2d at 13. We, the People of the State of Illinois, maintain that the photographs admitted into the case at bar were relevant to establish and corroborate the facts presented in the witness testimonies of Officer Frank Kelly, Ms. Beatrice Green, and Mr. Richard Edwards, and were thus correctly and fairly admitted by Judge Fitzgerald into trial court evidence. The trial courts decision to admit these photographs is supported by the case of People v. Henenberg. 55 Ill.2d 5, 302 N.E.2d 27, 25 Ill.Dec. 5 (1973). In People v. Henenberg, the defendant, Frank Alex Henenberg, was found guilty of armed robbery and murder. At trial, three photographs were admitted into evidence depicting the decomposed body of his victim. One featured the deceaseds skull and left arm, the latter of which was in a plaster cast. The other two photographs showed different views of the deceaseds skull. Two photographs were in color, and one was black-and-white. The defendant appealed based on arguments that these photographs were cumulative, deliberately prejudicial, and presented by the state solely to provoke adverse sentiments among the jury towards the defendant. Despite these arguments, the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the trial courts decision to admit the photographs into evidence. In Henenberg, the court applied the rule of law in Illinois to conclude that each admitted photograph added factual information to the aggregate of court evidence: The photograph of the skull and left arm showed the condition of the body as it was found and corroborated the testimony concerning the cause of death and the identity of the victim. The other two photographs, which showed a bullet hole in the skull, tended to show the cause of death[the photographs] did not become
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unnecessarily cumulative because there was oral testimony concerning the same issues. People v. Henenberg. 55 Ill.2d at 14. The defendants in both Henenberg and the case at bar argued that the photographs that were admitted into court evidence were more prejudicial than probative. Henenberg indicates that the process of evaluating probative valueand thus, the correctness of a photographs admissionmust not be governed by the unpleasantness of the photographs depictions. Thus, though blood spatter is visible in five of the seven photographs admitted into evidence in the case at bar, its presence must not govern our evaluation of their potential prejudice and the correctness of their admission. Rather, Henenberg indicates that the most important aspect of a piece of evidence in assessing its admission into court is the evidences relevance to the trial itself. Henenberg confirms that any photograph that is relevant to establish a fact on any issue is admissible into evidence, further stating that the presence of relevant oral testimony can corroborate this admission. People v. Henenberg. 55 Ill.2d at 14. Upon examination, the court in Henenberg found each photograph to be justifiable in its inclusion. We shall now demonstrate how the same holds true for each of the photographs admitted into evidence in the case at bar. In the case at bar, the first four admitted photographs offer wide-angle shots from different directions, showing the location of the police car relative to landmarks such as sidewalks, streetlights, intersections, and bus stops. These landmarks are mentioned extensively throughout the testimonies of all three of the States witnesses. In addition to confirming the testimony of Officer Frank Kelly, the first four photographs corroborate and clarify the location-driven statements of witnesses Richard Edwards and Beatrice Green. In his sworn statement, Mr. Edwards attempts to explain, We ran up around the
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squad car, and west on Division We went right by [a woman] when we took off down Division. Ms. Green makes similar references to specific intersections: I was on the southeast corner of LaSalle and Division Streets and, There was a police officer sitting in a squad car parked on the east side of LaSalle, just south of Division, about 20 feet from me. The jurys access to these four photographs is crucial to its comprehension of these complicated statements. Since both witnesses testified prior to Officer Frank Kelly (who introduced the photographs, and whose entire testimony was based off of the evidence in these photographsan aspect further affirming their relevance to the case at bar), the jurys ability to examine the photographs during deliberation was crucial to achieving a fact-based verdict. The photographs reveal such information as the bus stops true distance from the crime scene, which would have been exaggerated by Ms. Green had the photographs not been admitted. The ability to compare statements directly to photographs granted the jurors a greater factual foundation for their decision. The fifth photograph showed a closer view through the police cars open passenger door, depicting the victims body in the drivers seat. Once more, the image is relevant to all three of the prosecutions witnesses, each of whom referenced either the position of the shooter, the accomplice, the victim, or all three. Ms. Green testified, I looked over to the squad car. The two guys were right there. One was standing next to the open front passenger door. The other one was leaning inside the door, and backing out. Mr. Edwards testified, Fletcher told me to tap on the passenger door and open it. When I did, Fletcher just leaned in and shot the guy on the head. This photograph demonstrates that the blood spatter was on the drivers side doorand in effect, corroborates both aforementioned statements. The photograph is also critical to Officer Kellys testimony as to how the

shooting took place. This testimony hinged on the pictures confirmation of blood spatter on the drivers-side door. The sixth and seventh photographs showed close-ups of the bullets entry and exit wounds, as well as flash burns from the gunshot. These depictions were critical to the formulation of Officer Kellys testimony concerning the direction from which the victim was shot. The photographs were relevant to statements made by both Mr. Edwards and Ms. Green about the direction from which the victim was approached. By depicting the size of the bullet hole, these two photographs further corroborated Mr. Edwards claim that the victim had been shot with a .38 caliber revolver. Moreover, human memory is an imperfect mechanism. The violent nature of the crime in question predisposed its witnesses to err from correct recollection. Unlike the indisputable image found in a photograph, Mr. Edwards and Ms. Green were prone to making biased statements. The photographs also contributed to the core of Officer Frank Kellys investigation and provided factual foundation for his testimony. Each of the photographs presented in the case at bar, like each photograph in Henenberg, was therefore supplemented by apposite oral testimony. Though the defendant may argue that the black-and-white composition of one of the photographs admitted into Henenberg contrasts with the color composition of the photographs in the case at bar, this is an inappropriate comparison. The distinction between black-and-white and color imaging is merely a byproduct of the thirty-year time span between Henenberg and the case at bar. Black-and-white cameras were much more common and affordable than color cameras in 1973; the opposite is true in 2010. Had Henenberg taken place in the present decade, it is reasonable to believe that all three of its photographs would have been in

color. The rule in Illinois specifies that any photograph relevant to establishing a fact is admissibleany photograph, any issue, and concerning any fact. The language of this law alludes to neither specific quantities nor states of saturation; in implementing the law, neither should the Illinois Supreme Court. As in Henenberg, the photographs presented in the case at bar were both relevant to and concerned the same issues as trial testimonies. Though some of the admitted photographs depict some vivid details of the murder, Henenberg states that these qualities cannot invalidate or even infringe upon their probative value. Like the photographs admitted in Henenberg, each of the photographs admitted into the case at bar added additional information and corroborated the testimonies of the States three witnesses. Even if the defendant in the case at bar had argued that the photographs were cumulative, Henenberg still states that photographs relevant to establish any fact are admissible and cannot be considered cumulative People v. Henenberg. 55 Ill.2d at 13. The trial judge in Henenberg was upheld in his admission of similar photographic evidence. As the similarities between this case and the case at bar indicate, the decision in Henenberg can and should be extended to the case at bar. Judge Fitzgeralds decision to overrule defense counsels objection to the photographs in the case at bar is also supported by the courts ruling in the case of People v. Speck. 41 Ill.2d 177, 242 N.E.2d 208, 22 Dec. 180 (1968). In People v. Speck, the defendant, Richard Franklin Speck, was found guilty of murdering eight female nurses. Photographs of the deceased girls were admitted into court evidence, showing the location of their bodies in various locations and the manner in which their hands and feet were bound. On appeal, the defendant argued that because he had agreed to confirm the

identities of his victims and the causes of their deaths, admission of photographs of their bodies constituted prejudicial error. Much like the defendant in the case at bar, the defendant in Speck argued that the photographs lacked any probative value and aroused prejudicial emotions from the jurors; the court dismissed these allegations and affirmed the trial courts admission of the photographs. The rule in Illinois concerning the admission of evidence states that, Evidence having a natural tendency to establish the facts in controversy should be admitted. A party cannot have competent evidence excluded merely because it might arouse feelings of horror and indignation in the jury. Any testimony concerning the details of a murder or other violent crime may have such tendencies, but manifestly this could not suffice to render it incompetent. People v. Speck. 41 Ill.2d at 202. In Speck, the court reasoned, The photographs of the deceased girls showing the location of the bodies in the various rooms corroborated, to some extent, the testimony of Miss Amurao. The photographs also illustrated the manner in which the hands and feet of the victims were bound, further corroborating Miss Amuraos testimony. The bindings also tended to show premeditation and planning on the part of the killer and negated any claim that the slayings were done in an insane frenzy. People v. Speck. 41 Ill.2d at 203. Like the photographs admitted in Speck, the photographs admitted into evidence in the case at bar supported the testimonies of Mr. Richard Edwards, Ms. Beatrice Green, and Officer Frank Kelly, all three of whom spoke to the premeditated nature of the murder. In a criminal case such as the case at bar, the difference between hot-blooded (an insane frenzy) and cold-blooded (with premeditation and planning) often determines whether the defendant will be sentenced for murder or for manslaughter. In Speck, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the images in the disputed photographs were integral to corroborating the premeditated nature, distinguishing the crime as murder rather than manslaughter.
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In the case at bar, the first four photographswide-angle shots depicting the victims police car in relation to its surroundingsillustrate the intricacies of the labyrinth-like junction between LaSalle and Division Streets, and indicate the high degree of planning required for the defendant to have executed his plot. In his sworn statement, witness Richard Edwards made repeated references to both the apartment (which he shares with the defendant) and to the LaSalle and Division Street intersection, stating, I live with Frank Fletcher in a two-bedroom apartment at 18 East Elm Street. In describing the night of the murder, Mr. Edwards further stated, around 8:30 the two of us left the apartment, walked over to LaSalle Street and started walking north. In addition to assisting the jurors comprehension of these complicated, streetspecific explanations, the admitted photographs verified the murders premeditated nature. In order to arrive at the victims vehicle from his apartment building, the defendant would have had to research both his victims usual parking spot and an appropriate route for him to get there. The photographs demonstrate the defendant did not live in a location from which the crime scene was visiblebut rather, that he had to make a conscious and deliberate effort to stalk his victim. The photographs also display the complicated arrangement of streets where the crime took place, and further attest to the defendants malicious intentions. Much like the photographs affirmed in Speck, the photographs in the case at bar thus serve to establish the defendants malice aforethought. The Court in Speck referenced numerous case precedents to assist its evaluation of the photographs in question. In one such cited case, the court held that there was no error in admitting into evidence photographs of a deceased girls body showing the various wounds inflicted upon her People v. Speck. 41 Ill.2d at 203. Likewise, five of the seven

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photographs admitted into the case at bar featured blood spatter, and two photographs close-up shots of the bullets entry and exit woundsshowed the specific, fatal wounds inflicted upon the deceased officer. According to the precedents referenced in Speck, the appearance of these terminal wounds did not make the photographs prejudicial or erroneous. Speck cites another case in which the trial Court admitted photographs of a deceased woman as she had been found and additional photographs of her body at a morgue. The Court again upheld their admission both at trial and on appeal, reasoning, The pictures were admissible to show the condition of the victims clothing, certain bruises on her body, and to show the amount of force that had been used, and we held that the ruling of the trial Court was not in error, in spite of the shocking nature of the pictures People v. Speck. 41 Ill.2d at 203. The photographs admitted into our case were critical to depicting and corroborating similar conditions. The first four photographs added indispensible clarification to the circumstances surrounding our case, much of which depended on specific street and intersection names. The fifth photograph demonstrated the exact position of the victims body. This corroborated the testimonies of Mr. Richard Edwards, Ms. Beatrice Green, and Officer Frank Kelly, all of whom said that Mr. Fletcher and Mr. Edwards ran from the crime scene immediately after the victim was shotand did not, for example, stall to shift the location of his body or to otherwise tamper with his remains. The sixth and seventh photographs depict the entry and exit wounds of the bullet, demonstrating that the distance between the gun and the victim was consistent with all three witnesses statements, and that the officers vehicle was approached from the passenger-side door. Since no bullet was recovered from the crime scene and no mention

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of the bullet holes size was made in the autopsy report, these two final photographs also demonstrated that the size of the victims wound was consistent with Mr. Edwards claim that the victim was shot with a .38 caliber revolver. In the third case cited in Speck, the defendant argued that photographs of the deceased victim should not have been admitted into evidence on the grounds that a police officer had already provided an exhaustive description of the condition in which the deceased was found. This cited defendant expressed similar arguments to those made in the case at bar, arguing that the admitted photographs were submitted only to enflame the jurors. In the cited case, the Court held that the admission of photographs of a deceased is discretionary with the trial judge and ruled that the trial judge had not abused that discretion People v. Speck. 41 Ill.2d at 203. In the case at bar, State witness Officer Kelly supplied similar statements regarding the condition in which he found the victim. Extending the precedents cited in Speck to the circumstances of the case at bar, we see that the officers corresponding explanations did not render the photographs inadmissible. Moreover, the photographs correctly admitted into Speck were far more gruesome and prejudicial nature than the photographs admitted into the case at bar. In Speck, the photographs depicted the slain bodies of eight females, whom had also been bound and beaten by the defendant. These images were far more gruesome than the photographs admitted into the case at bar, which only depicted a single gunshot wound in the deceased police officers right temple. Despite these conditions, Speck was nonetheless denied a second trial; due to similarities between these two cases, this precedent is fully applicable to the decision in this case. The rule in Illinois concerning admission of evidence states,

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Questions relating to the character of the evidence offered, and the manner and extent of its presentation are largely within the discretion of the trial judge, and the exercise of that discretion will not be interfered with unless there has been an abuse to the prejudice of the defendant. People v. Speck. 41 Ill.2d at 203. Since Speck holds that judgment of disputed evidence rests first with the trial judge, we must also evaluate the manner in which our own judge handled the objection. In doing so, we find that Judge Fitzgerald made a point to hear both sides arguments before admitting the photographs. Although he did choose to admit all seven of the disputed photographs, his decision was not indicative of a magistrate misusing his discretion. Rather, it reflected the necessity of incorporating all of the photographs, as well as the likelihood that the prosecutionelaborating upon these requisitespresented a more persuasive argument. Unlike the trial judge in People v. Jackson, Judge Fitzgerald did not allow any more photographs to be admitted, nor did he re-open the case to enter additional evidence on behalf of the prosecution. The conduct of Judge Fitzgerald demonstrated a deep level of respect towards both the defendant and defense counsel. In accordance with the rule stated in Speck, our trial judge thus did not abuse his discretion. Consequently, as derived from the strikingly parallel circumstances found between Speck and the case at barin which those of Speck function as a much more exaggerated version of those in the case at barwe affirm that trial Judge Fitzgerald was correct to admit the photographs into trial court evidence. The case of People v. Jackson can be distinguished from the case at bar. 9 Ill.2d 484, 138 N.E.2d 528, 26 Ill.Dec. 485 (1956). In People v. Jackson, defendant Leroy Jackson was convicted of the murder of Louise Jackson. Evidence admitted into trial court included the defendants 23-page written confession, both weapons used in the crime (a knife and a Nichols gun), the gun the defendant had when arrested, and two photographs
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of portions of the victims apartment. Though the testimonies of all thirteen of the States witnesses contradicted claims made by Mr. Jackson, the defendant made no attempts to address the evidence presented against him, invite other witnesses to speak on his behalf, or even take to the stand himself. Prosecutors in Jackson went as far is to reopen the rested case to introduce one, additional piece of evidence against the defendanta single photograph taken of the deceased after her autopsy. The photograph depicted the face and neck of an obese black female with her mouth slightly open, her eyes nearly shut, and a pronounced view of the wounds from her autopsy incisions. Mr. Jackson had written this is the lady I stab and signed his name on the photograph. Indeed, so overwhelming was the States argument that even the prosecutors themselves did not hesitate to call the admission of this final photograph cumulative. On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court reinforced this impression by remanding People v. Jackson for a new trial. The rule in Illinois states that, Mindful of the prejudicial emotion that might be aroused by the introduction of a victims photograph, the courts have, on the whole, been strict in their requirement that a proper purpose be shown for the introduction of such an exhibit. People v. Jackson. 9 Ill.2d at 490. In Jackson, the Court based its decision to grant the defendant a second trial exclusively on the admission of this final photograph. Not one of the photographs presented in the case at bar, however, exhibits the distortional character found in Jacksons post-autopsy, incriminating, inflammatory, and excessive image. In Jackson, the Court determined that, It is clear thatthe only remaining use of the photograph from the States standpoint was to arouse the emotions of the jury so that they would administer a more severe penalty. This is particularly true in view of the fact that the
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photograph also displays a portion of the autopsy incision, a feature which accentuated its inflammatory character. People v. Jackson. 9 Ill.2d at 491. However, the significant differences between Jackson and the case at bar render Jackson inapplicable to the circumstances of our case. First, the photographed female in Jackson owes her most prominent wound to an autopsy incision irrelevant to the tried actions of the defendant. In the case at bar, all wounds shown in the admitted photographs were inflicted by the defendant himself and did not reflect the actions of others. Though not consistent with Jackson, this absence of post-autopsic incisions in the photographs admitted into the case at bar is analogous to the precedents of both Henenberg and Speck, both of which were affirmed. Second, whereas the photograph in Jackson was taken at a hospital a number of days after the crime had taken place, all seven of the photographs admitted into the case at bar were taken on the night of the crime, at the scene of the crime. The photographs were also taken several days before an autopsy was performed. Unlike the photograph in Jackson, the photographs in the case at bar therefore did not spoil the body of evidence with irrelevant information or with wounds resulting from a medical examination. Though not similar to the circumstances of Jackson, this aspect of the case at bar is again analogous to the conditions found in the affirmed case of People v. Speck, in which correctly admitted photographs were taken at the scene of the crime. Third, the defendant in Jackson wrote the self-incriminating and illiterate, this is the lady I stab, directly onto the photograph admitted into his case. In addition to indicating his self-professed guilt to the jurors, the defendants handwritten confession on Jacksons single, admitted photograph also predisposed its jurors to prejudice against the defendant. Mr. Jacksons annotation indicated that he was illiterate (an hence predisposed
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by his own lack of knowledge to act out in an impulsive, violent manner) and ignorant (despite this annotation, the defendant maintained that he was innocent). Like the defendants in the affirmed cases of Henenberg and Speck, the defendant in the case at bar did not even write on the admitted photographs; Mr. Fletcher did not even acknowledge personal involvement in the crime. The rule in Illinois further states, Whether the photograph of a deceased is properly admissible depends upon whether it has probative value, such as aiding a jury in the better understanding of medical testimony or aiding them in determining the manner in which the crime was committed. People v. Jackson. 9 Ill.2d at 490. Unlike the photographs admitted into the case at bar, the photograph in Jackson was supplemented by a far more comprehensive body of evidence. This included thirteen witness testimonies; two murder weapons; two photographs of the victims apartment; the defendants written confession; in addition, the defendant refused to take the stand and addressed no evidence on his own behalf. Even prosecutors in Jackson did not hesitate to call their own argument cumulative. Though the photograph indicated that the victim had been an obese, black female, these facts had already been established by thirteen witness testimonies and an autopsic report. The photograph added no information that could not already be procured from this evidence, and thus did not satisfy the laws requirement for an admitted photograph to have probative valuethat is, that the requirement that an admitted piece of evidence must prove something. People v. Jackson. 9 Ill.2d at 491. The photographs close-up of the victims face and neck made the victims autopsic incisions the images most prominent feature. The photographs focus on the victims face and neck did not help jurors to, for example, better understand the method and nature of the victims injuries, as had been the case in both Henenberg and Speck. This flagrant absence of
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probative purpose led the Court in Jackson to determine that the sole motive behind the photograph was to inflame and upset the jurors. In the case at bar, however, the photographs played a critical role in clarifying the testimonies of the States three witnesses. Though their admission was most closely associated with the testimony of Officer Frank Kelly, the photographs were available to jurors throughout their deliberation, helping them evaluate all three witnesses statements against the images depicted in the photographs. Like the photographs admitted into the affirmed cases of Henenberg and Speck, the photographs admitted into the case at bar were relevant to establishing facts that could not have been corroborated otherwise. Moreover, the photographs admitted into the case at bar were both relevant to and vital to the factual corroboration of the victims injuries. Whereas the zoomed-in, post-autopsic photograph in Jackson failed to depict its victims injuries, and in fact obscured her injuries with unrelated incisions made by a medical examiner, the photographs admitted into the case at bar were selected for their precise relevance to and factual corroboration of Officer Frank Kellys testimony. The first four photographs depicted the four-way intersection and confirmed the crime scenes setting; the fifth photograph indicated the direction from which the victim was shot; the final images specified that the murder weapon was consistent with Mr. Richard Edwards statement of a .38 caliber pistol. Since the photographs indicate that the bullet passed through the victims entire skull, the photographs also indicated the close range from which the victim was shot, corroborating the testimonies of all three of the prosecutors witnesses. Though Jackson establishes the precedent of a single piece of flawed evidence as sufficient grounds for a trials reversal, the rule in Illinois for evaluating admitted evidence

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is based on quality, not quantity. In comparing the precedents of Jackson and Henenberg, for example, we see that although the single photograph admitted into Jackson was in error, all three photographs admitted in Henenberg were deemed correct. Whereas the trial judge in Jackson abused his discretion in allowing prosecutors to both present the photograph into trial evidence and in allowing the case to be re-opened for its excessive introduction, the trial judge in the case at bar not only admitted the photographs during proper trial proceedings, but insisted on doing so only after considering arguments from both sides. Normally, the nuances of court proceedings are left to the discretion of a trial judge. Although the judge in Jackson clearly abused his judgeships discretion, as Judge Fitzgeralds insistence on considering both arguments demonstrates, such violations were not made in the case at bar. Thus, due to the overwhelming discrepancies between this case and the case of People v. Jackson, the decision of Jackson cannot be applied to the case at bar. The case of People v. Lefler can be distinguished from the case at bar. 38 Ill.2d 216, 230 N.E.2d 827, 29 Ill.Dec. 216 (1967). In People v. Lefler, the defendant, Theodore Wayne Lefler, was found guilty of the involuntary manslaughter of his infant daughter. Upon becoming frustrated with the newborns crying, the defendant proceeded to squeeze the child, break her ribs, and bring about the her death. At trial, the judge permitted the exhibition of several color photographs taken during the autopsy. The pictures were projected onto a wall, and enlarged to a size of 44 x 26. In one, the jury was able to see the chest cavity after the breastbone, ribs, lungs, heart, and main blood vessels had been removed. The other photographs showed the skull and portions of the brain after an area of the skull had been removed. The doctor who had performed the autopsy later testified in

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extensive detail about his findings, using a blackboard to illustrate the victims injuries once more. On appeal, the defendant questioned the trial courts admission of the aforementioned photographs. Leflers trial judgewho was found to have abused his discretion on a number of other issues throughout the trial, as wellwas determined to have, too, erred in admitting these photographs. The rule in Illinois states that, Whether a photograph of a deceased person should be admitted in evidence normally rests within the discretion of the trial court and if such a picture has sufficient probative value it may be admitted in spite of the fact that the photograph may be gruesome and inflammatory. People v. Lefler. 38 Ill.2d at 222. In Lefler, the Court applied the precedent of Jackson, reasoning that, In the present case the testimony that the body of the testimony was that the body of the deceased bore little superficial evidence of injury to the gruesome nature of the pictures was caused almost entirely by the autopsy procedure. We believe that the pictures had little probative value in view of the detailed testimony by the physician and the fact that the nature and extent of the injuries was not disputed. People v. Lefler. 38 Ill.2d at 222. The trial judge in Lefler committed reversible error in allowing prosecutors to present both the detailed testimony of a medical examiner and a series of enlarged photographs whose gruesome wounds were almost completely attributable to individuals other than the defendant. However, there are four fundamental differences between Lefler and the case at bar that make the decision in Lefler inapplicable to the case at bar. First, the photographs in both Jackson and Lefler were deemed erroneous largely because of their depiction of prominent, gruesome wounds not associated with the crime committed by the defendant, but with the incisions made during the victims autopsy. In contrast, all seven photographs admitted in the case at bar were taken at the crime scene prior to the victims medical examination; the injuries depicted in the admitted
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photographs were attributable only to the defendant himself. Second, whereas the photographs in Lefler were projected onto a screen approximately 44 by 26 in size, the photographs in the case at bar were not enlarged and were presented to the jury in their original 9 by 12 format. In Lefler, this enlargement added excessive dramatization and aroused the emotions of the jurorsindeed, it were almost as if the jurors were attending a horror movie, with the enlarged, gruesome images of a murdered infant flashing on the screen in front of them. In the case at bar, the photographs were kept to their initial size; the photographs were not dramatized in their presentation. Third, the expert oral testimony provided by the medical examiner in Lefler made the photographs presented in that case excessive. The doctor testified about his findings in great detail, using a blackboard to illustrate most of the victims injuries. Just as the overwhelming aggregate of evidence supplied by prosecutors in Jackson helped render Jacksons admitted photograph excessive in its absence of probative value, so too did the doctors testimony in Lefler render the cases photographs excessive. In the case at bar, however, the witness associated with the admitted photographs did not provide additional visual images to illustrate the extent of the victims injuries. Whereas the doctor in Lefler owed much of his evidence to injuries inflicted by his own examination, the witness in the case at bar relied on photographic evidence that did not include injuries unrelated to the defendants own actions. As the precedent previously cited in People v. Speck also demonstrates, although Officer Kelly testified to the condition in which he found the victim, his statements did not make the photographs inadmissible. Fourth, whereas the nature and extent of the injuries in Lefler were not disputed,

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the injuries in the case at bar were. In fact, Officer Kellys entire testimony concerned his hypothesis about how he believed the shooting took place; his hypothesis, in turn, was based on the evidence he gathered from the admitted photographs. In his sworn statement, Defendant Frank Fletcher denied these claims and stated that he did not know anything about the shooting: What makes you think I would know anything about that? Moreover, neither witness Richard Edwards nor Beatrice Green testified to the extent of the victims injuries, and added little to no factual foundation for Officer Kellys theories. Though an autopsy report was entered into evidence in the case at bar, no medical examiner was present to decipher the reports technical and complicated language. The minor overlap between the content of two photographs and that of the medical report was neither harmful nor cumulativerather, the photographs added an invaluable representation of the autopsy report that was much more accessible and understandable to jurors. The photographs were also more relevant to the testimony of the witness who presented them, who formed his theories from the series of police photographs that were properly presented at trialnot from an autopsy report. It would have been inappropriate to force the officer to testify without the evidence on which he based his theories, let alone to inhibit his precision by forcing him to decipher a cumbersome document composed by experts outside of his profession, or to explain his hypotheses without the evidence on which he had based them. Whereas the chalkboard drawings provided by the medical examiner in Lefler show that his testimony did not require the additional visuals of enlarged, post-autopsy photographs, the testimony of Officer Frank Kelly in the case at bar depended wholly on the content of his correctly admitted, pre-autopsy photographs. The trial judge in Lefler was incorrect to overrule defense counsels objection to admitting the

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enlarged, prejudicial, and post-autopsy photographs into trial court evidence. However, as the numerous discrepancies between this case and the case at bar demonstrate, the courts decision in Lefler cannot be extended to the case at bar. However, the most important distinction that can be drawn from the precedents of all four of these cases is the decisive importance of whether the admitted photographs were taken before or after the victims autopsy. Both Lefler and Jackson were reversed on the grounds that their admitted photographs depicted wounds attributable not to the actions of the tried defendant, but to the gruesome, autopsic incisions executed by a medical examiner. In contrast, like the photographs admitted and affirmed in Henenberg and Speck, the photographs admitted into the case at bar did not depict any such postautopsic wounds. In both of the affirmed cases, like in the case at bar, the correctly admitted photographs showed the victims bodies in the exact appearance in which the defendant had left them, and did not prejudice jurors with evidence of irrelevant incisions. Thus, although appellate courts have sustained strict requirements for trial courts to establish a proper purpose for introducing photographs into evidence, comparing the precedents of these four cases indicates that the display of post-autopsic wounds is a decisive negation of this strict proper purpose. People v. Lefler. 38 Ill.2d at 222. The photographs admitted in the affirmed cases of Henenberg and Speck, like the photographs in the case at bar, however, do not depict post-autopsic wounds. Extending this precedent, we see that the photographs in the case at bar were thus appropriately admitted into trial court evidence. Therefore, because the seven admitted, color photographs were not prejudicial, corroborated the testimonies of the prosecutions witness, established the premeditated

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nature of the murder, cannot be challenged on the basis of their shocking images, and were properly and respectfully admitted by Judge Fitzgerald into trial court evidence, based on the rule of law, evidence, and precedents established by previous cases, the court should affirm the trial courts decision.

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II. THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING THE INTRODUCTION OF FRANK FLETCHER'S PRIOR CONVICTION INTO EVIDENCE. The second issue presented by the Appellant following the jury's finding of Defendant Frank Fletcher guilty of first-degree murder is the trial judge's decision to overrule defense counsels objection to entering records of Fletcher's earlier arrest into evidence. The judge called a conference in the courts chambers, and attorneys for each side were invited to argue the objection out of the province of the jury; a court reporter was present. The defendant argued that the evidence of Fletcher's prior conviction was irrelevant to the charge concerned at the trial, and highly prejudicial to their client. Judge Fitzgerald overruled the objection and allowed the evidence to be admitted. On appeal, the Appellant argues that Judge Fitzgerald was incorrect to overrule this objection. The Appellee maintains that the trial judge did not err in overruling the defense counsels objection to the introduction of the defendants prior conviction into evidence. Both the Constitution of the United States of America and the Constitution of the State of Illinois support this decision. Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution of the State of Illinois states, "In criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person and by counseland to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county in which the offense is alleged to have been committed." Amendment V of the Constitution of the United States of America further states, "No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Amendment VI states, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district where in the crime shall have been committed." Though the State of Illinois has provided Frank Fletcher with the full extent of these rights, defense counsel
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argues that admission of Mr. Fletcher's prior conviction into evidence has infringed upon Mr. Fletchers constitutional right to a fair trial. At trial, the Assistant State's Attorney asked, "Mr. Fletcher, weren't you previously convicted of beating a man who argued with you?" Defense counsel objected, arguing that such information was "irrelevant to the charge concerned at the trial and highly prejudicial to the defendant." Judge Fitzgerald overruled the objection and instructed Fletcher to answer the question accordingly. Fletcher replied that he was invoking the privileges afforded to him by Amendment V of the Constitution of the United States of America; the transcript of Fletcher's 2003 conviction was subsequently entered into evidence. Defense counselors objected, but were overruled by Judge Fitzgerald. The Appellee maintains that evidence of Fletcher's prior conviction was admissible, was properly and fairly entered into evidence, and that the defendant did receive a fair trial. The issue of prejudicial evidence exists to inhibit counselors from submitting exhibits that lack probative value, and are instead intended to arouse jurors prejudicial emotions and provoke a more severe verdict. Such exhibits can undermine a defendants right, as guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States of America, to a fair trial by a fair an impartial jury. In refusing to answer the Assistant States Attorneys question concerning his past conviction, the defendant was invoking the privilege afforded to him by the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America, which granted him to right to refuse to be compelledto be a witness against himself. Since evidence of the defendants past conviction was crucial to the States argument, the Assistant States Attorney proceeded to enter records of the defendants prior conviction into evidence.

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The rule of law in Illinois distinguishes between admitting specific evidence of a prior conviction for the purpose of pure and prejudicial character testimony, and for purpose of independent relevancefor example, to corroborate facts presented in the trial, or to demonstrate a defendants pattern of action. In the case at bar, the transcript corroborated the fact that the defendant had been found guilty of a felony on a prior occasion, and that he had been sentenced to five years probation. Though the defendant later admitted on direct re-examination that he had been going through some personal problems, had been drinking too much, and had sought anger-management help after the conviction, the defendant had made these statements voluntarily, consciously departing from his previous invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights. Concerning admission of a prior conviction into evidence, the rule in Illinois states, The real and sole test of admissibility is independent relevance relevant evidence is evidence which tends to make the existence of any fact material to the issue more or less probable. People v. Lee. 151 Ill. 2d at 406. In the case at bar, admission of the defendants prior conviction into evidence was relevant to establish facts of the defendants prior experience with law enforcement, as indicated in the testimonies of Mr. Richard Edwards and Ms. Gina Larocca. The prior conviction was also relevant to corroborate Mr. Richard Edwards claim that the defendants Off the Pigs sign referenced the defendants animosity towards law enforcement, and not, as the defendant had claimed, a rock band. When accompanied by Mr. Fletchers voluntary testimony concerning this prior conviction, the conviction was further relevant to establish the defendants aggressive tendencies, experience with past legal violations (underage drinking and aggravated assault), prior negotiations with law enforcement, and participation in anger management. These elements endorsed the facts

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stated by Mr. Richard Edwards, Ms. Gina Larocca, and the defendant in the case at bar. We, the People of the State of Illinois, maintain that this relevance made admission of the transcript into court evidence appropriate, and request that the Illinois Supreme Court affirm the trial courts decision in the case at bar. Judge Fitzgerald's decision in the case at bar is consistent with court's decision in People v. Lee. 151 Ill. 3d 510, 502 N.E. 2d 399, 104 Ill Dec. 136 (1986). In People v. Lee, Defendant Robert E. Lee was convicted of the murder and attempted armed robbery of Mr. William Hawbecker. Since the defendant could not read or write very well, Assistant State's Attorney Thomas Epach wrote Mr. Lees three-page confession for him. In the confession, the defendant stated that he was a drug addict, needed money for his drugs, and decided to take his silver .22-caliber handgun on his search for people to rob. The defendant said that he tried to stick up his victim on Lakewood Street, but when Mr. Hawbecker reached into his pockets, Mr. Lee shot him after repeatedly, hitting Mr. Hawbecker in the face. The defendant then returned to his apartment until approximately 11 p.m., went back out to hail a cab with a man he did not know. Inside the cab, the two men robbed and shot their driver, Peter Larson. At his trial for the murder of William Hawbecker, the shooting of Peter Larson was brought up by the State's counsel and entered into evidence. On appeal, Mr. Lee raised the issue of entering of evidence of this past crime, arguing that such was in error. The rule in Illinois concerning the admission of a defendants earlier crimes into court evidence states that, Evidence of other crimes is admissible if it is relevant for any purpose other than to show the defendants bad character or propensity to commit a crime such evidence is proper to show motive, modus operandi, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, criminal intent, defendant's state of mind, or the circumstances of his arrest,
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or a common design or scheme. People v. Lee. 151 Ill. 2d at 406. The rule in Illinois further asserts, The real and sole test of admissibility is independent relevance relevant evidence is evidence which tends to make the existence of any fact material to the issue more or less probable. People v. Lee. 151 Ill. 2d at 406. In Lee, the court determined, The two shootings bear several similarities Larson's identification of Defendant placed a gun in Defendant's hand in the general vicinity and time frame of the shootings. People v. Lee. 151 Ill. 2d at 521. Lee establishes that the introduction of previous crimes into evidence is permissible if such information does not simply pigeonhole the defendants character or his propensity to commit a crime, but demonstrates relevance to the charge in question. In Lee, relevance of the defendant's prior crime was demonstrated through essential parallels between his prior conviction and the crime being presently tried; similar parallels exist between the defendants prior and current charges in the case at bar. In the case at bar, the defendants prior conviction was, like his current charge, a felony, fulfilling Lees example qualification of common arrest circumstances. The prior charge in the case at bar also illustrated the defendants past and current state of mind. In conjunction with the defendants voluntary testimony on cross re-examination, the prior conviction demonstrated the defendants previous experience with underage drinking (the defendant had been nineteen when he admitted to drinking too much), problems controlling his anger, undergoing anger-management, and experience negotiating with a trial court judge. These facts corroborated the testimonies of Mr. Richard Edwards and Ms. Gina Larocca, who both testified to the defendants violent means of conflict resolution, drinking, and aversion to law-enforcement officials. The prior charge also

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indicated an absence of a mistake on the behalf of the defendant, who had voluntarily stated during cross re-examination that he had enrolled in an anger-management program to encourage the trial judge in his prior charge to grant him a lighter sentence. In aggregate, these elements thus also illustrated Mr. Fletchers criminal intent. The admission of the defendants prior conviction corroborated Mr. Edwards witness testimony concerning the defendants motives, in which he stated, Fletcher was always talking about getting back at the cops. In the case at bar, the defendant had been tried for the murder of a police officer, a representative of law enforcement officials, indicating that the defendant had carried out this commitment as it had been expressed to Mr. Edwards. At trial, Mr. Fletcher had also stated, I know how you cops do things, just asking questions until someone says something that gets them in trouble, and had kept an Off the Pigs sign on his dresser. Admission of the defendants prior conviction corroborated Mr. Edwards claim that this Off the Pigs sign had been associated with the anti-police officer Black Panther movement, and not, as the defendant had claimed, a rock band. These facts, as corroborated by the introduction of Mr. Fletchers prior conviction into evidence, were critical to the prosecutions argument in the case at bar. While the prior conviction of the defendant in Lee was a shooting that took place in the direct vicinity and within a few hours of crime in Lee, and that of the case at bar was a violent beating several years before, the precedent of Lee indicates that similarity is not necessary to show motive, modus operandi, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, criminal intent, defendant's state of mind, the circumstances of his arrest, or a common design or scheme; the prior conviction is itself indicative of these elements. People v. Lee. 151 Ill. 2d at 406. Moreover, like both affirmed convictions of the defendant in Lee, both

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of the defendants convictions in the case at bar were felonies. Though the degree of damage inflicted upon the victim in the case at was is much more severe than in the defendants prior conviction, both nonetheless reflected a common design scheme of aggravated violence as a means of the defendants conflict resolution, a similar state of mind, and the analogous motivations of anger. The Appellant may argue that the differences in vicinity and time frame between Lee and the case at bar are enough to prove the prior conviction of Frank Fletcher was inadmissible. However, the precedent of Lee indicates that the mere presence of a separate crime is sufficient to link the defendant to the crime committed; location and time frame are irrelevant and should not bear weight on its admissibility into evidence. The defendant further endorsed the transcripts admission by discarding his prior insistence on invoking his Fifth Amendment rights, and voluntarily testifying to his prior experience with negotiating with law enforcement officials. This is demonstrated by the trade-off of his participation in anger management programs in exchange for a lighter sentence of five years probation, which the defendant voluntarily testified to having negotiated with his trial judge during his prior conviction. While it may be argued that the defendants participation in anger management is character testimony, the defendant testified to his participation in such a program voluntarily. Mr. Fletcher had not been forced to testify to his participation in such a program. As indicated by his prior knowledge and invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights to not give testimony against himself, the defendant made the decision to speak about his experience with alcohol and anger-management consciously, knowledgeably, and willingly. Though the law in Illinois does not permit the introduction of prejudicial character evidence, the law does not

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disallow a defendant from presenting character testimony on his own behalf. Information of the defendants experience with both alcohol and anger management was not included in the disputed transcript submitted into evidence by the Assistant States Attorney, and thus did not factor into the correctness of the transcripts admission. Extending the precedent found in Lee, admission of the defendants prior conviction into evidence in the case at bar was thus correct, not prejudicial, and not merely character testimony. As the precedent established in Lee and the parallels between Lee and the case at bar indicate, the Illinois Supreme Court should affirm the trial courts decision in the case at bar. The decision of Judge Fitzgerald to overrule the defense counsel's objection to the admission of Fletcher's prior conviction is also supported by the court's ruling in People v. Bartall. 98 Ill. 2d 294, 456 N.E. 2d 59, 74 Ill. Dec. 557 (1983). In People v. Bartall, the defendant, Kurt Bartall, was convicted of both armed violence and of the murder of Betty Quinn. The case involved the murder of Betty Quinn, who was standing in a parking lot on Milwaukee Avenue with three friends - Eileen Kampwirth, Mark Tatum, and Bill Will on December 29, 1979, when the Defendant drove down Milwaukee Avenue and fired his handgun in the general direction of the group. Eileen Kampwirth said in her testimony that she heard a gunshot that sounded like "a very loud firecracker", and turned around to see Betty Quinn lying face down on the ground, bleeding profusely from her face. Shortly after the shooting, Betty Quinn was pronounced dead at a nearby hospital. At the trial of the defendant for this offense, evidence of a subsequent offense was admitted by the trial court. The testimony of a Kathy Preze revealed that on December 30, 1979, approximately 20 hours after the drive-by shooting of Betty Quinn, a silver automobile with the license

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plate "KB 26" swerved in front of her and braked hard. Preze swerved into another lane, and heard a noise that sounded like a firecracker. The vehicles continued down the highway, and the man in the drivers seat of the other automobile who was identified as the Defendant by Kathy Preze made "an obscene gesture" and pointed a gun at her face. 98 Ill. 2d 294 at 310. Preze swerved into oncoming traffic to avoid the gun, and the Defendant then turned off his automobile's lights and sped away. Preze reported the incident, and police apprehended the defendant. At the time of his arrest, the defendant was wearing a shoulder holster carrying a loaded handgun, and was in possession of two empty rounds and a box of live ammunition for the same weapon. On appeal, the defense counsel argued that the trial court erred in admitting this subsequent charge as evidence, as it was a subsequent charge and therefore irrelevant to the charge concerned in this case. The rule in Illinois states that, Generally, evidence of other crimes is inadmissible if relevant merely to establish the defendant's propensity to commit crime. People v. Bartall. 98 Ill. 2d 294 at 310. In Bartall, the court ruled that, The Preze shooting incident was sufficiently similar to the Quinn homicide to make it admissible on the issue of intent. The evidence of the Preze shooting showed more than the defendant's general propensity to commit crime; it established that on at least two occasions within 24 hours the defendant had acted as a roving, mobile sniper. Whereas the Quinn homicide, standing alone, might have some ambiguity about it, the two incidents, taken together, increase the certainty that the defendant deliberately acted in this fashion. People v. Bartall. 98 Ill. 2d 294 at 312. While Bartall involves the entry of a subsequent offense as evidence rather than a prior charge, the court's decision to affirm the trial court on this issue can still be applied to the case at bar. Bartall, much like in People v. Lee, established that evidence of crimes separate from those concerned in the trial are admissible if they demonstrate independent

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relevance and are not simple presentations of the defendant's propensity to commit a crime. In the case at bar, the defendants prior conviction was a necessary piece of evidence for the State's counsel to demonstrate Frank Fletcher's intent, motive, and state of mind involved in the crime committed. The transcript also corroborated the testimonies of Mr. Richard Edwards, Ms. Gina Larocca, and the defendant himself, each of who alluded to the facts affirmed in the properly admitted transcript of Mr. Fletchers prior conviction. In 2003, the defendant in the case at bar was convicted of beating a man who argued with him. This not only displays his tendencies towards violence and aggression, but also demonstrates the defendants familiarity with the criminal process. In his trial testimony, Mr. Edwards spoke much about Mr. Fletchers negative contempt of police officers. Corroboration of such a grudge is relevant to the circumstances of the case at bar, in which the defendant planned and executed the murder of a police officer. In a similar vein, Bartall found that the defendant's subsequent offense was admissible as evidence because it demonstrated the defendants intent. In Bartall, the two convictions acted together to demonstrate the deliberate and aggressive fashion of the defendants actions. People v. Bartall. 98 Ill. 2d 294 at 312. This is similar to the circumstances of the case at bar, in which both the defendants prior conviction and his charge in the case at bar arose from the defendants problems with anger management and conflict resolution. In both convictions, the defendant had relied on violent means (aggravated assault in 2003, and armed homicide in 2010) to settle his disputes and grievances. Moreover, although the circumstances of the defendants prior conviction in Bartall were much more prejudicial towards the defendant than those in the case at bar, the Illinois Supreme Court nonetheless upheld Bartalls trial courts decision on this issue. In

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Bartall, the Illinois Supreme Court indicated that a prior convictions corroboration of how a defendant had acted is sufficient to affirm its admission into trial court evidence. People v. Bartall. 98 Ill. 2d 294 at 312. In the case at bar, the defendants prior conviction not only demonstrated that the defendant had acted in a violent fashion in the past, but also corroborated the witness testimonies of Mr. Edwards and Ms. Larocca, who testified to the defendants violent tendencies and hostile attitude towards the law. The prior conviction also indicated that the defendant had a history of acting in a violent rage to the point of inflicting aggravated assault, which is consistent with Ms. Laroccas testimony of the defendant having grabbed Edwards and [thrown] him out into the hall in the past, and indicated that the defendants Off the Pigs sign registered a message against law enforcement, and not, as Mr. Fletcher had claimed, an extinct rock band. The Appellant might also argue that the principles in Bartall cannot be applied to this case because the separate offense in Bartall was a subsequent crime, rather than the prior charge entered in the case at bar. The prior conviction of Frank Fletcher was not entered to show the defendants location, the time the crime was committed, or any other logistical facts, but rather, to demonstrate the defendants intent, motive, and state of mind. In Bartall, the Illinois Supreme Court indicated that the defendants other conviction was admissible on its relevance to the issue of intent. People v. Bartall. 98 Ill. 2d 294 at 312. The same relevance holds true in the case at bar. The defendant in the case at bar may also argue that since both offenses in Bartall were shootings, while the prior offense in the case at bar was an aggravating beating, the precedent of Bartall cannot be applied. Though the charges in the case at bar were different in their logistical execution, both were acts of aggression and violence; both were

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also felonies. Like the convicted felons in both affirmed cases of Lee and Bartall, the defendant in the case at bar had been convicted of two felonies with similar intentions and states of mind. Moreover, as the precedent established in Lee and applied in Bartall indicates, similar circumstances are not necessary to demonstrate any of the elements that qualify the admission of a defendants prior conviction as more than character testimony; the prior conviction itself fulfills such stipulations. People v. Lee. 151 Ill. 2d at 406. The trial judge in Bartall was correct in his admission of the defendant's subsequent offense as evidence. According to Bartall, evidence of other crimes is fair and admissible if such evidence is relevant to the existence of any material fact admitted into evidence, such as criminal intent. Extending the precedent of Bartall, we thus see that admission of the defendants prior conviction in the case at bar was relevant to corroborate the facts of the case, to demonstrate the defendants criminal intent, to establish prosecutors argument within the case, and did not inhibit the defendants right to a fair trial. The Illinois Supreme Courts decision to affirm Bartall on the issue of admitting a concurrent conviction into evidence should thus be extended to the case at bar. The trial judge's decision in the case at bar is further supported by the case of People v. Harris. 46 Ill. 2d 395 N.E. 2d 35 (1980). In that case, the defendant, Robert Harris, was convicted of armed robbery. According to the testimony of John Doyle, the defendant came into a Van's Drug Store, where he and two other girls pulled revolvers on the storeowners and instructed them to open the safe and the cash register. They took all of the money in the register and $135 from the safe, and asked for cocaine. When they were told that there was no cocaine, Harris rooted through a drawer and pulled out one bottle of a narcotic drug. The defendant was later arrested in a car that matched the

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description of a stolen vehicle. At trial, the testimonies of the two police officers and John Doyle described the theft and use of the car by the defendant. The defendants counsel brought out these statements during cross-examination. On appeal, the Appellant argued that these statements drew attention to separate crimes, were prejudicial against the defendant, and had denied him his right to a fair trial. The rule in Illinois states that, Ordinarily, evidence of separate offenses unconnected with crime for which defendant is on trial is incompetent, but evidence of other offenses may be introduced if it tends to identify accused as person who committed crime under investigation and to disprove alibi. People v. Harris. 46 Ill. 2d at 395. Harris determined that one reason that can make evidence of separate convictions admissible is identification of the defendant or a renunciation of his alibi. In Harris, the court affirmed the decision of the trial judge to admit the testimonies of the police officers and storeowner John Doyle, which involved the defendant's theft of the car, as evidence. Much like the defendants car theft in Harris, the prior conviction of the defendant in the case at bar was not simply prejudicial or irrelevant - it was an important component of prosecutors evidence, and was of utmost importance to their presentation of a fact-based argument concerning the defendants guilt. The defendant in Harriss use of a stolen car disproved his alibi and identified him with the crime concerned. Similarly, the defendants prior conviction in the case at bar had identified him as a man with aggressive, impulsive, and grudge-holding tendencies. Though Mr. Fletchers prior conviction did not explicitly denounce the defendants alibi, unlike the defendant in Harris, the defendant in the case at bar did not attempt to present an alibi to begin with; he did, however, insist on his innocence. However, though the defendants prior conviction in the case at bar does not directly disprove an alibi as it does
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in Harris, the prior conviction does corroborate other elements of the testimonies of both Ms. Gina Larocca and Mr. Richard Edwards, the latter of whom also testified as a direct crime scene witness. Mr. Fletcher also expressed a sort of alibi for his ownership of an Off the Pigs sign, dismissing the statement as the name of a pretty good, albeit extinct, punk band. However, the defendants prior conviction indicates that he had been familiar with both the criminal process and had acquired a grudge against law enforcement, and corroborates Mr. Edwards claim that Mr. Fletcher had in fact, acquired the sign in support of the anti-law enforcement Black Panther movement. The defendant in the case at bar may argue that admission of his prior conviction into evidence was prejudicial because it had taken place several years before his present charge, and did not involve as short of a timing connection as the defendants car theft had in Harris. While the defendants prior conviction in the case at bar had taken place seven years prior to his present charges, this fact was used by prosecutors to further their argument, and thus fulfills the requirements of relevance and demonstrated intent as indicated in Lee, Bartall, and Harris. In the voluntary testimony he had provided following the introduction of his prior conviction into trial court evidence, the defendant in the case at bar had indicated that the prior conviction had been a real wake up call, that it had inspired him to enroll in anger management counseling, and to discontinue his pattern of underage drinking (the defendant had been nineteen years old at the time he claimed to have been drinking too much). In his voluntary testimony, the defendant further stated that the trial judge in his prior conviction had sentenced him to five years probation. In conjunction with the testimonies of Mr. Edwards, Ms. Larocca, and Mr. Fletcher himself, prosecutors used this seven-year difference to demonstrate that the defendants violent

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predisposition had not changed throughout this time. To borrow the language of Bartall, a case that, like both Lee and Harris, had been affirmed on the issue admitting prior convictions into evidence, prosecutors used evidence of Mr. Fletchers past conviction to demonstrate that the aggressive nature of the defendants actions had not changed. People v. Bartall. 98 Ill. 2d 294 at 312. The trial judge in Harris was correct in his admission of the defendant's separate crime as evidence. As the essential similarities between Harris and the case at bar demonstrate, the Courts decision in Harris should be extended to the case at bar. The trial judges decision in the case at bar is also upheld by the court's ruling in People v. Baptist. 76 Ill. 2d 19, 389 N.E. 2d 1200 (1979). In that case, the defendant, Elijah Baptist, was convicted of the murder of Sam Blue, as well as an attempted armed robbery. According to witness Leo Carter, Elijah Baptist and two other individuals approached storeowner Sam Blue, placed a hand around Blue's neck, and put his other hand to Blue's head. A gun was fired, and the defendant ran away. Blue began to chase the Defendant and shoot at him, but after shooting three or four shots, was shot and fell to the ground near the side of his store. A few months after the initial shooting, Leo Carter was standing behind a building with his brother Henry and a Leslie Scott, when the defendant's brother Michael Baptist and three others forced Scott and the two Carter brothers against a wall and began to shoot at them. Leo Carter survived, but Henry Carter and Leslie Scott were killed; the defendant was found guilty. On appeal, the Appellant argued that the shootings of Henry Carter and Leslie Scott were irrelevant to the charge concerned, prejudicial towards the defendant, that the attention drawn to this separate crime inhibited the defendant's right to a fair trial, and that the trial judge thus erred in

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admitting the separate charge as evidence. The rule in Illinois states that, As a general rule, evidence of other crimes committed by Defendant, independent of crime for which he is being tried, is inadmissible; if relevant, however, for any purpose other than to show propensity to commit a crime, evidence of other crimes is admissible. People v. Baptist. 76 Ill. 2d 19 389 at 369. In Baptist, the court ruled that, If the June 14, 1975 shootings of Leslie Scott and the Carter brothers can be connected to the defendant, evidence of these shootings is admissible. Consequently, the trial court properly allowed evidence of the subsequent shootings to go to the jury. People v. Baptist. 76 Ill. 2d 19 389 at 1205. Although the court in Baptist reversed its decision, the trial judge was still found to have been correct in admitting the Scott and Carter shootings into evidence. In Baptist, the defendant's subsequent offense was deemed admissible because it linked the defendant to the charge concerned and established a consciousness of guilt. In the case at bar, the defendants 2003 conviction linked him in principle to the charge concerned in the case at bar, corroborating such links as they had been established in the testimonies of Mr. Edwards and Ms. Larocca. Such links included the defendants prior aggressive tendencies, underage alcohol abuse, understanding of the criminal process, and experience negotiating with a trial court judge. The prior conviction also corroborated his grudge against police officers as Mr. Edwards and Mr. Fletchers possession of an Off the Pigs sign had indicated. Both the defendants prior conviction and his conviction in the case at bar were also felonies, linking them with a common degree of violent aggression. Moreover, witness Richard Edwards burglary conviction was also entered into evidence, and was extensively employed by the defendant to discredit this witness at trial.

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Since both burglary and aggravated assault are classified as felonies, and since the jurors decision in the case at bar revealed that Mr. Edwards own conviction did not prejudice them against his testimony, the same reasoning should be extended to the introduction of the defendants prior conviction. Having considered this, the defendant's prior conviction was an essential element of evidence for the State's counsel to determine the intent, motive, and state of mind of the defendant. This is supported by Baptist, which like Lee, Bartall, and Harris stated that evidence of a separate crime is admissible evidence if it serves a relevant and independent purpose. The defendants prior conviction in the case at bar is not simply character testimony or demonstrative of his propensity to commit crime; it fairly and properly corroborated details that were crucial to the prosecutors argument. The introduction of the defendant's prior conviction as evidence was not done in a flagrant desire to prejudice against the character of the defendant. Instead, the properly admitted transcript held substantial probative value towards corroborating the testimonies of Mr. Edwards and Ms. Larocca, both of whom were contradicted by the defendant. The Appellant may argue that Baptist is inapplicable because it involves the admission of a subsequent shooting as evidence, rather than a prior unarmed assault as in the case at bar. While the weapons used by the defendant in the case at bar and in his prior conviction were different (and, thus, did inflict different degrees of damage upon the defendants victim), the aggressive and impulsive nature of the defendant is consistent in both convictions. The mere presence or absence of a specific weapon should not guide the Court in determining the convictions relevance to the case at bar. Baptist, like Lee, Bartall, and Harris, indicate that evidence of other crimes is admissible if it possesses any

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purpose other than to prejudice against the defendant. These purposes include the establishment of intent, motive, state of mind, knowledge and identity, the absence of mistake, and the corroboration of witness testimonies, all of which have been demonstrated in the prior conviction in the case at bar. The Appellant might also argue that Baptist cannot be applied to the case at bar because the victim of the separate offense in Baptist was the original victims brother, and in the case at bar, the victims of the defendants crimes were presumably unrelated. However, a common thread of law enforcement does relate the victims in both of the defendants convictions in the case at bar. Whereas Mr. Fletchers earlier conviction and subsequent hassles with law enforcement first inspired his dislike of police officers, his crime in the case at bar was directed at a police officer. Moreover, as the precedent established in Lee and applied in Bartall, Harris, and Baptist indicate, similar circumstances are not necessary to demonstrate any of the elements that qualify the admission of a defendants prior conviction as more than character testimony; the prior conviction can itself fulfill such requirements. People v. Lee. 151 Ill. 2d at 406. Baptist's trial judge did not err in admitting the evidence of the Scott and Carter shootings, as they were relevant and admissible elements in the argument of the prosecution. Extending the principles established in Baptist, the trial judge in the case at bar was correct to admit the defendants prior conviction into evidence, and the Illinois Supreme Court should affirm the trial courts decision. Therefore, because the transcript of the defendants prior conviction was relevant to establish facts presented by Mr. Edwards, Ms. Larocca, and Mr. Fletcher, was not prejudicial against the defendant, and demonstrated his aggressive nature, motive, intent,

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experience with and grudge against law enforcement, it was properly admitted by Judge Fitzgerald into trial court evidence. Based on the rule of law, evidence, and precedents established by the previous cases, the Illinois Supreme Court should affirm the trial courts decision.

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CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Appellee-Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Honorable Illinois Supreme Court affirm the trial courts decision in the case at bar.

Respectfully submitted,

Attorneys for the Appellee-Plaintiff, The People of the State of Illinois

Anastasia Golovashkina Josie Dalton

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